LEGAL  WORKS  BY  LEONARD  A.  JONES 


A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  MORTGAGES  OF  REAL  PROPERTY. 

Fifth  Edition  revised  and  enlarged.     2  vols.  8vo,  about  1,UUU  padres 
each.    Price,  $12.0(J  net. 

A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  CORPORATE  BONDS  AND  HORT- 
GAGES.    Being  Second  Edition,  revised,  of    "Railroad  Securities." 

1  vol.  bvo,  6S0  ijages.    Price,  Si,tj.W  iut. 

A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  MORTGAGES  ON  PERSONAL  PROP= 
ERTY.  Fourth  Edition,  revised  and  enlarged.  1  vol.  8vo,  !)U0  pages. 
Prices,  $6.00  net. 

A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  PLEDGES,  including  Collateral  Se- 
curities.   1  vol.  Svo,  634  pages.    Price,  $6.00  net. 

A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  LIENS.  Common  Law,  Statutory, 
Equitable  and  Maritime.    Second  Edition,  revised  and  enlarged. 

2  vols.  8vo,  about  7bO  pages  each.    Price,  $12.00  net. 

These  works,  treating  of  the  three  forms  of  security  upon  property, — 
Mortgages,  Pledges,  and  Liens, — while  sejjarately  complete,  have  been 
prepared  with  a  view  to  the  relations  of  the  subjects  to  each  other;  and 
each  treatise  contains  references  to  the  otliers ;  so  that  all  together 
constitute  one  work  upon  the  subject  of  Property  Securities. 

FORHS  IN  CONVEYANCING,  AND  GENERAL  LEGAL  FORMS,  coni- 
]iri,-infr  Pivccdiuts  for  ordinary  Use,  and  Clauses  adapted  to  special 
and  Unusual  Cases.  With  Practical  Notes.  Fifth  Kevised  Editiou. 
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A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  REAL  PROPERTY. 

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THE  BOWEN=MERRILL  COMPANY. 

Indianapolis  and  Kansas  City 


A  TREATISE 


ON  THE  LAW  OF 


REAL  PROPERTY 


AS   APPLIED   BETWEEN 


VENDOR   AND   PURCHASER 


m 


MODERN  CONVEYANCING 


OB 


ESTATES  IN  FEE  AND  THEIR  TRANSFER  BY  DEED 


BY 


LEONARD  A.  JONES,  A.B.,LL.B.  [Harv.] 


AUTHOR   OF    I^GAL  TREATISES 

IN   TWO   VOLUMES 
VOL.  I 


INDIANAPOLIS— KANSAS  CITY 

THE  BOWEN-MERRILL  COMPANY 

1896 


^> 


r 


Copyright,  1896, 
Bt  LEONARD  A.  JONES. 

All  rights  reserved. 


THE  HOIiLENBECK  PEES3 
INDIANAPOLIS 


Vis 


To 
THE  HONORABLE  WALBRIDGE  A.  FIELD,  LL.Do 

CHIEF   JUSTICE    OF   THE    SUPREME   JUDICIAL   COURT 

OF    MASSACHUSETTS 

AS  A   MARK    OF    RESPECT    AND    ESTEEM 

THIS  WORK   IS    DEDICATED 

BY    THE    AUTHOR 


734Co6 


PREFACE. 


These  volumes  treat  of  the  practical  parts  of  the  general 
subject  of  Real  Property  which  arise  in  ordinary  conveyancing 
between  vendor  and  purchaser.  They  do  not  profess  to  cover  the 
entire  field  of  Real  Property  law.  It  is  impossible  in  two  or  even 
three  volumes  to  state  the  law  and  give  the  authorities  relating  to 
the  entire  subject.  It  is  only  possible  in  such  compass  to  state 
general  principles  with  a  meagre  citation  of  authorities.  I  write 
now,  as  I  have  written  heretofore,  with  the  purpose  to  state  with 
considerable  fulness  the  law  of  the  topics  of  which  I  treat,  —  to 
state  it  with  such  completeness  as  to  make  the  treatise  valua- 
ble to  the  courts  and  to  practising  lawyers.  Moreover,  I  have 
intended  to  state  the  law  only  as  it  now  is,  with  as  little  reference 
as  possible  to  the  law  that  has  become  obsolete.  I  have  referred 
to  the  old  law  only  for  the  purpose  of  stating  the  principles  upon 
which  some  pai'ts  of  the  present  law  are  founded.  The  subjects 
that  present  the  most  difficulties  and  give  rise  to  the  most  litiga- 
tion I  have  discussed  with  the  greatest  care.  I  have  cited  a  great 
number  of  cases,  and  have  cited  them  after  examination  for  their 
value.  The  mode  of  treatment  is  similar  to  that  I  have  adopted 
in  my  other  works. 

It  will  be  observed  that  I  take  up  the  subject  of  Real  Property 
with  the  consideration  of  that  part  of  it  which  is  usually  made  the 
closing  part  in  other  treatises.  Instead  of  beginning  with  the 
least  possible  estates  in  realty,  going  up  through  the  larger  estates, 
and  finally  at  the  end  coming  to  something  about  estates  in  fee 
and  their  transfer  by  deed,  I  begin  with  this  part  of  the  subject, 

V 


PREFACK. 

and  in  fact  devote  these  volumes  to  it  wholly.  It  is  the  part  of 
the  general  subject  which  seems  to  me  to  afford  the  proper 
approach  to  all  the  learning  upon  it ;  and,  moreover,  it  is  the  part 
of  the  subject  which  more  than  any  other  is  of  practical  impor- 
tance. 

I  have  not  touched  upon  the  subject  of  Mortgages  of  Real 
Property  in  these  volumes  except  incidentally,  for  I  have  already 
written  upon  that  subject.  If  I  should  hereafter  write  upon  other 
parts  of  Real  Property  law,  my  writings  will  be  published  under 
separate  and  specific  titles.  These  volumes  are  complete  in 
themselves. 

L.  A.  J. 

Boston,  April  19,  1896. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


BOOK  I.     PART   I. 

CAPACITY  OF  PERSONS  TO  HOLD  AND  CONVEY  LAND. 
CHAPTER  I. 

DISABILITY    OF    INFANTS. 


I.  Deeds  of  infants  voidable,  not  void     . 
II.  No  estoppel  by  declaration  of  age  . 

III.  Disability  of  married  women  under  age 

IV.  Who  may  affirm  or  disaffirm  minority    . 
V.  What  amounts  to  an  affirmance 

VI.  What  amounts  to  a  disaffirmance    . 
VII.  Affirmance  from  lapse  of  time  . 
VIII.   Disaffirmance  within  a  reasonable  time  . 
IX.  Avoidance  of  mortgage  for  pm'chase-money 
X.  Restoration  of  purchase-money 


2 

5 
7 
10 
14 
17 
24 
27 
29 
31 


CHAPTER  II. 


DISABILITY    OF    MARRIED    WOMEN. 


I.  Common-law  disability  and  statutes  removing     ...  36 
II.  Disability  of  husband  and  wife  to  convey  to  each  other  at 

law 40 

III.  Conveyance  between  husband  and  wife  good  in  equity         .  45 


CHAPTER   III. 

DISABILITY    OF   INSANE    PERSONS. 

I.  Presumption  and  proof  regarding  insanity 
II.  Deed  of  insane  person  under  guardianship  void 
III.  Burden  of  proof  where  there  is  no  guardianship 


48 
52 
55 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 

SPCTION 

IV.  Confirmation  and  disaffirmance  of  deed  of  insane  grantor    .         59 

V.   Restoring  consideration  on  disaffirmance  ...  67 

VI.  Title  of  purchaser  in  good  faith  .....  70 

CHAPTER  IV. 

DISABILITY    FROM    DRUNKENNESS.  74 

CHAPTER   V. 

DISABILITY    FROM    DURESS. 

I.  Duress  by  imprisonment         ......  79 

II.  Duress  by  threats      ........         81 

III.  Duress  of  property         .......  89 

IV.  Defence  and  proof  of  duress       ......         90 

V.  Duress  renders  deed  voidable  only  ....  93 

CHAPTER   VI. 

DISABILITY    FROM    UNDUE    INFLUENCE. 

I.   What  constitutes  undue  influence        .....  97 

II.  Confidential  relation  of  the  parties           ....  103 

III.  Relation  of  parent  and  child       ......  108 

IV.  Relation  of  husband  and  wife          .....  112 
V.  Presumption  and  proof  of  undue  influence            .          .          .  114 

VI.  Deed  procured  by  undue  influence  is  voidable  only  .  .  117 

CHAPTER  VII. 

DISABILITY    FROM    ADVERSE    POSSESSION. 

I.  At  common  law  and  by  statute  ......       119 

II.  What  constitutes  adverse  possession         ....  122 

III.  Application  of  the  rule      .......       131 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

CAPACITY  OF  CORPORATIONS  AS  VENDORS. 

I.  Power  to  sell  and  convey       .         .         .         •         •         •  141 

II.  Power  to  mortgage   ........       144 

viii 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

SECTION 

CAPACITY   OF   TENANTS   IN  TAIL   AS  VENDOItS.  154 


BOOK   I.     PART  II. 

CAPACITY  OF  PERSONS   AS   PURCHASERS. 
CHAPTER   X. 

CAPACITY  OF  PERSONS  IN  GENERAL.  156 

CHAPTER   XL 

CAPACITY   OF   ALIENS   AS    PURCHASERS.  163 

CHAPTER   XII. 

CAPACITY  OF  CORPORATIONS  AS  PURCHASERS. 

I.  Restrictions  upon  domestic  corporations  ....  169 

II.  Restrictions  upon  foi-eign  corporations        ....       182 

BOOK  II. 

ESTATES  IN  FEE   AND   THEIR  TRANSFER  BY   DEED. 
CHAPTER   XIII. 

DEEDS   OF   CONVEYANCE   AND   THEIR   FORMS.  193 

CHAPTER   XIV. 

PARTIES    TO    DEEDS    AND    THEIR    DESCRIPTION. 

I.  Names  and  descrijjtions  of  tlie  tjjvantors  ....  213 

11.  Names  and  descriptions  of  the  grantees       ....  222 

III.  Corporations  and  associations  as  grantees        .         .         .  235 

IV.  Partnerships  as  gi'antees    .......  244 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XV. 

KECITALS    IN    DEEDS. 

SECTION 

I.  Use  and  effect  of  recitals        ......  24(5 

II.    Recitals  as  evidence            .......  251 

III.  Estoppel  by  recitals       .......  256 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

CONSIDERATION. 

I.  Consideration  in  deeds  of  bargain  and  sale          .         .         .  263 

II.  Consideration  for  covenant  to  stand  seised      .         .         .  268 

III.  What  is  a  valuable  consideration         .....  270 

IV.  Marriage  is  a  valuable  consideration       ....  280 
V.  Ajitecedent  debt  as  a  valuable  consideration        .         .         .  285 

VI.   Voluntary  conveyances            ......  288 

VII.   Parol  evidence  of  the  true  consideration     ....  295 

VIII.  Recital  of  payment  of  consideration         ....  303 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

OPERATIVE   WORDS.  311 

CHAPTER   XVIII. 

DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 

I.  Certainty 320 

II.  Parol  evidence       ........  335 

III.  Boundary  lines  by  agreement    ......  354 

IV.  General  rules  of  construction           .....  381 
V.  General  and  particular  descriptions    .....  410 

VI.  References  to  maps  and  surveys     .....  424 

VII.   Boundary  by  highway        .......  448 

VIII.  Boundary  by  the  sea,  rivers,  and  lakes  ....  470 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

EXCEPTIONS    AND    RESERVATIONS. 

I.  How  distinguished     .          .......  503 

II.  General  requisites  and  rules  of  construction     .          .          .  516 
X 


TABLE  OF  CONTKNTS. 


SBCTIOH 


III.  Of  particular  exceptions  and  reservations   ....       536 

IV.  Whether  a  reservation  is  personal  or  appurtenant  to  the 

land 548 


CHAPTER   XX. 

THE    HABENDUM,    OK    THE    ESTATES    CREATED. 

I.  The  ofl&ce  and  effect  of  the  habendum  clause       .         .         .  561 

II.  The  naming  of  the  grantee  in  the  habendum  clause  .  571 
III.  The  word  "  heirs  "  essential  at  common  law  to  create  an 

estate  in  fee  .         .         .         •         •         •         •         .5(0 

rV.  The  rule  in  Shelley's  Case 601 

V.  Estates  taU 611 

CHAPTER   XXI. 

CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

I.  How  defined  and  created        ......  619 

II.  Determinable  or  qualified  fee 628 

III.  Conditions  subsequent  not  favored  in  law         .  .  .  632 

IV.  Not  implied  from  the  purpose  of  the  grant           .          .          •  649 
V.  Void  conditions      ......••  6o8 

VI.  Performance  and  forfeiture         ......  678 

VII.  Waiver  of  conditions      .......  696 

VIII.  Reentry  for  forfeiture '^'08 

CHAPTER   XXII. 

RESTRICTIONS    AS    TO    THE    USE    OF    LAND. 

I.  Restrictive  conditions  and  covenants  in  general        .          .  733 
II.  Particular  restrictions  and  their  construction        .          .          .  750 

III.  Who  have  the  burden  and  benefit  of  restrictions      .  .  771 

IV.  When  restrictive  covenants  run  with  the  land     .          .          .  784  ■ 
V.  Waiver  and  release  of  restrictions  .....  802 

VI.  Enforcement  of  restrictions 814 

CHAPTER   XXIII. 

COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

I.  In  general  .........  8.^0 

II.  Implied  covenants  .......  833 

xi 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

SECTION 

III.  Covenants  for  seisin  and  viglit  to  convey       .         .         .  .842 

IV.  Covenant  aj^ainst  incmnbrances         .....  852 
V.  Covenant  for  warranty  and  quiet  enjoyment          .          .          .     892 

VI.  Covenants  that  run  with  the  land     .....         928 

VII.  Measure  of  damages  on  covenant  for  seisin    ....     943 

VIII.  Measure  of  damages  on  covenants  against  incumbrances       .         957 
IX.  Measure  of  damages  on  covenants  of  warranty      .         .         .     968 

X.  After-acquired  title  of  grantor  .....  990 


VOLUME   II. 


CHAPTER   XXIV. 

SIGNING.  EXECUTION    OF    DEED. 

I.  Signing  in  general     ...... 

II.  Signing  by  mark  .  .  .  .  . 

III.  Signing  by  the  hand  of  another 

IV.  Execution  under  a  power  of  attorney 

V.  Execution  by  married  woman  by  power  of  attorney 

VI.  Construction  of  power  of  attorney  .... 

VII.  Ratification  and  revocation  of  power  of  attorney 

VIII.  Form  of  execution  of  deed  by  attorney    . 

IX.  Execution  by  private  corporation 

X.  Execution  by  municipal  corporation 

XI.  Execution  by  executor,  administrator,  or  trustee 


Section 

.  1000 

1010 

.  1014 

1021 

.  1026 

1029 

.  1035 

1040 

.  1048 

1056 

.  1058 

CHAPTER   XXV. 


SEALING. 

I.  Use  and  necessity  of  seals 

II.  Seals  at  common  law 

III.  Scrolls  and  otlier  devices  used  as  seals 

IV.  Presumptions  as  to  sealing 

V.  Record  of  seals      .... 
VI.  Seals  of  corporations 
xii 


1059 
1064 
1068 
1073 
1075 
1079 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   XXVI. 

ATTESTATIOX. 


I.  At  common  law  and  by  statute 
II.  Requisites  of  a  good  attestation 
III.  Proof  by  attesting  witnesses  . 


SECTION 

1085 
1092 
1101 


I. 

II. 

III. 


VI. 
VII. 


CHAPTER   XXVII. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT. 


The  pupose  and  effect  of  acknowledgment . 
Who  may  make  an  acknowledgment 
Who  may  take  an  acknowledgment    . 
IV.  Jm'isdiction  of  officer     ...... 

V.  Manjaer  of  taking  and  certifying 
Authentication  of  official  character 
Errors  and  omissions  in  certificates    . 
VIII.  Identity  of  the  grantor  with  the  person  acknowledging 
IX.  By  married  women   ...... 

X.  Conclusiveness  of  certificates 


1109 
1114 
1120 
1129 
1136 
1153 
1159 
1176 
1181 
1196 


CHAPTER   XXVni. 


DELIVERY. 


I.  A  matter  of  intention         .......  1217 

II.  Gives  immediate  effect  to  deed       .....  1230 

III.  To  whom  it  may  be  made           ......  1240 

IV.  Presumption  of  delivery  from  possession  of  the  deed         .  1248 
V.  Destruction,  cancellation,  or  surrender  of  deed    .          .          .  1258 

VI.  When  delivery  is  complete     ......  1267 

VII.  Acceptance  by  the  grantee  essential    .  .  .  .  .1276 

VIII.  Presum])tion  of  delivery  from  recitals  or  acknowledgment  1286 

IX.  Recording  alone  does  not  constitute  a  delivery    .         .         .  1289 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 


DELIl^ERY    IX    ESCROW. 


I.   What  constitutes  a  delivery  in  escrow     . 
II.    When  the  title  passes  under  a  delivery  in  escrow 

xiii 


1302 
1314 


TABLK   OF   CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   XXX. 

PILLING   BLANKS   AND   MAKING   ALTEKATIONS   AFTER   EXECUTION. 


I.   Filling  blanks 
II.  Making  alterations 
III.  Burden  of  proof    . 


SECTION 

1328 
1338 
1359 


CHAPTER   XXXI. 


RECORDING. 

I.  Nature  and  application  of  the  recording  acts 

II.  Who  are  purchasers  within  the  terms  of  the  recording 

III.  When  a  judgment  creditor  is  a  purchaser  . 

IV.  An  assignee  of  a  mortgage  is  a  purchaser 
V.  Priority  as  affected  by  mechanics'  lien  laws 

VI.  Requisites  as  to  execution  and  acknowledgment 

VII.  Requisites  as  to  the  time  and  manner  of  recording 

VIII.  Errors  in  the  record        ...... 

IX.  Whether  the  index  is  a  part  of  the  record  . 

X.  The  effect  of  a  record  duly  made    .... 


.  1368 

acts   1385 

.  1402 

1420 

.  1430 

1435 

.  1451 

1468 

.  1479 

1482 

CHAPTER   XXXII. 


NOTICE    AS    AFFECTING    PRIORITY. 

I.  Notice  as  affecting  priority  under  the  registry  acts 
II.  Actual  notice         ...... 

III.  Implied  notice  ....... 

IV.  Constructive  notice  ..... 
V.  Lis  2>&ndens      ....... 

VI.  How  far  possession  is  notice  .... 
VII.  Fraud  as  affecting  priority  .... 

VIII.  Negligence  as  affecting  priority 


1499 
1509 
1532 
1544 
1559 
1563 
1580 
1583 


BOOK  III. 

NATURE   OF   REAL  ESTATE  AND  INCIDENTS   OF   OWNERSHIP. 


CHAPTER   XXXIII. 

REAL    ESTATE    IX    GENERAL. 


1592 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 
CHAPTER   XXXIV. 

TREES,    FBUIT,    AND    GRASS,    OR    FRUCTUS    NATURALES. 

SECTION 

I.  Trees        .         .         .   ' 1^00 

II.  Fruit 1616 

III.  Grass 1(318 

CHAPTER  XXXV. 

GROWING   CROPS,    OR    FRUCTUS   INDUSTRIALES.  1619 

CHAPTER   XXXVI. 

INCIDENTS    TO    REALTY    WHICH    PASS    AS    APPURTENANCES. 

I.  Appurtenances  in  general  ......  163o 

II.   Land  appurtenant  to  land  ......  1647 

III.  Appurtenances  to  mills  ......  1652 

IV.  Rights  of  way  appurtenant         .          .          .     '    .          •          =  1657 
V.  Water  rights  appui'tenant  ..„■'.  1660 

VI.  Drains  and  sewers  appurtenant  .....     1663 

CHAPTER   XXXVII. 


FIXTURES    TO    THE    REALTY. 

I.  General  principles  determining  what  are  fixtures' 

II.  Buildings  as  fixtures  ..... 

III.  Domestic  fixtures  ...... 

IV.  Agricultural  fixtures  ..... 
V.  Machinery  in  mills          ..... 

VI.  Rolling-stock  of  railroads  .  .  .  .  • 

VII.  Rights  of  mortgagees  as  to  fixtures 
VIII.  Mortgagees'  remedies  for  removal  of  fixtures 
IX.  Tenant's  fixtures  ...... 

XV 


1665 
1691 
1702 
1708 
1712 
1729 
1731 
1759 
1765 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

BOOK  IV. 

CONCURRENT  OWNERSHIP. 
CHAPTER   XXXV III. 

JOINT    TENANCY. 

SECTION 

I.  Creation  and  Incidents  of  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     1770 

II.  Statutes  abolishing  or  restricting    .  .  .  .  «  1781 

CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

TENANCY    BY    ENTIRETIES.  1790 

CHAPTER  XL. 

TENANCY    IN    COMMON. 

I.  In  general         .........     1818 

II.  Partnership  realty 1826 

CHAPTER   XLI. 

RELATION    OF    COTENANTS    TO    EACH    OTHER. 

I.  As  to  incumbrances  in  general  ......  1835 

II.  As  to  tax  sales 1846 

III.  Contribution  and  liens  therefor  ......  1852 

IV.  Contracts  and  management    ......  1859 

CHAPTER   XLII. 

POSSESSION    AND    OUSTER    OF    COTENANT. 

I.  Possession  presumed  not  to  be  adverse        ....  1862 

II.  Notice  of  adverse  possession  .....  1806 

III.  What  constitutes  an  ouster  ......  1870 

IV.  Entry  and  possession  under  deed  of  one  cotenant    .  .  1878 

CHAPTER   XLIII. 

LIABILITIES    OF    COTENANTS    TO    EACH    OTHER. 

I.  For  rents  and  profits  received  .  .  .  .  1883 

II.  For  use  and  occupation  .         .         .         •         .         •         1887 

xvi 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

BKCTION 

III.  For  money  expended  in  repairs  and  improvements     .         .     1898 

IV.  For  services  performed  ......  1908 

V.  For  waste  .  . 1911 

CHAPTER   XLIV. 

REMEDIES   BETWEEN    COTENANTS.  1917 

CHAPTER   XLV. 

REMEDIES    AGAINST    STRANGER. 

I.  In  personal  actions  .......  1925 

II.  In  real  actions  ........     1935 

CHAPTER   XL VI. 

PARTITION. 

I.  Voluntary  partition         .......  1939 

II.  Partition  by  suit 1954 

III.  Equities  to  be  considered        ......  1974 

IV.  Partition  by  sale 1994 

PAGE 

Index 745 

xvii 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


A. 


Abadie  v.  Lobers 
Abbey  v.  Chase 

V.  Wheeler 
Abbott  V.  Abbott 
V.  Allen 
V.  Alsdorf 
V.  Creal 
V.  Godfrey 
V.  Gregory 
V.  Hills 
V.  Holway 
V.  Marshall 
V.  Rowan 


1529 

1049,  1080 

1986,  1987 

326,  341 

928 

1318,  1319 

68 

1478 

1575 

989 

527 

302 

913,  987 


Adams  v.  Brackett 
V.  Conover 

V.  Cuddy 
V.  Daunis 
V.  Edgerton 
V.  Field 
V.  Frye 

V.  Halff 
V.  Hay  den 


Abercrombie  v.  Baldwin  1873 
Abernathie  v.  Con.  Virginia  Min- 
ing Co.  1868 
Abernathy  v.  Stone  1396 
Abert  V.  Lape  1220,  1253 
Abney  v.  De  Loach  llo9 
Aborn  v.  Smith  483 
Abraham  v.  Abbott  509 
V.  Mayer  14 GO 
Abrams  v.  Ervin  1123,  1124 
Acer  V.  Westcott          782,  1368,  1517, 
1523,  1547 
Acheson  v.  Stevenson  818 
Achorn  v.  Jackson  52o 
Acker  v.  Ledyard  1365,  1367 
Ackroyd  v.  Smith  787 
Acton  V.  Blundell  l-'^^^ 
V.  Dooley  354,  368 
Adair  y.  Cook  66,111 
V.  Davis  1463,  1464 
V.White  381,433 
Adam  v.  Brissrs  Iron  Co.  532,  1595, 
1866,  1867 
r.  Kerr  11^4 
Adams's  Appeal  11  ^'8 
Adams  v.  Adams  1269,  144H 
V.  Alkire-  381,  389,  414 
r.  Beadle  1613,1630 


44 

909,  910,  924, 

937,  957 

1401 

1372 

402,  1436 

1002,  1018 

1248,  1338,  1340, 

1352 

366 

1458 

V.  Irvino-   National   Bank 

86,  88 
V.  Lee  1683 

V.  Lindell  708 

V.  Loo-an  650,  658 

V.  Medsker       316,  1003,  1004, 
1005,1114,  1132, 1133 
V.  Morse  ^24 

V.  Neill  1412,  1414 

V.  Ore  Knob  Copper  Co. 

682,  705,  708,  715,  722 

V.  Pease  472,  480,  484 

V.  Pratt  1455 

r.  Robertson  1824 

V.  Rockwell  355,  364,  366, 

367 

V.  Ross  575,  579,  582,  611, 

614,  894 

V.  Ryan  1240,  1247 

V.  Sehiffer  89 

V.  Valentine  743 

Adamston  v.  Hartman  1328 

Addis  t;.  Graham         1073,1147,1196 

1440,  1485 

V.  Power 

Addison  v.  Dawson 

V.  Overend 

Addy  V.  Grix 

Adelman's  Estate,  In  re 

Adkins  v.  Tomlinson 

V.  Whalin 
Adsetts  V.  Hives 

xix 


218 

68 

1928 

1094 

1965 

850,  928 

136 

1S42 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


iEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Resli  1803 

.Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bishop         1481, 

15-17 

V.  Ford  1547 

V.  Franks  90 

V.  Ilesser  1403 

Agan  V.  Shannon  1145,  1172 

Agar  V.  Fairfax  19G7 

Agawani  Canal  Co.  v.  Edwards        494 

A^new  V.  Johnson  1928 

Agricnltui-al  Bank  v.  Rice         3 1  (i,  3 1 7, 

318,  1003,  1004 

Agricultural    Cattle    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Fitzgerald  1346 

Ague  V.  Seitsinger  512 

Aguirre  v.  Alexander  1862 

Ahern  i\  Freeman  1370 

1-.  White  1410 

Aiken  v.  Bruen  285 

V.  Franklin  834 

V.  McDonald  944,  968 

V.  Suttle  1028 

Aim  an  v.  Stout  48,  49 

Airhart  v.  Massieu  167 

Ake  V.  Mason  912 

Akerly  v.  Vilas  893 

Akers  v.  Akers  602 

V.  Railroad  Co.  409 

Alabama  v.  Georgia  471 

Alabama  Life   Ins.  Co.  v.  Bodkin 

1190 
Alabama     State     Land     Co.    v. 

Thompson  1346,  1361 

Alameda    Macadamizing    Co.     v. 

Williams  452,  463 

Albany  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bay        36,  1185 
Albert  v.  Burbank  1251,  1258 

V.  Thomas  448,  449 

Albin  V.  Riegel  1628 

Albrecht,  Matter  of  1808 

Albright  v.  Albright  40,  44,  45, 

1234,  1258 
Alden's  Appeal  538 

Alden  v.  Carleton  1898 

Alderson  v.  Ames  1410 

Aldine  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Barnard       1668, 

1680 

Aldis  V.  Burdick  138 

Aldous  V.  Cornwell  1338,  1342 

Aldrich  v.  Bailey  805 

V.  Billings  466 

V.  Funk  24 

V.  Griffith  380 

V.  Husband  1691,  1899 

V.  Reynolds  1630 

Aldridge  v.  Aldridge  112 

Alemany  v.  Daly  625 


Alexander  i;.  Alexander      1220,  1224, 

1243,  1292,  1294 

V.  Bridgford  870,  957 

V.  Caldwell  285,  1390 

V.  Crosbie  249 

V.  De  Kermcl      1287,  1289, 

1293 

V.  Ellison  1904 

V.  Haskins  68,  69 

V.  Ilickox  1346,  1349 

V.  Houghton  1148 

V.  Jones  10.'{5 

V.  Kennedy    1838,  1874, 

1881 

•  V.  Kimbro  1829 

V.  Merry  1159,  1162,  1180 

V.  Pierce       80,  85,  86 

V.  Polk  1060,  1066 

V.  Schreiber  840,  841 

V.  Shonyo  1764 

V.  Sully  1840 

f.  Tolleston  Club     151,175, 

190 

V.  Wheeler  354,  369 

Alford  V.  Alford  646 

V.  Dewin  1935 

Algonquin  Coal   Co.  v.  Northern 

Coal  Co.  538 

Allard  v.  Carleton  1955,  1994 

Allday  i-.  Wliitaker  337,  1946 

Allebach  d.  Ilunsicker  302 

Allegheny    National   Bank's  Ap- 
peal 1972 
AUeman  v.  Hawley                1898,  199  7 
Allen  V.  Allen        2,  222,  223,  256,  259, 
398,  846,  928,  1803 
V.  Ashley  School  Fund        155, 
613 
V.  Atkinson  828 
V.  Bates                                    424 
V.  Berryhill  68 
V.  Bolen                                    1484 
V.  Bowen                                    582 
V.  Cadwell           1501,  1517,  1563 
V.  Chambers                     337,  353 
V.  Cowan                                    310 
V.  Craft                      155,  583,  613 
V.  De  Groodt               1217,  1230, 
1231,  1234,1236,  1240, 
1241, 1248, 1835 
U.Drake                                     112 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Xenia 

174 
V.  Gibson  1936 

V.  Hall  1862 

V.  Hawley  1415 

u.  Hazen  828 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Allen  V.  Holton         326,  857,  894,  896, 

992 
V.  Hooper  40,  41 

V.  Howe  682,  687,  743 

V.  Hoyt  .  ■    138 

V.  Kennedy  928,  929,  948 

V.  Kersey  399,  894 

V.  Lee  295,  862 

W.Lenoir         1182,   1190,    1192, 
1196,  1201,  1205,  1207, 
1442 
V.  Little  928,  932 

V.  McCalla         1511,  1517,  1522 
V.  Mandaville  1560 

V.  Mitchell  1695 

V.  Montgomery  R.  Co.  150 

V.  Mooney  1668,  1673,  1702 

V.  Morris  1559 

V.  Peters  1919,  1937 

V.  Poole         2,  14,  17,  20,  22,  25, 
1532,  1559,  1560,  1846 
V.  Reynolds  1185 

V.  Sallinger  338,  395,  193  7 

V.  Sayward  834 

V.  Scott  351,  422,  536,  1652 

V.  Smith  121 

V.  South  Boston  R.  Co.         1539 
V.  Sullivan  R.  Co.  1064 

V.  Weber  488,  498 

V.  Welch  125 

V.  Withrow  1329,  1331 

V.  Woodard  1690,  1746 

I'.  Yeater  828 

Alliance  Milling  Co.  v.  Eaton  366 

Allin  V.  B II nee  613 

Allis  r.  Billings  54,  60,  61 

I'.  Jones  1052,  1054 

V.  2s''ininger  903,  918 

Allison  V.  Hagan  1529,  1530 

I'.  Montgomery  968 

V.  Thomas  1394,  1400 

Allore  V.  Jewell  99 

AUred  v.  Elliott  1104 

Almeric  v.  Alvarado  1981 

Almond  i:  Bonnell  1802 

Almy  V.  Daniels  1874,  1890,  1892 

Alseire  v.  Hulse  381 

Alsop  V.  Swafhel  126  7 

Alstin  V.  Cuiidiff  286 

Alston  V.  Als^ton  1485 

V.  Boyd  nO 

Altham's  Case  487,  566 

Althen  v.  Tarbox  37 

Alton  V.  Illinois  Transp.  Co.    324,  5;U 
Altringer  v.  Capeheart  295 

Alvarado  v.  Nordholt  1S66 

Alvis  V.  Morrison  1442,  1485 


Alvord    Carriage   Manuf.    Co.   v. 

Gleason  1668,  1671,  1718 

Alvord  V.  Waggoner  32,  939,  r87 

Alward  v.  Holmes  181,  182 

Ambler  v.  Cox  355 

Ambrose  v.  Raley  424 

Ambs  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  Minn.  & 

Omaha  Ry.  Co.  220,  333,  423 

American,  &c.  Co.  v.  Frank  1284 

American  Asso.  r.  Short  996 

American  Bible  Soc.  v.  Marshall     189 
American  Dock  Co.  v.  Trustees       4  71 
American  Emigrant  Co.  v.  Call      1481 
V.  Clark     224 
American    Freehold    Land  Mort- 
gage Co.  V.  James  1196 
American  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Hutch- 
inson                                               1396 
American  Mortgage  Co.   v.    Ten- 

nille  167,190 

American  Mortgage  Co.  r.  Wright 

°  14,  16 
American  Mut.  Life  Ins.   Co.  v. 

Owen  186 

Amerman  r.  Deane  773,  779,  824 

Ames,  Ex  parte  1 758 

Ames  V.  Ames  1966 

V.  Hilton  334,  335,  453 

V.  Norman         1791,  1792,  1801, 

1811,  1812,  1814 

V.  Phelps  1455,  1472 

Amey  v.  Cockey  2,  27 

Amick  V.  Brubaker  1871 

Ammidoun  v.  Ball  1651 

V.  Granite  Bank  4  76,  1647 

Amnions  v.  Dwyer  1364 

Amos  r.  Amos  1231 

V.  Cosby  962,  974 

Amphlett  v.  Hibbard  1415 

Anders  v.  Anders  1940 

Anderson  v.  Anderson  1236,  1269 

V.  Bailey  1188 

V.  Baughman         1436,  1437 

V.  Bellenger  1338,  1350 

r.  Buchanan  903 

V.  Carey  660 

V.  DUgas  1463,  1464 

V.  Hubble  1527 

V.  Jackson  361,  363 

V.  Knox     918,  928,  962,  974 

V,  Lay  ton  1547 

V.  Logan  581,  582,  599, 

■  1109 

V.  McCorniick  381 

V.  Nagle  1-106 

V.  Richardson  340,  381 

V.  Soward  16 


TABLE    OF    CASKS, 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Anderson  v.  Stamps  33.") 

r.  Stnuiss  1H2S 

V.  Wilbiirn  1070 

Anderson  School  c.  Milrov  Lodge 

1957 

Andress  r.  WelUr  75 

Andreu  v.  Watkiiis 


Andrew  c. 
Andrews  r 


Aitken 
Appel 
Burns 
Chandler 
Davison 
Dyer 


V.  Farnham 
V.  Jones 
V.  Mathews 
V.  Murphy 
V.  Pearson 

V.  Rue 
V.  Senter 
V.  Spurlin 


V.  Wolcott 
V.  Word 
V.  Youinans 


335,  339,  341, 
381,  398,  424,  466 
780 
930,  938,  974 
1380 
1686,  1737 
930,  96  7 
218,226,  227,  1248, 
1250 
1307,  1308 
281 
1406 
400 
326,  346,  351, 
399,  420 
381 
699,  704,  722 
579,  601,  602, 
608,  609,  613 
801,  935 
828 
448 


Andrus  v.  St.  Louis  Smelting  Co.    893 


Angell  V.  Rosenbui'y 
Angelo  v.  Angelo 
Angier  v.  Schieffelin 
Angle  V.  Young 
Ankeny  v.  M'Mahon 
Anketel  v.  Converse 
Annable  v.  Patch 
Annandale  v.  Harris 
Annely  v.  De  Saussure 


593 

1918,  1987 

1133 

377 

1066,  1070 

1536 

1784 

277 

1891,  1892, 

1898,  1902,  1906 

Annis  v.  Wilson  156,  570,  1297 

Anthony  v.  Chapman  303 

V.  Hutchins  49,  99 

V.  Providence    448,  449,  461, 

463,  10;j2 

V.  Wheeler    1386,  1517,  1524 

Apel  v.  Kelsey  1112,  1125 

Apperson  v.  Burgett  1408 

Appleton  V.  Boyd  1824 

V.  Edson  138 

Aqueduct  Co.  v.  Chandler  630 

Arambula  v.  Sullivan      326,  414,  423, 

427 

Archer  v.  Ellison  613 

V.  Helm  354 

V.  Hudson  108 

V.  Salinas  City  449 

Archibald  v.  Davis  323 

xxii 


Aransas  Pass  Co.  v.  Flippen  440 

Arden  v.  Thompson  381,  399 

Argo  V.  Coilin  48,  111 

Arguello  w.  Bours  1328,  1329 

Ariedgc  V.  Hail  1406 

Armentrout  v.  Gibbons  1485 

Armitagc.  v.  Widoc  4,  10 

Arms  V.  Ashley  594 

V.  Burt  575,  lOGO 

Armstrongs.  Armstrong     1255,  1281, 

1289 

V.  Brownfield  398,  407 

V.  Bryant  1981 

V.  Caldwell  1596 

V.  Colby  321 

V.  Du  Bois  335,  1637 

V.  Lawson  1600,  1609, 

1611,  1624 

V.  Logan  103 

V.  McCoy  254 

V.  Pearce    1066,1068,  1071 

V.  Ross  1185,  1442 

V.  Stovall       38,  316,  1001, 

1003,  1018,  1217 

Arneson  v.  Spawn  341,  437 

Arnold  v.  Arnold       1792,  1794,  1801, 

1803 
V.  Cauble  1968,  1979 

V.  Crowder  1668,  1718 

V.  Elmore  484 

V.  Hickman  74,  78 

V.  Jack  1 785 

V.  Patrick  1303 

V.  Richmond   Iron  Works 

54,  59,  60,  67 

V.  Smith  1529 

V.  Stephens  138 

V.  Stevens  1596 

V.  Townsend  53,  99 

V.  Whitcomb  98,  101 

Arnot  V.  Erie  Ry.  Co.  295 

Arrigoni  v.  Johnson  974 

Arrington  i'.  Arrington        1259,  1388, 

1527,  1528,  1529,  1."j34, 

1535,   1559,  1560,  l.")62 

Arrison  v.  Harmstead  1240,  1349 

Artcher  y.  Whalen  1319 

Arterburn  v.  Gwathmey  1997 

Arthur  I'.  Anderson  1008,  1222 

V.  Commercial  &  R.  Bank 

142,  145 

y.  Lamb  1912 

V.  Screven  1439 

V.  Weston  233,  244 

Arundell  v.  Phipps  45 

Ash  V.  Ash  1463 

Ashby  V.  Eastern  R.  Co.  476 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Ashchaft  v.  De  Armond   55,  56,  69,  72 
Ashcroft  V.  Eastern  R.  Co.      503,  508, 

548,  575 
Ashe  V.  Livingston  1463 

Aslier  V.  Mitcliell  '    1578 

Aslier  LuuibLT  Co.  r.  Lunsford        490 
Aslieville  Division  v.  Aston  235, 

239    598 
Ashfield  V.  Ashfield  '     14 

Asliford  V.  Prewitt  1304 

Ashley  v.  Cunningham  1559 

V.  Warner"  628,  713 

Ashmead  v.  Reynolds  99 

Ashton's  Appeal  285,  1390,  1529 

Ashton  V.  Thompson  108 

Ashurst  c.  Peck  131 

Askew  V.  Daniel  1185 

Askey  v.  Williams  2,  4,  27 

Aspden  v.  Seddon  533,  538,  1595 

Association  of  Colored    Orphans 

V.  Mayor  871 

Astbnry,  Ex  parte        1720,  1728,  1749 
Astley  V.  Reynolds  89 

Astor  V.  Wells    1457,  1458,  1501,  1537 
Atchison  V.  Pease  354,  359,  368 

Atchison,  T.  &  Santa  Fe  R.  Co.  v. 

Jaques  870 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.   Co.  v. 

Morgan  1668,  16  70,  1709 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.   F.  R.  Co.  v. 

Patch  468 

Atkins  V.  Bordman  546,  762,  1594 

V.  Paul  1578 

Atkinson  v.  Bell  990 

V.  Marietta,  &c.  R.  Co.      145 

r.  Tabor  1314 

Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis    175 

Atlantic  &  Pac.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Union 

Pac.  R.  Co.  142,  151 

Atlantic  Dock  Co.  v.  Leavitt  647, 

671,  780,  798 
Atlantic  Nat.  Bank  v.  Harris         1539 
V.  Tavener  43 

Atterbury  v.  Wallis  1539 

Attorney-General  v.  Algonquin 

Club  757, 

759,  814 
V.  Ayer  75  7,  758 

V.  Boston  Wharf 

Co.  483 

V.  Chambers  4  70 

V.    Del.    &   B. 

Brook  R.  Co.  480 
V.  Emer.'ion  4  70 

V.  Gardiner  756 

V.  Hall  664 

V.  Johnson  470 


Attorney- General    v.    Merrimack 

Manuf.  Co.  713,  715,  628,  631 

Attorney-General  v.  Parmeter       470, 

473 
Attorney-General  v.  Proprietors 

of  Federal  St.  Meeting-House      593 
Attorney-(ieneral  v.  Richards  473 

V.  Southmolton    640 
r.  Stewart  170 

V.  Tancred  276 

V.  Terry  473 

V.  Wax  Chand- 
lers'Co.  640,641 
V.  Wilkins  1531 

V.  Williams         770, 
808,  819 
V.  Woods  476 

Attwater  v.  Att water  662 

At  wood  V.  Canrike  466 

Aubuchon  v.  Bender  1392,  1527 

Auburn  Cong.  Church  v.  Walker 

326,  413,  420 
Auerbach  v.  Le  Sueur  IMill  Co.        169 
f.  Wylie  216 

Au  Gres  Boom  Co.  v.  Whitney  405 
Augusta,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Kittel  1082 
Augustine  v.  Britt  454,  462,  464 

AuU  V.  Lee  1555 

Aultman-Taylor  Co.  v.  McGeorge 

1585 
Aultman  &  T.  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Rich- 
ardson 239 
Aurora  Ag.  Soc.  v.  Paddock  144 
Ausable  Co.  v.  Hargraves                 364 
Austerberry  v.  Oldham  780 
Austin  V.  Barrett         1846,  1884,  1892 
V.  Cambridgeport  Parish     688, 
715,  718,  728 
V.  Charlestown      Female 

Seminary  13 

V.  Dolbee  323,  331 

V.  Hall  1925,  1926 

V.  King  13.S2 

I'.  Register  of  Deeds  1327 

V.  Rutland  R.  Co.  501 

V.  Sawyer   1620,  1623,  1624, 

1627 

V.  Shaw        223,  237,  241 

V.  Underwood  1412,  1415 

V.  Whitlock  1071 

V.  Willis  522 

Austrian  r.  Davidson  324,  395 

Averill  v.  Guthrie  1498 

Avery  v.  Akins  992 

V.  Bauni  359 

V.  Dougherty  893 

V.  Empire  Woolen  Co.  364 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Avery  v.  Hall  ISC.S 

V.  New  York  Cent.  &  II.  R. 

Co.  641,  G4'2,  681 

Axtol  r.  CTiase  899,  914,  919,  953 

Ayoofk  r.  Kiinbrouiili  194  7 

c.  U:lloi^h,  &c.  R.  Co.       1073, 

1075,  1440 

Ayer  v.  Emory         632,  643,  646,  6.50, 

741 
V.  Philadelphia,   &c.    Face 

Brick  Co.  860 

Ayers  v.  Beaty  43  7 

V.  Harris  399,  433,  442 

V.  Jack  1563 

V.  Lancaster  442 

V.  McConnel  303 

V.  Watson      340,  378,  381,  386, 

398,  433,  442 

Ayling  v.  Kramer  635,  742,  771 

Ayranlt  v.  Murphy  1559 

Ayray's  Dr.  Case  225,  235 

Ayres  v.  Duprey  1390,  1406,  1408 

i\  Harness  1328 

V.  Penn.  Ry.  Co.  448,  458 

V.  Probasco       1328,  1333,  1334 

Ayrey  r.  Hill  74 


Babb  V.  Clem  son 

1349 

V.  Harrison 

527,  1233 

Babbitt  v.  Day 

1773,  1782 

V.  Johnson 

1123 

Babcock  v.  Eckler 

284,  289 

V.  Jordan 

285,  1392 

V.  Latterner 

518 

V.  Lisk 

1555 

V.  Utter 

488,  490 

Babson  v.  Tainter 

476 

Bacharach  i'.  Von  Ei£f 

885 

Backenstoss  v.  Stahler 

1619,  1624 

Backus  ;;.  Detroit 

480 

V.  McCoy      843,  929,  931,  943 

Bacon  v.  Bacon  1547 

V.  Bowdoin  1652 

V.  Huntington  624,  641 

V.  Lincoln  847 

V.  O'Connor  1522 

V.  Shultz  1951 

V.  Van  Schnonhoven  1420 

Badger  v.  Batavia  Paper  M.  Co.     1  742 

V.  Boardman         774,  780,  796 

V.  Holmes       1884,  1887,  1917, 

1922 

I'.  Phinney  29 

Bagby  v.  Emberson     1185,  1188,  1190 

Bagley  i;.  Fletcher  8,17,21,22, 

1394,  1395 

V.  Morrill  340,  381 

xxiv 


Bagnall  v.  Davies  756,  760 

V.  Villar  1633 

Bagster  v.  Earl  of  Portsmouth  68 

Bailey  v.  IJailey  1234,  1271 

V.  Baker  366 

V.  Bamberger  ."I 

V.  Briant  1624 

17.  Campbell  1259,  1846,  19«1 
V.  Crim  1316 

V.  Galpin  1436 

V.  Gould  1581 

V.  Hobson  1912 

V.  Kilburn  234 

V.  Landingham  1196,  1197, 
1205 
V.  Laws  1853,  1988 

V.  Lloyd  249,  250 

V.  McConnell  381 

V.  Miltenberger  912 

V.  Myrick  1467 

V.  Railroad  Co.  4  71 

V.  Richardson  1563 

V.  Scott  974 

V.  Taylor  1365,  136  7 

V.  'Jimberlake  1416 

V.  AVells  688 

V.  White  388 

V.  Williams  88 

Baily  v.  De  Crespigny  810 

V.  Trammell  1867,  1870 

Bains  v.  Bullock  1792,  1816,  1817 

Baird  v.  Bank  1 75 

v.  Brookin  155,  233 

V.  Jackson  1745,  1901 

Baker  v.  Atherton  1720 

V.  Bessey  1640,  1649,  1652, 

1653 
V.  Bliss  1514,  1517 

V.  Clay  350,  398,  404 

r.  Clepper  1410 

V.  Corbett  962 

V.  Dening  1014 

V.  Griffin  14.S2 

V.  Haskell  1267,  1268,  1271 

V.  Hunt  842 

V.  Jordan  1624 

V.  Kennett  2,  16,  18,  24,  31, 
158 
V.  Lewis  1601 

V.  U<rht  389,  399,  407 

V.  Lorillard  1949 

V.  IMcArthur  341 

V.  ^Lather  1547,  1551 

V.  jMaltocks  613 

V.  Morton  81,  85,  1404 

V.  Mott  451,452,551,632. 

640,  653 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Baker  r.  Ne£E  175,  176 

V.  Pierson  1561 

V.  Scott  579,  602,  604,  610 

V.  Shepherd  17  78, 1821 

V.  Shy  ■    163 

V,  Stone  5,  30 

V.  Stewart        1793,  1797,  1801, 

1802,  18U3 

V.  Union  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.     29.5 

V.  Westcott  16  7,  267 

V.  Whiting  1873 

V.  Woodward  1396,  1406 

Bakes  v.  Gilbert  7 

Bakewell  v.  Ogden  1547 

Baldes  v.  Heniges  1962 

Baldock  r.  Johnson  108 

Baldwin's  Case  564 

Baldwin  v.  Aldrich  19  70 

V.  Atwood  650 

V.  Brown  326,  364,  365,  366, 

381,  384,  386,  398,  400, 

401 

V.  Crow  1407 

V.  Duntoa  49 

V.  Ely  848 

V.  Goldfrank  1034,  1041, 

lloG 

V.  Marshall  1476 

V.  Maultsby  1233,  1267 

V.  Richardson  244,  245 

V.  Rosier  11 

V.  Sager         1527,  1528 

V.   Shannon  446 

V.  Snowden  1196,  1198, 

1202,  1205,  1206,  144  7 

r.  Thompson  333 

Bale  V.  Newton  1277 

Balen  r.  Jacquelin  1958 

V.  Mercier  1460 

Baley  v.  Dcakins  125 

Balfouru.  Balfour  1887 

r.  Whitman  966 

Ballr.  Dnnsterville  1014,  1067 

V.  Foreman  1234,  1307,  1309 

0.  Palmer  1875,  1876 

V.  Taylor  1073 

Ballard  v.  Burrows  883 

V.  Butler  541 

V.  Carmichael    217,  239,  1055, 

1117 

V.  Child  894 

V.  Perry  1143,  1146,  1147, 

1148 

Ballaster  v.  IMann  1459 

Ballou  V.  Hale  1940 

Bally  I'.  Wells  793,  941 

Baltimore  v.  McKim  471 


Baltimore  v,  Williams  1510 

Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Gould     448, 

450,  461, 

463,  4G9 

V.  Trimble 

1972 
Bambaugh  y.  Bambaugh     1770,1784, 

1819 

Banbury  v.  Sherin  1109 

Bancroft  v.  Cousen  1483 

V.  Curtis  44  ■ 

V.  Otis  114 

Bane  v.  Detrick  85,  86 

Bangert  v,  Bangert  40,  44 

Bangor  v.  Brown  453 

V.  Warren     715,  723,  728,  729 

Bangs  1-.  Parker  548 

r.  Potter  813,818 

Bank  v.  Anderson  1420 

V.  Bailhache      1217,  1276,  1304, 

1310 

V.  Banks  256 

V.  Baumiester  1748 

V.  Benning  256 

V.  Breillat  144 

{•.  Bridgers  1392,  1393 

V.  Brook  field  Linen  Co.  782 

V.  Bugbee  1067 

V.  Campbell  1588 

V.  Carpenter  1478 

V.  Clapp  1416 

V.  Corder  1793 

V.  Covert  1586 

V.  Crary  1600,  1613,  1618, 

1627 

V.  Dandridge  1052,  1082 

V.  Davis  1532,  1543 

V.  Earle  182,  189 

V.  Finch  1667 

17.  Flagg  1563,  1566 

V.  Frank  1390,  1425,  1588 

V.  Gray  1026,  1028,  1064 

V.  Guttschlick  1080 

V.  Haggin  1451,  14  72 

V.  Houseman  309 

V.  Hove  1134 

V.  INIiller  1649,  1652,  1661 

V.  Xiles  178,  180 

V.  Rutland  &  W.  R.  Co.      1080, 

1082 

V.  Stark  620 

V.  Tishomingo  Sav.  Inst.      1466 

r.  Wise  1619 

Banks  v.  Amnion  321,  1436 

V.  Brown  295 

V.  Lee   219,  1343,  1359,  13C4 

V.  Long  1390 

XXV 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Banks  v.  Ogdeu        448,  449,  450,  485, 

492,  502 

V.  Poitiaux  169,  175 

V.  Sharp  1042 

Banner  v.  Ward  1568 

BanniniT  y.  Banning  1140,  1196 

I'.  Edt'S  1410,1411 

Bannister  v.  Bull  1935 

Banta  r.  Garnio  1584 

Banton  v.  Shorey         13.5,  1482,  1600 

Banzer  v.  Banzer  1  794 

Barbee  v.  Barbee  295,  303 

Barber  i'.  Bi'iscoe  1127 

V.  Gary  602 

V.  Harris         1791,  1792,  1797, 

1803,  1811,  1814 

r.  Richardson  1529 

Barbour  v.  Nichols  1482 

r.  Wiehle  1532 

Barclay,  Ex  parte  1707 

Barclay  y.  Hendrick  1770 

Barcley  v.  Howell  381 

Barclift  v.  Lillie  1396 

Barcus  V.  Brigham  1485 

Bard  V.  Poole  183,  185 

Barden  v.  Overineyer  1786,  1795 

Barger  v.  Hobbs  1060,  1061,  1063 

Barker  l-.  Avery  1196 

V.  Barker  1555 

V.  Barrows  650,  741 

V.  Bell  1406 

v.  Circle  IIM 

V.  Clark  1658, 1662 

V.  Cobb        626,  675,  693,  708, 

712 

V.  Jones  1958 

V.  Koneman  42,  284 

V.  Kuhn  849 

Barkhamsted  v.  Case  833 

Barksdale  v.  Elam  674,  708 

Barley  v.  Roosa  122 

Barlow  v.  Delaney  882,  903,  919 

v.  McKinley  852,  880,  882 

V.  St.  Nicholas  Nat.  Bank 

871,  967 

Barnard  v.  Campau  1469,  1523 

V.  Gooil  326 

V.  ^Urixn  410,  411 

Barncord  r.  Kuhn  1262 

Barned's  Banking  Co.,  Re  1328 

Barnes  v.  Barnes  1289,  1290 

V.  Boardman  1965 

V.  Brown  103 

V.  Burt  541 

V.  Lynch  196.5,  1968 

V.  M'Clinton  1514,  1534 

V.  Ontario  Bank  144 

XXV  i 


Barnes  v.  Suddard    175,  181,  182,  190 
V.  Trenton  Gas  Light  Co.  1543 
V.    Union     School    Town- 
ship 15(;3 
Barnet  v.  Barnet        1182,  1188,  1196, 
1204,  1215 
Barnett,  Ex  parte                             1421 
Barnett  v.  Barbour  939 
V.  Barnett     51,  155,  564,  568 
602, 613 
V.  Hughey            831,  947,  9G8 
V.  Proskauer           1196,  1202, 
1203,  1205,  1207 
V.  Shackleford        1182,  1207, 
1212 
Barney  v.  Button                             1442 
t?.  Cuttler  138 
V.  Keokuk    472,  473,  481,  500 
V.  Little                      143.5,  1481 
V.  McCarty                1451,  1481 
i;.  Miller       410,  412,  414,  416 
V.  Sutton                     1109,  1146 
Barnhart  v.  Campbell                      1976 
V.  Greenshields                1513 
V.  Hughes                   931,  962 
Barnitz  i;.  Casey                                1919 
Barns  v.  Hatch                                  1289 
V.  Learned                        945,  951 
Barnsby,  Ex  parte  48 
Barnum  v.  Childs                                303 
V.  Landon                            1884 
Barr  v.  Chapman                   1868,  1879 
V.  Kinard                                    1546 
V.  Schroeder                   1036,  1217 
Barratt  v.  Wyatt                                 250 
Barre  v.  Fleming                        885,  888 
Barren  v.  Barrel!                   1887,  1892 
V.  Joy                                        594 
Barren    Creek    Ditching     Co.    v. 

Beck  1812,  1814 

Barret  v.  Beckford  616 

V.  Coburn  1866,  1870 

Barrett  v.  Blagrave  743 

V.  Buxton  76 

V.  Davis  1207 

V.  French  81,313,  1937 

V.  Prentiss  1479 

r.  Tewksbury  1212 

V.  Thorndike  1346 

V.  Weber  81,  8 G,  92 

Barrie  v.  Smith         635,  652,  657,  6  78, 

699,  704.  705,  707 

Barrington  v.  Bank      1338,  1356,  1367 

Barron  v.  Barron  44 

Barrow  r.  Nashville  &  C.  T.  Co.      175 

V.  Richard  551,  765,  771, 

779,  780,  785 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Barrow  v.  Wadkin 
Barrows  v.  Barrows 

V.  Baughman 
V.  Keene 
V.  McDermott 
V.  Webster 
Barry  v.  Adams 


163 

1267 

1436 

44 

476 

466 

122 


V.  Guild  903,  932,  937 

V.  Merchant    Exch.    Co.      141, 

144 

Barteau  v.  Merriam  1843 

Barter  v.  Greenleaf  303 

Bartholomew  v.  Hamilton     1741,  1751 

V.  Muzzy  568 

Bartlett  v.  Cowles  33 

V.  Drake  33,  1014,  1018, 

1019 

V.  Emerson  375,  376 

V.  Farrington  893 

V.  Fleming  1190 

V.  Glascock    1513,  1517,  1563 

V.  Jones  712 

V.  Varner       1390,  1524,  1529 

V.  Woods  1674 

V.  Young  355,  358,  359 

Barton  v.  Barton  1526 

V.  Dawes  411 

V.  Morris         1159,  1165,  1185, 

1216 

Barwell  i'.  Barwell  162 

Basford  v.  Pearson         304,  847,  1328, 

1348 
Baskett  v.  Sellers  569,  579 

Bason  v.  King's  Mountain  M.  Co. 

1049,  1082 

Bass  V.  Estill  1109,  1435,  1442 

V.  Wheless  1389 

Bass  Foundry  v.  Gallentine  1746, 

1753,  1767 

Bassett  v.  Bassett  295,  303,  309, 

1354 

V.  Budlong  529,  662,  664, 

665,  669,  670 

V.  Hathaway  1492 

V.  Hawk  1042 

V.  Lockard  2000 

V.  McDonel  1493 

V.  Martin  1211 

V.  Norsworthy  1529 

V.  Wood  1566,  1571 

Basshor  v.  Stewart  1163,  1165 

Batchelder  v.  Keniston  48;> 

V.  Sturgis      861,  868,  958, 

962,  967,  974 

V.  White  1349 

Batchelor  v.  Brereton  316 

V.  Whitaker  582 


Batdorf  v.  Albert  303 

Bateman,  Petitioner  1189,  1195 

Bates  V.  Bank  353 

V.  Boston  &  N.  Y.  Cent.  R. 

Co.  1066 

V.  Delavan  833 

V.  District  of  Columbia         1934 

V.  Foster  412,  414,  834,  896 

V.  Grabham  1352 

V.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  437 

V.  Norcross         1371,  1482,  1506 

V.  Seely  1802 

V.  Swiger  524 

Batey  v.  Woolfolk  1372 

Bath  V.  Yaldez  1864,  1866,  1868 

Batte  V.  Stone  1441 

Batterman  v.  Albright         1628,  1629, 

1630 
Battersbee  v.  Farrington  256 

Batterton  v.  Chiles  138,  1968 

Battin  v.  Bigelow  1190 

*;.  Woods  1846 

Battle  ?;.  John  1968 

Battner  v.  Baker  364 

Baudendistel  v.  Zabriskie  903 

Bauer  v.  Gottmanhausen         358,  359, 

366 
V.  Schmelcher  1166 

Bauskett  v.  Jones  898 

Bavington  r.  Clarke  1949 

Baxter  v.  Baxter  52 

V.  Bradbury         843,  943,  946, 
953,  954,  956 
V.  Busli  158 

V.  Evett  381 

i;.  Ryerss  973,  990 

V.  Smith  160 

V.  Wilson  381,  389,  400 

Bay  V.  Posner  224,  256,  326 

Bay  City  Gaslight  Co.   v.  Indus- 
trial Works  483 
Bayley  v.  Bailey                               1466 
V.  McCoy  991 
V.  Onondaga  Ins.  Co.            23  7 
Bayliss  i'.  Williams           107,  297,  303 
Baylor  v.  Hopf.                                  1887 
V.  Scottish-American  Mortg. 
Co.                         13  71,  1396 
Baynard  r.  Eddings                           398 
Baze  V.  Arpcr               1109,  1151,  1442 
Biizcmore  v.  Davis                 1898,  1903 
Beach  v.  Hollister                              1792 
V.  Miller          503,  880,  881,  882 
V.  Packard      303,  307,  309,  861 
Bcacroft  v.  Strawn                             579 
Beal  V.  Blair                                        321 
V.  Gordon                                  1563 

xxvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Refereuoes  are  to  Sections. 


Boal  V.  WariTii  26t;,  '209,  293 

Ikall  V.  Evans  1807,  1874 

Beals  V.  Case  767,  771,  773,  774, 

779 
Beaman  v.  Russell  1359,  136  7 

V.  Whitney  244,  1125 

Bean  u.  Bachelder  431,432 

V.  French  548 

I'.  Kenmuu-  563 

V.  Smith  1529,  1531 

Bear  f.  Bitzer  1619 

V.  Whisler  626,  718 

Beard  v.  Dedolph  41 

Beardsley  v.  Crane    335,  355,  364,  437 
V.  Day        1073,  1075,  1334, 
1440 
V.  Hilson  1276 

V.  Hotchkiss  11 

V.  Knight  1821,  1953 

V.  Ontario  Bank  1729 

Beasley  v.  Bray  1388 

V.  Henry  1588 

Beatie  v.  Butler  1566 

Beaty  v.  Bordwell  1904 

V.  Robertson  431 

Beaubien  v.  Hindman  1568 

V.  Kellogg  364 

Beaudry  v.  Doyle  381 

Beaufort  o.  Duncan  1056 

Beaumont  v.  Field  340 

y.  Yeatman  1123,1124 

Beaumont    Car    Works    v.  Beau- 
mont Imp.  Co.  271,  1314 
Beaumont  Pasture  Co.  v.  Preston 

1364 

Beaupland  v.  McKeen  944,  945 

Beaupre  v.  Dwyer        1673,  1715,  1721 

Beavan  v.  M'Donnell  72 

Beaver  v.  Frick  Co.  1458 

V.  Slanker  1438,  1448 

Beck  V.  Kallmeyer  1975,  1986 

Beckel  v.  Petticrew  1443 

Becker  V.  Anderson  1159,  1173 

V.  Church  121 

V.  Knudson  980 

V.  Quiirir  1177,  1178,  1194 

Beckett  v.  Cordl.-v  1527 

V.  Ilc-u.n'  1289 

Beckham  v.  Dmiciin  1994 

Beckman  v.  Davidson  371 

V.  Kreamer  480 

V.  Sikes   1619,  1628,  1634, 

1732,  1736 

Beckwith  v.  Windsor  Manuf.  Co. 

1051 
Becnel  v.  Becnel  1887 

Beddoe  v.  Wadsworth  933,  !)40 

xxviii 


Bedel  r.  Loomis  968 

Bedell's  Case  264 

Bedford  v.  British  Museum     773,  780, 

804,  805,  813 

I'.  Tupper     1451,  1468,  1472, 

1479 

Bedgood  v.  McLain  1364 

Bedinger  i'.  Wharton  18,  31,  35 

Beebe  v.  Griffing  1862 

V.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &c.  R. 

Co.  1963 

V.  McKenzie  568 

V.  Swartwout  897 

Beecher  v.  Baldwin  962,  967,  969 

V.  Clark  284,  289,  290 

V.  Galvin  365,  379 

V.  Hicks      568,  573,  576,  614 

V.  Rolling  Mill  Co.  153 

Beekman  v.  Hudson   River,    &c. 

Ry.  Co.  151 

Beem  v.  McKusick  1319 

Beers  v.  Beers  1303 

V.  Broome  1589 

V.  Estill  155 

V.  Hawley  1589 

Begbie  r.  Fenwick  1718 

Behm  v.  Molly  24 

Behrens  v.  McKenzie  68 

Beiser  V.  Beiser  1275 

Beith  V.  Beith  109,  279 

Belbaze  v.  Ratto         1159,  1174,  1403, 

1451 

Belcher,  Ex  parte  1  748 

Belcher  v.  Weaver  1159,  1173, 

1190,  1192,  1195 

Belden  v.  Carter         1234,  1246,  1307 

V.  Meeker  1420,  1422 

V.  Seymour   295,  297,  301,  302, 

303,  309,   312,    381,  398, 

831,  948,  1344 

Belknap  v.  Belknap  1887 

V.  Louisville  364 

V.  Sealey  407 

V.  Wendell  310 

Bell  V.  Andrews  901 

V.  Davis  1523 

?'.  Dunsterville  1025 

?;.  Evans      1159,1178,1180,1404 

V.  Gough  4  72 

V.  Kcefe  1071 

V.  McDuffie  314 

V.  Quick  1328 

V.  Sawyer  401,  410 

V.  Scammon  268 

V.  Thomas  1499 

V.  Twilight         1529,  1531,  1547, 

1568,  1572,  1575,  1576 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Bell  V.  Tyson  1515 

Bell  County  r.  Alexander  (319 

Bellamy  v.  Sabine  108,  1559 

Bellas  V.  Cleaver  .    378 

V.  Lloyd  1483,  1547 

V.  M'Oarty  1374,  1528 

Bellis  V.  Bellis  1862 

Bellows  V.  Jewell  386 

V.  Litchfield         924,  934,  968 
V.  Wells  1620,  1626 

Belo  V.  Mayes     1181,  1186, 1188, 1207 
Belote  V.  Henderson  91 

Beman  v.  Rufford  142 

Bement    v.  Plattsburgli   &   Mon- 
treal R.  Co.  1729 
Bender  v.  Pitzer                375,  376,  378 
V.  Stewart  1846 
Benedict  v.  Gaylord         326,  335,  336, 
338,  388,  410 
V.  Marsh        1668,  1669,  1741 
V.  Torrent     1820,  1913,  1979 
Benefiel  V.  Aughe                              1149 
Benham  v.  Keane                               1501 
Benjamin's  Succession                     1435 
Benjamin  v.  Hobbs  955 
Benn  v.  Hatcher                                 523 
Benner  v.  Platter                       480,  486 
V.  Street                                1971 
Benneson  v.  Aiken      992,  1218,  1220, 
1234,  1286 
Bennet  v.  Jenkins              968,  970,  981 
V.  Paine                                  1143 
V.  Williams                           1560 
Bennett  v.  Caddell                            520 
V.  Child        1792,  1802,  1811, 
1814 
V.  Clemence             1875,  1922 
V.  Culver                                621 
V.  Green  217 
D.  Hethington                     1936 
V.  Keehn             858,  859,  860, 
882,  1846 
V.  Mattingly                           261 
V.  Robinson                          1575 
I'.  Shipley                 1109,  1125 
V.  Virtjinia  Ranch  &  Cat- 
tle Co.               1887,1937 
V.  Waller                              1266 
Benoit  r.  Sclineider                           1303 
Bensell  v.  Chancellor  65 
Bensieck  v.  Cook                           56,  305 
Bensimer  v.  Fell         1130,  1133,  1159, 
1190,  1191 
Bensley  v.  Atwill                              1292 
V.  Burdon                                25  7 
Benson  v.  Callaway                          1451 
V.  Daly                                    364 


V.  Green 

1463 

V.  Hall 

1220,  1273 

V.  Markoe 

600 

V.  Monroe 

89 

V.  Morrow 

481 

I'.  AA'oolverton 

1248 

Benson 


Bent  V.  Coleman         1436,  1437,  1522, 

1554 

V.  Rogers  412,  414 

Bentley,  Ex  parte  1768 

Bentley  v.  Deforest  314 

V.  Harris  283 

Benton  v.  Horsley  340,  381,  386, 

398 

V.  McLitire  326,  384 

V.  NicoU  1466 

Benton  County  v.  Ruth  928 

Bercaw  v.  Cockerill  1451,  1501, 

1551 
Beresford  v.  Browning  989 

Berg  V.  McLafferty  1866 

Bergen  t'.  Bennett  1036 

V.  Udall  108 

Bergeron  v.  Richardott  1541 

Berghoefer  v.  I'razier  354,  358 

Berkley  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.       643, 

687 
Berkowitz  v.  Brown  40,  45 

Berks  &  Dauphin  Turnpike  Road 

I'.  Myers  239,  1082 

Bernal  r.  Lynch  1846 

Bernard  t>. 'Elder         1182,  1190,  1192 
Bernard's    Township  v.  Stebbins 

1062 

Bernecker  v.  Miller  1862,  1863 

Berneson  v.  Aiken  127  7 

Bernheim  v.  Horton  1217 

Bernstein  v.  Humes         119,  121,  124, 

129,  353,  1563,  1568 

V.  Nealis  332 

Berridge  v.  Ward  448,  456 

Berrigan  i;.  Fleming  1792 

Berrisford  v.  Mihvard  1580 

Berry  v.  Anderson     1220,  1248,  1269, 

1303,  1314,  1315 

V.  Billings  563,  571 

V.  Kinnaird  1259 

V.  Jourdan  1108 

V.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.     1369,  1419, 

1586 

V.  Seawall         1940,  1941,  1944, 

1948,  1949 

V.  Snyder  484 

V.  Wliidden  1887 

V.  Whitney  1524 

r.  Whittaker  1559 

Berrj'hill  v.  Kirchner  1578 

xxix 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  sire  to  Sections. 


Berryhill  v.  Smith  1406 

Berryman  c.  Schumacher       624,  646, 

694,  704,  708 

Berthold  v.  Fox  1873 

Bertles  v.  Nunan        1791,  1792,  1800, 

1802,  1805,  1811 

Bertram  v.  Curtis  877 

Bertrand  r.  Bvrd  1069 

Besore  v.  Dosh  139G 

Best  1-.  Brown  1276,  1283,  1291 

Bethea  t;.  Byrd  376 

Bethell  v.  Betliell  828 

V.  IMcCool  1919 

Bethlehem  v.  Annis  732 

Betsey  v.  Torrance  127,  140 

Bettinck  v.  Franklin  120 

Bettison  v.  Budd  254 

Bettiswonh's  Case  1651 

Betts  r.  Carroll  29 

V.  Lee  1692 

V.  Letcher         1380,  1522,  1564, 

1565,  1568 

V.  Menzies  487 

V.  Union  Bank  280,  298 

V.  Wurth  1767 

Betz  V.  Mullin  1463 

V.  Snyder  1381 

Beuley  v.  Curtis  1124 

Bever  v.  North  302,  861,  862,  924 

Beverley's  Case  64,  65,  159 

Beverley  v.  Brooke  1529 

V.  Ellis  1472 

V.  Walden  49 

Beville  v.  Jones  49,  99,  108,  1138 

Bevin  v.  Powell  56 

Bevins  v.  Cline  1775 

Beyer  v.  Schultze  921 

Beyersdorfer  v.  Schultz  366 

Bibb  V.  Baker  14  78 

V.  Freeman  943 

Bice  V.  Nixon  1970 

Bickett  V.  Harris  480 

Bickford  v.  Page  867,  928,  939, 

943 

Biemann  v.  White  1563,  1564 

Bierce  v.  James  1970 

Bigelow  I'.  Barr  649 

V.  Booth  1145 

V.  Hubbard  867 

V.  Jones  969,  1878 

V.  Kinney  2,  27,  29 

V.  Littlefield  1965 

V.  Livingston  1041,  1115, 

1159 

V.  Stilphen  1338,  1340 

V.  Topliff       1451,  1469,  1778 

Bigg  V.  Strong  1860 

XXX 


Big<;;crs  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  House- 
Building  Co.  1197 
Bigiicrstaif  v.  Murphy  1526 
Bigiiins  V.  Champlin  366 
Bigham  v.  Bii^ham  861 
V.  McDowell  383 
Bigler  v.  Nat.  Bank  1712 
Bii^lcy  V.  Jones  1532 
Biles  V.  Tacoma,  &c.  R.  Co.    503,  508, 

509,  556 

Billinghani  v.  Bryan  883 

Billings,  Estate  of  164 

Billings  V.  Kankakee  Coal  Co.  338 

V.  Morrow  1029 

V.  Stark  1238 

Billingsley  v.  Bates  437 

V.  Niblett  1409 

Billington  v.  Welsh  1576 

Bingham  v.  Bai-ley  27,  31 

V.  Bingham  356 

V.  Kirkland  1506 

V.  Sessions  89 

V.  Weiderwax    295,  948,  997 

Binkley  v.  Forkner  1G68 

Binney's  Case  141 

Bioux  V.  Cormier  ;?98 

Birch  V.  Linton  2,  18,  24,  25 

Bircher  v.  Watkins  948 

Bird  V.  Bird  1883,  1887,  1889 

V.  Cruse  522 

V.  Decker  1014,  1018 

V.  Stark  366 

Birdseye  v.  Rogers  326 

Bird  song  v.  Birdsong  74,  78 

Birmingham  v.  Anderson  424,  450 

Birmingham,  &c.  Land  Co.,  In  re 

774,  778 

Birmingham  Canal  Co.  v.  Bold       1018 

Birnie  v.  Main  1409,  1489,  1490 

Bischoff  V.  ^Vethered  487 

Bisco  V.  Banbury  1544,  1554 

Biscoe  u.  Byrd  1127,1129 

Bishop  V.  Bishop  1668,  1709 

V.  Cook  1452 

V.  Little  901 

V.  Newton  13  74 

V.  Schneider  1392,  1435, 

1442,  1451,  1469,  1479, 

1480,  1527 

V.  Seeley  494 

Bishop  of  St.  Albans  v.  Battersby     768 

Bissell  i;.  Fletcher  492 

V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co. 

448,  449,  454 
Bissett  t;.  Bissett  1196,1447 

Bitner  v.  New  York  &  Tex.  Land 
Co.  331,339 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Bittinger  v.  Baker  1619,  1626 

Bivins  v.  Jarnigan  116 

Black  V.  Coan  958,  967 

V.  Del.  &  R.  Canal  Co.       .  142 
V.  Duncan  931 

I'.  Ellis  77 

V.  Gregg  1125 

V.  Hills  21,  23,  27 

V.  Hoyt  1240,  1241,  1280 

V.  Justice  1101 

V.  Long  1404,  1408 

V.  Pratt  Coal   &  Coke   Co. 

321,  339 

V.  Sharkey  1218,  1223 

V.  Shreve  1248,  1254,  1303, 

1314 

V.  Sprague  424 

V.  Thornton  1217,  1248 

Blackborn  v.  Edgley  1647,  1651 

Blackburn  v.  Nelson  383,  442 

V.  Norman  1034 

V.  Pennington  1190 

V.  Smith  157 

Blacker  v.  Dunlop  1942,  1947 

Blackie  v.  Hudson  872 

Blackington  r.  Sumner  386 

Blackman  v.  Hawks  1196,  1197, 

1205,  1447 

V.  Preston    1230,1233,  1269 

V.  Riley  462,  466 

V.  Striker         503,  528,  531, 

535 

Blackmore  v.  Gregg  1877 

Blackshire  v.  Iowa  Homestead  Co. 

849,  1049,  1082 

Blacksmith  v.  Fellows  619 

Blackstone  Bank  v.  Davis        660,  663 

Blackwell  v.  Hamilton  1068 

V.  McLean  1981 

Blackwood  i;.  Jones  1517 

r.  Van  Vleit  1882 

Blade  v.  Noland  1108 

Blades  v.  Blades  1499 

Blain  v.  Stewart  1109 

V.  Taylor  785 

Blaine  v.  Chambers  1652 

Blair  v.  Bruns  338,  346 

V.  Carpenter  295 

V.  Coffman  82 

V.  Howell  1248 

V.  Osborne  572,  573 

V.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  1325 

V.  Sayre  1187,  1188 

V.  Smith  354 

r.  Vanblarcum  155 

V.  Ward  1482,  1489 

Blaisdell  v.  Bissell  389 


Blaisdell  v.  Stevens 

1517,  1522 

Blake  v.  Blake 

41,  640 

V.  Burnham 

943 

V.  Clark 

1652 

V.  Everett 

879 

V.  Fash 

1218,  1238 

V.  Graham 

1482 

V.  Sanborn 

1824 

V.  Stone 

610 

Blakeley  v.  Blakeley       48,  49,  50,  54, 

61 

Blakemore  v.  Byrnside  1248 

V.  Stanley  750 

Blakeney  v.  Ferguson  1873 

Blakeslee  v.  Mobile  Life  Insurance 

Co.  990 

Blalock  V.  Miland  1091,  1261 

Blanchard  v.  Baker  1923 

V.  Blanchard  867,  915, 

944 

V.  Brooks         857,  894,  896, 

992 

V.  Detroit,  &c.  R.  Co. 

632,  638,  639 
V.  Ellis  957,  976,997,  998 
V.  Floyd  244 

V.  Hoxie  944 

u.  Morey  632,674 

V.  Porter  480 

V.  Tyler     1239,  1386,  1527, 
1528 
V.  Ware  1559 

Blanchard's,  &e.  Factory  v.  War- 
ner 169 
Blancke  v.  Rogers       1672,  1713,  1721 
Bland  v.  Smith                    381,  431,  432 
Blaney  v.  Rice                   364,  386,  407 
Blankenship  v.  Douglas                    1568 
V.  Stout  27 
Blanton  v.  Vanzant                          1891 
Blasey  v.  Delius                                  1362 
Blassingame  v.  Davis                         366 
Blatchford  v.  Boyden                       1411 
Blatchley  v.  Osborn    1521,  1529,  1556 
Blean  v.  Messenger                             6  76 
Bledsoe  v.  Bledsoe                             102 
V.  Doe                                     120 
V.  Rogers                                128 
Bleidorn  v.  Pilot  Mt.  M.  Co.    381 ,  435 
Blevins  v.  Baker                               1778 
V.  Barker                              1501 
V.  Smith                                  959 
Blewitt  V.  Front  Street  Cable  Ry. 

Co.  1258,  1303 

Blight  r.  Banks  1527 

V.  Schenck      1241,  1288,  1290, 

1313,  1316 

xxxi 


TAI'.LK    OF    CASKS. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Blinn  v.  Chesseman  229 

Bliss  V.  Kaweah  Ciinal  Co.  1082 

c.  Kounodv  1652,  1661 

V.  Mclntyre  1346,  1348,  1349 

r.  West  1243,  1290 

r.  Whitney  in.s 

Blotlgett  V.  Hitt  6S 

Bloili^ftt,  &c.  Co.  V.  Peters  483 

Blondeau  w.  Sheridan       844,  915,  931, 

974,  987,  1934 

Blood  V.  Blood     1109,  1435,  1442, 

1884,  1887 

V.  Goodrich  1021 

V.  Wilkins  948,  980 

Bloom  V.  Noggle  1451,  1478,  1501 

V.  Simms  1464 

V.  Welsh  1619,  1620,  1627 

V.  Wolfe  831,  948,  950 

Bloomer  o.  Henderson  1575 

V.  Nolan  31 

Blooming-dale  (;.  Chittenden  2 

Blooniington  v.  Cemetery  358,  366 

Blossom  c.  Brightnian  1965 

Blow  V.  Vaughan     33  7,  339,  342,  344, 

349,353,  402,  409 

Blnm  V.  Robertson  1029 

Blumenthal  v.  Brainerd  1534 

Blumenthal    Real   Estate    Co.    v. 

Broch  381 

Blundell  v.  Catterall  473 

Blunt  V.  Norris  1424 

Blythe  v.  Dargin  36,  38,  1004 

V.  Houston  1KJ5 

V.  Sutherland  378 

Board  of  Commissioners   v.  Bab- 
cock  14  72,  14  79,  1480 
Board  of  Commissioners  v.  Young 

(523,  633,  649,  6  75 
Board  of   Education   v.   Trustees 

635,  649,  715,  723 

Board  of  Street  Opening,  In  re       542 

Boardman  v.  Dean        265,  1290,  1292 

V.  Reed  327,  337,  376, 

378 

Bobb  V.  Barnum  253 

V.  Bobb  295,  302,  309,  948 

Bobinson  v.  Neil  929 

Bobo  V.  Richmond  355,  359,  368 

Bocock  V.  Pavey  1028,  1047 

Bodine  v.  Arthur     155,  562,  563,  564, 

56.5,  568,  569,  580,  583, 

614 

V.  Morgan  86,  94 

Bodwelly.  Webster  1307 

BodwcU  Granite  Co.  v.  Lane  570 

Bogan  V.  Hamilton  331 

Bogardus  v.  Trinity  Church    175,  1880 

xxxii 


Boggess  (;.  Meredith 


1979 


Boggs  V.  Anderson     1563,  1570,  1572, 

1575 

V.  Varner  154  7 

Bogie  V.  Bogie  (i46 

Bosjle  V.  Hammons  81 

Bogue  V.  Williams  1568,  1570 

Bohan  v.  Casey  1447 

Bohannon  v.  Travis  42,  44 

V.  Lewis  1067 

Bohlnian  v.  Coffin  1511,  1514 

Bohn  V.  Davis  1102 

Bohny  v.  Petty  367 

Bohon  V.  Bohon  992 

Boisaubin  v.  Reed  559 

Boland  v.  St.  John's  Schools    449,  450, 

453 

Bole  V.  Newton  1278 

Boley  V.  Barutis  1893,  198  7 

BoUes  V.  Beach  305 

V.  Carli  1409,  1411,  1415 

V.  Chauncey  1482 

V.  State  Trust  Co.  1811 

Boiling  V.  Munchus  307 

V.  Teal  1188,  1190,  1195, 

1942,  1949 

Bolton  V.  Bishop  of  Carlisle  1346 

V.  Eggleston  381 

V.  Hamilton  1862 

V.  Johns  307 

Bomar  v.  Mullins  1 792 

Bompart  v.  Roderman  1942,  1947 

Bonaparte  v.  Carter  341,  381,  385 

Bond  V.  Bond  50.  60 

V.  Coke       1627,  1718,  1748 

V.  Fav  326,  335,  336 

V.  Hiil  1853 

V.  Quattlebaum  968 

V.  Wool  471,  480 

Bondurant  v.  Watson  1372 

Bene  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.  175 

V.  Greenlee  1446 

V.  Lansden  990 

V.  Tyrrell  613 

Bonner  v.  Metcalf  303 

V.  Stephens  1517,  1527 

V.  Ware  1547 

Bonney  v.  Foss  1691 

Bonser  v.  Miller  280,  281 

Bonson  v.  Jones  555 

Boody  V.  Davis  1267,  1296 

V.  McKenney  24,  31,  158 

Boogher  v.  Neece  1112,  1394 

Booker  v.  Stivender  135.9 

V.  Tarwater  230,  232,  9!)2 

Bool  V.  Mix  2,  7,  10,  20,  21 

Boon  V.  Barnes  285 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Boon  V,  Hunter 
V.  Mc  Henry 

Boone  v.  Armstrong 
V.  Chiles 
V.  Clark 
V.  Knox 
V.  Moure 
V.  Telle  s 
V.  Tipton 


392,  433 

929,  953,  990 

1487 

1508,  .1529 

632,  718,  723 

1937 

223,  225 

1456 

698,  715 


Booraem  v.  Railroad  Co.  449 

V.  Wells  1981 

Boorman  v.  Sunnuchs  492,  501 

Booth  V.  Adams  1873,  1919,  1922, 

1940 

V.  Barnum  1514,  1517 

V.  Cook  1146,  1151 

V.  Hynes  295 

V.  Oliver  1601 

V.  Ryan  955 

V.  Starr  932,  936,  939 

V.  Strippleman  381,  384 

V.  Tiernan  1475 

V.  Upshur  384 

Boothby  v.  Hathaway  843,  928 

V.  Stanley  1359 

Boothroyd  v.  Engles       217,  218,  1172 

Border  State  Sav.  Ins.  v.  Wilcox 

1563 
Boreel  v.  Lawton  903 

i^orel  V.  Rollins  .  1035 

Borer  v.  Lange  340,  424,  425,  429 

Bork  V.  Martin  1835 

Borkenhagen  v.  Vianden  381,  399 

Borland  v.  Marshall  120 

V.  Walrath     1196,  1197,  1205 
Bornheimer  v.  Baldwin  1921 

Borough  of  Easton,  Appeal  of        461 
Borrell  t'.  Borrell  1917 

Borrowscale  v.  Tuttle  1559 

Borst  V.  Corey  260 

V.  Empie  528,  531,  549,  551 

V.  Simson  621,  703 

Borum  V.  King  279 

Boscawen  v.  Bliss  814 

V.  Canterbury  485 

Boshor  I'.  Stewart  1117 

Boskowitz  V.  Davis  1835,  1836 

Bosley  V.  Shanner  81 

Boston  V.  Richardson      393,  448,  453, 

476,  477 
V.  Scars  169 

Boston  &  A.  K.  Co.  v.  Charlton        9S6 
Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Sparhawk 

354,  355,  367 
Boston  Bank  v.  Chamberlin  2,  14 

Boston,   Concord  &  Montreal   R. 
Co.  V.  Gihnore  1729 


Boston  Franklinite  Co.  v.  Condit 

1783,  1788 
Boston  Safe  Deposit  &  T.  Co.  v. 
Bankers'    &   Mechanics'    Tele- 
graph Co.  1750 
Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v,  Bos- 
ton 424 
Boswell  V.  Goodwin                          1517 
Bostwick  V.  Atkins  25 
V.  Leach                   744,  1605 
V.  McEvoy             1399,  1324 
V.  Powers                          1481 
V.  Williams                         892 
Bosworth  V.  Danzien                           397 
V.  Sturtevant             326,  384 
Botsford  V.  Morehouse                     1259 
Bott  V.  Burnell                             410,  414 
Boughton  V.  Bough  ton                      1277 
V.  Sandilands                       218 
Boulden  v.  Lanahan                         1559 
Bouldin  v.  Miller                        660,  667 
V.  Reynolds  95 
Boulo  V.  New  Orleans  M.  &  T.  R. 

Co.  472 

Boults  u.  Mitchell  1604 

Bounds  V.  Little  1102,  1564 

Bourne  v.  Bourne  296 

Bours  V.  Zachariah     1207,  1208,  1209, 

1212 

Boursot  V.  Savage  1533 

Boutwell  V.  Steiner  1453 

Bovee  v.  Hinde  1224,  1236,  1237, 

1269,  1292 

Bowden  v.  Bland  1214 

V.  Parrish  1125 

Bowe  V.  Bowe  104 

Bowen  v.  Allen  326 

V.  Beck  798 

V.  Bell  303,  304 

V.  Bowen  715,  716 

V.  Conner     503,  505,  510,  511, 

534,  549,  551 

V.  Fassett  1455 

V.  Galloway  323 

V.  Guild  126 

V.  Hughes  111 

V.  Preston  1862,  1866 

V.  Prout  400,  1385 

V.  Swander  1892 

V.  Thrall  828,  896 

V.  ^Vickersbam  337 

Bower  v.  Bank  239 

V.  Bowen  1969 

V.  McCormick  260 

Bowers  v.  Andrews  344 

V.  Bowers  1600,  1603 

V.  Hechtman  1117 

xxxiii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Bowers  v.  Oyster  1-139 

Bowos  r.  Law  815 

Bowie  V.  Brahe  1-2 

V.  Stonestreet  44 

Bowker  v.  Bunlekin  1310 

V.  Seymour  718 

Bowlbv  V.  Thunder  1168 

Bowles  V.  Beal  331 

V.  Br  ice  323 

V.  Wathan  99 

Bowling  V.  Cook  1420 

V.  Uoark  125 

Bowman  v.  Anderson  1566 

V.  GriiHth  1292,  1396 

V.  Robb  1067 

V.  Taylor  257 

V.  Walthen  503 

V.  Weltig  1163 

Bowne  v.  Wolcott     845,  928,  943,  947, 

953,  954 

Bowser  t'.  Cole  1339,1350 

V.  Cox  1930 

Boxheimer  v.  Gunn  285,  1390 

Boyce  v.  McCulloch  1568 

V.  Montauk  Gas  Coal  Co.      153 

V.  Shiver  1416,  1478 

V.  St.  Louis  189 

V.  Stanton  1455 

V.  Washburn  1605 

Boyd  V.  Anderson  1404 

V.  Belmont  930 

V.  De  La  Montaigne        103,  112 

V.  Dunlap  275 

V.  Graves  354,  359 

V.  Mundorf  1413,  1497 

V.  Slavback  1287 

V.  Turpin  1026 

Boyden  v.  Boyden  158 

Boydston  v.  Sumpter  384,  389 

Boyer  v.  Amet  968 

V.  Beiryman  54,  68 

V.  Joffrion  1372,  1559 

V.  Williams  1619 

Boykin  u.  Rain  1190,  1192 

r.  Rosenfield  1601,  1605 

V.  Smith  1138 

Bovle  V.  Edwards      924,  944,  969,  984 

Boynton  v.  Rees  267,  1529,  1570 

V.  Reynolds  1071 

Bozeman  v.  Browning  11,  13,  35 

Brabrook  v.  Bank  1220,  1289 

Brace  v.  Marlborough  1402 

V.  Yale  1656 

Bracken  v.  Cooper      1836,  1840,  1852 

V.  Jones  1867,  1874 

V.  Miller  1529,  1534 

Bracket  t).  Norcross  1865.  1S66 

xxxiv 


Brackett  v.  Barney      1252,  1303,  1305 
V.  Evans  305 

V.  Goddard  IGOl,  1612,  1651 


V.  Ridlon 

1529 

Bradbury  v.  Davis 

1394 

Bradford  v.  Bennett 

1782 

V.  Cressey 

479,  488,  490 

V.  Dawson 

1159,  1164, 

1165, 1167 

V.  Griflin 

575,  578,  614 

V.  Kimberly 

1908 

V.  Randall 

1063,  1067,  1080 

Bradish  v.  Yocnm 

335,  33S 

Bradlee  v.  Whitney 

1514,  1517 

Bradley  v.  Ballard 

144 

V.  Boynton 

1926 

V.  Bryan 

1409 

V.  Dike 

-  870 

V.  Fuller 

1960,  1967 

V.  Irish 

88 

V.  Peixoto 

660,  670 

V.  Rice 

501 

V.  Riches 

1533 

V.  Tittabawassee      Boom 

Co. 

539 

V.  Walker 

753,  782,  783 

V.  West 

1130,  1133,  1134 

V.  Whitesides                     10'22 

Bradner  v.  Faulkner 

1619 

Bradshaw  v.  Crosby         856,  891,  958, 

962,  96  7,  986 

V.  Van  Winkle  6 

Bradstreet  v.  Clark  678,  730 

V.  Dunham      431,  432,  466 

V.  Huntington      367,  1879, 

1 880 

V.  Oneida  16  7 

Brady  v.  Evans  575,  587 

V.  Huff  1259,  1862 

V.  Peck  968 

V.  Spurck      928,  933,  974,  1394 

Bragg  w.Paulk  1396 

Brainard  v.  Boston  &  N.  Y.  Cent. 

R.  Co.  449,  463 

V.  Hudson  1563 

Braintree  v.  Battles  1836 

Braman  v.  Bingham       962,  967,  1303, 

1304,  1311,  1313 

V.  Stiles  664 

V.  Wilkinson  1563 

Bramberry's  Estate    1792,  1797,  1800, 

1802,  1806,  1809 

Bramlett  v.  Roberts  1487 

Bramwell  v.  Lacy  766 

Branch  f.  Atlantic,  &c.  R.  Co.         147 

r.  Griffin  1392,1393,154  7 

V.  Jesup  142,  146 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Branch  v.  Makeig 

1853 

Brand  v.  McMahon 

1753 

Brandlyn  v.  Ord 

1529 

Brandon  v.  Brown 

35 

V.  Leddy 

"    337 

V.  Robinson 

660,  664,  670 

Brands  v.  Foster     842,  928,  943,  953, 

967 
V.  Ogdon  397 

Branger  v.  Manciet  893 

Branham  v.  Turnpike  Co.        485,  486 
Brankley  v.  Tomeny  1213 

Brann  v.  Elzey  155,  231,  583,  618 

Brannan  v.  Mesick  619 

Brannon  v.  Brannon  1101 

Branson  v.  Caruthers  1248 

;;.  Studebaker  311,  1G52 

Brantley  v.  Wolf      5,  6,  9,  23,  25,  27, 

31,  33 
Brasington  v.  Hanson  233,  583,  592 
Brasted  v.  Sutton  1497 

Brattle  Square  Church  v.  Grant 

712,  713,  714 

Bratton's  Appeal  1463 

Bratton  v.  Adams  331 

V.  Clawson  398 

V.  Massey  575 

Braxon  v.  Biessler  480,  484 

Bray  v.  Adams  326,  339 

V.  Clapp  38 

V.  Hussey         524,  531,  623,  632, 

647,  654 

Brazleton  v.  Brazleton  1585 

Breathwit  v.  Bank  1245,  1284 

Breck  v.  Blanohard  79 

Breckenridge  v.  Ormsby  2,  13,  54, 

64 
V.  Todd  1239,  1463 

Breckinridge  v.  Denny  155 

Breed  v.  Conley  1481 

V.  Osborne  563,  564,  568 

Breen  v.  Donnelly  437 

Breese  r.  Bange  1419 

Brem  v.  Lockhart        1380,  1389,  1392 
Bremer  v.  Case  1524 

Brendel  v.  Klopp  1994 

Brendle  v.  German  Ref.  Cong.         650 
Breneiser  v.  Davis  381,  383 

Brennan  v.  Whitaker  1670,  1C72, 

1732,  1735 
Brereton  v.  Bennett  1125,  1127 

Bresnahan  v.  Bresnahan  646 

Bresse}-  v.  Gross  55 

Brevard  v.  Neely  1217,  1267 

Brevoort  v.  Brevoort  1986 

Brewer  v.  Browne  1541 

V.  Hardy  268,  269,  313 


Brewer  v.  Marshall 

737,  780,  781, 

782,  784,  787 

Brewington  v.  Jenkins 

430 

Brewster  v.  Carnes 

1421,  1422 

V.  Kitchell 

6  75 

Brewton  v.  Watson 

314 

Brice  v.  Osgood 

1947 

Bricker  v.  Bricker 

858,  860 

Brickett  v.  Spofford 

126 

Bridge  v.  Wellington 

311,  568 

Bridge  Co.  v.  Schaubacher               452 

Bridgeport  Bank  v.  New  York  & 

N.  H.  R.  Co. 

1331 

Bridger  v.  Pierson 

504,  506,  528, 

529,  548 

Bridges  v.  Bidwell 

2,  1423 

I'.  Winters 

1340 

Bridgewater  v..  Bolton 

575 

Bridgford  v.  Barbour 

1884,  1887 

Briggs  r.  Beach 

274 

V.  Boyd 

89 

V.  Glenn 

1349 

V.  Jones 

1583 

V.  Morse 

96  7 

V.  Prosser 

131 

r.  Rice 

1514,  1547 

Brigham  v.  Broun 

1455 

V.  Evt'leth 

1917 

V.  Fayerweather     49,  63,  67, 

V.  Shattuck 

1  \j 
728 

V.  Smith 

534 

Bright  V.  Adams 

1230 

V.  Buckman     1436,  1437,  1483, 

1489,  1559,  1568,  1571 

Brightman  r.  Brightman  1560 

Brimmer  v.  Boston  912 

Brinckerhoff  v.  Lansing       1484,  1521, 

1581 
t'.  Lawrence  1277 

Brinegar  v.  Chaffin  257 

Bringholff  v.  Munzenmaier  1734 

Brinkley  v.  Bethel  1061,  1062 

Brinkmjin  v.  Jones      1511,  1517,  1522, 


1563, 

1576, 

1578 

Brinley  v.  Kupfer 

1917 

?•.  Mann 

1050, 

1079, 

l(t80 

V.  Whiting 

121 

,  140 

Brinton  v.  Seevers 

1177, 

1178 

Briscoe  r.  Power 

1553 

/•.  Puckett 

363 

Bristol  Manuf.  Co.  v 

.  Barnes 

466 

Bristow  V.  Cormican 

496 

V.  Wood 

780 

British  &  Am.  Mort. 

Co.  V. 

Long 

326 

Brittain  v.  McKay 

1627 

V.  Work 

1220, 

1248, 

1303 

XXXV 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Brittin  c.  Handy        1836,  1838,  1840, 
1852,  18(i2 
Brittimun  v.  Jones  1886 

Britten's  Appeal  1403,  1407 

Britton  v.  Ferry  437 

V.  Stanley  1364 

V.  Wriglitnian  213 

Hroadnax  r.  Baker  481 

Broadwater  v.  Darne  78 

Broadway  v.  State  686,  692 

Brockenborough  v.  Melton  1452 

Brocket  v.  Fescue  303 

Brockway  r.  Harrington  101,  109, 

113,  267,  275,  292 
Broderick's  Will,  In  re  1867 

Brodie  v.  Watkius  837 

Brolasky  v.  Furey  1239 

Broliar  v.  Marquis  602,  608 

Bromley  v.  Mitchell  1232 

Bronner  v.  Frauenthal  1102 

Bronson  v.  Coffin     785,  786,  793,  794, 
798,  958,  1033 
V.  Wanzer  1547 

Brookbank  c.  Kennard  42,  44 

Brooke's  Appeal  1451,  1463,  1472 

Brookfield  v.  Goodrich  1455 

Brookhaven  v.  Strong  472 

Brooklyn  Life  Ins.    Co.  v.   Bled- 
soe '  703 
Brookman  v.  Kurzman              335,  336 
V.  Smith                            592 
Brooks  V.  Allen                                 1340 
V.  Berryhill                          79,  88 
V.  Black         968,  972,  981,  986 
V.  Britt                                    338 
V.  Chaplin                   1132,  1165 
V.  Davey                                1994 
V.  Fowle                                1862 
V.  Isbell                                 1251 
V.  Jones                                   593 
V.  Kearns  47 
V.  Lester                     1431,  1433 
V.  Marbury                 1113,  1284 
V.  Moody                930,  962,  967 
V.  Owen                                1391 
V.  Reynolds                              770 
V.  Rooney                                254 
Broome  v.  Beers                    1521,  1582 
Brophy  v.  Richeson          424,  484,  498 
Brophy  Min.  Co.  v.  Brophy   &  D. 
Gold  Min.  Co.         1563,  1568,  1575, 

1578 
Brotherton  v.  Hatt  1534,  1537 

Broughton  v.  Howe  1968 

Broussard  v.  Dull        1133,  1170,  1459 
Brouwer  i-.  Jones  765,  771,  780 

Brower  v.  Callender  92 


Brower  v.  Fisher  51 

V.  Witmeyer  1409,  1412, 

1413, 1425 

Brown  v.  Allen  913,  1)19,  95S 

V.  Anderson  323,  .503,  :>W, 

556 
V.  Austen        1267,  1282,  1307, 
1324,  1325 
V.  Bailey  404 

V.  Baldwin  1678,  1693 

V.  Banner  Coal    &  Oil  Co. 

1394,  1395,  145] 
0.  Bates  1824 

V.  Bennett  718 

V.  Blydenburgh  1427 

W.Brown     51,547,1009,1012, 
1217,     1218,    1230,    1,233, 
1234,  1267,  1271,  1273, 
1795,  1958,  1970 
V.  Caldwell  623,  649 

V.  Carter  283 

V.  Chadbourne  477,  480 

V.  Chambers  331,  339 

V.  Coble  339,  343 

V.  Cockerell  369 

V.  Cody  1529 

V.  Cohn  1081 

V.  Combs  223,  237 

V.  Conner  555 

V.  Corbin  1697,  1699 

V.  Cranberry  Iron,  &c.  Co. 

339,  418,  503,  516,  1958 
V.  Danforth  1240,  1279 

V.  Dean  1462 

V.  Dickerson  968 

V.  Dressier  37 

V.  Eastman  1093,  1547 

V.  Elmendorf  1526 

V.  Farran  1144,  1159 

V.  Feagins  918 

V.  Ferrell  602 

V.  Fox  1694 

V.  Freed  63 

V.  Gaffney  1466,  1563 

V.  Gale  1814 

V.  Graham  1862 

V.  Great  East.  R.  Co.  781 

V.  Guice  337,  338 

V.  Heard  413,  466,  479 

V.  Hearon  981 

V.  Hogle  1846,  1873,  1875 

V.  Homan         1835,  1836,  1921 
V.  Huger  381 

V.  Jackson  1400 

V.  Jordhal  1071 

V.  King  131 

V.  Kirkman  1451,  1472 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Brown  v.  Lazarus 

1458 

V.  Lunt 

!122,  1435 

V.  Lyon 

602 

V.  McCune 

5 

V.  Manter 

1109 

V.  Mattocks 

575 

V.  Meady 

520 

V.  Metz 

889,  939 

V.  Miles 

52,  54 

V.  Moore 

1125 

V.  Morrill 

381,  437 

V.  Nichols 

1660 

V.  Feck 

79,  91 

V.  Pforr 

1036 

V.  Pierce 

79,  81,  85 

V.  Pinkbam 

1340 

V.  Rawlings 

271,  291 

V.  Reyuolds     1252,  1303,  1304 
V.  Rickard  505,  521 

V.  Simons  1489 

V.  Simpson  1442 

V.    South     Boston     Sav. 

Bank  855,  857,  860 

V.  Staples  979,  988 

V.  Stutson  1310 

V.  Swift  1161 

V.  Taylor  924 

V.  Thissell  551 

V.  Thurston  1624 

V.  Tomlinson  840 

V.  Turner  1697 

V.  Vandergrift  loDS 

V.  Vanlier  1300 

V.  Yolkening    1563,  1568,  1570 
V.  Warren  346,  1937 

V.  Welch  1523,  1527 

V.  Wellington  1888,  1933 

V.  Wells  139 

V.  Wheeler  1942,  1947 

V.  Willey  339 

V.  Young  853,  908 

Brown  Oil  Co.  v.  Caldwell     481,  482, 

490 
Brownback  o.  Ozias  1495 

Browne  v.  Kennedy  480 

Brownell  v.  Talcott  87 

Browning  v.  Atkinson      355,  356,  384, 

3S9 

v.  Wright  834 

Brown  son  w.  Hull        1792,  1800,  1814 

V.  Scaiilan  1136 

Broyles  v.  Waddel  1997 

Bruce  v.  Croniar  239 

V.  Nicholson     1792,  1802,  LSI  2, 

1814 

V.  Osgood  1942 

V.  Wood  316,  318 


Bruckner  c.  Lawrence  437 

Brumagim  v.  Tillinghast  87 

Brundage  v.  Biggs  1559 

Bruns  v.  Schreiber     861,  863,  880,  951 
Brunson  v.  Brooks  1563 

Brunswick-Balke-Collender  Co.  v. 

Brackett  1162,  1165,  1179 

Brunswick  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Grossman 

411,  413,  414 

Bryan  v.  Atwater  1881 

V.  Bradley      203,  208,  313,  568 

V.  Harvey  1547,  1563 

V.  Lawrence  1711,  1721 

V.  Ramirez  1163 

V.  Stump  1041,  1185,  1949 

V.  Tormey  1522 

V.  Uland  896 

V.  Wash  1218,  1220,  1267, 

1276,  1277 

V.  Wisner  321,  326 

Bryant  v.  Bryant  1217,  1286 

V.  Crosby  1620 

V.  Erskine  646 

V.  Hunter  303 

V.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.    381,  388 

V.  Peck,  &c.  Co.  86,  88 

V.  Wilson  828 

Brydon  v.  Campbell     1441,  1468,  1469 

Buccleuch  v.  Board  of  Works  4  71 

V.  Wakefield  538 

Buchan  v.  Sumner  1404 

Buchanan  v.  Ashdown  3o6 

V.  Balkum  1547 

V.  Griggs  22 

V.  Hazzard  37 

V.  Hubbard      5,  7,  8,  9,  23, 

25,  31 

V.    International   Bank 

1368,  1482,  1484 

V.  Kauffman  923,  925 

W.King      1836,  1852,  1879, 

1921 

V.  Sahlein  85 

V.  Stewart  418 

V.  Tracy  254 

V.  Whitman  320,  402 

V.  Wise  1102,  1525 

Buck  V.  Adams  752 

V.  Axt  87,  89 

V.  Backarack  752 

V.  Holt  1568 

V.  Martin  1906 

V.  Nurton  1647 

V.  Paine  1513,  1517,  1522 

V.  Pickwell-  1600,  1603 

V.  SpolYord  1884,  1917 

V.  Squicrs  488,  164  7 

xxxvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Bnckelew  v.  Estell  723 

Biiokey  v.  Riiokcy  48,  49,  101 

Buckiii'ifhaiii  r.  llanna  997,  1488 

Buckle  r.  FnnUTicks  76S 

V.  Milclu'll  293 

Buoklon  V.  llustcrlik  1148,  1175 

Buckler's  C:u^e  5G2 

Buckley's  Ai)peal  305 

Buckley  i\  Early  1J16 

Bucknall  v.  Story  "87 

Buckuam  r.  Bucknam  448 

Buckner  v.  Anderson  355,  381,  388 

V.  Ilendrick  383 

V.  Street  833,  901 

Buckout  I'.  Swift  1760 

Budd  i\  Brooke  384,  564,  565 

V.  United  Oarriasie  Co.            883 
Buell  I'.  Irwin     1146,  1163,  1171,  1213 

Buetell  V.  Courand  2000 

Bueter  v.  Bueter  81 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.   Co.  v. 

Stigeler  324,  384,  400 

Buffington  v.  Gerrish  1390 

V.  Grosvenor  163 

Buff  urn  V.  Green  271,  272,  1240 

V.  Hutchinson  575 

Buford  I'.  Gray  "        386 

Bugbee's  Appeal  1513,  1563 

Bugbee  v.  Sargent  644 

Bu'-gy  Co.  V.  Pegram  1135 

Building  Asso.  v.  Clark  1380,  1501 

Bulkley  v.  Buffington  1292 

Bull  V.  Follett  825 

V.  Griswold  1619,  1620,  1627 

BuUard  v.  Briggs  271,  295,  298 

V.  Goffe  603 

Bullen  V.  Denning  531 

Bullene  u.  Garrison  1122 

Bullitt  v.  Taylor  1292,1297 

Bullock  V.  Battenhousen  1555 

V.  Hay  ward  1925 

V.  Knox  1963 

V.  Wallingford  1455 

V.  Whipp  1499 

V.  Wilson  481 

Bumgardner  r.  Edwards  1942,  1947 

Bumpus  V.  Platncr  1529,  1530 

Bunce  v.  Gallagher  10;39 

Bunch  V.  Hurst  99 

V.  Nicks  626,  527 

Bundy  V.  Birdsall  237 

V.  Iron  Co.  1280 

V.  Ridenour  975 

Bunker  v.  Gordon  1532 

V.  Steward     .  87 

Bunn  V.  Bunn  526 

v.  Wells  582 


Bunn  V.  Winfhrop         277,  1277,  1278 

Runnel  v.  Witherow  281 

Bunting  v.  Jones  1409,  1415 

r.  Ricks  1517 

Burbach  v.  Schweinler  424,  427, 

456,  458 

Burbank  v.  Gould  303 

j;.  Pillsbury         647,  771,  798 

Burch  V.  Burch  1884,  1886 

V.  Carter  1547 

Burchard  v.  Roberts  1846 

Burdell  v.  Taylor  432 

Burdeno  v.  Amperse  41 

Burdick  v.  Burdick  121 

Buren  v.  Hubbell  931,  959 

Burford  y.  McCue  217 

Burge  V.  Smith  316,  319 

Burger  v.  Miller  1042 

Burgess  v.  Pollock  50 

Burgett  V.  Taliaferro  1846 

;;.  Williford  1846,  1847 

Burgh  11.  Francis  1404 

Burghardt  v.  Turner  1819 

Burgwin  v.  Bishop  1365 

Burhaus  v.  Ilutcheson  1424 

V.  Van  Zandt  1846 

Burk  V.  Burk  892 

I'.  Clements  962 

V.  Hill  880,  881,  882 

V.  Sproat  1267,  1271 

Burke  v.  Adams  163,  121S,  1234, 

1276,  1290,  1293 

V.  Allen  1486 

V.  Beveridge  953,  1547 

V.  Gould  89 

V.  Nichols  846 

V.  Taylor  103,  115 

Burkett  v.  Scarborough  1188 

Burkholder  v.  Casad  1218,  1228, 

1277 

V.  Markley      381,  389,  432 

Burkle  v.  Levy  1 1 7 

Burks  V.  Hubbard  1030 

Burleigh  v.  Coffin  302 

Burleson  v.  McDermott  1560 

Burley  c  Russell  5 

Bian  V.  Burn  1404 

Hurnaby  v.  Equitable  Revers.  Soc.       2 

Burnap  i;.  Sharpsteen  1220,  1314 

Burnell  v.  Maloney  363 

Burnett  v.  Burnett  613 

V.  McCluey        330,  400,  1067, 

1182,    1188,  1346,   1359, 

1364 

V.  Pratt  1824 

V.  Strong  619 

V.  Wright  1331 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Bumham  v.  Ayer       1340,  1342,  1345, 
1349,  1365 
.V.  Brennan  1517 

V.  Burnliam  674 

V.  Dorr  '    305 

V.  Farmers'    Loan    and 

Trust  Co.  1453 

V.  Kid  well  54,  68 

Burns  v.  Berry  1484,  1486 

r.  Byrne  1848,  1892 

V.  Dreyfus  1886 

V.  Lynde  1328 

V.  Martin  354 

V.  Weesner  579,  614 

Burnside  v.  Twitchell  1667,  1721, 

1731,  1745,  1747 

V.  Watkins  1972 

V.  Wayman  1331 

Burr  V.  Lamaster  877,  882 

V.  McDonald  1051,  1053 

V.  Mills  1639 

V.  Mueller  1838 

V.  Wilson  7 

Burrell  v.  Burrell  369 

Burrill  v.  Nahant  Bank  1082 

Burris  v.  Fitch  364 

Burroughs  v.  Richman  76 

Burrow  v.  Railroad  Co.  323 

Burrus  v.  Meadors  1862,  1866 

Bursinger  v.  Bank  74 

Burson  V.  Andes  1196 

Burt  c.  Baldwin  1575 

V.  Busch  438,  443 

V-  Cassety  1563 

V-  Dewey  936 

V.  Quisenberry       49,  97,  98,  101, 

109,  110,  117 

V.  Rattle  144 

Burtners  v.  Keran  997 

Burton's  Appeal  141 

Burton  v.  Bovd  1228,  1286 

V.  Le'Roy         279,  1060,  1071, 

1076 

v.  Martz  1476 

V.  Pettibone  1144 

V.  Pressly  1348 

V.  Reeds  968,  997 

V.  Scherpf  1609 

V.  Wells  1259 

Burwell  V.  Fauber  1547 

i\  Jackson  829 

Bury  V.  Young  1226,  12.34,  1273, 

1309 
Busch  V.  Huston  1848,  1873,  1876 

Buse  V.  Russell  485 

Busenbarke  v.  Ramey  1392 

Busev  V.  Reese  285 


Bush  r.  Bradley 

1935 

V.  Brown 

85 

V.  Bush 

1404,  1527 

V.  Gamble 

1913 

V.  Golden 

1482 

V.  Johnson 

109,  111 

V.  Lathrop 

1425, 

1427,  1486 

Bushell  V.  Bushell  1499 

Bushey  v.  South  Mountain  M.   & 

I.  Co.  341 

Buss  V.  Dyer  534 

Bussing  V.  Crain  1453 

Buszard  v.  Capel  1637,  1649 

Butcher  v.  Peterson  944,  968 

V.  Yocum  1513 

Butler's  Case  666 

Butler  V.  Barkley  1396 

V.  Barnes       928,  930,  932,  969, 

983 

V.  Brown  1170 

V.  Butler  1785 

V.  Gale  881,  882 

V.  Heustis  602 

V.  Maury  1406 

V.  Myer  273 

V.  Page  1667,  1745 

V.  Phelps  1576 

V.   Roys  1965,  1977 

V.  Stevens    1513,  1524,  1568, 

1570,  1576 

V.  Thornburg  1409 

V.  Viele  1499 

Butler  Savings  Bank  v.  Osborne     1S28 

Butler  &  Baker's  Case  1240 

Butman  v.  Hussey  833 

Butrick  v.  Tilton  1248 

Butt  V.  Riffe  882,  892,  910 

Butte  Hardware  Co.  v.  Schwab       175 

Butterfield  v.  Beall       1022,  1028, 1185 

r.  Smith      1394,  1400,  1401 

Butternuth   v.   St.    Louis    Bridge 

Co.  480,  485,  486 

Buttlar  V.  Rosenblath  1792,  1800, 

1X02,  1812 

Buttrick  v.  Holden  1513,  1514 

Butts  V.  Cuthbertson  1082 

Buzzell  V.  Cummings  1741,  1746, 

1748,  1755 

V.  Gallagher      1942,  1947 

Byam  v.  Bickford  238,  241 

Byars  v.   Spencer    1217,  1218,  1220, 

1234,  1236,  1240,  1241,  1267,  1269, 

1289,  1301 

Byassee  v.  Reese  16o6,  1608 

Bybee  v.  Hageman  338,  402 

Byers  v.  Carll  is 78 

V.  Engles  1563 

xxxix 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Byers  v.  Fowler 

V.  IMcClanahan 

V.  Mullen 
Byington  r.  IMoore 
Byles  V.  Tome 
Byram  v.  (lordon 
Byrne  v.  JMoreliouse 
Byrnes  v.  Rich 

Byrora  v.  Chapin 


1527 

1218,  1328 

303 

1240,  1276 

1420,  1424 

1555 

256 

944,  947,  948, 

949    I 

1761,  1762   ' 


Cabeen  v.  Breckenridge  1563 

Cabell  V.  Gnibb  1163 

Cable  V.  Cable  526,  1109,  1175 

V.  Ellis  1588 

Cadeau  «.  Elliott  434,  43H 

Cadell  V.  Allen  1021,  1022,  1040 

Cadmus  v.  Fagan  869,  872 

Cadwalader  v.  Tryon  828 

Cady  V.  Shepherd        1025,  1035,  1832 
Cagger  v.  Lansing  1324 

Cahalan  v.  Monroe  1529 

Cahall  V.  Citizens'  Mut.  Building 

Asso.  1184,  1211 

Cain  V.  Cox  1517 

V.  Furlow  1865,  1880 

V.  Hanna  1463 

V.  Ligon  44 

V.  McGuire  1608 

V.  Monroe  120 

V.  Warford  48 

Caines  v.  Grant  1771,  1773 

Cains  v.  Jones  280 

Cairo  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Parrott 

1338 

Cake's  Appeal  1410 

Calais  v.  Bradford  394 

Calcote  V.  Elkin  948 

Calder  v.  Chapman     1462,  1466,  1482, 

1488,  1502,  1506 

Caldwell  V.  Alsop         1619,  1622,  1631 

V.  Carrington  1508 

V.  Center  331 

V.    East   Broad   Top    R. 

Co.  681 

V.  Fulton  537,  538,  1595, 

1596 
V.  Kirkpatrick  918 

V.  Neely  1879 

V.  Parker  1341 

V.  Parmer  244,  1831 

Cales  ?;.  Miller  1143 

Calhoun  v.  Curtis  1888,  1993 

i'.  Ilannan  310 

V.  Hays  1942,  1943,  1949 

Calhoun    Co.    v.    American    Emi- 
grant Co.  1314 

xl 


California  State  Tel.  Co.  v.  Alta 
Tel.  Co.  175 

Calkins  v.  Copley  .   858,  860 

V.  Steiubach  1990 

Call  V.  Carroll  4  76 

Callanan  v.  Merrill  1401 

Callaway  v.  Fash  1177,1178 

V.  Hcarn  303 

Callaway  M.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Clark        1(;9 
Gallery  v.  Miller  102 

Callis  V.  Day  29,  31,  158 

Calmady  v.  Calmady  1955 

Calmes  v.  McCracken  1410 

Calton  V.  Lewis  321,  323 

Calumet,   &c.  Dock  Co.  r.  Russell 

1128,  1159,  1165,  1189,  1196, 
1197,  1206 
Calumet  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  La- 

throp  1712, 1717 

Calvert  v.  Aldrich  1898,  1899 

V.  Nickles  295 

Calvin  v.  Bowman  1481 

V.  Shinier  1628 

Cambridge  Valley  Bank  v.  Delano 

1361S,  1517,  1522,  1547,  1554,  1556 

Camden  v.  Creel  484,  490 

Cameron  v.  Culkins  1447 

V.  Lewis  994 

Cammack  v.  Soran  1392 

Cameron  v.  Thurmond  1968,  1979 

Camp  V.  Camp  ;!()0 

V.  Carpenter       1196,  1201,  1205 

V.  Cleary  664 

V.  Forrest  135 

Campau  v.  Campau     1821,  1862,  1866, 

1875 

V.  Dubois  1882 

V.  Godfrey  1976 

Campbell's  A])peal  1434 

Campbell  v.  Brackenridge  1567 

V.  Campbell  102,  1846, 

1873,  1992 

V.  Carruth        302,  323,  330, 

400,  1248 

V.  Clark  437 

V.  Dearborn  1578 

V.  Hill  50,  68 

V.  Johnson        327,  337,  381, 

398,  402 

V.  Jones  1259,  i;i03 

V.  Ketcham  76 

V.  Kuhn  156,  159,  1276 

V,  Lowe  1955 

V.  McClure  869,  930 

V.  Mining  Co.  10.54 

V.  INIovgan  346,  1272 

V.  O'Neill  16  7:i 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Campbell  i'.  Pope  1051,  1054 

V.  Roach  1541 

V.  Roddy     1736,  1746,  1755 
V.  Shivers  1^62 

V.  Stokes  1!)66 

V.  Taul  1212 

V.  Thomas  1234,  1311 

V.  Vedder  1420,  1423, 

1427,  1484 
V.  Wallace  1780,  1925 

Campbell   Printing   Press  Co.  v. 

Walker  .  1381 

Campion  v.  Cotton  280,  281 

Canada  Southern  R.   Co.  v.  Geb- 

hard  189 

Canal  &  Dock  Co.  v.  Russell  1501 

Canal  Appraisers  v.  People      484,  499 
Canal  Commissioners  v.  People       472, 
481,  484,  499,  501 
Canal  Company  v.  Kinzie  367 

Canal  Trustees  v.  Haven         386,  448, 

452 
Canandaigua     Academy    v.     Mc- 
Keclmie  1082,  1100,  1119,  1159, 

1447 
Canedy  v.  Marcv  522,  529 

Canfield  v.  Ford  1596 

Canning  v.  Pinkham  1240 

Cannon  v.  Barry      579,  603,  609,  610, 

614 

V.  Boutwell  37 

V.  Cannon     1217,  1218,  1220, 

1243,  1255,  1289 

V.  Deming      1109,  1176,  1177, 

1178 

V.  Emmans  324,  340,  383 

V.  Handley      1312,  1314,  1321 

V.  Hare  16G6,  1767 

V.  Stockmon  1881 

Cansler  v.  Henderson  491,  494 

Cantagrel  v.  Von  Lupin  323 

Capehart  v.  Foster      1702,  170,3,  1707 

Capell  V.  Moses  1963 

Capen  r.  Peckham     1668,  1670,  16  71, 

1672,  1714 

V.  Stevens  450 

Caperton  v.  Gregory  1866,  1880 

v.  Hall  1086,  1090 

Capps  r.  Holt  323,  344 

Capron  v.  Kingman  506 

Caraway  r.  Caraway  274 

'■.  Chancy  355 

Carbine  /•.  Pringle        1502,  1506,  1520 

Carbon  Block  Coal  Co.  v.  Murphy 

657,  699,  705 
Card  r.  Patterson  1188,  1529 

Cardell  v.  Ryder  44 


Carden  v.  Tuck  1651 

Cardigan  v.  Armitage      503,  507,  533 

Cardwell  v.  Sprigg  121 

Carey  v.  Boyle  1414 

V.  Dennis  1233 

V.  Rae  1658 

Carithers  v.  Weaver  1846 

Carleton  v.  Byington  1380 

V.  Lombard!  1172,  1396 

Carley  r.  Parton  1937 

Carli  V.  Tayior  1428 

Carlin  v.  Ritter  1768 

CarHsle  v.  Blamire  239,  801 

V.  Campbell  1011 

V.  Carlisle  1143,  1145 

V.  Jumper  1371 

Carlow  V.  Aultman  167,  175,  182, 

190 
Carlson  v.  Duluth  Short  Line  Ry. 

Co.  504,  531,  542 

Carlton  v.  Cameron  1232 

Carmichael,  In  re  49 

Carnall  v.  Duval  1449,  1465 

Carnes  v.  Piatt  1241,  1254 

Carney  v.  Emmons  1408 

Carolina  Sav.  Bank  v.  McMahon 

596 
Carpenter  v.  Allen       1719,  1741,  1753 
V.  Black  Hawk  r.  G.  M. 

Co.  144,  148,  150 

V.  BuUer  256,  257,  333 

V.  Carpenter        5,  48,  1836, 

1845 

V.  Dexter  1109,  1110,  1130, 

1132,  1142,  1143,  1153, 

1159,  1165,  1179 

V.  Graber    638,  656,  694 

V.  Longan  1389 

V.  Monks        364,  438 

V.  Schermerhorn     1953 

V.  Tatro  44 

V.  Van  Olinder   583,  602, 

604,  610 

V.  Walker     1673,  1712, 

1714,  1719,  1720,  1741, 

1753 

V.  Westcott  732 

Carpentier  v.  Mendenhall    1865,  1877. 

1919 

Carper  v.  McDowell  1442 

Carr's  Estate  1993 

Carr  v.  Caldwell  1415 

V.  Clough  31 

V.  Dooley  303,  305,  861,  872 

V.  Estill  233 

r.  Frick  Coke  Co.  1196 

V.  Holliday  6S 

xli 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Carr  v.  Lowry 

795 

V.  Walliice 

1521 

C.arrell  r.  Potter 

SO 

Carrick  v.  French 

1310 

Carrier  v,  Hampton 

1010 

Carri"-an  r.  Drake     602,  603,  609,  610 

V.  Evans  1063 

r.  Peroni  106 

Carrington  v.  Potter  1073 

V.  Roots  1618 

Carroll,  In  re  97 

Carroll  v.  East  St.  Louis  173,  184, 

185 

V.  McCuUough  1736 

Carson  i\  Blazer  481 

r.  Cabeen  897,  978 

V.  Clark  1619 

V.  Fuhs  602,  603 

V.  McCaslin  563,  568 

V.  Railsback  321 

V.  Ray  339,  346 

I'.  Thompson  1216 

Carter  r.  Alexander  829 

V.  Beck  898 

V.  Branson  650,  688 

V.  Bnrley  1064 

V.  Bvistamente  994 

r.  Carter  256,  1902,  1997 

V.  Challen  1563 

V.  Champion     1099,  1435.  1441 

V.  Chandron      990,  1040,  1041, 

1067,  1159,  1168 

V.  Corley  1099 

V.  Denman     852,  903,  928,  930, 

932,  933 

V.  Grimshaw  289 

V.  Hallahan     1409,  1436,  1437, 

1522 

V.  Jackson  1099 

V.  Moulton  1303 

V.  Penn     1071,  1852,  1853, 

1857 

V.  Portland  1517 

V.  Railway  Co.     477,  484,  488, 

491,  494 

V.  Reddish  602 

?;.  White  410,417 

V.  Williams  782 

V.  Wingard  512 

Cartmill  v.  Hopkins  1071 

Carty  v.  Connolly        97,  99,  109,  113, 

115,  271,  295 

Caruthers  v.  McLaran  1159,  1168 

Carver  v.  Coffman      1892,  1900,  1902, 

1903,  1981,  1997 

V.  Fennimore  1887,  1892, 

1898,  1906 

xlii 


Carver  v,  Jackson  256 

V.  Loutiiain  295,  862 

V.  Smith  1792,  1794,  1802, 

1803,  1,S12 

Carvillei;.  Hutchins  381,  411 

V.  Jacks  968,  970 

Cary  v.  Daniels  488 

V.  White  285,  1390,  1393 

Casborne  v.  Barsham  103 

Case  V.  Case  99 

V.  Dexter         326,  336,  338,  343, 

381,  398,  410,  414 

V.  Dwire  '  664,  670 

V.  Green  336 

V.  Haight  505 

V.  Hargadine  1472 

V.  Kelly  177,  178 

V.  Owen  1772,  1773,  1786, 

1795 

Case  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Garven 

1712,  1715,  1719,  1744,  1748,  1752 
Casey  v.  Dunn  381 

V.  Inloes  471 

Cashion  v.  Faina  2000 

Casoni  v.  Jerome  1338,  1340 

Caspar  v.  Jamison  381 

Cassedy  v.  Jackson  119,  120 

Cassell  ?;.  Cooke  1143 

Cassiday  v.  McKenzie  1037 

Cassidy's  Succession  921 

Cassidy  v.  Charlestown    Savings 

Bank    326,  329,  335,  413 
V.  KUiije  1559 

Cassilly  v.  Rhodes  1628 

Castle  V.  Elder  501,  502 

Caswell  V.  Wendell  969 

Gate  V.  Thayer  326,  420 

Gates  V.  Gates  525,  526,  531 

V.  Wadlington  481 

Cathcart  v.  Bowman        884,  930,  959, 

968 

Catlett  V.  Starr  331 

Catlin  V.  Henton  85 

V.  Hurlburt  842,  955 

V.  Kidder  1838,  1873 

r.  Ware  316,  319,  1004 

Catt  r.  Tourle  737 

Caufraan  v.  Presbyterian  Cong.        378 

Caughman  r.  Smith  1532 

Caulkins  r.  Fry  74 

V.  Harris  943,  981 

Causey  v.  Wiley  99 

Cavalli  v.  Allen  1563 

Gavanaugh  r.  .Jackson     358,  359,  361, 

366 

r.  Peterson  1460 

Cave  r.  Gave  1539 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Cave  V.  Crafts       533,  549,  1643,  1G55 

Cavin  V.  Middleton  1514 

Cavis  V.  Beckford        1668,  1677,  1725 

V.  McClary  .   935 

Cayce  v.  Stovall  1627 

Caylor  v.  Luzadder  445 

Cayton  v.  Walker  622 

Cazassa  v.  Cazassa  1267,  1269 

Cecconi  r.  Rodden    877,  905,  969,  970 

Cecil  v.  Beaver  156,  1276,  1278, 

1282,  1293,  1296,  1297 

f.  Butcher  12C7 

Cecil  Bank  r.  Heald  285 

Centenary  M.  E.  Church  i:  Parker 

239 
Center  v.  Planters'  &  Merchants' 
Bank  1380,  1524,  1557,  1559, 

1560 

Central  Bank  c.  Copeland  89,  90, 

1198,  1201,  1204 

Central  G.  Min.  Co.  c.  Piatt  148 

Central  Transp.  Co.  r.  Pullman's 

Palace  Car  Co.  419 

Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabash,  St. 

L.  &P.  Ry.  Co.  1547 

Central  Trust,  &c.  Co,  v.  Cincin- 
nati Grand  Hotel  Co.  1703 
Central  Wharf  v.  India  Wharf      4  76, 

813 

Cessill  V.  State  485,  486 

Chadbourne  c.  Gilnian  44,  45 

V.  Rackliff  18,  20,  24 

Chadwell  r.  Chadwell  366 

Chadwick  v.  Carson  326 

V.  Davis  464 

Chaffe  V.  Oliver  1190 

Chaffee  v.  Dodge  563 

Chaffin  V.  Chaffin  424 

Chairs  v.  Hobson  135 

Chalfin  i:  Malone  1576 

Chalker  r.  Chalker  700,  715 

Challefoux  v.  Ducharme       1866,  1878 

Chamberlain,  Matter  of  1618 

Chamberlain  r.  Bell    1436,  1469,  1476 

r.  Boon  13  74 

V.  Chamberlain  179 

V.  Gorham  1108 

r.  Preble  924 

I'.  Reed  89 

V.  Spargur       1109,  1110, 

1499 

Chamberlaine  r.  Turner  329 

Chambers  v.  Chambers         1791,  1792 

V.  Haney  1458 

V.  Pleak  1872 

V.  Rin^staff  336,  337 

V.  St.  Louis  170,  175 


Chambers  r.  Smith  929 

Chamblee  r.  Tarbox  214,  216 

Chambliss  v.  Miller  899 

Champlain  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Val- 
entine 472,  499,  501,  516 
Champlin  v.  Pendleton  448,  454, 

466 
Chan  V.  Brandt  437,  438 

Chance  v.  McWhorter  1390,  1529 

Chancellor  r.  Bell  575,  598,  599 

V.  Windham  527 

Chandler  v.  Bailey  1109 

V.  Brown  915,  932,  933 

V.  Cheney  1794,  1802, 

1803,  1812,  1814 
V.  Dyer  1498 

V.  Green  326,  384 

V.  McCard  398 

V.  Ricker      1866,  1868,  1873 
V.  Sanger  89 

V.  Simmons       10,  13,  31,  32, 
33,  67,  1936 
V.  Spear  1165,  1171 

V.  Temple  1248 

Chandos  v.  Mack  484,  488 

Chaney  r.  State  1591 

Chanome  v.  Fowler  1151 

Chapel  V.  Bull  843,  943,  957,  962 

Chapin  v.  Cram  1454 

V.  Crow  579 

V.  First   Universalist    So- 
ciety 595 
V.  Foss                         1893,  1987 
V.  Harris                        627,  632 
V.  School  Dist.     619,  623,  632, 
635,  637,  650,  678,  681 
V.  Shafer  21 
Chapleo  v.  Brunswick  Build.  Soc    151 
Chapman  v.  Abrahams                      990 
I'.  Chapman  10 
V.  Crooks                    412,  414 
V.  Edmands               375,  479 
V.  Emery                          '    297 
V.  Gordon                   625,  749 
V.  Holmes                   924,  928 
V.  Kimball        472,  852,  928, 
930 
V.  Lono-          524,  1619,  1624 
V.  Miller                            1389 
V.  Pingree                           708 
f.  Polack            424,431,437 
r.  Sims                       209,  1394 
V.  Twitchell              375,  376 
i:  Union   Mut.    L.   Ins. 

Co.        1670,  1703,  1704 

V.  Veach      959,  1335,  1619, 

1628 

xliii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Chappell  V.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co. 

504,  534,  550,  551,  555 

V.  Trent  97 

Charles  v.  Hastedt  6 

V.  Patch  33S,  33:i 

Charles  River  Bridge  v.  Warren 

Bri.li^e  41!) 

Charleston    C    &    C.    R.    Co.    v. 

Leech  270,  1979,  1981,  1985 

Charlestown  v.  Tufts  476 

Charter  r.  Graham  1463 

r.  Trevelyan  162 

Chartiers'  Block  Coal  Co.  v.  Mel- 
lon 537,  1596 
Chaser.  Breed  1220 
V.  Kittredge  1094 
V.  M'Donald  1498 
«.  Palmer             223,  1328,  1329 
V.  Phillips  89 
V.  Tacoma  Box  Co.     1714,  1748 
V.  Weston                                 932 
V.  Whiting                   11C5,  1167 
I'.  Wingate                             1708 
Chatham  v.  Bradford            1472,  1479 
V.  Brainerd                         448 
Chauncey  v.  Arnold                           1331 
Chautauqua  Co.  Bank  v.  Risley       181, 

256 
Chauvin  v.  Wagner  1159,1182, 

1194,  1195 
Chavener  v.  Wood  244,  1585 

Chavez  v.  Chavez  1230,  1232 

Cheek  V.  Herndon  1172 

V.  Nail  1344,  1351 

Cheeney  v.  Nebraska,  &c.,  Stone 

Co.  363 

Cheesebrough  v.  Millard  1403 

Chenery  v.  Dole  1940 

Cheney  v.  City  Nat.  Bank       962,  967 

V.  Straube  892,  903,  919, 

921,  927 

V.  Watkins  208,  265,  268, 

312 

Cherbonnier  v.  Evitts  99 

Cherry  v.  Arthur        1668,  1714,  1721, 

1740,  1741 

V.  Boyd  378 

V.  Herring        1224,  1248,  1252 

1303 

Cheshire  v.  Barrett  15S 

Chesley  v.  Frost  1349,  1365 

Chesnut  v.  Shane       1139,  1182,  1188, 

1215 

Chess  V.  Chess  1290,  1292 

Chess-Carley  Co.  v.  Purtell  585 

Chessman  v.  Whittemore     1259,  1340, 

1346,  1347 

xliv 


Chester  i;.  Breitling 

V.  Greer 
V.  Kumsey 

Chcsterman  v.  Gardner 

Clieval  i'.  Nichols 

Chew  17.  Bank 
V.  Barnet 

Chicago  V.  Gage 
V.  Hill 
V.  Rumsey 
V.  Witt 


1210 

1582 
1164 
1563, 1566 
1499 
54,  67 
997 
1328 
1522 
463,  488 
1371,  1513,  1514, 
1517 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright 

1518,  1520,  1522,  1569 
Chicao-o,  &c.  Land  Co.  v.  Peck     1314, 

1320 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clin- 
ton 486 
Chicago  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Stein       480 
Chica<'-o,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis 

175,  1082 
Chicago  Dock  Co.  v.  Kinzie  338 

ChicafO  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ashworth 

244 
Chicago,  R.  L  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
nedy 1522,  1547 
Chick  V.  Sisson            1226,  1252,  1254 
Cliild,  In  re  52 
Child  V.  Baker                                 1099 
V.  Douglas        756,  780,  804,  805 
V.  Picket                                    413 
V.  Starr                             488,  490 
V.  Wells                                   1819 
Childers  v.  Eardley                            249 
Childs  V.  Alexander                           955 
I'.  Hayman                              1966 
V.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.,  &c. 

R.  Co.  1866,  1892,  1919 
Chiles  V.  Conley  125,  206,  210,  1523 
Chiniquy  v.  Catholic  Bishop  1133 

('.  People  405 

Chinn  v.  ISIurray  1906 

Chinoweth  r.  Haskell  383,  384 

Chipman  v.  Hastings  1937 

Chippewa  Lumber  Co.  v.  Trember 

802 

Chirac  v.  Chirac  165 

Choate  v.  Burnham  523 

/;.  Kimball      1668,  1672,  1676, 

1720,  1721 

Choteau  v.  Jones         1435,  1442,  1846 

i\  Thompson  1454 

Chouquette  r.  Barada  1056,  1082 

Chouteau  r.  Allen  1U54,  1163 

r.  Suydam  1252 

Chrisman  c.  Wyatt  1235 

Christ  Church  v.  Lavezzolo  734 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Christian  v.  Cabell  829 

V.  Dripps  1668 

Christian  Union  v.  Yount         182,  184 
Christie,  In  re  53 

Christie  v.  Gage  124,  132,"  138, 

1880 

V.  Hale  1466,  1584 

Christine  r.  Whitehill  832 

Christy  v.  Burch  1380,  1382 

V.  Dana  1487 

V.  Fisher  '  1846 

Chrystie  v.  Phyfe  579 

Chudleigh's  Case  794 

Church  V.  Church  1530,  1782 

V.  Gilman        1240,  1281,  1282 

V.  Grant  628,  631 

V.  Meeker  448,  487 

V.  Ruland  1529,  1530 

V.  Schoonmaker  122 

V.  Stiles       381,  388,  448,  458, 

495 

V.  Waggoner  1879 

Churcher  v.  Guernsey  1513 

Churchill  v.  Marks  662 

V.  Morse  1404 

r.  Scott  85 

Chute  V.  Washburn  620,  632,  690, 

708,  731 
Cilley  V.  Chikls  324,  352,  381 

Cincinnati  v.  Newell  530,  542 

Cincinnati  &  Ga.  R.  v.  Minis  449 

Cincinnati,  Ind.   &c.   Ry.    Co.    v. 

Smith  1547,  1573 

Cincinnati,  W.   &  Z.    R.    Co.    r. 

Iliff  1254,  1256,  1303,  1304 

Citizens'  Bank  v.  Knapp      1718,  1760 
Citizens'  F.  Ins.  S.   &  L.   Co.  v. 

Doll  1021,  1042 

Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dayton      1437, 

1522 

City  Bank  v.  McClellan  239 

V.  Smith  622 

City  Council  v.  Moorhead  1082 

City  Nat.  Bank's  Appeal      1411,  1413, 

1498 
City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kusworm  88 

Clabaugh  v.  Byerly  1410,  1482 

Clack  V.  Mackin  1420 

Clader  v.  Thomas  1451,  1472 

Claflin  V.  Carpenter  1601,  1605, 

1606 

V.  Case  903,  915,  987 

V.  McDonough  85,  86,  87 

V.  Smith  1159,  1162,  1165, 

1166 

Clague  V.  Washburn  1134,  1435 

Clairborne  v.  Holmes  1463,  1461 


Clamorgan  v.  Badger  &  St.  L.  R. 

Co.  331,  386 

V.  Hornsby      331,  386,  388 

V.  Lane  15,  1455 

Clancey  v.  Houdlette  476 

Clanin  v.  Machine  Co.  1314 

Clap  V.  Draper  1603 

Clapp  V.  Bromagham  1880 

V.  Herdman  842,  849,  928, 

944,  974 

V.  Leatherbee  293 

V.  Tirrell  295,  303,  307 

Claremont  v.  Carlton       338,  340,  480, 

484,  486 
Claremont  Bridge  Co.  v.  Royce  182 
Clarity  v.  Sheridan  1971 

Clark  V.  Akers  1239 

V.  Allen  1331,  1335 

V.  Baird  335,  366 

V.  Baker  561 

V.  Beck  1566 

V.  Bos  worth  15G3 

V.  Brown  1497 

V.  BuUard  1547 

V.  Butler  1409,  1415,  1434 

V.  Caldwell  77 

V.  Campau  483 

V.  Chamberlain  289 

V.  Cliamberlin  323 

r.  Clark  36,38,1783,1802 

V.  Conroe  882,  910,  915 

V.  Cottrel  522 

V.  Crego  1877,  1919 

V.  Crounshaw  16  71 

V.  Davis  125,  364 

V.  Devoe         535,  735,  7  72,  790, 
793,  938 
V.  Edwards  1207 

V.  Farmers'  Woolen  Manuf. 

Co.  1056 

V.  Fisher  852,  868,  959 

V.  Flint  1386,  1390 

V.  Fuller  1532 

V.  Gifford  1307,  1310 

V.  Goss  1459 

V.  Graham,         1021,  1022,  1086 
V.  Gregory  338 

V.  Ilershey  1886 

V.  Hillis  526 

r.  Holland  154  7 

V.  Holton  717,  718,  722,  730 

V.  Houghton  1102 

V.  Jenkins  1557 

V.  Kirkpatrick  48,  58,  100 

V.  Lindsey  1846 

i».  Lyons  828 

V.  Mackin  1487,  1504,  1506 

xlv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  tire  to  Sections. 


Clark  I'.  McLean  i;V2 

V.  IMcXoal  1530 

V.  Martin  635,  705,  707,  731, 

742,  743,  771,  780 
V.  Miimford  921,  923,  925, 

986,  987,  1028 
V.  Miinroe  1409,  1412,  1414 

V.  Parker         448,  449,  450,  455 
V.  Parr  943,  968,  981 

V.  Perry  967 

V.  Powers  338 

V.  Providence  475 

V.  Rainey  1846 

V.  Redman  828 

V.  Reyburn  1760 

V.  Rochester  City  R.  Co.        463 
V.  Scammon  398,  407 

V.  Sidway  1830 

V.  Society  373 

V.  Stephenson  1989 

V.  Swaile  162 

V.  Swift  928,  930,  967 

U.Tate  18,19,31,33 

V.  Troy  270 

17.  Turnbull  80 

V.  Van  Court  16 

V.  Vaughan  1879,  1880 

V.  Wethey       334,  338,  364,  366 
V.  Whitehead  830 

V.  Wilson  1145 

V.  Ziegler  958,  959 

Clarke  v.  Brookfield         638,  656,  658, 

684,  718 
y.  Central  R.  Co.  182 

V.  Cogge  534 

V.  Courtney  1040,  1042 

V,  Hardgrove  944 

r.  Imperial  Gas  Light  Co.  1082 
V.  M'Anulty  892,  921 

V.  Milligan  240 

V.  Tappin  303 

V.  White  1463 

Clarkson  v.  Clarkson  613,  616 

Clary  v.  McGlynn  338,  389 

V.  Owen  1767 

Clason  V.  Rankin  1871,  1919 

f.  Shepherd  1589 

Claughton  v.  Claughton  1963 

Clavering  v.  Clavering  1277 

Clay  V.  Chenault  565,  602 

V.  Wyatt  119 

Clay  County  Land  Co.  v.  Monta- 
gue County  376 
Claycomb  v.  Munger       933,  936,  939, 

974 

Clayton  v.  Liverman  1254 

V.  McCay  1895 

xlvi 


Clayton  v.  Merrett 

i\  Rose 
Clearwater  v.  Rose 


1037 
1185 
575 
125,  140,  367, 
369,  388 
V.  Smith  3,S1,  385 

CI  egg  V.  Hands  780 

Cleland  v.  Long  1091,  1162,  1165 

Clem  V.  Newcastle,  &c.  R.  Co.        1009 
Clement  v.  Bank      388,  411,  851,  903, 

928,  973 

V.  Bartlett  1372 

V.  Burns  475,  476 

V.  Burtis  642 

Clements  v.  Cates        1835,  1836,  1852 

V.  Collins  923 

V.  Kyles  381 

V.  Landrum  297 

V.  Pearce  326,  336,  381 

V.  Wells  815 

Clementson  v.  Streeter  955 

Clementz  v.  Jones  Lumber  Co.       1555 

demons  v.  Elder  1462,  14C6 

Clendaniel  v.  Hastings  1328 

Cleveland  v.  Choate  429,  431 

V.  Hallett  593 

ih  Obenchain  466 

V.  Shannon  1406 

V.  Sims     324,  331,  339,  343 

Cleveland,  &c.   Ry.  Co.  i".  Coburn 

649,  650,  656,  696,  718 
Clevinger  v.  Ross  1563 

Click  ('.  Green  944,  968 

Clifford  V.  Koe  616 

V.  Turrell  295 

Clifton  V.  Clifton  113 

V.  Jackson  Iron  Co.  560 

Clifton  Heights  Land  Co.  v.  Ran- 

dell  236,  348,  412,  1706 

CHmie  v.  Wood  1725,  1765 

Climer  r.  Wallace  381,  437 

Clinch  River  Veneer  Co.  v.  Kurth 

1125,  1193 
Cline  V.  Jones  1217,  1230,  1233, 

1237,  1276,  1277,  1278 
Cloos  V.  Cloos  1792,  1795 

Clore  V.  Lambert  1731,  1748 

Close  V.  Burlington,  &c.   Ry.  Co. 

643,  731 

V.  Phipps  89 

Clough  V.  Adams  99 

V.  Bowman  369 

V.  Clough  1018,  1019 

Cloutman  v.  Bailey  602 

Clow  V.  Plummer  219,  1913 

Cloyes  V.  Sweetser  489 

Clute  V.  Fisher  492,  496 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Clute  V.  Robison  1624 

Clymer  i;.  Dawkins  1868,1880 

C'lyiie  V.  Benicia  Water  Co.  1660 

Coal  Creek  Co.  r.  Heck  1204 

Coale  V.  Barney  1958 

Coari  v.  Olsen  1566 

Coates  V.  Gerlach  40,  44,  45 

Coats  r.  Taft  36  7 

Cobb  V.  Chase  1289 

V.  Davenport  496,  497 

V.  Hines  312 

V.  Kidd  1930,  1932 

V.  Lavalle  477,  480 

V.  Lucas  221 

V.  Taylor  404 

Coburn  v.  Coxeter     335,  381,  383,  442 

V.  Ellenwood  1050 

u.  Herrington  1177,1178 

V.  Litchfield  869,  872,  962, 

966 

Cocheco  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Whittier      503 

Cochran  v.  Flint  1741,  1755 

V.  Goodell  1824 

V.  Guild  869 

V.  Kerney  1814 

V.  Smith  339,  448,  464 

V.  Stewart  1069 

Cochrane  r.  Moore  196 

Cocke  r.  Montgomery  48 

Cockerel!  v.  Cholmeley  1062 

Cockey  v.  Milne  1435 

Cockrell  v.  Proctor  929,  946,  953 

Cockrill  V.  Downey  1612 

Cocks  V.  Barker  1303 

V.  Simmons  1224,  1846 

Cockson  V.  Cock  787,  789 

Coddington  v.  Bay  1390 

r.  Goddard  1002 

Codman  v.  Evans  454,  455 

V.  Winslow  502 

Coe  V.  Columbus,  Piqua  &  Ind.  R. 

Co.  1551,  1729 

V.  Manseau  1563 

V.  Persons  Unknown  1400 

V.  Ritter  338 

V.  Winters  1499 

Coffey  V.  Hendricks         326,  336,  338, 

1109,  114.3,  1148 

Coffin  1-.  Heath  1904,  1905 

V.  Portland      632,  649,  650,  718, 

731 

V.  Ray  1406,  1531 

V.  Scott  543 

Coffman  i\  Lookout  Bank  88 

Cofran  v.  Cockran  1040,  1057 

Cogan  /•.  Cook  1435 

Cogburn  r.  Hunt  402 


Cogel  r.  Rapli  7 

Coggswell  c.  Griffith  1532 

Cogswell  c.  Stout  1489 

Cohea  v.  Hemingway  1846 

Cohen  c.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  732 

Cohn  V.  Hewsey  1  703 

V.  Hoffman  1415 

Coit  V.  Millikin  1064 

V.  Starkweather  1346 

Coke  V.  Brummell  219 

Coker  v.  Roberts  339,  1198 

Colburn  r.  Mason  1865,  1887 

Colby  V.  Colby  525 

V.  McOmber  I144 

V.  Osgood  953 

Colchester  v.  Culver  1108 

Colcord  V.  Alexander  338,  36  7 

r.  Swan  36 

Cold  Spring  Iron  Works  v.  Tol- 
land 490 
Coldwater  v.  Tucker  482 
Cole  V.  Cole                             48,  49,  99 
V.  Gibbons  78 
V.  Hadley                              458,  467 
V.  Hughes                             799,  800 
V.  Irvine                                     1935 
V.  Kimball                             931,  974 
V.  Lake  Co.                                576 
V.  Lee                                         853 
V.  Long                                     1020 
V.  Parkin                                    1352 
r.  Patterson                               1930 
V.  Pennoyer                        2,  18,  27 
V.  Stewart                        1667,  1745 
Cole  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Collier    1792, 1811, 
1812,  1814 
Colee  V.  Colee               1217,  1276,  1297 
Colegrave  v.  Dias  Santos      166  7,  1702 
Coleman  v.  Ballard                            968 
y.  Barklew     1.547,1568,1570 
V.  Billings     1182,  1185,  1442 
V.  Bresnahan               791,  930 
V.  Brooke                             538 
V.  Burr                                   284 
V.  Coleman     795,  1850,  1955 
V.  Lyman                     929,  931 
V.  Manhattan  Beach  Co. 

324,  325,  342,  351 
V.  San  Raphael  Turnp. 

Co.  178 

V.  Smith     355,  356,  358,  359, 

366,  434,  1390,  1447 

V.  State  1099 

w.  Stearns  Manuf.  Co.     1717, 

1721,  1748 

Coles  V.  Berryhill  1380,  1403 

V.  Coles  1830,  1831,  1917 

xlvii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  SeetionSo 


Coles  V.  Sims     733,  743,  773,  780,  781, 

78-2,  784,  805 

V.  Soulsbv  2!):),  2!)S 

I'.  Trocothick  Ki-' 

1-.  Wooding  381,  1942,  1949 

V.  Yorks  381,  424 

Collaniore  v.  Gillis  1765 

Collerd  V.  Huson  1-")8(J 

Collier  v.  Cowger       924,  962,  974,  982 

V.  Gamble  840 

v.  Jenks  1708 

CoUingwood  v.  Brown  1559,  1562 

{'.  Irwin  861 

Collins  V.  Aaron  1464 

V.  Benbury  471,  481 

V.Boyd  1149,1151 

v.Castle        771,773,778,785, 

823 

V.  Collins    99,  111,  1292,  1342, 

1356 

V.  Dressier  323 

V.  Durward  981 

V.  Prentice  534,  1658 

V.  State  485 

V.  Storm  402,  406 

V.  Suau  899 

V.  Tillou  303,  744 

V.  Westbury  89 

Collins  Manuf.  Co.  Marcv      657,  671, 

694,  705 
Colomer  v.  Morgan  1460,  1462 

Colquhoun  v.  Atkinson  1498 

Colquitt  V.  Thomas  1-^29 

Colton  V.  Seavey  381,  1004,  1008, 

1386 

V.  Smith  1967 

Columbet  v.  Pacheco  364 

Columbia  Bank  v.  Jacobs  146  7 

Columbus  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  With- 

erow  448 

Columbus   Buggy   Co.    v.  Graves 

182,  186,  1406 
Colyer  v.  Hyden  1240,  1241 

Coman  v.  Thompson  1619,  1622 

Combe's  Case  1021 

Combs  V.  Hawes  31 

V.  McQiiinn  120 

Comegys  v.  Clarke  90 

Comer  v.  Baldwin  1252,  1276 

V.  Comer  1866 

Comerford  v.  Cobb  1068,  1071 

Comfort  !'.  Mosser  1294 

Comings -y.  Little  962,974 

Commercial  Bank  v.  Kortright       1052 

1331 

V.  Ullman  1072 

Commercial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ives  363 

xlviii 


Commissioner  v.  Thompson  898 

Commissioners  v.  Kempshall  481 

Coumionwealth  v.  Alger  475,  476, 

480,  844 
V.  Chapin  480 

V.  Cutler  1289 

V.Dudley  1262 

V.  Emery  1113 

V.  Emigrant   Sav. 

Bank    1340,  1341, 
1342 
V.  Frew  378 

U.Jackson  1276,  1282 
V.  M'Clanachan  833 
V.  New  Yoi'k,  &e. 

II.  Co.  184 

V.    Reading     Sav. 

Bank  1 050 

V.  Roxiniry      470,  4  75, 

476 

V.  Smith  145 

V.  Vincent  480 

Compton  V.  Bunker  Hill  Bank     85,  86, 

90 

V.  White      1276,  1278,  1292, 

1293,  1297 

Comstock  V.  Comstock  103,  842 

V.  Eastwood  1865,  1866 

V.  Johnson  1639 

V.  Smith  853 

V.  Son  266 

Conard  v.  Conard  1890 

Concord  Bank  v.  Bellis       39,  156,  159 

Concord  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Robertson 

475,  500 
Condit  V.  Wilson        1408,  1513,  1517, 

1529 
Conduitt  V.  Ross  793,  799 

Congleton  v.  Pattison  788 

Congregational  Society  v.  Stark       689 
Conine  v.  Junction,  &c.  R.  Co.       1082 
Conklin  v.  Conklin      1900,  1981,  1997 
V.  Parsons  1709 

Conkling  v.  Brown  1942 

V.  Secor  Sewing  Machine 

Co.  261 

Conlan  v.  Grace  1014,  1085,  1087, 

1220,  1269 

Conlee  v.  McDowell  1563,  1566 

Conley  v.  Nailor      74,  75,  97,  116,  277 

Conn  u.  Penn  378 

f.  Tonner  1419 

Connally  v.  Spragins  1363 

Connard  v.  Colgan      1251,  1292,  1296 

Connecticut  v.  Bradish  1502,  1503 

1504,  1531 

Connecticut  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bulte  1846 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Albert  186 

Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Cross  182,.  186 

Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Lathrop  55 

Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Skinner  602,  608 

Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Smith  169,  175,  1511 

Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  c. 

Talbot  1420,  1422 

Connell  v.  Galligher  1109 

Conner  v.  Abbott  1170 

V.  Coffin  1708 

V.  Cox  1956 

V.  Stanley  282 

Connihan  v.  Tliompson  1521 

Connor  v.  Eddy  979 

V.  Follansbee  296,  302 

V.  Tippett  1259 

Conover  v.  Sealy  1959 

V.  Van  Mater  1499,  1588 

Conrad  v.  Atl.  Ins.  Co.  285 

V.  Douglass  1233,  1271 

V.  Effinger  986,  944 

V.  Lane  5 

V.  Saginaw  Miring  Co.      1722 

V.  Starr  1431,  1434 

V.  Trustees  943,  968 

Constant  v.  Am.  Bap.  Soc.  1390, 

1534,  1537 

V.  University         1392,  1527, 

1532,  1534 

Converse  v.  Blunirach  1517,  1522, 

1555 

V.  Converse  112 

V.  Ferre  1898 

V.  Porter  1472 

V.  Searls  134,  135 

Conwell  V.  McCowan  1448 

Cooey  V.  Porter  1879 

Coogler  V.  Roberts  1872 

V.  Rogers        1862,  1874,  1919 

Cook  V.  Babcock  322 

V.  Brown  202,  1217,  1230, 

1233,  1267,  1271,  1309,  1324 

V.  Curtis         948,  949,  868,  1866, 

1881 

V.  Dennis  433 

V.  French  1499 

V.  Hall  1452 

V.  International  &  G.  N.  R. 

Co.  1952 

U.Knott  1124 

V.  Leggett  650 

?■.  McClurc  488,  495 


Cook  V.  Moore 

90,  91,  1335 

V.  Nott 

1123 

V.  Oliver 

339 

V.  Par  ham 

1390, 

1393,  1463 

V.  Patrick 

1240, 

1241,  124  2, 

1282 

V.  State 

1591 

V.  Stearns 

1603 

V.  Steel 

1627 

V.  Stone 

1484 

V.  Toumbs 

33 

V.  Travis 

138, 

1486,  1506, 
1529,  1577 

V.  Trimble        645,  646,  649,  718 

V.  Walker 

590 

V.  Walling 
V.  Webb 

4-2 
1964 

1'.  Wesner 

520 

V.  Whiting 

1612, 1709 

Cooke  V.  Chilcott 

780,  821 

V.  Clayworth 

74,  76 

V.  Cooper 

1701 

V.  Lamotte 

97 

V.  McNeil 

1673 

V.  Watson 

1487 

Cool  V.  Peters  Box  &  L.  Co.          1606, 

1609 

Cooley  V.  Cooley 
V.  Warren 

1108 
381 

Coolidge  V.  Dexter 

749 

V.  Hager 

1652,  1C60 

V.  Melvin 

289 

Coombes'  Case 

1040 

Coombs  V.  Anderson 

155,  613 

V.  Beaumont 

1765 

V.  Jordan 

1619 

V.  Thomas 

1185 

Coon  V.  Brickett 

708 

Cooney  v.  Hays 
Cooper  V.  Adams 
V.  Austin 

549 

1748 

359,  366 

V.  Bigly 

1482,  1489 

V.  Bloodgood 

912 

V.  Cooper 

602,  613,  616, 
1793,  1802 

V.  Harvey 

1668, 
1746 

1672,  1712, 
1748,  1757 

V.  Jackson 

1276 

V.  Johnson 

1722 

V.  Lonan stein 

552 

V.  Page 

1331 

1333, 1334 

V.  Standley 
V.  Vierra 

40,  44 
364,  366 

r.  A\'ats()n 

924 

Cooter  V.  Dcnrborn 

1972 

1981,  1986 

Coovert  r.  O'Connor 

490 

Cope  V.  Romeyne 

1717 

xHx 

TAULK   OF   CASES, 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Copeland  v.  Copeland 

723,  1499 

r.  ]\IcAdoi*y 

943,  957,  958, 

970 

Copelin  r.  Slnilor 

1451 

Copenratli  /-.  Kii'iiby 

52,  54,  67,  68 

Ci)pis  /•.  Middk'toii 

277 

Copp  r.  Swift 

1668,  1673 

Coppin  r.  Fornyliough 

1554 

Co(piillaril  r.  French 

1029 

Corbett  r.  Hill 

1594 

I'.  Laurens 

1903 

V.  Noroross 

429,  1099 

V.  Spencer 

21 

V.  Wrenn 

962,  964 

Corbin  r.  Healy. 

566,  613 

V.  Jackson 

403,  404 

V.  Sullivan 

1502,  1547 

Corbit  r.  Smith 

49,  58,  68,  99 

Corbitt  c.  Clenny 

1547 

r.  Corbitt 

1957 

Corbleys  c.  Ripley 

375 

Corcoran  r.  Webster 

1679 

Cordeviolle  c.  Dawson 

14C2 

Cordova  c.  Hood          1512,  1547,  1552 

Core  v.  Faupel 

1564,  1568 

Corey  v.  Bishop 

173G 

v.  Burton 

33 

V.  Moore 

1125 

Corinth  v.  Emery        1792,  1801,  1814 

Corker  v.  Corker 

1273 

Corley  v.  Corley 

1220 

Corliss  V.  McLagin 

1721 

Cornelius,  Will  of,  In  re 

1011 

Cornelius  i\  Ivins      638, 

667,  718,  728 

Cornell  o.  Jackson 

388,  843,  851, 

858,  944, 

945,  956,  990 

v.  Todd 

489 

Cornett  v.  Dixon 

431 

Corning  i\  Murray 

1484,  1496 

V.  Nail  Factory 

529 

V.  Troy  Iron  Factory        528, 

529 

Cornish  v.  C  apron 

895,  906 

h.  Frees 

1411 

Cornog  V.  Fuller 

1420 

Cornwell  r.  Thurston 

621,  530 

Corpman  /•.  Baccastow 

1406,   1466 

Corrigan  v.  Pironi 

115 

IK  Tiernay 

1792 

Corwin  v.  Corwin 

265,  268,  280 

Cory  V.  Cory 

76,  708,  730 

V.  Eyre 

1508 

Cosby  r.  West 

943 

Costello  '•.  Burke 

251 

Coster  V.  Bank 

1463, 1494 

i\  Coster 

1994 

Costigan  i'.  Pennsylvania  11.  Co.     795 
1 

Cottingham  r.  Parr  398,  418 

V.  Seward      377,  381,  430 

Cottle  V.  Young        448,  455,  461,  463, 

542 

Cotton,  Ex  ])arte  1765 

Cotton  i\  Coit  1990 

r.  (Jregory  1257,  1315 

V.  King  1277 

r.  Ward  956 

Coudert  r.  Earl  1786 

V.  Sayre      552,  733,  74  7,  780, 

781,  784,  803,  807 

CoughUn  i:  Barker  771,  774,  775, 

776,  779,  780 

V.  Coughlin  1627 

Coughran  r.  Alderete        355,  363,  382 

Coulson  r.  Allison  116 

V.  Walton  1365 

i\  Wing  1935 

Council  Bluffs  Lodge  v.  Billups     1551 

Countryman  v.  Deck         635,  642,  647 

Conrsey  v.  Davis  580 

Courtnay  v.  Parker  1404 

Courtney  v.  Turner  167 

Coutant  V.  Servoss  29 

Cover  V.  Black  1402,  1404 

V.  Manaway  1196, 

1205,  1206,  1238,  123:*, 

1248,    1287 

Covey  V.  Pittsburgh,  Fort  Wayne 

&  Chicago  R.  Co.  1729 

Covillaud  v.  Tanner  1935 

Covington  V.  Stewart  1862,1880 

Cowan  V.  Green  1463 

V.  Silliman  953 

V.  Withrow  1532 

Coward  v.  Culver  1407 

Cowardin  v.  Anderson  1404,  1409 

Cowdrey  o.  Colbnrn  509,  551 

Cowell  t:  Springs  Co.      175,  181,  182, 

184,  190,  657,  671,  718 

Co  wen  V.  Loomis  1563 

V.  Withrow  1501 

Cowles  V.  Hardin  1485 

V.  Reavis  381,  385 

Cowper  V.  Andrews  649 

Cox  V.  Carson  1413 

V.  Coleman  1151 

V.  Esteb  1436 

V.  Freedley         448,  455,  461,  633 

V.  Gill  1196,  1207 

V.  God  salve  1619 

V.  Hart  335,  337,  339 

V.  Hayes  402 

V.  Henry  303,  943,  948,  968, 

974,  981 

V.  Holcomb  1212 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Cox  V.  Jones  1563 

V.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R. 

Co.  448,  449,  450 

V.  McGowan      381,  388,  415,  417, 

•   418 

y.  McMullin  19  72 

V.  Manvel  1331 

V.  Palmer  1366 

V.  Rust  339,  1092 

V.  Strode  968 

V.  Ward  1981 

V.  AYayt  1442 

V.  Wells  316,  319 

Coxe  I'.  Smith  1963 

Coy  V.  Miller  341,  364 

Craddock  v.  Riddlesbarger  1620, 

1627 

Craft  V.  Russell  285,  1390,  1526 

V.  Wilcox  1800 

V.  Yeaney  389 

Crafts  V.  Crafts  1981 

V.  Hibbard  324,  338 

Crager  v.  Reis  1238 

Cragin  v.  Powell       424,  437,  438,  492 

Craig  V.  Cartwright  1867,  1874 

V.  Chandler  44 

V.  Donovan  928 

V.  Lewis  874 

V.  Pinson  203,  1085 

V.  Taylor  1935,  1940 

V.  Van  Bebber     2,  8,  15,  18,  21, 

31,  33 

V.  Wells         503,  516,  528,  531, 

632,  635,  637,  657,  678, 

723,  736 

V.  Zimmerman  1394 

Crain  v.  Wright  1234,  1272 

Cram  v.  Bangor  House  1080 

V.  Ingalls  1101 

Cramer  v.  Benton  1576 

Crancc  v.  Collenbaugh  921 

Crane  v.  Brigham  1670 

V.  Conklin  76 

V.  Crane  1196,  1197  1205, 

1447 

V.  Dwyer  731 

V.  Hyde  Park  678,  692 

V.  Patton  1610 

r.  Reeder  120,  166 

V.  Riedcr  1086 

V.  Stickles  274 

V.  Turner         1416,  1417,  1423, 

1486,  1487,  1507 

V.  Wagoner  1887,  1892 

Cranmer  v.  Porter  1259 

Crapo  r.  Cameron  1874,  1.S7.S 

Crary  v.  Goodman  122,  124,  125 


Crassen  v.  Swoveland 

Craven  v.  Winter 

Cravens  v.  Kitts 

V.  Rossiter 
V.  White 

Crawford  v.  Bertholf 

V.  Cato 
I".  Crawford 
V.  Scovell 
V.  Spencer 
V.  Whitmore 
V.  Witherbee 

Crawfordsville  v.  Boots 

Creagh  v.  Blood 

Credle  v.  Hays 

Creed  c.  People 


1509,  1511, 

1575,  1578, 

1220,  1248 

1980 

1289 

518 

1217,  1218, 

1228,  1247 

89 

944 

54,  65,  67,  70 

227,  1392 

40,  44 

786 

1651 

48,  49,  50 

381,  414 

1889 


Crenshaw  v.  Slate  River  Co.     484 

V.  Ullman  176 

Cresinger  v.  Welch         20,  21,  24,  25, 

26,  31,  120 

Cressinger  v.  Desseburg  1314 

Cresson  v.  Miller  120 

v.  Stout  1713 

Cressona  r.  Sowers  1198 

Cressona  Sav.  &c.  Asso.  v.  Sowers 

1197,  1214 
Crest  V.  Jack  1899,  1904 

Creswell  v.  Welchman  101 

Crews  t'.  Pendleton  1619,  1628 

V.  Taylor  1451,  1480 

Cribben  v.  Deal  1331 

Cribbs  v.  Sowle  82 

Crine  v.  Tifts  1627 

Crippen  r.  Morrison  1668,  1754 

Crips  r.  Towsley  99 

Crisbine    v.  St.' Paul  &  S.  C.  R. 

Co.  459 

Criscoe  v.  Hambrick  1958,  1963 

Crisfield  v.  Storr        936,  968,  971,  985 
Critchfield  v.  Critcbfield      1224,  1286, 

1289 

Critchlow  V.  Beatty  364 

Crittenton  v.  Alger  488 

Croan  i:  Joyce  1800 

Crocker  v.  Belangee  290 

V.  Lewis  1560 

V.  Lowenthal  1240,  1241 

)".  Tiffany  1979 

V.  Whitney  174 

Crockett  r.  Magnire  1488,  1502 

Crofts  ('.  Middleton  257 

Cromie    v.    Louisville     Orphans' 

Soc.  1 79 

Cromwell  v.  Selden  540 

r.  Tate         1005,  1071,  1114 

li 


TARLE   OF   CASES. 


Pefereiioes  are  to  Sections. 


Cronin  r.  Gore  340,  366 

Crook  r.  Vandevoort  1862,  1936 

Crooked  Lake  Nav.  Co.  v.  Keuka 

Nav.  Co.  122 

Crooker  v.  Brai^g  -186 

V.  Jewell  932,  936,  931) 

Crooks  r.  Crooks    40,  44,  45,  1234, 

1307,  1309 

r.  Kennett  1807 

Cropp  V.  Cropp  58 

Crosby  r.  Bra.lbury  329,  413 

V.  Loop  1930 

V.  Montgomery  525,  529 

V.  Parker  388 

V.  Vleet  1469 

V.  Wadsworth  1618 

Cross  V.  Carson  708,  723,  724 

V.  DeValle  167 

r.  Fombey  1403 

V.  Frost  706 

V.  Marston  1706,  1737 

V.  Robinson  1919 

V.  State  Bank  1328 

Crossman  v.    Hilltown   Turnpike 

Cg.  1082,  1084 

Crotty  V.  Collins  1625 

Crouse  v.  Hoi  man  54,  58 

r.  Murphy  1403 

Crow  V.  Mark  1884,  1918 

Crowder  r.  Searcy     1217,  1218,  1234, 
1240,  1241,  1276 
Crowe  V.  Peters  99 

Crowell  V.  Gleason  79 

V.  Maughs  354,  358 

Crowley  v.  Wallace  1164 

Crowne  v.  Baylis  86 

Crowther  v.  Rowlandson  48 

Croxall  V.  Sherard  198 

Croydon  IIos])ital  v.  Farley  235 

Cruger  r.  McLaury  718,  1936 

Crum  r.  Cot  ting  934 

Crumbaugli  r.  Kugler  1127,  1129 

Cnimlif^h  r.  Railroad  Co.  1517 

Cubitt  V.  Porter  1922 

Cucullu  V.  Hernandez  1372 

Cuffee  r.  Milk  613 

Culbertson  v.  Duncan  364 

V.  Witbeck  Co.  1096, 

1158 
Culin's  Appeal  674 

Cullen  V.  Sprigg  404,  632 

Caller  w.  Motzer  1878,1879 

Cullers  V.  Piatt  410,411 

Cullum  V.  Branch  Bank  828 

Cullwick);.  Swindell  1765 

Culmore  v.  Genove  1289,  1294 

Culpepper,  &c.  Soc.  v.  Digges  239 


Culver  ('.  Ithodcs  1862,  1866  ' 

Cumberland  Bank  v.  Hall  1367 

Cuniming  v.  Cunnuing  526,  1230 

Cummings  c.  Black  410,  411,  420 

V.  Boyd  285 

V.  Dearborn  896,  1396 

V.  Glass  1248 

V.  Harrison  924,  936 

V.  Henry  74,  78 

V.  Holt  869 

V.  Powell  2,  4,  10 

V.  Wyman  1866,  1877 

Cummins  v.  Cassily  1328 

V.  Kennedy        922,  924,  933 

V.  Woodruff  1063,  1071 

Cunninggim  v.  Peterson        1453,  1455 

Cunningham  v.   Boston  &  A.  R. 

Co.  424 

V.  Brown  1511,  1563 

r.  Cure  ton         1712,1731 

1748 

V.  Curtis      381,  388,  397 

V.  Dillard  838 

V.  Knight  939 

V.  Pattee  1566,  1570 

V.  Roberson  372 

V.  Thornton         335,  339, 

1506 

V.  Webb  422,  1651 

Curdy  v.  Stafford  337,  406 

Curran  i».  Smith  1720,1729 

Currie  v.  Kerr  1170,  1182,  1194 

Currier  v.  Howes  449 

V.  Nelson  397 

Curtin  V.  Patton  16 

Curtis  V.  Aaronson    339,  376,  381,  442 

V.  Board  of  Education  632,  637 

V.  Brownell  58 

V.  Cockrell  1965 

V.  Deering       893,  915,  968,  975 

V.  Gardner  548,  575 

V.  Leasia  1678,1709 

V.  Leavitt  144,  1064 

U.Lyman  1469,1479 

u.  Mundy         1510,1511,  1513, 

1514 

V.  Norton  1652 

y.  Poland  1981,1997 

V.  Root  1409,  1411,  1412, 

1413,  1414 

V.  Topeka  632,  650,  653 

Curtiss  V.  Ayrault  1654 

V.  Colby  1127 

Curyea  v.  Berry  1485 

Cushing  V.  Hurd  1519 

V.  Rice  948 

Cushman  v.  Blanchard  843,  969 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Cushman  v.  Church  650,  687,  723 

V.  Wooster  1014 

Cussack  V.  Tweedy     1217, 1221,  1286, 

.1292 

Cuthbert  y.  Ives  1963 

Cutler  V.  Callison  354,  358,  359 

V.  Currier  1884 

V.  James  1394,  1524 

W.Pope  1618 

V.  Rose  1350 

V.  Steele  1381,  1403 

V.  Tufts  503,  516,  518 

Cutter  I'.  Whittemore  1008 

Cuttsr.King  1919 

V.  United  States  1062,  1338, 

1356 

V.  York  Manuf.  Co.  1248 


Dadmun  i\  Lamson 

134 

Daggett  V.  Daggett 

1307, 

1^14 

V.  Reas 

848 

,  943 

0.  Shaw 

375 

V.  Willey 

381 

Daggs  V.  Ewell 

1573 

Dail  V.  Moore 

1109, 

1116 

Dailey  v.  Kastell 

1547 

Daily  v.  Litchfield 

340 

Daisz,  Appeal  of 

1248 

Dakin  v.  Williams 

707 

Dale  V.  Jackson 

364 

V.  Lincoln        40,  44,  1276,  1278, 

1296 

V.  Shively  928,  974 

V.  Travellers'  Ins.  Co.  383 

V.  Wright  1073,  1076,  1174 

Daley  v.  Koons  602 

Dalton  V.  Bowker  924,  968,  983 

V.  Rust  398 

Daly  V.  Bernstein  593 

Dame  v.  Dame  1698 

Damery  v.  Fenjuson  512 

Damon  v.  Granby  1050,  1079 

Damziger  v.  Boyd  384 

Dana  v.  Conant  531 

V.  Coombs  29,  158 

V.  Goodfellow  957 

(,'.  Middlesex  Bank  410 

V.  Newhall  1346,  1529 

V.  AVentworth  743,  773,  774 

Danbury  r.  Robinson  1531 

Danby  v.  Coutts  249 

Danforlh  v.  Paxton  1314,  1326 

Daniel  v.  Hester  1563,  1565 

V.  Hill  526 

V.  Hodges  1560 

V.  Sorrells  1380 

V.  Veal  516 


Daniels  v.  Bailey  1600 

V.  Cheshire  R.  Co.  488 

V.  Daniels  1925,  1926 

V.  Davison       1563,  1564,  1566 
V.  Hart  145 

V.  Lovvery  1190,  1192 

V.  Pond  1708 

Danville  Seminary  v.  Mott     279,  1079, 

1080 

Danziger  v.  Boyd  125,  326,  400 

Darby  v.  Hayford  48,  49 

Darden  v.  Burns  617,  618 

Dargin  v.  Becker  1437,  1555 

Dark  v.  Johnston  1597 

Darling  v.  Crowell  520,  531 

V.  Harmon  1904 

Darlington's  Appeal  104 

Darlington's  Appropriation  1949 

Darrah  v.  Bryant  389 

Darraugh  v.  Blackford  14 

Darst  V.  Bates  1238,  1589 

V.  Enlow  364 

V.  Gale  151,  1125,  1444 

Dart  V.  Barbour  405 

Daubenspeck  v.  Piatt  1575, 1578 

Dausch  V.  Crane  87 

Davar  v.  Cardwell  1166 

Davenport  v.  Davenport  930,  987 

V.  Mason  297 

V.  Parsons  1021,  1040 

i;,  Prewett  1282 

V.  Shants   1674,  1736,  1741, 

1743,  1748,  1754,  1755 

V.  Sleight  1021,  1329 

Davey  v.  Ruff  ell  1463 

V.  Turner  36 

David  V.  David  1994 

V.  Williamsburgh  Ins.  Co. 

218,  229 
Davidson  v.  Arledge        331,  414,  424, 

432 

V.  Bridgeport  1052 

V.  Cooper     1328,  1338,  1346 

V.  Cox  928 

V.  Jones  295 

V.  Killen  382,  389 

V.  Thompson  1884,  1892 

i>.  Wallingford  1937 

V.  Young  6,  15,  16,  25 

Davies  v.  Sear  534 

V.  Semmes  1010 

V.  Skinner  1894,  1895 

Davis  V.  Agnew  1195,  1976 

»;.  Alvord  1431,  1433 

V.  Bartholomew  319 

V.  Baylor  381 

V.  Beazley  1125 

liii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Refereiioes  are  to  Sections. 


Davis  V.  Bilsland  1430 

u.  Bonle  1159,  1180,  1194 

V.  Bnuulon  KJtJS 

V.  Burton  10G7 

V.  Calvert  97 

V.  Cass  1847 

V.  Cliaj)man  1888 
V.  Clark      899,  1801,  1812,  1814 

V.  Cross  1217,  1271,  1289, 

1290,  1325 

V.  Culver  49 
V.  Davis     314,  1297,  1301,  1792 

V.  Dean  99 

V.  Dudley  2,  24,  25 

I'.  Easley  1692 

V.  Ellis  1267,  1269 

V.  Fox  92 

V.  Fuller  375 

V.  Garrett  1276,  1282,  1289, 

1292,  1297 

i:  Givens  1862 

v.  Gray  674,  708 

r.  Hall  1072 

r.  Hayden  603 

V.  Henderson  829 

V.  Hess  400 

V.  Higgins  11'*  I 

V.  Hone  813 

V.  Hopkins  1568 

V.  Howell  374 

V.  Hutton  1887 

V.  Inscoe  1259,  1340 

V.  Jenney  1363 

V.  Jewett  1492 

V.  Judge  449,  450 

V.  Kennedy  1196,  1198,  1204 

V.  King  1846 

V.  Kneale  1314 

V.  Lane  1039 

V.  Lang  1969 

r.  Luster  84,  86,  88 

V.  Lutkiewiez  1380,  1393 
r.  Lyman         928,937,9/32,967, 
974 

V.  McFarlane  1620 

V.  Mitchell  364 

V.  Mugan  1718 

V.  Nolan  1524 

r.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.  175 

V.  Ownsby    "  1404,  1408 

V.  Pearson  1034 

V.  Rainsford  359,  381,  382, 
383,  384,  386,  400,  424 

V.  Roosvelt  1149,  1150,  1151 

V.  Seinmes  1094 

V.  Smith  364,  968 

v.  Strange  110 

liv 


Davis  V.  Strathmore  1499 

V.  Townsend  354 

V.  Treharne  538 

V.  Whitaker       1451,  1455,  1479 
r.  Williams       1217,  1220,  1234, 
1237,  1286,  1287 
V.  Windsor  Sav.  Bank  1037 

Davis  Sewing-Machine  Co.  v.  Bar- 
nard 68 
Dawes,  Ex  parte                                 249 
Dawes  v.  Tredwell                     249,  262 
Dawley  v.  Brown               122,  124,  125 
Daws  V.  Craig                                    1584 
Dawson  v.  Danbury  Bank     1575, 157  7 
V.  Hall                        1248,  1303 
V.  Helms                      21,  31,  33 
V.  Lawrence             1953,  1976 
V.  Mills                        905,  1936 
r.  Shirley                  1028,  1183 
Day  V.  Adams                                    1086 
V.  Chism                                       927 
V.  Clark                 1502,  1505,  1529 
V.  Griffith                                    1289 
V.  Howard            1862,  1879,  1919 
V.  Lacasse                        1303,  1304 
U.Perkins              1717,1765,1767 
V.  Philbrook                                   542 
V.  Railroad  Co.                          1569 
V.  Schroeder                                468 
V.  Seely  48 
Dayton  v.  Newman                           1218 
V.  Vandoozer                      1626 
Deakins  v.  Hollis                                 834 
Deal  V.  Cooper                                     330 
V.  Palmer                                   1501 
Dean  v.  Anderson                             1527 
V.  De  Lezardi                          1491 
V.  Long                                       1547 
V.  Lowell                            448,  455 
t;.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.     40,  41 
44,  45 
V.  Ne<Tley                                  116 
V.  O'Meara                    1981,  1997 
V.  Parker            1220,  1226,  1267 
Deane  y.  Hutchinson           1372,  1419, 

1460 
De  Arnaz  r.  Escandon         1139,1183, 
1196,  1198,  1206 
Dearborn  v.  Parks  303 

Deai-dorif  i\  Foresman  1304 

Dearmond  v.  Dearmond  1209 

Deason  v.  Taylor         1514,  1547,  1552 
Deaver  v.  Jones  323,  343 

De  BoUe  v.  Pennsylvania  Ins.  Co. 

825 
De  Camp  v.  Dobbins  175,  179,  181 
Dech's  Appeal  1885,  1904 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


De  Chaumont  v.  Forsythe  990 

Decker  v.  Boice  1425,  1426,  1496, 

1531,  1585 

V.  Clarke  1419 

V.  Dt'cker  1232,  1260 

V.  Freeman       1049,  1057, 1080 

i;.  Livingston  1925,  1930 

De  Courcy  v.  Ban-  1133 

Deer  Lake  Co.  v.  Michigan  Land 

Co.  538 

Deere  v.  Nelson  1289,  1295 

Deerfield  v.  Arms  483,  485 

Deering  v.  Ladd  1699 

V.  Long  Wharf  479 

Deery  v.  Cray  364,  424,  1185 

V.  McCHntock  1963 

Deetjen  v.  Richter  1563,  1566 

De  Forest  v.  Leete  96  7 

De  Forth  v.  Wis.  &  Minn.  R.  Co. 

1142 

Degenhart  v.  Cracraft  1215 

Degman  v.  Elliott  485 

De    Gray    v.    Monmouth     Beach 

Club-house  Co.  771,  7  72,  7  73, 

774,  779,  780 

Dehoritv  v.  Wright  931 

Deininger  v.  McConnel         1238,  1494 

Deisner  v.  Simpson  1591 

De  Lacy  r.  Tillman  1678,1717 

Delafield  v.  Illinois  1030 

De  Lancey  v.  Piepgras  472 

V.  Stearns  285,  1390, 

1425 

De  Lane  v.  Moore  1379,  1464 

Delaney  v.  Root  1605,  1620 

DelajjJaine    v.    Chicago  &  N.   W. 

Ry.  Co.  480,  501 

Delaslimutt  i-.  Parrent  1846 

Delaunay  v.  Burnett  1159,  1180 

Delavergne  v.  Norris         958,  962,  967, 

974 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral S.  Y.  Co.  820 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Han- 

non  483 

Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ox- 
ford Iron  Co.  1712,  1721,  1748 
De  Leon  v.  JMcMurray  1880 
Delhi  V.  Yonmans  1599 
Delraer  v.  M'Cabe  833 
Delogny  i>.  Mercer  785 
Delong  V.  Delong  646 
Demarest  v.  Willard  937 
V.  Wynkoop  1529,  1531 
De  ILittos  V.  Gibson  780 
Dcmby  V.  Parse  1666 
Dement  V.  Williams                 355,  1942 


Demesmey  v.  Gravelin  1321 

Deming  v.  Bullett  1041,  1066 

V.  Carrington  376 

V.  Miles  1451,  1472,  1485 

V.  Williams  44,  46 

Dempsey  v.  Tylee  40,  1112 

Den  V.  Ashbee  1185 

V.  Farlee  1365 

V.  Ferebee  1190 

V.  Geiger  1162,  1182 

V.  Graham  384 

V.  Hanks  266 

V.  Hardenbergh  1792,  1802, 

1803 

V.  Hay  237,  239 

V.  Hobson  616 

V.  Lewis  1182 

V.  Richman  1408 

V.  Roberts  1463 

V.  Smith  613 

V.  Taylor  616 

V.  Underwood  293 

V.  Van  Riper  1784 

V.  Vreelandt  1082 

V.  Wade  1372 

V.  Watkins  1463 

V.  Wright  1348,  1367 

Dengenhart  v.  Cracraft         1182,  1213 

Denham  v.  Sankey  1699 

V.  Walker  681 

Denis  v.  Velati  1223,  1224 

Dennett  v.  Dennett  48,  49,  50,  99, 

155,  613 

V.  Hopkinson  1619 

Dennis  v.  Burritt  1482 

V.  Tarpenny  1159,  1185, 

1190 

V.  Wilson  505,  551 

Dennison  v.  Taylor  517 

Denny  v.  Ashley  1145 

Denson  v.  Love  974 

Dent  V.  Bennett  99,  103,  104 

V.  Long  117,  118,  1206 

Denton  v.  Donner  162 

V.  Perry  1289 

V.  White  1575 

Dentzel  v.  Waldie  38,  316,  1022, 

1027 
Denver  v.  Pearce  484,  488,  489 

Denver,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lockwood 

324 
V.  School  Dis- 
trict        630, 
708 
Department  of  Parks,  Matter  of 

124,  131 
Depas  V.  Mayo  1801 

Iv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Refereuces  are  to  Sections. 


De  Peyster  v.  Mali  462,  4C3,  469 

V.Michael     617,660,661, 

664,  669,  712 

r.  Murphy  871 

De  Prez  V.  Everett  10u9 

Deputy  V.  Stapleford  91,  1335 

De  Puy  t'.  Strong  1925 

Derby  i;.  Tlirall  1342 

De  Rochemont  v.  Boston  &  M.  R. 

Co.  879 

Derrick  v.  Brown  1396 

Derry  Bank  v.  Webster        1289,  1296 
De  Ruyter  v.  Ti-ustees  1566 

De  Segond  y.  Culver  1120 

Desilver,  Iti  re  67 

Des  Moines  v.  Hall  452 

Des  Moines  Nat.  Bank  v.  Harding 

1352,  1365 
Despatch    Line    Co.   v.   Bellamy 
Manuf.  Co.  1035,  1049,  1051, 

1668 
Desverges  v.  Willis  885 

Detroit  v.  Mut.  Cras  Light  Co.  144 

Detroit  &  B.  C.  R.   Co.  v.  Busch 

1748 

De  Yanghn  v.  McLeroy        1102,  1936 

Devausney,  In  re  52 

De  Vendal  v.  Malone     *  1463 

De  Vendell  v.  Doe  1407 

De  Veney  v.  Gallagher  466 

Devereux  v.  McMahon         1000,  1002, 

1010,  1013,  1014,  1094,  1218, 

1475 

Devin  v.  Himer  1331,  1337 

Devine  v.  Lewis  948,  968 

V.  Rawle  872 

Devinney  v.  Reynolds  1021,  1043 

Devonshire  v.  Pattinson  484 

Devore  r.  Kemp  1627 

V.  Sunderland        843,  929,  931 

De  Vries  v.  Conklia  41 

Devries  v.  Hiss  1886 

V.  Phillips  291 

Devyr  v.  Schat^-fer  131 

Dewey  v.  Allgire  67,  71 

V.  Brown  905,  1936 

V.  Burbank  158 

V.  Campau        1139,  1163, 1185, 

1186,  1196 

V.  IngersoU  1490 

V.  Lambier  1938 

V.  Sugg  1403 

V.  Walton  1404 

V.  Williams  723 

Dewitt  V.  Ackcrman  1963 

De  Witt  l:  :Mattison  48 

r.  Moulton  1435 

Ivi 


De  Witt  V.  San  Francisco  1772 

D'Wolf  V.  Haydn  992 

Dexter  v.  Beard  785,  793,  938 

V.  Hall  1023,  1024 

V.  Harris  1502,  1506 

V.  Lothrop  1820 

u.  Manley  '  9  IS 

V.  Nelson  119 

V.  Riverside,  &c.  Mills  Co. 

448,  454,  462,  463 
Dey?).  Dunham  1462,1517 

De  Zeng  i;.  Beekman  1056,  1057 

Dias  tJ.  Glover  1792 

Dibble  v.  Rogers  364 

Dibrell  v.  Carlisle  1 55 

Dicku.  Balch  1112,  1484 

V.  Pitchford  660 

Dicken  v.  Johnson  48 

Dickens  v.  Barnes  337,  344 

Dickenson  v.  Grand  June.  Canal 

Co.  823 

Dickei'son  v.  Bowers  1407,  1453 

V.  Col  grove  1394 

V.  Davis      1159,  1165,  1173 

U.Talbot  1133 

V.  Tillinghast        285,  1386, 

1387,  1390 

Dickey  v.  Henarie  1406 

V.  Lyon  1566 

V.  M'Cullough  682,  707 

V.  Weston  928 

Dickie  v.  Carter  98 

Dickinson  v.  Burrell  290 

V.  Glenney  1212 

V.  Grand  June.  Canal      823 

V.  Hoomes       793,  828,  858, 

903,  907,  939,  942 

r.  Williams  1830,1917 

Dickson  v.  Bamberger  1358 

V.  Desire     929,  931,  968,  971, 

974 

V.  Kempiusky  48 

V.  Wilson  391 

Diedrich  v.  Nortliwost  Ry.  Co,        500 

Diefendorf  v.  Diefendorf     44,  4.5,  303, 

1230,  1232,  1234,  1240,  1272,  1282 

Diehlv.  Emig  1286,1288 

V.  Fowler  1240 

V.  Zanger  364 

Diener  v.  Diener  227 

Dietz  V.  Mission  Transfer  Co.  538 

Diez,  In  re  1232 

Digby  V.  Jones  1528 

Digman  v.  McCollum  1374,  1488, 

1547 

Dikeman  v.  Arnold       828,  1196,  1221 

v.  Parrish     1866,  1868,  ls,so 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Dikeman  v.  Puckbafer 
Dikes  V.  Miller 
Dill  V.  Board 
V.  Bo  wen 


1479 
1217 
449 
7,  31,  33 


Dillahunty  v.  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S. 
Ry.  Co.  913,  915,  919,  926,  974, 

978 
Dillaway  v.  Butler  1539 

DiUaye  v.  Commercial  Bank  1508 

Diller  v.  Johnson  79 

Dillinger  v.  Kelley  1836 

Dillingham  v.  Roberts  479 

V.  Smith  499 

Dimmick  v.  Dimmick  1274 

V.  Lockwood  957,  967, 

970 
Dimon  v.  Dunn  1483 

Dimpfel  i'.  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.         148 
Dingey  v.  Paxton  402 

Dingley  v.  Bon  1499,  1547 

Dinwiddie  i-.  Smith  1272,  1958 

Dishmore  v.  Jones  1515 

Dishon  v.  Smith  658 

Disney  v.  Coal  Creek  Min.  Co.       381, 

433 

Disque  v.  Wright  1435,  1469 

Distilled  S])irits  1534,  1535 

Ditman  v.  Clybourn  519 

Diver  v.  Diver  1800,  1*502 

Dixon  V.  Caldwell  1508 

V.  Dixon  87 

V.  Hill  1527,  1528 

V.  Hunter  1420 

V.  Merritt  2,  7,  21,  22 

Doane  v.  Broad  Street  Asso.  1649 

V.  Willcut  4  76 

Dobbin  v.  Cordiner      1087,  1109,  1336 

Dobbins  v.  Brown  909,  912 

Dobschnetz  v.  Holliday         1682,  1720 

Dobson  V.  Hohenadel  448,  449 

Docking  v.  Frazell     1668,  1679,  1699, 

1732,  1736 

Docktermann  v.  Elder  1947 

Doctor  V.  Darling      875,  882,  958,  970 

V.  Furch  399 

Dodd  V.  Bartholomew  214 

V.  Ben  thai  9 

V.  Birchall  1663 

V.  Parker  1372,  1501 

V.  Seymour  828 

V.  Williams  1488,  1502 

V.  Witt  338,  381,  448,  465 

Dodge  V.  Boston  &  P.  Co.         553,  693 

V.  Davis  1575,  1892,  1913 

r.  Hollin-shead  1196 

V.  Kinzy  1807,  1812 

V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.         448,  449 


Dodge  V.  Potter  1452,  1455,  1479 

V.  Williams  170 

Dodson  w.  Hays  1891 

Doe  r.  Abernatby  27 

V.  Beeson  1220,  1307 

V.  Bingham  1346 

V.  Botts  1930 

V.  Burt  1593 

V.  Butcher  675 

V.  Carew  677 

V.  Catomore  1359 

V.  Collins  1647 

V.  Davies  1094 

V.  East  India  Co.  485 

V.  Errington  256,  259,  1935 

V.  Giillini  583 

V.  Galloway  415 

V.  Hearick  1879 

V.  Henderson  253 

V.  Hildreth  431 

V.  Hirst  1349 

V.  Holtom  325 

V.  Howell  256 

V.  Howland  1182,  1792,  1803 

V.  Hurd  266,  267 

V.  Jackman  601,  602,  609 

V.  Knight  1240,  1267,  1280, 
1309 

V.  Lock  505 

V.  Manning  293 

V.  Phelps  252 

V.  Porter  256,  410 

V.  Pretty  man  1110 

V.  Prosser  1862,  1872 

V.  Reed  1178 

V.  Roe  121 

V.  Routledge  277,  293,  1387 

V.  Rugeley  674,  675 

V.  Rusham  ^                        293 

V.  Salkeld  '                        207 

V.  Stone  257 

V.  Sumraersett  1776 

V.  Tranmer  313 

V.  Vallejo  384 

V.  Webster  345 

Doebler's  Appeal  602,  604,  660 

Dogan  V.  Seekright  381 

Doherty  v.  Dola'n  969 

V.  Stimmell  1531 
Dohoney  i'.  Womack       334,  403,  404, 

1822 

Dolan  V.  Baltimore  '    712,  723,  743 

Dolde  V.  Vorlicka  331,  424,  432 

Dole  V.  Bodnian  1296 

r.  Thurlow  1085,  1109 
Dolliff  V.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.         534, 

1664 

Ivii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Dollins  i 
Dolliver 


Pollock 
.  Dolliver 
I'.  El  a 
Dolman  v.  Cook 
Dolph  V.  Barney 

c.  Hand 
Dominick  v.  Micliael 
Donahoe  v.  Emery 


310 

!)7 

1G94,  l«!)o 

81 

1937 

24,  25,  27 

20 

831,  858,  9G9, 

975,  989 

Donahue  v.  Case  334,  338 

r.  Hubbard  1803,  1805 

V.  Mills  1198,  1205,  1501 

Donald  v.  Beals  1455,  14G8,  14(!9, 

1532 
V.  Nesbitt 
Donegan  v.  Donegan 
Donelson  v.  Posey 
Donnell  v.  Humphreys 
V.  Mateer 
V.  Thompson 


861. 


Donuels  v.  Edwards 
Donner  c.  Palmer 
Donnor  v.  Quarterraas 

Donohue  v.  Whitney 
Donovan  r.  "Ward 
Dooley  v.  Baynes 
V.  Wolcott 
Doolittle  V.  Bailey 
V.  Cook 


V.  McCullough 

V.  Tice 
Doorley  v.  McConnell 
Doran  v.  Butler 

V.  McConlo2;ue 


Doremus  r.  Doremus 

Doren  v.  Gillum 

Dorn  /•.  Beasley 
V.  Best 

Dorr  V.  Clapp 

V.  Diidderar 
V.  Harrahan 
V.  School  District 

Dorsey  v.  Jackman 

Doswell  V.  Buchanan 

Dott  V.  Cunnington 

Doty  V.  Cox 

Dongal  V.  Fryer 

Doiigall  i:  Foster 

Dougherty  v.  Chesnutt 
V.  Duvall 

Doughty  V.  Owen 

Douglas  V.  Bishop 

V.  Branch  Bank 

Iviii 


1230 

1793,  1801 

74 

1G43 

61G,  1955 

919,  928, 

952 

1824 

1229 

1846,  1955, 

1957,  1981 

378 

24 

1799 

1510,  15G3 

3G4,  438 

285,  1390,  1482, 

1489,  1490,  1571 

81,  95 

369 

743 

1127 

49,  55,  97, 

107,  271 

19G9 

563,  567 

1935 

1092,  1159 

594 

1745 

765 

321,  338,  400 

833 

1416,  14.S7 

40G 

10 

667,  700 

1912 


1672. 


34G 

972 

1717 

1133 

239 


Douglas  V.  Dangerfield  1846 

r.  Do  Laittre  1031 

V.  Fulda  1027 

V.  Lock  503 

V.  Shumway  1601,  1605, 

1609 

v.  Union  Mat.  L.  Ins.  Co.    731 

V.  West  1220,  1258,  1259, 

1272,1277 

Douglass  r.  Cline  1729 

V.  Lewis      838,  839,  840,  841 

V.  McCrackin  1559 

V.  Peele         1484,  1494,  1496 

V.  Scott  1487 

V.  Thomas  653 

Douthit  V.  Hipp  898 

V.  Robinson  340 

Douthitt  V.  Stinson  223,  236,  237, 

241,  242 
Dow  V.  Gould,  &c.  Silver  M.  Co. 

1022,  1027,  1028 

V.  Jewell  1365,  1940 

V.  Lewis  830,  834 

V.  Mining  Co.  42 

V.  Whitney  413,  1394,  1400, 

1401 

Dowdney  v.  Mayor  871 

Dowling"  y.  Salliotte  1789,1792, 

1794,  1797,  1801 

Down  V.  Down  329 

Downard  v.  Groff  1628 

Downer  v.  Smith  944,  1846 

Downes  v.  Grazebrook  162 

Downie  v.  Ladd  960 

Downing  v.  Blair        1196,  1204,  1206, 

1207 

V.  Marshall  171 

Downs  V.  Porter  1092 

v.  Yonge  1087 

Doyle  V.  Dixon  744 

V.  Mellen  398 

V.  Peerless  1487 

V.  San  Diego  Land  Co.  176 

V.  Stevens  1482,  1563 

V.  Teas  1374,  1617,  1522 

V.  Wade  1407,  1529 

Dozier  v.  Barnett  1383 

Drake's  Appeal  98 

Drake  v.  Crowell  1560 

V.  Curtis  476 

V.  Ramsay  2,  3,  24,  25,  26 

V.  Regtrel  1460 

V.  AVells  1606,  1609 

Draper  r.  Bryson  1200,  1404 

r.  Monroe  466,  46  7 

Draude  v.  Rohrer  Manuf.  Co.       1438, 

1482 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Dray  v.  Dray 
Dreisbach  v.  Serf  ass 
Dresel  v.  Jordan 
Dresser  v.  Dresser 

V.  Norwood 
Dreutzer  v.  Baker 

V.  Lawrence 
V.  Smith 
Drew  V.  Arnold 
V.  Baldwin 
V.  Drew 
Swift 


1836 

526, 568 

1238 

1887,  1895 

1534 

1061,  1087 

1087 

1081 

1188 

620,  722 

329,  413 

335,  381 


V.  Towle  131,  915,  968,  981 

Drey  v.  Doyle  1514,  1563 

Driggers  v.  Cassady  336 

Driseoll  v.  Green  324,  326,  416 

Drown  c.  Smith  525 

Drury  v.  Foster  1212,  1331,  1332, 

1333,  1447 
V.  Midland  R.  Co.  252 

V.  Shumway  969 

V.  Tremont  Imp.  Co.     295,  303 
Dryden  v.  Kellogg  968 

V.  Newman  1872 

Drye  v.  Cook  1123,  1124 

Drysdale  v.  Mace  1554 

Dubber  v.  Trollop  577 

Dubei;.  Smith  1935 

Dublin,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Black  27 

Dubois  u.  Beaver  1614,1922 

V.  Campau      1836,  1846,  1866, 
1872 
V.  Glaub  1928 

V.  Kelly  1603 

Dubose  V.  Young  1455,  1472 

Duchess  of  Chandois,  In  re  52 

Dudley  v.  Collier  187 

V.  Elkins       355,  358,  359,  364 
V.  FoUiott  «93 

D.  Hurst  1672,1717,1721 

Duer  V.  James  1240,  1267 

Duester  v.  McCamus  1490 

Duff  V.  Moore  389,  392,  447 

V.  "Wilson  1836 

Duffus  V.  Bangs  1684 

Duffy  V.  Masterson  365 

Dufour  V.  Cainfranc  254 

Dufphey  v.  Frenaye  1441,  1442 

Du'i^an  V.  Thomas  '16 

DuStrer  V.  Oglesby  908,  927 

Duke  V.  Markham  1079,  1133 

Dukes  V.  Jones  1466 

V.  Spangler  12-J9 

Dulany  V.  Tilghman  1215 

Dull  V.  Blum  334,  403 

Duly  V.  Brooks  1129 

Dumoncel  v.  Dumoncel  163 


Dumpor's  Case  707 

Dun  V.  Dietrich  835,  841 

Dunbar  v.  Stickler  625 

Duncan  v.  Blair  861 

V.  Central  Passenger  Ry. 

Co.  782,  802 

V.  Duncan  1146,  1940 

V.  Forrer  1773,  1775 

V.  Harder  1949 

V.  Hodges       1328,  1331,  1337 

V.  Johnson  1527 

V.  INIadara  326,  350 

V.  Miller  1404,  1436 

V.  Pope  1303,  1304 

V.  Sylvester  1940,  1952 

V.  Williams  1862 

Duncombe  v.  Richards  103 

Dundas  I'.  Hitchcock  1190 

Dundy  v.  Chambers  1085,  1101, 

1103,  1120 

Dungan  v.  Am.  Life  Ins.  &  Trust 

Co.  1463 

V.  Van  Puhl  190G 

Dunham  v.  Cincinnati,  Peru,  &c. 

Ry.  Co.  1729 

V.  Dey  1547 

V.  Gannett  394 

V.  Griswold  82,  87 

V.  Kirkpatrick  538 

V.  Loverock  1827 

V.  New  Britain  6  75 

V.  WiUiams  448,  458 

V.  Wright  37 

Dunklee  v.  Wilton  R.  Co.     494,  1642, 

1652 
Dunlap  V.  Daugherty  1130,  1133, 

1155 
V.  Green  226,  244,  245, 

287 
I!.  Hawkins  289 

r.  Mobley  641,645 

r.  Stetson  479,  488,  490 

Dunlieth  &  D.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Du- 
buque '^-6 
Dunman  r.  Gulf,  &c.  Ry.  Co.         1673 
Dunn  V.  Adams  ,                               1146 
V.  Chambers  275 
V.  Davis                             579,  617 
V.  Dunn  104 
V.  Enfi^lish  338 
r.  Games                          219,  1007 
V.  Sanford                         530,  542 
Dunnage  '•.  White  76 
Dunning  r.  Ocean  Nat.  Bank         1809 
Dunstan  c  Northern  Pac.  I'v.  Co. 

508,  531,  556 
Dunton  v.  Brown  11,  13 

lix 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Dunwell  r.  WuU-vW  1402 

Dupee    r.    Boston    Water-Power 

Co.  141 

•Dupont  c.  Starring  364,  366 

c.  Wertlieinan  589 

Dupree  v.  Dupree  580 

Duraind's  Appeal       1233,  1236,  1269, 

1271 

Durant  /•.  Crowell  1516 

r.  Muller  602,  614 

i:  Ritchie  36,  43 

Durfee  *'.  Garvey  1208 

Durham  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Walker     510 

Durkee  i:  Nat.  Bank  1393 

Durnherr  i:  Ran  865,  942 

Durrett  c.  Piper  867 

Durst  t\  Daugherty  1162,  1174, 

1192, 1547 

Duryea  i:  Mayor  531,  543,  735 

Dnrvee  r.  New  York  632,  708 

Dusenbury  v.  Hulbert  1413,  1448, 

1497 
Dussaume  v.  Burnett  1109,  1125, 

1126 
Dustin  I'.  Newcomer  968 

Dutch  V.  Boyd  321 

Dutch   West   India   Co.    v.    Van 

Moses  235 

Dutro  V.  Kennedy  1748,  1759 

Dutton  V.  Ives  1429 

c.  M'Reynolds         1404,  1406, 

1572 

V.  Tilden  303 

V.  Warschauer  1566,  1568 

Duval  V.  Bibb  303 

i:  Covenhoven  1442 

Duval!  i:  Craig  858,  860,  919 

Dwenger  r.  Bi'anigan  1414 

Dwight  i:  Cutler  828 

V.  Tyler  372 

Dwinel  r.  Veazie  830 

Dwinell  r.  Bliss  1217,  1220,  1248, 

1254,  1294 

Dwyer  v.  Rich  493 

V.  Rippetoe      1559,  1844,  1852 

Dwyre  v.  Speer  338,  404 

Dyckman  v.  Mayor  1860 

i.\  Valiente  1900 

Dycus  V.  Hart  1396 

Dyer  i\  Bean  44 

V.  Clark  1542 

V.  Duffy  1029,  1030 

V.  Eldridge  372,  1803,  1807 

V.  Sanford        510,  551,  560,  634 

V.  Wightman  912 

V.  Wilbur  1884,  1917 

Dygert  i'.  Matthews  523 

Ix 


Dygert  i'.  Remerschnider        280,  283, 

284,  289 

Dyne  r.  Nutlcv  415 

Dyson  v.  Brad'shaw  1314,  1319 

v.  Simmons  1468,  1478 

Eadie  v.  Slinimon  85,  86,  88 

Eads  V.  Retherford  1853 

Eagle  Fire  Co.  v.  Lent  21 

Eagle  Woollen  Mills  Co.  v.  Mon- 

teith  1080 

Eakle  v.  Reynolds  113 

Eames  v.  McGregor  213 

Earle  v.  Dawes  619,  621,  622, 

635 

V.  De  Witt  833 

V.  Earle  1028,  1224 

V.  Fiske  1383,  1385,  1463 

V.  Middleton  944,  968 

V.  Wood  1824 

Early  v.  Burtis  1767 

V.  Friend  1891,  1892,  1906 

Earnhart  v.  Earnhart  602 

East  V.  Pugh  1216,  1529 

East  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Eastern, 

&c.  R.  Co.  145 

East  Hampton  v.  Kirk  472,  479 

East  Haven  v.  Hemingway       472,476 
East  Line,  &c.  R.   Co.  v.   Garrett 

299,  625 
East    Norway    Lake     Cluircli    v. 

Froislie  176 

East    Tennessee,   &c.   Rv.  Co.   v. 

Davis  1161,  1177,  1178 

East  Texas  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clarke 

1303,  1305 
Easter  v.  Little  Miami  R.  Co.         785, 

793 
Easterbrooks  v.  Tillinghast  628 

Eastern    Carolina    Land    Co.    v. 

Frey  521 

Eastham  v.  Powell  1276 

Eastman  v.  Batchelder  274 

y.  Foster        1696,1699,1748 

V.  Knight  326 

V.  Wright  989 

Easton  v.  DriscoU  1303 

Eastwood  V.  Lever  773 

Eaton  V.  Campbell  1112,  1113 

V.  Chesebrough  882 

V.  Eaton  50,  54,  59,  61,  68 

V.  George  39 

V.  Knowles  969 

V.  Lyman        924,929,  931,952, 

962,  967,  971 

V.  Perry  78 

V.  Rice  358 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Eaton  V.  Tallmadge       962,  974, 1942, 

1952 
V.  Trowbridge  1168,  12^8, 

1239,  1396,  1401 
Eaves  v.  Estes             1668,  1719,  1737, 

1748,  1753 
Ebersole  v.  Rankin  1394 

Eberstein  v.  Willets         91,  93,  94,  95 
Ebert  v.  Wood  1942,  1949 

Eberts  v.  Fisher  1955 

Echols  V.  Cheney  1040,  1042 

V.  Sparks  1936 

Eck  V.  Hatcher  1516 

Eckert  v.  Elowry  97 

Eckhart  v.  Irons  734,  741 

Eckman  v.  Eckman         208,  313,  526, 

1240,  1267,  1309 
Eddie  V.  Tinnin  358 
Eddy  V.  Herrin                          80,  85,  86 

V.  Hinnant  694 

V.  St.  ISlars  498 

Edgerton  v.  Jones  1185,  1196 

Edinburoh  Am.  Land  Mortg.  Co. 

V.  Peoples  1134,  1206 

Edington  v.  Nix  962,  907 

Edmondson  v.  Harris  1190 

Echininds'  Appeal  873,  1837 

Edmunds  r.  Leavell  1447 

Edsall  V.  Merrill  1885,  1887, 

1892 
Edson  V.  Knox  388,  442,  1109 

Edward's  Appeal  579 

Edwards  v.  Barwise  1455,  1482, 

1544 

V.  Beall  563,  568 

V.  Bishop  1919 

V.  Bowden         84,  87,  94,  97, 

330,  337,  343,  349 

V.  Champion  1775 

V.  Clark  883,  959 

V.  Dickinson  1258,  1259 

V.  Handley  89 

V.  Hillier  1487,  1532 

V.  McKcrnan  285,  1390, 

1416,  1417 

V.  Header  1402 

V.  Ogle  484,  491 

V.  Parkhurst  140 

V.  Perkins  1626 

V.  Ptoys  140 

V.  Thorn  1091,  1191 

V.  Thompson  1563,  1564, 

1627 

V.  Trumbull  1406 

Edwardsville  R.  Co.  v.  Sawyer        575 

Effinger  v.  Hall  1517,  1522,  1563 

Eire  V.  Kille  1668 


Egerton  v.  Carr 
Egery  v.  Woodard 
Eggleston  v.  Pollock 


1234 

1238 
1314 

V.  Watson  1436 

Egremont  Burial  Board  v.  Egre- 

mont  Iron  Co.  1595 

Ehlev.  Brown  1406,  1408,  1563, 

1567 

Eichlor  v.  Holroyd  1320 

Eiden  v.  Eiden  364 

Einstein  v.  Shouse       1162,  1169,  1179 

Eiseman  v.  Gallagher  1517,  1522 

Ekin  V.  McCracken  50,  56 

Ela  V.  Card  329,  413,  944 

Elbert  v.  McClelland  1350 

Elcessor  v.  Elcessor  48,  55 

Elder  v.  Burrus  481 

r.  Derby  996 

V.  McClaskey  1863,  1807, 

1868,  1880,  1881 

V.  Schumacher  54,  68,  69 

V.  True  969,  9  76 

Eldridge  v.  Post  1529 

V.  Smith  178 

V.  Trustees  80 

Elias  V.  Verducro  1942 

Eliot  V.  Thatcher  326,  420 

Elkhart  Car  Works  Co.  v.  Ellis      6  7  7, 

708,  716,  722 

Ellett  V.  Richardson  1185 

Ellicott  V.  Pearl  375,  376 

Ellingboe  v.  Brakken  1111 

Ellinwood  v.  Stancliff  442 

Elliot  V.  Davis  218 

V.  Ince  54,  68,  69 

V.  Lane  1570 

V  Sleeper         38,  316,  318,  1003 

V.  Small  457,  503,  530,  531 

Elliott  V.  Frakes  1862 

V.  Gibson  427 

V.  Gilchrist  352 

V.  Harris  1481 

V.  Horn  2 

V.  Nichols  1793,  1800 

I'.  Peirsol       36,37,1187,1207, 

1208,  1212,  1476 

V.  Sauflcy  922,  924,  927 

V.  Small  542 

V.  Teah  37,  1028 

V.  Thompson  968 

V.  Wright  1668 

Ellis  /•.  Alford  158 

t:  Allen  310 

r.  Elkhart  Car  Co.  730 

r.  Ellis  113,  117 

r.  Horrman  1517 

V.  Kyger  718 

Ixi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Ellis  r.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  1267 

r.  Stewart  11)66 

V.  AVait  1331,  1334 

r.  Young  1068 

Ellison  r.  Briiiham  1605 

r.  .Salem    Coal  &  U.   Co. 

1680,  1753,  1754 

Ellsworth  r.  Central  R.  Co.  1238 

r.  Lord  448 

Elmendorff  r.  Carmichael         16G,  167 

Elmore  r.  Marks  1217,  1220,  1289, 

1301 
Elrod  r.  Keller  1898,  1981,  1997 

Elsay  V.  Metcalf  1292 

Elsberry  i'.  Boykin  1218,  12X2, 

1291 

Elsey  V.  Metcalf  1238,  1296 

Elston  v.  Jasper  52,  53,  54 

V.  Piggott  185,  186,  1836 

El  well  r.  Bm-nside  1911,  1987 

i:  Grand  St.  &  N.  R.  Co.   1054 

r.  Shaw  1040,  1042 

Elwes  r.  Briggs  Gas  Co.  1691 

r.  Maw  1666 

Elwood  f.   Klock    1109,  1185,  1196, 

1204,  1208 

Ely  r.  Ely  1367 

V.  Scofield  1421,  1586 

V.  Stannard  1394 

v.  Wilcox   44,  1371,  1435,  1445, 

1479,  1504,  1505,  1520,  1530, 

1568 

Elyton  Land  Co.  v.   South  &  N. 

Ala.  R.  Co.  623,  632,  635 

Emeric  v.  Alvarado  331,  1506, 

1846,  1974,  1976,  1978,    1979,    1995 

Emerson  v.  Cutler  1819 

V.  Mooney  510,  548,  555 

V.  Proprietors  892 

V.  Sansome  1408,  1628 

V.  Simpson         632,  648,6  78, 

679,  693 

V.  Taylor  476,  483 

Emery  v.  Chase  268,  295,  313 

*;.  Fugina  1626 

r.  Three  Rivers  1226 

V.  Wase  160 

V.  Webster  487 

Emmal  v.  Webb  1123 

Emmerson  r.  Hughes        601,  602,  613 

Emmett  v.  Emmett  163,  166 

Emmons  v.  Murray  10,  1563,  1576 

Encking  v.  Simmons  99 

Engel  V.  Ayer  503,  506,  549,  553, 

555,  575 

England  r.  Dearborn  1054 

>:  Hatch  1112 

]xii 


England  r.  Vandermark  381,  438 

Englebert  r.  Troxell         2,  18,  27,  28, 

31,  34 

Engleman  n.  Craig  303,  948 

English  r.  Brennan  462,  464 

r.  Helms  1071 

V.  Powell        1846,  1873,  1S79, 

1.S80 

r.  Waples        1504,  1522,  1527 

Ennor  r.  Thompson  1198,  1204 

Enochs  V.  Miller  400,  402 

Enos  V.  Cook  1423 

Ensworth  v.  King       1285,  1288,  1291, 

1449 
Enterprise  Transit  Co.  r.  Sheedy 

1208 
Enyeart  v.  Kepler  42,  1792,  1801, 

1803,  1805 
Enys  V.  Donnithorne  989 

Eoff  r.  Irvine  1394 

Episcopal  City  Mission  v.  Apple- 
ton  623,  641,  642,  650,  741,  742 
Epley  I'.  Epley  1958 
V.  Witherow  1521 
Eppes  V.  Randolph  283 
Eppright  V.  Nickerson  1117 
Epps  V.  Flowers  7,  8,  9 
Equitable    Life     Assur.     Soc.    v. 

Brennan  779,  782 

Equitable  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Slye      1430, 

1432 
Equitable  Mortg.  Co.  v.   Kemper 

1148,  1440 

V.  Lowry     1575 

Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Christ       1670, 

1673,  1721 

Erickson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  1358 

V.  Mich.  Land  &  Iron  Co. 

529,  533,  538,  1596 

V.  Rafferty  1437 

Ernst  V.  Parsons  930 

V.  Reed  1240,  1302 

Erskine  v.  Davis  219,  1007 

r.  Moulton  424,476,479, 

488 

V.  Plummer  1605,  1606 

V.  Wilson  898 

Erwin  v.  Hurd  650,  731 

V.  Lewis  1504 

V.  Olmsted  1922 

V.  Shuey  1499,  15U1 

Eshleman  v.  Henrietta  Vineyard 

Co.  1245 

V.  Malter  445,  446 

Eslberry  v.  Boykin  1292 

Eslow  V.  Mitchell  1108 

Esmond  v.  Tarbox  432 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Espalla  V.  Touart  1996 

Espin  V.  Pemberton     1538,  1539,  1544 
Ef^py  V.  Anderson  828 

V.  Comer  1831 

Essex  V.  Daniell  58 

Estabrook  v.  Smith  858,  860,  861, 

948,  974 
Estep  V.  Estep  1892 

Estes  V.  Odom  407,  1522 

Estill  V.  Beers  233 

Esty  V.  Baker  359,  418 

V.  Currier  351,  535,  422,  557 

Ethel  V.  Batchelder  1989 

Etheridge  v.  Doe  164,  165 

Ettenheimer  v.  HefEernan  163 

Eubank  v.  Poston  1390 

Euliss  V.  McAdams  331,  340,  346, 

351,  436 
Eureka  Co.  v.  Bailey  Co.  1052 

y.  Edwards    16,17,24,31, 
33,  35,  124 
Eureka  Lumber  Co.  v.  Brown         1090 
Eureka  Mower  Co.,  Iti  re  1690 

European  Bank,  In  re  1539 

Eury  V.  Merrill  1981 

Eustache  v.  Rodaquest  163 

Eustis  V.  Cowherd  987 

Evans  v.  Bagshaw  1970 

V.  Brittain  1819 

V.  Commonwealth  1182 

V.  Duncan  861,  863 

V.  Foreman  1358 

V.  Gibbs  1310,  1311 

V.  Greene  326,  327 

V.  Horan  54 

V.  Hurt  375 

V.  Jones  1369 

V.  Lee  1082 

V.  McGlasson  1404 

V.  INlcLucas  892 

V.  Martin  1942 

V.  Nealis  1529 

V.  Pence  1392 

V.  Richardson  1086 

V.  Roberts        1602,  1618,  1619, 
1620,  1627 
V.Smith  1146 

r.  Summerlin  38,1164 

V.  Templeton    1391,  1485,  1866 
V.  Weeks  383 

V.  Wells  1040 

Evelyn  v.  Templar  293 

Evens  v.  Griscom  328 

Everest  v.  Ferris  209,  1394 

Everett  v.  Insurance  Co.  324 

V.  Remington  755,  809 


V.  Whitney 


1280 


Everingham  v.  Braden  1621 

Everitt  v.  Thomas  331 

Eversole  v.  Early  891,  921 

Everson  v.  Waseca  492 

Everts  v.  Agnes  1256,  1314,  1315, 

1320,  1527 

V.  Beach  18S7 

Evetts  V.  Tendick  1906 

Ewald  i".  Corbett  1182,  1919 

Ewer  V.  Hobbs  1824,  1825,  1959 

V.  Lovell  1873 

Ewing  V.  Burnet  1563,  1568,  1573 

V.  Colquhoun  480 

V.  Savary  1796 

V.  Shannahan  593 

V.  Shropshire         579,  602,  613 

615 

Exton  V.  Scott  1277 

Exum  V.  Canty  1230 

Eylar  v.  Eylar  1575 

Fao'an  v.  Armstead  481 

°       V.  Cadmus  872,  958,  962 

V.  Stoner  384,  389 

Fahey  v.  Marsh  340 

Fahrney  v.  Holsinger  616 

Fain  v.  Smith    1217,  1218,  1220,  1240, 

1287 

Fair  v.  Stevenot    1563,  1565,  1568, 

Fairbanks  v.  Insurance  Co.     1303 

V.  Metcalf     1217,  1252, 

1303,  1304,  1307 

V.   Snow        4,  90,  93 

V.  AVilliamson  991 

Fairchild  v.  Chastelleux       1792,  1802, 

1811 

Fairclaim  v.  Shack elton  1872 

Fairclolh  v.  Isler  828 

Fairfax  v.  Hunter  166 

Fairhaven  v.  Cowgill  1359 

Fairis  f.  Walker  1718 

Faivre  v.  Daley  564,  568 

Falconer's  Succession  14  72 

Fall  V.  Glover  295 

V.  Roper  1178 

Fallas  V.  Pierce  1479,  1504,  1505 

Fallon  V.  Chidester  1836,  1846 

V.  Kehoe  218,  229 

Falls  V.  Carpenter  127 

V.  Falls  111 

V.  Reis  448 

Falls  Land,  &c.  Co.  v.  Chisholm     331, 

348 
Falls  Village  Water-Power  Co.  v. 

Tibbetts  466 

Faloon  V.  Simshauser  580 

Fanninff  v.  Chadwick  1830 

Ixiii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Fargason  i-.  Edrington         1389,  1390, 

1393,  13!)4,  1399,  1529,  1572 

Farges  v.  Kvhuul  256 

Faris  r.  PhJlan  39  7 

Farist  Steel  Co.  v.  Bridgeport         476 

Farley  v.  Bryant  544 

{'.  Deslonde  341,  405 

V.  Weslande  335 

Farlin  v.  Sook  1628 

Farmer  v.  Batts         337,  339,  343,  344 

V.  Farmer  45 

V.  Ukiah  Water  Works      1660 

Farmers'  &  Manufacturers'  Bank 

V.  Haight  10G4 

Farmers'  &  Meclianics'  Nat.  Bank 

V.  Gregory  1792 

Farmers'  &  Mechanics'  Turnpike 
Co.  V.  McCuUoch     1080,  1082, 1449, 

1476 
Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank 

V.  Wallace  1940,  1947,  1793 

Farmers'  &  Millers'  Bank  v.  De- 
troit, &c.  R.  Co.  ISl 
Farmers'  &  Traders'  Bank  v.  Ha- 

ney  1220,  1252 

Farmers'  Bank  v.  Corder  1802 

V.  Glenn  943,  956 

Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Cur- 
tis 181 
Farmers'    Loan    &    Trust  Co.    v. 

Hendrickson  1729 

Farmers'    Loan    &   Trust    Co.    v. 

McKinney  186 

Farmers'    Loan    &    Trust    Co.   v. 
Maltby  1487,  1488,  1506,  1527, 

1563 
Farmers'    Loan    &   Trust    Co.    v. 
Minneapolis  Engine  Works       1712, 

1714 
Farmers'    Loan    &    Trust  Co.    v. 
St.  Joseph  &   Denver  City  Ry. 


Co. 
Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  v 


Farnham  v.  Thompson 
Farnsworth  v.  Converse 
V.  Jordain 
V.  Minn 


1729 
Fletcher 

1560, 15G2 

632,  641,  650 

138 

1472 

&c.    R.    Co. 

146,  726 
V.  Perry  557 

V.  Rockland  394 

V.  Western  Union  Tel. 


Co. 
Farnum  v.  Brooks 
V.  Buffum 
V.  Peterson 

Ixiv 


1724 

48 

1151 

127,  140,  962, 

986 


Farnum  v.  Piatt  558 

Farquharson  v.  Eichelberger  52(i, 

563,  565,  593 

Farr  v.  Trustees  1772 

Farrall  v.  Hilditch  262 

Farrand  v.  Beshoar  1392 

c.  Gleason  1898 

Farrar  v.  Bridges  1247,  1286 

V.  Chauffette  1712 

V.  Christy  576,  613,  616 

V.  Cooper  334 

V.  Farrar  1259,  1262 

V.  Payne  1483 

V.  Stackpole 

Farrell,  In  re 

Farrell  v.  Enright 

V.  Palestine  Loan  Asso 

Farrington  v.  Barr 

v.  Tourtelott 
V.  Woodward 

Farrior  v.  Security  Co. 

Farwell  v.  Rogers 
V.  Warren 

Fash  V.  Ravesies 

Fasholt  V.  Reed 

Fassett  v.  Smith 

Fau<j;ht  V.  Ilolway 

Faulk  V.  Faulk 

Faulkner  v.  Adams 

Favorite  v.  DeardorfE 

Fawcett  V.  W^oods 


Fay  ('.  Burditt 

V.  Muzzey 

V.  Oatlcy 

V.  Prentice 

V.  Richardson 

V.  Valentine 
Fearing  v.  Irwin 
Fecht  V.  Drake 
Feder  v.  Abrahams 
Feely  v.  Hoover 
Feigley  ?'.  Feigley 
Feilden  v.  Slater 
Feirbaugh  v.  Masterson 
Feitner  v.  Lewis 
Felder  v.  Bonnett 
Feliz  V.  Feliz 
Fell  V.  Young 
Feller  v.  Green 
Fellows  v.  P^niperor 
V.  Fellows 
V.  Tan  11 
Felton  V.  Gregory 
V.  Pitman 
Female  Oi-phan  Asylum  v.  John 

son 
Fenley  v.  Flowers 


1649 

52 

163 

1178 

302,  309 

880,  882 

1532 

187 

128 

1824 

1408 

1571 

1514 

364 

1230 

1238,  1248 

1627 

968,  974 

54,  68 

1708 

79,  86 

1593 

1217,  1267 

1521,  1582 

463 

1723 

1392 

1258 

1560 

768,  780 

1563 


501 

1864 

1177 

92 

278 

1112 

617 

80 

1108 

1080 
441 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Fenton  v.  Miller         1292,  1818,  1862, 

1866,  1875 

V.  Perkins  217 

V.  Steere  19G3 

Feoffees   of    Grammar    School   v.  ■ 

Andrews  575 

Ferebee  c.  Hinton  1133,  1196 

Ferguson,  Appeal  of         292,  449,  450 

Ferguson  v.  Bell  2,  14 

V.  Bloom  444 

V.  Bobo  5,  6,  31 

V.  Clifford  310 

V.  Crick  354 

V.  Dent  833 

V.  Glassford  1420 

V.  Houston,  &c.  Ry.  Co.    27, 

31 

V.  Kinsland  1184 

V.  Miller  1591 

V.  Neville  167 

V.  Staver  339 

V.  Wright  1878 

Ferrars  v.  Cherry  297,  1508 

Ferrenbach  v.  Turner  452 

Ferris  v.  Boxell  1111 

V.  Coover  381 

V.  Irving  1037 

V,    Montgomery    Land    & 

Imp.  Co.  1966,  1968, 

1976,  1979,  1981,  1983, 

1991 

V.  Quimby  1668,  1712 

V.  Smith  1469 

Fery  t).  Pfeiffer  1563,  1566 

Fessler's  Appeal  1528 

Fetrow  v.  Merriwether  120 

V.  Wiseman  2,  16 

Fewell  u.  Kessler  1240 

Fidelity  Ins.   T.    &  S.  D.    Co.   v. 

Shenandoah  Val.  R.  Co.  1512, 

1554 

Field  V.  Coliimbet  398,  400 

V.  Huston  420 

V.  Moore  160 

V.  ProvWence  650 

V.  Snell  988 

V.  Stagg  1331,  1335 

Fielder  v.  Childs  1862,  1887 

Fi<-lding  V.  White  1844 

Fields  V.  Hunter  925 

V.  Watson  602,  609,  610 

V.  Willingham  948 

Fifield  V.  Farmers'  Nat.  Bank       1668, 

1672,  1682,  1718,  1721 

V.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.         1682 

Fifty  Associates  v.  Ilowland  628 

Fig;htmaster  v.  Levi  90 


Filbert  v.  Hoff 

Fillingham  v.  Bromley 

Filniore  v.  Reithman 

Final  v.  Backus 

Finch's  Case 

Finch  V.  Beal 
V.  Trent 
V.  Ullman 
V.  Winchelsea 

Finegan  v.  Theisen 


1922 

677 

1522 

1144 

225 

1563 

1396 

176,  368 

1402,  1404 

103,  106 


Finlay  v.  King  619,  620,  674,  683 

Finlayson  v.  Finlayson  112 

Finley  v.  Simpson  552 

V.  Steele         838,  839,  840,  841 
Finney  v.  Grice  1 703 

Finton  v.  Egleston  986 

Fiquet  y.  Allison  1917 

Firebaugh  v.  Ward  1403 

Fireman's  Ins.  Co.  v.  McMillan     1303 
Firmstone  v.  Spaeter  448 

First  Baptist  Church  v.  Brooklyn 

F.  Ins.  Co.  169 

First   Methodist    Church    v.    Old 
Columbia  Public  Ground  Co.       649, 

650 

First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Adam  1 76  7 

V.  Ashmead         1089, 

1196 

V.  Beegle  1619, 

1621,  1622,  1634 

V.  Bryan  88 

V.  Cody  1374 

V.  Conn.  Mut.  L. 

Ins.  Co.  285 

V.  Elmore  174, 

1719,  1746,  1753 
V.  Hayzlett  1404 

V.  Maxfield  174 

v.  NewMilford  1532 
V.  Paul  1185,  1187, 
1204,  1207,  1208 
r.  Roberts  174,1127 
V.  Security  Bank  799 
V.  Sheaf er  1419 

First  Parish  v.  Cole  169,  170,  178 

V.  Jones  1691,  1698 

First  Universalist  Society  v.  Bo- 
land  628,  630,  631,  714 
Fischer  v.  Eslaman  1853 
V.  Laack                        503,  509 
Fish  V.  Fish  122 
V.  N.  Y.  Water- Proof  Paper 

Co.  1721 

Fishburne  v.  Furguson  55,  58,  99 

Fisher  v.  Bennehoff         354,  358,  359, 

364,  381,  386,  389,  466 

V.  Bishop  98,  103,  104 

Ixv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Fisher  v.  Butcher 

V.  Cojiper  M.  Co. 
V.  Cowles 
r.  Dewerson 
V.  Dixon 
V.  Fields 
V.  Fisher 
V.  Hakleinan 
V.  Hall 


References  are  to  Sections. 

1111,  IKiS 

503 

1424,  1442 

1963 

1728,  1765 

593,  594 

99 

481 


1217,  1236,  1267, 
1269,  1277,  1286 
V.  Kinaston  1830 

V.  Mayor  871 

V.  Meister  1139 

V.  Mihnine  1448 

V.  Nelson  54  9 

V.  Provin  1792,  1802,  1803 

V.  Quackenbush  337,  338, 

342 
V.  Salmon  1040 

V.  Smith  264,  448,  449,  453 

V.  Taylor  664 

V.  Vaughn  1156 

V.  Wigg  CI 6 

Fisherdick  v.  Hutton  1340,  1342, 

1345 

Fisk  V.  Cathcart  890,  933 

V.  Chandler  645,  682 

V.  Patton  182,  185 

V.  Stubbs  92 

Fitch  V.  Baldwin  842,  897,  978 

V.  Boyer  389,  1485 

V.  Bunch  1217,  1302,  1303, 

1306,  1311 

V.  Johnson  786 

V.  Lewiston  Steam  Mill  Co. 

1054 

V.  Reiser  100 

V.  Seymour  874 

Fitts  V.  Davis  1411 

V.  Fitts  42 

V.  Hall  31 

Fitzer  v.  Fitzer  862 

Fitzgerald  r.  Barker  1392 

V.  Brennan  384,  387 

V.  Fauconberge  1359, 

1534 

V.  Faunce  552 

V.  Fitzgerald        1196,  1197 

V.  Goff       1012,  1256,  1315, 

1448 

V.  Libby  1401 

V.  Milliken  1122 

V.  Reed  67,  73 

V.  Williamson  1866 

V.  Wynne  1380 

Fitzhugh  V.  Croghan       842,  846,  928, 

1087 
Ixvi 


Fitzhugh  V.  Wilcox 

52,  62 

Fitzpatrick  r.  Burchill 

45 

V.  Fitzpatrick 

109 

Fitz waiter's  Case 

4  70 

Flack  V.  Gosnell 

1886 

Fladung  v.  Rose 

1792,  1797 

Flagg  V.  Bean 

411 

V.  Fames 

565,  632 

V.  Mann            1513, 

1527,  1564, 

1565 

1566,  1836 

V.  Mason 

375 

V.  Thurston 

383 

Flaggerston  v.  Hanbury 

313 

Flanagan  v.  Cushman 

1410 

V.  Boggess 

339 

V.  Young 

1141 

Flanders  v.  Davis 

67 

Flaniken  v.  Neal                932,  933,  990 

Flannigan  v.  Goggins 

1222,  1269 

Flaten  v.  Moorhead 

650,  653 

Fleck  V.  Zilhaver 

1792 

Fleet  V.  Youngs 

221 

Fleetwood  v.  Brown 

1396 

Fleischpresser  v.  Schmidt 

381,  386 

Fleming  v.  Burgin 

1501 

V.  Burnham 

805 

V.  Kenney 

490 

V.  Powell 

1071 

V.  Ramsay 

355 

Fleschner  v.  Sumpter 

1389,  1442, 

1464 

Fletcher  v.  Alcona  Turnpike          1600 

V.  Chamberlin 

882 

V.  Clark 

410 

V.  Ellison 

1396,  1398 

V.  Fletcher        581 

,  614,  1243 

V.  Kelly 

1668,  1769 

V.  Livingston 

1605,  1609 

V.  Mansur 

227,  1346 

V.  Peck 

1317 

V.  Phelps 

499,  501 

V.  Tyler 

618 

Flexner  v.  Dickerson 

16 

Flick,  Estate  of 

448 

Flinn  v.  Brown 

1338 

V.  McKinley 

1846,  1850 

V.  Powers 

2,  29 

Flint  V.  Clinton  Co. 

1049,  1082 

i\  Phii)ps 

1218,  1248 

V.  Steadman 

9S1 

Flood  V.  Yandes 

1067 

Florence  v.  Hopkins 

1862 

Florence  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Zeig 

ler         1528 

Flowers  v,  Wilkes 

1472 

Flowerv  M.  Co.  v.  North  B 

onanza 

M.  Co. 

1073,  1148 

Flovd  V.  Clark 

876 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Floyd  V.  Harding 
V.  Rice 
V.  Ricks 
i;.  Taylor 

Flynn  v.  Bourneuf 
V.  Flvnn 
V.  Glenny 
V.  Lee 


1404,  1407 

365 

1060,  1075,  1619 

.  1224 

861,  864 

1239 

364 

1866 


V.  White   Breast   Coal   M. 


Ford  V.  Hennessy 
V.  James 
V.  Knapp 

V.  Marcall 

V.  Osborne 

V.  Pliillips 

V.  Teal 

V.  Unity  Church 


Co. 

Flynt  V.  Arnold 
V.  Conrad 
Fogarty  v.  Finlay 
V.  Stock 
Fogg  V.  Holcomb 
Fogfeman  v.  Shiveley 


Foley  V.  Bitter 
r.  Cowgill 
V.  Greene 
V.  Howard 
I'.  McCarthy 
V.  McNamara 
Folk  V.  Varn 
FoUett  V.  Grant 
Folly  V.  Vantuyl 
Folsom  V.  Cragen 

V.  Freeborn 
Folts  V.  Ferguson 
V.  Huntley 
Foltz  V.  Wert 
Fomby  v.  Colquitt 
Fonda  v.  Sage 

V.  Van  Home 


883,  919 

1503 

1627 

1127,  1177,  1178 

568 

1145,  1156, 1198 

1791,  1801,  ' 
1802,  1808,  1814 
289 
1303 
83,  86,  88 
1448 
381,  466 
1248,  1256 
1297 
843 
1247 
1591 
475 
35,  1021 
912 
1404,  1975 
1524 
708,  723,  1276 
4,  1023. 


V.  Clark 
V.  Colvin 
V.  Gooch 

V.  Hambrick 
Forbes  v.  Appleton 
V.  Deniston 
Forbush  r.  Lombard 
Force  v.  Craig 

V.  Dutcher 
Ford  V.  Burks 

V.  Col)b 


106 

1252,  1468 

1899,  1900,  1906 

1981,  1982 

1575 

1196,  1205 

16 

1196 

327,  1488, 

1502 

1499, 1501 

389 

1829 

1874 


1240 
Fontaine  v.  Boatman's  Sav.  Inst. 

295,  303,  1239 
Foot  V.  Tewksbury  ^4 

Foote  V.  Burnet        843,  929,  931,  95  ^ 
962,  967,  968 
831 
1619 
1666,  1667,  1668, 
1748 
1351,  1352 
89 
1499 
536,  1652 
1070 
1031 
1170 
1679,  1685,  1686, 


V.  White 
Fordtran  v.  Ellis 
Fordyce  v.  Hicks 
Foreman  r.  Drake 

V.  Presbyterian  Asso.       448, 

455,  461,  565 

Forest  v.  Jackson        1563,  1868,  1880 

Forror  v.  Forror  1836,  1853 

Forepaugh  v.  Appold  1404,  1499 

Forsyth  v.  Day  1*^43 

V.  Forsyth  1963 

V.  Smale  492,  496 

Fort  v.  Allen  41,257,1940 

V.  Burch  1420,  1425,  1499, 

1504,  1524,  1531 

Fort   Worth    Publishing     Co.   v. 

Hitson  10^4 

Fortier  v.  New  Orleans  Bank  1  <4 

Fortman  v.  Geopper  1680,  1681, 

1685,  1732,  1735,  1757 
Fortune  c.  Watkins  1259,  1  380 

Forward  v.  Deetz  1866,  1870 

Fosdick  V.  Barr  .1380,  1406,  1451 

Foshay  v.  Ferguson  79,  85,  89 

Foss  V.  Crisp  166,  167,  424 

V.  Hildreth  67,  8 o 

Foster's  Appeal  1410,  1463 

Foster  v.  Beardsley  Scythe  Co.      1450 


V.  Dugan 
V.  Fletcher 
r.  Foss 
V.  Foster 
V.  Fraser 
V.  Hackett 
V.  Johnson 
V.  Joice 
r.  Latham 
V.  Mansfield 


1735,1737,  1740,1742,1750, 

1753 

V.  Flint  579 

V.  Gregory  l-^'^ 

».  Harrington  1*^3 


V.  Mapes 
V.  Perkins 
V.  Prentiss 
V.  Runk 
V.  Stallworth 
V.  Strong 
V.  Thompson 
V.  Woodward 

Ixvii 


1476 

1619 

397 

875,  882 

750 

1937 

244,  245 

575 

1152,  1197 

1234,  1240,  1302, 

1307,  1308,  1309 

893 


1217 

1751 

538 

1522 

1547 

943,  968 

854 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Foster  v.  Wright  485 

V.  Young  831 

Fouehc  V.  Swain  14 72 

Foiilke  V.  Bond  1862,  1868,  1878, 

1880 
Foulkes,  In  re  14 

Fountain    Coal   &   Mining  Co    v. 
Beckleheimer       579,  583,  585,  602, 

610 

Foushee  v.  Grigsby  1430 

Foust  V.  INIoorman  138 

Foute  V.  Fairman  321 

Fowke  V.  Darnall  362 

Fowle  j^.  Welsh  893 

Fowler,  In  re  52 

Fowler  v.  Black        570,  602,  604,  605 

V.  Bntterly  112 

V.  Fowler  1830,  1904 

V.  Nixon  140 

V.  People  323,  367 

V.  Poling  915,  919 

V.  SeuUv  173,  174 

V.  Shearer  36,  1040,  1042 

V.  Trebein  40,  44 

V.  Vreeland  496,  498 

Fox's  Estate,  In  re  1792 

Fox,  Matter  of  Will  of,  185 

Fox  V.  Coon  1846 

V.  Hall    1394,  1397,  1404,  1408 

V.  Mover  289 

V.  Thi'bault  1480 

V.  Union  Sugar  Refinery         449, 

499 
17.  Widgery  1881 

Foxcroft  V.  Barnes  129 

Foxwell  V.  Craddock  166 

Fraim  c.  Frederick  1527 

Fraley  v.  Bentley  296 

Franco-Texan  Land  Co.  v.  McCor- 

niick  154  7 

Francois  v.  Maloney  445 

Frank,  Appeal  of  281 

Franks.  Frank  1109,  1277,  1297, 

1301 

V.  Heidenheimer  1506 

V.  Mainwarinif  53 

Frankfort  Bank  >:  Anderson  1079 

Frankland  y.  Moulton  1717,  1719, 

1735,  1745,  1747 

Franklin  v.  Cannon  1451,  1472 

V.  Pv,obinson  1908 

V.  Talniadge  219 

Franklin    Co.    C.    &   M.    Co.    v. 

Beckleheimer  2.31 

Franklin  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cousens  16.57 

Franklin  Inst,  for  Sav.  v.  People's 
Sav.  Bank  1788,  1789 

Ixviii 


Franklin  Sav.  Bank  v.  Taylor      1485, 

1560 

Franz  v.  Orton  1566 

Fraser  v.  Cliene  602 

V.  Davie  1222 

V.  Ott  448 

V.  Supervisors  954 

V.  Thompson  281 

Fratt  V.  Whittier         1668,  1695,  1703 

V.  Woodward  342,  396,  39  7 

Frazee  v.  Inslee  1584 

Frazer  v.  Peoria  155 

1-.  Western  280,  291 

Frazier  v.  Brown  1599 

V.  Crafts  1408 

Frederick  v.  Devol  1751 

V.  Frederick  1947 

V.  Gray  1865,  1872 

Free  v.  Stuart  1 768 

Freed  v.  Brown  54,  56,  68 

Freelore  v.  Cole  103 

Freely  v.  Hoover  12G3 

Freeman  v.  Auld  261,  1551 

V.  Barber  1792 

V.  Foster  855,  860 

V.  Lawton  1244 

V.  Love  1128 

V.  McLennan  1625 

i\  Mahoney  392 

V.  Peay  1448 

V.  Person  1125,  1128 

V.  Preston  1195,  1984 

V.  Schroeder  1448,  1588, 

1590 

V.  Wilson  92 

Freemantle  v.  Bankes  45 

Freiberg  ?;.  De  Lamar  1207 

V.  Magale  1472 

French  v.  Bankhead  471 

V.  Carhart  531,  540,  1652 

V.  Edwards  1937 

V.  Freeman  1708 

V.  French         74,  76,  200,  202, 

268,  1085 

V.  Loyal  Co.  1513,  1547, 

1559,  1564 

V.  Mehan       1792,  1797,  1802, 

1811,  1814 

V.  Old  South  Soc.  714 

V.  Shotwell  290 

V.  State  1359 

V.  Williams  544 

Frenkel  v.  Hudson  1539 

Frentz  v.  Klotsch        1840,  1846,  1921 

Fresno  Canal,  &c.  Co.  v.  Dunbar     792 

V.  Rowell      793, 

799,  1374,  1521 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Frey  v.  Clifford    285,  346,  1386,  1392, 

1394,  1395 

V.  Drabos  1637,  1638,  1731 

Frick  V.  Sinon  1878,  1880 

Friedenwald  v.  Mullan  38 

Friedley  v.  Hamilton  1466 

Friedman  v.  Hirsch  275 

V.  Nelson  423 

Friend  v.  Friend  381 

Fries  v.  Null  1464 

Frink  v.  Bellis  931 

V.  Darst  836 

V.  Green  295 

V.  Pond  1104 

V.  Roe  1628 

Frissell  v.  Rozier  40 

Fritts  V.  Palmer  175,  190 

Fritz  V.  Pusey  852,  868,  914,  915, 

958,  959 
Frizzell  v.  Reed  99 

Frizzle  v.  Veach  138 

Froggatt  V.  Wardell  233 

Front  Street,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Butler 

620,  622 

Frontin  v.  Small  1040 

Frost  V.  Angier  381,  466 

V.  Beavan  76 

V.  Beekman       1324,  1435,  1442, 

1468,  1469,  1472,  1491 

V.  Butler  699,  705,  715,  722 

V.  Deering  1014 

V.  Erath  Cattle  Co.  1030 

V.  Missionary  Society  992 

r.  Raymond  834 

V.  Spaulding  381 

V.  Wolf       245,  1061,  1068,  1832 

V.  Wolverton  21 

r.  Yonkers  1589 

Frostburg    Mut.    Build.    Asso.  >:. 

Brace  1049,  1115,  1117,  1165, 

1441 

Fry  V.  Currie  376 

V.  Martin  1372,  1501 

V.  Shebee  1532 

Fryatt  v.  Sullivan  Co.  1717,  1738 

Frye  v.  Partridge  780 

Fryer  u.  Rockefeller  1161,1177, 

1178,  143.5,  1446 

Fuhrman  v.  Loudon  1132,  1133, 

1443 
Fulbriirht  V.  Yoder  562,  576 

Fiilgbam  ?;.  Pate  44 

FiilUim  r.  Stearns  1674,  1731 

Fullenwidcr  v.  Roberts  1387 

Fuller  V.  Arms  551,  742,  785 

V.  P.enett  1532,  1534,  1.037 

V.  Carr  364,  398,  399,  442 


Fuller  V.  Cunningham 

1455,  1472 

V.  Dauphin 

480,  492,  501 

V.  Fuller 

1908 

V.  Fellows 

321,  337 

V.  Jillette 

869,  930 

V.  Montague 

1963 

;'.  Scribner 

1560 

Fulmer's  Appeal 

1914 

Fulshear  v.  Randon 

1002 

Fulton  V.  Fulton 

1277 

V.  Hood 

85,  86,  88 

Fulton  Bank  v.  New  York  &  Sha- 
ron Canal  Co.  1534,  1539,  1543 
Fulwood  V.  Graham         381,  383,  386, 

398 

Funk  V.  Brigaldi  1703 

V.  Creswell      891,  892,  914,  921, 

967 

V.  Haldeman  1597 

V.  McReynold  1585 

V.  Newcomer  1921 

V.  Paul  1390 

V.  Rentchler  62 

V.  Voneida      837,  841,  884,  930, 

958,  962,  967 

Funkhouser  v.  Lay  1529 

Furguson  v.  Bond      1238,  1259,  1287, 

12.S8 

Furman  i\  Elmore  968 

V.  McMillan  1853 

Furnas  v.  Durgin     903,  906,  969,  975, 

1330 
Furness  v.  Williams  896,  978 

Furniss  v.  Ferguson  944,  945 

Furrh  v.  Winston  1853,  1979 

Furrow  v.  Atbey  40,  44,  45 

V.  Chapin  1109 

Futrill  V.  Futrill  99 

Gabby  y.  Forgeus  81,  119G 

Gabert  v.  Olcott  650 

Gadberry  v.  Sheppard     625,  632,  650, 

670,  6  78 

Gafford  v.  Stearns  1390 

Gage  V.  Bissfll  1942,  194  7 

V.  Downey  1862,  1866,  1S69 

V.  Gage  1022,  1292,  1301, 

1884,  1891 

V.  School  District  692 

Gaines  v.  Poor  88 

V.  Saunders  1522,  1547 

V.  Summers  1394 

Galbraith  v.  Galbraith  1770 

V.  Lunsford  364 

Galbreath  ;;.  Cook  295 

V.  Drought  1628 

V.  Estes  1559 

Ixix 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Galbreatli  r.  Moore  1830 

Gale  c.  (.  obuni  268,  2!)5 

V.  Gale  1022 

V.  (u.uld  288 

V.  nines  1862,  1865,  191!) 

v.  Morris  1360,  1508,  1519, 

1547 

V.  ShiUock  1440 

V.  Ward  1712,  1731,  1733 

r.  Williamson  295 

Gallagher  r.  Galletley  1406 

V.  Shipk'y  1708 

Gallaher  v.  Herbert         632,  635,  637, 

646 
Gallaud  V.  Jackman  307,  1365, 

1404,  1517 
Gallatin  Turnpike  Co.  v.  State  391 
Galley  v.  Galley  1153 

Galpin  V.  Abbott  1435,  1441 

Galusha  y.  Sinclear  1778,1903 

Galveston,  &c.  lly.  Co.  v.  Pfeuffer 

625 
V.  Stealey 

214 
Galveston  County  ?;.  Tankersley     386, 

491 
Galveston  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Per- 
kins 175,  191 
Galveston   Railroad  Co.  v.   Cow- 
drey                             1590,  1729,  1730 
Galway  v.  Malchow  1404 
Gamble  v.  Caldwell  187 
V.  Hamilton                   121,  12S 
Gambril  v.  Rose  312 
Games  r.  Stiles                           219,  1007 
Gammon  v.  Hodges                          1485 
Gamons  v.  Knight                             1220 
Gandolfo  v.  Hartman  740 
Gann  v.  Free  Fishers                 470,  472 
Gannett  v.  Albree  767 
Gano  V.  Aldridge                                410 
Garanflo  v.  Cooley                  1619,  1628 
Garcia  v.  Callender                    669,  739 
Gardenier  u.  Furey                            1792 
Gardiner  v.  Harback                        1340 
V.  Heald                              1940 
Gardner  v.  Dit-derichs                     1586 
V.  Emerson                          1492 
V.  Finley                   1667,  1748 
V.  Gardner          74,  1014,  1016 
V.  Heartt                              1761 
V.  Li^rhtfoot                    99,  103 
V.  London,  C.   &  D.  Ry. 

Co.  142 

V.  Moore  1087,  1441 

Garfield  v.  AVilliams  928,  953 

Garitee  v.  Baltimore  471 

Ixx 


Garland  v.  Hodsdon 

V.  Wells 
Garner  v.  Jones 
Garnett  v.  Garnett 
V.  Stockton 
Garnier  v.  Barry 
Garnsey  v.  Rogers 
Garrard  ?'.  Hull 
Garret  i'.  Weinberir 


503,  540 

1831, 1335 

1792,  1802 

228 

1178 

1178,  1183 

865 

1570 

1971) 


Garrett  V.  Burlington  Plough  Co.     151 

V.  Christopher  1396 

V.  Lyle  1563 

V.  Moss  1185,  1190 

V.  Puckett  1551 

V.  Scouten  675 

V.  Stuart  948 

Garrison  v.  Cox  1966 

V.  Hall  471 

V.  Haydon  1457,  1458 

V.  Sandford  928,  930,  937, 

962,  96  7 

V.  Savignac  1863 

Garstang  v.  Davenport  449 

Garth  V.  Fort  1201,  1213 

Garvey  v.  Fowler  927 

Garvin  v.  Dean  397 

V.  Ingram  43 

Garwood  v.  Garwood  1406 

V.  Hastings  218,  229 

Gashwiler  v.  WiUis  1080 

Gass  V.  Sanger  926,  944,  945 

Gassen  v,  Hendrick  1392 

Gaston  v.  Bennett  99 

V.  Merriam  1220 

V.  Portland     1303,  1310,  1311, 

1314 

V.  Weir          40,  336,  339,  1004 

Gately  v.  Wei  don  124 

Gates  V.  Dundou  82,  89 

V.  Salmon  1947,  1968 

Gatzmer    v.    St.   Vincent     School 

Soc.  814,  820 

Gaugh  V.  Henderson  297 

Gauit  V.  Hall  268 

Gausen  v.  Tomlinson  1494 

Gauson  v.  Madigan  338 

Gavin  v.  Buckles  948 

Gavit  V.  Chambers  480,  484 

Gawtry  v.  Leland  752,  784 

Gay  V.  Baker  580 

V.  Parpart  277,  1954 

V.  Walker  503,  516,  528 

Gayetty  v.  Bethune  1637,  1658 

Gayle,  Succession  of  1372 

Gayle  V.  Johnston  1884,  1887 

Gaylord  v.  King  454 

Gazley  v.  Price  828 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Gear  v.  Barnum       448,  449,  454,  455, 

461 

Geary  i\  Kansas  City  1073,  1140, 

1147,  1148,  1149,  1440 

Gebb  V.  Rose  40,  42,  43,  1212 

Gebhardt  c.  Keeves  4C8 

Gediiey  v.  Prall  1866 

Gee  V.  Gee  1265 

V.  Moore  892,  896 

V.  Pbarr  834,  836 

V.  Spencer  356 

Geer  •.  Kedman  857 

Geissmann  v.  Wolf  1291,  1292 

Gelott  V.  Goodspeed    1101,  1102,  1104 

General  Ins.  Co.  v.  United  States 

Ins.  Co.  1417 

General  Prov.  Ass.  Co.,  In  re  144 

General  So.  Am.  Co.,  Jn  re  144 

Center  v.  Morrison  1238 

Gentile  v.  Crossan  338 

Geofroy  V.  Riggs  165 

Gerald  v.  EUey  861,  882 

V.  Freeman     382,  384,  389,  392 
Gerdine  v.  Menage  855 

Gere  v.  Gushing  1430 

Gerhard  v.  Commissioners  475 

German  i'.  Chapman  766,  7  73,  805 

812,  813,  823 
German   Land    Asso.    v.   Scholler 

236,  242 

German  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Grim  121 

Germania  Sav.  Bank  v.  Jung  1809 

George  v.  Bartoner  901 

V.  Bates  323 

V.  Cooper  1415 

V.  Kent  1483,  1510,  1522, 

1546,  1547,  1551 

V.  Putney  921 

V.  Thomas     355,  356,  3  76,  377, 

378 

V.  Wood  382,  1482,  1489 

Georgia  C.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott 

1792,  1796 
Georgia  R.  Co.  i'.  Hamilton  381 

Georgia  So.  R.  Co.  v.  Reeves  647, 

798 

Gerrish  v.  Clough  485 

V.  Shattuck  546 

V.  Towne  487 

Gest  V.  Flock  1168 

V.  Kenner  929 

V.  Pack  wood  1394 

Getchell  V.  Allen  1432 

V.  Whittemore     326.  413,  521 

Gettysburg   Nat.    Bank   v.    Chis- 

olm  1361 

Ghcen  v.  Harris  *  870 


Gibbons  v.  Dillingham  1619,  1622, 

1624 

V.  Gentry  1123,  1124 

Gibbs  V.  Estey  1691 

V.  Grant  1497 

V.  McGuire  1063,  1068 

V.  Swift  404,  1109,  1822 

V.  Thayer  892 

Gibert  v.  Peteler      623,  624,  637,  723, 

743,  771,  780,  782,  1547 

Gibson  v.  Bennett  280 

V.  Bogy  326,  327 

V.  Brockway  1652 

V.  Chouteau  896 

V.  Colt  1033 

V.  Hough  1466 

V.  Jeyes  103,  116 

V.  Keyes  1463,  1586 

V.  Partee  1303,  1311 

V.  Richart  828 

V.  Seymour  1466 

V.  Soper  32,  54,  57,  67,  70 

V.  Win  slow  1837 

V.  Zimmerman  1791,  1792, 

1800 

Giddens  v.  Boiling  1196 

V.  Byers  1041 

Giddings  v.  Day  337,  339 

V.  Smith  613 

Gifford  V.  Corrigan    1241,  1279,  1289, 

1291 
Gilbert  V.  Anthony  1328 

V.  Averill  1484 

V.  Emerson  448   478,  502 

V.  Hole  173 

V.  Insurance  Co.  1303 

17.  Jess  1087 

V.  North  Am.  F.  Ins.  Co. 

1252,  1292,  1294,  1304 

V.  Richards  1770 

V.  Rushmer  962,  964 

Gilbraithu.  Gallivan  1122,  1208 

Gilbreath  y.  Dilday  1146 

Gilchrist  v.  Beswick  1835,  1836 

V.  Gough      1392,  1393,  1464, 

1469,  1479,  1480 

V.  McGee  364 

V.  Middleton  1874,  1937 

Gilder  v.  P>ri'nhaui  343 

Giles  V.  Simonds  1606,  1609 

Gill  y.  De  Armant  1692 

V.  Fauntleroy       1127,  1141,  1190, 

1212,  1866,  1880 

V.  Hardin  1563,  1575 

V.  Lydick  485 

V.  Pearson  662 

V.  Pinney  1456,  15.0.") 

Ixxi 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Cillan  V.  Dixon  17;)2,  1S02 

(;illo  v.  Hunt  244,  24.^ 

Gillespie  v.  Bailey  2,  18,  24,  26,  31,  35 

V.  Broas  630,  631 

V.  Brooks  1064 

V.  Moon  1437 

V.  Rogers         219,  225,  1451, 

1472 

Gillett  V.  Abbott  251 

V.  Balcom  1628,  1 630 

V.  Gaffney  16.S9 

J'.  Stanley  1196 

Gillii;  V.  Maass  1424,  1460,  158S 

Gilliland  v.  Fenn  995 

Gillis  V.  Bailey  751,  814 

('.  M'Kinney  1917 

Gillum  t'.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  E,y. 

Co.  1925,  1926,  1928 

Oilman  v.  Moody  1586,  1587 

V.  Philadelphia  471 

V.  Stetson  1862 

Gilmer  v.  Mobile  &  M.  Ry.  Co.        795 

Gilmore  v.  Hayworth  650 

V.  Morris  1220 

V.  Sapp  12^9 

V.  Wilbur       559,  1604,  1924, 

1925 

Gilpin  v.  Hollingsworth  1819 

Gilson  V.  Gilson  1824 

Giniell  v.  Adams  1031 

Gimon  v.  Davis  1259 

Girardin  v.  Lampe      1395,  1420,  1442, 

1505 
Gittings  V.  Worthington  1953, 

1979,  1981 
Glading  r.  Frick  14  72 

Gladwin  v.  Garrison  271 

Glass  V.  Glass  233,  58i> 

Glasscock  V.  Glasscock  1071 

Glaze  V.  Three  Rivers   Farmers' 
Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  1244,  1290, 

1292 

Gleason  v.  Burroughs  544 

V.  Fay er weather  660,  662 

V.  Hamilton  1338,  1340 

V.  Smith  893 

Glendenning  v.  Bell  1408,  1563, 

1566 

Glenn  v.  Davis  632,  678 

V.  Hill  1303 

V.  Mathews  968 

V.  Thistle  913 

Glidden  y.  Bennett  1748 

V.  Hunt  1504,  1529,  1531 

V.  Strupler  36,  37,  1182 

Globe  Marble  Mills  Co.  v.  Quinn 

1 766 
Ixxii 


Glouinger  v.  Franklin  Coal  Co.        538 

Godard  v.  Gould  1679,  1733 

Goddard  v.  Donaba  1396 

V.  Parker  3 SO 

V.  Prentice  1407 

Goddin  v.  Vaughn  828 

(Jodfrey  v.  Bryan  1811 

Godman  v.  Simmons  613 

Goelet  V.  Gori  1792 

V.  McManus  1504 

Goff  V.  Rogers-  271 

Gohegan  v.  Leach  88 

Goins  V.  Allen  1563 

Golden  v.  Ilardesty  1256 

Golding  ?;.  Golding  112 

Goldsborough  v.  Pidduck  368,  434 

Golson  V.  Fielder  285,  1390,  1549, 

1866,  1874,  1875 

Golterman  v.  Schiermeier  363,  367 

Gooch  V.  Bryant  1359 

Good  V.  Zercher  37 

Goodall  V.  Godfrey  534 

Goodbar  v.  Dunn  323,  402,  1436 

Goode  V.  Smith  1182,  1190 

Goodel  V.  Bennett  889 

Goodell  V.  Bates  1014,  1018 

V.  Hibbard  213 

V.  Pierce  1277 

Goodenough  v.  McCoid  1402 

V.  Warren  1109 

Goodenow  v.  Allen  1699 

V.  Curtis  1342 

V.  Ewer  1884,  1887 

Goodhue  V.  Barnwell  1940 

Gooding  v.  Riley  1679 

V.  Shea  1759,  1763 

Goodlett  V.  Hansen  1353 

V.  Kelly         1217,  1221,  1234, 

1248,  1250 

Goodman  i\  Baerlocher  1455 

V.  Kine  1912 

V.  Myrick  389,  438 

V.  Randall  1005 

V.  Sapp  49 

V.  Winter  31,  1947 

Goodnow  V.  Empire  Lumber  Co.        9, 

27,  28 

Goodpaster  v.  Leathers  646,  1234, 

1307,  1309 

Goodrich  v.  Burbank  511 

V.  Cushman  81,  91 

V.  Jones  1708,  1709 

V.  Lambert  602 

V.  Shaw  81 

Goodridge  v.  Goodridge  579 

Goodright  v.  Cator  718 

V.  Moss  207 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Goodsell  V.  Lawson 

471 

I'.  Stinson 

1448 

Goodspeed  r.  Fuller 

275,  295,  301, 

303,  948 

Goodtitle  v.  Gibbs 

562,  564,  565 

V.  Tombs 

1921 

Goodwin  r.  Cloudman 

1563 

V.  Dean 

1515,  1517 

V.  Gilbert 

510 

V.  Hubbard 

559 

V.  M'CIuer 

1034 

V.  Owen 

1448 

V.  Richardson 

1824 

V.  Smith        1619,  1621,  1628 

Goodwyn  y.  Spray  1912 

Goodyear  v.  Adams  54,  71 

V.  Shanahan  494 

Gordon  v.  Booker  381,  384,  438 

V.  Bulkeley  1016,  1021 

V.  Collett  1216 

V.  Goodman  321 

V.  Gordon  301,  303 

V.  Haywood  36 

V.  Leech         1123,  1124,  1174 

V.  Pearson  1865 

V.  Preston  144 

V.  Rixey  1420 

V.  San  Diego  1238 

V.  Sizer  1340,  1342 

V.  Trimmier  336,  1292, 

i  1293 

Gore  V.  Brazier  969 

V.  Dickinson  1963,  1965 

V.  Gibson  74 

Gorham  v.   Eastchester    Electric 

Co.  1645 

V.  Gorham  12 

V.  Meacham      223,  237, 

1217,  1218,  1269,  1289, 

1301 

V.  Summers  1469 

Gorman  I'.  Gorman  1236,1277 

V.  Stanton  1168 

Gosselin  v.  Smith  1910 

Gossett  V.  Tolen  1460 

Gossom  V.  Donaldson  1559,  1835, 

1836 

Gotham  V.  Gotham  1487 

Gotthelf  V.  Stranahan  871 

Gou<,di  V.  Bell  472 

Gould  V.  Day  1298 

V.  Eastern  R.  Co.  448,  449, 

450,  453,  45.5,  456 

V.  Howe  452,  503,  504,  .542 

V.  Lamb  593 

V.  Railroad  Co.  471,  472 

V.  Wise  1252,  1256,  1315 


Goundie  v.  Northampton  W.  Co.    1 75, 

181 
Gourdin  v.  Commander  1331 

V.  Davis  398 

V.  Deas  609 

Gourley  v.  Hankins  1057 

Gouverneur  v.  Lynch  1563,  1571 

V.  Nat.  Ice  Co.  490, 

493,  496,  501 
V.  Titus  1437 

Gove  V.  Cather  1178,  1183 

V.  AVhite  448 

Governeurt).  Robertson  167 

Goward  v.  Waters  295 

Gowen  v.  Shaw  1884,  1887 

Gower  V.  Doheney  1408 

V.  Quinlan  1919 

Grabfelder  v.  Gazetti  1608 

Grace  v.  Wade  1408,  1529 

V.  Whitehead  29 

Graeme  v.  Cullen  166  7 

Graflf  V.  Fitch  1620 

V.  Middleton  1394 

Grafton  v.  Moir  531 

Gragg  V.  Richardson  923 

Graham  v.  Anderson  1130,  1197, 

1206,  1207,  1447 
V.  Burch  98,  99,  101 

V.  Dewees  432,  439 

V.  Dyer       916,  922,  924,  968, 
982,  985 
r.  Graham  992 

V.  Hawkins  1396 

V.  Hite  761,  774 

V.  Holt  1328 

V.  Long  1182,  1185 

V.  Nesmith  1563 

V.  Newcastle-upon-Tyne     752 
V.  Pierce  1891,  1898 

V.  Railroad  Co.  290 

V.  Stevens  626 

V.  Stuve  40,  42 

V.  Van  Wyck  41 

V.  West  1515 

Granby  v.  Allen  160 

Granby  M.  Co.  v.  Richards  1 76 

Grand  County  v.  Larimer  Co.  391 

Grand  Island  Banking  Co.  v  Frey 

1740 
Grand   Junction   R.  Co.  v.  Bick- 

ford  149 

Grand  Junction   R.  Co.  v.  County 

Commissioners  424 

Grand  Rapids  &  Ind.  R.  Co.  463 

Grand  Tower  M.  M.  &   T.  Co.  v. 

Gill  217,  1156 

Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  c.  Dyer         398 

Ixxiii 


TARLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Graiulin  r.  Ainlerson 

1482, 

14S;5 

('.  Hernandez 

lOCl 

Grandona  v.  Lovdal 

1014 

Grandy  r.  Casey 

410 

Granger  i\  Avery 

484 

V.  Crouch 

1586 

V.  Swart 

122 

Grant  v.  Armstrong 

327 

V.  Bennett 

1394 

V.  Bissett 

1484 

V.  Chase 

1(358 

V.  Dod2;e 

1409, 

1415 

V.  Henry  Clay  Coal  Co.        175, 

190 

V.  Hill  945 

V.  IMoon  461 

V.  Tallman  962,  967,  974 

V.  Thompson  56,  65 

V.  U.  S.  Bank  1498 

V.  White  490,  491,  1196 

Grapengether  v.  Fejervary  1212 

Graser  v.  Stellwagen  1832 

Gratz  V.  Ewalt         837,  838,  840,  841, 

1949 

Graves  v.  Atwood  525 

V.  Deterling  627,  632,  635, 

636,  637,  641,  741,  815 

r.  Dolphin  663 

V.  Dudley  1252 

r.  Fisher  486 

i:  Graves  309 

V.  Mattingly  831 

V.  Pierce  1720 

V.  Trueblood  590 

Gray  i'.  Bates  1880 

r.  Berry  358 

t'.  Blanchard  623,  638,  657, 

673,  677,  698,  705,  723,  743 

V.  Deluce  476 

V.  Gardner  253 

V.  Givens  905,  1936 

f.  Kauffman  167,1170,1173 

I'.  Lake  271 

V.  Lessington  35 

V.  Limerick  249 

V.  Mathis  38 

V.  Patton  1403 

V.  Ulrich  1109,  1207 

Graybeal  v.  Davis  582 

V.  Powers  388 

Graydon  v.  Hnrd  1873 

Graysons  r.  Richards  1259 

Great  Falls  Co.  v.  Worster     333,  375, 

376,  1572 

Great  Western  Stock  Co.  v.  Saas 

843 
Greeley  i'.  Stilson  1606 

Ixxiv 


Greeley  v.  Weaver  338 

Green  v.  Abraham  1125,  1215 

V.  Abrahams  1216 

V.  Armstrong  1600,  1601, 

1603,  1624,  1627 

V.  Arnold  I960,  1966,  1977 

V.  Batson  902 

V.  Chelsea  476 

V.  Collins    335,  336,  910,  1642, 

1643 

V.  Drinker  1435 

r.  Garrington  1472,  1479 

V.  Green         20,  24,  31,  32,  33, 

1459,  1528 

V.  Gross  1086,  1153 

V.  Home  825 

V.  Irving  913,  914,  915 

I'.  Liter  1229 

V.  Morgan  1513 

V.  Pettingill  715 

V.  PhiUips  1712,  1714 

V.  Putnam  551,  1900,  1902, 

1981,  1997 

V.  Rick  1559 

V.  Roworth  113 

V.  Scranage  88 

V.  Slayter  1554,  1560 

V.  Sutton  567,  590 

V.  Thomas  266,  267,  274 

V.  Wilding  2,  27 

V.  Witherspoon  1436 

V.  Yarnall  ''       1236 

Green  Bay  &  Miss.  Canal  Co.  v. 

Hewitt  326,  413,  420,  505,  531, 

536,  565 

Greenby  v.  Wilcocks         893,  928,  930 

Greencastle  v.  Hazelett  1599 

Greene  v.  Conant       1240,  1280,  1296, 

1299 

V.  Creighton  779 

V.  Deal  1494 

V.  Dennis  241 

V.  Godfrey  1196 

V.  Nunnemacher  488 

V.  O'Connor         632,  635,  650, 

651 

V.  Warnick  1495 

Greenfield's  Estate  105,  1009 

Greenfield  Bank  v.  Crafts  1019 

Greenhill  v.  Biggs      1866,  1868,  1879, 

1880 

Greenlaw  v.  Williams  924 

Greenleaf  v.  Allen  825 

V.  Birth  518 

V.  Brooklyn,    &c.    Ry. 

Co.  386 

V.  Kilton  484,  486 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Greene  v.  Barnard  1415 

Greenough  ;;.  Turner  316,  319 

Greenslade  v.  Dare  55,  72,  1583 

Greenvault  v.  Davis        298,  892,  915, 

919,  921,  971 

Greenwade  v.  Greenwade  49 

Greenwold  v.  Jenswold         1371,  1481 

Greenwood  v.  Coleman  7 

Greer  r.  Blanchar  1784 

Gregg  V.  Blackinore  1872 

Greer  v.  Greer  49 

V.  Higgins  1511,  1563 

V.  N.   Y.    Cent.   &    H.   R. 

Co.  448,  462,  463 

V.  Pate  576,  617 

V.  Squire  437,  438 

V.  Tripp  1871 

V.  Wintersmith  131 

Gregg  V.  Hill  384,  392,  440 

V.  Patterson  1898,  1904 

Gregor  v.  Hyde  85,  86 

Gregory  v.  Forbes  471 

V.  Ford  1159,  1188 

V.  Gregory  1879 

V.  Kenyon  1159 

V.  Knight  443 

V.  Perkins  1466 

V.  Savage  1523 

V.  Walker  1230 

Greither  v.  Alexander  1680,  1738 

Grellet  v.  Heilshorn  1372,  1462, 

1466 
Grennan  v.  McGregor  520 

Gresham  v.  Chambers  331,  339 

V.  King  1793 

V.  Webb  120 

Gress  v.  Evans  1396,  1398 

Gress  Lumber  Co.  v.  Coody     339,  404 
Gresty  v.  Gibson  225 

Gribben  v.  Maxwell  54,  68,  69 

Grice  v.  Scarborough  868 

Grider  v.  American  Mortgage  Co. 

1166,  1203,  1204,  1205 

Grier  r.  Penn.  Coal  Co.  432 

V.  Rhyne  337 

Griesler  v.  McKennon  1170 

Griffin  v.  Birkhead  43 

V.  Bixby  381,  1614 

V.  Fairbrother  842,  843 

V.  Griffin  1196,  1197,  124S 

V.  Marquardt  13S1 

V.  Reynolds  837,  945 

V.  Sheffield  1073,  1440 

Griffith  V.  Frederick  Co.  Bank         272 

V.  Griffith  1544 

V.  Marsh  526 

V.  Rife  434 


Griffith  V.  Schwenderman  156 

V.  Ventress  1207,  1208, 

1209,  1212 

V.  Winborne  1221,  1314 

Griffiths  V.  Morrison  384,  1637, 

1639 

Griffitts  V.  Cope  650 

Grigg  V.  Landis  73  7 

Grigsby  v.  Combs  354,  359 

V.  Schwarz  271 

Grim  v.  Wicker  1836 

Grimball  v.  Mastin  307 

Grimes  v.  Brigrgs  87 

V.  But'ts  1942,  1947 

V.  Hobson  1406 

V.  Shaw  52 

Grimmer  v.  Carlton  274 

Grimsley  v.  Riley  1069,  1071 

Grimstone  v.  Carter  1462,  1563, 

1564 

Griscom  v.  Evens  329 

Grist  V.  Hodges         915,  917,  919,  928 

Griswold  I'.  Butler  52 

V.  Hicks  583,  610,  617 

V.  Johnson  1819 

r.  Messenger  304 

V.  Miller  52,  76 

Groce  v.  Jenkins  305 

Grocers'  Bank  v.  Penfield  1393 

Groesbeck  v.  Harris  981 

V.  Seeley  1125 

Groff  V.  Ramsey  1563,  1575 

V.  State  Bank  1575 

Grogan  v.  Vache  404 

Groner  v.  Smith  1069,  1070 

Grose  V.  West  448 

Grosvenor  v.  Bethell  1 705 

Grosz  V.  Jackson  1704 

Grotenkemper  v.  Carver      1196,  1197, 

1201,  1213 

Groton  Sav,  Bank  v.  Batty  1575, 

1578,  1579 

Grout  V.  Townsend  303,  309 

Grove  V.  Brien  1285 

V.  Jeager  43 

V.  Todd  1182,  1212,  1215 

V.  Zumbro  1182,  1195,  1442 

Grownino-  v.  Behn  1075,  1440 

Grube  i'.' Wells  368 

Grueber  v.  Lindenmeier  568 

Grundies  v.  Reid  1292,  1517,  1520, 

1522 
Guard  v.  Bradley  1240,  1282 

Guerin  v.  Smith  987 

Guerrant  v.  Anderson  1406 

Guersney  v.  Wilson  166  7,  1745 

Guess  r.  South  Bound  Ry.  Co.        1240 

Ixxv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Guest  V.  Beeson  48,  J)i) 

Gurty  r.  HukiU  720 

Giig<i;enhoimer  c.  Lockridge  1282 

Gii-'hlidhnii  c.  Geismar  381 

Guild  r.  Hull  48,  98 

V.  Richanls  635,  68!),  69!), 

707,  708,  723,  728,  729, 

808 

Guilmartin  v.  Wood         335,  338,  381, 

410 

Guinn  v.  Spurgin  1409 

Guinotte  v.  Chouteau  948 

Guion  L\  Knapp  1546 

Guiteau  v.  Wisely  1406 

Gulf,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Carter  1143 

V.  Dunman  620, 

708,  718 

V.  Jones  299 

V.  Morris  142 

Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cusen- 

berrv  1925,  1928 

Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gill 

1436,  1529,  154G,  1569 

Gulick  V.  Grover  1860 

Gulley  V.  Macy  1466 

V.  Thurston  1403 

Gully  V.  Grubbs  303 

Gum  V.  Equitable  Trust  Co.  1568 

Gump  I'.  Sibley  448 

Gunn  V.  Brown  595 

V.  Harris  434 

V.  Scovil  133 

Gunnell  v.  Cockerill  1220,  1267 

Gunter  v.  Beard  981 

V.  Laffan  1838,  18G2 

V.  Williams  1832 

Gunther  y.  Gunther  112 

Guthrie's  Appeal  579 

Guthrie  v.  Jones  1765 

V.  New  Haven  449,  450 

V.  Pugsley  944,  958,  960 

V.  Russell  962,  964,  974 

Guy  V.  Barnes  .S23 

n.  Carriere  1415 

Gwathmeys  v.  Ragland  1586 

Gwinneth  v.  Thompson  1830 

Gwynn  v.  Neath  Canal  Co.  250 

V.  Schwartz  354,  358,  359, 

364,  381,  399 

V.  Turner  1481 

Habig  V.  Dodge  896 

Habergham  v.  Vincent  1230,  1233 

Haberman  v.  Baker  459 

Hackensack  Water  Co.  v.  De  Kay 

144 
Hacker's  Appeal  1069,  1071 

Ixxvi 


Haokett  v.  Amsden 
V.  Callender 


1674,  1687, 
1709 
1402,  1404, 
1408 
r.  King  79,  86 

Hackley  v.  Headley  89 

Hackney  v.  Butts  1040,  1042 

Hackwith  v.  Damron  1563 

Hadden  v.  Larned        112,  1148,  1154, 

1440 
Hadduck  y.  Wilmarth  120 

Hadley  v.  Hadley  Manuf.  Co.         632, 
678,  679,  686 
Hadlock  v.  Gray  1792,  1797 

V.  Hadlock  1257 

Haeg  V.  Haeg  1243,  1272,  1309, 

1324 

Haenni  v.  Bleisch         1240, 1241,  1277 

Haeussler  v.  Glass  Co.  1720 

V.  Missouri  Iron  Co.      1955, 

1964 

Haffey  v.  Birchetts  919,  968 

Hafner  v.  Irwin  565,  572 

Hafter  v.  Strange  1575 

Hagan  v.  Campbell  485 

Hagar  t'.  Board  169 

Hageman  v.  Hageman  602,  610 

Hager  w.  Spect;  418,  1034 

Hagerty  v.  Lee  510,  552,  799,  825 

Hagey  v.  Detweiler  354 

Hague  V.  Hague  579,  580 

V.  Wheeler  1597 

Hahn  v.  Baker  Lodge  1593 

Haight  V.  Hamor  488,  489 

V.  Keokuk  481 

V.  Sahler  1080 

Haines  v.  Fort  923 

Hainey  v.  Alberry  1125. 

Hairston  v.  Randolphs         1182,  1188, 

1204 

Halbert  v.  Hendrix  38,  1210 

Hale  V.  Cole  102 

V.  Cottle  383,  384,  400 

V.  Hills  49 

V.  .Joslin  1230,  1233,  1267, 

1271,  1277 

V.  New  Orleans  968 

V.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank  1393 

V.  Wooils  1040 

Haley  v.  Amestoy     351,  420,  421,  427 

V.  Hammersley  1727 

Hall  V.  Ashby  119,  120 

V.  Baltimore  450 

V.  Barnett  1267 

V.  Bliss  313 

V.  Bray  921 

V.  Burkham  526,  1232 


TABLfc;    OF   CASES. 


Hall  V.  Butterfield 
V.  Davis 
V.  Dean 
V.  De  Laplaine 
V.  Eaton 
V.  Edwards 
V.  Ewin 
V.  Gittinofs 


References  are  to  Sections. 


31 
335 

962,  967 

968,  1386 

395,^427 

1489 

765 

418,  1159 


U.Hall  167,1242,1267,1276, 

1282,  1528 

V.  Ionia  509,  540 

V.  Law  1880 

V.  Leonard  219,  22G,  230 

W.Livingston  1513,1517 

V.  Loveman  303 

V.  McDuff  1482 

V.  Marshall  658 

V.  Mayhew  398 

j;.  Mayo  376 

V.  Morris  1960 

V.  Nelson  1562 

V.  Patterson  1196,  1447 
V.  Piddock           1902,  1981,  199  7 

V.  Redson  1008,  1096 

V.  Savage  316,  319 

V.  Savill  1466 

V.  Scott  County  898,  929 

V.  Shannon  1485 

V.  Shotwell  400,  401 

V.  Smith  1546 

V.  Solomon  744,  782,  806 
V.  Stephens         1792,  1811,  1814, 
1817 

V.  Stevens  122 

V.  Sullivan  R.  Co.  145 

V.  Tanner  431^  438 

V.  Thayer  I55 

V.  Tufts  660,  6G2 

V.  Tunnell  1455 

V.  Vandegrift  577,  613,  616 

V.  Warren  58 

V.  Wesster  823 

V.  Westcott  121,  140 

Hallam  v.  Todhunter  948 

Hallenbeck  v.  Dewitt  1009,  1012 

Hallett  V.  Hunt  432 

V.  AVylie  825 

Halliday  v.  Hnrt  295 

Halloway  v.  Plainer  1436 

Halsey  v.  McCormick  463,  488,  490 

Halso  t'.  Seawright  1123,1127 
Halstead  v.  Bank         1390,  1417,  1489 

V.  Lake  Co.  166,  16  7 

Hamar  v.  iVIedsker  1212 

Hamblet  v.  Bliss  1627,  1628 

Hamby  v.  Wall  '  1887 
Hamilton  v.  Annapolis,  &c.  R.  Co.  1 78 


Hamilton  t;.  Armstrong      98,  107,  113 

1240 

f.  Boggess    1061,1073,  1075 

V.  Conine  1908,  1918 

V.  Cutts  915,  917,  919, 

921,  924 

V.  Doolittle  1394,1395, 

1400,  1401 

V.  Elliott  682,  683,  722 

V.  Foster  383 

V.Huntley  1731,1767 

w.  Kneeland      624,708,717, 

723 

V.  Lusk   _  906 

V.  McGuire  303 

«•  Nutt  1547,  1555 

V.  Phillips  1947 

V.  Pitcher  233,  1122 

V.  Smith  81,  92 

V.  Wilson  928,  930 

Hamilton  Co.  v.  Indianapolis  Nat. 

Gas  Co.  448 

Hamlen  v.  Werner  755,  773,  780 

Hamlin  v.  Bevans  1560 

V.  Kassafer  1122 

V.  Pairpoint  Manuf.  Co.      454, 

463 

Hamm  v.  San  Francisco  326,  364 

Hammekin  v.  Clayton  '  16  7 

Hammell  r.  Hammell  1217,  1298 

Hammers  v.  Dole  '  1125 

Hammersly,  In  re  570 

Hammerslough  v.  Cheatham  1220, 

1241,  1269 

V.  Hackett  953 

Hammett  v.  Blount  1935 

Hammond  v.  Alexander  1036 

V.  Gordon  1073,  1440 

V.  Hammond  250 

V.  McLachlan  448 

V.  Paxton  1562 

V.  Port  Royal,  &c.  Ry. 

Co.       '     625,  632,  633, 

638,  699,  704,  707 

V.  Williams  364 

V.  Woodman  266,  302 

Hamner  v.  Smith  602 

Hampton  v.  Helms  51 6 

V.  Wheeler  580,  1874 

Hamsher  i'.  Hamsher  I8I 

FLinbeck  v.  Westbrook  241 

Hanbury  v.  Litchfield  1522,  1566 

Hancock  v.  Beverly  1383 

V.  Butler  568,  602 

V.  Carlton  732 

V.  Day  1892 

V.  Tram  Lumber  Co.        1112 

Ixxvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Hand  v.  Savannah  &  C.  R.  Co.      1415 

V.  Startup  1591 

r.  Wi'idner  1200,  1214 

Ilandfoith  r.  Jackson  1693 

Ilandlv  V.  Anthony  485,  488 

Handy  v.  Rk-Kim  575,  609,  616 

Han  ford  v.  MiNair  1035 

Hankinson  v.  Barbour  1517,  1522 

Hanks  v.  Folsom  568,  576 

v.  Phillips  1020 

Hanlon  v.  Union  P.  R.  Co.       175,  338, 

427 
Hanly  v.  Morse  1563,  1566 

Hanna  v.  Renfro  125,  138 

V.  South  St.  Jo.  Land  Co. 

681 

V.  Wilcox  116 

Hannah  ?;.  Carver  1906 

V.  Davis  1109 

V.  Swarner     1224,  1245,  1307 

Hannan  v.  Osborn        1884,  188G,  1894 

V.  Oxley         44,  294,  295,  302 

Hannibal   &   St.   Jo.    R.    Co.    v. 

Green  410 

Hannig  v.  Mueller  184G 

Hannon  v.  Christopher  896,  1796 

V.  Hilliard  323,  342 

Hano  V.  Bigelow  771,  772 

Hanrick  v.  Patrick  896 

Hansue  v.  Mead  401 

Hansen  v.  Berthelson  109 

Hanson  v.  Buckner  277 

V.  Cochran  1137 

V.  McCue  1.099 

r.  Metcalf  1119 

V.  Red  Rock        382,  383,  389, 

433,  438,  439 

V.  Willard  1955 

Hapgood  V.  Houghton  624 

Harang  v.  Piatt smier  1484,  1501 

Ilarber  v.  Dyclies  1937 

Hardage  v.  Stroope  601,  602,  609 

Hardeman  v.  Cowan  994 

Harden  v.  Hays  56 

Hardenbergh 'y.  Hardenbergh         1800 

Hardenburgh  v.  Lakin  1026 

Harder  v.  Plass  1627 

Hardin  v.  Crate  1238 

V.  Hardin  222 

V.  Harrington  1528,  1531 

V-  Hyde  261,  1551 

V.  Jordan     480,481,  484,  491, 

492,  496,  499,  500,  501 

v.  Kirk  1131 

I'.  Osborne  1131,  1238 

V.  Sparks  1099 

Harding  v.  Allen  1464 

Ixxviii 


Harding  r.  Custis  1151,  1153 

V.  Des  Moines  Nat.  Bank 

1352,  1365 
V.  Foxcroft  1830 

V.  Handv  99 

V.  Larkin  968,  984,  986 

V.  Springer  1792,  1803 

V.  Wright  336,  381 

Hards  v.  Conn.   Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co. 

184,  187 

Hardwick  f .  Beard  121 

V.  Laderoot  523 

Hardy  v.  Galloway  660,  662,  669 

V.  Harbin  1513 

V.  McCullough  471 

V.  Matthews  337 

V.  Mills  1963 

V.  Nelson  969 

t;.  Summers  1947 

V.  Wiley  687 

Hare  v.  Jeringan         1109,  1259,  1340 

Hargrave  v.  Melbourne        1251,  1303, 

1305 

Hargreaves  v.  Rothwell         1534,  1538 

Harsha  *;.  Reid  793 

Harshaw  v.  Dobson  81 

Haring  v.  Van  Houten  466 

Harker  v.  Dement  1928 

Harkey  v.  Cain      347,  414,  421,  1668, 

1680,  1750 

Harkins  v.  Forsyth      1196,  1201,  1204 

Harkness  v.  Devine  323 

V.  Russell  1680 

Harkreader  v.  Clayton        1276,  1307, 

1310,  1314,  1315,  1320,  1324 

Harlan  v.  Harlan         1712,  1713,  1741 

V.  Langham  1968 

V.  Seaton  1383 

Harley  v.  State  166,  167 

Harlow  v.  Fisk  476 

V.  Thomas     861,  879,  882,  883, 

944,  945,  948,  958,  962, 

963,  967,  974 

Harlowe  v.  Hudgins  589,  1428 

Harman  v.  Gartman  1873 

V.  Kelley  1955,  1963 

V.  Obeniorfer  1217,  1238 

Harmer  v.  Killing  16 

Harmon  v.  Harmon  81,  85,  86,  88 

V.  James  1877 

V.  Kline  1691,  1697 

V.  Magee      1137,  1205,  1207, 

1208,  1209 

V.  Myer  1449 

Harmony  Build.   Asso.   v.  Berger 

1668,  1669,  1673 
Harn  v.  Smith  356,  358,  366 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Harpending  v.  Wylie 
Harper,  Matter  of 
Harper  v.  Barsh 
V.  Bibb 
V.  Dowdney 
V.  Perry 
V.  Tapley 
Harpham  v.  Little 
Harral  v.  Gray 

V.  Leverty 


1196 
1138 
1441 
1482 
■       871 
295 
1458 
1394 
1404,  1408 
121,  131,  133, 
1563 
Harrell  v.  Butler  344,  3,53 

V.  Houston  358,  359 

V.  Miller  1600 

V.  Morris  387 

Harrelson  v.  Sarvis     1004,  1935,  1936 
Harrer  y.  Wallner  1801 

Harriman  v.  Brown  376 

V.  Southam  235,  236 

Harring  v.  Barwick  120 

Harrington  v.  Allen  1484,  1501, 

1529,  1531 
V.  Fish  1147,  1158,  1163 
V.  Fortner  1109,  1439 

V.  Gage  nil,  1219 

V.  McFarland  1534 

V.  Murphy      867,  962,  96  7 
V.  Slade  I559 

Harris  v.  Arnold  1563,  1565 

V.  Bannon  1760 

V.  Broiles  331 

V.  Cannon  2,  20,  21 

V.  Carmody  86,  88 

V.  Elliott  1636,  1637,  1647 

V.  Frink  1620,  1625,  1627, 

1628 
V.  Harlan  1586 

V.  Harris  1014,  1018 

V.  Haynes  1674,  1717 

V.  Hopkins  1240 

V.  Horner  1390 

V.  Hull  324,  381,  398,  416 

V.  Monroe  Cattle  Co.  145  7 

V.  Musgrove  11 

V.  Newell  943 

V.  Norton  1238 

V.  Oakley       125,  334,  335,  338 
V.  Ross  2,  18 

V.  Saunders  1243 

V.  Scovel  1709 

V.  Shaw  643,  650,  658 

V.  Tyson  87 

V.  Wamsley  99 

Harrisburg  Electric  Light  Co.  v. 

Goodman  1668,  1673,  1723 

Harrison,  In  re  1796 

Harrison  v.  Adcock  2 


Harrison  v.  Boring      1396,  1514,  1525 
;;.  Cachelin  1483 

V.  Des  Moines  &  Ft.  D. 

R.  Co.  852,  881,  885 

V.  Forth  1529,  1531 

V.  Good  765,  773 

V.  Hahn  339 

r.  Harrison  1836,  1846, 

1862 

V.  McMurray  252,  1034, 

1451,  1485 

V.  McWhirter         1087,  llo9 

V.  Maxwell  254 

V.  N.  J.  R.  &  T.  Co.        1570 

V.  Oakman  1139 

V.  Phillips  Academy       1296, 

1467 

V.  Ray  1792,  1799,  1800 

V.  Simons       316.  1003,  1004, 

1094,  1151 

V.  Stipes  492 

V.  Taylor  1871,  1919 

V.  Wade  1476 

Harrod  v.  Myers  7,  10    I8 

Harrold  v.  Simonds  '     1451 

Harry  i-.  Graham  385,  442 

V.  Harry  1898,  1908 

Hart  V.  Bostwick  131 

V.  Caffery  1372 

V.  Chalker  1466 

V.  Connor  523,  545 

V.  Eastern  Union  Ry.  Co.        142 

V.  Farmers'    &    Mechanics' 

Bank  1402,  1404,  1407, 

1467,  1500,  1534 
V.  Gregg  1862,  1877 

^-  Lyon  786,  791,  799 

V.  Randolph  1173 

V.  Rust  124  7,  1251 

V.  Seymour  237 

V.  Sheldon  1668,  1753 

V.  Steedman  1559 

V.  Stone  1082 

Hartford  &  Salisbury  Ore  Co.  v. 

Miller  928,  943,  946 

Hartley  v.  Ferrell        1164,  1185,  1194 

V.  Frosh         1196,  1198,  1204, 

1207,  1447 

V.  M'Anulty  295 

Hartman  v.  Kendall  25,  27 

Hartness  v.  Thompson  n 

Hartnett  v.  Hartnett  84,  97 

Hartshorn  v.  Cleveland     872,  962,  974 

V.  Dawson  1165,  1180, 

1189 

V.  Wright  386 

Hartung  v.  Witte  340,  355,  367 

Ixxix 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Ilartwi'll  r.  Bissoll  1627 

t'.  Camman  15!)G 

llarty  r.  Ladd  1185,  1187,  1204, 

1207 
Hartz  I'.  Owen  335 

Harvey  v.  Aloxander       295,  301,  303, 

123S 
13,  31 


V.  Bv'i^gs 
V.  Dunn 
V.  Edens 
V.  Mitchell 
V.  Mount 
V.  Thorpe 


1159 

348 

326 

99 

1475 


Harwood  v.  Lee        891,  962,  965,  967 

V.  Pearson  1508 

Hasbrouck  v.  Young  56 

Haseltine  v.  Donahue  1056,  1057, 

1071 

V.  Espey  1462,  1466 

Hasenritter  v.  Kirchhoffer       256,  261 

Haskell  v.  Ayres  1606 

V.  Bis  sell  1456 

V.  Queen  1958,  19C3 

Ilaskill  V.  Sevier  1442 

Haskins  v.  Lombard  1008 

V.  Tate  580 

Haslett  V.  New  Albany,  &c.  R. 

Co.  448 

Hass  V.  Plautz  355,  356,  369 

Hasselman  v.  McKernan  1420 

Hassenfrats  v.  Kelly  129 

Hassey  r.  Wilke  1547 

Hassler  v.  King  1143 

Hastings  i'.  Cutler       1435,  1441,  1499 

V.  Doliarhide      2,  10,  11,  21, 

27,  158 

V.  Hastings       326,  413,  420, 

1912 

V.  Merriam  595 

V.  Nissen  1394 

V.  Stark  364 

V.  Vaughn  1109,  1110, 

1146,  1218,  1220,  1223 

Hatch  V.  Barr  1040,  1050,  1080 

V.  Bates      266,  290,  1218,  1299 

V.  Bigelow  1568 

V.  Brier  422 

i^.  Dwight  4  78,484,488 

V.  Garza  398 

V.  Haskins  1248,  1455 

V.  Hatch  16,  1240,  1259, 

1307,  1309,  1338,  1342, 

1346 

Hatcher  v.  Andnsws  867 

Hatfield  I',  (irimstead  471 

V.  Workman  356,  36  7 

Hathaway  v.  Hathaway  513 

Ixxx 


Hathaway  i;.  Payne  1234,  1272, 

1302,  1307,  1308,  1309 

V.  Power  39«,  414 

('.  Wilson  4  76,  4  79 

Hathorn  v.  Hinds  411,  413,  <S95 

('.  Mayiiard  I  79;> 

V.  Stinson  484,  499,  50(> 

Hathorne  v.  Haines  1 2S 

Hatter  v.  Greenlee  79,  «0 

Hattersley  v.  Bissett  292,  1909 

Hauenstein  v.  Lynliam  165 

Haug  V.  Third  Nat.  Bank  1381 

Haughabaugh  v.  Honald  194  7 

Haughton  v.  Sartor  321 

Haughwort  v.  Murphy  1527,  1528, 

1559,  156U 

Hauk  V.  MeComas        1942,  1945,  1947 

Hause  v.  Hause  1887 

Haussnian  v.  Biirnham  43 

Haven  v.  Adams  1049,  1559 

V.  Emery  1682,  1736,  1737 

V.  Kramer  1314 

V.  Mehlgarten  1830 

Havens  v.  Dale  265 

V.  O shorn  1365 

V.  Seashore  Land  Co.         562, 

565,  581,  613,  616 

V.  West  Side  Elec.  Light 

Co.  1723 

Hawes  v.  Hawes  1771 

V.  Mann  1182 

V,  Railroad  Co.  31 

V.  Wiswell  1568 

Hawesville  v.  Lander  448,  449 

Hawkes  v.  Pike  1220,  1267,  1269, 

1276,  1289,  1448 

Hawkins  v.  Burress  1190 

V.  Chace  1002 

V.  Chapman  593 

V.  Files  1406 

iJ.  Hersey       1670,1678,1741 

V.  Lee  602 

Hawley  v.  Bullock       1458,  1513,  1563 

V.  James  593 

V.  Northampton  613,  660 

V.  Tesch  105 

Haworth  v.  Norris  1254,  1303 

V.  Taylor       1451,  1455,  1566 

Hawthorne  v.  City  Bank  966 

Hawtry  v.  Butlin  1765 

Hay  V.  Bennett  1782 

V.  Estell  1963 

I'.  Hill  1455 

V.  Mayer  1045 

Playdel  v.  Dufresne  438 

Hayden  v.  Bucklin  1560 

V.  Burkemper  1628 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Haydenv.  Easter  1240,  1272 

V.  Goodnow  1367 

V.  Meeks  13U 

V.  Merrill  1891,  l.sii2 

r.  Moffat        1109,  1188,  11!)0, 
1193 
V.  Patterson  1931 

V.  Stoughton         656,  682,  728 
V.  Wescott  1171,  1196 

Haydock  v.  Haydock  101 

Hayes's  Appeal  1963 

Hayes  v.  Bickerstaff  893 

V.  Bowman  484,  490 

V.  Boylan         1227,  1233,  1237, 
1267,  1269,  1276 
V.  Davis  1265 

V.  Ferguson  903 

I'.  Frey  1185 

V.  Livingston  355 

I'.  Parker  6 

V.  Waverly  &  P.  R.  Co.        694, 
780,  782 
Hayne  v.  Gould  1956,  1990,  1995 

Hayner  v.  Eberhardt  205,  1392 

Haynes  v.  Bennett  18,  20,  21 

V.  Heller  324 

V.  Rudd  88 

V.  Seachrest  1585 

V.  Stevens  879,  979,  983 

V.  Young  381,  881,  882 

Haynsworth  v.  Bischoff  1389 

Hays  V.  Askew  258,  260,  531,  542 

V.  Doane  l'^^ 

V.  Galion  Gas,  &c.  Co.  144 

V.  Hays  1201 

V.  Ottawa,  &c.  R.  Co.  142 

V.  Peck  295,  862,  1624 

V.  Perkins  331 

V.  Reger  1404 

Hayward  v.  Davidson  173,  175, 

178,  181 
V.Kinney  664,  708,  711, 

723 
V.  Nat.  Insurance  Co.     1536 
Hayward  Homestead  Asso.  v.  Mil- 
ler 745,  780 
Haywood  v.   Brunswick  Building 

Soc.  780 

V.  Nooney  1412,  1414 

V.  Shaw  1532 

Hazard  v.  Albro  1890 

Hazelrigg  v.  Donaldson  89 

Hazen  r'  Barnett  1942,  1947 

Hazlett  V.  Sinclair  785,  1547 

Heacock  v.  Lubuke  1197,  1485 

Headley  v.  Bell  15«3 

Headman  v.  Rose  168 


Healey  v.  Babbitt  448,  459,  468 

V.  Seward       1250,  1256,  1320 

V.  Worth  1213 

Heane  v.  Rogers  1582 

Heaps  V.  Dunham  80 

Heard  v.  Fairbanks  1627 

V.  Hall  831 

V.  Horton  232,  583,  585 

Hearle  v.  Greenbank  2 

Hearick  v.  Doe  1879 

Heaston  v.  Randolph  Co.  650 

Heath  v.  Big  Falls   Cotton  Mills 

1053,  1073,  1075,  1082, 
1440 
V.  Blake  1351 

V.  Crealock  257,  258 

V.  Heath  580 

V.  Hewitt  232,  583 

V.  Kutter  1021,  1033,  1035 

V.    Second    Nat.    Bank    of 

Lafayette  174 

V.  Silverthorn,  &c.  Co.  285 

V.  Stevens  31 

V.  West  29 

V.  Whidden  928 

Heatley  v.  Finster  1527 

Heaton  v.  Hodges  431 

1-.  Prather       1483,1485,1489, 

1517,  1555 

Heavilon  c.  Heavilon  1619,  1621, 

1624 
Heberd  v.  Wines  1404 

Hebron  r.  Centre  Harbor  1439 

Hecht  V.  Dettman  1631 

Heck  v.  Remka  381 

Heckert  v.  Haine  HOI 

Heckman  v.  Swartz  95 

Hedden  r.  Overton  1440 

Hedge  v.  Drew  1238,  1290,  1296 

r.  Sims  389 

Hedger  r.  Ward  1133 

Hedges  v.  Kerr  828 

Hedrick  v.  Atchison,  &c.  Ry.  Co. 

1522 
V.  Smith  983 

Heeney  v.  Brooklyn  Benev.  Soc.  167 
Heermans  v.  Montague  1406,  1407 
Heeter  v.  Glasgow  1196,  1197, 

1198,  1206,  1444,  1447 
Heffclfinger  y.  Shutz  1367 

Heffelman  r.  Otsego  Water  Power 

Co.  338,  424 

Heffron  '•.  Cunningham  1303 

r.  Flanigan  1497 

Heflin  v.  Bingham       1600,  1604,  1606 

v.  Phillips  837,  928 

Hefner  v.  Downing  363,  367 

Ixxxi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Iloil  V.  Reddon 
lloilliniii  r.  llaminond 
Ilt'ilman  '■.  Kruh 
Ilciiili'ii  /•.  Mai'liii 
IK'iiirii'li  r.  Simpson 
Heinz  r.  Cnuner 
Heister  r.  Fortner 


1172,  12!)2 
1442 
119(),  119.S 
1022 
1178 
3li7 
1402,  1442, 
14G8 
Helliiwell  V.  Eastwood  16  71,  1703 

Ilellcr,  In  re.  1900 

Hellyor  r.  King  11)3(5 

Holm  c.  Gilrov  1672,  1712,  1714, 

1721 

/•.  riehn  85 

c.  Klfinschmidt  1306,  1308 

r.  Webster  463 

r.  Wilson  355,  358,  364 

Ilelme  r.  Guy  1637 

Ilelnier  v.  Castle  448 

Helms  r.  Chadbourne  1482,  1514, 

1517,  1522,  1559 

Hemenway  v.  Cutler  1695 

Hemingway  v.  Scales  1793,  1800, 

1802,  1803 

Hemphill's  Case  492 

Hemphill  r.  Holford  99 

Hempstead  v.  Johnston  1285 

Hencke  ''.  Johnson  946 

Hendee  r.  Pinkerton  146,  1066 

Henderson  r.  Baltimore  1239 

('.  Downing  1407 

V.  Easen  1887,  1S88 

V.  Ford  1038 

V.  Grewell  1159,  1162, 

1169,  1173,  1178,  1180 

V.  Hatterman         386,  448, 

454,  455 

V.  Henderson         302,  303, 

309,  948,  958,  962 

V.  Hodgen  1258 

V.  Hunter  630,  65G 

V.  Hunton  274 

V.  McGregor  49,  1478 

f.  Mack  565,56  7,568, 

569 

V.  Pilgrim  1420,  1423 

V.  Rice  1182,  1190 

V.  Smith  1182,  1196, 

1198 

Hendon  k.  White  1086,  1110 

Hendrick  v.  Crowley  295 

Hendricks  r.  Huffmeyer  1441 

c.  Keesee  928 

'•.  Rasson  1289 

V.  Robinson  272 

c.  Stark s  «77 

Hendrickson's  Appeal  1403,  1466 

Ixxxii 


Hendrickson  r.  Woolley      1499,  1500, 

1589 
Hendrix  r.  Baggs  1072 

r.  Money  56 

Hendy  v.  Smith  1226,  13.S7 

Henfree  v.  Bromley  133S,  134  6 

Henkle  v.  Dillon  1672,  1684,  1740 

Henley  t'.  Wilson  346,  351 

Henman  v.  Dickinson  1365 

Hennessey  v.  Andrews  1578 

Hennessy  r.  Murdock  448,  449, 

450 

Henning  v.  Bennett  485 

r.  Withers  ,968 

Henninger  r.  Heald  1529,  1530 

Henrichsen  c.  Hodgen  1240 

Henry  r.  Anderson  1282 

V.  Atkison  1056 

r.  Carson  1256,  1314,  1315, 

1448 

r.  Etowah  Co.  686 

('.  Raiman  1527 

V.  Root  29,  158 

V.  Tupper  646,  693,  732 

V.  Von  Brandenstein  1719, 

1732,  1753 

V.  Whitaker  331 

Henry  Co.  a.  Bradshaw  1239 

Hensal  w.  Wright  1911 

Henshaw  v.  Mullens  391 

Hensley  c.  Brodie  16  79 

Hepburn  v.  Dubois  1109 

Herbert  v.  Herbert  1276,  1289 

V.  Odlin  1822 

V.  Pue  503,  528,  556 

V.  Rainey  448,  449 

V.  Wise  381 

Herd  v.  Cist  1146,  1442 

Herff  v.  Griggs  1389 

Herman  i\  Deming  1436 

Herndon  v.  Harrisson  943 

V.  Kimball  1435 

/•.  Reed  1124 

Herren  ;■.  Strong  1090 

Herrick  v.  Hopkins  324,  410 

V.  Malin         1340,  1346,  1348, 

1361,  1367 

V.  Marshall  505,  551 

V.  Moore  882,  962,  967 

V.  Musgrove  1196,  1205 

V.  Sixby  401 

Herring  v.  Rogers  6 1 7 

V.  White  1139,  1196,  1206 

V.  Wickham  281,  283 

Herrington  v.  Herrington  1559 

Herryford  r.  Turner  828 

Hersey  v.  Turbett  1559 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Hershee  v.  Hershsey  1591 

Hershey  v.  Metzgar  1623,  1627 

Hershman  v.  Hershman  712 

Hertzog  V.  Hertzog  .       968 

Hervey  i\  Smith  1569 

Hess  I'.  Cheney         398,  399,  481,  4.S2 

V.  Clark  1392 

t'.  Meyer  436,437,438 

Hester  r.  Hiinnicutt  919 

Hetherington  v.  Clark  1482,  1520 

Heuisler  r.  Nickum  1410,  1414 

Hewes  V.  Wiswell  1567 

Hewitt  V.  Loosemore  1538,  1539, 

1544,  1545,  1565 

V.  Morgan  1150 

V.  Week  1087 

Hext  V.  Gill  538 

Heyn  v.  Ohman  904,  918 

Heyshara  v.  Dettre  89,  1703 

Hiatt  V.  Calloway  14  72 

Hibbard  v.  Foster  1937 

Hibberd  v.  Bovier  1406 

V.  Smith         1218,  1223,  1224, 

1240,  1267,  1277,  1281, 

1282,  1300 

Hibblewhite  v.  M'Morine  1328 

Hickey  v.  Lake  Shore,  &c.  Ry.  Co. 

647,  648 

Hicklin  V.  McClear  338,  425,  428, 

449 

Hickman  v.  Green  1532,  1536 

)•.  Perrin  1455,  1483 

Hickory  Farm  Oil  Co.  v.  Buffalo, 

N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.  173,  190 

Hicks  V.  Bullock  582 

V.  Cochran  1792,  1797 

V.  Coleman  395,  396,  400, 

401,  491,  492 

V.  Goode  1311 

Hieatt  v.  Dixon  23,  27 

Hiern  v.  Mill  1544,  1559 

Hiester  v.  Green  644 

Hiett  V.  Shall  48 

Higbee  v.  Rice  1862,  1879,  1880, 

1919 

V.  Rodeman  650,  68  7,  723, 

728 

Higginbottom  v.  Mateer  1955 

V.  Short  1994 

Higgins  V.  Brown  85 

_ 

V.  Higgins  42 

V.  Wasgatt  5G8 

Highberger  v.  Stiffler  99,  101,  103 

Highley  v.  Barron  31 

Highstone  v.  Burdette  1870,  1879 

Higinbotham  v.  Stoddard  124,  384, 
386,  400,  401 


Hignite  v.  Hignite  1862,  1881 

Higueras  v.  United  States  432 

Hiiin  V.  Peck  620,  1912 

Hilborn  v.  Bucknam  85,  86,  87 

Hileman  v.  Bouslaugh  575,  602 

Hiles  V.  Atlee  1481 

V.  Fisher  1792,  1804,  1812, 

1813 

V.  La  Flesh  1165,  1178,  1179 

V.  Rule  1966 

Hill  D.  Bacon  869,1127,1196 

V.  Barclay  732 

V.  Blackwelder  363 

V.  Butler  943 

V.  Cutting     532,  1604,  1606,  1609 

V.  De  Rochemont  1708 

V.  Edie  364 

V.  Evans  487 

V.    Farmers'     &    Mechanics' 

Nat.  Bank  1721 

V.  Gibbs  1925,  1935 

V.  Grange  163  7 

i".  Hill  559,  667,  1220,  1233, 

1234,  1236,  1248,  1269,  1274, 

1278 

V.  Hobart  828,  829 

V.  Lord  530 

V.  McCarter  1482,  1489 

V.  McNichol         1218,  1286,  1289, 

1469,  1499,  1502,  1529,  1531 

V.  Manchester,  &c.  W.  Co.      1082 

V.  Meeker  1383 

V.  Miller  101 

V.  Moore  1525 

r.  Mundy  1707 

V.  Murray  1522 

V.  Nash  48,  49 

V.  National  Bank  1668,  1712 

V.  Nelms  1365 

('.  Newman  1925 

I'.  Proctor  376 

V.  Sewald  1668,  1756 

V.  Taylor  1112,  1154,  1442 

V.  Tupper  787 

D.  Wentworth       1668,1674,1717 

V.  West   ,  294 

V.  Young  1963,  1994 

Hiller  )'.  Jones  1565,  156  7 

Ilillhouse  I'.  Mix  1935 

Hilliard  v.  Scoville  1970 

Hi II man,  Ex  parte  293 

Hills  V.  Bcarsc  38 

V.  Doc  1824 

V.  Ilomton  491 

r.  Ludwig  358,  359 

V.  Miller'  780,  784 

Hillyer  v.  Bennett  31,  35 

Ixxxiii 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


IlilnuTt  r.  Christian  S45 

liiltiin's  Appoal  141!) 

Hilton  r.  (;ilman  422 

lliim-s  r.  Kci-hhlinglier  1288,  121)2 

Hinclu'v  c.  Xichols  337,  344,  353 

lliiu'hli'fY  r.  Ilinman  IIU 

Iliiulunan  v.  Town  141)1 

Ilimle  V.  Longvvorth  279 

llin.ls  ('.  Allen  !)24 

V.  Eallou  1409 

V.  Dodd  1499,  1517 

V.  Fugh  1390 

V.  Koberts  1472 

Ilinely  v.  Magaritz  If! 

liines  i'.  Anient  KJOS 

V.  Thorn  1148 

V.  Trantham  1935 

Hinkley  i\  Grouse  365 

V.  Greene  1880 

Hinkley  &  E.  Iron  Co.  v.  Black 

1668,  1695, 1696,  1698 

Hinman  v.  Booth  1319 

Hinson  v.  Bailey  1230,  1234 

V.  Bush  1801 

ITinters  v.  Hinters  1835,  1853 

Ilinton  V.  Leigh  1501 

V.  Roach  337 

V.  Walston  1634 

Hirsch  v.  Tillman  37 

V.  Trainer  53 

Hirth  V.  Graham  1600 

Hislop  V.  Leckie  772 

Hiss  L\  McCabe  1171 

Hitchcock  V.  Grimshaw  289 

V.  Kiely  289 

V.  Simpkins  527,  646 

V.  Skinner  1862 

Hitchman  v.  Walton  1764 

Hittinger  v.  Eanies  496 

Ilitz  V.   Nat.   Metropolitan  Bank 

1406 

Hiiadley  v.  Hadley  1448 

Hoar  r."  (Moulding  338 

Hoag  V.  Howard  1404,  1562 

V.  Sayre  1406 

Hohack  v.  Kilgore  828 
Hobbs  I'.  Payson  326,  411,  413,  420 
Hoboken  City  Bank  v.  Phelps        1267 

Hoboken    Land   Co.   v.  Kerrigan 

461,  463,  1162 

Hobson  r.  Cartwright  764,  784 

r.  Kissam  1159,  1168 

V.  Middlcton  853 

u.  Philadelphia  453 

Hochstedler  r.  Hochstedler  605 

Hockenhull  r.  Oliver  1394,  1464 

Hockett  /•.  Jones  1234,  1309 

l.KXxiv 


Hockman  /•.  McClanahan     1159,  1187, 
1188,  1201 
Hockmoth  /•.  Des  Grands  Champs 

369 

Hodge  ('.  Amerman  1563,  1564 

V.  Boothby  528 

V.  Gilman  1365 

('.  Sloan  733,  771,  780,781, 

789,  798 

Hodgen  v.  Guttery  1381,  1486 

Hodges  V.  Cook  113 

V.  Eddy  1880 

V.  Fleetwood  618 

V.  Heal  1926,  1931 

V.  Horsfall  425 

V.  Rowing  346 

V.  Latham  919 

V.   New  England    Screw 

Co.  141 

V.  Saunders  830 

V.  Thayer  943,  948,  949 

V.  Williams  481 

V.  Winston  1463,  1526 

Hodgkins  v.  Montgomery  Co.  Ins. 

Co.  1532 

Hodgson  i\  Butts  276,  1441 

Hodnett  v.  Forman  1104 

Hoes  V.  Boyer  1380 

Hoff  V.  Tobey  494 

Hoffert  V.  Miller  2,  24 

Hoffman  v.  Armstrong  1614 

V.  Beard  1963 

V.  Blume  1575 

V.  Bosch  968 

V.  Hoffman  1234 

V.  Mackall  1453 

V.  Port  Huron  331,  352, 

364,  371,  400,  466 

V.  Porter  244 

V.  Riehl  330 

w.  Stigers     1771,1793,1797, 

1800,  1802 

V.  Strochecker  1527 

V.  AVhite  364,  372 

Hoffsass  V.  Mann  575,  582,  587, 

609 

Hogan  V.  Hogan  1182 

r.  Welcker  575 

Hogans  v.  Carruth         381,  388,  1015, 

1101,  1106,  1109,  1125 

Hogel  r.  Lindell  303 

Hogg  V.  Beerman  497,  1867 

V.  Odom  225 

Hogins  I).  Bojigs  335 

Ho2;hton  v.  Hoghton  103,  108 

Iloit  r.  Russell  1447,  1531 

V.  Stnitton  Mills  559,  1604 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Holbert  v.  Edens      480,  488,  490,  493 
Holbrook  o.  Chamberlin      1018,  1019, 
12o7,  1765 
V.  Debo  892,  992 

V.  Dickenson  I486 

V.  Moore  485 

V.  Nicbol  1146 

V.  Tirrell  1259,  1262 

V.  Worcester  Bank  1447 

Holbrooke  v.  Harrington      1990,  1999 
Holcomb  V.  Coi-yell  1861 

V.  Mooney  335,  338 

Holeombe  v.  Coryell  1976 

V.  Ricbards  1240,  1241 

Holdane  v.  Cold  Spring  451 

Holden  v.  Burnbam  289 

V.  Cbandler  488,  495,  498 

V.  Garrett        1404,  1405,  1406 
Holder  V.  Coates  1614 

Holiday  u.  Cromwell  1143 

Holladay  v.  Daily  1028 

Holland  v.  Cruft  155 

V.  Hodgson  1671,  1712, 

1725,  1748,  1764 
V.  Moon  1028 

Holleman  v.  De  Nyse  1153 

Hollenback  v.  Fleming  1092 

HoUenbeck  v.  McDonald  1660 

V.  Sykes  381,  383 

Holley  ?;.  Glover  1994 

V.  Hawley  1866,  1879 

HoUiday  v.  Cromwell  1435 

V.  Franklin  Bank  1380, 

1406,  1501 
V.  Maddox  374 

V.  Overton  249 

Hollino'swortb  v.  Holbrook  1349 

V.  McDonald  616 

V.  Walker  1259 

Hollins  V.  Demorest  769 

HoUis  V.  Carr     •  262 

V.  Dasbiell  1106 

V.  Drew  Tbeological  Semi- 
nary 183,  189 
V.  Harris  1353 
V.  Pond  1067 
HoUocher  i'.  Delano         463,  464,  469 
V.  Hollocber    294,  295,  298, 
303,  309 
V.  lloUoway  1963 
V.  Mcllbenny                    1966 
V.  Soutbmayd          448,  462, 
463,  469 
Holly  Manuf.  Co.  v.  New  Chester 

Water  Co.  1668,1680,1741 

Holman  v.  Patterson  1559 

Holmes  v.  Bellingham  448,  449 


Holmes  v.  Best 
V.  Blogg 
V.  Buckner 


1371 


V.  Danforth 
V.  Goring 
V.  Hill 
V.  Holmes 
V.  Johns 
V.  Powell 
V.  Seely 
V.  Sinnickson 


1883,  1892 

27 

1408,  1506, 

1529 

887 

534 

80 

595 

990 

1563 

1639 

968,  983 


Stout  1517,  1529,  1563, 

1568,  1569,  1570 

Turner's  Falls  Co.  463 


Holston  V.  Needles 
Holston  Salt  Co.  v. 

Holt's  Appeal 
Holt  V.  Agnew 

V.  Baker 

V.  Maverick 

V.  Moore 

V.  Robertson 

V.  Thomas 

V.  Wilson 
Holt  County  Bank  v.  Tootle 


326 

Campbell  335, 

336,  409 

1240,  1272 

88,  92 

1584 

1364 

1196,  1198,  1205 

1892 

87 

1802 

496, 

1699 

1837,  1.846 

1962 

831 

321 

1159,  1162 

218 


Honzik  v.  Delaglise 
Hoobler  v.  Hoobler 
Hood  V.  Brown 

V.  Fahnestock 


Holterboff  v.  Mead 

Holton  V.  Guinn 

Holyoke  v.  Clark 

Homan  v.  Stewart 

Homer  v.  Schonfield 

Hommel  v.  Devinney 

Homceopathic  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Marshall  1444,  1447 

Honevman  v.  Thomas  1672,  1673, 

^  1723 

1696 

55 

1267,  1450 

1529, 1532, 

1534,  1566 

V.  Perry  44 

Hook  V.  Donaldson  2,  29,  158 

V.  Pratt  277 

Hoole  V.  Attorney-General  1559 

Hooper  V.  Cummings        623,  632,  6  78, 

696,  704,  705,  723,  728, 

729 

Hooneston  Building  Asso.  v.  Green 

^  1436 

Hoot  V.  Spade  944 

Hooten  V.  Comerford  338,  340 

Hoover  v.  Wheeler  1591 

Hope  V.  Blair  1394 

V.  Liddell  1554 

Ixxxv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Keferonoes  are  to  Seotions. 


Hope  V.  Sawyer  ll-'-!.  1124 

V.  Stone  8P4,  !il)2,  1391 

Hope  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cambrelling 

1538 

Hopewell   Mills  v.  Taunton    Sav. 

Bank  1008,  16(it),  1673,  1712, 

1741,  1744,  1748 

Hopkins  v.  Delanoy  1180 

V.  Gallatin  Tnrnpike  Co. 

1051,  1082 
V.  Garrard  1575 

V.  Kent  484,  488 

V.  Lee  9  08 

V.  Smith  771,  808 

V.  Ward  121 

Hopkins  Academy  v.  Dickinson     483, 

485 
Hopkinson  v.  McKnight  449 

Hopper  V.  Lovejoy  1117,1118 

V.  Parkinson  1415 

Hoppin  V.  Doty  1516,  1564 

Hoppiss  V.  Eskridge  121 

Hoppock  V.  Johnson  1536 

Hopson  V.  Fowlkes  1801 

Horback  v.  Porter  1562 

Hord  v.  Olivari  386 

Horgan  v.  Bickerton  1979,  1998 

Horn  V.  Miller  795 

V.  Thompson  302 

Hornbeck  v.  Mut.  Building  Asso. 

1165,  1188,  1189,  1447 

V.  Westbrook  528,  530, 

548 

Home  V.  Howell  1880 

V.  Smith  1717 

V.  Walton  943 

Horner  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.  295,  649,  650,  718 

V,  Pleasants  471 

V.  Still  well  376 

Horrigan  v.  Rice  89  7 

Horsburg  v.  Baker  731 

Horsford  v.  Wright  969 

Horsley  i:  Garth  1451,  1455,  1458 

Horton  v.  Arnold  943 

V.  Bloedorn  85 

V.  Brown  359 

V.  Davis  261 

V.  Sledge  1991 

Hosford  V.  Ballard  718 

Hoskin  v.  Woodward  1670,  1759 

Hoskins  v.  Brawn  1640 

Hosleton  r.  Dickinson  407 

Hosley  V.  Holmes  1240,  1267 

Hotchkiss  V.  01m  stead  1220 

Hotel  Co.  V.  Wade  1054 

Hottenstein  v.  Lerch  1513,  1564 

Ixxxvi 


Houck  V.  Yates  4  7  7,  480,  484,  491 

Houfes  V.  Schultze     1448,  1450,  1494, 

1496 

Hough  r.  Cook  Co.  Land  Co.  175 

V.  Hill  1021 

V.  Hough  1792 

Houghton  r.  Biirnham  1456 

V.  Uardenberg  1229 

r.  Steele  677 

Hounshell  v.  Sams  99 

Hourtienne  v.  Schnoor         1196,  1197, 

1205,  1447 

House  ('.  Fowle  44 

V.  Fuller  1836 

Houseman   v.  Girard  Loan  Asso. 

1532,  1534 
Houser  v.  Belton  381,  414 

Plouston  V.  Blackman       266,  288,  289, 

295,  298 

i:  Blythe  1101 

i:  Houston     7,  14,  1410,  1497 

V.  Jordan  1357 

V.  McCluney  1901 

V.  Matthews  358 

i\  Sneed  358,  359,  194  7 

V.  Spruance  622 

V.  Williamson  1802 

Houston,  &c.  R.  Co.  ^'.  Knapp       1925 

Houstoun,  In  re  52 

Houts  u.  Showalter  1628 

Houx  ('.  Batteen  214,  368 

Hovelman  v.  Kansas  City,  &c.  R. 

Co.  175 

Hovey  v.  Blanchard  1532 

r.  Chase  48,  54,  56 

V.  Elliott  1559 

V.  Hobson       23,  48,  49,  50,  52, 

54,  67,  70,  71,  120 

Howard  r.  Chase  1494,  1551,  1824 

V.  Fessenden  1691,  1695, 

1697 

V.  Howard  1693 

V.  Huffman  1259 

V.  IngersoU  471,  488 

V.  Lincoln  559 

V.  Patrick  1309,  1234 

V.  Schmidt  1585 

V.  Shrewsbury  250 

V.  Throckmorton  1884 

i\  Wadsworth  536 

Howard  Ins.  Co.  v.  Halsey    1482,  1489, 

1522,  1534,  1547,  1554 

Howard  Mut.  Loan  &  Fund  Asso. 

V.  McLUyre  1380 

Howe  ('.  Bass  381 

V.  Batchelder     1603,  1604,  1627 

V.  Harrinston  1033 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Howe  V.  Howe         54,  55,  60,  97,  1286 

1849,  1876 

V.  Keeler  1051 

V.  Powell  1435 

V.  Saddler  "        518 

V.  Thayer  1469,  1481 

V.  Walker  861,  864 

V.  Warnack  271 

Howell  V.  Brewer  1406 

V.  Hanrick  1364 

V.  Howell  1411 

V.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  691 

V.  M'Coy  1639 

V.  McCrie  1447 

V.  Merrill  388 

V.  Mills  1970 

V.  Moores  948 

V.  Ray  1101 

V.  Richards  858,  860 

V.  Saule  410 

V.  Schenck  1624, 1628 

Howk  V.  Minnick  186  7 

Hoxie  ;•.  Can-  1522,  1527,  1542 

V.  Finney  855,  857 

Hoxsie  V.  Ellis  1969 

Hoy  V.  Allen  1109,  1404,  1408 

V.  Bramhall  1482,  1489,  1517 

Hoyle  V.  Plattsburgh  &  Montreal 

R.  Co.  1729 

V.  Stowe  11,  13,  14,  20,  21, 

64,  1936 

Hoyt  V.  Dewey  85 

V.  Hoyt  1420,  1516 

V.  Jaques  1030 

V.  Ketcham  638,  696,  728 

V.  Kimball        623,  632,  635,  637, 

641,  642,  678,  709,  1955 

V.  McLagan  1306 

V.  Schuyler  1395,  1396 

V.  Swar  7 

V.  Thompson  138,  1082 

V.  Tuers  1963 

Hrouska  v.  Janke  1003,  1095 

Hubback  v.  Ross  1311 

Hubbard  v.  Allen      295,  303,  307,  310 

V.    Ascutney    Mill-Dam 

Co.  1856 

V.  Bagshaw  1717,  1748 

?'.  Beckwith  10(;3 

V.  Cummings  29,  158 

V.  Cox  1217,  1220,  1247 

w.  Dusy  387,437,438 

I'.  Greeley  1303,  1304, 

1316,  1393 
r.  Gurney  1393 

V.  Hubbard        698,  699,  702, 
708,  715,  718,  722 


Hubbard  v.  Kansas  City,   &c.    R. 

Co.  640 

(;.  Knous  316 

('.  Norton  882,  979,  982 

V.  Smith  1563 

r.  Turner  1420 

V.  ^\'alker  1404 

Hubbell   V.    E.    Cambridge    Five 

Cents    Sav.    Bank 

1668,  1712,  1719,  1741 

V.  McCulloch  356,  357, 

364,  366 

V.  Warren  743,  796,  797 

Hubby  V.  Hubby  1245,  1824 

Huber  V.  Huber  44 

Huddleson  v.  Reynolds  351 

Hudson's  Case  1277,  1346 

Hudson  V.  Coe  1862,  1870,  1873, 

1917 

V,  Green  Hill  Seminary       176 

V.  Irwin  424,  432 

V.  Poindexter  1070,  1071 

V.  Putney  1861 

V.  Randolph  1456 

V.  Revett  1356 

V.  Steere  867 

V.  Warner  1520,  1554 

Huebsch  v.  Scheel  295,  1486 

Huebschmann  v.  McHenry  1691 

Huey  V.  Huey  1234,  1236,  1256, 

1267,  1269 

V.  Van  Wie  1115,  1117 

Huff  V.  Cunibei-land  Val.  Land  Co. 

921 

V.  McCauley  1600,  1603 

V.  McDonald       1874,  1884,  1890 

V.  Webb  1163,  1171 

Huggins  V.  Ketchum  254 

Hughes,  Ex  parte  161 

Hughes  V.  Cawthorn  385 

I'.  Cohnan  1197 

V.  Debnam  1065 

r.  Easter  1222 

V.  Edwards  165,  6  74 

V.  Lane  1182,  1195 

V.  McDivitt  1137,  1177, 

1180 

V.  Morris        1159,  1165,  1171, 

1178 

V.  Prov.  &  W.  R.  Co.  454, 

463,  484 

V.  Thistlewood  1321 

V.  Tong  1439 

?'.  United  States  1563 

V.  Watson  7 

V.  Westmoreland  Coal  Co. 

338 

Ixxxvii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Hughes  r.  Wilkinson  1129,  1133 

c.  Worlev  1498 

Huoruenin  r.  Basely  99,  103 

Hn'lirlv  V.  Scovil  1282 

Ilulino-  r.  Abbott  1530 

IInlin'<Ts  r.  (iutlirie        1405,  1406,  1407 

Hull  r.  Beals  002 

c.  Fuller  338 

V.  Hull  894 

r.  Louth  70,  71 

V.  Noble  1517,  1563,  1566 

V.  Sullivan  1551 

Hullett  V.  Hamilton  304 

V.  Inlow  1802,  1803,  1814 

Hullhorst  V.  Scharner  85 

Hiilse  r.  Hulse  1862 

Hultz  v.  Ackley  1154 

Humbert  r.  Trinity  Church  181, 

1862 
Humble  v.  Langston  1328 

Hume  V.  Franzen  1516 

Humes  r.  McFarlane  120 

Hummelman  v.  Mounts  311,  314, 

315 

Humphrey  v.  Foster  198G 

V.  Hurd  1575 

V.  Spencer  44 

Humphreys  o.  Finch  1021 

V.  McKissock  1635, 

1636,  1639, 1648 

V.  Merrill  1406,  1407 

V.  Newman  1482 

Humphries  c.  Davis  1887,  1892 

Humphry  r.  Beeson  254 

Hunnewell  r.  Taylor  1964 

Hunnicutt  v.  Peyton  375,  376,  378 

Hunt  V.  Amidon  933 

V.  Adams  1338,  1340,  1342 

V.  Bass  88 

V.  Bay  State  Iron  Co.  1682, 

1736,  1741,  1747,  1748,  1767 

V.  Beeson  649,  678,  687 

(.'.  Bishop  119 

V.  Blackburn  1792,  1797 

V.  Brown  448,  463 

V.  Bullock  1729 

'■•  IJiinn  1517,  1522 

V.  Gray  1338,  1348,  136  7 

V.  Ilardwick  95 

V.  Hazclton  1964 

V-  Hunt  53,  134,  269 

V.  Innis  1485 

V.  Johnson         44,  45,  294,  1026, 

1178,  1416, 1417 

V.  Marsh  931 

V.  Middlcpworth       933,  939,  973 

V.  Mullanphy  1731 

Ixxxviii 


Hunt  V.  Nolen 
V.  Orwig 
V.  Raplee 
V.  Remnant 
V.  Rich 

V.  Rousmanier 
i\  Satterwhite 
V.  Swayze 
V.  Weir 
V.  Wright 
Hunter  v.  Atkins 
V.  Carrol 
V.  Giddings 
I'.  Hume 
V.  Hunter 
V.  Martin 
V.  Miller 
i\  Morse 


944 

933,  944,  972 

458,  944,  957 

119 

455 

1036,  1037 

580 

1224 

64 

641,  667,  1955 

107 

373 

1043 

339 

1312,  1324 

244 

1041 

398 


V.  Stoneburner  1517 

V.  Watson  223,  1404,  1408 

V.  Windsor  1480 

Huntington  v.  Asher  1641 

V.  Finch  1359 

V.  Havens  250,  257 

V.  Lyman  565,  57  7 

Huntsman  v.  Hendricks  946 

Hurd  V.  Curtis  505,  509,  540,  793, 

938,  942 

V.  Hall  974 

V.  Hurd  525 

Hurlbert  u.  Weaver  1415 

Hurlburt  v.  Wheeler  1220 

Hurley  u.  Brown  347 

V.  Hurley  1846,  1853,  1854 

V.  Miss.  Rum  River  Boom 

Co.  449 

Hurst  V.  Wilson  602 

Hurt  V.  Cooper  1575 

V.  Evans  375,  3  76 

V.  McCartney  1162 

Hurto  V.  Grant  681,  704 

Husband  v.  Aldrich  1954 

Iluscombo  V.  Standing  88 

Huse  V.  Ames  1137,  1160 

V.  Den  1220,  1293 

Huss  V.  Stephens  230,  231 

Huston  V.  Cantril  283 

V.  Clark  1714 

Hutchings  v.  Talbot  316 

Hutchins  v.  Bacon  1937 

V.  Byrnes  1000,  1049, 

1068 

V.  Dixon  1288,  1290 

V.  King  1601,  1603,  1614 

V.  Masterson         1665,  1668, 

1672,  1673,  1711 

V.  Moody  869 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Hutchins  v.  Roundtree 


968,  981, 

983,  984 

V.  Scott  1346 

Hutchinson  v.  Ainswortli      1188,  1213 

V.  Bramhall       1372,  1407, 

1419,  1584 

V.  Harttmann  1396 

V.  Hutchinson       274,  1499 

r.  Kay  1726 

V.  Rust  1196,  1287 

V.  Tindall  76 

V.  Ulrich       734,  735,  751, 

779 

Hutchison  v.  Rust  1287 

V.  Sinclair  303 

Huth  V.  Carondelet,  &c.  Co.      2,  24,  26 

Huttemeier  v.  Albro      469,  1643,  1657 

Hutton  V.  Smith  1220,  1248,  1256 

V.  Webber  1109 

Hutzler  v.  Phillips  1369 

Huxley  v.  Harrold  1130 

Huyck  V.  Andrews  852,  872,  874, 

882,  885,  886,  958 

Huzzey  v,  Heffernan  990 

Hyatt  V.  Cochran  1485 

Hyde  v.  Bennett  1372 

Hyer  v.  Hyatt  2 

V.  Little  1009,  1012 

Hymes  v.  Esty         882,  885,  944,  ?57, 

958,  968,  977 

V.  Van  Cleef  944,  945 

Hyne  v.  Osborn  1090,  1258,  1259 

Idaho  Land  Co.  v.  Parsons      358,  359, 

363 

Ide  r.  Ide  664,  670 

Iddings  V.  Cairns  1878 

I<llehart  r.  Crane  1482,  1489,  1553 

Ihley  r.  Padtrett  2,  3,  27 

Ijanies  v.  Gaither  1546 

Ikerd  v.  Beavers  99 

Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  r.  Illinois  500 

I'.  Johnson     1072, 

1076,  1079, 

1080,  1148 

Illinois    Cent.   R.   Co.   v.   McCul- 

louc^h  1314,  131.S,  1575 

Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson 

1893 
Illinois  Land  Co.  v.  P)eem  17 

y.  Bonner     2,  13,  27 
Imhoff  r.  Witmer  52,  77 

Indiana  r.  Milk  4.S4,  501 

Indiana,  B.  &  W.   Ry.  Co.   r.  Mc- 

Brooni  1517,  15  IS,  1569 

Indianapolis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  /•.  Hood 

649,  650,  718,  730 


Indianapolis  Water  Co.  v.  Nulte      793 

Ing  V.  Brown  1466 

Ingalls  V.  Byers  653 

V.  Eaton  849 

V.  Newhall      1862,  1870,  1872, 

1876 

V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.   Ry. 

Co.  1697 

Ingersoll  v.  Roe  82 

V.  Truebody  333 

Ingleby  v.  Swift  249 

Ingoldsby  v.  Juan         316,  1002,  1003, 

1149 

Ingraham  v,  Baldwin  54,  64 

V.  Grigg       1163,  1165,  1292 

V.  Wilkinson     477,  484,  485 

Ingram  v.  Little  1328 

V.  Morgan  928 

V.  Walker  970 

Inhabitants  v.  String  239 

Inloes  V.  Harvey  1559 

Inman  v.  Prout  1957 

Innerarity    v.    Merchants'     Nat. 

Bank  1539 

Innis  ;;.  Sayre  276 

Insurance  Co.  r.  Nelson  92,  1196, 

1197,  1204,  1205,  1447 
International,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rags- 
dale  1925 
International  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scales 

1450 

Iowa  V.  Illinois  486 

Iowa  College  v.  Fenno  1551 

Ireland  v.  Geraghty         98,  1276,  1277 

V.  Rittle  1948 

Irey  v.  Markey  1878 

Irish  t:.  Sharp  1417,  1502,  1506 

Irons  V.  Webb  559 

Irvin  V.  Bevil  424 

Irvine  v.  Grady  1534 

V.  Irvine     2,  3,  10,  14,  24,  25,  26 

V.  McKeon  302,  303 

V.  Thompson  1014 

Irving  i;.  Brownell     1151,  1153,  1154, 

1167 
V.  Campbell  11  78 

V.  Cunningham  326 

Irwin  V.  Brown  1925,  1927 

V.  Dunwoody  1819 

%i.  Longworth  571 

V.  Towne  395,  397 

V.  Welch  1109,  1442 

Isaacs  V.  Green  225 

Isele  r.  Arlington  Five  Cents  Sav- 
ings Bank  874 
V.  Schwamb                                   874 
Isett  V.  Lucas                                   1586 

Ixxxix 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Isham  r.  Bennington  Iron  Co.       1049, 

1082,  1435 

r.  Morgan  1592 

Island  Coal  Co.  r.  Streitlemier         323 

Isle  Koval  Min.  Co.  v.  Hertin         1615 

Israel  r.  Israi'l  1887,  1892 

Ives  r.  Kimball  1162,  1165 

I'.  Stone  14G6 

V.  Van  Anken  503,  528,  531 

Izard  r.  Bodine  1884,  1.S87 

V.  Kimniel  1563 

Jacks  r.  Dillon  1181,  1211 

Jackson  r.  Adams  1G7 

V.  Alexander     207,  2G3,  2(J4, 
312 
V.  Allen  1085,  1088,  1109 

V.  Andrews  129 

V.  Ashton  92 

V.  Austin  1412,  1414 

V.  Barringer  326,  420 

r.  Beach  313 

V.  Blackwood  1508,  1544 

V.  Bodle  1277,  1285 

V.  Boston  &W.R.  Co.        476 
r.  Brown  144 

V.  Burchin  20,  21,  23 

V.  Burton  1104 

V.  Cadwell  264,  268 

V.  Cairns  1196,  1802 

V.  Campbell  1083 

V.  Carpenter         2,  13,  20,  21, 
24,  26 
V.  Cary  1226 

V.  Catiin       1310,  1314,  1319, 
1320 
V.  Chamberlain       1406,  1408 
V.  Chapin  1226 

V.  Christman  1942,  1947 

?,'.  Clark  414 

V.  Cleveland  266,  1296 

V.  Cody  214 

V.  Colden        1129,  1380,  1443 
V.  Cole  431 

V.  Collins  138 

r.  Corey  241 

V.  Croy  1009,  1012 

V.  Crysler  705,  718 

V.  Culpepper  1230 

V.  Davis  254 

V.  Delancy  264,  268,  346, 

664 
V.  Demont  129 

V.  Dickenson  1562 

V.  Dieffendorf  364 

V.  Dubois  1402,  1404, 

1484 

XC 


Jackson  v.  Dunlap 
V.  Dysling 
V.  Evans 
t'.  Fish 
i\  Fisk 
V.  Florence 
r.  Fi'ier 
V.  Gardner 
r.  Gilchrist 
V.  Given 
r.  Gould 
V.  Green 

V.  Groat 
r.  Gumaer 
V.  Harder 
V.  Hart 


1287 
358,  364 
1600 
297 
207 
264,  274,  639 
1108 
519,  531 
36,  1162 
1425,  1486 
1346,  1349 
166,  167,  840, 
928,  931 
933 
54,  138,  1178 
1942 
213,  226 
i\  Hathaway  448,  454, 

462,  463,  1636,  1637, 
1647 
V.  Hayner  1009,  1196 

V.  Hoffman  855,  860 

V.  Hudson  519,  531 

V.  Humphrey  1129,  1443 

V.  Jackson  579,  602,  609, 

1011 
V.  Jacoby  1346,  1361 

V.  Johnson  131 

V.  King  48,  49,  99,  1846, 

1981 
r.  Leek  1217,126  7 

i\  Livingston  404 

V.  Long  194& 

V.  Loomis  414 

V.  Louw  448 

V.  Lynn  1315,  1322,  1326 

V.  McAuley  906 

V.  McChesney  307,  310, 

1486 
V.  McConnell  398,  399, 

1791,  1802,  1811 
V.  McKenny  525 

V.  Malin  1338,  1367 

V.  Marsh  324 

V.  Miller  1226 

I'.  Miner  278 

V.  Moore  378,  398 

r.  Myers  488,  531,  575, 

1965 
V.  Ogden  358 

V.  Osborn  1361,  1367 

V.  Parkhurst  256,  991 

r.  Perkins       1292,  1447,  1448 
V.  Perrine  364,  466 

r.  Phillips  1093,  1455 

v.  Phipps       1218,  1267,  1276, 
1289,  1301 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


V.  Pierce 

354 

V.  Pike 

265,  297 

i\  Post 

289,  1504 

V.  Pratt 

254 

V.  Reeves 

397 

V.  Reid  285,  1392,  1412, 

1425 

V.  Richards  1217,  1421, 

1448,  1450 
V.  Roberts  223 

V.  Robins  590 

V.  Root  207,  263,  264 

I'.  Rosevelt  323 

r.  Rowland  1321 

V.  Rowley  1314 

V.  Schoonmaker         264,  369, 

1196,  1447 
V.  Schultz  669 

V.  Sebring  264,  268 

V.  Sheldon  1104,  1217, 

1307,  1310,  1314,  1320 
V.  Shelton  1791 

V.  Silvernail  632 

V.  Sisson  243 

V.  Smith  523,  1879,  1880, 

1881 
V.  Spear  131 

V.  Sprasue  326,  398 

V.  Stanford  1004,  1008 

V.  Stanley  226,  227 

V.  Stevens  1792 

V.  Stevenson  771,  806,  813, 
814 
V.  Streeter  1921 

V.  Striker  1637 

V.  Swart  528,  825 

V.  Todd  2 

V.  Topping  528,  646,  711, 
720,  724,  728 
V.  Trullinger  1643,  1653 

V.  Turrell  1760,  1763 

V.  Van  Corlaer  364,  365 

V.  Vanderheyden  256 

V.  Van  Diisen  1094 

V.  Van  Valkenburgh  1425, 
1486,  1499,  1513,    1517, 

1531,  1532 
V.  Van  Zandt  613 

V.  Vedder  364 

V.  Vosburgh  1942,  1949 

V.  Vroonian  138 

V.  Warford  369 

V.  Warren  1559 

V.  West  1380 

V.  Whitbeck  1872 

V.  Winnifrith  805 

V.  Wood  1059,  1060 


Jackson,  L.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Davi- 
son 1510,  1555 
Jacksonville,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  r.  Lock- 
wood  448 
Jacob  L\  Woolfock             448,  449,  452 
Jacobs  V.  Alexander              1267,  1271 
V.  Benson  226 
V.  Denison                               1451 
V.  Gilreath                  1354,  1353 
V.  Miller                       1789,  1792 
V.  Moseley             341,  354,  364, 
368,369,  435,  437 
V.  Richards  53 
V.  Seward                   1912,  1919 
Jacobus    c.   Mutual   Benefit   Life 

Ins.  Co.  1450,  1860 

Jacoway  c.  Gault    1159,  1170,  1191, 

1442,  1501 

Jacox  V.  Jacox  103 

Jacques  v.  Short  938 

Jaeger  i:  Hardy  1513,  1571 

Jagers  v.  Jagers  99 

Jakeway  v.  Barrett  501 

Jamaica   Pond    Aqueduct    Co.  i\ 

Chandler       34S,  422,  45  7,  536,  548, 

563,  566,  1401 

James,  Ex  parte  161 

James  v.  Adams  840 

V.  Brown  1482,  1489,  1490 

V.  Cowing  1508 

V.  Drew  445 

V.  Fisk  37 

V.  Johnson  1420 

V.  Lamb  974 

V.  Lichfield  1563 

V.  Morey  1420,  1462,  1465 

V.  Plant  1658 

V.  Roberts  85 

V.  Vanderheyden        1303,  1311 

Jamison  v.  Craven      1220,  1240,  1241, 

1243,  1291 

V.  Fopiano  326,  381,  387, 

1056 

V.  Gjemenson  1527,  1537 

V.  Jamison  1197,  1207, 

1447 

V.  Petit  354 

Janes  v.  Brown  1887 

Jansen  v.  McCahill  1014,  1201 

Janvrin  r.  Janvrin  1517,  1563 

Jaques  v.  Lester  1563 

V.  Weeks         1405,  1466,  1513, 

1522,  1565 

Jarechi  v.  Philharmonic  Society    1703 

Jarrell  v.  Jarrell  1205 

Jarrett  v.  Jarrett  49 

V.  Tomlinson  138 

xci 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Jarstadt  v.  INIorgan 
Jarvis  r.  Aikens 
c.  Davis 
r.  Dutelier 
Jaylor  i'.  .laques 


Jayne  i;.  Gregg 
Joan  r.  Wilson 


448,  450,  499 
1487 
585 
1369,  1417 
85 
1238 
1431,  1591 
Jefferis  v.  East  Omaha  Land  Co.  424, 

485,  492 
Jeffers  v.  Philo  1259 

Jefferson    Co.    Building    Asso.    v. 

Heil  1145,  1276,  1289,  1291 

JettVrsonville,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
bour 687 
JelTersonville,  M.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Oylcr             1518,  1568,  1569,  1573, 

1576 

Jeffery  v.  De  Vitre  233 

V.  Graham  624,  632,  638, 

657,  671,  718 

V.  Underwood  1063 

Jeffreys  y.  Callis  1143 

Jeffries  v.  Jeffries  735,  742,  764, 

771,  773 

Jeffryes  v.  Evans  893 

Jenkins  v.  Adams  1506 

V.  Adcock  1232 

V.  Fahey  1970 

V.  Hall  44 

V.  Harrison  1353 

V.  Hopkins  943,  957 

V.  Hurst  1071 

V.  Jenkins  2,  23,  27,  31, 

214,  217 

V.  Jones  969 

V.  Merritt  659,  6  78 

V.  Pye  99 

V.  Trager  356,  367 

V.  Wood  1915 

Jenks  /■.  Morgan  391 

V.  Pawlowski  671,  802 

V.  Quinn  924,  933,  968, 

971,976 

Jenner  v.  Jenner  249,  320 

Jenners  c.  Howard  74,  78 

Jfinmngs,  Ex  parte  490 

Jennings  r.  Biizeadine    327,  335,  336, 

337,  342 

V.  Brown  277 

V.  Dixey  1547 

V.  Dockham  1399,  1476 

V.  Jennings  1331 

V.  Moon  1835,  1858 

V.  O'Brien  625 

V.  Wood  1469,  1472 

Jerald  r.  Elly  849 

Jerome  v.  Ortman  1000,  1068 

xcii 


Jerry  r.  Townshend 

56 

Jesson  r.  Wright 

583 

Jessup  V.  Stone 

1434,  1591 

Jeter  v.  Davis 

1823,  1874 

V.  Glenn 

892,  931,  944 

Jett  r.  Rogi-rs 

1197 

Jewell  V.  Harding 

1061,  1068 

V.  Lee               773, 

774,  79(1,  814 

V.  Porter 

44 

('.  Warner 

155,  (113 

Jewett  V.  Berry 

715 

V.  Davis 

36,  1212 

V.  Hussey 

388 

r.  Keonholts 

1630 

V.  Palmer 

1527,  1528 

V.  Preston 

1217 

V.  Tucker 

1386 

Jillson  V.  Wilcox 

616 

Jinwright  v.  Nelson     1117,  1153,  1207 
Joannin  v.  Ogilvie  89 

Job  t:  Potton  1912 

Joeckel  v.  East  on  260 

Joest  V.  Williams  78 

John  i\  Conger  1376 

V.  Hatfield  1338 

V.  Sabattis  1940 

John  Van  Range  Co.  v.  Allen      1702, 

1741 

Johns  V.  Hardin  923,  925 

V.  Johns  1846,  1866 

V.  Reardon    1133,  1182,  1435 

V.   Scott      1109,  1442,  1468 

V.   Sewell  1529 

Johnson  r.  Anderson        448,  455,  461 

V.  Archibald  389 

V.  Arnold  467 

V.  Ashland  Lumber  Co.      337 

520,  521, 

V.  Badger  M.  &  M.  Co.    1159, 

1165,  1180,  1499 

V.  Baker  1310 

r.  Boy  field  1277 

V.  Branch  1303 

V.  Brown  366 

V.  Bryan  1212 

V.  Burden  1452,  14  74 

V.  Clark  1511,  1563 

r.  Collins  962,  967,  974 

V.  Cook  121,  140 

y.  Davis  1011 

V.  District  of  Columbia       409 

V.  Dodgson  1002,  1006 

V.  Edwards  1792 

V.  Elkins  167 

V.  Farley   1267,  1282,  1284, 

1289,  1449 

V.  Godden  1170 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Johnson  v.  Goodwin 

1940 

V.  Graves 

1390 

V.  Haines 

1143 

V.  Harrellson 

1906 

V.  Hart 

1790,  1797 

V.  Hines 

526 

V.  Hollensworth 

825,  828, 

852 

V.  Hoover 

1995 

V.  Hurst 

125 

V.  Jolinson 

616,  1970 

V.  Jones 

1085,  1087 

V.  Jordan 

1664 

V.  Jouchert 

42 

V.  Knapp 

874 

V.  Mcintosh 

470 

V.  Medlicott 

76 

V.  Moore 

1239, 

1342,  1350, 
1601 

V.  Mosher 

1668,  1706 

V.  Newman 

1526 

V.  Pelot 

1997 

V.  Phifer 

49,  76 

V.  Preston 

381,  437 

V.  Rayner 

536, 1651 

V.  Richardson 

1216 

V.  Robinson 

1406 

V.  Sandhoff 

1085 

V.  Scliumacher 

1937 

V.  Sepulveda 

1925,  1935 

V.  Simpson 

324,  326,  414  | 

V.   Stucrct 

1419 

,  1482,  1484 

V.  Stiliings 

40,  41 

V.  Taylor 

1182, 

1188,  1213, 
1215 

V.  Thompson  2G1 

V.  Tilden  1937 

V.  Timmons  253 

V.  Toulmin  1862,  1872 

V.  Turner  1098 

V.  Valido  Marble  Co.         1489 

V.  Vandervort  40 

V.  Van  Velsor        1196,  1197, 

1204,  1438,  1447 

V.  Walter  801 

V.  Walton      1178,  1435,  1446 

V.  Wilkinson  1605 

U.Williams     330,1396,  1397, 

1398 

V.  Wilson  1940 

V.Wiseman  1703,1714 

Johnson  Co.  v.  Wood  335 

Johnston  v.  Canby  li'.^d 

V.  Crawley  1051,  1072, 

1079 

V.  Furnier  158 

V.  Glancy  1563 


Johnston  v.  Jones     .  483 

V.  Markle  Paper  Co.         866 

1-.  Morrow  1721 

V.  Piper  828 

r.  Wallace  1187,1196, 

1198,  1205,  1207,  1447 

Johnstone  v.  Hall  823 

V.  Scott  429 

Johnstown    Iron    Co.  v.  Cambria 

Iron  Co.  53 S 

Jolland  V.  Stainbridge  1513 

Jolly  V.  Bryan  1874 

Jonas  V.  Flanniken  1839,  1846 

Jones,  Appeal  of  281 

Jones,  In  re  199  7 

Jones  V.  Andrews  383,  439 

V.  Bach  1177 

t?.  Bamford        1522,  1532,  1534 

V.  Berkshire  1442 

V.  Bland  918 

V.  Bone  1768 

V.  Boston  872 

V.  Bramblet     676,  677,  698,  699 

V.  Buck  326 

V.  Bull     1668,  1672,  1673,1718 

V.  Bunker  341 

V.  Burgett  383 

V.  Bush  1289 

r.  Butler  11,24 

V.  Cable  1782,  1785 

v.  Cannon  308 

V.  Carter  1041 

V.  Chamberlin  1375 

V.  Chandler       1792,  1794,  1803 

V.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co. 

619,  620,  674,  677 
V.  Clifton  45,  288 

V.  Cohen  1919 

V.  Costigan  1762 

V.  Crawford  1060 

V.  Crowley         1339,  1345,  1348 
t'.  Davis  1846 

V.  Dean  380 

V.  De  Lassus  503,  523,  532 

V.  Detroit  Chair  Co.  17G8 

V.  Evans  59,  60 

V.  Felch  1930 

V.  Flint  1600,  1601,  1620, 

1627 
V.  Gibbons  1421 

V.    Guaranty  &   Indemnity 

Co.  149,  150 

V.  Gurlie  1005 

V.  Habersham  175,179 

r.  Ilagler  1086 

17.  Harrader  1917 

V.  Hough  1105 

xciii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


es  r.  IIou2;bton 

87 

r.  Hudson 

1531 

r.  lliii^lios 

49 

V.  Johnston 

429,  483 

r.  Jones  27,  48,  98,  104,  922, 
924,  1217,  1234,  1324 
c.  Kimble  437,  445 

V.  Laphani  1520 

V.  Lewis  1141,  1190 

V.  Loveless  1217,  1230,  1233, 
1234,  1236,  1254,  1271, 

1289,  1297,  1309 
V.  McNarrin  1560 

r.  Marks  1563 

V.  Martin  472,  1073,  1148, 

1440 
V.  Massey  1892 

V.  Merrill  1846 

V.  Morris  225,  244,  1063 

V.  Motley  400,  520 

V.  Napier  1966 

V.  Neale  244 

V.  Obenchain  44 

V.  Parker  488,  495,  498,  1409, 
1414,  1415 
V.  Pashby  324,  340,  352,  359, 
366,  405,  410,  412,  414 
V.  Paul  987 

V.  Pettibone  480,  485 

V.  Pbelps  1494,  1496,  1588 

V.  Phoenix  Bank  25 

V.  Porter  1125,  1127 

V.  Potter  1792 

V.  Poundstone  390,  436 

V.  Powers  1458 

V.  Ramsey  1668 

V.  Reeves  1940 

V.  Richmond  903,  915,  939 

V.  Robbins  1092 

V.  Robinson  285,  1390,  1393 

V.  Rogers  81 

V.  St.  Louis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  723 
V.  Shaddock  1508 

V.  Shaw  1303 

V.  Shepley  336 

V.Smith"  325,364,410,411, 
1424,  1517,  1520,  1544, 
1545,  1554,  1565, 1583 
V.  Soulard  480,  485,  486 

V.  Stanton  1835,  1836 

V.  Swayze  1220,  1224,  122.5, 

1280,  1282,  1307 
V.  Swearingen  575,  591 

V.  Tainter  1414 

V.  Thomas  1628 

V.  Thompson  48,  49 

V.  Timmons  1611,  1624 

xciv 


Jones  u.  Wagner  1596 
r.  Walker               674,  677,  1936 

V.  Warner  928 

r.  Weathersbee  1919 

V.  Webster  Woollen  Co.         413 

V.  Wbitbread  218 
r.  Williams          716,  1522,  1546 

Jooss  V.  Fey     1792,  1795,  1801,  1802, 

1803 

Jordan  v.  Corey  1185,  1209 

V.  Davis  1221,  1226 

V.  Deaton  366 

V.  Elliott  82,  88 

V.  Eve  881,  885 

V,  Farnsworth  1448 

V.  Kraft  799 

V.  McNeil  1335,  1389 

V.  Mead  1499 

V.  Neece  582 

V.  Pollock  1259,  1303 

V.  Roach  155,  613 

V.  Soule  1830,  1899 

V.  Stewart        1361,  1365,  1367 

V.  Surghnor  1871,  1919 

V.  White  44,  295 

Joseph  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Doggett        1529 

Josephthal  r.  Heyman  1532 

V.  Steffen  1532 

Joslyn  V.  Parlin  646,  693 

Jost  V.  Jost  165 

Jourdan  r.  Jourdan  1182,1185, 

1187,  1204,  1207,  1447 

V.  Patterson  1294 

Journeay  i'.  Gibson  1215,  1443 

Joyce  V.  Williams  366 

Judd  V.  Anderson  339 

V.  Randall  845 

V.  Seekins  1450 

V.  Woodruff  1472 

Judevine  v.  Goodrich  559 

Judge  of  Probate  v.  Stone  63 

Judson  V.  Porter  1213 

V.  Sierra  1026 

June  V.  Purcell  480 

V.  Willis  104 

Justice  V.  Eddings  121,  140 

Juvenal  v.  Jackson  1292,  1528 


Kain  v.  Fisher 
V.  Miller 
Kaine  v.  Denniston 
Kaiser  v.  Earhart 


1618 
1071 
1547 
1487 


I'.  Lembeck      1409,  1412,  1414 

Kalbfleisch  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.      381 

Kampmiinn  v.  Heintz  360 

Kane  /'.  Mackin  1288 

V.  Railroad  Co.  471 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Kane  v.  Sanger 
Kanne  v.  Otty 
Kanouse  v.  Slockbower 


939 

338 

328,  480, 

484,  496,  501 

Kansas  City  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  Jo. 

R.  Co.  "      1041,  1049,  1080,  1081, 

1082,  1117 

Kansas  City  Land  Co.  v.  Hill         1547 

Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dunmej'er 

913,  927 
Kansas  Valley  Bank  v.  Rowell  174 
Karchner  v.  Hoy      562,  564,  56  7,  623 


Karmuller  v.  Krotz 

551 

Karr  v.  Burns 

1562 

Kauffman  v.  Robey 

1534 

Kaufman  v.  Ehrlech 

1232 

V.  Schoeffel 

1797 

Kavanagh  v.  Day 

1185,  1197 

Kea  V.  Robeson 

323,  343 

Kean  v.  Connelly 

1853, 1887 

Keane  v.  Boycott 

2 

V.  Smallbone 

1342 

Kearnes  v.  Hill 

1862,  1879,  1919 

Kearney  v.  Macomb 

575,  593 

Kearsing  v.  Kilian 

1259 

Keates  i-.  Lyon        7 

72, 

773,  774,  777, 
780.  781,  798 

Keating   Tmnlement 

& 

M.  Co.  V. 

]\Inrsball  Electric  Light  Co.       16  72, 

1723 

Keaton  v.  Terry 

1994 

Keator  v.  Dimmick 

1226 

Keay  v.  Goodwin 

1876,  1922 

Keech  v.  Enriquez 

1435,  1442 

Keegan  v.  Cox 

14 

Keeler  v.  Keeler 

1681,  1712,  1714, 

1717, 

17 

26,  1732, 1733 

r.  Ullrich 

288 

V.  Wood 

531 

555,  969,  984 

Keeling  v.  Hoyt 

1109,  1173 

Keen  i:  Coleman 

5 

V.  Monroe 

1342,  1345 

Keenan  v.  Cavanaug 

h 

381 

Keener  v.  Keener 

274 

Keening  v.  Ayling 

750,  763,  764 

Keesey  v.  Old 

944 

Keil  V.  Healey 

2 

Keith  V.  Briggs 

295 

»,'.  Day 

939,  969 

V.  Reynolds 

326,  420 

r.  Siibcrberg 

1196,  1207 

Keith  &  Perry  Coal  Co. 

V.  Bingham 

238,  1-199 

Keizer  v.  Beemer 

339 

Kellam  v.  Kellam 

726 

Kellar  v.  Stanley 

1559 

Keller  v.  Ashford 

859 

Keller  v.  Auble  1835,  1836,  1921 

V.  Moore  1138,  1153,  1154, 

1161 

V.  Nutz  1482 

Kelleran  i:  Brown  1060 

Kelley  v.  Bourne  223,  241,  244 

V.  Divver  1108 

V.  Jenness  993 

V.  Stanbery  '    1511,  1563 

Kellog  V.  Piatt  903,  919,  927 

Kellogg  V.  Frazier  1555 

V.  Ingersoll  881,  882 

V.  Malin       844,  882,  931,  958 

V.  Mullen  381,  388 

V.  Robinson  64  7,  785,  798 

V.  Smith      338,  358,  364,  1427 

Kellum  V.  Berkshire  L.  Ins.  Co.      868 

Kelly  I'.  Allen  955 

V.  Austin  1668,  1714,  1745, 

1767 

V.   Calhoun    1117,  1118,  1159, 

1162,  1165,  1178 

V.  Dunlap  1111 

V.  Dutch  Church  893,  924, 

957,  968 

V.  Hill  526,  563 

V.  Low  974 

V.  Mills  1404,  1406,  1408 

I'.  Palmer  901 

V.  Riley  898 

V.  Rosenstock  1165,  1167, 

1433,  1442 

V.  Smith  99,  101 

V.  Wagner  1259 

V.  West  Seattle  Land  Co.      451 

Kelsey  v.  Dunlap  1446 

V.  National  Bank  1054 

V.  Remer  962,  974 

Kemp  w.  Porter  1123 

V.  Sober  805,  823 

t'.  Walker  1300 

Kemper  v.  Campbell  1381,  1466, 

1501 

V.  Hughes  1146 

Kempson  v.  Ashbee  99 

Kendall  v.  Hathaway  1675 

V.  Kendall  1346,  1350 

V.  Lawrence  2,  11,  1568 

V.  Miller  1185 

Kendrick  v.  Latham  1191 

V.  Neisz  2 

Kennard  v.  Mabry  1403,  1462 

Kennebec,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Portland, 

&c.  Co.  145 

Kennebec  Purchase  v.  Tiffany       382, 

386,  424 
Kenneday  v.  Price  1185,  1187 

XCV 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Kennedy  r.  Raker  2!) 

■    r.  Bovkiii       398,  1468,  insu 

r.  CuVrie  91) 

V.  Green  152-2,  1533, 

1538,  1539,  1544,  1583 

I'.  Harden  1458 

r.  Lubold  378 

V.  AFCartney  990 

V.  Marrast  55 

V.  Moore  1348 

V.  Northup  1383,  1385, 

1394 

V.  Owen  742,  798 

V.  Seovil  550,  1912 

I'.  Ten  Broeck  112 

Kennemore  v.  Kennemore  1940, 

1947 
Kenner  v.  American  Contract  Co. 

()99,  704,  705,  708,  715 

Kenney  r.  Norton  928 

V.  Phillipy  295 

r.  Wallace  650 

Kennison  r.  Tavlor  981,  984 

Kennon  v.  Wright  1889 

Kent  V.  Cecil  1239 

V.  Taylor  490,  493 

V.Welch  96  7 

Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Kenney     785 

Kentucky  Seminary  v.  Wallace        239 

Kenworthy  v.  Tullis  562 

Kenyon  v.  Segar  1092 

Keohane  r.  Smith  1584 

Keokuk  &  H.  Bridge  Co.  v.  People 

48:; 
Kepler  r.  Erie  Dime  Sav.  &  L.  Co. 

1541 

Keppell  r.  Bailey        737,  787,  793,  942 

Kerfoot  v.  Cronin         1371,  1386,  1482 

Kerlicks  v.  Keystone  Land  Co.        321 

Kerlin  v.  Campbell  650 

Kern  v.  Hazelrigg  1559 

Kerngood  v.  Davis  825 

Kerns  v.  Swope  1435,  1442,  1513 

Kerr  v.  Bell  31 

V.  Birnie  292,  310 

V.  Day        1563,  1564,  1566,  1570 

V.  Dougherty  1X9 

V.  Freeman  209.  1394 

V.  Hill  1620,  1628 

V.  Hitt  354,  358 

V.  Kerr  573 

V.  Kingsbury  1768 

V.  Kitciien  1547 

V.  Lunnsford  49 

V.  Russell  1019,  1128,  1182, 

1196,1197,1198,  1199,  1205, 

1206,  1207,  1447 

xcvi 


Kerr  r.  Shaw 
Kerwin,  Ex  parte 
Kesner  v.  Trigg 
Kessinger  c.  Kessinger 
Kessler  v.  State 
Ketcham  v.  Brooks 
Ketchin  v.  Patrick 
Ketch um  v.  Barber 
V.  Evertson 
V.  Walsworth 


901,  917 

1331 

174,  13S9 

116 

14.">1 

1108 

1961,  1973 

244,  1871 

828 

1792,  1800 


Kettle   River  R.    Co.   v.    Eastern 
Ry.  Co.  779,  780,  785,  787,  788, 

793 
Keve  V.  Paxton  1670,  1717 

Key  V.  Davis  54,  64 

V.  Snow  140 

V.  Vattier  120 

Keyes  v.  Bump  1555 

Keys  V.  Test  1527,  1563 

Keyser  V.  Evans  1875,  1877 

Kickland    v.    Menasha    Wooden 

Ware  Co.  295,  296,  303 

Kidd  V.  Venable  8 

Kidder  I'.  Bork  903,  927 

V.  Rixford  1898 

r.  Stevens  1248 

Kier  v.  Peterson  1597 

Kilbee  v.  Myrick  64 

Kilbourn  V.  Fury  1185,1213 

Kilcrease  v.  Lum  1527 

Kiley  v.  For  see  1054 

Kilfoy  V.  Powers  163 

Kilgore  v.  Jordan  6,  10,  27 

V.  Powers  1070 

Kille  V.  Ege  1288,  1448 

Killian  v.  Andrews  1591 

Killmer  v.  Wuchner  1906,  1982, 

1997 

Killmore  v.  Howlett  1606 

Kilpatrick  v.  IMayor         624,  632,  635, 

641,  649,  650 

Kimball  v.  Blaisdell  892,  1487 

V.  Bryant  928,  929,  943, 

946,  953,  974 

V.  Cuddy  48,101 

V.  Eaton  1009,  1012 

V.  Fenner  303,  310 

V.  Grand  Lodge         893,  1706 

V.  Greig  1259 

r.  Johnson  1127,1444 

V.  Kenosha  448,  452,  468 

V.  Sattley  1618 

V.  Schoff  486 

in  Semple  894,896,1177, 

1178 

V.  Sumner       1925,  1926,  1931 

V.  Walker  302,  303,  309 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Kimball  v.  Withington  50o 

Kimble  c  Esworthy  1409 

Kimbrell  v.  Rogers  3ol 

Kime  i;.  Brooks  1014,1017 

Kimmarle  v.  Houston  &  T.  C  Ry. 

Co.  -1109 

Kincaid  v.  Brittain  943,  954 

V.  Dormey  368,  369 

V.  Howe  221 

V.  McGowan  537,  538 

V.  Meadows  130 

Kinealy  v.  St.  Louis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.     1 75 

King  y.  Bangs  1^62 

°  V.  Bill  1559 

V.  Bishop  530 

y.  Brio-ham  368,374,381, 

389 

V.  Bullock  1937 

V.  Burchell  669 

V.  Carmichael  1866,  1878, 

1879 

V.  Crocheron  1259 

V.  Cummings  49 

V.  Fink  327,  337 

V.  Fraser  1464 

V.  Gilson         928,  943,  946,  953, 
954,  956,  990 
V.  Haley  1525 

V.  Jones  929 

j;   Kerr  924,  936,  968 

V.  Kilbride  858,  860 

V.  King  484,  489 

V.  Little  322 

V.  Loncrnor  1009,  1012,  1014 

,;.  McCully  1482,  1484 

V.  McVickar  1489 

V.  Mayor  1657 

V.  Merk  919,  921 

V.  Mitchell  364 

V.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  388, 

467,  553 
r.  Parker  593 

V.  Paulk  1406,  1408 

V.  Portis  1406,  1458,  1501 

V.  Pyle  968 

V.  Rea  602,  609,  614 

V.  Rowan  1836,  1840,  1850 

V.  Sears  120 

V.  Smith  470 

V.  Wells  521 

V.  AVight  793,  799 

r.  Wilcomb  1613 

V.  Young  476 

King's  Chapel  r.  Pelham  723 

Kind's    County  Fire   Ins.    Co.   v. 

Stevens  454,  462,  463 

Kincrdon  v.  Nottle  929 


Kingman  v.  Perkins  H 

Kino-sbury  v.  Burnside         1267,  1276, 

1289,  1292,  1301 


V.  Milner 
Kingsland  v.  Chittenden 
Kingsley  v.  Hillside 
V.  Holbrook 

V.  McFarland 
Kingston  v.  Pickins 

Kinnaman  v.  Pyle 
Kinnear  v.  Lowell 
Kinnebrew  v.  Kinnebrew 


Kinney  v.  Dexter 

V.  Farnsworth 
i\  ]\Iathews 
V.  Miller 
V.  Shelby  ville 
V.  Slattery 


V.  Watts 
Kinsey  v.  Bailey 

V.  Satterthwaite 
Kinsley  v.  Abbott 
Kinsman  v.  Kinsman 

V.  Loomis 
Kip  V.  Norton 
Kipp  V.  Merselis 
Kirch  V.  Davies 
Kircher  v.  Schalk 
Kirchline  r.  Kirchline 
Kirchman  v.  Lapp 
Kirk  r.  Furgerson 
V.  King 
V.  Kirk 
Kirkaldie  v.  Larrabee 
Kirkendall  v.  Mitchell 
Kirkland  v.  Cox 
V.  Way 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Caldwell 
V.  Peshine 


968 
391,  488 
538 
1086,  1600, 
1603,  1627 
1695, 1696 
326,  335,  337, 
338,  339,  342 
42 
855  . 
279,  292, 
295,  1230 
40,  44 
380 
233,  580 
1553 
704 
1862,  1878,1879, 
1880 
970,  981 
1737,  1740 
326,  358 
1824 
1619 
256,  1129 
354,  358,  364 
1489 
335,  1690 
1760 


1111 

1703 

613 

629,  649 

650 

1487 

825 

593 

400 

1380,  1381 

780,  781, 

784 

t'.  Ward  1499 

V.  Yates  Ice  Co.  496, 

497 

Kirk  wood  v.  Domnau  1801 

Kirsch  V.  Tozier  1550 

Kiser  v.  Heuston  1451,  1472 

Kister  v.  Reeser         503,  504,  505,  548 

1668,  17-21, 

1744 

1551 

29.  30 

1855,  1894 

97 


Kisterbock  v.  Lanning 

Kitchell  V.  Mudgett 
Kitchen  V.  Lee 
Kites  r.  Church 
Kithcart  v.  Larimore 

xcvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


KittoU  r.  .TiMisson 

341 

Knoiiir  ('.  Thomj^son 

1547 

Kitteritiiio  r.  Cha[)man 

1527,  1528 

Knowlden  v.  Li'a\'itt 

595 

Kittle  i\  PtVilY.T 

449,  450 

Knowles  i\  Harris 

1890 

c.  St.  John 

1087 

V.  Kennedy 

954,  956 

V.  Van  Dyck 

1409 

V.  ]\k'Cauiley 

1196,  1212 

Kittredge  r.  Proprietors 

1878,  1879, 

V.  Torbitt 

323,  337 

1880 

Knowlson  v.  Fleming 

526 

r.  Woods      1612 

, 1621,  1708 

Knowlton  V.  Smith 

367 

Kleeb  r.  Bard 

1359 

V.  Walker 

1462,  1466 

Kleppner  v.  Laverty 

602 

Knox  V.  Flack 

4 

Kline  v.  Bvebc                   2, 

27,  31,  158 

V.  Haralson 

1600 

V.  Jacobs 

1887,  189S 

V.  Haug 

52 

V.  Ragland 

1792 

V.  Hunt 

285 

V.  Raymond 

1342 

V.  Jenks 

127,  128 

Klingensniitli  v.  Ground 

490,  491 

V.  McFarren 

1392 

Klinger  r.  Leniler 

1529 

V.  Pickering 

4  79 

Kloess  V.  Katt              1667, 

1669,  1721 

V.  Silloway 

1531 

Klohs  V.  Klobs 

52,  53,  77 

V.  Singmaster 

108 

Klopp  V.  Moore 

830 

Knox  Co.  ('.  Brown 

1437,  1547 

Klose  V.  Hillenbrand 

99,  115 

Knudsen  v.  Oraanson 

492 

Kluse  V.  Sparks            1619, 

1620,  1624 

Koch  V.  Roth 

1515 

Knadler  v.  Sharp 

891,  974 

Koconrck  v.  Marak          84 

,  1196,  1198 

Knaggs  V.  Green 

31 

Koehler  v.  Black  River  Falls  Iron 

V.  Mastia 

1335 

Co. 

1082,  1083 

Knapp  V.  Bailey         1395, 

1510,  1511, 

V.  Wilson 

88 

1512 

1544,  1563 

Koelle  V.  Knecht 

548 

V.  Hall 

744,  746 

Koenig  v.  Branson 

896 

i^  Hyde 

85,  86 

Koenigheim  v.  Miles 

518 

V.  Jones 

1419 

V.  Sherwood 

365 

V.  Maltby 

1331 

Koenigs  v.  Jung 

431 

V.  Smith 

1026 

Koepsel  ?'.  Allen 

339 

i;.  Woolverton 

503 

Koerper  v.  St.  Paul  &  N. 

P.  Ry. 

Kneeland  v.  Van  Valkenburgh       449, 

Co. 

1458 

461,  463 

Koevenig  r.  Schmitz 

1496,  1587 

Knell  V.  Green  St.  Buildin 

g  Asso. 

Kohler  i\  Kleppinger 

448 

1402, 

1403,  1404 

V.  Wells,  &c.  Co. 

87,  89 

Knepper  v.  Kurtz 

914,  921 

Kohn  (;.  McHatton 

1372 

Knight  V.  Alabama  Mid.  Ry.  Co.     690 

Koke  V.  Balken 

1836 

V.  Bowyer 

1566,  1570 

Koltenbrock  r.  Cracraft 

1212 

V.  Cole 

249 

Konrad  r.  Zimmerman 

99,  115 

V.  Coleman 

369 

Koon  V.  Tramel             285, 

1390,  139.3, 

V.  Crockford 

1002 

1575,  1578 

V.  Elliott 

437 

Kopp  V.  Gunther 

98 

r.  Indiana  Coal  Co 

537,  538 

Korbe  v.  Barbour 

1698 

V.  Leary 

1109,  1153 

Kortz  V.  Carpenter 

915 

V.  Mains 

528 

Kostendader  v.  Pierce 

944 

V.  Thayer 

990,  1487 

Kountz  V.  Davis 

24 

V.  U.  S.  Land  Asso 

.     471,472, 

Kramer  v.  Carter              903,  905,  906, 

473 

907 

J'.  Wilder 

480,  488 

V.  Goodlander 

3  76,  738 

Knighton  v.  Smith 

11. ->5 

Kranert  l\  Simons 

1391 

Knolls  V.  Bariihart 

1223,  1292. 

Kraut  V.  Crawford             485,  491,  492 

1294,  1844,  1835, 

1836,  1837, 

Krebaum  v.  Cordell 

1289,  1301 

1921 

Krehl  ;;.  Burrell 

823 

Knopf  V.  Hansen          1302, 

1314,  1327 

Kreuger  r.  Walker 

1173 

Knott  V.  Jefferson  St.  Fen 

y  Co.      460 

Kribl)s  r.  Alford 

1734 

Knotts  V.  Hydrick           548,559,1611 

Krider  v.  La£ferty 

1568,  1573 

XCviii 

TABLE   OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Krider  v.  Milner 
Krieger  r.  Crocker 
Kroiienberger  v.  Hoffner 

Krouskop  V.  Shontz 
Krueger  c.  Walker 
Kriiuibhaar  v.  Griffiths 
Kruse  V.  Wilson 
Kuechler  v.  Wilson 
Kuhn  V.  Farnsworth 

V.  Freeman 
Kuhns  V.  Fennell 
Knhtman,  Ex  parte 
Kill!  V.  KuU 
Kumler  c.  Ferguson 
Kurtz  V.  Hibner 
Kutz  V.  McCune 
Kuykendall  r.  McDonald 
Kyle  V.  Kavanagh 

V.  McKenzie 

V.  Perdue 

V.  Roberts 

V.  Rhodes 

V.  Thompson 

V.  Ward 


354,  368,  369 

1182,  1185 

340,  381, 

432 

1340 

1216;  1563 

107 

326 

433,  434,  440 

457,  542 

912 

364 

1229 

163,  165 

303,  1014 

1981,  1997 

884,  885 

275 

828,  1394 

838 

1232 

245 

323,  331 

482,  1483 

1517 


Labadie  v. 
Laberee  v. 


Hewitt  1954 

Carleton         266,  627,  632, 
633,  641,  643,  654,  678 
La  Bourgeoise  v.  McNamara  1195 

Lacassagne  v.  Chapuis  1559 

Lacedotte  v.  Duralde  1480 

Lacey.  Ex  parte  162 

Lacey  V.  Davis  1846 

V.  Marnan  949 

Lackey  v.  Lubke  254 

Lacustrine  Fer.  Co.  v.  Lake  Guano 

&  F.  Co.  1529 

Lacy  I'.  Overton  1940 

Pixler         6,  24,  25,  26,  31,  33 
771.  779,  795 
1423, 1424 
882,  930,  937 
491 

Ladies'   Friend    Society   v.    Hal- 
stead  391,  475,  476,  479,  488 
Ladue,  Matter  of  448,  449,  454 
La  Farge  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell       1499, 

1543 
Lnfavour  v.  Homan  1872 

Lafavette   Building,  &c.   Asso.  v. 

Erb  1410 

Lafferty  v.  Milligan  852,  872 

Laflin  v.  Griffiths         1667,  1721,  1762, 

1764 
La  From  hois  v.  Jackson  1866 

Lagger  i-.  Mut.  Union  L.  Asso.         1907 


Ladd  V.  Boston 

V.  Campbell 
V.  Xoyes 
V.  Osborne 


Lagoria  v.  Dozier 

Lagow  V.  Glover 

Lahr's  Appeal 

Laidley  v.  Aikin 
V.  Knight 
V.  Land  Co. 

Laird  v.  Scott 

Lake  v.  Doud 
V.  Gray 
V.  Jarrett 
v.  Shumate 

Lake  Erie  &  W.  R. 


Co. 


Lee 
Priest 


R.  Co. 


1875 

361 

1403 

1409,  1414 

1188 

1187,  1188 

1182 

1478 

271 

1955 

1489 

958 

742 

785,816 

Zie- 

653,  708 

885 

1436, 1472 

492 

960 

1415,  1497 

1788 

844,  882,910,  939, 

1934 

6  74 

1509,  1511,  1563 

322 

485,  488,  490 

.•)05 

894 

1067 

1919 

921,  948,  968, 

982 

V.  Newman  1513,  1524 

Lamberton  ;;.  Merchants'  Bank      1406 

Lambertville  Nat.  Bank  v.  Boss 

1402,  1403 
Lamm  v.  Railway  Co.  448 

Lammers  v.  Nissen  485,  492 

Lamont  v.  Cheshire  1561 

V.  Stimson  1513 

L'Amoureaux  r.  Crosby  53 

Lamoreux  v.  Huntley  1563 

L'Amoureux  c.  Vandenburgh         1581 
Lampe  i'.  Kennedy  1380 

Lampman  v.  Milks       1644,  1650,  1655 
Lamprey  v.  State     481,  482,  484,  492, 

496 
Lamy  v.  Burr  1031 

Lancaster  v.  Amsterdam  Imp.  Co. 

181,183,  192 

V.  Ayers  385 

V.  Blaney  1220, 1233,  1242, 

1243,  1267,  1269,  1270, 

1276 

V.  Du  Hadway  1989 

xcix 


Lake  Erie  &  W. 
barth 

Lallande  v.  Wentz 

Lally  V.  Holland 
V.  Rossman 

Lamb  v.  Buker 
I'.  Cannon 
V.  Clark 
V.  Danforth 


V.  Miller 

V.  Pierce 

V.  Reaston 

V.  Ricketts 

V.  Tucker 

V.  Wakefield 
Lambden  v.  Sharp 
Lambert  v.  Blumenthal 
V.  Estes 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Land  r.  Coffmnn  1  7'") 

r.  Sniitli  1955 

Land  Asso.  r.  Scholler  245 

Land  Co.  v.  Hill  1547 

r.  Saunders        326,  381,  3s8 
Land  &  Kiver  Imp.  Co.  v.  Bardon 

1481 
Landa  v.  Obert  85,  8G,  87 

Landers  v.  Bolton       1109,  1110,  1195, 

l.")(i6 

Landes  v.  Brant  1563 

Landon  v.   Brown         1307,  1320 

Landt  V.  Major  .S49 

Lane  r.  Collier  1415 

V.  Craddock  19(>4 

V.  Davis  1585 

V.  Dobyns  192r) 

V.  Dolick  316,  1194 

V.  Ducliac  1451 

r.  Fnry  929,  974,  984,  986 

V.  Hitchcock  17G1 

V.  King  1628,  1630,  1632 

V.  Lane  660 

V.  Logue  285,  1392 

V.  Newdigate  821 

V.  Nickerson  1495 

V.  Richardson  962,  967 

V.  Taylor  1898 

V.  Thompson  324,326,  416 

V.  Utz  602,  605,  609 

V.  Woodruff  935 

Langr.  Smith  1217,  1233,  1267, 

1269, 1273 

V.  Waring  1831 

V.  Whidden  12 

Langdon  v.  Buchanan  1668,  1712 

V.  Clayson  29,  30 

V.  Ingram  667 

V.  Mayor  471,  503,  543 

Langley  v.  Chapin  638,  694,  730 

Langmaid  v.  Reed  824 

Langton  v.  Marshall  1 189 

Lanham  v.  Wilson  584 

Lankin  v.  Terwilliger  1659 

Lanphere  y.  Lowe  1699 

Lansing  v.  Smith  471 

Lansing  L-on  &  Engine  Works  v. 

Walker  1(583,  1720 

Lanterman  v.  Williams  1942,  1945 

Lapeyre  v.  Paul  18(i6 

Lapham  r.  Norton       1693,  1696,  16!)8 
Lapish  /'.  Bangor  Bank  476,  484 

Lapowski  v.  Smith  1259 

Large's  Case  fjC2,  667 

Large  v.  Penn  3()8 

Larman  v.  Huey  1850,  1866,  1878 

Larson  v.  Cook  944 


Larwoll    r.   Hanover    Sav.  Fund 

Soc.  144 

Lash  V.  Edgerton  1491 

V.  Lash  1801 

La  Societe  Fran^aise  v.  Weidmann 

1831 
Lassell  r.  Reed  1708 

Lassitcr  v.  Davis  289,  291  j! 

Latham  t>.  Blakely  17181 

V.  McCann  903  " 

V.  Udell  112,  1234' 

Lathers  v.  Keogh  871 ' 

La  Tourette  v.  Decker  1862 

Lathrop  v.  Blake  1731 

V.  Commercial  Bank   169,  170 
Lauchner  v.  Rex  1619,  1624 

Landman  v.  Ingram  861 

Laughlin  v.  Calumet,  &c.  Dock  Co. 

1292 

V.  Fream       1004,  1185,  1190 

V.  Hibben  56 

V.  Tips  1396,  1436 

Laughton  v.  Harden  289,  290 

Laurens  w.  Jenney  166,167 

Laval  V.  Staffel  662 

Lavalle  v.  Strobel  1942,  1947 

Lavender  v.  Holmes  1395 

Lavenson  v.  Standard  Soap  Co.     1668, 

1714,  1717,  1718,  1721 

Laverty  v.  Moore  358 

Lavery  v.  Purssell  1605 

Law  V.  Hempstead  324 

V.  Long  2,  3,  8,  17,  33 

V.  Patterson         1865,  1872,  1880 

Lawe  V.  Hyde  632,  650 

Lawless  v.  Collier  943,  946,  962 

Lawrence  v.  Ballon  404 

V.  Clark  1390 

V.  Conklin  1559 

V.  Du  Bois  1578 

V.  Farley  1292 

V.  Fletcher  238 

V.  Fox  865 

V.  Kemp  1 703 

V.  McArter  4,  1023 

V.  McCalmont  307 

V.  Montgomery  890,  928 

V.  Owens  1392 

V.  Palmer  335 

V.  Senter  932 

V.  Singleton  660,  662 

V.  Smith  1600 

V.  Stratton  1262,  1510 

V.  Taylor  1021 

V.  Tennant  375,  376 

V.  Tucker  285 

V.  Webster  1921 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections, 


Lawson  v.  Cunningham  1866 

Lawton  v.  Bufkingham  295 

V.  Gordon  1455,  1513 

V.  Howe  968 

V.  Lawton  1666 

V.  Sager  1303,  1313 

Lay  V.  Mottraiii  262 

Layard  v.  Maud  1583 

Lay  ton  v.  New  York  Land  Co.        440 

Lazell  V.  Lazell  303 

Lea  V.  Polk  County  Copper  Co.     1563 

Leach  v.  Ansbacher  1565 

V.  Beattie  1482 

V.  Hall  1856,  1878 

V.  Leach  646,  729 

V.  Noyes  39 

V.  Leacox  v.  Griffith  31 

Leake  v.  Hayes  1902,  1906,  1991, 

1997 

V.  Watson  602 

Learned  v.  Cutler  319 

V.  Riley  1127,  1129 

V.  Tritch  1508 

Leas  V.  Garverich  1517 

Leasure  v.  Uniop  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co. 

186,  187,  190 

Leaver  v.  Gauss  527,  1230,  1233 

Leavitt  v.  Files  68 

V.  Lamprey  316,  319 

V.  Towle  542 

Leazure  v.  Hillegas  173,  175,  ISO, 

190 
Lebanon  Sav.  Bank  v.  Hollenbeck 

183,  186,  1380 
Le  Barron  v.  Babcock  1887,  1889 

Le  Bourgeoise  v.  Blank         1942,  1947 
Leckey  v.  Cunningham  77 

Le  Clert  v.  Oullahan  1402 

Lecompte  v.  Lueders  364 

Lecoiiite  v.  Toudozue  366 

Leddy  v.  Enos  839,  852,  869,  893, 

906 

Ledger  Building  Asso.  v.  Cook      1447 

Ledyard  r.  Phillips  1628 

V.  Ten  Eyck  496,  497 

Lee  V.  Adkins  1071 

V.  Alexander  1338 

V.  Bermingham  1408,  1451, 

1472,  1480 

V.  Bumgardner  538,  1596 

V.  Cato  1529,  1531 

V.  Fox  1836,  1848,  1852 

V.  Lee  462 

r.  Munroe  -  1581 

V.  Newland  1363 

V.  Richmond  1223,  1252 

V.  Risdon  1613 


Lee  V.  Salinas  1559 

V.  Turner  1925,  1928 

Lee  Chuck  c.  Quan  Wo  Chong     1937 

Leebrick  r.  Stahle  1563 

Leech  v.  Bonsall  1420 

V.  Leech  1346 

V.  Schweder  823 

Lefavour  v.  Homan  1865 

Lefebvre  r.  Dutruit         84,  90,  92,  Uj, 

1447 

Leferve's  Appeal  1,541 

Lefferson  v.  Dallas  1571 

Leffingwell  v.  Elliott         962,  983,  986 

Le  Franc  v.  Richmond  353,  1060, 

1063,  1066,  1073 

Leftwich  v.  Neal        1159,  1190,  1U)5, 

1204,  1207,  l.>12 

Le  Gendre  v.  Byrnes  lOl 

V.  Goodridge     98,  109,  113 

Leger  v.  Doyle  1464 

Legg  V.  Leyman  86 

Leggate  v.  Clark  54 

Leggett  V.  Barrett  249 

V.  Bullock  1380,  1501 

V.  New  Jersey   M.  &   B, 

Co.  1082 

V.  N.  J.  Manuf.  Co.  1082 

Lego  r.  Medley  338,  402,  520 

Lehigh    Coal  &  N.  Co.  v.   Early 

6  71,  678,  699,  7U4,  705 

Lehman  r.  Godberry  1588 

c.  Taliassee  Manuf.  Co.      144 

Lehndorf  r.  Cope  155,  609,  613 

Leiby  v.  Wolf  1482,  1483,  1489 

Leicester  v.  Biggs  564 

Leifchild's  Case  297 

Leigh  V.  Dickeson  1S95 

Leighton  r.  Orr  116 

Leiman's  Estate  1556 

Leinenkugel  v.  Kehl  1085,  1087 

Leitch  V.  Little  1S57 

V.  Wells  1560 

Leland  v.  Garset  1694 

V.  Isenbeck  1396 

V.  Stone  861,  945,  951 

Lemacks  v.  Glover  610 

Lemay  v.  Johnson  1350 

Lembeck  v.  Andrews  498 

i\  Nye  4  96,  497 

Lemert,  hi  Re  14<»3 

Le  Mesnagcr  v.  Hamilton     1205,  1206 

Lemingtoii  v.  Stevens  1114 

Lcmmon  r.  Beeman  2,  33 

c.  Hartsook        363,  372,  375 

Lemon  v.  Graham  568,  575,  58  7, 

589 
r.  Jenkins  50 

ci 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Refereiioos  are  to  Sections. 


Lemon  v.  Kailwav  Co.  1 1'> 

V.  Staats  '  M-"''! 

Le  Neve  r.  he  Neve  14!»9,  1504 

L'Engle  r.  Reed  1111,  1183,  1191 

Leiiheart  r.  Ream  24 

Lenoir  c.  Valley  River  M.  Co.      1371, 

1937 

Lente  v.  Clark  346 

Leon  Land  Co.  /•.  Dunlap  1119 

Leonard  i'.  Adams  879 

r.  Bosworth  133 

V.  Burr  630 

V.  Clough  1700 

r.  Leonard  52 

V.  Smith  67  7 

V.  Stickney  1673,  1702 

I'.  White  1637 

Leonardson  v.  Hulin  49,  69 

Leonis  r.  Lazzarovich  1182 

Leppoc  r.  Nat.  Union  Bank  1288, 

1289,  1290,  1292 

Le  Roy  V.  Beard  1033 

V.  Piatt  1639,  1652 

Leroy  v.  Jamison  1229 

Le  Saulnier  v.  Loew  1234,  1235, 

12  74 

Lesley  v.  Johnson  1521 

Leslie  v.  Hinson  1451 

V.  Merrick  1009,  1012 

Lessly  r.  Bowie        867,  892,  953,  955, 

967 

Lester  r.  Frazer  1 1 

V.  Georgia,  &c.  Ry.  Co.         690 

Letcher  v.  Bates  1338 

Letson  i'.  Reed  1524 

Lett  V.  Brown  955 

Levengood  v.  Bailey  1309 

Levering  v.  Mayor  1082 

Levi  V.  Karrick  1908 

Levinz  v.  Will  1380 

Levy  V.  Cox  121,  128 

V.  Maddux  358,  359,  366 

V.  Mentz  1372 

V.  Yerga  364 

Lewars  i\  Weaver  1447 

Lewis'  Appeal  1803 

Lewis,  In  re  1801 

Lewis  i\  Baird  1108,  1376,  1435, 

1458 
V.  Bannister  94 

V.  Beattie  453 

r.  Cole  1526 

r.  Cook  933 

V.  Coxe  1028 

V.  Curry  1125 

V-  Day  305 

V.  Harris  974 

cii 


i  Lewis  r.  Hinman  1451,  1472 

V.  Johnson  1529 

('.  Jones  1  708 

r.  Keeling  471 

r.  Kirk  1420 

r.  Lewis  381,  389,  944 

V.  Oakley  381 

V.  Overby  1068,  1069, 

1070,  1071 

V.  Pavn  1338,  1346,  134f> 

V.  Phillips  1527,  1528 

V.  Prather  1318,  13-25 

V.  Roper  Lumber  Co.  501 

V.  Sellick  1981 

V.  Terrell  1396,  1881 

V.  Ward  1846 

V.  Waters  37 

V.  Watson  1014,  1248.  1292 

Liberty  v.  Burns  341,  437 

Lick  V.  O'Donnell  346,  404 

Lickmon  v.  Harding  1196,  1197, 

1198,  1204,  1206 

Liddon  V.  Hartwell  364 

Liddy  v.  Kennedy  715 

Liebraiid  v.  Otto  730 

Liford's  Case  1702 

Lighthall  v.  Moore  79,  84 

Lignoski  v.  Crooker  1451,  1472 

Likins  v.  Likins  101 

Liies  V.  Ratehford  331 

Lillard  v.  Ruckers  223 

Lillianskyoldt  v.  Goss  1862 

Lillibridge  v.   Lackawanna    Coal 

Co.  537,  1592 

Liilie  V.  Dunbar  KiOO 

V.  Hickman  125 

Lilly  V.  Menke  1966,  1986 

Lincoln  v.  Buckmaster  68 

t\  Davis  501 

V.  Edgecomb  384,  390 

V.  McLaughlin  381 

V.  Purcell  1552 

V.  Shaw  449 

V.  Thompson  1145,  1172 

V.  Wilder  424 

V.  Wright  1578 

Lincoln  &  K.  Bank  v.  Drummond 

722 
Lincoln  Building  &   Saving  Asso. 

V.  Hass  14  79 

Lindauer  v.  Younglove  1547 

Lindley  v.  Dakin  868 

V.  Groff  1314,  1324,  1866 

V.  Kelley  1627 

V.  Martindale  1581 

V.  Smith  1136,  1178,1183, 

1194 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Lindsay  y.  Eastwood  869 

V.  Freeman  1396 

V.  Hoke  244 

V.  Jaffray  244 

V.  Lindsay     1220,  1224,  1267 
V.  Springer  354,  358 

V.  State  1069 

V.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co. 

1615 
Lindsey  r.  Lindsey      48,  49,  705,  708, 

730 

V.  Parker  986 

V.  Veasy  956 

Lindsley  v.  Lamb  1328 

Line  v.  Blizzard  84,  90 

Lineberger  v.  Tidwell  1152,  1184 

Link  V.  Page  1009,  1021 

Linker  v.  Benson  1872,  1873 

V.  Long  1261 

Linn  v.  Barkey  828 

V.  Patton  1185,  1195 

Linnartz  v.  McCulloch  404,  1942 

Linney  v.  Wood       337,  338,  359,  381, 

383 

Linscott  V.  Fernald  340 

Lin^ley  v.  Brown  1018,  1196 

Linthicmii  v.  Ray  1636 

Linton  v.  Allen  858,  894 

V.  Brown  1240,  1241,  1242, 

1247,  1288 

V.  Crosby  44 

Linzee  V.  Mixer       756,  757,  771,  773, 

814, 817 

Lipp  V.  Land  Syndicate  1563 

Lipscomb  r.  McClellan  310 

V.  Underwood  401 

Lipsky  V.  Borgmann  1694 

Lipse  V.  Spear  1547 

Lister  v.  Pickford  1637 

Litchfield  v.  Cudworth  1814 

V.  Ferguson  476,  4  79 

V.  Scituate         475,476,479 

Literary  Fund  v.  Clark  431 

Litligow  V.  Kavenagh  36 

Little  V.  Bishop  138 

V.  Dodge  1146,  1170,  1182, 

1190 

V.  Gibson  1248 

V.  Herndon  1359,  1363 

V.  Megfjuicr  13  71 

V.  Paddleford  829 

V.  Weatherford  1179 

V.  White  1097,  1101 

V.  Willfoid  1697 

Littlefield  v.  Mott  516,  528,  670, 

723 
V.  Pinkham  929 


Littleham  v.  St.  Leonards  1346 

Littlejohn  v.  Barnes  1872 

Littleton  v.  Giddings  1521,  1532 

Lively  v.  Rice  85& 

Liverpool  Wharf  ;;.  Prescott  36  7 

Livesey  v.  Brown  1466 

Livingston  r.  Hudson  1109 

V.  Kettelle  1159,  1446 

V.  Livingston  296 

V.  McDonald        1143,  1144 

V.  New  York  449,  450 

V.  Peru  Iron  Co.  123 

V.  Prose  us  140 

V.  Stickles  669,  731 

V.  Tompkins  731 

Llawelly  Ry.  Co.  v.  London  &  N. 

W.  Ry.  Co.  297 

Llewellyn  r.  Earl  of  Jersey      326,  398 

Lloyd  V.  Bennett  1309 

r.  Conover  1940 

V.  Fulton  289 

V.  Loudon,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  805 

V.  Lynch  307,  1836,  1846, 

1852 

V.  Quimby  968,  975 

V.  Taylor  36 

V.  Tomkies  893 

Loan  V.  Gregg  1703 

Lochte  V.  Austin  321,  326,  339 

Lockart  v.  Roberts  1328 

Locke  V.  White  896,  992 

Locker  v.  Riley  1556 

Lockwood  V.  Bassett  1328,  1337 

V.  Bates  285,  1560 

V.  Gilson  830 

V.  Lockwood  1703 

V.  New  York  &  N.  H. 

R.  Co.  4  72 

V.  Sturdevant  842,  846, 

928 

Lodge  V.  Barnett  364,  381 

V.  Hamilton  1797 

V.  Lee  326,  420 

V.  Patterson      1866,  1868,  1872 

Loftin  V.  Murchison  233 

Logan  V.  Gardner  2,  7,  25 

V.  Moulder  928,  930,  943, 

968,  970 

V.  Steele  1014,  1021 

V.  Williams  1165,  1215 

Logsdon  V.  Newton  1267,  1314 

Lomax  v.  Le  (irand  1515 

Lombard  v.  Culbertson  1451 

I'.  Morse  12 

Lomersou  v.  Johnston  88 

London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gar- 

nett  768 

ciii 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


London    &    S.    W.    Rv.     Co.    v. 

(ionun  737,  780,  781 

Loniion    &   Westminster  Loan    & 

Di-^count  Co.  1769 


London,  Chatham,  &c. 

R. 

Co.   V. 

Bnll 

782 

London  v.  Ixiggs 

534 

Long's  Appeal 

1967 

Long  V.  Barnes 

1792,  1802 

V.  Cockcrn 

1719,  1720 

V.  Colton 

375,  376 

V.  Crews 

1128,  1133 

V.  Crosson 

43 

V.  Dollarhide 

1482,  1942 

V.  Fewer 

542 

V.  Joplin,  M.  &  S. 

Co.            1073 

V.  Lanojsdale 

1563 

V.  Long 

391,  1071 

V.  McConnell 

625 

V.  Moler 

861,  869,  882 

V.  Neville 

1559 

V.  Ramsay           1068 

1069,  1071 

V.  Seavers 

1627 

V.  Sinclair 

944,  974 

V.  Stapp 

1880 

V.  AVeller 

1517 

V.  Williams 

17,  19 

V.  Woodman 

303 

Long  Beach  Land  Co.  v. 

Richard- 

son 

472 

Longbottom  v.  Berry 

1712,  1715, 
1749 

Longfellow  v.  Quimby 

1929 

Longoria  v.  Sliaeffer 

433 

Longstaff  v.  Meagoe 

1667,  1702 

Lonsdale  Co.  v.  Moies 

510 

Lookout  Bank  v.  Noe 

1407 

Loomis  V.  Bedel         914 

919,  920,  974 

V.  Brush 

44 

V.  Jackson 

326 

V.  Pingree 

1239 

V.  Riley 

1559,  1967 

V.  Spencer 

68 

Looncy  v.  Adamson 

1182 

Lord  V.  Doylo 

1529 

V.  Folmer 

1086,  1110 

V.  Sherman 

1029 

V.  Yonkers  Fuel  G 

as 

Co.         150 

Lord  Advocate  v.  Hamilton              4  70 

Loree  v.  Abner 

1121 

Lorick  v.  McCreery 

575,  587 

Lorillard  v.  Clyde  " 

865 

Loring  v.  Eliot 

601,  602,  603 

V.  Groomer 

1548 

V.  Otis 

449 

V.  Palmer 

594. 

Lorman  ;•.  Benson 

480,  484 

Los  Angeles  Cera.   Asso.  v.   Los 

Angeles  678 

Losey  v.  Bond  7,  14,  21 

V.  Simpson        1371,  1482,  1486, 

1487,  1506,  1527,  1528, 

1532,  1537,  1557,  ]5(;3, 

1571 

Lothrop  V.  Arnold        1925,  192.S,  1929 

('.  Foster  316,  319 

V.  Snell  892 

Lott  V.  Kaiser  1303 

V.  Wilson  1793 

Lotz  V.  Reading  Iron  Co.  448,  502 

Loubatt  i\  Kipp  1303,  1324 

Loud  ;,'.  Darling  119,  121,  125 

Loudon  r.  Blythe        1190,  1196,  1197, 

1198,  1199 

V.  Todd  1240 

Lough  r.  Machlin  463 

Loughridge  c.  Bowland        1407,  1513, 

1517,  1522,  1564 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Boykin 

1090 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Coving- 
ton 625,  691,  694,  1\\,  718 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Koelle  795 
Louisville  &  N,  R.  Co.  r.  Stephens  37 
Louisville,   New  Albany,  &c.  Ry. 

Co.  r.  Sparks  958 

Louisville,  New  Albany,  &c.  Ry. 

Co.  r.  Sumner  958 

Louisville,  St.  L.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  r. 

Neafus  296,  948 

Louk  V.  Woods  523 

Lounsbury  v.  Norton  1508,  1516 

Love  I'.  Bell  538 

V.  Breedlove  1575 

V.  Harbin  1101,  1344 

V.  Morrill  374 

V.  Sierra   Nev.,  L.  W.  &  M. 

Co.  1040,  1049 

V.  Smathers  1838 

V.  State  '         81 

V.  Taylor     285,  1185,  1192,  1392 

Lovejoy  v.  Gaskill  402 

V.  Lovett     3:^6,  334,  3'38,  364, 

410,413 

r.  Richardson  1014,  lOlS, 

1019 

V.  Tieljen  381 

Lovelace's  Case  1067 

Loveland  v.  Loveland  1234,  1248, 

1249 
Lovett  v.  Gillender  667 

V.   Steam    Sawmill     Asso. 

1082,  1117 
Lovingrston  ik  St.  Clair  485 


CIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


References  are  to  Sections, 


Low  r.  Holmes 

1967 

V.  Knowlton 

476 

??.  Muinford 

1925 

V.  Pratt 

1560 

V.  Settle 

521 

r.  Tibbetts 

448,  461,  490 

Lowber  r.  Kelly 

133 

Lowd  V.  Brigham 

1228 

Lowell  V.  Robinson 

490,  495 

r.  Wren 

1205.  1447 

Lowell  Inst.  Sav.  v  Lowell       796,  798 

Lowenberg  w.  Bernd  1697,  1698 

Lowery  v.  Drew  245 

r.  Rowland  1928 

Lowndes  v.  Board  472 

Lowrance  v.  Robertson  968,  972 

Lowry  v.  Harris  1371,  1445 

V.  Tilleny  1866 

Lowther  v.  Carlfon  1529 

Loyless  v.  Blackshear  233 

Lozear  v.  Shields  48,  50 

Lozier  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  448 

Lubbering  v.  Kohlbrecher     1338,  1359 

Lucas  r.  Clafflin  1453 

V.  Cobbs  1141 

)'.  King  1963 

V.  Larkin  1142,  1152 

V.  Wilcox  944 

Lucas  Co.  V.  Hunt  658 

Luce  V.  Carley  490 

Luch's  Appeal  1460,1462,  1466 

Luckett  V.  Scruggs  381 

Lucy,  Estate  of  1900,  1986,  1994 

Ludlow  V.  Carr  414 

V.  Clinton  Line  R.  Co.       1406 

V.  Kidd  1559 

V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co. 

620,  678,  699,  704,  705, 
707,  708 
V.  O'Neill  38,     184 

Ludwell  I'.  Newman  893 

Luen  ;;.  Wilson  121 

Luff  V.  Lord  162 

Luffboroiigh  v.  Parker  1132,  1165, 

1179 

Lufkin  V.  Curtis  316,  319,  1004 

V.  Haskell  479 

Luhrs  V.  Eimer  168 

Lumbard  v.  Aldrich         182,  186,  323, 

1022 

Lumpkin  v.  Adams  1 506 

V.  Muncey  1457,  1459 

V.  Wilson  1030 

Lunsford   /•.  La  Motte  Lead  Co. 

1067 
Lnnt  V.  Holland  480,  486,  490 

Luntz  i\  Greve  42 


Lusk  V.  McNamer  1529 

Lutcher  &  Moore  Lumber  Co.  v. 

Hart  415,  431 

Lutes  V.  Reed  1224 

Lux  V.  Haggin  481 

Luzenburg  v.  Bexar  Bldg.  Asso.    1 292 
Lyde  V.  Russell  1702 

Lydiard  v.  Chute  1109,  1111 

Lydick  v.    Baltimore  &  Ohio  R. 

"Co.  821,  942 

Lyford  V.  North  Pac,  C.  R.  Co.        785 

Lyle  V.  Ducomb  1434,  1591 

r.  Palmer  1712,  1725 

V.  Richards  338,  341,  613 

Lyles  V.  Lescher  230 

Lyman  v.  Babcock  338 

V.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co,        1933 

V.  Gedney  244 

V.  Hale  1614 

V.  Russell  1568 

V.  Smith  1585 

Lynch  v.  Allen  485,  495 

V.  Doran  109,  111 

V.  Hancock  1527 

V.  Livingston         206,  207,  313, 

1123,  1124,  1127,  1128, 

1156,  1444,  1447 

V.  Richter  1035 

Lynde  v.  Budd  14,  29 

V.  Hough  678,  6  79 

v.  Rowe  1748,  176  7 

Lynne  Regis,  Case  of  235,  239 

Lyon  ('.  Gleason  13<S3 

V.  Hersey         632,  637,  640,  649 

V.  Home  103 

V.  Kain  214,  217,  1185 

V.  King  744 

V.  Lyon  1271 

(7.  Mcllvaine  ■    1288 

V.  Waldo  93,  95 

Lyons  r.  Bodenhamer  1508,  1563 

V.  Campbell  103 

V.  Holmes  1010,  1105 

V.  Wait  1860 

Lytle  V.  Lytle  687 

V.  Turner  1515,  1552 

Mabie  v.  Matteson  830 

r.  Whittaker  1919 

Mabry  v.  Harp  1626 

Maccubbin  /■.  Cromwell  265 
Macdonald  r.  Morrill                  338,  487 

Macdoncll  r.  McKay  1600 

Macey  v.  Stark  1122 

MacFarlane  v.  MacFarlan£  1962 

Macher  v.  Foundling  81  2 

Machette  v.  Wanless  l:>i)\ 

cv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


^larintosh  v.  Tliiirston  1410,  1497 

Mai-k  V.  Chani])i()n  G02,  (i04 

Ahukall  r.  Mackall  lOt),  110 

V.  Rifliarils  51)3 

Maokay  v.  Bloodiiood  106  7 

V.  Easloii  1013 

Mackenzie  r.  Childers     772,  773,  776, 

780 

V.  Jackson     1124,  1155, 

llo6 

Mackey  v.  Collins  915 

V.  Harmon  799,  877,  958 

JNIacleay,  In  re  668 

]\I;K-lin  ('.  Haywood  44 

jMacIoon  v.  Smith  89 

Madden  v.  Floyd  1004 

V.  Tucker  413 

Maddox  v.  Arp  1506 

I'.  F'enner  389 

V.  Goddard  1923 

V.  Gray  1217,  1237 

V.  Simmons  48 

Madison,  &c.  Plank  Road  Co.  v. 

Stevens  1303, 1304 

Madore's  Appeal  735 

Magee  v.  Beatty  1451 

V.  Magee  1415 

V.  Mellon  831 

V.  Merriman  1485 

V.  Welsh  7 

Magill  V.  Hinsdale  1049 

Magness  v.  Arnold  1171 

Magniac  r.  Thompson  281 

Magnolia,  The,  v.  Marshall  480 

Magoun  v.  Lapham  423,  424 

Maguire  v.  Park         1668,  1673,  1702, 

1712,  1714,  1719 

V.  Sturtevant  389 

Magwire  v.  Riggin  929 

Maiion  V.  Cooley  1947 

Mahoney  v.  Mahoney  1981 

V.  Middleton  1504 

Maier  v.  Joslin  350,  404 

Main  v.  Alexander  1406,  1442 

V.  Killinger  358 

V.  Schwarzwaelder       1667,  1702 

Maine  v.  Cumston  634,  799 

Mainwarring  v.  Templeman  1400 

Major  V.  Bukley  5G2 

V.  Dunnavant  944 

V.  Rice  359 

V.  State  1144 

V.  Todd  1222 

V.  Watson  341 

Majoribanks  v.  Hovenden  1538 

Majors  v.  Cowell  1560 

Makepeace  v.  Bancroft    359,  382,  410 

cvi 


Maker  v.  Lazell  826,  411 

Maloom  v.  Rogers  1935 

Malcomson  c.  O'Dea  470 

Malin  v.  Malin  1338 

Mallett  V.  Page  1291 

r.  Simpson  175 

Mallory's  Case  577 

Mallory  r.  Stodder  1451,  1464,  1531 
Malloy  V.  Bruden  1212 

Manasses  v.  Dent  1521 

Manaudas  v.  Mann     1109,  1499,  1511, 

1563 
Manchester  v.  Hough  36 

Manderbach  v.  Bethany  Orphans' 

Home  786 

Mandlebaum  v.  McDonell  660,  662 
Manderville  v.  Solomon  1836,  1852 
Maney  v.  Porter  833 

Mangold  v.  Barlow  1451,  1472,  1480 
INIangum  >:.  Piester  578 

Manhattan  Co.  v.  Evertson  1390 

Manistee  Manuf.  Co.  v,  Cogswell 

306,  443 
Manly  v.  Pettee  1502,  1506,  1942, 

1945 

Mann  r.  Best  1397 

V.  Falcon  1466 

V.  Mathews  945,  981 

V.  Pearson  398 

i\  Stephens  775,  777,  780, 

781 

Manners  r.  Manners  1963 

Manning  r.  Johnson         2,  31,  33,  758, 

815,  823 
V.  McChire  285,  1390 

V.  Ogden  1702,  1703 

V.  Pippen  40,  295 

V.  Smith  164  2,  1660 

Mansfield  v.  Dyer  828,  1394,  1395 

V.  Gordon  11 

V.  Gregory  1404,  1408 

V.  McGinniss  1862 

V.  Watson  74,  76,  78 

Mansur  r.  Blake  495 

Manufacturers'  N.  Gas  Co.  r.  Doug- 
lass 1213,  1214 
Man  waring  v.  Jenison          1668,  1679, 

1084 
V.  Powell  1792,  1803 

V.  Tabor  577,  016 

Mapes  V.  Newman  100  7 

Maphis  *'.  Pegram  1135 

Maple  u.  Stevenson  368,1866 

Maples  V.  Millon  161.3,  1  765 

Mara  v.  Pierce  1511,  1563 

IVlarahk'  v.  Mayer  1087 

jNIaraman  /•.  Maraman  44 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Marbur<^  v.  Cole         1792,  1797,  1800, 

1802 

Marbury  v.  Eblen  1549 

i;.  Madison  1229,  1377 

V.  Tbornton  890,  903, 

907,  915,  930,  932,"  937 

Marcb  v.  Huyter  1952 

Marchbanks  i:  Banks  1528 

Marcy  f.  Dunlap  1338,  13.')0 

V.  Marcy  1865,  1866,  1878 

V.  Stone  1862 

Marden  v.  Cbase  268 

Mardes  r.  Meyers  317,  331 

Marine  Bank  v.  International  Bank 

1585,  1586 
Mariposa  Co.  v.  Bowman  89 

Maris  v.  lies  862,  880 

Markbam  v.  Parker  1563 

Markland  v.  Crump  933 

Markley  v.  Swartzlander  1101 

Markoe  r.  Wakeman  197  7 

Marks  V.  Marks  711 

V.  Sewall  1825 

Marlin  v.  Kosmyroski  1937 

Marmaduke  v.  Tennant  1965 

Marmon  v.  Marmon  49,  99 

Marr  c.  Given  1029 

Marsb  i'.  Austin  1240 

r.  Burt  448,  454 

V.  Chestnut  374 

V.  Fish  888,  896 

V.  Mitcbell  381,  431,  432, 

1185,  1196 
V.  Nelson  1566 

V.  Thompson  967 

Marshall  v.  Bacbeldor  1680 

V.  Conrad  K^S 

V.  Dunham  1524,  1525 

V.  Ferguson  1620 

V.  Fisher  341 

V.  Fisk  267,  1259 

V.  Green  1605 

V.  Gridley  336,  338 

r.  Marshall       48,111,1966, 
1969 
V.  Morris  280 

V.  Palmer  1936 

);.  Roberts  1394,  1395 

V.  Shafter  1«71 

V.  Trumbtdl  503,  532 

Marshall  Co.  High  School  Co.  v. 

Iowa  Evangelical  Synod     625,  1303 

Marston  r.  Brackett  1581 

/•.  Brasbaw  1 '  '-^ 

V.  Brittenbam         1197,  1204, 

1 205 

t;.  Hobbs  843,86  7,943 


Marston  v.  Williams  1466 

Martel  v.  Somers  1513 

Martin  c.  Atkinson  376 

V.  Baker  929,  931 

V.  Ballou  619,674,6  76 

V.  Bonsack  254 

^^  Bowie  HOI 

V.  Brown  1394 

V.  Carlin  438 

V.  Cauble  1522,  1546 

t;.  Cook  503,  529 

V.  Cooper  485 

V.  Davidson  1182 

V.  Drinan  798 

V.  Dwelly  1182,  1212 

V.  Evansville  481 

V.  Flaharty  1220,  1240, 
1272,  1312 

V.  Flowers  1042 

V.  Gordon  948,  968,  981 

r.  Hargadine  1207,1212 

r.  Harris  1031,1942 
r.  Jackson        1568,1792,1814 

V.  Lloyd  397,  421 

V.  Long  575,  943 

V.  McRee  613 

V.  Martin  101,  643 

V.  Nance  484,  488,  491 

V.  Neblett  1552,  1559 

^^  O'Bannon  1170 

V.  O'Brien  472 
V.  Ohio  R.  Co.      718,  720,  728 

V    PtlC  t?  loo 

v.  Ramsey  1220,  1269 

V.  Reynolds  1824 

V.  Skipwith  723 

V.  Smith  1819 

V.  Spicer  7i  3 

V.  Splivalo  645 

V.  Tbompson  1625 

V.  Townsend  1081 

V.  Tradesmen's  Ins.  Co.    1338, 
1340 
v.  Waddell  419,470 

V.  Weyman  1061 

V.  Wilbourne  254 

Martindale  17.  Alexander  1981 

V.  Kansas  City,  &c.  R. 

Co.  1 75 

Martling  v.  Martling  99,  110,  115, 

1220,  1233,  1256,  1257 

Martyn  y.  Knollys  1912 

Martz  r.  Eggemann  1240 

V.  Williams  445 

Marvin  v.  Applegate  921 

I'.  Brewster  Iron   Mining 

Co.  534,  1595,  1596 

cvii 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Marvin  c.  Elliott 

351,  423 

Matthews  /•.  Coalter 

1359 

Rlarwii'k  v.  Andrews 

715,  732 

r.  Denicrritt 

1563 

Marx  V.  Mo(il\  nn 

103,  167 

r.  Matthews 

1969 

Mascolo  V.  Montosanto 

87 

r.  Skinker 

173 

Mash  I'.  Daniel 

1011 

Mattingly  r.  Nye 

290 

Mason  c.  Black 

1511,  1547 

Mattis  /•.  Boijss 

1936 

V.  Brock          1146, 

1150,  1151, 

Mattocks  r.  Brown 

614 

1182 

Matzon  r.  Grifliii 

1745, 

1759 

V.  Ham 

830 

Man<>hani  r.  Sliarpe 

225,  244 

V.  Kellogg  924 

V.  Merrill  338,  339,  353 

V.  Mullahy  1387,  1522, 

1524,  1568 

r.  Pate  233,  602 

V.  Philbrook  1484 

V.  Ring  103 

V.  White  413 

Massey.  v.  Belisle  339,  342 

V.  Hubbard  1563 

r.  Westcott  1406 

Massie  v.  Yates  1566,  1946,  1952, 

1979 
Masten  v.  Olcott  336 

Mastery.  Hansard  773,  777,  781, 

798 

V.  Miller  1328,  1331,  1341 

Masters  v.  PoUie  1614 

Masterson  i:  Cheek     156,  1220,  1227, 

1276,  1277,  1282, 

1297 

V.  Little  1404 

V,  Munro  423 

V.  Todd         338,  343,  1146, 

1442 

r.  West  End  N.  G.   R. 

Co.  1570 

Mastin  v.  Halley  1062 

Mateskey  v.  Feldman  1575 

Matheny  r.  Stewart  968,  983,  985 

Mather  v.  Chapman  4  72 

V.  Corliss  266,  1234,  1240 

V.  Eraser  1725,  1727 

V.  Jarel  1447 

V.  Scoles  295 

Mathers  /•.  Hegarty  389 

Matherson  v.  Davis  7,  9 

Mathews  r.  Aikin  1484 

V.  Feaver  279 

Mathiessen  &  W.  Refining  Co.  r. 

McMahon  °  1039 

Matlack  v.  Hogue  388 

Matson  r.  Calhoun  1698 

Mattair  v.  Payne  1963 

Matteson  v.  Vaughn         850,  903,  914, 

987 

^Matthews  (;.  Baxter  "8 

V.  Bliss  l«40 

cviii 


Maul  r.  Rider  1482,  1513,  1517, 

1522,  1846,  1942 

Maupin  r.  Emmons  1511,  1512, 

1517,  1563,  1566 

Maverick  v.  Routh  923,  925 

Mawson  v.  Blane  16 

Maxey  r.  Wise  1215 

MaxfieJd  v.  Burton  1522,  1532 

Maxon  /•.  Lane  785 

Maxwell  /•.  Grace  40,  42,  44 

L\  Hartmann  1451 

r.  Higgins  1878 

V.  Hosmer  408 

May  V.  Borel  1532 

V.  Le  Claire  1394,  1397,  1532 

V.  Ritchie         579,  602,  614,  617, 

618 

V.  Seymour  1012 

V.  Slade  1925,  1928 

V.  Slaughter  139 

V.  Sturdivant  1575 

c.  Tillman  336 

Maybee  v.  Sniffen  1367 

Maybin  v.  Kirby  1522 

Maybnrry  v.  Brien  1410,  1773 

Mayer's  Appeal  820 

Mayer  ;;.  Waters  1698 

Mayes  in  Manning  1867,1879 

Mayhani  v.  Coombs  1406,  1451, 

1501 

Maybe w  v.  Norton  476 

Maynard  r.  Maynard     163,  167,  1217, 

1248,  1267,   1289,   1296, 

1448 

r.  Moore  798 

V.  Weeks  448 

Mayor  v.  Hart  472 

v.  Law  503,  543 

V.  Lefferman  87 

r.  Moore  1311 

V.  New  York  Cent.  &c.  R. 

Co.  514 

V.  AVatson  6  75 

r.  Williams  1522 

Mays  y.  Hedges  1139,  1205 

V.  Leggett  1563 

r.  Pryce  1207 

Maze  V.  Bm-ke  1403,  1589 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


]\KA(low  V.  Black      1115,  1396,  1404, 

1408,  1442 

McAfee  v.  Arline  340,  346,  347, 

351,  404,  423,  503,  529 

McAfferty  v.  Connover  368 

Mc Allen  v.  Raphael  1979 

McAllister  v.  Avery  1365 

V.  Honea  503,  519 

r.  Mitchner  1258,1259, 

1303 

V.  Plant  142,  14  7,  1789 

McAlpin  V.  Woodruff  86  7,  986 

McAlpine  v.  Reicheneker  445 

McAnincli  v.  Freeman  389,  439 

Mc  Arthur  ?;.  Henry  358 

V.  Scott  1960 

McBurnie,  Ex  parte  281 

McCabe  v.  Grey  1482 

V.  Hunter  195,  1058 

V.  McCabe      1887,  1986,  1987 

JNIcCafferty  v.  Griswold  968 

McCain  v.  Hill  1108 

V.  Pickens  1285 

McCaleb  v.  Pradat  1061 

McCall  V.  Carpenter  1963 

V.  Davis  450 

r.  Reybold  1940 

V.  Webb  1872 

V.  Yard  1568 

McCalla  v.  Bane  302,  1233,  1234, 

1236,  1302,  1307,  1309 

McCallum  v.  Petigrew  1185 

McCammon  v.  Detroit,  L.  &  N.  R. 

Co.  1153 

McCampbell  r.  McCampbell  44 

V.  Mason  1485 

McCandless'  Appeal  1972,  1975 

McCandless  v.  Engle     91,  1185,  1186, 
1199,  1447 
McCann  v.  Atherton  1248,  1303 

McCarley  v.  Tippah  Co.       1062,  1066 
McCartee  v.  Orphan  Asylum  Soc. 

43,  169 
McCarthy  v.  Nicrosi         2,  10,  17,  19, 

24,  1576 

McCartney  v.  Dennison  402 

McCarty  v.  Leggett  842,  928,  953 

V.  Murray  11 

?•.  Woodstock  Iron  Co.        17, 

18 

McCauley  v.  Fulton  244 

MoCausland  r.  Fleming  376,  378 

McCelvcy  v.  Crver  1364 

McChesney  v.  VVliite  1846 

McClain  v.  McClain  1331,  1335 

McClair  v.  Wilson  81 

McClanahan  c.  Williams  9,  27 


iNIcClaskey  r.  Barr 

McClatchie  v.  Haslam 
McCleary  v.  Ellis 


1868,  1981,  1984, 

1988 

83,  92 

660,  662,  663, 

664 

McCleery  v.  Wakefield  1331 

McClellan  v.  Zwingli  1248 

McClelland  v.  INIoore  974 

McClenaghan  v.  McClenaghan         166 
McClintick  v   Cummins  88,  94 

McClintock's  Appeal  1608 

McClintock  v.  Ro£ers       381,  400,  438 

1877 
1873 
1331 
1420 
869 
274 
968 
1165,  1204 
29,  968 
1439 
668 
430 
802,  824 
1957 
Reed  209,  1394 

Blood  1678,  1712, 

1717,  1719,  1721,  1746, 
1765 
V.  Brayner  309 

r.  Brillhart  1002 

r.  Carey     1942,1949,1950 
V.       Citizens'       State 

Bank  303 

V,  Downs  924 

McConville  v.  Howell  163 

McCord  V.  Oakland  Q.  M.  Co.       1887, 

1911,  1912,  1914 

McCormack  v.  James  1159,  13  74 

McCormic  v.  Leggett  2,  10,  14 

McCormick  v.  Barnum  359,  364 

V.  Bauer  1426 

V.  Cheevers  861 

I'.  Fitzmorris      1359,  1364 

r.  Leonard  1524 

V.  McCormick     1240, 

V.  Monroe     342,  353 


McCloskey  v.  McCIoskey 
McClung  V.  Ross 
i\  Steen 
McClure  v.  Burris 

i\  Campbell 
V.  Cook 
V.  Gamble 
V.  McClurg 
r.  McClure 
McClurg  V.  Phillips 
McCollough  V.  Gilmore 
Mc  Combs  V.  Sheldon 
McConaghy  v.  Pemberton 
McConnel  r.  Kibbe 


McConnell 


1280 

519, 

521 

151 

1534 


V.  Parry 
V.  AVheeler 
McCormick   Harvesting  Machine 

Co.  *'.  Hamilton  88 

McCormick    Harvesting  Machine 

Co.  V.  Scovell  •  1807 

M'Coun  V.  Dclany  407 

McCourt  V.  Eckstein  1919 

cix 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections, 


McCown  r.  King 

filO 

r.  Wheeler 

1^31 

McCoy  r.  Barns 

1807 

r.  (';\ssi(lay 

1073 

r.  (ialloway 

389 

V.  (Jreen 

88 

V.  I  lance 

372 

V.  Willi  ford 

131 

McCracken  r.  San  Francisco 

1082 

M'Craily  v.  Bi-isbane        931,  933,  967 

V.  Jones  1995 

McCraven  v.  Doe  1124 

V.  j\Ic(Juire  1123 

McCrea  r.  Newman  1547,  1555 

V.  Purniort  295,  298,  301, 

303,  306,  948 

McCready  v.  Lansdale  402 

McCreary  v.  Douglass  898 

V.  McCreary  1146 

McCruden  v.  Rochester  Ry.  Co.      448 

McCuUock  V.  Aten  490 

V.  Holmes  573,  576 

McCullough  I'.  Absecon  Imp.  Co. 

381 

V.  Day  1238 

V.  Wall         428,  480,  484, 

485 

McCurdy's  Appeal  10.")4 

McCurdy  v.  Canning  1792,  1797, 

1«00,  1803,  1812,  1814 

McCusker  v.  McEvey  1488 

McDaid  V.  Call  1292 

McDaniel  v.  Grace  1028 

V.  Johns  525 

V.  McCoy  48 

V.  Needham  1163 

McDaniels      v.      Flower      Brook 

Manuf.  Co.  1049,  1117,  1442 

McDavid  y.  AVood  1767 

McDermot  v.  Lawrence  1585 

McDermott  r.  French  1794,  1797, 

1800 
McDill  V.  Gunn  295,  862 

McDodrill  r.  Pardee,  &c.  Lumber 

Co.  1916 

McDonald  v.  Belding  1394,  1527 

V.  Donaldson  1981 

V.  Eggleston  1025,  1035 

V.  Elfes  901 

V.  Fox  1866 

V.  Minnick  1220,  1256 

V.  Morgan  219 

V.  Whitohurst  471,  4  79 

McDonough  v.  ^lartin  833,  896 

McDowel  V.  Chambers  1238 

McDowell  V.  Mili-oy  974 

McDuff  V.  Beauchamp  1802 

cx 


McDuffie  i'.  Clark  219 

McDiinn  c.  Dts  Moines  944 

McElroy  r.  Ilines        1217,  1220,  123G 

V.  McElroy  594 

V.  Morley  723 

McElwain  v.  Russell  48,  103 

McEntee  v.  Scott  1733 

INIcEowen  v.  Lewis  410 

McEvoy  V.  Leonard  1994 

V.  Loyd  438 

McEwen  r.  Bamberger  1289 

McEwin  V.  Troost  1293 

McFadden  v.  Allen     1667,  1672,  1743, 

1748 

V.  Crawford  1712,  1716 

V.  Worthington  1406 

McFadgen  v.  Eisensmidt  1287 

McFall'w.  McFall  1220,  1248 

McFarland  v.  Stone  1937 

McFarlin  r.  Leaman    1836,  1844,  1K52 

McGahan  v.  National  Bank  1832, 

1833,  1834,  1892 

JNIcGan  v.  Marshall  21,  22 

McGarrahan  v.  New  Idra  M.  Co.     247 

McGary  v.  Hastings  913,  919,  962, 

968,  974 

McGavock  i'.  Deery  1547 

M'Gee  v.  Eastis  990 

McGeey.  Hall  1862,  1874,  1986 

V.  Holmes  1839,  1846 

McGehee  v.  Gindrat  1521,  1523 

McGennis  v.  McGennis  613 

McGill  V.  Ash  1922 

V.  Doe  1  38 

V.  McGill  1924,  1925,  1928 

McGinn  V.  Tobey  13  79 

McGinnis  v.  Commonwealth  53 

V.  McGinnis  616 

McGlawhorn  v.  Worthington  337, 

343,  349,  351,  402 

McGlennery  v.  Miller  1184 

McGorrisk  v.  Dwyer  1665,  1718 

McGowan  v.  Reid  1104 

V.  Smith  1409 

McGowen  v.  Myers  874,  882,  883 

McGown  V.  Yerks  1390 

McGrath  v.  Hyde  1247,  127  7 

McGraw,  Matter  of  179,  180 

McGraw  v.  IMcGraw  1233,  1289 

McGregor  v.  Brown  1600,  1602 

V.  McGregor  1559 

V.  Tabor  923,  925 

McGrew  v.  Harmon  905,  919,  921 

McGror\-  v.  Reilley  88 

McGuckin  c.  Milbank  967 

McGiiffev  V.  Hunu's  949,  968,  981 

McGiiite'c.  Barker  1464 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


78 

254 

104 

1979 

155,  578, 


McGuire  v.  Callahan 

V.  Kouns 
McHarry  v.  Irvin 

V.  Stewart 
Mcllhinny  D.  Mcllhinny 

579,601,604,606,613,614 

Mcllvain  v.  Mut.  Assur.  Co.  1489 

Mcllvaine  v.  Harris  1619,  1624 

V.  Kadel  ^-^ 

Mclndoe  v.  St.  Louis  175 

Mclnerney  v.  Beck  2_-J4 

Mclnnis  v.  Lyman    848,  850,  943,  9d6, 

y  u  o  ^  c7  tj  * 

V.  Pickett  1487 

Mclntire  v.  Patton  127 

Mclntyre  u.  Barnard  559 

i\  Delong  *^5i5 

V.  Mclntyre  609,  610 

V.  Park  1035 

V.  Velte        1346,  1349,  1350 

V.  Ward  1159 

M'lver  V.  Walker 


M'Kain  v.  Miller 
ISIcKamey  v.  Thorp 
McKay  v.  Mumford 
McKeage  i'.  Hanover 


F.  Ins.  Co. 


381 
1071 
1390 
1895 


1703 


McKean  &  Elk  Land  Imp.  Co.  v. 

Mitchell  1435,  1454 

M'Kechnie  v.  Hoskins 
McKee  v.  Bain 
V.  Hicks 
V.  Perchment 
V.  Spiro 
V.  Wilcox 
M'Keen  v.  Delancy 

V.  Sultenfuss 
McKellar  v.  Peck 
McKelway  v.  Seymour 


1575,  1578 

974 

1220 

450 

225 

1563,  1568 

1120 

1406 

1143, 1146 

678,  686,  696, 

743 


McKissick  v.  Colquhoun  1457 

V.  Pickle  686,  723,  743 

McKnight  V.  Bell  1942,  1949 

V.  Krentz  63o 

M'Lanahan  v.  Reeside  1488 

McLane  v.  Canales     1087,  1981,  1997 
McLarren  v.  Thompson  1469 

McLaughlin  v.  Ihmsen  1380 

V.  Johnson  1709 

V.  McLaughlin  1842, 

1862,  1887 
u.  McManigle  1217, 

1220,  1234,  1240, 
1243 
V.  Miller  871 

V.  Randall  1068 

V.  Shepherd  1575 

McLauren  v.  Baxter  225 

McLean  v.  Button  1247    12  m 

V.  Clapp         1564,  1568,  15^8 
V.  McKay 
V.  McLean 
V.  Nelson 
V.  Palmer 
V.  Patterson 
V.  Webster 
McLellan  v.  Jenness 
McLennan  v.  IMcDonnell 
?'.  Prentice 

943,  944,  955,  956 

McLeod  V.  First  Nat.  Bank  1386, 

1390,  1517,  1522 


McKenna  v.  Kelso 
McKenzie  v.  Lampley 

V.  Railroad  Co. 
McKeon  v.  Millard 
McKey  v.  Hyde  Park 
M'Kibbin,  In  re 
]M'Kibben  >:  Newell 
McKie  V.  Anderson 
McKiernan  v.  Hesse 
McKildoe  V.  Darracott 
M'Kim  V.  Mason 
M'Kinney  v.  Rhoads 

V.  Rodgers 

V.  Settles 
McKinster  v.  Babcock 
McKinzie  c  Pcrrill 

V.  Stafford 


773,  775 

1958 

1282 

1668,  1673 

1058 

893,  906 

1923 

1222 

500,  913, 


1220 

1627 

44 

388 

341 

1717 

1340 

1180 

1689 

707 

1717,  1726 

1269 

1115 

312,  316 

295 

1511,  15(13 

1172 


V.  Skiles 
V.  Swain 
V.  Tarrant 

McLouth  V.  Hurt 
McLure  ^.  Colclough 
McMahan  v.  Bowe 

V.  McMahan 


861 
375 
571,  572, 
574,  575,  1792 
1436, 1472 
1218 
119, 121, 127 
128,  140 
1942,  1949, 
1950 
285 
290 
1887 
1836 
1109,  1846 
1109,  1540 
481 
1380,  1523, 


V.  Morrison 
McMahon  v.  Allen 

V.  Burchell 

t'.  McClernan 

V.  McGraw 
McMaken  v.  Niles 
McManus  v.  Carniichael 
MrMechan  c  Griffing 
McJVlecnan  ^563:  1565, 1568, 1570 

McMichaeU.  Carlyle  1238 

McMillan  z).  Edfast,  1111,1112 

V.  N.  Y.   Waterproof 

Paper  Co.  1672 

V.  Peacock  40,  44,  46 

McMinn  u.  O'Connor  143o 

Cxi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


^rc^forris  v.  Webb 
.McMuUeu  r.  Ea«ran 


7,  9,  23 

1188,  1195, 

1208,  1212 

^Ic^hillin  V.  Wooley  874 

:NrMuri>by  r.  Rlinot  935 

:Mf.Mmr:iv  r.  I\K-jMurray  24 

:\IcMmTy  c.  Fletcher  244 

McMurtrie  v.  Kccnan  89 

V.  Kiddcll  1392 

McMurtry  v.  Brown     1016,  1017,  1021 

V.  Keifner  1958 

MoXab  V.  Younii         1328,  1335,  1337 

McNally  r.  Connolly  1717 

McNamara  v.  Seaton        334,  354,  359 

McNamee  v.  Hnckabee  1464 

McNear  v.  McComber  894,  896 

M'Neelv  v.  Rucker        266,  1196,  1447 

MoNeirv.  Polk  1572 

McNitt  V.  Turner  1408 

McNulty  i'.  McNulty  1257 

McParland  v.  Larkin  1890 

McPheeters  v.  Wright  1835,  1836 

McPherson  v.  Housel  1559 

V.  Reese  1066 

V.  Rollins    782,  1482,  1483 

tK  Seguine  1940 

V.  Sanborn         1196,  1197, 

1205,  1447 

M'Queen  v.  Farquhar  1531 

V.  Logan  608 

V.  Turner  1963,  1970 

McQuie  I'.  Peay  1331,  1332 

McRae  r.  Battle  112 

V.  McMinn  1563 

McRaven  v.  Crisler  1350,  1352 

McRea  v.    Central   Nat.   Bank 

1668,  1672,  1673,  1712, 

1713,  1714,  1748,  1757 

V.  Dutton  1979 

McRpynolds  v.  Longenberger         1175 

]\Ic Roberts  v.  Copeland  1791 

:\IcShane  v.  Main  448,  466 

V.  Moberly  449 

■Mc Shirley  v.  Boit  1529 

McWhirter  v.  Allen  339 

McWhorter  v.  Wright  271 

McWillianis  v.  Nisly  667 

Meacham  v.  Meacham  1942,  1946 

V.  Steele  1489 

Mead  v.  Ballard  687 

V.  CoomVjs  76,  99 

V.  Fox  829 

V.  Haynes  490 

V.  New  York,  Housatonic  & 

Northern  R.  Co.    1403,  1407 
V.  Parker  321,  346 

V.  Riley  462,  463 

cxii 


Mead  v.  Staokpole 
Meade  v.  Gilfoyle 

V.  Land  Co. 
Meadows  v.  Smith 
INIeagher  v.  Drury 
V.  Hayes 
I'.  Thompson 
Meazles  v.  Martin 
Mebane  v.  Mebane 


903,  914 

1563 

390 

85 

1457 

1667 

1044 

1013,  1103 

663 


Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Schaumburg  1536 
Mecklcm  v.  Blake  929,  931,  943, 

952,  953,  955 
Meddock  v.  Williams  1141 

Medford  v.  Frazier  1891 

Medler  v.  Hiatt  883 

Medley  v.  Mask  303 

Medlin  v.  Platte  Co.  1338 

V.  Steele  1940 

Medway    Cotton   Manuf.  Co.  v. 

Adams  239 

Mee  V.  Benedict  321,  1375,  1461, 

1601 

Meech  v.  Fowler  1238 

V.  Lee  84,  88 

Meehan  r.  Williams  156  7,  1568 

Meek  v.  Breckenbridge         1635,  1640 

V.  Holton  526 

Meeker  v.  Meeker  295,  301,  303 

V.  Wright  1802,  1805 

Meeks  v.  Willard  341,  394 

Meier  «.  BInme  1514,  1517,  1532 

V.  Kelly  335,  339,  1404 

V.  Railway  Co.  449 

Meigs'  Appeal  1668 

Mei'kel  v.  Borders        1396,  1398,  1463 

V.  Greene  323 

Melcher  r.  Merryman  381 

Melick  V.  Pidcock  575,  581,  593 

Mellichamp  v.  Mellichamp  609 

Mellon's  Appeal  1456 

Mellon  V.  Reed  1942,  1943,  1949 

]\Ielsheimer  v.  Gross  578,  579 

Melton  V.  Lambard  1595 

V.  Monday  521 

V.  Turner  1458 

Melvin  v.  Proprietors  of  Locks  & 

Canals  156,  326,410,413,418,420 
Memmert  v.  McKeen  884,  885,  887 
Memphis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Neighbors 

620,  708,  715,  731 
Memphis  Land  Co.  v.  Ford  13  74, 

1385 
Menage  v.  Burke  244 

Menasha  Ware  Co.  v.  Lawson         483, 

491,  492 
jVIendall  r.  Delano  551,  555 

Mendenhall  r.  Slower  578 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Mendenhall  v.  Parish  303 

Meni  v.  Rathbone  1-464 

Menkens  i'.  Bhimenthal  372 

Menkins  r.  Liglitnor  48,  68 

Mercantile  Nat.  Bank  v.  Parsons 

1543;  1549 
Mercantile    Trust    Co.    v.    South 
Park  Residence  Co.      943,  944,  983, 

986 
Mercers  of  Shrewsbury  v.  Hart  236 
Mercier  v.  Missouri  River,  &c.  R. 

Co.  587 

]\lerchants'  Bank  v.  McClelland  1392 
Merchants'  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Grant  14 
Merchants'  Nat.   Bank  v.  Lovett 

1532,  1697,  1744,  1754 
Merchant  Tailors'  Co.  v.    Attor- 
ney-General 640 
Meredith  ?;.  Andres                          1887 
r.  Kunze                             1737 
Meriam  v.  Brown                             1748 
V.  Harsen      43,  295,  305,  309, 
1182,  1190,  1442 
Merle  v.  Matthews                     167,  265 
Merriani  v.  Cunningham  ^  5 
Merrick  v.  Merrick                             326 
V.  Wallace     1436,  1437,  1451, 
1472 
IMerrifield  v.  Cobleigh     632,  635,  678, 
697,  704,  707,  730 
V.  Parritt                          1860 
Merrill  v.  Emery                                  674 
I,.  Hutchinson            1396,139/ 
V.  Montgomery                    1117 
V.  Newton                                450 
V.  AVyman                             1687 
Merrills  v.  Swift         1234,  1240,  1282, 
1291,1449 
Merriman  v.  Hyde                 1109,  1383 
V.  Moore                             305 
Merritt  v.  Byers                858,  860,  988 
V.  Disney                        575,  593 
V.  Harris                        626,  696 
V.  Home                               1064 
V.  Hughes                             1970 
V.  Judd                                  1689 
V.  Morse                                  ''24 
V.  Northern  R.  Co.    1387,1570 
V.  Phenix                                1178 
r.  Yates          1171,1207,1208, 
1209 
Mertins  i'.  Jolliffe                              1531 
Merwin  v.  Camp                                1085 
Meserve  v.  Meserve                   522,  529 
Meservey  v.  Snell      892,  893,  913,  986 
Mesick  v.  Sunderland     337,  619,  1374, 

1482 


Meskimen  v.  Day  1146,  1442 

Messelback  v.  Norman  1292 

Messer  v.  Oestreich  352,  943,  944, 

968,  981 
Messersmith  v.  Messersmith  731,  732 
Metcalf  17.  Van  Benthuysen  1108 

Metcalfe  v.  Brandon     1292,  1294,  1296 
V.  Miller  1970 

V.  Pulvertoft  1387 

Methodist  Church  v.  Old  Colum- 
bia Co.  627 
V.  Remington      170 
Meth.  Epis.  Church  v.  Jaques        1277 
V.  Town  276 
Methodist    Protestant   Church   v. 

Laws  649,  650 

Metropolitan  Bank  v.  Godfrey        178, 

1390 
Metropolitan  L.  Ins.  Co.  i;.  Meeker 

84,  88 
Mettart  v.  Allen  324,  334 

Mette  V.  Dowe  944,  968,  971 

V.  Feltgen  27,  1770,  1773, 

1782,  1787 
Metts  V.  Bright  '  1451,  1455 

Meux  V.  Jacobs  1749 

Meyer's  Appeal  1835 

Meyer  v.  Construction  Co.  1433 

V.  Go?sett         1196,  1198,  1205 
V.  Huneke  1350 

V.  Johnston  1729 

V.  Knechler  56 

V.  Mitchell  336 

17.  Orynski  1721 

V.  Sulzbacher  40,  44 

Meyers  v.  St.  Louis  481 

Mhoon  V.  Cain  1867,  1874 

Michael  r.  Foil  295 

Michcll's  Trusts,  In  re  250 

Michener  v.  Cavender  1196,  1197, 

1201,  1206,  1447 
Michigan  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brown  1555 

Michio-an   Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Co- 

nant  1510,  1511,  1517 

Michio-an     Mut.     L.    Ins.    Co.    i'. 

Cronk  1695, 1696 

Michigan    State    Bank   v.    Ham- 
mond 685,  731 
Michi<--an   State  Bank  v.  Hastings 

685,  731 
Mickey  r.  Stratton  1082 

Micklcthwait    v.    Newlay    Bridge 

Co.  484 

Middk'brook  v.  Corwin  1708 

]\Ii(ldlebrooks  v.  Warren  1409 

Middlebury  College  v.  Cheney        953, 

1120 

cxiii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Multlloliokl  c.  Church  Mills  Knit- 
tin;;  Co.  795 
MidiilokanfY  v.  Barrick                      833 
MiililloniDre  r.  Gooilale                      988 
Middlesex,  &f.    II.  Co.  r.  Boston 

&c.  11.  Co.  142 

Middleton  r.  Findla       217,  218,  10(»7, 

1165 
V.  Hone  14,  158 

V.  Pri\ chard  4  72,  480 

Middletown  v.  Newport  Hospital 

779,  782 
Middletown  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bacha- 

rach  1846 

Midgett  V.  Wharton  521 

Midgley  v.  AValker     1773,  1775,  1778, 

1779 

Midland  Ry.  Co.  V.  Fisher  816 

Milbourn  v.  David  1862,  1873 

Milburn  v.  Phillips  310 

Mildmay's  Case  264 

Miles  i:  Barrows  335,  338 

i;.  Blanton  1524 

V.  Fisher  575,  1781 

V.  King  1407 

V.  Lingerman  8,  9,  23,  31 

V.  Sherwood  442 

Millard,  In  re  1212 

Millard  v.  McMullin  1866 

Milldam  Foundry  v.  Hovey  1065, 

1080,  1082 

Mill  River  Woollen  Manuf.  Co.  v. 

Smith  495 

Miller,  Ex  parte  1010,  1094 

Miller  v.  Alexander  1061 

V.  Beeler  381,  388 

V.  Bentley  398 

V.  Binder  1070,  1073 

V.  Bingham  1521,  1582 

V.  Bradford  1469 

V.  Bryan  324,  384 

V.  Church  1259 

V.  Craig  48,  49 

V.  Dennett  1784 

V.  Des verges  882 

V.  Ewer  1053 

V.  Ewing  992 

V.  Fletcher  1303,  1317 

V.  Fraley  1394,  1395,  1527 

V.  Gilleland  1346 

V.  Goodwin     268,  295,  298,  303 
V.  Halsey  976 

V.  Hensliaw  1146 

V.  Irish  Catholic  Asso.  1 281 

V.  Lamb  1011 

V.  Levi  713 

V-  Link  1177,  1178 

cxiv 


Miller  t'.  Lullman  1234,  1267 

V.  McCoy  295 

V.  Mc(;iaun  355 

V.  Mann  485,  1647 

V.  Marx     1196,1206,1207,  1447 

V.  Meers  1220,  1226,  1269 

V.  Miller     40,  44,  45,  82,  85,  89, 

251, 1501,  1784,  1884, 1917 

V.  Mills  1846 

V.  Minor  Lumber  Co.       88,  94, 

95 

V.  Murfield  100,  1236,  1243 

V.  Myles  1862,  1866,  1867, 

1871 

V.  Physick  1217,  1234,  1269 

V.  Porter  1 70 

V.  Powell  1209 

V.  Rutland  &  W.  R.  Co.      1050 

V.  Scars  1306 

V.  Sherry  1560 

V.  Smith  31,  33 

V.  Superior  Machine  Co.     1072, 

1079 

V.  Topeka  Land  Co.      331,  424, 

432,445,  446 

V.  Travers  326 

V.  Tunica  Co.         250,  649,  650, 

679,  687 

V.  Waddingham  1695 

V.  Ware  1469 

?;.  Wentworth  1188,1196, 

1197,  1198 

V.  White  437 

V.  Wilson  1742,  1743,  1753 

Millership  v.  Brookes  1304 

Millett  V.  Fowle  394 

V.  Parker  1312 

Millican  v.  Millican  97,  99 

Milligan  v.  Poole  1989 

Milliken  v.  Marlin  1361 

Millikin  v.  Armstrong  1670,  1746 

Millis  V.  Roof  1836,  1921 

Mills  V.  Catlin  842,  960 

V.  Comstock  '  146  7 

V.  Dow  303,  307 

V.  Evansville  Seminary  632,  6  78, 

692 

V.  Gore  1220,  1327 

V.  Mills  1248 

V.  Penny  368 

V.  Rice  915 

V.  Saunders  930,  962,  967 

V.  Seattle  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  743 

V.  Starr  1348 

V.  Van  Voorhies  1409 

Milne  v.  Cummings  1938 

Milncr  y.  Milner  1929 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Milot  r.  Reed  I' I 

Milton  v.  Colby  1695,  1696 

Milwaukee  v.  Milwaukee  &  Bcloit 

R    Co.  ■^■^''^'  •^^- 

Milwaukee  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  UW- 

waukee  &  W.  K.  Co.  •    290 

Mim?  V.  Miins  1472 

Minah  Consolidated  Min.  Co.  v. 

Briscoe  1303,  1310 

Mincke  v.  Skinner  48o 

Miner  v.  Brader  381,  439 

i;.  Brown  1794,1797 

V.  Clark  924 

V.  Lorman  1931 

Miner's  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zellerbach      141, 

142,  151, 1049,  10S2 

Minc-ns  v.  Condit  285,  1390 

ISIinincr    Co.  v.    Anglo- California 

Bank  1052, 1054 

Mining  Co.  v.  Taylor  1862 

Minke  v.  McNaniee  193b 

Minnesota  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  Co.        1  -  29 

Minor  v.  Kirkland  340 

V.  Powers       325,  326,  338,  342, 

1245 

u.  Willougbby  1517 

Minter  v.  Durham  1846,  1937 

Minto  f.  Delaney  485,491,492 

Minton  v.  New  York  Elevated  K. 

Co.  1578 

V.  Steele  1871 

]\Iischke  V.  Baugbn  944 

]SIiskev's  Appeal  53,  74,  103,  108 

Missis'sippi  Valley  Co.  v.  Chicago, 

St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.        1372,1406 
Missouri  V.  Kentucky  485,  486 

Missouri  Fire  Clay  Works  v.  Elli- 

Missouri  Hist.  Soc.  v.  Academy 
of  Sciences  716,  718 

Missouri  Lead  Min.  Co.  v.  Rein- 
hard  182,  183 

Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  House- 
man ^'^^'l 

Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Maffitt     1638 

Mi-^souri  River  R.  Co.  v.  Commis- 

1062 
sioners  ^"   - 

Missouri  Valley  Land  Co.  v.  Bar- 
wick  1«19,  1621,  1628 
Missouri  Valley  Land  Co.  v.  Bush- 


Mitchell  V.  Churchman 
V.  Hazen 
V.  Ireland 
V.  Kingman 
a;.  Leavitt 
V.  Lipe 
V.  Mitchell 
V.  Pillsbury 
V.  Ryan 


125 
831,  850,  967 
337 
65 
796,  814 
138 
582, 1937 
869 
156, 1234,  1282, 
1292,  1297 
V.  St.  Andrews,  &c.  Co.  1080 
V.  Seipel  534 

V.  Shortt  1314 

V.  Simpson  583 

V.  Smale  492 

V.  Smith  1559 

V.  Stanley  958 

V.  Starbuck  1955 

V.  Stevens  138 

V.  Steward  805 

V.  Thorne  503 

V.  Union  L.  Ins.  Co.         1066 


V.  Warner 

V.  Wilson 
Mitchner  v.  Holmes 
Mittel  V.  Karl 


874,  879,  909, 

919,  928 

562 

1149 

568,  1786, 1793, 

1796,  1802 

541, 1651 

135 

1414 

677 

382 

402 


nell 

Mitchel  V.  Reynolds 
Mitchell  V.  Aten 

I'.  Bartlett 
V.  Brawley 
V.  Bmdctt 
V.  Chi>holm 


173,  175,  1087 
(175 
1530,  1582 
1217,  123H 
361 
381 
304 


Mixer  v.  Reed 
Mixter  v.  Woodcock 
Mize  V.  Barnes 
Mizell  V.  Burnett 

V.  Simmons 
Mizzell  V.  Ruffin 
INlobile  Bank  v.  Tishomingo  Sav. 

Mobile  Sav.  Bank   v.  McDonnell 

271,  292,  29.J,  309,  310 
Mobile,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Talman  150 

Moblev  r.  Bruner  1936,1938 

Moelle  i:  Sherwood       1355, 1356, 1394 
Moffit  V.  Witherspoon  48 

Moffitt  I'.  Lytle  504 

Mohawk  Bank  r.  Atwater  ^»9 

Mohlis  v.  Trauffler  1352 

Mohr  V.  Parmelee  8  / 1 

1,.  Tulip  52,53,68,71 

]\Iolitor  V.  Sheldon  450 

MoUyneaux  r.  Wittenberg  738 

Molton  r.  Camroux  65,  68,  bJ 

Monell  r.  Douglass  »»6 

Moufort  I'.  Stevens  52d 

Monnots  i:  Husson  IJ- 

Monongahela  Bridge  Co.  v.  Ki^k    481 
Monroe  v.  Arledge  1117,  114', 

1149,  1159,  ll'O 
V.  Bowen  1''01 

oxv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Monroe  v.  Hamilton 
V.  Luke 
V.  I'oonnan 


i;S7i 

U)17 

119(i,  1197, 

1447 

Montajc  v.  Linn  1161,  13G5 

Montague  v.  Dent  1703 

V.  Sell)  1836,  1840 

Montague  Co.  v.  Clay   Co.  Land 

Co.  436 

Montgomery,  Ex  parte  16  70 

Montgomery  v.  Byers  1559 

V.  Carlton  330 

V.  Crossthwait  1353, 

1361,  1363 

V.  Dorion  166,  1041 

V.  Hines  448,  465 

V.  Keppel         1506,  1517, 

1522 

V.  Merrill  1628 

V.  Northern  Pac.  Ry. 

Co.  949 

V.  Perkins  1094 

V.  Reed       476,  479,  843, 

888,  903,  928,  943 

V.  Sturdivant      562,  563, 

576 

Montville  v.  Haughton  1062 

Monument   Nat.   Bank   v.    Globe 

Works  144 

Monypenny  v.  Monypenny  262 

Moody  V.  Aiken  1668 

V.  Butler  1867,  1874 

V.  Dryden  1255,  1448 

V.  Johnson  1937 

V.  Leavitt  968 

U.Moody  1794 

V.  Palmer      448,  455,  463,  468 

V.  Spokane,  &c.  R.  Co.         829 

Mooers  v.  Bunker  1917 

V.  White  166,  167 

Moogw.  Strang  118,  1198,  1206 

Moon  i;.  Jennings  1853 

Mooney  v.  Burchard  905,  924 

Moor  V.  Watson  1406 

Moore's  Appeal  645 

Moore's  Banking  Co.,  Ex  parte     1718 

Moore's  Estate  1990 

Moore  v.  Abernathy  24 

V.  Adams  85 

V.  Antil  1878 

V.  Appleby  1966 

V.  Baker  137 

V.  Bennett  1547 

V.  Brooks  610 

V.  Brown  122 

6.  Curry  1531 

I'.  Davey  1  loi; 

cxvi 


Moore  v.  Flynn  1242,  1276,  1282 

V.  Frankenfield       903,  968,  971 
V.  Fuller  1196,  1198,  1447 

V.  Giles  1282,  1297,  1301 

V.  Glover  14(i3 

V.  Gordon  1963 

V.  Grifhn  324,  410,  4  76 

V.  Hazelton  1248,  1286 

V.  Ivers  1338 

V.  Johnston  448,  449,  842, 

844,  92S 
V.  Jourdan  1.563 

V.  Kerr  1942,  1943,  194  7 

V.  Lee  233 

V.  Leseus  1063,  1066,  1069 

V.  Littel  602 

V.  Lockett  1031 

V.  McKie  948 

V.  Madden  1439 

V.  Mao-rath  246,  250 

V.  Merrill  928,  932,  933 

V.  Moore       99,  115,  1129,  1871 
V.  Page  45 

V.  Pierson  1563 

V.  Pitts  712 

V.  Quince  599 

V.  Ragland  1455 

V.  Rake  616 

V.  Reiley  389,  392 

V.  Ryder  285 

V.  Siinborne  484 

V.  Shannon  1958 

V.  Shattuck  309 

V.  Simkin  614 

V.  Sloan  1428 

V.  Stewart  1937 

V.  Tarrant  Co.  Agricultural 

Asso.  1386,  1568 

V.  Thomas       1109,  1380,  1441, 
1501 
V.  Thorp  1997 

V.  Titman  1146,  1147 

V.  Vail  915,  917,  919 

V.  Vallentine  1667,  1717 

r.  Vance  1129 

V.  Waco  564,  568 

V.  Walker  1389 

V.  Weber  893 

V.  Whitcomb  389 

V.  Wilder  540 

V.  Willamette,  T.  &  L.  Co. 

480,  1049 

r.  Williamson  1997 

V.  Woodall  1836,  1846 

V.  Worley  123 

Moorman  v.  Board  1818 

Moote  V.  Scriven  1340 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Moran  v.  Lezotte  324,  352,  398, 

400,  401,  412 

More  V.  Massini  324,  326,  472 

Moreau  r.  Saffarans  244 

Morehouse  v.  Heath  861 

Moreland  v.  Metz  •     968 

V.  Myall  1620,  1627 

V.  Page  381,  445 

V.  Richardson  1563 

Morey  v.  Hoyt  1768 

Moring  v,  Dickerson  1409,  1411, 

1414 
Morgan,  Ex  parte  256 

Morgan  v.  Bass  494 

V.  Bitzenberger  303 

V.  Clayton  1394,  1401 

V.  Donovan  1 78 

V.  Givens  386 

V.  Hannibal  &  St.  Jo.  R. 

Co.  921,  962 

V.  Henderson  903 

V.  Hudnell  1929 

V.  King  484 

V.  Morgan  616,  1899 

V.  Reading  480 

V.  Smith  874 

Morison  v.  New  York  Elevated 

R.  Co.  462 

Morland  o.  Cook  782,  789 

Morley  v.  Rennoldson  059 

Morrall  v.  Waterson  301 

Morrill  v.  Morrill  1441,  1499 

V.  Noyes  1729 

'        V.  Otis  1342 

V.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Rv. 

Co.  632,  643,  650,  691 

Morris's  Appeal        1668,  1670,  1712, 
1714,  1757 
Morris  v.  Beecher  1420 

V.  Clay  74 

V.  Daniels  1523,  1527 

V.  French  1(;91 

V.  Harris  1953,  1973 

V.  Henderson  1248 

V.  Hogle  1547 

V.  Jansen  995 

V.  Keil  1051,  1082 

V.  Keyes  1447 

V.  McCarty  1773,  1786, 

17.S7,  1794 
V.  Murray  1546,  1547,  1555 
V.  Pate  1415 

V.  Phelps  944,  945 

V.  Rowan      968,  981,  983,  985 
V.  Sargent  1196 

V.  State  241 

V.  Stephens  230 


Morris  v.  Tillson  295,  303 

V.  Tuskaloosa  Manuf.  Co. 

733,  767,  771,  780,  782 

V.  Vanderen  1395 

V.  Wadsworth  1483 

V.  White  1517 

Morris    Canal  &  Banking   Co.  v. 

Ryerson  295 

Morrison  v.  Bauseraer  1532,  1534 

V.  Berry  1668 

V.  Bowman  1040,  1042 

V.  Brown  1442 

V.  Funk  1406 

V.  Keen  478,  484 

V.  Kelly       1240,  1241,  1517, 

1522,  1563,  1568 

V.  March       1563,  1566,  1575 

V.  Mendenhall  245 

V.  Morrison  859,  1551 

V.  Neff  433 

V.  Robinson  1906 

V.  Underwood  928,  930, 

953,  956,  902,  967 

V.  "White  11.30 

Morrow  v.  Whitney  381 

V.  W^illiird  443,  463 

Morse  v.  Aldrich  786,  793 

V.  Carpenter  227,  244 

V.  Clayton        1159,  1162,  1105, 

1168 

V.  Curtis  1502,  1503 

V.  Godfrey  285,  1390 

V.  Hackensack  Bank  1028 

V.  Hayden  674,  1696 

V.  Hill  161 

V.  Morse  1436 

V.  Rogers        326,  381,  382,  4  24 

V.  Rollins  381 

V.  Shattuck  295,  302,  303, 

943,  948,  968 

V.  Slason  1234 

V.  Stockman  402 

V.  Wheoler  16 

V.  Woodworth        79,  82,  86,  90 

V.  Wright  1386 

Morton  v.  Lcland  1085,  1087 

V.  Lowell  1525 

V.  Morton  99 

V.  Nelson  1830 

V.  Robards  1404 

V.  Root  400 

V.  Smith  1155,  1371 

Mosby  V.  Arkansas  1328 

Mosely  v.  Mosely  1344 

V.  Withie  1874 

Moscr  V.  Miller  625,  626 

Moses  r.  Dude  118,1206 

cxvii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


1112,  1178 

1884 

944 

1527,  1528 

15<»1) 

1060 

1563 

109 

109 

1303 

330,  397,  184<; 

563,  578 

1190 

1969 

448,449,  453, 

454,  455 

V.  Whitemore  1783,  1800 

Mott  V.  Danville  Seminary       656,  719 

V.  Mott     448,  453,  454,  464,  488, 

490 


Moses  r.  DibroU 
V.  Koss 
V.  Wiillace 
Iklosluer  r.  Knox  College 
Mosier  r.  Caldwell 
Moss  V.  Andei-son 

V.  Atkinson 

V.  Averill 

V.  Moss 

V.  Riddle 

V.  Shear 

V.  Sheldon 
Motes  V.  Carter 
Motley  V.  Blake 
V.  Saro-ent 


V.  Palmer 

i\  Smith 
Motte  V.  Alger 
Motz  V.  Mitchell 
Moulton  p.  Egery 
V.  Faught 
V.  Libbey 
V.  Trafton 


Mount  V.  Kesterson 

V.  Morton 
Mountford  v.  Scott 
Moye  V.  Kittrell 
Mover  v.  Hinman 
Mudd  V.  Grinder 
Mueller  v.  Brigham 
V.  Engelin 
Muhlker  t".  Ruppert 
Muir  V.  Galloway 

V.  Jones 
Muldoon  V.  Deline 
Mul<lrow  V.  AVhite 
Mulford  r.  Le  Franc 
Mullaly  V.  Noyes 

Mullancy  v.  Duffy  , 

]\Iullanphy  Sav.  Bank  v.  Schott     1560 
Mullens  v.  Mortgage  Co.  18  7 

MuUer  v.  Bo^ss  1123,  1124,  1936 


847,  928,  1688, 

1737 

1028 

43 

82,  89 

402 

528 

476 

422,  457,  504, 

536,  557 

38 

1942 

1534 

526 

1563,  1571 

1963 

1499 

1547 

381 

1182,  1185,  1442 

1682,  1700 

326,  336 

602 

334,  340 

416 

358,  363,  380 


V.  Boone 
Mulligan  v.  Jordan 
V.  Newton 
Mulliken  v.  Graham 
Mullins  V.  Weaver 

V.  Wimberly 
Mullison's  Estate 
!Mulloy  V.  Ingalls 


1117,  1159 

774 

1627 

1513,  1517 

1181 

1563 

1515 

49,  99 


Mumford  v.  Brown  1895,  1898 

V.  Nicoll  1900 

?',  Ward  well  471 

r.  Whitney  1606,1627 

Mundy  u.  Vawter     '  1436,1517 

V.  Whittemore  88 

Munford  v.  Mclntyre  1406 

Munger  v.  Baldridge  1109,  1115, 

1159 

Munn  V.  Achey  1563,  1572 

V.  Burges  1565 

V.  Lewis  1441 

V.  Stone  558 

V.  Worrall  542 

Munnink  i\  Jung  323 

Munns  v.  Dupont  1092 

Munoz  V.  Wilson        1234,.  1240,  1282, 

1291,  1292 

Munro  v.  Meech  590 

V.  Merchant  167 

Munroe  v.  Eastman  1359,  1521 

V.  Hall  660 

V.  Luke  1884,  1922,  1967 

Munson  v.  Carter  97,  103 

V.  Ensor  1394,  1454 

Murdock  v.  Anderson  339,  346 

V.  Chapman  382,  383 

V.  Ford  1586 

V.  Gifford  1713 

V.  Gilchrist  303 

V.  Harris  1713 

Murley  v.  Sherren  65 

Murphy  v.  Copeland  488,  490 

V.  Hendricks  1436 

V.  Lee  503,  506,  528,  530 

V.  Nathans  1529 

V.  Paynter  95 

V.  Price       831,  850,  915,  928, 

943 

V.  Reynaud  1195 

V.  Ryan  480 

V.  S.  C.  &  Pac.  R.  Co.      1615 

V.  AVelch  1049 

V.  Williamson  1177 

Murray's  Estate  120 

Murray  v.  Ballou         970,  1508,  1527, 

1559,  1560 

V.  Blackledge  244 

V.  Gilbert  1605 

V.  Green  660,  662,  740 

V.  Hall  1922 

V.  Hobson      326,  330,  338,  339 

V.  Kelly  163 

V.  Kimball        1303,  1304,1314 

i^.  Klinzing  264,  426,  1340, 

1342,  1344 

V.  Lylburn  1559 


CXVIII 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Murray  v.  SlKuikliii  15,  20 

V.  Smith  295 

V.  Spencer  385 

V.  Stair  1224,  1309,  1310 

V.  Webster  1925 

Murrel  v.  Miirrel  "  292 

Murrell  v.  Diggs  1196 

V.  Mandelbaum  1942 

V.  Mathews  613 

Mnrry  v.  Sermon  485 

Musch  V.  Burkhart  1614 

Musgrove  v.  Bonser  1109,  1479, 

1499,  1511,  1514,  1517, 

1527 

Muskingum  Co.  f.  Glass  1151 

Mussehnan  v.  Cravens  54,  65 

Musser  i;.  Hyde  1451,  1472 

V.  Johnson  1082,  1123 

Mussey  v.  Scott  1041 

Mustard  v.  Wohlford        17,  20,  21,  23 

Mutual  Benefit  Life   Ins.    Co.    v. 

Brown  1000,  lOK),  1014 

Mutual   Benefit   Life   Ins.  Co.  v. 

Rowand  1431,  1450 

Mutual  Build.  Asso.  v.  Wveth         402 

Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bigler        1628 

V.  Corey        1092, 

1134,  1196 

v.  Dake         1451, 

1472,  1479, 

1480 

V.  Hunt  54 

V,  Sturges     1589, 

1824 

V.  Wilcox       1429 

Mutual  Loan  Asso.  v.  El  well  1413 

Muzzarelli  v.  Hulshizer  771 

Muzzy  1-.  Tonipkinson  108 

:Myatt  /•.  St.  Helen's,  &c.  Ry.  Co.     142 

V.  Walker  48 

Myers  v.  Anderson  609,  610 

V.  Boyd  1171,  1174 

V.  Buchanan  1485 

V.  Coal  Co.  14 

V.  Croft  235,  236 

V.  Daviess  708 

V.  Dunn  534 

V.  Knabe  55,  68 

V.  Ladd  321,  326,  339 

V.  McGavock  173,  175,  190 

V.  Picquet  1463 

V.  Reed  1792 

V.  Ross  1532 

V.  St.  Louis  386 

V.  White  1623 

Mygatt  V.  Coe  791,  793,  801,  928, 

935,  938,  940,  941,  942 


Myrick  v.  Bill 

1680 

V.  McMillan 

1087,  1109 

Naglee  v.  Alexandria  &  T 

Ry.  Co. 

142 

V.  Lyman 

285 

Nailor  v.  Nailor 

113 

Nairn  v.  Prowse 

280 

Naldred  v.  Gilham 

1277 

Nantz  V.  Bailey 

1159,  1188 

Nash  V.  Bean 

1400 

V.  Fugate 

1305 

V.  Palmer 

893 

V.  Simpson 

1958 

V.  Wilmington,  &c.  R.  Co.      423 
Nason  v.  Grant  1262 

Natal  Land  Co.  v.  Good  1513 

Natchez  v.  Minor  243 

V.  Vandervelde        354,  1942, 
1947 
Nathans  v.  Arkwright  2,  27 

National  Bank  v.  Conway  1125, 

1126,  1128 
V.  Hartman  224 

V.  King  1408 

V.  Kirk  88 

V.  Matthews  173, 

174,175,  181,  1054 
tj.  North       1669,1673, 
1702,  1703 
V.  Scriven  1119 

V.  Segur  738 

V.  Whitney       174,  175, 
1391 
National  Exchange  Bank  v.  Wat- 
son 280,  295,  298,  302 
National  Land  Co.  v.  Perry  700 
National  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Minch 

1539 
National  State  Bank  v.  Morse  1448 
National  Trust  Co.  v.  Murphy  186 

National  Union  Bank  v.  Segur         787 
Natoma  Water  &  M.  Co.  v.  Clar- 

kin  175,  181 

Nattinger  v.  Ware  1451,  14  75 

Nave  r.  Smith  1942,  1947 

Nay  V.  Mograin  1286 

Naylor  v.  Minock  1803 

Neal  V.  Kerrs  1499 

V.  Perkerson  1570 

Neal's  Trusts,  In  re  250 

Neale  o.  Lee  364 

Nealley  v.  Greenough  80 

Neary  v.  Jones  374 

Nebraska  r.  Iowa  485 

Needham  v.  Allison  1708 

V.  Bronson  1802 

cxix 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Xi'fly  r.  Ilix^kins 

641,  640,  652 

Noeson  r.  Bray 

911 

Negbauer  r.  Smith 

383,  3S4 

Nt'iile  c.  lVniiyi);K'ker 

1420 

Neidig  r.  Wliiteford 

lo,S4 

Neil  V.  Case 

i;i(;7 

V.  Shackelford 

1887,  1,SII2 

Neill  c.  Shanihurg 

1S27 

Neilson  r.  Iowa  Eastern  R. 

y.  Co. 

1430,  1433 

v.  Lagow 

593 

V.  AVilliams 

1721 

Neimeyer  v.  Knight 

723 

Nellis  V.  Muiison 

1499 

Nelson  v.  Brodhack 

331 

V.  Brush 

121, 140 

V.  Clay 

1887 

1906,  1981 

V.  Davis 

1880 

V.  Eaton 

144 

V.  Graff 

1157, 

1164,  1165 

V.  Hall 

381 

V.  Leake 

1898 

V.  McDonald 

1331 

,1336,1351 

V.  Nelson 

1609 

V.  Stocker 

6 

V.  Swan 

304 

V.  Wade 

1436 

Neponset  Land  Co.  v 

.  Dixo 

n            1563 

Neslin  v.  AVells 

1374, 

1420,  1460, 
1486,  1494 

Nesselrode  v.  Parish 

437 

Nettleton  v.  Sikes 

160.5,  1609 

Neuman  v.  Dreifurst 

1899 

New  V.  Wheaton 

1563, 

1575,  1578 

New  Albany,  &c.  R. 

Co.  V. 

Fields 

1009 

New  Albany,  &c.  R. 

Co.  V. 

Peter- 

son  1599 

Newberry  v.  Bulkley  1466 

Newbold  v.  Glenn  650 

V.  Peabody  Heights  Co. 

733,  771,  780 
V.  Smart      1853,  1862,  1866, 
1887 
New  Brunswick  &  N.  S.  Land  Co. 

V.  Kirk  1605 

Newburg  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Weare 

218 
New  Chester  Water  Co.  v.  Holly 
Manuf.  Co.  1668,  1680,  1730 


Newcomb  v.  Lewis 

445 

V.  Presbrey 

892,  1367 

V.  Raynor 

1627 

I'.  Smith 

1141 

Newell  V.  Fisher 

74 

V.  Hill 

647 

V.  Mayberry 

1349 

cxx 

Newell  V.  Woodruff     1865,  1866,  1870 
New  England   F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  o. 

Rubin  son  169,  181 

New  England   Iron  Co.  v.  Gill)crt 

El.  R.  Co.  1082,  1084 

New  England  Jewelry  Co.  v.  Mer- 

riani  1415 

New  England  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Spit- 

ler  52,  58,  62,  72 

New   England    Mar.    Ins.    Co.   v. 

De  Wolf  1041 

New  England  Mortg.  Security  Co. 

V.  Payne  187,  1134,  1198 

New  England  Wiring  Co.  v.  Farm- 

ington  Electric  Light  Co.  1111 

Newhall  v.  Burt  1467 

V.  Ireson  448,  455,  461 

i\  Kinney  1674 

V.  Pierce  1467,  1575,  1578 

V.  Wheeler  593 

New  Hampshire  Land  Co.  v.  Til- 
ton  182,428,1114 
Newhoff  V.  Mayo  552 
New  Ipswich  Factory  v.  Batchel- 

der  1635,  1639, 1652 

New  Jersey  Zinc  Co.  v.  New  Jer- 
sey Franklinite  Co.  1596 
New  Jersey   Zinc  &  Iron  Co.   v. 

Morris  Canal,  &c.  Co.  708 

Newlin  v.  Beard  1228,  1248 

Newlove  y.  Callaghan  1792,  J815 

Newman  v.  Bank  1936,  1937 

V.  Chapman  1559 

V.  Newman  1891 

V.  Rutter  678 

V.  Samuels    1159,  11.63,  1173, 

1208,  1215 

V.  Tymeson  331,  1436 

Newmarket  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Pender- 

gast  1879 

New  Orleans  /'.  United  States  485 

New  Orleans,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
ris 145 
New   Orleans  Canal  &  B.  Co.  v. 

Montgomery  1389 

New  Orleans   Nat.  Bank  v.  Ray- 
mond 1745 
New  Orleans  Pas.  R.  Co.  v.  United 

States  725 

Newpoint  Lodge  v.  Newpoint  650 

Newsom  v.  Kurtz  1380 

Newton  v.  Bealer  1243,  1247,  1276 

V.  Eddy  483,  490 

V.  Emerson     1002,  1006,  1018 

V.  McKay  224,  244 

V.  Marshall  1846 

New  York  r.  Hart  471 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


New  York  Annual  Conference  v. 

Clarkson  239 

New  York,  &c.  Land  Co.  v.  Gard- 
ner 363 
New  York  &  T.  Land  Co.  v.  Hy- 

land  1874,  1878,  1968,  1979 

New  York  Cent.   Ins.  Co.  v.  Nat. 

Protection  Ins.  Co.  1532,  1534 

New  York  Cent.  11.  Co.  v.  BufPalo 

&  N.  Y.  &  Erie  11.  Co.  1637 

New   York  Chemical  Manuf.  Co. 

V.  Peck  1588 

New  York  Dry  Dock  v.  Hicks        182, 

183,  186 
New  York,  Lake  Erie,  &c.  R.  Co. 

r.  Yard  471 

New  York  Land  Co.  v.  Thomson     435 

r.  Yotaw  387 

New  York  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cutler     1575 

New  York  Life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co. 

V.  Smith  1421 

New  York  Life   Ins.  &  Trust  Co. 

V.  Staats  1441 

New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  White 

1455,  1468 
New  York   Security  Co.  v.  Sara- 
toga Gas,  &c.  Co.  1723 
Ney  V.  Munmie  1937 
Niagara  Falls  Bridge  Co.  v.  Back- 
man  451 
Nice's  Appeal                         1463,  1478 
Nicodemus  v.  Young          219,  226,  990 
Nichol  V.  Alexander          850,  957,  997 
V.  Davidson  Co.                     1220 
i\  Henry                                   1479 
V.  Thomas                     54,  56,  6  7 
Nicholas  r.  Chamberlain       1654,  1660 
Nicholl  V.  Jones  160 
V.  New  York  &  E.  R.  Co.    723 
Nichols  V.  Denny                                1773 
V.  Eaton                                   664 
V.  Hampton                          1463 
V.  Howland                              488 
V.  Johnson                  1338, 1340 
V.  Lewis                          472,  476 
V.  Luce                         534,  1658 
V.  Manufacturing  Co.           486 
V.    New    Eng.    Furniture 

Co.  424,  430,  653 

V.  Nichols  1314,  1958 

V.  Overackcr  1415 

V.  Padficld  1942 

V.  Kevnolds  1451,  1472 

V.  Sm'ith  19  76 

V.  Stewart  1147 

V.  Suncook  Manuf.  Co.        484 
V.  Turney  381,  398 


Nicholson  v.  Bettle 
V.  Caress 


613 

896,  992,  1862, 

1866 

V.  Leavitt  189 

Nickel  V.  Brown  1382,  1463 

Nickerson  v.  Crawford  479,  484 

V.  Saunders  295,  305 

V.  Swett  1340 

Nicklin  v.  Betts  Spring  Co.  1462 

Nickum  v.  Danvers  1361 

>«'icolin  V.  Schneiderhan  381,  424 

Nicoll  V.  New  York  &  E.   R.  Co. 

708,  723,  727,  728,  729 

Niehaus  v.  Shepherd  484,  485 

Niell  V.  iNIorley  53,  69 

Nightingale  v.  Hidden  565 

Niland  v.  Murphy  1279 

Niles  V.  Patch  479 

Nippel  V.  Hammond    1177,  1185,  1821 

Nitche  V.  Earle  1463 

Nixon  V.  Cobleigh  217,  218,  1475 

V.  Hyserott  1033 

V.  Porter  380 

Noble  V.  Chrisman  363 

V.  Goigins  395 

V.  Hill  1878 

V.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  531,  547 

V.  McFarland    1871,  1892,  1919 

V.  Moses  108 

V.  Sylvester  1709,  1710 

Noblitt  I'.  Bet-be  1792 

Noell  V.  Gaines  1547 

Nolan  r.  Grant  1568,  1573 

Noland  v.  Wasson  321 

Noonan  v.  llsley  952 

I'.  Lee  340,  424,  429,  893, 

919 

Norcross  v.  Griffiths  480,  484,  488 

v.  James  787,  788,  793, 

795, 938 

V.  Norcross  1825,  1959 

V.  Widgery  1570 

Norcum  v.  Leary  364 

V.  Sheahan  20 

Nordholt  v.  Nordholt  2 

Norfleet  t-.  Cromwell  785,  798 

V.  Russell        1073,  1147,  1440 

Norfolk,  Case  of  Duke  of         649,  654 

Norfolk  City  v.  Cooke  4  71 

Norfolk  Trust  Co.  v.  Foster    335,  381 

Norman  i\  Cunningham  1793 

V.  Finch  943 

V.  Foster  858,  860 

V.  Towne  154  7 

V.  Wells  786,  787 

V.  Winch  953 

Norres  /•.  Hays  1372 

exxi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Referoncos  are  to  Sections. 


Norris'  Appeal  3  73,  374,  1431 

Norris  r.  Colorado  Turkey  Hone- 
stone  Co.  890 
V.  Dains             1040,  1042,  105(» 
V.  Dunn                                  1870 
V.  Freeman                             1104 
V.  Hensley                        610,  060 
V.  Hill                                     484 
V.  Hoyt                   163,  166,  167 
V.  Hunt           323,  337,  338,  339 
V.  Laberee                                643 
V.  Milncr                           708,  723 
V.  Sullivan                   1865,  1919 
i\  Vance  16 
North  V.  Knowlton                            1482 
V.  Philbrook                               593 
North  British  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hallett    1513 
Northeott  v.  Casper                            1874 
Northern  Pine  Land  Co.  v.  Bige- 

low  483,  492 

Northern  Transp.  Co.  v.  Chicago  182 
North  Hempstead  v.  Hempstead  243 
North    River   Meadow    Co.    v. 

Shrewsbury  Church  1359 

Northrop  i\  Marquam  1862,  18GG 

V.  Wright     1872,1873,1881 

Northrup  v.  Brehmer  1463,  1464 

V.  Hottenstein  1436 

Northwestern  Forwarding  Co.  v. 

Mahaffey  1404,  1405 

Northwestern    L.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Blankenship  54 

Northwestern   Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Blankenship  63,  67,  70 

Norton  v.  Babcock  962,  969,  975 

V.  Birge  1559,  1562 

IK  Colgrove  967 

V.  CoUins  1866 

V.  Conner  331,  424 

V.  Craig  1708 

V.  Davis  1188,  1195,  1213 

V.  Header  1139,  1183 

V.  Norton  100 

V.  Perkins  626,  701 

V.  Relly  106 

V.  Sand(!rs  125 

V.  Schmucker  893 

V.  Williams  1404 

Norvell  v.  Walker  1067,  1071 

Norwood  V.  Crawford       385,  442,  443 

Nosl(;r  V.  Huiit  952 

Nott  V.  Owen  1859 

V.  Thayer  4. S3 

Nottingham    Brick,  &c.  Co.    v. 

Butler  773,  774,  777,  785 

NowcU  V.  Boston  Academy  756 

Noyes  V.  Hall  1563,  1568 

cxxii 


Noyes  v.  Horr  1481 

r.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.        632 

649,  650,  690 

V.  Sturdivant  1466 

Nudd  V.  Hobbs  475,  476 

Nugent  P.  Priebatsch  1408 

Nute  V.  Nute  1517,  1522,  1523 

Nutting  V.  Herbert  303,  410,  943, 

945,  948,  951,  968,  1565 

Nyce  V.  Obertz  944 

Nye  V.  Hoyle  786,  791,  800 

V.  Lowry  1014,  1018,  1224, 

1240 

V.  Moody        334,  403,  424,  1437, 

1822 

Nys  V.  Biemeret  380 

Oakes  v.  De  Lancey        407,  472,  474, 

493 

V.  Marcy  127,  128 

V.  Oakes  1893 

Oakey  v.  Ritchie  99 

Oakland  Cemetery  Co.  v.  Bancroft 

1677 

Oakley  v.  Stanley  1639,  1652 

Oates  r.  Cooke  593 

V.  Hudson  89 

Oatman  v.  Fowler  137,6 

Oats  V.  Walls  1451,  1472,  1473 

Oberholtzer's  Appeal  1458 

Obernalte  v.  Edgar  364 

Obert  V.  Obert  1963,  1981 

Oblenis  v.  Creeth  472 

O'Brien  v.  Bailey  1958,  1959 

V.  Gaslin  27 

V.  King  466 

i^  McGrane  445 

V.  Pettis  1434 

V.  Wagner  638,  708,  718, 

722 

y.  Wetherell       190,657,671, 

694,  718 

O'Cain  v.  O'Cain  1070 

Occum  Co.  t'.  Sprague  Manuf.  Co. 

178 
Ocean  Beach  Asso.  v.  Yard  443 

Oceanic  Steamship  Co.  v.  Tappan     89 
Ochoa  V.  Miller  38,  318 

O'Connell  i'.  Brvant  448,  464 

O'Connor  y.  McMahan  1802 

V.  Nova  Scotia  Tel.  Co. 

448 

Oconto  Co.  V.  Hall  80 

V.  Jerrard  1451,  1479, 

1481 

Odell  V.  Buck  49 

V.  Cannon  638,  656 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Odell  v.  Odell  170 

O'Dell  V.  Rogers  27 

Odessa  Improvement  Co.  v.  Daw- 
son G71,  C94 
Odiorne  v.  Lyford                  1919,  1922 
V.  Mason                    1127,  1129 
Odle  V.  Odie                  1371,  1482,  1502 
Odom  V.  Riddick              54,  68,  69,  72 
V.  Weathersbee         1873,  1878, 
1880 
O'Donnell  v.  Johns  1034 
V.  Kelsey  483 
V.  Penney                 354,  364 
O'Farrel  v.  Harney                   431,  432 
O'Ferrall  v.  Simplot             1188,  1204, 

1207 
Oo;biirn  t'.  Whitlow  923,  925 

Ogdeu  V.  Ball  858,  919,  921,  928 

946,  952,  953 
V.  Brown  568,  665 

V.  Jennings       1637,  1639,  1651 
V.  Ogden  40,  44,  1314 

V.  Stock  1695,  1748 

V.  Walters  44,  254,  1482 

Ogdensburgh  v.  Lyon  482 

Ogilvie  V.  Copeland  433,  438 

Ogle  V.  Ogle  1409 

Oglesby  v.  Bingham  17  93 

V.  Hollister  1847,  1862, 

1864,  1866,  1870 
Ogontz  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  John- 
son 760 
O'Herrin  v.  Brooks                    381,  423 
Ohio  Life  Ins.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Ledyard 

1380,  1390,  1486,  1499 

Ohmer  v.  Boyer  295,  302 

O'Keefe  v.  Kennedy  893 

O' Kelly  V.  O'Kelly  1309 

Okison  V.  Patterson  264,  265 

Olcott  V.  Gabert        597,  649,  650,  655 

Old  Colony  R.  Co.  v.  Evans  169 

Old  South"  Society  v.  Wainwright  384 

Oliphant  v.  Burns  1506,  1560 

Olivant  v.  Wright  616 

Oliver  v.  Brown  339 

V.  Davy  1413 

V.  Dix  1040 

V.  Hawley  1342 

V.  Hedderly  1835,  1850 

V.  Houdlet  11 

V.  Mahoney  326 

V.  Montgomery  1S53 

V.  Oliver  1267,  1269 

V.  Piiitt  1397,  1508 

V.  Sanborn  1522 

V.  Stone  1217 

Olmstead  v.  Niles  1603 


Olney  u.  Sawyer  1836,1921 

O'Meara  v.  McDaniel  953,  981 

V.  North   American   M. 

Co.  214,  217,  1007 

O'Neal  V.  Brown  1267,  1269,  1272 

V.  Pettus  1485 

V.  Seixas  331,  1396,  1416 

O'Neil  V.  Webster      1112,  1113,  1202, 

1203 
O'Neill  V.  Nolan  56 

Oney  v.  Clendenin  1132 

Opdyke  v.  Stephens  338,  381 

Opening  of  Eleventh  Avenue,  Mat- 
ter of  449 
Oppenheimer  v.  Wright                  1447 
Ord  V.  Ord                                           1226 
Ordinary  v.  Thatcher           1220,  1222, 

1303 

Oregon  Trust  Co.  v.  Shaw     1424,  1427 

Orena  v.  Santa  Barbara  466,  46  7 

Orlando  v.  Gooding  1338 

Orme  v.  Roberts  1408 

Ormes  v.  Beadel  94 

Ormond  v.  Martin  1991 

Orr  V.  Clark  1218,  1220,  1234, 

1240,  1245,  1258 

V.  Hadley  358,  366 

V.  Hpdgson  165 

IK  How  244 

O'Rourke  v.  O'Connor         1408,  1566 

Orrick  r.  Durham  1547,  1552 

Ort  V.  Fowler  1335 

Orth  V.  Jennings  1404 

O'-thwein  i\  Thomas  1814 

Ortley  v.  Messere  12 

Orvill  V.  Newell  1482 

Orvis  V.  Newell  1498 

Osborn  v.  Osborn         1884,  1887,  1892 

i;.  Bobbins  79,  88,  91 

Osborne  v.  Anderson  324 

V.  Andrees  1351 

V.  Atkins  930 

V.  Endicott  257,  333 

V.  McMillan  830 

V.  Tunis  1049 

Osgood  V.  Abbott  619,  678,  688, 

708,  715,  724 

V.  Howard  1693 

V.  Osgood  962,  96  7 

Osmond  r.  Fitzroy  99 

Osterhout  v.  Shoemaker  53,  1217 

Osternian  v.  Baldwin  167 

O'Sullivan  v.  Overton  1104 

Otis  V.  Beckwith  1220,  1277 

V.  Browning  1331 

V.  Cusack  1942 

V.  Payne  1527 

cxxiii 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Otis  V.  Smith 
V.  Spencer 


1637,  1647 
1218,  1220,  1247, 
1251,  1513 
Ott  V.  Kri'iter  448,  468 

Ottnian  r.  Moak  29 

Ottor.  Doty  1234,  1236,  1243 

Ottumwa    Woollen     Mill    Co.    v. 
Hawley  1637,  1668,  1712,  1713, 

1717 
Oulds  V.  Sansoni  1<»26 

Ousby  V.  Jones  411,  412,  414 

Outland  V.  Bowen  230 

Overall  v.  Taylor  1515,  1521 

Overand  v.  Menczer  339,  402 

Overhiser  v.  McCollister         929,  931, 

990 

Overman  v.  Kerr  1252 

V.  Snsser  1666 

Overmyer  v.  Williams  169 

Overseers  v.  Sears  597 

Overstreet  v.  Manning  285,  1390 

Owen's  Case  573 

Owen  V.  Baker  1130,  1144,  1159, 

1164,  1165,  1179 

V.  Bartliolomew  364,  382 

V.  Cooper  579,  609 

V.  Field  628,  631 

V.  McGehee  1857 

V.  Morton  1873 

V.  Perry  1331 

t;.  Williams  527,1234. 

1235,  1272,  1307,  1309 

Owens  V.  Lewis  1600,  1602,  1606, 

1609,  1611 

V.  Miller  1466 

Owensboro  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grif- 

feth  691,  718 

Owings  V.  Freeman  390 

17.  Tucker        1263,  1282,  1448 

Owsley  V.  Owsley  657,  723,  726 

Oxford  V.  White  323 

Oxley  V.  Lane  660 

V.  Tryon  2 

Oxnard  f .  Blake  1289,  1296 

V.  Proprietors  1936 

Oxton  V.  Groves  448,  455,  463 

Pace  V.  Pace  664 

Pacific  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Brown  1532 

Pacific  R.  Co.  r.  Seely  178 

Pack  V.  Hansbarger  1404 

Packard  v.  Johnson  1862,  1866, 

1871,  1404 

V.  Ames      627,  632,  637,  649, 

650 

Packer  v.  Bird  471,  480,  481 

Paddack  v.  Pardee  412,  414 

cxxiv 


Paddack  r.  Potter 
V.  Pulsifer 


Pado-ett  V.  Cleveland 


1217,  1269 

99,  100,  101, 

103,  110 

166S,  1717, 

1721,  1746 

V.  Lawrence       221,  285,  1390 

Page  V.  Branch  1836,  1S74,  1878 

V.  Edwards  1736,  1741,  1755 

V.  Fall  River,  &c.  R.  Co.        1054 

r.  Heineberg  169,  170 

V.  Kendrick  288 

V.  Lashley  868 

i;.  ]\Iurray  773,805,811,813 

V.  Palmer  632,  648,  678,  693 

V,  Robinson  1 763 

V.  Ro<iers  1469 

V.  Waring  1482,  1562,  1566, 

1568 

V.  Webster  1846 

Paige  V.  Sherman  295,  303 

Paine  V.  Abercrombie  1517 

V.  Aldrich  49,  06 

V.  Benton  1391 

V.  French  1581 

V.  Mooreland  1406 

V.  Slocum  1929 

V.  Tucker  1035 

V.  Woods  477,  487,  495,  501 

Painter  v.  Pasadena,  &c.  Co.  506, 

518,  554,  555 

Pakenham's  Case  794,  942 

Palairet  v.  Snyder  638 

Palfrey  v.  Foster  551 

Palmer  v.  Bates  1575 

V.  Casjjerson  1963 

V.  Dodd  492 

V.  Dougherty  453 

V.  Ekins  258 

V.  Farrell  338,  479 

V.  Forbes  1729 

V.  Miller  2,  14,  15,  21 

V.  Palmer        1276,  1282,  1297, 

1581 

V.  Plank  Road  Co.        639,  718 

V.  Rvan  632,  635 

V.  Wall  889 

V.  Williams  1527 

Pancoast  v.  Duval  285,  1390 

V.  Travellers'  Ins.  Co.       187 

Pangburn  v.  Miles  364 

Paramore  i'.  Lindsey  1359,  1361 

Pardee  v.  Lindley  1342 

V.  '^I'reat  865 

Pardun  v.  Dobesberger  1185 

Parent  r.  W  aim  sly  163 

Parfitt  V.  Lawless  103 

Parham  v.  Thompson  1627 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Paris  V.  Lewis 
Parish  v.  Camplin 
V.  Murphree 
V.  Wheeler 
V.  White 
V.  Whitney 
Park  V.  Bates 
V.  Cheek 
V.  Mears 
V.  Park 
V.  Pratt 
Parke  v.  Kilham 
V.  Neeley 
Parker  v.  Bennett 
V.  Brown 


1531 

1981 

290 

151 

837,  853 

647,  798,- 882 

969 

943 

1092,  1097 

381 

140,  1792 

1925 

1463,  1547 

449,  1659,  1660 

842,  944,  954 


V.  Conner  1514,  1523,  1524 

V.  Duncan  103 

V.  Diistin  126  7 

V.  Foy  295,  303 

V.  Franiingham  469 

V.  Gerard  1955 

V.  Hill      1238,  1276,  1289, 

1448 

V.  Kane  1259,  1513,  1517 

V.  Kett  1123 

V.  Marks  990 

V.  Nichols  268,  269,  295, 

619,  723 

V.  Nightingale       742,  750,  771, 

773,  779,  780,  784,  822 

V.  Osgood    1510,  1511,  1563 

V.  Parker   674,  708,  853,  955, 

1220,  1240,  1241,  1252, 

1276 

V.  Proprietors  1862,  18  72, 

1878,  1880 

r.  Randolph  1396 

V.  Rogers  519 

V.  Scott  1451 

V.  Smith  449 

V.  Staniland  1620 

V.  Storts  1628 

V.  Washoe  Manuf.  Co.         1082 

V.  Whyte  738 

Parkersburg  Nat.  Bank  v.  Neal     1406 

Parkhurst  v.  Ilarrower  616 

V.  Hosford  1513 

Parkinson  v.  Ca])linger         1073,  1148 

V.  McQuaid  324,  384 

V.  Sherman  914 

Parkist  v.  Alexander  1416,  1417, 

1482,  1484,  1506 

Parks  V.  Boynton  445 

V.  Dial  1928 

V.  Hendricks  125 

V.  Hewlett  1071 

V.  Jackson  1559,  1562 


Parks  V.  Loomis         326,  382,  383,  384 

Parler  v.  Johnson  331 

Parmelee  v.  Railroad  Co.  635 

V.  Simpson  1276,  1289, 

1299,  1300 

Parmenter  v.  Oakley  1423 

V.  Pater  82 

Parmers  v.  Respass  104"2 

Paroni  v.  Ellison  -4  21 

Par  ret  u.  Shaubhut  1371,  1435, 

1442,  1469 

Parrish  and  Hazard's  Appeal        1431 

Parrott  v.  Avery  1220,  1236,  1286, 

1289 

V.  Raker  1298 

Parsell  v.  Thayer  1563,  1578 

Parsons  v.  Boyd  1782 

V.  Camp  1708 

V.  Clark  4  76 

V.  Copeland  1691,  1712, 

1713,  1746 

V.  Johnson  1658 

V.  Hill  13 

V.  Hind  1671 

V.  Hoyt  1559 

V.  Lent         1460,  1462 

V.  Miller  639,  728 

V.  Smith  1605 

V.  Winslow  659 

Partee  v.  Mathews  1259 

Partridge  v.  Badger  144 

V.  Chapman  1568 

V.  Hatch  944,  945 

V.  Hemenway  1 760 

V.  Patten  892 

V.  Russell  335,  375,  378 

V.  Smith        285,  1392,  1437 

Pascault  V.  Cochran  1410 

Paschall  v.  Passmore         623,  635,  641 

Passumpsic    Sav.    Bank   v.    First 

Nat.  Bank       1514,  1522, 1544, 1555, 

1556 
Pastel  r.  Palmer  1396 

Patch  V.  Keeler  338 

V.  White  338 

Patching  v.  Dubbins  774,  780 

Pate  V.  Mitchell        928,  953,  962,  964, 

974 

Patent  File  Co.,  In  re  144 

Patman  v.  Harland  780 

Patrick  v.  Howard  1292,  1294 

('.  Leach  303,  948,  968 

V.  McCormick  1314 

V.  Marshall  1981 

Patten  u.  Moore  1527,1563,1570, 

1578 
V.  Stitt  355,  366 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Patterson  r.  Arthurs  885,  f>12 

V.  Ball  1448 

V.  Carneal  .'512 

V.  De  la  Ronde  1372 

V.  Delaware  Co.  16G8 

V.  Downer  658 

V.  Forry  1108 

V.  Langston  1378 

V.  Lanning  1952 

V.  Linder  1404 

r.  Martin  1942,1945, 

1947 
V.  Moore  675,  582 

K.Nixon  121,136,138, 

140 
V.  Pease  1085,  1086 

V.  Snell        1234,  1269,  1289 
V.  Wabash,  &c.  Ry.  Co. 

1102 

V.  Yancy  861 

V.  Yeaton  1262 

Pattinson  v.  Luckley  1346 

Pattison's  Appeal        1600,  1603,  1627 

Pattison  v.  Hull  1619 

Patton  V.  Eberhart  1389 

V.  Hollidaysburg  1573 

V.  McFarlane  914 

V.  Moore  1712,  1716 

V.  Quarrier  885 

V.  Rankin  1812,  1814 

V.  Wagner  1954 

Pattv  V.  Middleton  1525 

Patureau  v.  Wilbert  1912 

Paul  V.  Carver  448,  455,  461 

V.  Connersville    &  N.   June. 

R.  Co.  728,  1518,  1569 

V.  Fulton  1527 

V.  Hoeft  1497 

V.  Witman  1934 

Paxson  r.  Brown  1485,  1522 

Paxton  V.  Bailey  131 

V.  Marshall     1196,  1198,  1207, 

1447 

Payne  v.  Abercrombie  1515,  1547 

V.  Atterbury  3^6 

V.  Bensley  285 

V.  English  467 

V.  Mathis  225 

V.  Parker  816,  318,  1004 

V.  Pavey  1472 

Payson  v.  Burnham  756,  758,  771, 

785,  806,  817 

Pea  V.  Pea  862,  1682 

Peabody  i\  Brown  219,226 

v.  Fenton  1387 

V.  Hcwett  316,  1004 

V.  Kendall  101 

cxxvi 


Peabody  Heights  Co.  v.   Sadtler 

448,461,463 

V.  Wilson   733, 

734,  771,  780, 

781,  807 

Peaceable  v.  Read  1872 

Peachy  v.  Somerset  732 

Peacock  v.  Monk  297 

V.  Penson  778 

V.  Pulvis  1627 

V.  Tompkins  1178 

Peak  V.  Swindle  1952 

Pearce  v.  Dansforth  1290 

V.  Moore  122,  140 

Pearl  v.  Hervey  1414 

V.  McDowell  52 

Pearne  v.  Coal  Creek  Co.  534 

Pearson  v.  Carlton  1891,  1892 

i\  Cox  54 

r.  Davis  1087,  1404 

V.  Ford  957 

V.  Hartman  556 

V.  Howey  1129 

V.  Powell  1452 

Peart  v.  Brice  323,  339 

Pease  v.  Barbiers  1188 

V.  Coats  768 

i\  Gibson  559 

V.  Lawson  1065 

Peasley  v.  McFadden  1563,  1566 

Peavy  v.  Tilton  156,  1240 

Peay  v.  Briggs  •  398 

Peck  w.  Batchelder  1702 

V.  Brummagim  42 

V.  Carpenter  1884,  1887 

V.  Cary  74,  75 

V.  Clark  541 

V.  Conway        756,  771,  777,  780, 

782,  784,  798,  823 

V.  Denniston     448,  449,  453,  464 

w.  Hensley  923,927 

V.  Honghtaling  849,  892 

V.  Lofkridge        1838,  1866,  1868 

V.  Mallams  310,  1468, 1469, 

1472 

V.  Matthews  814 

V.  Peek  1837 

I'.  Smith  448,455,457,461, 

542 

V.  Vandenberg        265,  295,  298, 

301 

V.  Ward  1873 

V.  Williams  1404,  1975 

Peckham  v.  Hendren  87 

V.  Millikan  1989 

V.  Stewart  215 

Peden  v.  Cavins  1986 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Peden  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  632, 

635 

Peebles  v.  Horton  91) 

I'.  Reading  1513 

Peek  V.  Matthews  773.,  8U4 

Peet  V.  Dakota  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co. 

1668 
Peine  v.  AVeber  1832 

Peirce  v.  Goddard  1691,  1692 

Pell  V.  McEh-oy  1575,  1576,  1578 

Pemberton  v.  Williams  89 

Pence  v.  Arbuckle        1199,  1331,  1335 
V.  Armstrong  324 

V.  Diivall  928,  968 

Pendill  v.  Marquette  County  Ag. 

Soc.  991 

Pendleton  v.  Button  1136 

V.  Pomeroy  1239 

Penfield  v.  Dunbar  1527 

Penhallow  y.  Dwight  1627 

Penman  v.  Hart  1463 

Penn  v.  Cox  1781,  1793 

V.  Garvin  1126 

V.  Glover  893 

Pennel  v.  Weyant  1288,  1289 

Pennell  v.  Felch  621 

Penniman  r.  Hartshorn  1002 

Pennington  v.  Flock  323,  400 

V.  Pennington  1252,  1268, 

1271 

Pennock  V.  Coe  1729 

v.  Hoover  1431 

Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Dovey  1218 

Pennsylvania    Mut.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Semple  1712 

Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  New  York 

&  L.  B.  R.  Co.  471 

Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 

&c.  R.  Co.  142 

Pennsvlvania   Salt  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Neel  265,  294,  307,  309,  1423, 

1464 

Penny  v.  Corwithe  1356 

Pennybecker  v.  McDougal  16  78 

Penry  v.  Richards  381,  424,  425, 

431,  432, 

Peoples  V.  Bartels  1127,  1128 

People  V.  Bostwick  1303,  1314 

V.  Bristol  1453,  1469 

V.  Brown  725 

V.  Canal  Appraisers  471, 

481,  484 

i;.  Collins  1122 

V.  Conklin  166,  16  7 

V.  Fire  Association  1H3 

V.  Folsom  16  7 

V.  Galloway  1196 


People  v.  Gilon  871 

V.  Henderson  491,  492 

V.  Jones  472,  480,  481,  484 

488,  490,  499,  501 
V.  Kellogg  451 

V.  La  Rue  169,  176 

V.  Lunipke  323 

V.  Madison  Co.  478,  484 

V.  Manning  674 

V.  Mayor  of  New  York  13S 

V.  Miller  992 

I'.  Murray  1002 

t'.  Muzzy  1340 

V.  New  York  &  L.  I.  Ferry 

Co.  470,  471 

V.  Organ  1328 

V.  Reed  449 

V.  Rogers  164 

V.  Schermerhorn  409 

V.  Snyder        1130,  1238,  1248, 
1447 
V.  Society  for  Propagation 

of  the  Gospel       694,  696, 
711,  723,  728 
V.  Stahl  354 

V.  Storms  1436 

r.  Supervisors  488 

V.  Tibbetts  471,    472 

V.  Vanderbilt  4  71 

People's  Building  &  Loan  Asso.  v. 

Billing  1807 

People's  Gas  Co.  i'.  Tyner  1598, 

1599 
Pepin  Co.  v.  Prindle       638,  656,  658, 

684,  718 
Pepper's  Appeal  1420 

Pepper  v.  George  1532 

V.  Haight  133 

Pequawkett  Bridge  u.  Mathes        106  7 
Percifull  i'.  Piatt  244,  245 

Percy  f.  Milhiudon  1904 

Perdue  v.  Aldridge  1380 

Pere    Marquette     Boom    Co.    v. 

Adams  492 

Pereau  v.  Frederick  1205,  1342, 

1350,  1448 

Pereles  r.  Magoon  445 

Perkins,  In  re  52 

Perkins  v.  Aldrich  536 

V.  Carter  1194 

r.  Coleman  933 

V.  Dilfble  254 

V.  Gay  356,  358,  36  7 

V.  Perkins  48 

V.  Stock  well  503,  559 

V.  Strono;         1451,  1472,  1479 

V.  Swank  1390 

oxxvii 


TARLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Perkins  v.  West 
Perli-y  v.  Chase 
IVrininter  r.  :McDaniel 
Pernain  v.  Woad 
Pen-in  r.  Blake 

V.  Railroad  Co. 

V.  Heed 
Perry  r.  Burton 

V.  Carr 


1563 
1G28 
1331 

381 
601,  602 

448 
1458 
1108 
1708 


V.  Central  So.  R.  Co.  !>48 

V.  Clark  322,  847 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  548, 

1637 
?;.  Porter  1220 

r.  Price  265,266,267,312 

V.  Scott  337,  339,  349,  409, 

643,  649 
Person  r.  Chase  13 

Peru  Iron  Co.,  Ex  parte  181 

Peter  v.  Russell  1580,  1582 

V.  Stephens  18G6 

V.  Wri-ht  1315 

Peters  v.  Bowman  903 

V.  Cartier  1396 

V.  Clements  154  7 

V.  Farnsworth  1033 

V.  Goodrich  1482 

V.  Grubb  858,  909 

V.  Ham  1436,  1499 

V.  McKeon  968,  970,  981 

V.  Westborough  744 

Peterson  v.  Fowler  1963 

V.  Horn  blower  1415 

V.  Kil<j;ore  1448 

V.  Laik       2,  21,  24,  26,  1519 
V.  McCauley  1506,  1525, 

1529 
V.  Skjelver  433,  435,  437 
V.  Ward  326 

Petrier.  Folz  968,  971,  9  74 

Pettee  v.  Case  646 

V.  Hawes  505,  540,  1652 

Pettibone  v.  Hamilton  449 

Pettigrew  v.  Dobbelaar  346 

Pettingill  v.  Devin  1396 

V.  Porter  534 

Peychaud  v.  Citizens'  Bank  1484 

Peyser  v.  Mayor  89 

Peyton  v.  Peacock  1446 

Pfeaff  V.  Jones  1463 

Pfeiffer  v.  IMatthews  799 

V.  University  1968 

Phelan  v.  Boyd  1712 

V.  Boy  Ian  1846 

V.  Brady  1563,  1567,  1568 

i;.  Gardner  75 

V.  Kelly  1921 

cxxviii 


Phelan  r.  Smith  1871 

Phelps  V.  Chesson  708,  712,  715 

V.  Fockler         285,  1390,  1393, 

1404,  1409 

V.  Green  1963 

V.  Jepson  1781 

U.Phelps  44,1288,1290 

V.  Simons  1796,  1812 

V.  Townsley  1959 

V.  Webster  454,  463 

V.  Zuschlag  79 

Philadelphia  v.  Girard  708 

V.  Philadelphia        & 

Reading  R.  Co.   1648 
V.  Reeves  989 

V.  Scott  471 

Philadelphia  &  Reading  R.  Co.  v. 

Lehigh  Nav.  Co.  1788 

Philbrick  v.  Ewing  1661 

Philips  V.  Bank  1420,  1513 

V.  (ireen  '- 

V.  Lumber  Co.  527 

Phillip  V.  Phillips  534 

Phillipi  V.  Leet  ^^93 

Phillips  V.  Bishop  1196,  1205 

V.  Bonsall  989 

V.  Bowers     455,  461,  463,  464 

V.  Chamberlain  1906 

V.  Coffee  1049,  1080,  1082 

V.  Costley  1563 

V.  Davis  582 

V.  Gregg  1862 

V.  Green  14,  21,  1185 

V.  Hodges      1382,  1783,  1800, 

1802 

V.  Houston  1271,  1309 

V.  La  Forge  613 

V.  Moore  167 

V.  Pearson  1478 

V.  People  1143,  1155 

V.  Porter  398 

V.  Reichart  968 

V.  Thompson  582 

z?.  Winslow  150,  1729 

V.  Wooster  289 

Phillipson  V.  Flynn      1866,  1874,  1875 

Philly  IK  Sanders  1487 

Philpot  V.  Bingham  4 

V.  Sandwich  Manuf.  Co.        30 

Phinney  v.  Watts  495 

Phipps  I'.  Hope  1233 

;'.  Phipps  1846 

V.  Tarpley  943,  968 

Phffinix    Ins.    Co.    i'.   Continental 

Ins.  Co.  786 

Phoenix  Mills  v.  Miller         1686,  1712, 

1748 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Physio-Medical  College  v.  AVilkin- 

son  54,  58,  67,  70 

Piatt  V.  Hubbel  1940,  1942,  1947 

V.  St.  Clair  1846 

V.  Yattier  1529 

Pibus  V.  Mitford  '      607 

Pickard  v.  Sears  1328,  1580 

Pickens  v.  Delozier  121 

V.  Knisely       1159,  1182,  1190, 

1191,  1196,  1198,  1201, 

1205, 1206,  1207 

V.  Rymer  1067 

V.  Webster  1626,  1627 

Pickering  v.  Lomax  662 

V.  Pickering  1898,  1906 

V.  Stapler  1652 

Pickett  V.  Barron  1387,  1390,  1427 

V.  Doe  1159 

V.  Foster  1372 

V.  Nelson  340,  855,  364, 

367,  438 

V.  Sutter  74 

Pickler  v.  State  4 

Pickman  v.  Trinity  Church  898 

Pico  V.  Columbet  1887 

I'.  Gallardo  146  7 

Picot  V.  Paije  1836,  1953,  1973 

Pidge  V.  Tyler  1112,  1113 

Pierce  r.  ^tna  Life  Ins.  Co.  1591 

V.  Brew  295,  297 

V.  Brown  1111,  1167 

V.  Chace  1793,  1803 

V.  Emery     141,  142,  145,  1682, 

1729,1736 

V.  Faunce  1529 

V.  George         1712,  1732,  1736, 

1737,  1746 

V.  Georger  1207 

V.  Hakes  1014,  1018 

V.  Indseth  1064 

V.  Jackson  1416 

r.  Rollins  1958 

V.  Selleck  534 

V.  Somersworth  239 

V.  Spear  1463 

r.  Taylor  1506,1557 

V.  Woodward  744 

Piercy  v.  Crandall  "  381 

Pierrepont  v.  Barnard  1600,  1606, 

1609 

Pierson  v.  Armstrong  312 

V.  Conley  1875,  1982 

V.  Lane  602 

Piggott  V.  Stratton  780 

Pigot's  Case  1338 

Pike  I'.  Armstead  1499 

l:  Bacon  1018,  1832 


Pike  r.  Clark 

39 

V.  Collins 

1547 

V.  Dyke 

432 

V.  Galvin 

892,  1487 

V.  Goodnow 

1546 

V.  Hayes 

375 

V.  Hood 

486 

V.  INIoiiroe 

476,  479,  481 

I'.  Robertson 

1563 

Pilcher  c.  Rawlins 

1547 

Pillow  V.  King 

1228,  126!) 

V.  Roberts 

1064 

1-.  Southwest  Va.  Imp.  Co. 

1866, 1872 
Pillsbury  v.  Alexander  990 

v.  Mitchell  931,  962,  967 

Pinckard  v.  Milmine  256 

Pinckney  v.  Burrage  1163,  1178 

Pingry  i:  Watkins  338 

Pinkum  v.  Eau  Claire       695,  727,  729 
Pinney's  Will  55 

Pioneer  Sav.  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Farn- 

ham  315,  1633 

Piper  V.  Chippewa  Iron  Co.  1123 

V.  Connelly  424 

V.  Richardson  167 

V.  L'nion  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  723 

Pipes  V.  Buckner  1942,  1047 

Pipkin  V.  Allen  404 

Pique  r.  A  rend  ale  1564 

Pironi  v.  Corrigan  103,  115.  271 

Pitcher  v.  Barrows  1371 

V.  Dove  359 

V.  Laycock        2,  13,  20,  21.  31 

V.  Livingston        943,  952,  957, 

968, 970,  981, 984 

Pitkin  I'.  Leavitt  919,  924,  925 

r.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  795 

Pitman  v.  Conner  295,862 

V.  Kitner  1049 

Pits  r.  James  235 

Pitt  V.  Smith  74,  76 

Pittman  v.  Sofley  1513,  1517 

Pittenger  v.  Pittenger  76 

Pitts  r.  Hendri.K  1619 

V.  Sheriff  44,  46,  1224,  1248, 

1269 

Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

O'Brien  1794 

Pixley  V.  Huggins  1404 

Place  V.  Faug  1718 

Plant  V.  Gunn  80,  85 

V.  Shrvock  1517 

V.  Sniythe  1404 

Piatt  V.  Bente  395 

V.  Eiigleston  799 

V.  Piatt  619 

cxxix 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Piatt  r.  Squire  15-21,  151S2 

V.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.       146,  147 
Plavter  v.  Cunningham  893,  915 

Pleasants  r.  Bludgett  1396,  1563 

Plenny  v.  FiM-rcU  402 

Plowman  c.  Williams  869 

Plumb  r.  Bav  1404 

V.  Fliiitt  1544 

r.  Tubbs        657,  671,  704,  705, 
718 
Plume  V.  Bone  1463 

Plumer  v.  Johnston  449 

V.  Plumer  1708 

V.  Prescott  559 

r.  Robertson  1571,1572 

Plummer  V.  Gould  412,  414 

V.  Iron  Co.  538 

V.  Neile  681 

V.  People  88 

Plyler  v.  Elliott  1348 

Plymouth  v.  Carver  647 

Poev.  Domec  195,312 

Poignand  v.  Smith  134 

Point  Street  Iron  Works  v.  Sim- 
mons 828 
Point  Street  Iron  Works  v.  Turner 

981,  985 
Poitevent  v.  Hancock  County         650, 
679,  686,  687 
Poland  V.  Lamoille  Valley  R.  Co. 

1588,  1589 

Polhemus  v.  Emson  1963 

Polk  V.  Chaison  1547 

V.  Cosgrove  1472,  1547 

V.  Faris  602 

Pollak  v.  Davidson        1515,  1523,  1524 

Pollard's  Estate,  In  re  1777 

Pollard  V.  Hagan  471 

V.  Lively  1376,  1458 

V.  Maddox  1090 

V.  Union  Nat.  Bank  590 

PoUey  V.  Johnson  1619,  1627 

Pollock  ;'.  Morris  448,  454,  455, 

456 

V.  Speidel  613,  615 

Pomeroy  r.  Bailey  290,  295 

V.  Latting  1496 

Pomet  '•.  Si'ranton  1484 

Pomroy  v.  Stevens       1510,  1511,  1563 

Pond  V.  Bergh  346 

V.  Minnesota  Iron  Co.  334 

Ponder  v.  Scott  1519 

Pool  V.  Blakie  568 

V.  Buffum  1011 

V.  Chase  1196,  1198,  1204 

V.  Davis  1228,  1248 

Poole  r.  Jackson  1093 

cxxx 


Poor  V.  Considine 

593 

V.  Oakman 

1748 

V.  Robinson 

139 

Pope  V.  Allen 

1663, 

1568 

V.  Harkins 

1884 

V.  Ilenry 

1435, 

1940 

V.  Jackson 

1670 

V.  O'Hara 

1659 

V.  Pope 

1532 

V.  Whitehead 

1981 

Poplin  r.  Mundell 

1451,  1472, 

1480 

Porche  v.  Bodin  1619,  1626,  1627 

Port  V.  Embree  1393,  1436 

Porter  v.  Androscoggin  &  K.  R. 

Co.  1049,  1080 

V.  Bleiler  1930 

V.  Bradley  868,  944,  958, 

959,  974 
V.  Bryne  1436 

V.  Buckingham  1218,  1287 

V.  Cole  1218 

V.  Eaton  1891 

V.  Green  1389 

V.  Hill  996,  1862,  1940 

V.  Judson  1151 

17.  King  1427 

V.  Noves  861 

V.  Perkins  209,  1940 

V.  Pittsburgh        Bessemer 

Steel  Co.  1748 

V.  Read  589 

V.  Robinson  264 

V.  Sevey  1511, 1563 

V.  Sullivan  479,  892 

V.  Woodhouse  1237,  1267, 

1312 

Portington's  Case  654 

Portland  v.  Terwilliger  632,  643, 

649,  675 
Portwood  V.  Outton  1439 

Portz  V.  Schantz  1448 

Posner  v.  Bavless  1021,  1042 

Post  r.  Campau  852,  873,  930 

V.  First  Nat.  Bank  92,  1196 

V.  Weil        632,  641,  642,  657,  723 
Potomac  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Upper 

Potomac  Steamboat  Co.  471 

Potter  V.  Cromwell      1668,  1672,  1713 
V.  Dooley  1451.  1469 

V.  Gracie  278,  295 

V.  Herring  1852 

V.  McDowell  1404,  1408 

V.  Stransky  1427,  1441 

V.  Tavlor  930 

V.  Thornton  170 

V.  Tuttle  828,  1394 

V.  Washburn  251 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Potter  V.  Woodruff  99 

Pottkamp  I'.  Buss  422 

Potts  ('.  Blackwell  1392 

j;.  Cantoa  Warehouse  Co.      381, 
467 
V.  New  Jersey  Arms  &  Ord- 
nance Co.  1712,  1731 
Potwin  V.  Blasher  986 
Poull  V.  Mockley         '  695 
Poutz  V.  Reggio                                  1372 
Powe  V.  McLeod                            40,  4  4 
Powell  V.  Campbell                 1559,  1560 
V.  Clark                            398,  898 
V.  Glenn                                   617 
V.  Haley                                   1517 
V.  Jeffries                                1374 
t'.  Jones                                  1908 
V.  Monson      &      Brimfield 

Manuf.  Co.  316,  1717 

V.  Morisey  580 

V.  Pearlstine  1348,  1350 

V.  Rich  1621 

Powers  V.  Bryant  1151 

V.  Dennison      848,  1736,  1745 

V.  Jackson  331,  388,  424, 

432,  437 

V.  M'Ferran  13.S3 

u.  Minor  1245 

V.  Patten  993,  998 

V.  Powers  644 

V.  Russell  1292 

Powis  V.  Smith  1930 

Pownal  V.  Taylor  646 

Poyas  V.  Wilkins  120 

Poydras  v.  Laurans  1563 

Prather  v.  Prather  1984 

Pratt  V.  Barker  107 

V.  Battels  1185 

V.  Clemens  1005,  1061,  1114 

V.  Coman  1393 

V.  Eaton  831 

V.  Holman  1304 

V.  Lanison  477 

V.  Nixon  261 

V.  Pierce  120 

V.  Potter  1450 

V.  Pratt  992 

V.  Topeka  Bank  1415 

V.  Woodward  389 

Pratte  >:  Coffman  1619 

Pray  r.  Pierce  313,  1380 

V.  Stebhins  1793,  1802,  1803, 

1811 

Preachers'  Aid  Society  v.  England 

593 
Preble  r.  Baldwin  295,  305,  864 

Prentice  r.  Acliorn  74 


Prentice  c.  Duluth  Storage  Co.     1371, 

1394,  1435,  1445 

V.  Janssen  1900,  1901 

V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.     325, 

411 

I'.  Stearns  325,  326 

Prentiss  v.  Brewer  338 

Presbrey  v.  Presbrey  1819 

Prescott  V.  Beyer  1383 

V.  Hawkins  335,  35S 

V.  Hayes  310,  1122 

V.  Nevers       1866,  1879,  1880 

V.  Prescott  616 

V.  Trueman         852,  873,  875, 

930,  950,  953,  96  7 

V.  Williams  878 

Preston  r.  Boston  87,  89 

V.  Bowmar  395 

V.  Brant  1970 

V.  Breckinridge  138 

V.  Briggs  1767 

V.  Evans  1112 

V.  Fryer  40 

V.  Hull  1328,  1329 

r.  Nash  1386,  1563 

V.  Robinson  322,  1819 

V.  Ryan  1G2  7 

V.  Wright  1855 

Prettyman  v.  Goodrich         1296,  13.")1 

Prewit  V.  Wilson  281,  291 

Prewitt  V.  Ashford  990,  1324 

Pribble  v.  Hall  1182,  1204 

Price  V.  Bell  1563 

V.  Berrington  68,  69,  73 

V.  Bray  ton  1613 

V.  Deal  928,  943,  944,  974 

V.  Ferguson  338 

V.  Furman  23,  31,  33 

V.  Hall       1866,  1870,  1881 

V.  Haynes  1085 

V.  Hudson  1217,  1218,  1220, 

1226,  1254,  1267,  1314 

V.  Jenks  1712 

V.  Jennings  5,  13 

V.  McDonald  1109,  1442, 

1478,1511,1521,1522,1554 

V.  Malott .  1699 

V.  Martin  1531 

V.  Parker  12S4 

V.  Pittsburgh,  Ft.  W.  &  C. 

R.  Co.  1304,  1307,  1324 

V.  Pollock  2(;i 

V.  Sisson  579 

'■•  Taylor  612,  613 

('.  Thompson  452 

1'.  Weehawken  Ferry  Co.     1748 
V.  White  1501 

cxxxi 


TABLE    OK   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Priebard  r.  Atkinson        881,  882,  879 

V.  Sharp  80 

Pridgen  r.  Pridgen  1094 

Priest  V.  Cunimings  8,  1196 

r.  Rire  1407,  1408 

Prignon  v.  Daiissat  281,  282,  1291) 

Primm  c.  Raboteau  495 

r.  Walker  485,  1977 

Primrose  r.  Browning  157(1 

Prince  r.  Blackburn  1106 

I'.  Boston  872 

v.  Case  1488,  1736,  1745 

Princeton  M.    Co.  v.    First    Nat. 

Bank  163 

Pringle  i\  Dunkley  659 

V.  Dunn     1109,  13  71,  1435 

1441,  1442,  1451,  1469, 

1481,  1522,  1529,  1531, 

1532,  1540,  1547 

Printup  r.  Mitchell  1367 

V.  Turner  244 

Prior  V.  Scott  400 

V.  Swartz  475 

Pritchard  r.  Bailey  660,  G62 

V.  Brown  303,  1563 

I',  James  583,  584 

V.  Kalamazoo  College     1426 

V.  Young  358 

Proctor  r.  Pool  326,  381 

Prodiiers  v.  Langhara  283 

Prosser  v.  Edmonds  290 

Prout  V.  Wiley  21,  24 

Prouty  V.  Edgar  2 

Provart  v.  Harris  1267 

Provident  Life  &  T.  Co.  v.  Fiss       937 

Provost  V.  Calder  531 

Prudden  v.  Railroad  Co.  449 

Pruitt  r.  Ellington  1925 

V.  Holly  1846 

Pruner  v.  Bisbin  389,  434,  439 

Prutsman  v.  Baker    1234,  1267,  1271, 

1303,  1307,  1309,  1312 

Pry  V.  Pry  323,  1353,  1379 

Pryor  v.  Coulter  1040 

Pryse  v.  McGuire  892,  903 

Puckett  V.  McDaniel  1866,  1879, 

1968 

V.  Reed  1568 

V.  Smith  1884 

Pugh  V.  Mays  694 

Pullan  V.  Cincinnati   &  Chicago 

Air-Line  Co.  145,  1729 

Pullen  V.  Bell  1693 

Pulvertoft  r.  I'ulvertoft  293 

Purcell  V.  Enright  1566 

V.  Goshorn         316,  318,  1182, 

1212 

cxxxii 


Purcell  V.  Wilson  1877 

Purczcll  V.  Siuidt  166 

Purdy  r.  Huntington  1420,  1423, 

1424,1127,1428,1462,1467 

Purkiss  V.  Benson  448 

Purner  v.  Piercy  1616,  1620 

Purviance  v.  Jones  1269 

Pusey  V.  Desbouvrie  356 

Putnam  v.  Bicknell  40,  44 

V.  Gleason  602 

V.  Putnam  Machine  Co.      367 

V.  Stewart  489 

V.  Tuttle  559 

r.  White  1417 

V.  Wise  1927 

Putney  v.  Day  1603 

V.  Dresser  1780 

V.  Farnham  305 

Fyerv.  Carter  1663 

Pyle  r.  Cravens  4,  1023 

V.  Oustatt  1361,  13G5 

r.  Pennock  1668 

Pynchon  v.  Stearns  516,  565,  6  70 

Quackenboss  v.  Lansing  735 

Queen  v.  St.  Paul  1064 

Quick  V.  Milligan      1292,  1314,  1316, 

1317,  1318,  1575 

V.  Nitschelm  358,  366 

V.  Taylor  873,  880,  882 

Quigley  «.  Birdseye  16  7 

Quinby  v.  Manhattan  Cloth  & 

Paper  Co.      1668,  1670,  1672,  1717, 

1721 
Quincy  v.  Ginsback  1423 

Quinn  v.  Heart  389,  431 

V.  Logan  1460 

Quinnerly  v.  Quinnerly  1501 

Quinrim  v.  Reimers  424 

Quirk  V.  Thomas  1528 

Rabsuhl  v.  Lack  295 

Racine  v.  Case  Plow  Co.  431 

V.  Emerson  371,  466 

Rackleff  v.  Norton      1130,  1133,  1134, 

1167 

Rackley  v.  Chesnutt  599 

Racouillat  w.  Rene  1439,  1547 

V.  Sansevain  167,  1026, 

1439,  1478 

Radford  v.  Edwards  338,  344 

i;.  Willis  678 

Radich  v.  Hutchins  81 

Rafferty  v.  Mallory  1547 

.  Ragan  v.  McElroy  175,  1887 

Ra"-o-en  ?i.  Avery  1086 

Radand  v.  McFall  1054 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Ragsdale  v.  Kobinson  337,  1331, 

1335 
V.  Vicksburg    &   M.    R. 

Co.  706 

Railway  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Irving  St. 

Baptist  Church  1 702 

Railroad  v.  Koontz  181) 

Raih'oad  Co.  l\  Schurmeir       481,  489, 

490,  491,  492 

v.  Beeler  625 

Raines  v.  Calloway  945 

V.  Walker         1109,  1238,  1442 

Rainey  v.  Chambers  643 

Rains  i\  Ranis  391 

Rake  v.  Lawshee  37 

Raleigh  Nat.  Bank  v.  Moore  1589 

Raley  v.  Umatilla  Co.     619,  623,  632, 

650,  718,  731 

Ralls  V.  Graham  1384 

Ralphsnyder  v.  Ralphsyners  646, 

726 

Ralston  v.  Tiirpin  75,  97,  103,  104 

Ramage  v.  Ramage  1041 

Ram  berg  V.  Wahlstrom        1835,  1836, 

1841,  1852 

Ramolsberg  v.  Mitchell  245 

Ramires  v.  Kent  167 

Ramsey  v.  Jones  1484 

V.  Riley  1480 

V.  Wallace  968 

Rand  v.  Cartwright         381,  384,  398, 

435 

V.  Davis  1534 

Randall  v.  Burk  Tp.  439 

V.  Elwell  1729 

V.  Errington  162 

V.  Ghent  266 

V.  Gill  379,  381,  443 

V.  Latham  550,  551 

V.  Marlde  659,  6  74 

V.  Phillips  1824 

V.  Randall  555 

V.  Sanders  739 

V.  Silvertliorn  1563,  1569 

V.  Van  Vechten  1080 

Randell  i'.  Malktt  975 

Randolph  i\  Gwynne  1717 

V.  New  Jersey  W.  L.  R. 

Co.  1483 

V.  W.  &c.  R.  Co.  148 

Rangely  v.  Sjjring  256 

Rankin  v.  Iluskisson  733 

V.  Kinsey  1628 

V.  Wallace  292,  295,  296 

Rannells  v.  Gerner  52 

Ranney  v.  Hardy        1489,  1563,  1564, 

1568 


Ranney  v.  Ilogan  1406 

Ransier  v.  Yanorsdol  1346 

Ransom  v.  High  1958 

V.  Ransom  40,  41 

V.  Stonington  Sav.  Bank 

1080 
Ranstead  v.  Ranstead  1908 

Rapid  Transit  Land  Co.  v.  Sand- 
ford  29 
Rardin  v.  Walpole                              962 
Rash  V.  Jenne                              950,  968 
Ratcliff  V.  Teters                               1052 
Ratcliffe  v.  Dougherty                   40,  44 
V.  Marrs              565,  568,  569 
Rathbun  v.  Gecr                          364,  417 
V.  Rathbun              1292,  1296 
Ratliff  V.  Burleson             389,  433,  440 
Ratteree  v.  Conley                           1513 
Rau  V.  Von  Zedlitz                               88 
Ranch  V.  Oil  Co.                                1080 
Raun  V.  Reynolds                               1908 
Rawlings  v.  McRoberts                   1232 
Rawson  v.  Fox                       1240,  1241 
V.  Putnam                              128 
V.  School  Dist.    623,  635,643, 
649,650,  654,  655,  741 
Ray  V.  Durham  Co.                             599 
V.  Wilcoxson            37,  1258,  1259, 
1380,  1382 
Rayburn  c.  Davisson                        1563 
V.  Winant                    414,  492 
Raymond  y.  Coffey          326,339,389, 

398,  410 

I'.  Fish  6  75 

V.  Morrison  1396 

V.  Raymond     842,  843,  861, 

901 

?•.  Smith  1303,  1304 

Raynor  v.  Lyon  779 

V.  Wilson  1259,  1489 

Rea  V.  Bishop  31,  6  7 

V.  Minkler  879,  892,  910 

Read  r.  Allen  1937 

V.  Foo;g  602 

V.  Hilton  602 

V.  Huff  1963 

Ready  v.  Kearsley  223 

Real  V.  Hollister      842,  892,  903,  919, 

928,  932 
Real  Est.  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Collonious  1559 
Reamer  v.  Nesmith  326,  338,  339, 

342 
Reams  ?'.  Spann  1935 

Reardon  v.  Murphy  760 

Reasoner  v.  Edmundson        1445,  1464 
Reast  V.  Donald  379,  440,  442 

Reaume  r.  Chambers         575,  587,  589 

cxxxiii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Reavis  v.  Keavis  1259 

Rebeckah,  The  419 

Reck  c.  Clapp  1020,  1521 

Recoils  V.  Yoan<j;love  iS42,  954 

Rector  v.  Waugh  1973 

Rcdil  r.  iMiirry  425,  428,  429 

Reddon  v.  MilK-r  1527,  1528 

ReiUliiii;-  c.  Lamb  989 

Rodoiuptorist,  The,  v.  Wenig  457, 

542 

RedfieUl  v.  Gleason  1908 

Redtield,  &c.  Co.  v.  Dysart       307,  310 

Redman  r.  Sanders  133 

Redmond  r.  Coffin  1042 

r.  MuUenax  427 

V.  Stepp  384,  442 

Redpath  v.  Lawrence  1392 

Redwine  /•.  Brown  933 

Reed's  Petition  448 

Reed  v.  Bo^ihears  IG 

V.  Bradley  10.S2 

V.  Douthit  1227,  1276,  1277, 

1278 

V.  Exum  95,  96 

V.  Farr  364,  365 

V.  Gannon  1517,  1577 

V.  Hatch  682,  687,  .S92 

V.  Jones  IS 98 

t;.  Kemp     1109,1110,1361,1442 

V.  Lainmel  424 

V.  Lane  155,  613 

V.  McCourt  333,  364,  365 

V.  Marsh  389,  435 

V.  Ounby  1404 

V.  Pierce  962,  967,  9  74 

V.  Shenck  386 

V.  Spicer  326 

V.  Stouffer  656 

V.  Tacoma  Build.  Asso.  397 

Reeder  v.  Bar  1547 

Rees  V.  Ludington  1591 

V.  Overbaugh  1338 

Reese  v.  McQuilkin  968 

V.  Mi-dlock  1030 

/•.  Smith  953,  956,  968,  990 

Reeves  v.  Hayes  1420,  1422 

V.  R(;eves  1981 

V.  Vinacke  1547,  1551 

V.  AVatts  225 

Reformed  Dutch  Church  v.  Vee- 

der  237 

Regan  v.  Boston  Gas  Light  Co.      1658 

V.  Howe  1234,  1242,  1307, 

1323, 1327 

Regina  v.  Lee  1671 

V.  North  Staffordshire  Ry. 

Co.  1723 

cxxxiv 


Rogina  v.  Reed 
Register  r.  Rowell 
Rego  r.  Van  Pelt 
Reliol)oth  r.  Hunt 
Ucicliart  v.  Willielm 
lu-ichcrt  V.  McClure 


151 

582 

1394 

1935 

1236,  1269 

1406 


Reinskoff  v.  Rogge 
Relfe  V.  Riindel 


Reich  wald    i\   Commercial   Hotel 

Co.  141,  144 

Reid  r.  Abcrnethy  1448 

V.  Klein  388,  466 

V.  Mitchell  323 

Reidinger   v.   Cleveland  Iron  M. 

Co.  521 

Reifsnyder  v.  Hunter  660,  708 

Reimers  v.  Quinnin  445 

Reinders  v.  Koppelmann  1970 

Reinhart  v.  Miller  1014 

74 
189 

Ri'lph  V.  Gist  1064,  1071 

Remington  v.  Wright  84 

Remington  Paper  Co.  v.  O'Dough- 

erty  1127 

Renals  v.  Cowlishaw         772,  773,  774, 
777,  780,  781,  790,  798 
Renfro  r.  Harrison  1282 

Renick  v.  Dawson  1547 

V.  Ludington  1404 

Renoehli7.  Shirk  616 

Rensselaer,  &c.  R.  Co.  i>.  Davis        178 
Reorganized  Church  v.  Church  of 

Christ  182,  183,  190,  192 

Repp  V.  Repp  1390 

Resor  v.  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  1303 

Respass  v.  Breckenridge  1997 

V.  Jones  1340,  1382 

Resser  ?;.  Carney      842,  914,  956,  979, 

997,  998 

Reubens  v.  Joel  303 

Reusens  v.  Staples  1074,  1148 

Rex  V.  Creel  903,  915 

('.  Yarborough  485 

Rexford  v.  Marquis  489,  551 

V.  Rexford  1177 

Reybold  v.  Dodd  1908 

Rcynal,  Ex  parte  1748 

Reynolds  v.  Boston  Rubber  Co.       338 

V.  City  Nat.  Bank  44 

V.  Cleary  805 

V.  Crawfordsville  Bank     175 

V.  Glasgow  Academy     1072, 

1079,  1080 

V.  Kingsbury         1178,  1182, 

1183,  1435 

v.  Kirk  1563 

V.  Lansford  42 

V.  McCurry  31,  33,  35 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Eeynolds  v.  Pitt 

732 

V.  Reynolds 

1955 

V.  Ruckmaa 

1541 

V.  Shaver 

89(5 

V.  Stark  Co. 

141,  169 

V.  Strono; 

1792 

V.  To  we  11 

527 

V.  Waller 

76 

f.  Wilmeth 

1887 

Rhea  v.  Swain  943,  968,  982 

Rhine  v.  Ellen  295,  303 

r.  Robinson  1248 

Rhoades  v.  Canfield    1496,  1588,  1590 

v.  Selin  1143 

Rhoads  v.  Frederick  1338 

Rhode  c.  Alley  828,  853 

c.  Loiuhaiu  1014,  1021 

Rhodes  v.  Bate  103,  104,  115 

V.  Gardiner  School  Dist.    1314 

V.  Green  1527,  1528 

V.  Outcult  1511 

Ricard  u.  Williams  367,  186  7 

Rice  V.  Adams  1717 

V.  Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.   696,  707, 

728.  729,  808 

V.  Dewey  1484,  1581,  1748 

r.  Peacock  1185,  1186 

V.  Rice  1853,  1854 

v.  Ruddiman  492,  496,  501 

Rich  V.  Bray  1868 

V.  Minneapolis  448 

V.  Rich  1887 

v.  Zeilsdorff  503,  559 

Richard  v.  Bent       869,  930,  931,  933, 

962,  96  7 
V.  Boiler  1066 

Richards  v.  Downer  99 

V.  Iowa  Homestead  Co.    974 
V.  Kni"ht  1631 

V.  McClelland  39 

V.  Merrimack,     &c.    R. 

142,  412 

t'.  Randolph  1146 

V.  Revitt     773,  780,  805,  823 

V.  Richards  1846 

V.  Snider  334,  364 

V.  Vanderpoel  79,  81,  85 

Richardson  r.  Bates  1086 

V.  Biixelow  1(;52 

I'.  Borisrht  27,  29 

V.  Chickering  364 

V.  Clow  302,  303 

V.  Copeland        1733,  1734, 

1735,  1746 

V.  Dorr  962,  96  7 

V.  Duncan  79 

V.  Grays  1220,  126  7 


Richardson  v.  Koch  1722 

c.  Levi  1396 

c.  Palmer       324,  416,  45  7, 
517,  529,  530,542 
V.  Pate  8,  9,  25,  26,  33 

V.  Scott   River  W.  & 

M.  Co.  1080 

r.  Sibley  145 

r.  Tobey  799 

r.  York  525 

Richman  i:  Baldwin  1940 

Richmond's  Appeal  103 

Richmond  r.  Ames  958,  963,  986 

r.  Gray  215 

Richmond  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Davis     1328, 

1354 
Richmond    Manuf.    Co.    v.   Mor- 

ford  1248,  1303 

Richter  v.  Richter     624,  718,  722,  730 
Richwine  v.  Jones  399 

Rickard  v.  Rickard  1963 

Rickert  i:  Snyder  842,  927 

Rickets  v.  Dickens  834 

Ricketson  c.  Richardson  1555 

Ricketts  i-.  JoUiff  58,  67 

V.  Louisville,  &e.  Ry.  Co. 

666,  708 
Ricks  V.  Pulliam  582 

V.  Reed  1109 

Rico  V.  Brandenstein  40,  42 

Rico,  R.  &  M.  Co.  V.  Musgrave     1899 
Riddle  V.  (ieorge  1587 

V.  Littlefield  351,  1649 

Riddlesburg  L'on,  &c.  Co.  v.  Rog- 
ers 431,  432 
Ridgelev  v.  Crandall  2 
Ridgely"w.  Howard  1196,  144  7 
Ridgeway  v.  HoUiday  139  7 
r.  Lanphear  583,  604,  606 
Ridgeway  Stove  Co.  v,  W^ay  1702 
Ridgway  v.  Ludlow         484,  491,  492, 

496 
Ridler  v.  Ridler  12 

Ridley  v.  McGehee  1453 

Riecke  v.  Westenhoff  1196,  1197, 

1201 
Rieman  /■.  Baltimore  Belt  R.  Co. 

448,  463,  464 
Kifener  v.  Bowman  1346 

Ri'Igan  v.  Green  54,  68,  69 

Riggin  V.  Love         562,  563,  564,  568, 

580,  602 

Riggins  V.  McClellan  602 

Riggs  V.  Boy  Ian  1472 

V.  Dooley  1866 

V.  Fisk  20.  21 

Right  V.  Bucknell  258 

CXXXV 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Ei'jjliter  r.  Forrester 

1404,  1408 

lliolitsoll  r.  Hale 

534 

Riglor  r.  Cloud 

11(32,  1292 

r.  Lio-lit 

15SS 

Kilov  r.  C.ri'lHu 

389,  435 

v.  lloyt 

148G,  1517 

i:  Qingley 

15(55 

V.  Wilson 

42,  43 

Rindskopf  c.   Farmers'  L.   &  T. 

Co.  932,  9S7 

Rinehart  r.  Rineliart  861,  895 

Rines  v.  Mansfield  562,  563,  56  7 

Ring  V.  Burt  44 

V.  Jamison  16 

V.  Steele  1504 

Ringgold  V.  Bryan  1511,  1563 

V.  Waggoner  1514 

Rioux  V.  Cormier  401 

Ripley  v.  Babcock  56 

V.  Harris  174,  1436 

V.  Paige  1709 

Rippetoe  v.  Dwyer       1840,  1844,  1852 

Ripple  V.  Ripple  1513 

Risley  ?;.  McNiece      637,643,646,730 

Ritchie  c.  Griffiths      1469,  1470,  1471, 

1481 

V.  Kansas,  &c.  Ry.  Co.        625, 

679,  717,  718,  732 

V.  McAllister  1665 

Ritcbmyer  v.  Morss  1691 

Ritter  v.  Bell  81 

V.  Ritter  1217 

V.  Worth  1446 

Rittmastor  o.  Brisbane        1217,  1276, 

1283.  1289 

Rivard  c.  W^xlker         156,  1240,  12G7, 

1276,  1277,  1297,  1282 

Rivas  V.  Summers  1963 

Riverview  Cemetery  v.  Turner       1963 

Rix  c.  Johnson  490 

Roacli  V.  Karr  1534 

Roane  v.  Baker  1220,  1380,  1406, 

1409,  1411,  1413 

Roane  Co.  v.  Anderson  Co.  388 

Roanoke  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kansas   City 

&  S.  R.  Co.  632,  635 

Bobbins,  In  re  448,  458,  459 

Robbins  r.  Austin  1041 

V.  Barnes  1644 

V.  Eaton  29,  158 

V.  Harris  339 

V.  Magee         1314,  1320,  1349 

V.  Spencer        523,  1225,  1235 

Roberts  v.  Bauer  1437 

V.  Bourne         1371,  1482,  1506 

r.  Coleman  276,  647 

V.  Cooper  120 

cxxxvi 


Roberts  v.  Dauphin  Deposit  Bank 

1717,  1748 

V.  Deeds  402,  406 

r.  EUvod  1990 

V.  Fleming  1559 

V.  Forsythe  575,  582 

V.  Grace  14  36 

V.  Helm  381,  387 

V.  Holland  1930,  1934 

V.  Jackson  1254 

V.  Levy  875 

V.  Mansfield  1586 

V.  Moore  1868 

V.  Morgan        1862,  1866,  1879 

V.  Moseley  1563 

V.  Pillow  1064 

V.  Preston  340,  375 

!;.  Richards  334,  1371 

V.  Robertson  521 

V.  Rockbottom  Co.  744 

V.  Thorn  1840,  1844,  1852 

i\  Unger  1363 

V.  Wisgin        2,  11,  18,  20,  29 

Robertson  v.  Corsett  1668,  1683, 

1712,  1717,  1721,  1768 

V.  Du  Bose  214 

V.  Frank  89 

V.  Hay  1338,  1340 

V.  Johnston  617,  618 

V.  Lemon  943,  968,  983, 

984 

V.  Mooney  387,  389 

V.  Robertson  41,  44 

Robidoux  V.  Cassilegi  1132,  1165, 

1862 

Robinius  v.  Lister  295,  305 

Robinoe  r.  Doe  918 

Robins  v.  Bellas  1320 

Robinson  v.  Brennan  331 

V.  Coulter  2 

V.  Crenshaw  1517 

V.  Doss  326,  384 

V.  Eagle       1792,  1799,  1802 

V.  Gould  88,  1220,  1282, 

1285,  1292,  1297 

V.  Hall  959 

V.  Jones  339 

V.  Kime  326,  340 

V.  Lewis  1846,  1848 

V.  Missisquoi  R.  Co.  653 

V.  Myers  1361,  1367 

V.  Neil  843 

t;.  Noel  1207 

V.  Payne  565 

V.  Preswick  166  7 

V.  Robinson  1109,  1146 

V.  Schly  526,  1230 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Robinson  r.  Smith  285,  1392 

V.  Weeks  24,  33 

V.  Wheeler  1238,  1248 

V.  White  490,  495 

v.  Willoughby  1501 

Robison  v.  Codinan  1775 

Robson  V.  Thomas  1159,  1180 

Roche  c.  Roanoke  Classical  Seuii- 

naiy  1303 

Rochereau  v.  Delacroix  1501 

Rochfonl  r.  Hackman  664 

Rockafeller  v.  Arlino;ton  521,  522 

Rockfonl,   R.   I.  &."^  St.   L.  R. 

Co.   V.  Shunick  1014 

Rockhill  V.  Spraggs  270,  295 

Rock  Island  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dim- 

ick  1517,  1568 

Rockwell  V.  Adams  364 

r.  Baldwin  480,  488 

V.  Brown  263,  300 

V.  Coffey  1561 

V.  Elkhorn  Bank  144 

V.  Insurance  Co.  337 

r.  Wilder  1917 

Roddy  r.  Brick  1712,  1717,  1721, 

1746 
r.  Fitzgerald  616 

Rodes  V.  St.  Anthony,  &c.  Eleva- 
tor Co.  1172 
Rodgers  v.  Burchard  1396 
r.  Gibson  1402 
r.  Kavanaugh            1436,  1506 
V.  McCluer  1238 
V.  Parker  449 
Rodman  v.  Zilley  76 
Rodney  r.  McLaughlin          1862,  1866 
Rodwell  r.  PhiUips                            1616 
Roe  V.  Gemmill                                  1616 
V.  Taylor                                           98 
r.  Traunier                                    313 
Roebuck  r.  Duprey                             837 
Roehl  r.  Haumesser                            323 
Rogan  V.  Walker                         619,  732 
Rogers  r.  Adams              90,  1178,  1206 
V.  Benson                               1800 
v.  Black  well                        54,  71 
I'.  Bollinger                              449 
r.  B(jrchard                              828 
V.  Bracken                            1021 
V.  Brokaw       1712,  1713,  1714, 
1721 
w.  Carev  1225,1234,1241,1276 
V.  Crow                        1703,  1704 
V.  Eagle  F.  Co.                       268 
V.  Fire  Co.                              647 
V.  Frost                                   1042 
V.  Golson                                968 


Rogers  v.  Gosnell  726 

V.  Grider  1802 

V.  Hillhouse  264,  266 

V.  Hoskins  1513 

V.  Hurd  2 

V.  Jones  472,  1510,  1517, 

1523,  1544,  1563,  1564. 

1565 

V.  Manley  1172 

V.  Palmer  1532 

V.  Peebles  398,  399,  898 

V.  Place  1009 

V.  Prattville  Manuf.  Co.     1668, 

1672,  1714 

V.  Rogers  579,  1258 

V.  Sebastian  Co.  625,  6  74 

V.  Tucker  1409,  1413 

r.  Turley  1953 

V.  Walker        52,  58,  65,  6  7,  70 

r.  Wiley  1517,  1523,  1524 

Roles  V.  Mintzer  1014 

Roll  v.  Rea         1224,  1506,  1529,  1563 

Rolland  v.  Hart  1499,  1532,  1534, 

1538,  1539 

Rollins  V.  Davidson  438 

r.  Henry  1109 

V.  Menager   1196,  1197,  1198, 

1201,  1204,  1207 

V.  Riley  268,  693,  715,  722 

Rolls  V.  Miller  766 

Roney  v.  Moss    1112, 1138, 1161, 1188, 

1353 
Ronnebaum  r.  Mt.  Auburn  Cable 

Ry.  Co.  1861 

Rood  V.  Johnston  540 

V.  Winslow  80 

Rooke  r.  Kensington  249 

Rooney  v.  Michael  37 

Roosevelt  v.  Gardinier  219 

Root  r.  Cincinnati     431,  432,  436,  441 
c.  Woolworth  1873 

Rootes  y.  HoUiday  1463 

Roper  V.  Williams  773,  804,  805 

Ropes  f.  Upton  595 

Rorer  r.  Roanoke  Nat.  Bank        1193, 

1382 
Rorer  Iron  Co.  v.  Trout  1529 

Rorke  v.  Lloyd    '  1538 

Rose  u.  Hawley       678,  680,  705,  743, 

814 

V.  Newman  1123 

V.  Schaffner  935 

Roseboom  v.  Roseboom       1883,  1884. 

1887,  1987 

Rosenau  v.  Syring  186  7 

Rosenberger  r.  Keller  958 

Roscnkrans  v.  Snover  552 

cxxxvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Rosenthal  r.  Griffin  1180 

Kosette    r.  AVynn  1515 

Rosi'ville   Altu  Min.   Co.  v.  Towa 

Guloh  Min.  Co.        1G70,  16.S9,  1717 

Ross  r.  Bedell  10G4 

i:  Campbell         1220,  1276,  12S2, 

12!)  2 

V.  Conway  103,  106,  115 

i:  Faust  484,  491 

V.  Ross  103 

v.  Tremain  645,  682 

1-.  Welch  1620 

V.  Worthington    1441,  1547,  1551 

Rosseau  v.  Bleu  1234 

Rosser  v.  Cheney  1547 

Roswald  I'.  Hobble  310 

Roth  V.  Gabbert  404 

Rothenbarger  i'.  Rothenbarger      1234 

Rothschild  v.  Daugher  1125 

Rothwell  V.  Dewees     1846,  1847,  1SS6 

Rountree  v.  Denson  1836,  1953 

V.  Lane  1940,  1947 

V.  Smith  1218,  1277 

Roussain  v.  Norton     1134,  1199,  1447, 

1567 

Routh  i\  Spencer  1484 

Rowan  v.  Portland  449,  450 

V.  Reed  1986 

Rowand  v.  Anderson  1744 

Rowden  v.  Murphy  1856,  1892 

Rowe  V.  Beckett  135 

V.  Fleath  840,  858,  860 

V.  Minneapolis  656,  692 

V.  Peabody  1989 

V.  Ream  1563 

V.  Wave  1021 

Rowell  V.  Hayden  1292 

V.  Jewett      645,  646,  682,  698, 

705,  712,  730,  732 

V.  Williams  1389,  1499 

Rowland  v.  Miller  733,  765,  806 

V.  Murphy  1925,  1928 

V.  Rowland  566,  1782 

V.  Sworts  1 745 

V.  West  1738,  1753 

Rowletts  V.  Daniel  313 

Rowley  v.  Berrian  1144 

Royal  V.  Chandler  375 

Royal    Bank   v.    Grand   Junction 

R.  Co.  1066 

Royer  v.  Foster  96  7,  974 

V.  Keystone  Nat.  Bank  285 

Rozier  r.  Johnson  1963 

Rublee  v.  Mead  1563 

Ruch  V.  Rock  Island        708,  718,  723, 

728 
Ruchizy  v.  De  Haven  33 

cxxxviii 


Rucker  v.  Steelnian  323 

Ruckman  v.  Outwater  1708 

V.  Ruckman         1220,  1222, 

1243,  1247,  1269 

Rudd  V.  Savelli  828 

Ruff  V.  Lind  1515 

Rufiin  V.  Johnson  140 

Ruftner  v.  Hill  383 

r.  McLenan  1185 

Ruffners  v.  Lewis  1891,  1898 

Rufner  v.  McConnel  845 

Rugg  V.  Ward  335,  338 

Ruggc  V.  Ellis  718 

Ruggles  V.  Bucknor  1143 

V.  Clare  632,  637,  643 

V.  First  Nat.  Bank  1628 

V.  Lawson     1234,  1272,  1277, 

1307,  1309,  1312,  1324 

V.  Williams  1462,  1466 

Ruleman  v.  Pritchett  1188, 119.5, 

1212 

Rumery  v.  McCulloch  1832 

Rumsey  v.  Railroad  Co.  471 

Rundell  i".  Lakey  871 

Rundle  v.  Canal  Co.  471,  481 

V.  Spencer  24 

Runge  V.  Sabin  1188 

V.  Schleicher  1331 

Runkle  v.  Gaylord  1516,  1529 

Runnells  v.  Webber  867,  962,  967 

Runyan  v.  Coster  175,  180,  182 

Rupert  V.  Mark  1517 

y.  Penner     213,217,331,580, 

583 

Rushin  v.  Shields  1286 

Rushton  ?'.  Hallett  542 

Rusk  V.  Fenton  54,  68,  69 

Russ  V.  Ali)augh  990,  999,  1487 

V.  Perry  867,  930 

V.  Steel  879,  910,  915 

V.  Wingate  1143,  1144,  1159 

Russell  V.  Annable  1832 

V.  Baptist    Theo.     Union, 

1196,  1197,  1205,  1447 
V.  Beasley  1957 

V.  Branham  1009 

V.  Cothn  313,  1104,  1107 

V.  Doyle  119,  136 

V.  Mabney  367 

V.  IMoorc  1566 

V.  Mver  1600 

V.  Nail  1383 

r.  Oliver  216 

V.  Petree  1514,  1521,  1522 

V.  Peyton  1363 

V.  Reed  1350 

V.  Richards  1682,  1693 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Kussell  V.  Russell       1792,  1797,  1801, 

1816,  1908 

V.  Sweezey  1563 

V.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.        142, 

152,  173,  175 

V.  Theological  Union  1197 

V.  Topping  235,  236 

V.  Waite  1466 

Russum  r.  Wanser  14  78 

Rust  V.  Mill  Corporation  476,  483 

c.  Rust  1866,  1891 

Ruth  V.  Ford  267,  285,  286 

Rutherford  i-.  Green  1408 

V.  Jones  1954 

V.  Stamper  19  79 

V.  Tracy         326,  327,  381, 

420,  423 

Rutland's  Case  564 

Rutland  v.  Chesson  621 

V.  Paige  1061,  1062 

Rutledge  v.  Montgomery  126  7 

Rutter  I'.  Small  1868,  1880 

Ryan  v.  Brown  480 

V.  Martin  239 

V.  Wilson  412,  414,  525 

Ryder  r.  Cobb  1591 

i:  Rush  1523 

Ryerson  r.  Chapman  969,  983,  984 

Ryerss  i-.  Wheeler  1942,  1949 

Sable  r.  Brockmeier  953 

Sabledowsky  v.  Arbuckle  48 

Sac  County  Bank  v.  Hooper     928,  967 
Sadler's  Appeal  1508 

Safford  v.  AVade  1390 

Sailer  v.  Sailer  1887,  1909 

Sainsbury  v.  Matthews  1619 

St.  Andrew's  Church  Appeal  750, 

771,  775,  780 
St.  Andrew's  Church  v.  Tompkins 

1493 
St.   Anthony   Falls  Water  Power 

Co.  V.  Minneapolis  533 

St.  Clair  County  i\  Lovingston       485, 

490 
St.  Croix  Land  &  L.  Co.  r.  Ritchie 

1451,  1468,  1481 

St.  Felix  V.  Rankin       1900,  19  79.  1981 

St.  Helen  Mill  Co.,  In  re      lOSo,  1439 

St.  John  V.  Coates  1829,  1924 

V.  Conger  1458,  1520 

V.  Palmer  906,  914,  917, 

920,  987 

V.  Spalding  1420,  1429 

V.  Swain  1631 

St.  Louis  V.  Bissell  924,  943,  962, 

967,  974 


St.  Louis  c.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 

424,  485 
V.  Myers  481 

V.  Rutz  480,  481 

V.    Wiggins    Ferry    Co. 

424,  633,  635,  691 
St.  Louis,  &c.   Ry.  Co.  v.  Higgins 

31  33 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Foltz  'l84 
St.    Louis,    A.   &   T.    R.    Co.    v. 

Prather  1919 

St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.  Curtis       1637, 

1647 
St.  Louis  Hospital  v.  Williams  239 
St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  Risley 

485,  1082 
St.  Louis  University  v.  McCune  368 
St.  Marks  F.  Ins.  Co.  y.  Harris  1380 
St.  Paul,  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  First  Divi- 
sion, &c.  R.  Co.  492 
St.  Paul,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Paul 

U.  D.  Co.  710 

St.  Peter's,  &c.  Cong.  v.  Germain 

173,  181 
St.  Philip's  Church  v.  Zion  Presb. 

Church  1080 

St.  Thomas's  Hospital  v.  Charing 

Cross  Ry.  Co.  422 

Sale  V.  Pratt  476 

Salem  Nat.  Bank  v.  White     1878,  1907 

Salinas  v.  Bennett  1832 

Salisbury  v.  Aldrich  102,  104 

V.  Andrews      449,  488,  7  70, 

1437 

V.   Great  Northern   Ry. 

Co.  454 

Salisbury    Sav.    Soc.    r.    Cutting 

1487, 1488 
Sallade  v.  James  1619,  1632 

Salmon  v.  Huff  1177,  1178,  1180, 

1485 

V.  Vallejo  928 

Saltonstall  v.  Long  Wharf  476 

Salter  v.  Baker  1389 

V.  Jonas  448,  463 

V.  Kidley  257 

Saltmarsh  v.  Spaulding  143 

Salyer  r.  Romanf  1173 

Sammes'  Cmsc  573,  5  74 

Sample  v.  Irwin  1125 

Sampson  v.  Easferl.v  262 

V.  Graham  1688 

Samson  v.  Rose  1628 

V.  Samson  113 

V.  Thornton  1289,  1448 

Samuel  v.  Marshall  74 

Samuels  v.  Borrowscale         1112,  1113 

cxxxix 


TARLK    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Samuels  v.  Sholton      IKSa,  1179,  1204 
San  Antonio  r.  (iould  1056 

San    Antonio    Bnnving    Asso.    v. 
Arctic  Ice  Macli.  Manuf.  Co.     1738, 

1750 

Sanborn  v.  Adair  1464 

L\  Cloiigh  335 

V.  Iloyt  536 

I'.  Minneapolis  653 

V.  iMueller  424 

V.  Rice      381,  387,  448,  733, 

735,  756,  758,  763,  771 

V.  Robinson  1441,  1547 

V.  Woodman       685,  715,  730, 

732 

Sanders,  In  re  579 

Sanders  v.  Devereux  1958 

V.  Godding  398 

U.Robertson    1981,1991,1997 

Sanderson  v.  Berwick-upon-Tweed 

893 

V.  Symonds  1342 

Sandilands,  In  re  1073 

Sands  v.  Church  124 

V.  Davis  1880,  1882 

V.  Lynham  166,  16  7 

u.  Pfeiffer  1764 

Sandwich  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Zellmer 

855,  858 
Sanford  v.  Bulkley  1171,  1176 

V.  McDonald        355,  357,  367 
V.  McLean  7 

V.  Sanford  303,  1936 

V.  Sornborger  85,  86 

V.  Tucker  1866 

V.  Weeks  1568,  1570 

San  Francisco  v.  Burr  449 

V.  Le  Roy  4  71 

San  Francisco  &  O.  R.  Co.  r.  Oak- 
land 312 
San  Francisco  Breweries  v.  Scburtz 

1768 

Sanger  v.  Craigue  1436,  1469 

V.  Johns  930 

V.  Merritt  1945 

Sankey  v.  Hawley  1466 

Santa  Clara  Academy  v.  Sullivan 

182,  188,  189 
Santa  Clara  M.  Asso.  v.  Quicksil- 
ver M.  Co.  401 
Sappington  v.  Oeschli            1404,  1408 
Sarbach  v.  Newell                              1981 
Sargent  v.  Hubbard                 544,  154  7 
V.  Parsons                   1884,  1887 
V.  Webster  141 
Sarles  v.  McGee                               1489 
Sasportas  v.  Jennings  89 

cxl 


Sasscr  V.  Herring  376 

Sasserath  v.  Metzgar  846 

Sattcrficia  r.  Malonc  1513,  1520, 

1532,  1540 

Satterwhite  r.  Rosser  1568,  1874 

Saul  v.  Dawson  1936 

Saulet  V.  Shepherd  485 

Saunders  v.  Hlvthe        267,  1109,  1238 

I'.  DJhew  1508 

V.  FJaiiiken        932,  933,  944 

V.  Hackney  1006 

V.  Saunders  582,  599 

V.  Schmaelzle  331 

Saunderson  v.  Broadwell  271 

V.  Marr  4 

Savage  i\  Foster  1580 

V.  Lee  1235,  1947 

V.  Mason  793,  799,  877 

r.  Murphy  289,  290,  291 

V.  Savage  40,  41,  1958 

Savannah  v.  Georgia  471 

Savannah   &   Memphis   R.  Co.  v. 

Lancaster  104  9 

Savery  v.  King  108 

('.  Turner  103 

Saville  V.  Chalmers  902 

Savings  Bank  v.  Davis  1051,  1080 

Sawyer  r.  Adams         1469,  1471,  1479 
V.  Cox  1049.  1055,  1127 

V.  Fellows  355,  358,  359 

V.  Insurance  Co.  338 

V.  Kendall  416 

I'.  Northan  221 

V.  Pennell  1454 

V.  Peters  1262 

V.  Twiss  1708 

Sawyers  r.  Baker  1578 

Sayers  v.  Collyer       773,  804,  805,  813 
V.  Wall  44 

Sayles  v.  National  Water  Purify- 
ing Co.  1680,  1686 
Sayre  v.  Sheffield  Land  Co.    918,  928, 

956,  990 
Say  ward  v.  Thompson  1377,  1531 

Scaife  v.  Thomson      1892,  1902,  1906, 

1981 
Seammon   v.   Commercial    Union 

Assurance  Co.  187 

Scanlon  v.  Cobb  54,  68,  69 

y.  Wright     156,157,160,167, 

219,  226,  2-28,  1113, 

Scantlin  v.  Allison       1884,  1887,  1892 

V.  Garvin  625,  650 

Scarborough  v.  Smith  1958 

V.  Watkins  43,  112 

Scarlett  v.  Gorham  1559 

Schad  V.  Sharp         354,  359,  368,  o7^ 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Schaeffler  v.  Miekling  874 

Schaferman  v.  O'Brien  120 

Schaffer  v.  Lavretta  7,  18,  24 

Schaidt  v.  Blaiil       234,  503,  528,  1435 
Sclialk  r.  Kincsley  17(31 

Scliallard  i-.  Eel  River  Nav.  Co.    1082 
Scliaper  v.  Bibb  1668 

Scharf  V.  Moore  37 

Scharfenburg  v.  Bishop         1165,  1174 
Scharman  i'.  Scliarinan  1563 

Schattler  v.  Cassinelli  402 

Schee  r.  McQiiilken  261,  1989 

Scheerer  r.  Cuddy  1563 

Sclieetz  V.  Fifzwater  629,  649 

Sclieible  r.  Hart  364,  367 

r.  Slagle  944 

Sebeifele  v.  Schmitz  1712,  1717, 

1721 
Schell  V.  Stein  1468,  1472,  1479 

Schenk  v.  Evoy  404 

Scliernierhorn  v.  Negus  660,  662 

Schillinger  v.  ^McCann  303 

Scliintz  V.  McManamy        1331,  1333, 
1334,  1335,  1353 
Schipper  v.  St.  Palais  650 

Schi?sel  V.  Dickson      1853,  1854,  1989 
Schleicher  v.  Catlin  1180 

Schlesinger   v.    Kansas  City,  &c. 

R.  Co.  712,  718,  725 

Schley  i:  Blum  434 

V.  Pullman  Car  Co.      38,  1177, 
1178,  1179,  1180 
Schluter  v.  Harvey  1392 

Schmertz  /•.  Shreeve  1832 

Schmidt  V.  Deegan  1302,  1314 

('.  Hoyt  1404 

Schmisseur  v.  Penn  881 

Schmitheiiner  I'.  Eiseman  6 

Schmitt  V.  Giovanari  265 

V.  Schmitt  1014,  1220 

Schneider  v.  Botsch  366 

V.  Jacob  449,  452 

Schnelle  &  Q.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Bar- 
low 929 
Schuorbus  r.  Winkle  1939 
Schnyder  l\  Orr  645 
Schoch  V.  Birdsall  1413 
Schoenor  /■.  Lissaucr  88 
Schoenewald  r.  Rosenstein  326,  336 
Schofield  /•.  If)\va  Homestead  Co. 

849,  929 

V.  Jennings  219 

Scholey  V.  Mumford  89 

School  Committee  /•.  Kesler  1009, 

1012 

School  District  v.  JEtna,  Ins.  Co.   1030 

V.  Lynch  535 


School  District  v.  Taylor  1563 

School  Township  v.  School  Town 

of  Macy  650 

Schools  V.  Rislcy  486 

Schoonmaker  v.  Doolittle  354 

Schori  i:  Stephens  1958 

Schrader  v.  Decker  1197,  1198 

Schraeder  Min.  Co.  v.  Packer         355, 

356 
Schramm  v.  Gentry  1136,  1179,  1180 
Schreiber  v.  Creed  780 

Schroeder  c.  Giirney  1408 

Sclirugham  v.  Wood  1288 

Schuff  V.  Ransom  54,  63,  730 

Schuffert  v.  Grote        1226,  1271,  1275 
Schulenberg  v.  Harriman        708,  723, 

725 
Schults  V.  Moore  1127,  1435 

Schultz  V.  Catlin  84,  88 

V.  Culbertson  88 

Schultze  V.  Houfes  1448,  1527 

V.  Schultze  165,  1G7 

Schumpert  v.  Dillard  1390,  1393 

Schurmeier  v.  Railroad  Co.     452,  481, 

492 
Schutt  V.  Large  1504,  1523,  1530 

Schuylkill  R.  Co.  v.  Schmoele  893 

Schwab  V.  Stoneback  374 

Schwalback   i:  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 

P.  Ry.  Co.  625 

Schwallback  c.  Milwaukee  &  C.  P. 

R.  Co.  1575 

Schwartz  v.  Kuhn  127 

Schweiss  v.  Woodruff  1522,  1523 

Schwerin  v.  De  Graff     "  1014 

Schwoerer    r.    Boylston    Market 

Asso.  784 

Scituate  v.  Hanover  594 

Scobell  V.  Block  16  72 

Scobey  v.  Walker  1217,  1248 

V.  Waters  2 

Scoffins  V.  Grandstaff  928 

Scofield  i\  Douglass  1866 

V.  Quinn  570,  600 

V.  State  Nat.  Bank  1 74 

Scoles  V.  Wilscy  1481 

Sconce  V.  Sconce  1887 

Scorell  V.  Boxall  1600,  1603 

Scott  i\  Buchanan  2,  3,  7,  14,  27 

V.  Clinton  &  Spriniifield  R. 

Co.  ^  1729 

V.  Gallagher       1143,  1563,  1576 
V.  Guernsey      1886,  1887,  1S92, 
1899,  1975,  1986,  1987, 
1997 
V.  McMillan  799,  800 

V.  M']\Iurran  1402 

cxli 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Scott  V.  Means  Iron  Co.  375 

V.  Micliael  521 

r.  Ne^bitt  li)04 

r.  Pettii^rew  385,  400,  442 

V.  Scott     27,  30,  274,  292,  123(i, 

1248 

V.  Simons  111)6 

r.  State  1861 

V.  Stetler  816 

V.  Stripe  688,  712,  718 

V.  Tyler  659 

r.  Weisburg  383 

V.  "Whipple  1008 

V.  Yard  338,  341,  435 

Scovil  V.  Kennedy  ,  1955 

Scovill  V.  McMahon         632,  635,  637, 

647,  649,  656,  675,  704 

Scranton  i:  Stewart  2,  7,  8,  19,  27 

Scriven  v.  Moore  1628 

Scriver  v.  Smith  874,  910 

Scruggs  r.  Bnickin  1071 

Scrugiiam  c.  Wood     1243,  1247,  1248, 

1277,  1278,  1292 

Scull  V.  Pruden  341,  351,  399,  421 

Seabrook  v.  Brady  1559 

Seagood  v.  Hone  614 

Sea  Grove  Build,  Asso.  v.  Parsons 

1547 
Seale  v.  Soto  1981 

Seals  V.  Pierce  1232 

Seaman  r.  Smith  501 

Search's  Appeal  307 

Searcy  v.  Hunter      2,  7,  8,  21,  23,  27, 

28 

Searle  v.  Galbraith  48 

Sears  v.  Hicklin  104 

V.  King  424 

V.  Munson  1908 

V.  Russell  593 

V.  Sellew  1836,  1892 

V.  Taylor  1689 

Seaton  v.  Hixon  324 

V.  Son  1879 

Seaver  v.  Phelps  54,  70 

v.  Spink  1380 

Seavey  v.  Jones  1642,  1662 

Sebastian  v.  Keeton  366 

Seckler  v.  Fox  844 

Second  National  Bank  v.  Swan      1633 

Second  Reformed  Presb.  Church 

V.  Disbrow  664,  6  70 

Second  Universalist  Soc.  ?;.  Dugan    656 
Seddon  v.  Senate  893 

Sedgwick  v.  Hollcnbeck  893,  903 

V.  Laflin  575,  590 

Seeberger  v.  Campbell  1403 

Seebold  v.  Shitler  650 

cxHi 


Seedhouse  v.  Broward  1714,  1748, 

1752 
Seeger  v.  Pettit  1668,  16  73,  1703 

Seeley  v.  Price  103 

Seerly  v.  Sater  48 

Seevers  r.  Delashmutt  1389 

Segar  v.  Babcock      335,  336,  388,  397 
Seibel  v.  Bath  1559 

V.  Rapp  1238,  1243,  1258, 

1259,  1288 
Seiber  v.  Price  79 

Seitzinger  v.  Weaver  837,  841 

Selby  V.  Jackson  58,  68,  69 

Sellars  v.  Fiiedman  1963 

Selleck  v.  Starr  122 

Sellers  v.  Sellers  1010,  1476 

Selover  v.  American  R.  C.  Co.       1212 
Semon  v.  Terhune  1479,  1487 

Semple  v.  Miles  1380 

V.  Whorton  848,  943,  944, 

948 
Seneca  Nation  v.  Hugaboom  341, 

381,  391 

V.  Knight  488,  490 

Sergeant  v.  TngersoU  1508 

V.  Stcinberger        1781,  1793 

Serrano  v.  Rawson  424 

Sessions  i\  Reynolds  120 

V.  Sherwood  1301,  1448 

Severance  v.  Kimball  79 

Severn's  Case  832,  833 

Severy  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.  463 

SewaH  v.  Haymaker  1382 

Sewall  Co.  V.  Boston  Water- Power 

Co.  476 

Seward  v.  Jackson  288,  289 

Sewell  V.  Angerstein  1703 

V.  Holland  1563 

V.  Sewell  7 

Sexsmith  v.  Jones  1475 

Sexton  V.  Breese         1619,  1627,  1628, 

1634 

V.  HoUis  380 

V.  Wheaton  290 

Seymour  v.  Carter  874 

V.  Darrow  1522,  1555 

V.  McKinstry         1563,  1566, 

1575 

V.  Prescott  85 

V.  Ricketts  1963 

V.  Slide    &   Spur    Gold 

Mines  175,  190 

V.  Wilson  285 

Shaber  i'.  St.  Paul  Water  Co.  799 

Shackelford  v.  Hall  659 

Shackelton  v.  Sebree  74,  527,  1235 

Shacklett  v.  Ran  son  830 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Shade  v.  Oldroyd  646,  700 

Shaffer  v.  Greer  841 

V.  Hahn         324,  326,  355,  367, 

381,  1048,  1053,  1082 

Shaller  v.  Brand  1159,  1192 

Shalters  v.  Ladd  616 

Shanahan  v.  Perry  856 

Shank  v.  Butsch  1010 

Shankland's  Appeal  664 

Shanks  v.  Lancaster  1027,  1041 

Shannon  v.  Hall  1485 

r.  Pratt  536 

.Share  v.  Anderson  1129,  1134 

Sharington  c.  Strotton  263 

Sharon  v.  Davidson  1937 

V.  Gager  86,  88 

Sharon  Iron  Co.  v.  Erie  638,  6  78,  699, 

706,707,  718,731 

Sharp  V.  Blankenship  375 

v.  Cheatham  799,  1394 

V.  Hamilton  1159 

V.  Ingraham  1919 

V.  Lumley  1559 

V.  Robertson  11,  13 

V.  Ropes  773,  7  74 

V.  St.  Sauveur  163 

V.  Shea  1406,  1408 

V.  Thompson  338,  416,  418, 

531 

Sharpe  v.  Davis  1529 

V.  Foy  1539,  1580 

V.  Orine  1159,  1165,  1179, 

1363,  1366 

r.  Me  Pike  112 

Shattuck  r.  Hastings  620,  708 

r.  Lamb  914,  915,  987 

r.  People  1144 

Shaul  V.  Rinker  6,  34 

Shaver  v.  Woodward  1466 

Shaw  V.  Bisbee  895 

V.  Boyd  31 

I'.  Etlieridge  1663 

V.  Hayward  1299,  1307 

V.  Hearsey  1803 

V.  Hunt  218 

V.  Lenke  1703 

V.  Loud  223,  225 

V.  Newsom  15S6 

V.  Shaw  97,  115 

V.  Tracv  290 

V.  Wilkins  968 

V.  Williams  303 

V.  Wilshire  1466 

Sheafe  v.  Wait  404 

Sheafer  v.  Sheafer  718 

Sheaffe  u.  O'Neil  166,16  7 

Shearer  v.  Ranger  867 


Shearer  v.  Winston  1963 

Shed  y.  Shed  1271 

Sheehan  v.  Davis         1049,  1070,  1082 
Sheeliy  v.  Miles  215 

Sheets  V.  Selden  1080,  1643,  1652 

I'.  Sweeney  354,  358,  366 

Sheetz  r.  Lons;lois  921 

Sheffey  v.  Bank  1499,  1500 

v.  Gardiner  907,  968 

Sheffield   Build.   Soc.  v.  Harrison 

1715 

Sheffield  Land,  &c.  Co.  i:  Neill      1292 

Shelby  v.  Burtis  1196,  1198 

V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.        515, 

551 

V.  Tardy  1303,  1305 

V.  Teris  338 

Shelden  v.  Erskine  1245,  1824 

Sheldon  v.  Atkinson  364 

r.  Cox  1537,1538 

V.  Edwards  1753 

V.    Eickemeyer,     &c.    M. 

Co.  1054 

r.  Holmes  1420 

V.  Newton  2 

r.  Strvker  1159,  1180 

Shell  V.  Havwood  1679 

V.  Walker  1836 

Shelton's  Case  1218 

Shelton  v.  Armor  1066 

V.  Aultman  &  Tavlor  Co. 

1123,  1196,  1198,  1202, 

1203,  1204,  1205,  1206, 

1207 

V.  Bone  437,  441 

V.  Deering  1342 

r.  Ficklin  1712,1714 

V.  Maiipin  386,  424 

V.  Pease  840,  841 

V.  Shelton  257 

Shelz  f.  Shreck  1794 

Shenk  v.  Phelps  79 

Sheorn  v.  Robinson  1563,  1564 

Shepard  v.  Carriel  1177,  1178 

V.  Hunsacker  1396 

V.  Philbrick  1627,  1628, 

1630 

V.  Richards  1825,  1884, 

1885,  1887,  1917 

V.  Rinks  1942,  194  7 

V.  Shepard  40,  44,  1513 

Shepardson  c.  Potter  113 

Shephard  v.  Little  303 

Shepherd  v.  Burkhalter        1438,  14  72 

V.  Jernigan  1977 

V.  Nabors  617 

V.  Nave  381 

cxliii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  arc  to  Sections. 


Shepherd  v.  Orleans  Cotton  Press 

^  Co.  1372 

Shei)ley  r.  Atlantic,  &c.  Co.  145 

Sheppanl  v.  Allen  814 

V.  Gilmoi-e  713 

r.  Hunt  5o2 

r.  Wilniott  427 

,    Shepperson  r.  Sbepperson  43 

Sherman  t'.  Ballou  1917 

r.  Dodge  726 

•  V.  Fitch  1080 

'  V.  Hastings  363 

V.  Kane  354 

i  V.  McKeon  448 

ij.  Willett     1619,1624,1628, 

1630 

V.  Williams  893 

Sherry  v.  Gilmore  244 

V.  Picken  _         ^      1620 

Sherwood  v.  American  Bible  Soc. 

169,  189 
V.  Merritt  1349 

V.  Moelle  1398 

V.  Waller  125 

V.  Whiting         326,  413,  420 
Shewalter  v.  Pirner  175,  326,  327, 

381 

Shields  V.  Delo  513 

V.  Netherland  1196,  1197, 

1204,  1212 

Shiels?;.  Stark  1821,  1891,  1892 

Shimcr  v.  Mann        579,  583,  602,  604, 

605,  610 

Shinn  c.  Roberts  619 

V.  Shinn  1529,  1793,  1812, 

1814 

Shipley  v.  Bunn  2,  10 

Shipman  v.  Furniss  98,  103,  112, 

114,  116,  117 

V.  Horton  10 

Shirk  V.  Shultz  33 

V.  Thomas  1380,  1404,  1408 

Shirley  v.  Ayres  1307,  1314,  1321, 

1324 

V.  Bnrch  1331 

V.  Fcarne  1104 

Sliiriock  c.  Sbirlock  580 

Shirras  *;.  Caig  285,  1454 

Shively  v.  Howlby  419,  470,  471, 

472,  473,  475,  480,  485 

Shivers  v.  Hand  1996 

V.  Simmons  1196 

Shoemake  v.  Smith  1532 

Shoemaker  v.  Chappell  1547 

V.  McMonigle         320,  402 

Shoenberger  v.  Hackman  1 303 

Sholl  V.  German  Coal  Co.  538 

cxliv 


Sboiik  r.  Brown 

1215 

Sliontz  V.  Brown 

274,  830 

Shore  v.  Miller 

338 

Short  V.  Battle 

285,  1390 

V.  Conlee 

1163 

V.  Foglc 

14  99 

V.  Terry 

584,  613,  61.^) 

Shortall  v.  Hinckley 

119,  120 

Sborthill  V.  Ferguson 

981 

Shortridge  v.  Catlctt 

1063 

Shotwell  V.  Harrison     336,  1521,  1529 

i:  Matthews  1422 

Shove  V.  Larsen  1451 

V.  Pincke  313 

Shovers  v.  Warrick  1220,  1277 

Shrader  2'.  Decker  1196 
Shraeder  M.  &  M.  Co.  i'.  Packer     367 

Sbrawder  v.  Snyder  1215 

Shreck  v.  Pierce     _  828 

Shriver  v.  Shrlver  805 

Sbrock  V.  Crowl  13 

Schroder  v.  Kellar  1182 

Shropshire  r.  Behrens  1079 

Shroycr  v.  Nii-kell  1212,  1792 
Shryock  v.  Cannon     1170,  1182,  1185, 

1194 

V.  Waggoner  1402,  1404 

Shuart  v.  Taylor  17G8 

Slmbert  v.  Winston  1209 

Shuetze  v.  Bailey  1021 

Shufeldt  V.  Spaulding  424 

Slmford  v.  Alexander  33 

Shnlman  v.  Fitzpatrick  309 

Shultz  w.  Moore  1109,1143 

V.  Young  324 

Shumaker  r.  Johnson  992 

Shumway  i\  ilolbrook  1865 

V.  Phillips  918 

Shurtleff  v.  Francis  1220,  1233, 

1234,  1267,  1269,  1271 

V.  Millard  31 

Shutt  V.  Rambo  616 

Sibley  v.  Alba  1862 

V.  Holden  448,  461,  463 

V.  Johnson  1185 

D.  Leffingwell  1510,1511, 

1563 

Sicard  v.  Davis  1109 

Siceloif  V.  Redman  602 

Sickles  V.  Carson  86 

Sidders  r.  Riley  861 

Sidle  V.  Maxwell  1380 

Sidney  v.  Clarkson  778 

Sidwell  y.  Birney  1130,1133 

Siglar  I'.  Van  Riper    1871,  1919,  1936 

Sigourney  r.  Lamed  1435 

V.  Munn  1542,  1547 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


SigwortL  V.  Merriam 
Sikemeier  v.  Galvin 
Sikes  V.  Showers 

V.  Work 
Silberberg  v.  Trilling 
Silliman  r.  Cummins 
Silloway  v.  Brown 
Sillyman  v.  King 
Silsbury  v.  McCoon 
Silvarer  v.  Hansen 


1404 
1970 
410,  423 
1827 
1627 
1212 
873,  1922 
1524 
1692 
357,  358,  359, 
366 
Silver  Creek  Cement  Co.  v.  Union 

Lime  Co.  368,  399 

Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  North      186,  190 

Silverman  v.  Loomis  889 

Silvey  V.  McCool  448 

Simanovich  r.  Wood  861,  951 

Siramerman  v.  Songer  97 

Simmons  r.  Cloonan  1654 

V.  Fuller  1436 

V.  Havens  1108 

V.  McElwain  40,  44 

V.  Nahant  1865 

V.  Rudall  1359 

V.  Simmons  1218,  1248 

V.  Spratt  ■    234 

V.  Winters  1643,  1649 

Simmons  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Doran   442, 

1543,  1544,  1564,  15'i8 

Simms  r.  Barefoot  88 

V.  Hervey         223,  1331,  1333, 

133  7 

Simon's'Estate  1303 

Simon  ;•.  Sewell  1435,  1453 

V.  Simon  109 

Simons  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  1390,  1546 

V.  French  487 

V.  McLain       1770,  1773,  1782 

V.  Pierce  1738 

Simonson  v.  Falihee  1451,  1468, 

14  72 
Simonton  v.  Cornelius  1783,  1792, 

1802 

V.  Thompson  381 

Simpkins  v.  Rogers  1625 

V.  Wells  442 

Simpkinson  v.  McGee  1482 

Simpson  v.  Amnions  1777 

V.  Bank  1316,  1318 

V.  Belvin  968 

V.  Blaisdell  324,  334,  375 

V.  Del  Hoyo  1316,  1318 

V.  Gardiner  1853 

V.  Hinson  1521 

V.  King  326 

V.  McGlathery  1324 

V.  Master  son  1721 


Simpson  f.  Mundee  1109,  1442 

V.  Pearson  1801,  1812 

V.  Robert  272 

Sims  V.  Bardoner     8,  9,  24,  25,  26,  27 

r.  Cross  131,  138 

V.  Everhardt      5,  7,  8,  9,  10,  18, 

24,  26,  27,  31 

V.  Gay  1879 

V.  McLure  99 

V.  Ray  44 

V.  Rickets  40,  44,  45 

V.  Sims  1108 

V.  Smith  7,  9,  15,  23 

Simson  v.  Eckstein  255,  256,  257 

Sinclair  v.  Jackson  993 

11.  Slawson  1451,  1472 

Sine  V.  Fox  898 

Singer  v.  Jacobs  1 521 

V.  Scheible  1517 

Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Chalmers       1389 

V.  Lamb       2,  3,  10, 

11,13,17,  21,  22 

V.  Rawson  88 

V  Rook  1196, 

1198,1206,144  7 

Singletary  v.  Hill  613 

Singleton  v.  Bremar  268 

V.  Southwestern  R.  142 

Sinker  v.  Floyd  931 

Sioux   City    &    St.  P.  R.   Co.  v. 

Singer  652,  657,  672,  717,  718 

Sipley  V.  Wass  44 

Sirrine  v.  Briggs  1359 

Sisson  V.  Donnelly  575,  582 

V.  Hibbard        1684,  1719,  173  7, 

1740,  1750 

V.  Pearson  1365 

Siter  V.  McClanahan  1159,  1498 

Sitler  V.  McComas  1442 

Sixth    AVard    Building    Asso.    v. 

Willson  1463,  14  78 

Skaggs  V.  Murchison  1030 

Skeate  v.  Beale  89 

Skeele  v.  Stocker  1584 

Skinker  v.  Haagsma  226,  339,  368 

Skinner  v.  Baker        1217,  1240,  1314, 

1319,  1320 

V.  Crawford  368 

V.  Dayton  1025 

V.  Fletcher  1185 

V.  Fulton  1146,  1151 

V.  Moye  882 

r.  Pinney  1112 

I'.  Shepard  742,  774,  796 

V.  Wilder  1614 

Skipwith  V.  Cunningham      1217,  1284 

V.  IMartin  708 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Seetions. 


Slack  r.  Dimes  401,404 

Slamiing  r.  Style  45 

Slater  r.  Nason  !(!<; 

V.  Kawsoii       84-_>,  84;i,  !»-28,  'J42 
Slattery  r.  Scbwannecke      1531,  15;!-2, 

15;J4 

Slaughter  v.  Cunningham  2 

V.  Doc  244 

Sliiyton  V.  Blount  615,  617,  618 

Sleeper  v.  Laconia  484 

Slegel  V.  Herbine  655 

V.  Lauer  62!) 

Slice  V.  Derrick  1945 

Slifcr  r.  Beatos  200 

Sloan  V.  Beel)e  871 

r.  Bicmillcr  501 

V.  Frothingham  1.S02 

V.  Gridcr  "  1940 

V.  Holcomb  1380 

V.  Lawrence  Furnace  Co.        507 

V.  Owens  1119 

Sloane  v.  McConaliy  223,  241 

Slockbower  v.  Kanouse  1963 

Slocuiii  V.  SL'ymour      1600,  1601,  1603 

Small  V.  Clifford  1873 

V.  Field  44,  46,  1123 

V.  Rowland  602 

V.  Reeves  943 

V.  Small  112 

V.  Staug  1489 

V.  Williams  88 

V.  Wright  518 

Sraalley  v.  Isaacson  1970 

Smallman  v.  Onions  1912 

Smallwood  v.  Lewin  1499 

Smiley  w.  Dixon  1840 

V.  Fries         323,  367,  400,  896, 

978 

V.   Smiley   1234,  1272,  1307, 

1309 

Smillie  v.  Smith  80 

Smith's  Appeal  339 

Smith's  Will,  Jnre  97,  113 

Smith  V.  Adams  1248 

V.  Allen  280,  281,  282,  283 

V.  AUis     1196,  1197,  1204,  1205 

V.  Ashton  1062 

V.  Atwood  80 

V.  Ayer  1532 

I'.  Baker  1068 

V.  Barrie  635,  657,  671 

V.  Benson  1694,  1699 

V.  Blake  1668 

V.  Boone  432,  441 

V.  Boquet  42 

V.  Bowen  1508 

V.  Brackett  1584 

cxlvi 


Smith  r.  Bradley  334,  735,  761,  763 
('.  Branch  Bank  1380,  1396, 
1558 

V.  Bran  nan  723 

V.  Bryan  1606 

('.  Bullock  360 

V.  Butler  1148 

V.  Cannell  867,  979 

I'.  Carmody  319 

V.  Carney  962,  974 
V.  Catlin  Land  Co,        359,  381, 

388 

V.  Chamberlain  1085,  1098 

V.  Cha[)iiian  1099 

V.  Chatham  326 

V.  Clark  660,  662,  66  7 

V.  Cockrell  1259 

V.  Collins  602,  604,  609,  616 

V.  Compton  858 

V.  Crawford  338,  339 

V.  Crooker  1342 

V.  Cuddy  103 

r.  Dall  1075,  1440 
V.  Davis         356,  381,  3S9,  868, 

959 

•  V.  Dean  40,  44 

V.  Dickinson  1021,  1035,  1328 

V.  Dixon  903,  924 

V.  Dodge  381 

r.  Dunman  1109 

V.  Dunton  1532 

V.  Eason  882 

V.  Eigcrman  853,  870 

V.  Elliott  1190 

V.  Evans  35 

V.  Faulkner  122,  125 

V.  Ford  488 

V.  Forrest  375,  376 

V.  Gaines  19  70 

V.  Garden  1133,  1177,  1178 

V.  Gibson  1566 

V.  Gillum  214 

V.  Greaves  323 

V.  Greenop  1568 

V.  Hague  1619,  1628 

V.  Hamilton  354,  359,  366 

V.  Hankins  602 

V.  Harrington  631 

V.  Hastings  602 

V.  Headrick  376,  388 

V.  Henkel  30 

V.  Higbee  551,  555 

V.  Hodsdon  1562 

V.  Hosmer  369,  370 

V.  Howell  1002 

V.  Hughes  885,  946,  952,  955 

V.  Hunt  1110,  1171,  1207 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Smith  V.  Jackson  1566,  1568 

V.  Jefts  928,  962,  967 

V.  Jewett  726,  731 

V.  Jones  892 

V.  Jordan  1407,  1408,  1529 

V.  Kay  104 

V.  Kerr  1832 

V.  Keobane  1420 

V.  Kick!  1340 

V.  Ladd  549,  505,  555 

V.  Leighton  959,  1619,  1622 

V.  Lewis  1846 

V.  Lindsey  1485 

V.  Lloyd  845,  883 

V.  Lock  449 

V.  Low  346,  351 

V.  Lowry  1469,  1547 

V.  McAllister  364 

V.  McCorkle  354,  359 

V.  McGowan  1343,  1367 

V.  McGuire  1197 

V.  Martin  1651 

V.  Maryland  471 

V.  Mayo  14,  16 

V.  Miller  1565 
V.  Moodus  Water-Power  Co. 

1652 

V.  Necrbauer  338,  381,  386 

V.  Kfiison  1416 

V.  Nelson  402 

V.  Nettles  1499 

V.  Newton  363,  903 

V.  0.-<borne  1835,  1836,  1837 

V.  Park  1699,  1768 

V.  Parsons  903,  986 

V.  Perry  1021 

V.  Pollard  1396,  1487 

V.  Porter  551,  1238 

V.  Powell  19  76 

V.  Price  125,  512,  1613 

V.  Richards  928 

V.  Ridp;way  1647 

V.  Rochester  480,  481,  484, 
496,  497,  499 

V.  Rowley  88 

r.  Rudd  1396 

V.  Russell  376,  378 

V.  Scholtz  138 

i;.  Schwcii^crer  1517 

V.  Scribiier  868,  915 

V.  Seiberling  40,  44,  45 

V.  Sheeley  235,  236 

V.  Shepard  919 

V.  Sloconib  461,  463 
V.  Smith         99,  100,  565,  1055, 
1462,  1513,  1792,  1802, 
1955,  1994 


Smith  V.  South  Royalton  Bank 

1314,  1315,  1320 

v.  Stair  470,  473 

r.  State  466 

V.  Steely  88 

V.  Strong  410,  943,  948 

V.  Sublett  1534 

V.  Surman  1601,  1605 

V.  Tritt  1627 

V.  Upton  580,  1994 

V.  Van  Gilder  1154 

V.  Vreeland  1028,  1531 

V.  Waggoner     1670,  1732,  1747 

V.  Walser  1508 

V.  Ward  1196,  1204,  1205 

r.  Weld  1367 

V.  Westall  270,  346,  348 

V.  Wiley  1927 

V.  Williams  1159,  1562 

V.  Worman  1391 

V.  Young  1862 

V.  Yule  1517,  1563,  1568, 

1572 

V.  Zaner  166 

Smith  Charities  v.  Connolly  1102 

Smith  Paper  Co.  v.  Servin  1668, 

1712,  1714,  1744 

Smithwick  v.  Ellison  1708 

V.  Jordan  123 

Smyles  v.  Hastings  452 

Smyley  v.  Reese  112 

Smyth  V.  Knickerbocker    L.    Ins. 

Co.  1425 

V.  Tankersley     1878,  1927 

Sneathen  v.  Sneathen  112,  1217,  1218, 

1230,  1233,  1234,  1240,  1241, 

1276 

Snedeker  17.  Warring  1667,  1677, 

"  1702,  1721,  1748 

Sneed  v.  Atherton  1850 

V.  Osborn        358,  359,  361,  364 

V.  Ward  1440 

V.  Waring  1775 

Snell  V.  Harrison  1836,  1841 

V.  Iowa  Homestead  Co.     953,  974 

V.  Young  582 

Snively's  Ajjpeal  1972 

Snoddy  i'.  Bolen    '  448,  450,  452,  459, 

461,  .503,  505,  507,  537, 

1595,  1647 

r.  Finch  1265 

Snooks  V.  AVatts  53 

Snow  V.  Chapman  398 

V.  Lake  1380,  1396 

V.  Mt.  Desert  Isl.  Co.  476 

V.  Orleans  127,  140,  12-12, 

1279 

cxlvii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Snow  V.  Perkins  1 708 

Snowden  v.  Diinlavey  54 

c.  IMc'Kinney  138 

V.  Rush  1136 

r.  Tvler         1101),  13i)5,  1398 

r.  Dales  GG3 

Snowman  v.  Harford  155;) 

Snyder  I'.  Bot kin  1404 

V.  Braden  87 

V.  Chnrch  124 

V.  .Jennings  921 

V.  Lane  883,  962 

V.  Martin  1404 

V.  Snyder  92 

V.  Vaux  1692 

Snyner  v.  Sponable     1026,  1540,  1542, 

1792 
Society  of  Cincinnati's  Appeal  754 
Society  of  Friends  v.  Haines  305 

Sohier  y.  Coffin  121,130 

V.  Trinity  Church         623,  632, 
641,  650,  741 
Solari  v.  Snow  1548 

Solms  V.  McCulloch  1405,  1499 

Solomon's  Lodge  v.  Montmollin     1082 
Solon  V.  Williamsburgh  Sav.  Bank 

1062,  1064,  1072,  1340,  1365 
Solyer  i'.  Ronianet  1193 

Somers  v.  Pumphrey        49,  54,  6  7,  70, 
71,  1218,  1220,  1225 
V.  Schmidt  924 

Somerset  o.  Fogwell  473 

Somersworth  Sav.  Bank  v.   Rob- 
erts 1555 
Somes  V.  Brewer          1316,  1317,  1531 
V.  Skinner                       990,  1487 
Sonfield  V.  Thompson  1150 
Soniat  v.  Sup[)le  1994 
Sontag  V.  Bigelow      1846,  1862,  1866, 
1873,  1875,  1876,  1879,  1942 
1947,  1948 
Soper  V.  Stevens  833 
Sarden  v.  Gatewood  609 
Sorenson  i\  Davis                               1846 
V.  Sorenson                         1 263 
Sou(h*r  V.  Morrow                   1464,  1482 
Soukup  V.  To])ka                         652,  653 
V.  Union  Inv.  Co.         402,  406 
Soule  V.  Bonney  79 
V.  Corbley                                  1428 
V.  Dixon                                       967 
V.  Frost                                      1899 
V.  Shortwell                    285,  1392 
Southampton  v.  Post                          422 
Southard  r.  Cent.  R.  Co.    632,  678,  681, 
691,  723,  724,  728,  742 
Soutli  Baptist  Soc.  v.  Clapp            1080 

(  xlviii 


Soulh  Berwick  *'.  Huntress  1331, 

1335 
Soutiihridge   Sav.  Bank  v.  Exeter 
Machine  Works      1668,  1712,  1717, 
1736,  1741,  1744 
Southbridge  Sav.  Bank  v.  Mason 

1670,  1673,  1712,  1741 
Southbridge     Savings     Bank     o. 

Stevens  Tool  Co.  1731,1741 

South   Carolina  Loan,  &c.  Co.  v. 

McPherson  1403,  1464 

Southcote,  Ex  parte  52 

South  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Warton  333 

Southerland  v.  Fremont  1527 

V.  Hunter  1184,  1259 

Southern    Cal.    Colony    v.  Busta- 

mente  1051,  1082 

Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.   r.  Hen- 

shaw  1831,  1906,  1919 

Southern  Exp.  Co.  r.  Duffy  88 

Southern  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cole      1254, 
1303,  1304,  1315 
South  Hampton  v.  Fowler  375 

Southport  Banking  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son 1690 
Southworth  v.  Smith  1862 
Soutter  V.  Atwood  1957 
Souverbye  v.  Arden              1218,  1240, 
1247,  1277,  1288,  1313 
Sowden  f.  Craig                      1483,1734 
Sowers  v.  Peterson                 1092,  1937 
Sowler  V.  Day                          1532,  1534 
Spackman  v.  Steidel                  448,  449 
Spaids  V.  Barrett  89 
Spalding  v.  Archibald           1600,  1606 
V.  Grigg  „                               526 
V.  Hallenbeck                      274 
Spargur  v.  Hall                     99,  103,  110 
Spariiawk  v.  Bagg            121,  125,  140, 

388 

V.  Bullard  483 

Sparks  v.  Hess  1649,  1651 

V.  State  Bank  1496,  1588, 

1717 

Sparrow  r\  Hovey         1143,  1144,  1150 

t;.  Pond  1617 

V.  Smith  303,  309 

Spaulding  I).  Abbot  1642,1662 

('.  Bradley  424,  1394 

V.  Crawford  79,  88 

V.  Hallenback  646,  681, 

699,731.  732 

V.  Scanland  1455 

V.  Woodward  1955 

Spawr  V.  Johnson  437 

Speake  v.  United  States        1331,  1356 

Spear  v.  Crawford  169 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Spear  v.  Fuller  715 

('.  Ward  297 

Speclit  V.  Spaugenberg  883 

Speck  V.  Riggin  1511,  1512 

Spect  V.  Gregg  620,  1871 

Speer  v.  Coate  378 

V.  Evans  i470 

V.  Speer  1966,  1967 

Speers  r.  Sewell  49 

Speiden  r.  Parker  1G72,  1729 

Speier  v.  Opfer  1792 

Spellbrink's  Estate  1887 

Spencer's  Case         786,  787,  790,  792, 

942 

Spencer  v.  Austin  1773,  1818 

V.  Carr  156,  1276,  1282 

V.  Credle  1559 

V.  Field         1041,  1042 

V.  Reese     37,  1182,  1188, 

1213 

V.  Robbins      527,  1230,  1232, 

1235,  1309 

Sperry  v.  Pond  657,  743 

V.  Wesco  428,  435 

Spessard  v.  Rohrer  593 

Sphung  V.  Moore  386,  491,  492 

Spicer  y.  Martin       772,  777,  778,  780, 

781,  785 

V.  Waters  1525 

Spielmann  v.  Kliest  1419 

S[)ies  V.  Rome,  &c.  R.  Co.  656 

Spiller  V.  Scribner  410,  420 

Spinney  o.  Barbe  1703 

Spitts  r.  Wells  1954 

Spitznagle  v.  Vanhessch        1159,  1173 

Spofford  V.  Hobbs  1035 

V.  Manning  1566 

r.  True  620 

V.  Weston      1371,  1512,1517 

Sponable  v.  Hanson  49,  70 

Sprague  v.  Baker  882,  903,  906, 

914,  919 

V.  Duel  49 

V.  Rockwell  1423 

V.  Snow  412,  414,  518 

V.  White  1562,  1575 

Spreckles  v.  Ord  388 

Spring  V.  Cluise  962,  974,  982 

Springer  v.  Bartle  1396,  1397 

r.  Young  1874 

Si)ringfield  Founclry  Co.  v.  Cole 

1  722 
Sprinf;ficld    Homestead     Asso.    v. 

Roll  1568 

Spriiiirficld  Sav.  Bank  v.  Spring- 
field Cong.  Soc.  I(»(i2,  10(;8 
Springs  v.  Hanks               263,  265,  312 


Sprout  V.  Crowley 
Spurgin  v.  Traub 
Spurlock  V.  Sullivan 
Spurr  V.  Andrew 
Spyve  V.  Tophani 
Squire  v.  Greer 
Squires  v.  Clark 

V.  Summers 


1894 

1185 

285,  1390 

861,  951 

571,  573 

338,  431,  437 

1873 

1233,  1234, 


1240,  1241,  1248,  1-J.Jl 

Staak  V.  Sigelkow  226 

Staats  V.  Ten  Eyck  943.  944,  968, 

970,  981,  983 

Stacy  V.  Bostwick  121,  127 

Stafford  v.  Ballou  1521,  1582 

V.  King  381,  410,  416 

V.  Stafford  288 

V.  Van  Rensselaer  1494, 

1590 

Stafford  Nat.  Bank  c.  Sprague       1578 

Staffordville  Gravel  Co.  v.  Newell    562 

Stagg  V.  Small  1563 

Stahn  V.  Hall  1563 

Staley  v.  Housel  116 

Stalker  v.  McDonald  1387,  1390, 

1528 

Stall  V.  Fulton  308 

v.  Wilbur  1619,  1627 

Stambaugh  v.  Smith         843,  852,  929, 

962,  967 

V.  Yeates  1623,  1627 

Stamm  r.  Bostwick  16  7 

Stamper  v.  Armstrong  583 

Stanard  v.  Eldridge  962,  96  7 

Stanbrough  v.  Cook  1632 

Standiford  v.  Standiford       1218,  1220, 

1234,  1240,  1241,  1273,  1276 

Staudish  v.  Lawrence  799 

Standlee  v.  Burkitt  433 

Stanhope  v.  Yerney  1505 

Stanley  r.  Chamberlin  1532 

c.  Colt  623,  632,  635,  640, 

641,  642 

V.  Epperson  1340 

V.  Green  351,  398,  1532 

V.  Robbins  274 

I'.  Valentine     1314, 1320, 1324 

Stannard  c.  Forbes  853 

Stansell  v.  Roberts       1410,  1414,  1501 

Stanton  r.  Button  1163 

'■.  Miller  1302,  1327 

Stanus  V.  Smith  433 

Staples  V.  Dean  948 

'•.  Fenton  1572,  1575 

V.  Wiiite  1560 

Stapleton  v.  King  1926 

Stark  V.  Coffin  453,  455,  46  7 

/•.  Olney  943,  944,  948,  968 

cxlix 


TABLE    01-'   CASES. 


KefereiH'cs  are  to  Sections. 


Starkie  v.  Riclimond  813 

Starks  r.  Sikos  18<i0 

Starkweather  v.  Am.  Bible  See.   173, 

189 

V.  Martin       lOGfi,  1073, 

1074,  1076,  1440 

Starling  v.  Blair  340 

Starnes  r.  Hill  601,  602,  603,  607 

Starr  v.  Child  463,  477,  488,  4!)0, 

503 
V.  Starr  1259 

V.  Wright  2 

State  w.  AUis  1050 

V.  Boston,  C.  &  M.  R.  Co.    163, 
166,  1S2 
V.  Brady  1812 

V.  Brown  409,  630,  708 

V.  Byrd  1010,  1013,  1094 

V.  Canterbury  484,  486 

V.  Columbia  480 

V.  Consolidation  Coal  Co.        142 
I'.  Davis  1469,  1480 

V.  Dean  1340 

V.  Douglass  1122 

V.  Eason  481,  4S2 

V.  Elting  658 

V.  Gilmanton  484,  495,  501 

V.  Glen  480,  481 

V.  Higgins  220 

V.  Insurance  Co.  1591 

V.  Jennings  1040,  1042 

V.  Loveless  1591 

V.  Madison  169 

V.  Mexican  Gulf  Ry.  Co.         145 
i;.  Manley  1144 

V.  Mansfield  178 

V.  Matthews        1328,  1333,  1335 
V.  Milk  499 

V.  Moore  1384 

V.  Narrows  Island  Club  4  71 

V.  Nelson  89 

u.  Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co.    1729 
V.  Pacific  Guano  Co.  471 

V.  Pepper  l.')28 

V.  Pinckney  4  71 

V.  Plaisted  2,  21,  27,  28 

V.  Portsmouth  Sav.  Bank       491 
V.  Preble  163 

V.  Purdy  058 

V.  Register  of  Deeds  1384 

V.  Sargent  4  75 

V.  Sluder  81 

V.  Standard  Oil  Co.  1867 

V.  Supervisors  058 

V.  Wilner  58 

V.  Wilson  503,  504,  505,  506 

V.  Word  in  675 

cl 


State  r.  Young  1331 

State  Bank  v.  Bailey  1067 

r.  Brackenridge  1 78 

V.  Cha])pelle  80 

V.  Evans  1310,  1314 

t;.  Frame    1392,1511,1514 

V.  McCoy  76 

State  Line  &  8.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal  1859 

State  Savings  Hank  v.  Kircheval 

16  72, 1745 
Staten  Island  Ra])id  Transit  Co., 

In  re  All 

Staton  V.  Davenport  1563 

V.  Mullis  582 

Stead  r.  Grosfield  1436 

Stearn  v.  Hesdorfer        846,   849,  961, 

967 

Stearns  v.  Chenault  1150 

V.  Godfrey  713 

V.  Harris  715,  729 

V.  Palmer  593,  649 

V.  Porter  1466 

Stebbins  v.  Duncan  1442,  1485 

r.  Merritt      1080,  1082,  1083 

V.  Wiitson  1328 

v.  Willard  1853 

V.  Wolf  968,  983 

Stedman  v.  Perkins  1409 

V.  Smith  1919,  1922 

Steed  V.  Calley  159 

Steedman  o.  Weeks  1994 

Steel  I'.  Miller  1220,1256 

V.  Prickett  448 

Steele  v.  Adams  303 

r.  Boone  1485 

V.  Farber  1619,  1633 

V.  Lowry  1243 

V.  Mansell  1464 

V.  Sanchez  485 

V.  Sioux  Val.  Bank  1396 

V.  Spencer  1345 

V.  Worthington  295 

Steeple  v.  Downing  121,  140,  163 

Steffen  v.  Bauer  1207,  1447 

Steffens  v.  Cameron  1403 

Steffey  V.  Stefeey  1182 

Steffian  v.  Milmo  Nat.  Bank  285, 

1226,  1267,  1390 

Steigleder  v.  Marshall  339 

Stein  v.  Sullivan  1420 

Steinbeck  r.  Stone  322,  331,  337 

Steiner  v.  McCall  285,  287,  1391 

V.  Clisby         1463,  1494,  1524, 

1542 

V.  Tranum  1878 

Steinride  c.  Te2;ge  273 


Stell  V.  Barham 


575,  582 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Stell  V.  Paschall  1  ''•"'G 

Stelz  V.  Shreck  1791,  1792,  ISOI 

Stem  v.  Cox  1966 

Stembridge  v.  Britschur  362 

Stephens  v.  Buffalo  &  N.  Y.  City 

R.  Co.  1-217 

V.  Graham  1345 

?;.  Huss  1234,1309 

t;.  Motl  1132,1172 

V.  Rinehart  1234,  1307, 

1309 

Stephenson  v.  Boody  992 

V.  Cotter  1892,   1981, 

1994 

V.  Haines  1410 

Stepney  t:  Lloyd  79 

Sterling  v.  Baldwin  1602 

V.  Peet        919,  943,  969,  983 

Sterry  v.  Arden  281,  283,  293 

Stetson  t'.  Eastman  1771 

V.  Freeman  380 

Stevens  v.  Bachelder  1469 

r.  Bell  2  72 

V.  Brown  1376 

V.  Buffalo  &X.Y.  CityR. 

Co.  1729 

V.  Castel         1226,  1256,  1292, 

1293 

V.  Dewing  575 

17.  Doe  1185,  1188 

t;.  Enders  1958,1970 

f.  Goodenough  1517 

V.  Griffith  297 

V.  Hampton  1109,    1125, 

1380,  1435,  1442 

f.  Hatch  1220,1243 

V.  Hulin  1575 

V.  King  476,  501,  1325 

v.  McCormick         1994,1995, 

196  7 

V.  Morse  1380 

V.  Orr  534 

r.  Owen  316,319 

V.  Pillsbury  728,  731,  732 

V.  Pratt  184,  188 

V.  Railroad  Co.  4  70,  471 

V.  Reynolds    1836,  1840,  1852 

V.  Rose  1668 

V.  Ruggles  1936 

V.  Stevens    43,  1220,  1256, 

1269,  1270 

V.  Thompson  1898 

V.  Wait  326,  338,  398 

V.  "NVatson  1404 

Stevens  Point  Boom  Co.  v.  Reilly    500 

Stevenson  v.  Anderson  1862,  1966 

V.  Brasher  1125 


Stevenson  r.  Cloud 

1109 

V.  Coft'erin 

1935 

V.  Crapnell 

1303 

v.  Erskine 

385 

V.  Loehr 

912 

V.  MoReary 

253,  259 

r.  Texas  Ry.  Co.  1406, 

1408 

Steward  v.  Lombe  1690 

V.  Winters  780 

Stewart's  Appeal  142 

Stewart  v.  Allegheny  Nat.  Bank 

1967 

V.  Anderson       837,  840,  990, 

1303,  1304 

V.  Aten  402 

V.  Barrow  667 

V.  Beard  1086, 1094 

r.  Brady  667 

V.  Carleton  366,  443 

V.  Drake      903,930,962,  96  7, 

968,  974,  976 

V.  Flint  48,  55 

V.  Hadley  951 

V.  Huff  1436 

r.  Jones  145 

I'.  Lispenard  48 

v.  McSweeney  1458 

D.Mathews  1109,  1380 

V.  Patrick  364,  393 

V.  Perkins  449,  1123 

V.  Redditt      1218,  1286,  1292 

V.  Severance  254 

V.  Smith  1409,  1415 

V.  Stewart     1223,  12.34,  1307, 

1866,  1868,  1870,  1874, 

1921 

V.  Sutherland  214 

V.  Weed  1269,  1282 

V.  West  904 

V.  Wood  524 

Stickney  r.  Borman  40 

Stiles  V.  Brown  1217 

V.  Curtis  448 

V.  Estabrooks  339 

r.  Japhet  40 

r.  Probst  1356 

V.  Stiles      •  112 

Still  V.  Lansingburgh  1056 

Stillman  v.  Flenniken  1712 

Stillwell  i:  Adams  1185,  1190 

V.  McDonald  1404 

V.  Patton  1361 

Stilphen  v.  Stilphen  1793,  1802 

Stilwell  1-.  Hubbard  1236,  1267, 

1269,  1271,  1289 

V.  Knapper  624,  641 

cli 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Stilwell  V.  St.  Louis  &  H.  Ry.  Co. 

ti2;5,  G24,  632,  640 

Stinipson  r.  BaKcniuui  1786 

Stiiu'li(.-(>iiib  /•.  Marsh  lOlC 

Stinolilii'ld  r.  Liille  1010 

StiiiiK'tt  /■.  House  1458 

Stiiisou  V.  AndiTsou  1234,  123(1, 

1207,  1271,  1275 

r.  Doolittle  14  7  7 

r.  Goer  1111 

V.  Russell  1144 

Stirmau  r.  Cravens  1087 

Stivers  v.  Home  1397 

Stockbridge  Iron   Co.  v.  Hudson 

Iron  Co.  503,  507,  508,  555 

Stockett  r.  Taylor  1517 

Stockham  v.  Browning  476,  483 

Stockton  V.  AVeber  622,  6  76 

r.  Williams  140 

Stockton  Sav.  Bank  v.  Staples         169 
Stockwell  r.  Campbell  1668,  1702, 

1714 

V.  Couillard     503,  505,  506, 

509,  516,  518,  522, 

528,  896 

V.  Hunter  536,  1593, 

1651 

V.  McHenry  1479 

V.  State  1506 

Stoddard  r.  Gage  962 

r.  Rotton  1467 

V.  Sloan  1151 

V.  Weston  1866 

r.  Whiting  1416 

Stoebler  r.  Knerr  1814 

Stoffel  r.  Schroeder  1397 

Stokes  V.  Anderson    1220,  1222,  1256, 

1269 

V.  Detriek  1054,  1292 

V.  Jones  995 

i:  Riley  1517,  1522 

Stoll  V.  Beecher  381 

Stolp  V.  Hoyt  485,  4.S8 

Stone  r.  Ashley  1022,  1086 

V.  Augusta  479,  488 

V.  Brooks  449 

V.  Clark  334,  338,  364 

V.  Duvall  1234,  1307,  1314, 

1320,  1324,  1386 

V.  Ellis  71.5,  716 

V.  French     1236,  1269,  1286 

V.  Hooker  919 

V.  Houghton  032,  638,  741 

r.  King  1266 

V.  Montgomery         38,  316,  319, 

1003,  1164,  1194,  1196, 

1198,  1201 

clii 


Stone  V.  Sledge      316,  317,  318,  1208, 

1213 

V.  Stone  1185 

V.  Wilbern  49 

Stonerv.  Ellis              1349,  1359,  1363 

V.  Rice  492 

Stonestreet  r.  Doyle  1866,  1872 

Stoney  r.  Winterhalter  1224 

Stooksbury  v.  Swan  1150 

Stoops  V.  Blackford  36 

Storer  v.  Freeman  472,  476,  479 

V.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.  821 

V.  Whitman  120 

Story  V.  Johnson  14 

V.  Marshall  42,  44 

V.  N.  y.  Elevated  R.  Co.      448, 

449 

V.  Saunders  1866,  1919 

Stott  V.  Harrison  1209 

Stouffer  V.  Latshaw  79,  80,  86 

Stoughton's  Appeal  1597 

Stoughton  V.  Leigh  1595 

V.  Pasco  1555 

Stout  V.  Curry  1912 

V.  Merrill  27,  35 

V.  Woodward  338,  354 

Stoutimore  r.  Clark  256 

Stow  V.  Miller  1273 

r.  Tifft  1409 

/•.  Wyse  256 

Stowell  V.  Waddingham  1759 

Straight  v.  PLarris  1489,  1490 

Strain  v.  Murphy  254 

c.  Wright  30 

Strang  v.  Peterson  88 

Strasson  r.  Montgomery  1600 

Straunch  v.  Hathaway  1205 

Straus  V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  144 

Strawn  v.  Norris  1259 

Streeper  r.  Abeln  890,  958 

Street  f.  Benner  1971 

Streeter  r.  Shultz  1837 

Stribling  v.  Atkinson  1364 

Strickland  r.  Draughan  340,  381 

('.  Kirk '  1503 

V.  McCormick  1109 

r.  Parker  10  70,  16  77 

Strickler  v.  Todd  1652 

Stringer  r.   Northwestern  M.  L. 

Ins.  Co.  9,  24,  25,  26,  27 

Stringer  v.  Young  322 

Stroebe  v.  Fehl  44 

Strohauer  v.  Voltz  295 

Stroman  v.  Yarn  1832,  1834 

Strong  i\  Brewer  1010 

V.  Colter  1862 

V.  Doty  637,  650 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Strong  V.  Doyle 

1708 

V.  Ehle 

1409 

V.  Grannis 

79 

c.  Lynn 

1394, 

1395 

V.  Shea 

1563 

V.  Smith 

1435 

V.  Van  Deursen 

1415, 

1497 

V.  Waddell 

955 

Stroud  V.  Lockart 

1407, 

1531 

V.  McDaniel 

1213, 

1215 

V.  Sprincrfield  376,  378,  380 
Strough  V.  Wilder  1110,  1248,  1249 
Stroughill  V.  Buck  256,  260 

Stroup  V.  MfCloskey  388 

Strout  V.  Harper  559 

Strubbee  c.  Trustees'    Cincinnati 

Ry.  Co.  1615 

Stuart  V.  Baker  2,  21,  27,  31 

V.  Barker  1947 

i\  Clark  481 

V.  Button  1159,  1164,  1173, 

1191,  1193,  1194 

V.  Rumsey  1194 

Stubbs  v.  Page  943 

Stuckey  v.  Keefe        1785,  1791,  1792, 

1797 

Studabaker  v.  Marquardt  261 

Studdard  v.  Wells  632,  633,  635, 

637,  638,  646 

Studwell  V.  Shapter  5 

Stukeley  r.  Butler  660,  670 

Stull  t'.  Hnrris  9,  24,  31,  35 

Stumpf  V.  Osterhage  1371 

Sturo;eon  r.  Floyd  381 

Sturgis  r.  Warren         1674,  1681,  1733 

Sturtevant  r.  Sturtevant  97,  1227 

Stutt  r.  Building  Asso.  871 

Stuyvesant  r.  Davis  708 

V.  Hall  1482,  1489 

V.  Hone  1489,  1559 

V.  Mayor  710 

V.  New  York  639,  682 

Suddereth  v.  Smyth  1443 

Snffell  r.  Bank  of  England  1341 

Siiffern  y.  Butler  1012 

Suffield  V.  Bi-owii  1663 

Sullivan  v.  Davis  1029 

V.  Flynn  70 

V.  Ilodgkin  101,  109 

V.  Lear  295,  296 

V.  McLaughlin     155,  G13,  (il8 

V.  Smith  1832 

V.  Sullivan  1958 

V.  Toole        1668,  1718,  1747, 

1748 

Sullivan  Sav.  Inst.  *•.  Young  285, 

1393 


Summer  v.  Mitchell  1123,  1124, 

1143,  1144,  1147,  1162,  1165,  1179, 

1216,  1440 

Summers  r.  Brice  1390 

r.  Cook  1603 

v.  Darue   1239,  1410,  1412 

V.  Kilgus  1420 

Sumner  v.  Barnard  979 

V.  Conant  1028 

V.  Darnell  624,  632,  650, 

687 

V.  Rhodes  1435 

V.  Williams         571,  830,  831, 

834,  858,  860,  943,  981 

Sunderlin  i\  Struthers  259 

Susquehanna  Bridge  &  B.  Co.  v. 

General  Ins.  Co.  1053,  1082 

Susquehanna  Canal  Co.  v.  Bonham 

145 

Sutherland  v.  Goodnow  3G6 

V.  Jackson  448,  449 

r.  Ross  1107 

Sutliff  V.  Forgey  166,  1  792 

Sutter  V.  San  Francisco  1968 

Sutton  V.  Jervis  1563 

v.  Miles  616 

V.  Porter  1942,  1947,1950, 

1951 

V.  Sutton  1997 

Suydam  v.  Jones  861 

Sugden  v.  Beasley  1628 

Swafford  v.  Ferguson  2 

V.  Whipple  295 

Swan  ('.  Moore  1407 

V.  Stedman  1025,  1035 

V.  Swan  1900,  1904,  1997 

V.  Vogle  1472,  14  79 

Swarts  i\  Stees  1437 

Swartz  0.  Ballon  986,  1331,  1335 

V.  Page  1056 

V.  Swartz  1654 

Swasey  v.  Brooks  928,  930 

Swazey  v.  Brooks  1642,  1662 

Swearingen  r.  Reed  42 

Sweeney  v.  Bixler  285 

Sweet  /-.  Brown  855,  857,  894, 

896 

r.  Jacocks  1404 

*'.  Southcote  1529 

Sweetser  v.  Lowell  1224 

Sweetzer  r.  Jones        1674,  1717,  1745 

Sweezy  r.  Jones  1419 

Sweigart  r.  Richards  378 

Swenson  v.  Searle  270,  285 

V.  Willsford  442 

Swepson  v.  Bank  14  72 

r.  Exch.  &  Dep.  Bank      1  !G-2 

cliii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Swett  V.  Patrick      039,  969,  974,  986, 

1934 
r.  Poor  121,  124 

Swick  V.  Sears  522,  529,  544 

Swift  V.  Hall  1474 

Swinburne  c.  Swinburne  1S35 

Swinoy  i\  Swiney  34fi,  12!)2,  12:»3 

Switztiable  r.  Worscldine  3(16 

Switzor  i:  Knapps        1060,  1075, 1077, 

1440 
Swoll  V.  Oliver  721 

Swope  V.  Le(lin2;well  1  74 

Sword  V.  Low     1672,  1684,  1734,  173  7, 

1753 
Sydnor  v.  Palmer        1866,  1870,  1874, 

1878 

V.  Roberts  1531 

Syer  v.  Bundy  1527 

Symonds  v.  Harris  1923 

Taaffet'.  Kelley  1511 

Tabor  v.  Bradley        1639,  1642,  1652, 

1656 

Taft  V.  Kessel  943 

V.  Ser<reant  16 

V.  Stetson  1751 

V.  Taft       1225,  1233,  1234,  1236, 

1267,  1271,  1307,  1314,1319, 

1321,  1324,  1325 

Tag  r.  Keteltas  462 

Tagg  V.  Tenn.  Nat.  Bank  1532 

Taggart  ('.  Risley  991 

V.  Stanberry  303,  1033 

Talbert  v.  Dull  1159,  1165 

I'.  Singleton  1530 

V.  Stewart  1115 

Talbot  V.  Copeland  384 

Talbott  V.  Hooser  1124 

Taliaferro  v.  Rolton  1259 

Talkin  v.  Anderson  384,  1951 

Tallinger  v.  Mandeville  44 

Tallmadge  v.  East  River  Bank       744, 

745,  746,  780,  783 

Tallman  v.  Cooke        1220,  1243,  1297 

V.  Snow        619,  708,  715,  730 

Tally  V.  Reed  1838 

Talinadge  v.  Wilgers  1489 

Tamm  v.  Kellogg  368 

Tancre  v.  Reynolds  104 

Taney  v.  Fahnley  583,  601,  602, 

605,  608 

Tankard  v.  Tankard  1563,  1568 

Tankersley  v.  Childers  1927 

Tanner  v.  Bell  1415 

V.  Livingston  982 

r.  Stine  254 

V.  Van  Bibber  6;)8 

cliv 


Tanney  v.  Tanney      1835,  1836,  1837, 
1839,  1846 
Tapley  v.  Tapley  84 

Tappan  v.  Boston    Water -Power 

Co.  4  75 

V.  Redlield  1021 

Tarbell  v.  Page  1745,  176  7 

V.  West  1371,  1416,  1417, 

1482,  1486,  1506 

Tarleton  v.  Goldthwaite  1874 

Tarpenning  v.  Cannon        364,  432,437 

Tarpey  v.  Ueseret  Salt  Co.       169,  173, 

182,  189,  1086,  1088,  1090 

Tarpley  v.  Poage  925 

Tarrant  Co.  v.  McLemore  403 

Tartt  V.  Clayton  255 

Tarver  v.  Ellison  1402,  1403 

Tasker  ?;.  Barllett        1065,  1067,  1068 

Tate  V.  Fosbee  1942 

V.  Lawrence  1092,  1093 

V.  Liggat  1389 

V.  Stooltzfoos  1215 

V.  Sally  613 

V.  Tate  1277 

V.  Williamson  161,  162 

Tatom  V.  Wbite  1013,  1094 

Tatum  V.  JMcLellan  1906 

V.  St.  Louis  452,  485 

V.  Tatum  325,  567 

Taul  V.  Bradford  828 

V.  Campbell  1800 

Tavenner  v.  Barrett      828,  1125,  1188 

Tayler  V.  Waters  1606 

Taylov,  Ex  pai'te  157 

Taylor  v.  Agricultural  &  M.  Asso. 

1522,  1526 
V.  Alliance  Trust  Co.  182,  183 
V.  Armstrong  448,  459 

V.  Baldwin        1900,  1903,  1904 
V.  Biuford  650,  711 

U.Birmingham  1799 

V.  Board  89 

V.  Cedar  Rapids  &  St.  P. 

R.  Co.  635,  732 

V.  Cleary  575,  583 

V.  Collins        1668,  1672,  1712, 
1717,  1752 
V.  Crockett  98 

V.  Davis  831 

V.  Eckford  994 

V.  Franklin  Sav.  Bank        1485 
V.  Fried  1827 

V.  Glaser  1066,  1069 

V.  Glenn  375 

V.  Hampton  1652,  1653 

V.  Harrison       831,  1396,  1436, 
1451 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Taylor 


r.  Heggie 
r.  Heitz 
V.  Hill 
V.  Holter 
V.  Hotchkiss 
V.  Jaques 
V.  Kelly 
V.  King 
V.  McDonald 
V.  Marcum 
V.  Maris 
V.  Mason 
V.  Millard 
V.  Miller 
V.  Morton 

V.  Mosely 

V.  Opperman 

V.  Patrick 

V.  Phila.  &c.  R.  Co 

V.  Preston 

V.  Smitli 

V.  Stewart 

V.  Stibbert 

V.  Sutton 


V.  Taylor 
V.  Thomas 
V.  Wallace 
V.  Warnaky 
r.  Watkins 
V.  Wing 
V.  Zepp 
Taymoutb  v.  Koehler 
Teafe  V.  Ilewett 

Teal  r.  Auty 
V.  Ti'rrell 
V.  Woodworth 

Teass  v.  Sr.  Albans 


Tebb  V.  Hodge 
Teblu'tts  V.  Estes 
Ted  ford  r.  Wilson 
Tefft  V.  Munson 
Temple  v.  Hawley 
Tenant  v.  Blacker 
Tendiek  r.  Evetts 
Teiioick  v.  Flagg 
Ten  Eick  v.  Simpson 
Ten  Eyck  v.  Witbeck 


lOSO 
931 
1877,  1919 
968, 1109 
1470,  1472 
81,  86 
1529 
1009 
1380 
79 
1482,  1489 
660,  067 
1942,  1949 
1406 
1060, 1063 
1563 
42 
48,  74 
149 
,S25 
1784 
925 
1546,  1563,  15G6, 
1570 
526,  632,  670, 
674,  678,  708,  711 
99,  115,  1936,  1981 
1484 
968,  971,  972 
1658 
1720 
1589 
354 
1052 
1665,  1672,  1712, 
1713 
1600,  1603 
1870 
197!) 
358,  364,  381, 
383 
1749 
466 
1375 
1379,  1416,  14H7 
!) 
1041 
602 
1324 
1571 
1387 


Terhune  r.  Oldis  1220,  1222 

Terre  Haute,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Rodul     448 

V.  Scott       448 

Terrell  i:  Andrew  Co. 

V.  Cunningham 

V.  Frazier 

V.  INlartin 

V.  Murray 

Chandler 


Terry 

V.  Drabenstadt 
V.  Eureka  College 
V.  McClintock 
Tessier  v.  Hall 
Tesson  v.  Newman 
Tetherow  r.  Anderson 
Tevis  V.  Collier 
Tewksbury  v.  Provizzo 


1469,  1471 

18.S7 

IGOO 

1115 

1918 

354,  355,  360, 

366 

924,  960,  985 

1182 

29 

1452 

602 

346 

1376,  1981 

1953 


Texas  L.  &  L.  Co.  V.  Blalock       1198, 

1574 
Texas  Land  Co.  v.  WiUiams  1146 

Texas  Western  Pvy.  Co.  v.  Gentry 

151.  1054 

Texira  r.  Evans 
Thacher  v.  Phianey 
Thacker  v.  Belcher 
V.  Howell 
Thames  v.  Rembert 
Tharp  v.  Jarrell 

V.  Yarborough 
Tharpe  v.  Dunlap 
Thatcher  v.  Howland 
V.  Omans 
V.  St.  Andrew's 
324,    1217, 


1328,  1331 

1085,  1112 

131 

338 

1393 

1217 

232,  583,  585 

1559 

384,  420 

43 

Church 

1218,    1220, 


1226,  1234,  1240,  1289 
Thayer  v.  Clemence         928,  930,  933, 


Tennessee,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  East  Ala- 
bama Ry.  Co.  ^'21,676 

Tennant  v.  Watson  1  •'- '  4 

Tenney  v.  East  Warren  Lumber 
Co.  1049,  1080.  1117 

Tenny  v.  Beard  410 


V.  Finton 

V.  Payne 

V.  Recder 

r.  Richards 

V.  Stark 

V.  Torrey 
Theurer  v.  Nautre 
Thiele  v.  Axell 
Thing  V.  Libl)ey 
Third  Av.  Sav.  Bank  v.  Dimock      lul 
Tbird  Nat.  Bank  v.  O'Brien  1099 

368 

933,  987 

1005 

1667,  1672 

1797,  1800, 

ISo;! 


967,  974 

324,  325,  338, 

398,  399,  411 

1663,  1664 

902 

646 

1296, 1448 

1182,  1185 

1718 

922,  925,  968,  974 

16 


Thoen  r.  Roche 
Thomas  r.  Babb 
V.  Bland 
i'.  Caldwell 
V.  Davis 
V.  De  Baum 


dv 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Thomas  v.  Godfrey  381,  3S8 

V.  Groesbeck  1251,  12r)8 

V.  Hamilton  !)6S 

I'.  Han.^on       1409,  1457,  1185 
V.  Hatch        52,  54,  481,  4,ss, 
l.s(52 
V.  Higfjins  ()'*2 

V.  eli'iikins  37(S 

V.  Kelsey  14(»4 

V.  Marshfield  241,  242 

r.  Meier  11 89,  1194 

V.  Moody  Hi  2 5 

V.  Owen  1637 

r.  Patten  424 

V.  Pickering  1880 

V.  Poole  449,  450 

V.  Pullis  24,  25,  26 

V.  Railroad  Co.  142 

V.  Record  646,  712,  724 

V.      St.     Paul's     M.     E. 

Church  918 

V.  Stickle  919,  921 

V.  Stone  1528 

V.  Thomas  1918 

V.  Vanlieu      1403,  1408,  1529 

Thomason  v.  Dayton  259 

Thomasson  v.  Hanna  388 

Thompson's  Appeal  733 

Thompson  v.  Allen  45 

V.  Bostick  1891,  1S92 

V.  Brannon  1106 

V.  Burhans  125 

V.  Candor  176 

V.  Carl  563,  566,  613 

V.  Carr  1057 

V.  Cart  Wright  1539 

V.  Craigmyle  1627 

V.  Dearborn  1289,  1291 

r.  Easton  1220,1243, 

1269 

V.  Ela  326 

u.  Erie  Ry.  Co.  149 

V.  Gerrish  1919 

V.  Harris  381,  435,  437 

u.  Holden  195S 

V.  Johnson  r2;)0 

V.  Jones         326,  943,  1289, 

1292,  1887,  19S1, 

1988 

V.  Lambert  144 

V.  Leach         54,  1240,  1282 

V.  Lloyd  1231 

V.  Lockwood  79,  88,  94 

V.  Lovrein  38 

V.  Lyman  1409,  1493 

V.  Mack  1468 

V.  Major  .",59,  459 

clvi 


Thompson  v.  Mawhinney  1778 

V.  Maxwell  1499 

V.  Mills  42,  44,  45 

V.  Morgan  1143,  1144, 

1151,  1441 
V.  Morrow  1182 

V.  Motor  Road  Co.         323, 

338,  352 
V.  New  Eng.  Mortg.  Se- 
curity Co.      1200,  1206 

V.  Niggley  90 

V.  Pioche  1517,  1523, 

1563,  1564,  1565, 
1566 
V.  Railway  Co.  324 

17.  Sanders  939 

V.  Schuyler  1153 

V.  Slu'ppard  1515 

V.  Smith  336 

V.  So.  Cal.  M.  R.  Co.    323, 

339,  352 
V.  Spencer  1394 
V.  Strickland  27 
V.  Swoope  189 
V.  Thompson           26  7,  268, 

295,  625,  632,  678, 

70S,  722,  723,  1364 

V.  Vinton  1741,  1744 

V.  Waters         169,  182,  189 

V.  Westbrook       1506,  1525 

V.  Wilhite  1620 

Thomson  v.  Cin-tis  799 

V.  Wilcox  1483 

Thorington  v.  City  Council  310 

Thormaehlen  r.  Kaeppel  6,  27,  31 

Thorn  v.  Frazer  1122 

y.-Mayer  1440,  1455 

V.  Newsom  1396 

V.  Phares  323 

V.  Pinkham  86 

V.  Wilson  1593 

Thornberry  v.  Churchill  389 

Thornburg  v.  Wiggins  1778,  1792, 

1794,  1795,  1796,  1803,  1814 

Thorndike  v.  Richards  410 

Thornell  v.  Brockton  338 

Thornton  i-.  Court  801 

V.  Nat.  Exchange  Bank 

174,  175 

V.  Thornton  1772,  1790, 

1800 

r.  Trammell  635,  650 

V.  York  Bank         1862,  1873 

Thoroughgood's  Case  1012,  1303 

Thorp  V.  Merrill  1436,  1455 

Thorpe  r.  Holdsworth  1583 

Thrall  v.  Spear  646,  708 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Threadgill  v,  Bickerstaff 

V.  Reclwine 
Threlkeld  v.  Fitzhugh 


1171,  1396 

1836,  11S38 

944,  968, 

986 

Throckmorton  v.  Burr  1935 

r.  Moon  "  323 

V.  Pence  1966 

V.  Price        1451,  1472, 

1479 

Throp  V.  Johnson  708,  715 

Thruston  v.  Minke  1964,  1996 

Thurman  v.  Burt  85,  87 

V.  Cameron  122,  1133, 

1134,  1136,  1153,  1159, 

1179,  1180,  1196,  1446, 

1447 

V.  Morrison  481 

V.  Stoddard  285,  1390 

Thweat  v.  Stamps  1619,  1709 

Tibbals  v.  Jacobs  1282 

Tibbetts  v.  Home       1736,  1740,  1746, 

1755 

V.  Langley  Mauuf.  Co.     1415 

V.  Leeson  930,  966,  967 

V.  Moore        1719,  1748,  1753 

Tibeau  v.  Tibeau  1259 

Tice  I'.  Annin  1484 

V.  Derby  1846,  1850 

Tichenor  v.  Yankey  1207 

Ticknor  v.  McCleland  1620 

Tidd  V.  Pvines  245,  1109 

Tierney  v.  Brown  402 

V.  Whiting  960 

Tiffin  V.  Shawhan        1056,  1057,  1080 

Tifft  V.  Horton  1719,  1737,  1740, 

1753,  1754,  1767 

Tilden  v.  Tilden  1935 

TilUnghast  v.  Bradford  663,  664 

V.  Champlin        1516,  1541, 

1542 

Tillman  r.  De  Lacy    1668,  1670,  1672, 

1673,  1712,  1714,  1717,  1748 

Tillotson  V.  Gesner  215 

V.  Prichard  932,  939 

V.  Webber  213 

Tilton  V.  Cofield  1559 

V.  Hunter  1371,  1482 

Timothy  I'.  Wright  130  7 

Tindall  r.  Castle  74S 

Tinder  1).  Tinder  213,    230,231, 

578,  583 
Tinicum  Fishing  Co.  v.  Carter  471 
Tinkers.  Forbes  510,  551,  779 

Tinkham  r.  Erie  Ry,  Co.  696,  729 

Tinney  v.  Stebbins  1994 

Tippecanoe  Co.  v.  Lafayette,  &c. 
R.  Co.  142 


Tippen  v.  Mc Campbell  440 

Tipping  V.  Eckersley  823 

Tipton  V.  Feitner  622 

V.  La  Rose  613 

Tisdale  v.  Tisdale  1836 

Tisher  v.  Beckwith     1220,  1256,  1315, 

1335 
Titcomb  v.  Vantyle  48,  58 

Titsworth  V.  Stout       1835,  1836,  1853 
Titterington  v.  Trees  381,  383, 

389 

Titus  V.  Ginbeimer  1729 

I'.  Mabee  1729 

V.  Phillips  1257,  1314,  1326 

Tobey  v.  Moore       714,  742,  743,  771, 

798 
Tobias  v.  Francis  16  74 

Tobin  V.  Bass  1241,  1276,  1282, 

1297 
Tod  V.  Baylor  1159 

Todd  V.  Grove  101,  103 

V.  Jones  1159,  1180 

V.  Outlaw  1133,  1435,  1442, 

1501,  1560 
V.  Union  Dime  Sav.  Inst.     1075, 
1076,  1077,  1078 
V.  Wickliffe  43 

V.  Zachary  1800 

Tognazzini  v.  Morganti  381,  439 

Toland  i'.  Corey  115,  1563 

Toledo,  St.  L.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Co- 
sand  785,  816 
Tolle  V.  Alley  1485 
Tolles  V.  Winton        1668,  1670,  1671, 
1714, 1717 
Tolman  v.  Smith                     1181,  1413 
V.  Ward               280,  281,  282, 
295,  296,  298,  301 
Tom  V.  Sayers                                    1061 
Tonilin  v.  Dubuque  R.  Co.  481 
V.  Hilyard        1942,  1947,  1948 
Tompkins  I'   Henderson                    1517 
V.  Wheeler           1267,  1277, 
1282,  1284,  1285,  1291 
Toms  V.  Greenwood                   108,  113 
V.  Owen                         1274,  1286 
Toncra  r.  Henderson  300 
Tone  V.  AVilson                           944,  946 
Tonnjue  I'.  INIorton                             1659 
Tooker  v.  Sloan              87,  1196,  1201, 

1447 
Tooley  u.  Dibble  1277,  1309 

Topi)ing  u.  Sndler  1811 

Torrence  v.  Shcdd  120,  1395 

Torrey  v.  F(>rl)es  1121 

V.  IMartin  1900,  1904 

V.  Torrey  1  792 

clvii 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Touchard  r.  Crow      11 23,  11 24,  1 1 32, 

11  (;2,  iiti5 

Toulmin  r.  Iloidelberg  1027 

Tourville  r.  Picrson  1164,  1194 

TousK'v  V.  (lalena  M.  &  S.  Co.        448 

V.  Tousley  1406,  143C, 

1437,  1451,  1472 

Towarv.  Hale  223,  23  7 

Towart  v.  Sellers  58 

Tower  v.  Tower  11)58 

Towery  v.  Henderson  1251 

Towle  V.  Smith  708 

Towler  v.  Towler  525 

Town  0.  GrilHth  1455 

V.  Needhain  801,  933,  1879, 

1900,  1981 

Towne  v.  Bowers  718,  723,  731 

V.  Fiske  1702,  1703 

Townend  v.  Toker  297 

Towner  I".  Lucas  1303 

I'.  ThomiDSon  375 

V.  Wells  1498 

Townsend  v.  Corning  1041,  1042 

r.  Downer  353 

V.  Eichelberger  1867 

V.  Hayt  365,  384 

V.  Hubbard         1041,  1042, 

1067 

V.  Little     1086,  1544,  1568 

V.  Maynard  43 

V.  Morris  927 

V.  Weld  861,  8.S3 

Townsend  &  Paston's  Case  1880 

Townshend  v.  Goodfellow  245 

V.  O'Bogert  196  7 

V.  Townshend  44,  294 

Townsley  v.  Chapin  1212 

Townson  v.  Green  853 

t;.  Tickell  1282,  12.S5 

Tracy  v.  Greffet  840 

V.  Jenks  1455,  1472 

Trader  v.  Jarvis  2,  26 

Traders'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Manuf.  Co. 

1501 
Tradesmen's    Building    Asso.    v. 

Thompson  1420 

Trafton  v.  Hawes     266,  267,  269,  293, 

294,  313 
Tram  Lumber  Co.  v.  Hancock        402, 

1396 
Trammell  v.  Thurmond  1162 

Transue  v.  Sell         448,  449,  450,  461 
Tranum  v.  Wilkinson  1437 

Traphagen  /•.  Irwin  M82 

Trappes  v.  Hartor  1690,  1765 

Trasher  v.  Everhart  1068,  1071, 

1073 
clviii 


Trask  v.  Trask  1272,  1273 

V.  Wheeler  808 

V.  Wilder  929 

Travellers'  Insurance  Co.  v.  Yount  386 
Travis  v.  Tyler  1265 

Tray,  &c.  11.  Co.  v.  Kerr  142 

Traylor  v.  Townsend  1511,  1517, 

1522 
Traynor  i\  Palmer  845 

Treiidwell  v.  Reynolds  1238 

V.  Salisbury  Manuf.  Co. 

141,  142 
Treat  r.  Chipman  476 

V.  Joslyn  455 

Tredway  v.  McDonald  1569 

Trefts  V.  King  1514 

Tremain  v.  Liming  828 

Tremmel  v.  Kleiboldt  590 

Trenouth  v.  Gilbert  1870 

Trentman  v.  Eldridge  1529,  1530 

V.  Neff  338,  351 

Treptow  v.  Buse  1408 

Trezise  v.  Lacy  1568 

Trice  v.  Kayton  842,  911 

Trimmer  y.  Heagy  36,  1182 

Trinity  Co.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Pinck- 

ard  1021 

Tripe  v.  Marcy  1482 

Triplett  zj.  Witherspoon  1109 

Tripp  i;.  Ha sceig  1619,1621 

I'.  Riley  1994 

Tritch  V.  Norton  1591 

Trotter  v.  Hughes  647 

Troup  V.  Haight  1446 

Trowel  v.  Castle  1359 

Troy  City  Bank  v.  Wilcox  1530 

True  V.  Nicholls  616 

Truesdale  v.  Ford  1563,  1568 

Truesdell  v.  White  1 786 

Truett  V.  Adams      351,  352,  359,  364, 

520,  521 
Truitt  V.  Truitt  1559 

Trull  V.  Bigelow  1502,  1503,  1504, 

1529 

V.  Eastman  892 

V.  Fuller  1688,  1721 

V.  Skinner  1262,  1264 

Trullinger  /•.  Kofoed  1430 

Truluck  V.  Peebles  1132 

Truman  v.  Lore  1010,  1127,  1444 

V.  McCoIlum  1448 

Truscott  V.  King  295,  1489 

Trusdell  v.  Lehman  575,  599 

Trussel  v.  Lewis  355,  364 

Trustees  v.  Bryson  40,  44,  4  5 

V.  Davidson  1 1  85 

V.  Davison  1171,  1212 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Trustees  v.  Hawes  452 

V.  Kirk  1866 

V.  Lynch  733,  771,  779, 

780,  786,  875 

V.  McKechnie  1153 

V.  Manning  1110 

V.  SchroU  480,  484,  501 

V.  Tbacher        733,  766,  773, 

782,  805,  811 

V.  Wheeler  1425,  1563, 

1566 

Trutt  V.  Spotts  448,  450,  461 

Tryon  v.  Hun  toon  323 

V.  Munson  1380 

Tubbs  V.  Gatewood  1159,  1162, 

1190 

Tucker  v.  Allen  1257 

V.  Campbell  1925 

V.  Clarke  997,  998 

V.  Constable  1513 

V.  Cooney  920 

V.  Feri:;uson  146 

V.  Heiizill  1538 

V.  Jones  533,  549,  1637, 

1643 

r.  Markland  1997 

V.  Moreland      2,  5,  14,  20,  21, 

24,  31,  54,  59,  60 

V.  Shaw  1451,  1485 

V.  Smith  376 

V.  Tilton  1532,  1536 

V.  Tucker  231,  583,  586, 

618 

V.  Vowles  748 

Tudor  Iron  Works  v.  Hitt  1698 

Tufts  V.  Adams        903,  935,  962,  96  7, 

975 

V.  Charlestown  449 

V.  Tapley  1467 

V.  Tufts  1528 

Tulk  V.  Moxhay  779,  780,  781 

Tull  V.  Royston  871 

Tulloch  V.  \Vorrall  1875 

TuUy  V.  Davis  1 1 80 

Tunison  v.  Chaml)lin         2,  17,  18,  19, 

1196,  1197,  1202,  1248 

Tunstall  v.  Cobb  1261 

('.  Trappes  1499 

Tupper  V.  Fonlkes  1018 

Turk  V.  Funk  1413 

Turman  v.  Bell  1467,  1473.  1563, 

1575,  1576 

V.  White  602 

Turnbull  v.  Schroeder      339,  340,  381, 

386,  389,  398 

Turner  v.  Babb  1559 

V.  Baker  354,  364,  366 


Turner  v.  Carpenter  1217,  1287 

V.  Collins  108 

V.  Connelly  1125 

V.  Cool  524,  1619,  1624 

V.  Field  1065 

V.  Gaither  16 

V.  Goodrich  869,  919,  921, 

924,  974 

V.  Houpt  1559,  1560 

V.  Kelly  44 

V.  Kennedy  1698 

V.  McDonald  215 

V.  Me  Fee  285,  287,  1391 

v.  Mebane  1760 

V.  Miller  968 

V.  Parker  490,  492 

V.  Rusk  57,  65 

V.  Scott  527,  1232,  1233 

V.  Shaw  44,  4  6 

V.  Thomas  131 

V.  Turner  99,  356 

V.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.        433, 

437 

V.  Warren        1240,  1248,  1259 

V.  Wentworth  1668,  16  73, 

1702 

V.  Whidden  1241 

Turnipseed  v.  Fitzpatrick  1991 

Turpin  V.  Ogle  1420 

Tustin  V.  Faught  1004,  1007 

Tuten  V.  Gazan  1143,  1144,  1149, 

1154 

Tuttle  V.  Armstead  305 

V.  Churchman  1575 

U.Jackson  138,  1563,  1568 

V.  Rainey  1248 

V.  Turner         1243,  1248,  1276, 

1282 

V.  Walker  530,  542 

Tutwiler  v.  Montgomery  1563 

V.  Munford  310 

Twambly  v.  Henley  843 

Twelves  D.  Nevill  617 

Twiford  v.  Alamakee  Co.  658 

Twogood  V.  Hoyt  381,  466,  484 

Twomev  v.  Crowley  271,  295 

Twitchell  v.  McMurtrie  1447 

T witty  V.  Camp     ■  660,  667 

Tydings  v.  Pitcher  1547,  1552 

1^'ler,  In  re  1884,  1S87 

Tyler  v.  Carlton  295,  305 

V.  Dempsey  43 

V.  Fiekett  338,  340,  381 

V.  Gallop  24 

V.  Gardiner  98 

V.  Hall     1220,  1227,  1228,  1236, 

1237,  1267 

clix 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Tyler  r.  Hammond 


410,  411,  448, 
1G37 

V.  Moore         5G3,  565,  56t;,  5(18, 

570,  580,583,  608,  609 

V.  Thomas  1559 

Tynerr.  Feniier  1M91 

V.  People's  Gas  Co.  159S 

Tyrone  Co.  v.  Cross  378 

Tyson  v.  Post  1680,  1739,  1750 

Uecker  v.  Koehn  29 

Ufford  V.  AVilkins  398,  441 

Uhl  V.  May  1563 

Uhler  V.  Hutchinson     1405,  1406,  1407 
V.  Seniple  1406 

Ulrich's  Appeal  617 

Umbarger  v.  Chaboya  388 

Umscheid  i'.  Scholz  542 

Underbill  v.  Morgan  40 

V.  Saratoga  &  W.  R.  Co. 

619,624,636,638, 

708,  723,  728,  729 

Underwood  v.  Birchard  893 

V.  Campbell        268,  1060, 

1063 

V.  Carney  1662 

V.  Dollins  1069,  1070 

Unger  v.  Mooney        1862,  1864,  1666, 

1878,  1880 

Union  Bank  v.  Call  1082 

V.  Emerson  1731 

Union  Canal  Co.  v.  Young       649,  687 

Union    Coal    Co.    v.    City    of   La 

Salle  452 

Union  College  v.  Wheeler  1570 

Union  Dime  Savings  Inst.  v.  Du- 

ryea  1390 

Union  Gold  M.  Co.  v.  Bank  1080, 

1082 
Union  Mut.  Life  Lis.  Co.  v.  Camp- 
bell 1276,  1287,  1289,  1290, 
1292,  1301 
Union  Ry.  &   T.   Co.  v.   Skinner 

326,  420,  423,  495 
United  Brethren  Church  v.  First 

Methodist  Church  238 

United  Presb.  Ch.,  In  re  650 

United  Society  v.  Brooks      1606,  1607 

United  States  v.  Appleton     1649,  1 652 

V.  Arredondo      6  74,  67  7 

V.    California,     &c. 

Land  Co.  1394 

V.  Fox  165,  185 

V.  Griswold  1406 

V.  Hooe  272 

V.  Huckabee  81,  89 

V.  King  323 

clx 


United  States  v.  Linn  1365 

V.  Murray  381 

V.  Nelson  1328 

V.  New  Orleans  R. 

Co.         1730,  1743, 

1753 

V.  Pacheco        471,  472, 

473 

V.  Rei)entigny  725 

V.  Schurz       1219,  1229, 

1377 

V.  Sliney  1566 

r.  Stephenson  1064 

V.  Sutter  432 

United   States   Insurance    Co.    v. 

Shriver  1374,1416 

United  States  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Gross 

184,  185,  187,  1547 
United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  Lee        85, 

173 
University  of  Vermont  v.  Joslyn  140 
University  of  Vermont  v.  Rey- 
nolds 1919 
Upham  V.  Bradley  1960 
Upington  V.  Corrigan  682,  694,  718 
Upton  V.  Archer  1328,  1329,  1333 
V.  Basset  138  7 
Urann  v.  Coates  594,  1277 
Urban  v.  Grimes  24,  27 
Usina  V.  Wilder  256 
Utermehle  v.  McGreal  5,  29,  31 
Utley  V.  Fee  1396 
Utz,  Estate  of                             602,  609 

Vail  V.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  708 

V.  McMillan  274,  295,  302 

V.  Weaver  1668,  1723,  1741 

Valentine  v.  Healey  1895,  1896 

V.  Lunt  48,  116 

I'.  Piper  476,479,1101, 

1102 

V.  Sloss  472 

V.  Wheeler  1248 

Vallandingham  v.  Johnson       2,  5,  21, 

23,  33 
Valley  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v.  West  460 
Valpcy  V.  Rea  63,  64 

Vanada  r.  Hopkins  1041 

Van  Aken  v.  Gleason  1495,  1496, 

1504 
Van  Alst  v.  Hunter  48 

Van  Alstyne,  r.  Van  Slyck  1067 

Vanauken  v.  Ilornbeck  1348 

Van  Bibber  i'.  Frazier         1862,  1873, 

1877 
Vanblaricum  v.  Yeo  1063 

Van  Brunt  r.  Applegate  1832 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Van  Brunt  v.  Gordon  1918 

V.  Van  Brunt  1338 

Vance  ?'.  Fore  417,418,424,431, 

1066 

V.  Johnson  135 

V.  Schuyler  1153,  1154 

Vancleave  v.  Wilson  1206 

Van  Cloostere  v.  Logan  1499 

Vim  Den  Brooks  v.  Correon  466 

Vandercook  v.  Baker  1451,  1487 

Vanderkenip  v.  SheUon        1420,  1484 

Vanderpoel  u.  Van  Allen      1713,  1743 

Vanderslice  v.  Knapp  1760,  1764 

Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet      48,  49,  52,  53, 

54,  70,  71 

V.  Swift  48 

Vandiveer  v.  Stickney      119,  1  24,  125, 

129,133,  135 

Van  Doren  v.  Relfe  929 

Van  Dusen  v.  Shively  438 

Vanduyne  v.  Vreeland  1513 

Van  Dyck  v.  Van  Buren  1872 

Van  Eps  v.  Schenectady  828 

Van  Etta  v.  Evenson  1331,  1335 

Van   Gunden  v.  Virginia  Coal  & 

Iron  Co.  1868,  1879 

Van  Heusen  v.  Radcliffe  1390 

Van  Hoesen  v.  Benham  140 

Van  Hook  v.  Walton  1224 

Van  Horn  v.  Bell         1351,  1361,  1365 
Van  Home  v.  Dorrance  6 1  9 

V.  Fonda  1836,  1846 

Van  Husan  v.  Heames  1380,  1384 

Van  Keuren  v.  Central  R.  Co.      1563, 

1575 

V.  Corkins         1420,  1424 

Vanmeter  v.  Darrah  56 

V.  Knight  1458 

V.  Vanmeter  271,  272 

Van  Ness  v.  Bank       1116,  1143,  1165 

Van  Nostrand  v.  Wright  1182 

Vannoy  v.  Blessing  138 

Vanorden  v.  Johnson  1482,  1489 

Van  Orman  v.  McGregor      1196, 1197 

Van  Ostrand  i'.  Reed  1021 

Van  Peh  V.  McGraw  1761 

Van  Rensselaer  r.  Ball  723 

V.  Clark  1504 

V.  Kearney      155,  991 

Van  Riswick  r.  Goodhue  1439 

Vansant  v.  Morris  233 

r.  Roberts  237 

Van  Schiiyver  r.  Mulford  1963 

Van  Slyck  v.  Skinner  154  7 

Vanstory  )'.  Thornton  1403 

Van  Thorniley  v.  Peters      1406,  1435, 

1441,  1460 


Van  Valkenburg  v.  Huff  1862 

Van  Voorhis  v.  Kelly  140 

Van  Wagenen  v.  Hopper  1524 

Van  Wagner  r  "Van  Nostrand        861, 

882,  883 
Van  AVinklc  v.  Constantine  36 

Van  Wyck  v.  Brasher  74 

V.  Seward  289 

Vardeman  v.  Lawson  829 

Varick  v.  Briggs         1425,  1486,  1529, 

1531 

Varn  v.  Varn  575,  1782 

Varner  r.  Rice  525 

V.  Young  233 

Varnum  v.  Leek  1887,  1892 

Vasey  v.  Board  of  Trustees  1945 

Vason  V.  Ball  1711 

Vass  V.  Hill  1885,  1892 

Vattier  v.  Hinde  1511 

Vaughan  v.  Bacon  1862,  1863 

V.  Fowler  1348 

V.  Godman  1218,  1276, 

1282,  1289,  1297 

V.  Parr  24 

Vaughen  v.  Haldeman  1703 

Vaughu  i\  Carlisle  1213 

V.  Moore  1258,  1451 

V.  Schmalsle  402,  1404 

V.  Tracy  1511,  15C3 

Vaux  V.  Nesbit  167 

Veal  V.  Fortson  13 

Veasey  r.  Williams  360 

Veazie  v.  Parker  1371,  1506 

Veheu  v.  Mosher  1708 

Veith  V.  McMurtry  1521,  1527 

Vejar  v.  Mound  City  Asso.      334,  338, 

421 
Venable  v.  Beauchamp        1835,  1836, 
1846,  1853 
Veramendi  v.  Hutchins  252 

Vereycken  v.  Vandenbrooks  87,  89 
Vermont  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Hills  1642 
Verner  ?'.  Betz  1759,  1760 

Verplanck  v.  Wright  694 

Verplank  v.  Sterry  281,  283,  1277 

Vest  V.  Michie  1510,  1515,  1517, 

1524 
Viall  V.  Carpenter  534 

Vick  V.  Edwards  1796 

V.  Gower  41 

Vickers  v.  Leigh  682,  599 

Victoria  v.  Schott  485 

Vidal  V.  Girard  183 

Videau  v.  Griffin  1014,  1017,  1021 
Vide  V.  Judson  1422,  1428 

Vilas  V.  Reynolds  1050 

Vilbas  V.  Beaumont  1278 

clxi 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Villa  V.  Koilriiitu'z 
Villors  r.  Hoaiiiiiont 
Villiers  r.  XWUvva 
ViiK'onr  ('.  Walker 
Vinton  r.  Beanier 
VioU'tt  r.  Viok'tt 
Virgin  i\  Biubaker 
Viser  i\  Rice 


1394 

1277 

59;? 

302.  309 

1792,  1803 

138 

1415 

1331 


Visitors  M.  E.  Church  v.  Town        599 

Vliet  V.  Camp  1331 

Vo2;clsan<r  ('.  Null  34 

Vogiti  i\  Brown  1857 

Voiglit  ('.  Kaby  359 

Voorhees  v.  Burchard  351,  1()39 

1649,  1651,  1652 

V.  McGinnis  1668,  1715, 

1717,  1719,  1735,  1737, 

1746,  1747,  1753 

r.  Presbyterian  Church    40, 

528 

Voorhies  v.  Voorhies  2,  24 

Voorhis  V.  Freeman  1668,  1728 

V.  Westervelt  1405 

Vorebeck  v.  Roe  1600 

Voris  L\  Renshaw     632,  6  78,  6  79,  715 

V.  Thomas  1846 

Vosburgh  V.  Teator  338,  35i,  355, 

361 

V.  Yeaton  359 

Vose  V.  Dolan  1340,  1344 

V.  Handy  326 

Voss  V.  King  1937 

Vought  V.   Vought     44,  1220,  1244, 

1357 

Vredenburgh  v.  Burnet   1494,  1495, 

1499,  1555 

Vreeland  c.  Clafflin  1405 

V.  Vreeland  1220,  1222, 

1240,  1248,  1963 

Vrooman  v.  Shepherd  134 

V.  Turner  865 

Vunk  V.  Raritan  Hi  v.  R.  Co.  1817 

Vyvyan  v.  Arthur  793 

Wacliendorf  y.  Lancaster  948,  980 

Waco  Bridge  Co.  v.  Waco  512 

Waddell  v.  Hewitt  1218 

V.  Lanier                99,  101,  103 

V.  Latham  1257 

Wade  V.  Am.  Col.  Soc.  1  75 

I'.  Bunn  1337 

V.  Comstock             893,  968,  981 

V.  Deray  326,  414 

V.  Donau  Brewing  Co.  1721 

V.  Doyle  1874 

V.  Lindsay  140 

V.  Love  31 

clxii 


Wade  V.  State  58 

Wadhams  v.  Gay  992 

r.  Tniies  861,  944 

r.  Swan     398,  881,  962,  9(;3 

Wadleigh  r.  danvrin  1667 

Wadsworth  c.  Sherman  52 

V.  Snath  549 

V.  Wadsworth  166 

V.  Wendell  1061,  1062 

Wager  v.  Scluiyler  960 

V.  Troy,  &c.  R.  Co.  448 

V.  Wager  565,  568,  573 

Waggener  ik  Waggener        1014,  1021 

Waflesu.  Cooper  1513,  1547 

Wainman  v.  Hampton  1984 

Wain  Wright  v.  Low  1207 

V.  McCullough  471 

Wait  V.  Baldwin  1547,  1601,  1611 

V.  Day  278 

V.  Maxwell  52,  54,  843 

V.  May  459,  502 

V.  Richardson  1873,  1922 

V.  Savage  1407 

V.  Smith  1436,  1506 

Wakefield  ;;.  Brown  218,  244 

V.  Ross  354 

Walbridge  v.  Arnold  81 

Walbrunn  v.  BaUen  368,  369 

Waldin  v.  Smith  410 

Waldo  V.  Chicago  &  B.  Co.  1  78 

Waldron  v.  Toledo,  &c.  Ry.  Co.      678 

Wales  V.  Coffin  318,  1803,  1806 

Walker  v.  Board  of  Works  485 

('.  Boynton  424,  449,  455 

I'.  Deaver  925,  931,  958, 

959,  962 

V.  Dement  1585 

V.  Denison  1036 

V.  Devlin  359 

V.  Douglas  1559 

V.  Flouring  Mill  Co.  1668 

V.  Grand  Rapids  Flouring 

Mill  Co.  1672,  1717 

U.Hill  1628 

V.  Keile  1071 

r.  Kirshner  921,927 

w.  Laflin  1963 

V.  Lincoln  1400 

V.  Long  41 

V.  Miller  1396 

V.  Moses       321,  331,  339,  344 
V.  Owens  1162 

I'.  Perrvmnn  1936 

V.  Pnbfic  Works  480 

V.  Schin.lel  1752 

V.  Schreiber  1532 

V.  Shepardson  485 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Walker  v.  Sherman  1720,  1721 

V.  Simpson  364 

V.  Tupper  1827 

I?.  Vincent     141,660,662,708 

V.  AValker       1218,  1220,  1227, 

1277,  1278 

V.  Wilson  958 

V.  Worcester  449 

Wall  V.  Harbor  Co.  4  71 

V.  Hickey  1303 

V.  Hinds  1931 

V.  Wall  268,  527,  1230, 

1246,  1277,  1297 

Wallace  v.  Berdell     1243,  1247,  1251, 

1277,  1292 

V.  Campbell  1408 

V.  Cohen  1529 

V.  Fee  448,  468 

V.  Furber  1436 

V.  Harmstad  1331,  1335, 

1346, 1349 

V.  Harris        1234,  1307,  1309 

V.  Latham  25,  27 

V.  Lewis  2,  25,  27 

V.  McCollough  1014 

V.  Marquett  1559 

V.  Miller  404 

V.  Minor  1086 

V.  SiUby  1371 

V.  Talbot  944 

Wallaeh  v.  Hoexter  81,  84 

Waller  r.  Bowling  1738 

V.  Cralle  87 

Wallingsford  r.  Allen  44 

Wallis  V.  Delancey  1104 

V.  Rhea  1499 

*•.  Wallis  268,  295,  313 

Walmsley  v.  Milne  1690,  1707, 

1713,  1725,  1748,  1765 

Walrath  v.  Redfield  528 

Walrod  r.  Flanigan  381 

Walsh  r.  Dunn  983 

V.  Hill  324,  340,  381,  385 

V.  Powers  29,  30,  158 

V.  Ringer  402 

V.  Trevanion  249,  250 

t).  Vermont   Mut.    F.   Ins. 

Co.  1289,  1290 

V.  Young  7,  33 

Waltee  V.  Weaver      1139,  1183,  1196, 

1198 
Walterhouse  v.  GaiTard  901 

Walters  v.  Walters  1409 

Wfilthal!  w.  Gorcc  1793,  1802 

W;dther  v.  Rcgnault  1986 

Walton  V.  Ronham  956 

f.  Burton  1259,  1290 


Walton  V.  Hargroves  1406 

I'.  Northington  49 

Wambole  v.  Foote      1182,  1183,  1185, 

1188,  1190 

Wannall  v.  Kern  1207,  1208,  1209, 

1212 

Wannell  v.  Kem  1182,  1208,  144  7 

Wanner  r.  Sisson  599 

Warbritton  r.  Demcrett  448 

Warburton  v.  Lauman  1436 

V.  Mattox  1488 

Ward,  /h  re  409 

Ward  I'.  Amory  593 

V.  Anderson  14 

V.  Ashbrook  867,  921,  962, 

974 

V.  Bartholomew  138,  1057 

V.  Carey  1413 

V.  Corbett  19  79 

V.  Dougherty  1238,  1248 

r.  Fuller  139,  1112 

r.  Hague  1482,  1489 

V.  Kilpatrick  1703 

V.  Lambert  264 

V.  Lant  1277 

V.  Laverty  27 

V.  Lewis  1248,  1303 

V.  Lumley  1346 

V.  Mcintosh  918,   1195 

V.  Bapp  1606,  1609 

v.  Small  1240,  1276,  1448 

V.  Ward  1811,  1883,  1891, 

1898,  1899,  1901, 

1906,  1981,  1997 

Warden  v.  Watson  507,  531,  537, 

1595 

Warden  v.  Adams  1519 

r.  Lyons  43 

Warder  r.  Henry  1180 

Wardlow  v.  Miller  1947 

Ware  v.  Brookhouse  375,  376 

V.  Brush  24 

V.  Cann  660,  662 

V.  Egmont  1514, 1544 

V.  Hylton  165 

r.  Johnson  398 

V.  McQuinn.  447 

V.  Nesbit  79,  88 

)■.  Iiich;irdson  583,  602,  617 

r.  Smith  1220 

Warfield  v.  Lindell     1862,  1865,  1866, 

1868,  1872,  1878 

I'.  Marshall  Canning  Co.     151 

V.  Warfield  48,  69 

Waring  v.  Smvth  1338,  134  7,  1350 

Wark  r.  Willanl  1109,   1487 

Warlick  v.  White  40,  44,  45 

clxiii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Warn  r.  Brown  563,  5(55,  583,  617 

Warner  r.  Bull  V2H 

I".  Cros'.n'  1447 

r.  Fountain  156!) 

V.  Hanlv        1112,  1159,  1178, 

llSd 

i\  Kenning  17;i.S 

V.  Peck  3,S 

V.  Rogers  799,  852 

r.  South  worth  448,  494 

V.  Whitalcer  1386,  1527, 

1528 

V.  Winslow  1420,  1424, 

1450,  1462 

Warnett  v.  Bennett  623,  638,  715, 

724,  728,  731 

Warnock  v.  Campbell  76 

V.  Harlow  1380,  1383, 

1388,  1562 

Warren  v.  Blake  534 

V,  Brown  44,  1185 

V.  Chambers  485 

V.  Cochran  933 

V.  Frederichs  1364,  1942 

w.  Jacksonville  1292 

V.  Leland        559,  1600,  1602, 

1603 

V.  Lynch  1060,  1064 

V.  Lyons  City  650 

V.  Makely  402 

V.  Sohn  1591 

V.  Swett  1220,  1522 

V.  Syme  1436 

V.  Thomaston  484,  485 

V.  Tobey  1258,  1259 

Warren  Co.  v.  Patterson  650 

Warrick  v.  Hull  1196,  1197,  1204 

V.  Warrick  1534 

Wartemberg  v.  Spiegel  99,  103 

Warthen  v.  Siefert  1976 

Warwick  v.  Bruce  1620 

Washband  v.  Washband         266,  275, 

288,  292 
Washburn  v.  Burns  1802,  1811, 

1814 
V.  Gardner  44 

V.  Sproat  1691 

Washington    City    Sav.    Bank    v. 

Thornton  '  y03,  907 

Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  Shortall  480 
Washington  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
shall 304 
Wasson  V.  Conner  1125,  1127 
Water  Lot  Co.  v.  Bucks  814 
Waterfall  v.  Penistone  1690,  1718 
Waterman  v.  Andrews  331,  1866 
V.  Clark                              G32 

clxiv 


Waterman  v.  Higgins  40,  45 

V.  Johnson      326,  335,  338, 

339,  386,  487,  501 

r.  Soper  1614 

Waters  v.  Bew  334 

V.  Spofford  1436 

Watertown   Steam  Engine  Co.  v. 

Davis  1744 

Watkins  v.  Baird  79 

V.  Brant  103 

V.  Eaton   1846,  1851,  1853, 

1854 

V.  Edwards  1524,  1525, 

1573 

V.  Green  1882 

V.  Gregory  903 

r.  Hall  1159,1178 

V.  Lynch  448 

V.  Nash  1302,  1303,  1304 

V.  Tucker  505,  518 

V.  Wassell  14,  21 

V.  Wilhoit     1451,  1461,  1468, 

1469,  1471,  1472,  1480 

Watrous  v.  Allen  583,  6  71,  731, 

743,  780 

V.  McGrew  252 

V.  Morrison        354,  355,  360, 

389,  441 

V.  Southworth  448,  458 

Watson's  Appeal  1853 

Watson  V.  Anderson  56 

V.  Bailey         1129,  1182,  1206 

V.  Baker  339 

V.  Billings  7,  9,  18,  1010, 

10-19 

V.  Blaine  303 

V.  Bondurant  1372 

V.  Campbell  1177,  1446 

V.  Chalk  1506 

V.  Cressey  525 

V.  Crutcher  402 

V.  Dundee  M.  &  T.  Co.     1420 

V.  Edwards  1840 

V.  Gregg  1862 

V.  Hillnian      1243,  1269,  1276 

V.  Hurt  130? 

V.  Jones  381,  389,  1072 

V.  Mercer  1182,  1216 

V.  Michael  1159,  1188 

V.  Peters     480,  485,  487,  488, 

502 

V.  Phelps  1396 

V.  Union  Gravel  Co.  1933 

V.  Watson  526,  1197 

V.  Watson  Manufacturing 

Co.  1717 

Watt's  Appeal  144 


TABLE   OF   CASES, 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Waiters  v.  Bredin 

V.  Wagley 
Watterson  v.  Ury 
Watts  V.  Fletcher 

V.  Gaiitt 
Wattson  V.  Dowling 


563,  624,  627, 

641,  646 

1262,  1269 

632,  649,  650 

882 

175 

1559 


Watuppa,  &c.  Co.  r.  Fall  River      496 

Waugh  c.  Miller'  583 

V.  Richardson  503 

V.  Riley  167 

V.  Waugh  526,  527 

Way  V.  Arnold  1488 

Wayne  v.  Lawrence  603 

V.  Middleton  147 

Wayzata  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 

Co.  501,  502 

Wead  V.  Larkin  933 

V.  St.  Johnsbury  &  L.  C.  R. 

Co.  339,  446 

Weakland  v.  Cunningham  538 

Weare  v.  Van  Meter  1836,  ]S46 

V.  WilHams  1513,  1522 

Weathersby  v.  Weathersby  674 

Weaver  v.  Barden        285,  1386,  1390, 

1527 

V.  Carpenter  27 

V.  Coumbe  1087 

V.  Wible        1835,  1836,  1852, 

1921 

V.  Wilson  903 

Webb  V.  Alexander  917 

v.  Bindon  135 

V.  Camp  120 

V.  Den  225,  234 

V.  Hall  2,  7,  18 

V.  Huff  1147,  1167 

V.  Marsh  127,  140 

•    V.  Mullins  314,  1068,  1239, 

1357 

V.  Robbins     733,  779,  780,  7S2, 

1517.  1.M6 

V.  Russell  79;?,  942 

V.  Thompson  121,  138 

V.  Webb  1185,  1188,  1207 

Webber  v.  Cal.  &  O.  R.  Co.  448 

V.  Eastern  R.  Co.  454 

V.  Merrill  1928 

V.  Pere  IVIarquette  Boom 

Co.  4. SO 

V.  Sullivan  9  7 

Weber  v.  Anderson  943,  944 

V.  Christen      1217,  1218,  1220, 

1276,  1289,  1297,  1301, 

1303 

V.  Commissioners  471,  473 

V.  Mo.s.s  1442,  1485 


Webster  v.  Bible  Society  1867 

V.  Calef  1887,  1918 

V.  Cooper  593 

V.  King's  County  Trust 

Co.         1310,  1324 

V.  Maddox  1511,  1563,  15  75 

V.  Taylor  1568 

V.  Vandeventer  1770,  1793, 

1824 

V.  Van  Steenbergh    138  7, 

1390,  1392,  1486,  1517, 

1529,  1563,  1568 

V.  Webster  525 

Wedel  V.  Herman       1182,  1208,  1212, 

1213 

Weed  V.  Beebe  29,  30,  33,  35 

V.  Hewlett  1217,  1286 

V.  Lyon  1468 

Weeks  v.  Barton  944,  945,  951 

I'.  Boy n ton  646 

V.  Martin  338,  340 

Weems  v.  McCaughan  839,  840, 

841 
Weese  v.  Barker  1937 

Weidler  v.  Farmers'  Bank  1544 

Weigley  v.  Weir  303 

Weil  V.  ]M  c  Whor ter  1521 

Weill  V.  Baldwin  799 

Weinberg  v.  Rempe  1389 

Weinreich  v.  Weinreich  621,  632, 

718,  726 
Weir  V.  Humphries  1 785 

Weisberger  v.  Wisner  1563 

Weisbrod  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.  449,  450,  1026 

Weiser  v.  Weiser  1953,  1973 

Weisinger  v.  Cock      1236,  1243,  126  7, 

1269,  1271 

V.  Murphy  1868,  1880 

Weiss  V.  Oregon  Iron  Co.  492 

AVeisser  v.  Denison  1532,  1534 

Weiting  v.  Nissley  943 

Welch's  Appeal  1963 

Welch  V.  Agar  1967 

V.  Allen  593 

V.  Bunce  10 

V.  Ketchum  1383,  1853 

V.  Priest  1424 

V.  Sackett         1218,  1276,  1296 

V.  Sullivan  IISO 

Welchel  v.  Thomp-son  194  7 

Weld  V.  Mndilcn  1408,  1563 

V.  Nichols  800 

Welder  v.  Carroll  376,  378,  435 

V.  Hunt  381,  400 

Welland  Canal  Co.  v.  Hathaway  1.128 

Welland  v.  Williams  1898 

clxv 


TABLK   OF   CASES. 


Referenc-os  are  to  Sections. 


Wellborn  v.  Weaver  1230,  1233, 

126  7,  1292,  1303,  1307,  1324 

WoIUt  r.  Barber  413 

V.  llolason  509 

r.  Weller  101 

Welles  V.  Baldwin  1404 

Wt'Uinoton  ('.  AVelliugton  (iSO 

Wolloiis  r.  Jordan  339 

Wells  V.  Atkinson       1157,  1159,  1162, 

1165,  1179 

V.  Benton  793 

V.  Cay  wood  41 

V.  Chapman  1850 

V.  Heddunberg  1978,  1979 

V.  Jaekson  Iron  Co.     336,  14  75 

!;.  Maples  1721 

V.  Morrow  285,  13p0,  1527, 

1528 

V.  Seixas  24 

V.  Sluder  85 

V.  Smith  1482 

I'.  Treadwell  44 

V.  Watson  310 

V.  Wells  40,  44,  45 

Welsh  V.  Foster  268,  269 

V.  Kibler  892 

V.  Usher  1040 

Weltou  V.  Tizzard  1404,  1437 

Welz  V.  Rhodius  295 

Wendel  v.  North  924 

Wendell  v.  People  .  381 

V.  Wadsworth  1061 

Wendlinger  v.  Smith  1305 

Wenlock  v.  River  Dee  Co.  151 

AVeutworth  v.  Woods  Mach.  Co.   1741 

Wert  V.  Naylor  285,  1392 

Wertz's  Appeal  1402 

Wesson  v.  Stephens  1240 

West  t;.  Bretalle  326,  327,  381 

V.  Douglass  55,  56 

V.  Fitz  1508 

V.  Ki-ebaum  1125 

V.  Madison  Co.  Ag.  Board      144 

V.  Masson  893 

V.  Miller  261 

V.  Moore  1619 

V.  Pine  256 

V.  Reid  1517 

V.  Shaw  381,  386 

V.  Stewart  847,  905 

V.  West  525,  968 

V.  AVeyer  1890 

Westbrook  v.  Eager  1620,  1627 

V.  Gleason         1425,  1426, 

1486,  1489,  1496. 

1504,  1531,  1563 

Westbrooks  r.  Jeffers  1197 

clxvi 


West  Chester  &  P.  R.  Co.'s  Ap- 
peal 364 
Westerly  Sav.    Bank  v.    Stillman 

]\Ianuf.  Co.  1374,  1439,  1499 

Westei-n  v.  Maederinott  773,  777, 

780,  781,  784,  805,  807,  817,  823 
Western  v.  Short  960 

Western  Ave.  Build.  Asso.  v.  Wal- 
ters 88 
AVestern   Building  Asso.   v.   Fitz- 

niaurice  1340 

Western  M.  &  M.  Co.   v.  Peytona 
Cannel  Coal  Co.      1563,  1564,  1565, 

1568 
Western  N.  Y.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clin- 
ton 735 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 

Burlington  &  S.  AV.  Ry.  Co.       1684 
Westervelt  v.  Haff  1390 

V.  A^oorhis  1380,  1406 

V.  AA^yckoif  1551 

West  fall  V.  Cottrills  323 

AVc'st field  V.  Mayo  986 

AVestgate  v.  Wixon      1691,  1695,  1696 
AVest  Hartford  Soc.  v.  First  Bap- 
tist Church  374 
Westmoreland  N.  Gas  Co.  v.   De 

AA^itt  159  7,  1598 

AVestphal  v.  Scliultz  445 

AVest  Point  Iron  Co.  v.  Reymert 

529,  530,  1180,  1446 
West  Portland   Homestead   Asso. 

V.  Lawnsdale  267 

Westrope  r.  Chambers      919,  923,  925 

r.  AA'illiams  928 

AVest  Roxbury  v.  Stoddard      495,  496, 

501 
West    Virginia    Transp.     Co.    v. 

Ohio  River  Pipe-Line  Co.  "  787 

Wetherbee  v.  Bennett  879,  958 

V.  Ellison  1708 

AVethered  v.  Boon  1508,  1513 

Wetherell  v.  Brobst  795 

AA'etmore  v.  Bruce  805,  875 

V.  Green  968 

V.  Laird  1 148 

V.  Neuberger  1600,  1606 

Wetzel  V.  Richcreek  842,  850 

AVeyinan  v.  Ringold  793 

AVhak-n  v.  Nisbet  376 

AVhaley  v.  Dawson  1948,  1954 

AVhiilley  V.  Small  1481 

AVhartin  v.  Garvin  382,  389 

AVharton  v.  Brick  324,410 

V.  Eborn  837,  343 

Whatley  r.  Barker  613 

V.  Patten  832 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


'\Vhatman  v.  Gibson 
Wheat  V.  Rice 
Wheatley  v.  Baugh 

V.  Calhoun 
Wheaton  i\  East 
Wheeler  v.  Bedell 

i\  Carpenter 
V.  Dascomb 
V.  Duke 
V.  Hatch 
V.  Kirtland 
V.  Moody 
V.  Nevins 
V.  Schad 
V.  Single 
V.  Sohier 
V.  Spinola 


773,  776,  780 

865 

1599 

1831 

14,  25 

1GG8 

1820 

G35 

614 

843 

285, 1418 

658,  C74 

1021 

793 

1238 

939,  973 

472,  495,  499, 

501 

V.  Stone  4  76 

V.  Walker  623 

V.  Wayne  County      834,  836, 

838 

Wheelock  v.  Moulton  1082 

V.  Overshiner  924,  925 

V.  Thayer  793 

Wheelwright  v.  Depeyster    1482, 1489 

V.  Wheelwright        1233, 

1234,  1307,  1309 

Whelan  v.  McCreary  1389 

Whelpdale  v.  Cookson  162 

Whicker  u.  Hume  170 

Whipple  V.  Barton  104 

V.  Foot  1627 

Whisenant  v.  Gordon  1259 

Whisler  i;.  Hicks  96  7 

Whitacre  v.  Fuller  1493 

Whitaker  v.  Brown  503,  505,  506, 

507,  509,  555 

r.  Miller       223,  1328,  1329, 

1333,  1566 

V.  Whitaker  279 

Whitbeck  v.  Cook  885,  903 

V.  Wliitbeck  304 

Whitbread  v.  Jordan  1522,  1544 

Whitby  v.  Duffy  56  7 

White  w.  Bailey  1310 

V.  Beckforth      1866,  1875,  1879 

V.  Brocaw  894,  992 

V.  Brooks  1925,  1928 

V.  Carpenter  1 54  7 

V.  Connelly  1123,  11 28 

V.  Core  1314 

V.  Crawford  548,  555 

u.  Cuyler  lOK) 

V.  Denman        1406,  1435,  1441, 

1442,  1478 

V.  Flannigain  450 


White  v.  Flora  20,  21 

V.  Foster  1511,  1547,  1601, 

1603,  1687 
V.  Fuller  138 

V.  Gay  326,  383,  401,  416 

V.  Godfrey  448,  453,  464 

V.  Graves  118,  1198 

V.  Hampton  1481 

V.  Hapeman  355 

V.  Hermann  326 

V.  Heylman  89 

V.  Flolley  926,  944,  945 

V.  Hopkins  526.  1232 

V.  Howard  170,  182,  189 

V.  Hutchings  1112 

V.  Hyatt  402 

V.  Johnson  103 

V.  Luning  382,  384,  400 

V.  King  1606,  1609,  1610 

V.  Magarahan  1441,  1463 

V.  MciGarry        1394,  1400,  1468 
V.  Moore  1462 

V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co. 

505,  555 
V.  O'Bannon  1940 

V.  Palmer  52 

V.  Patten  990,  1487 

V.  Perry  1560 

V.  Pickering  1935 

?;.  Pollock  1241 

V.  Port  Huron,  &c.  R.  Co.     731 
V.  Prcsly  933,  968 

V.  Pulley  1622,  1633 

V.  Smith  336,  449 

V.  Spreckels  354,  358,  359, 

364 
V.  Starr  113 

V.  Stevens  903 

V.  Stuart  1891,  1906 

V.  Tide- Water  Oil  Co.  449 

V.  Wager  41,  44 

V.  Ward  356 

V.  Weeks  297 

V.  White        163,  664,  1563, 1575 
V.  Whitney  801,  903,  932, 

933,  935,  969,  975 
I'.  Williams  1311 

V.  Williamson  580 

V.  Wilson  1437 

V.  AVood  1  ]  04 

White's  Bank  (;.  Nichols         393,  448, 
449,  454,  456,  462,  464,  469 
White  Star  Line  Co.  r.Moragne    1314 
AVliitc  Water  Val.    Canal   Co.   v. 

V;illcttc  141 

Wliitcfield  r.  Longfellow  79,  86 

Whitehead  v.  Curry  1851 

clxvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Wlutoliead  v.  Rai;an 

424,  432 

\Yhitehill  r.  (Jotwalt 

2G2,  83(3 

Whitehurst  v.  IMcDon 

aid 

490 

r.  Pettipl 

er 

37G 

Whiteside  r.  Ilaselton 

1559 

Whitesides  v.  JMartin 

126,  128 

AVhitfield  v.  Harris 

1324 

V.  Riddle 

1393,  1529 

Whit  ford  r.  Laidler 

1310 

Whiting  V.  Daniel 

1329, 

1340,  1342 

r.  Dewey 

410,  831,  943, 

1862 

V.  Edmunds  135 

V.  Gardner  431 

V.  Whiting  602,  1954 

V.  W^ilkins  577 

Whitley  v.  Davis  1069,  1071 

Whitloek  v.  Johnson  1547 

Whitlow  r.  Echols  1802 

Whitman  r.  Boston  &  Me.  R.  Co.    424 

(;.  Haywood  375 

V.  Heneberry         1218,  1238 

V.  Shingleton        1224,  1248, 

1254 

V.  Taylor  1563 

Whitman  Min.  Co.  v.  Baker    175,  182, 

189 
Whitmarsh  v.  Walker  1605,  1606, 

1609 

Whitmore  v.  Learned  227 

Whitney  v.  Arnold  1164 

V.  Bacon  375 

V.  Burr  1532 

V.  Dinsmore  920,  930 

V.  Dutch  4,  1023 

V.  French  626 

V.  Holmes  367 

V.  Lumber  Co.  424,  492 

V.  Olney  1649,  1652 

V.  Robinson  352 

V.  Spencer  674,  677 

V.  Union  Ry.  Co.      551,  731, 

733,  735,  765,  771,  779, 

7.S0,  782,  784,  814 

V.  Union  Trust  Co.  1082 

V.  Wheeler  Cotton  Mills 

252 
Whittaker  v.    Southwestern    Va. 

Lnp.  Co.  49,  87 

V.  Whittaker  155,  613 

Whittemore  v.  Bean  120 

Whitten  ;•.  Whitten  1954,  1958 

Whiltick  V.  Kane  146  7 

Whittingham's  Case  13 

Whittington  v.  Clarke  1066,  1070 

V.  AVright  1482 

Whittle  I'.  Artis  1935,  1936 

clxviii 


Wliittlesey  v.  Fuller  1781,  1793 

V.  Kellogg  381,  388 

Whitton  V.  Whitton  730,  1968 

Whitworth  r.  Stuckey  955 

Whitzman  v.  Hirsh  939,  944,  971 

Wicke  V.  Lake  1563 

Wicker  r.  I'ope  1367 

Wickersham  v.  Reeves  1173 

Wickes  w.  Caulk  1167 

V.  Lake  1568 

Wickham  v.  Hawker  510 

Wickoti'  V.  Wickoff  IBS 7 

Wiedner  v.  Hell  1974 

Wieland  v.  Kobick  5 

AVier  v.  Batdorf  1304 

V.  Simmons  632,  644,  1547 

V.  Railroad  Co.  679 

Wiggin  V.  Wiggin  1898 

Wiggins  V.  Fleishel  1101 

V.  Lusk         126  7,  1269,  1271, 

1276,  1286,  1288,1289 

Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  Ohio  &  M. 

R.  Co.  630,  787,  1765 

AVight  V.  Gray  1745,  1748,  1751 

V.  Thayer  612 

AVikle  i;.  McGraw  617,618 

Wilber  v.  AA^ilber  44,  1887 

AVilbur  v.  Brown  786 

V.  Tobey  166 

V.  AA'arren  277,  279 

V.  AA'ilbur  1887 

AVilburn  v.  Larkin  1041 

AVilchel  V.  Thompson  1942 

AVilcox  V.  Campbell  976 

V.  Haviland  87 

V.  Kendall  541 

V.  Leominster  Nat.  Bank 

1406 

V.  AVheeler  593,  597,  598 

r.  AVilcox  1887,  1895 

Wilcoxon  V.  McGhee  1653 

Wilcoxson  V.  Miller  1404 

V.  Osborn  1165,  1171 

V.  Sprague  326 

AA^ild's  Case  616 

AVilde  V.  Armsby  1361,  1367 

AVilder  v.  Brooks  40,  44,  45 

V.  Butterfield  1404 

V.  Davenj)ort  413 

V.  Ireland  924 

i:  AVheeldon  519,  932,  C35 

V.  AVhittemore  646 

Wildes  V.  Vanvoorhis  316 

AAMldey  o.  Bonney  1942,  1947 

AVildgoose  v.  AA^ayland  1513 

Wiley  V.  Ewalt  74 

V.  Lovely  326,  424,  429 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


"\^'iley  V.  Moor 

1331 

Williams 

V.  Council 

127 

V.  Prince 

1196 

,  1198 

V.  Cowden 

659 

V.  Sidorous 

531 

V.  Crutcher 

1328 

V.  Williamson 

1427 

V.  Diilvln 

678,   707 

V.  Wilson 

27,  28 

V.  Ellingsworth 

1212 

Wilhelm  v.  Burleyson 

485 

V.  Evans 

1749 

V.  Finiple 

968 

V.  Flood 

1600, 

1601,  1604 

Wilie  V.  Brooks 

31 

V.  Frost 

1041 

Wilken  v.  Young        1774,  1775,  1777, 

1778,  1792,  1795 

Wilkerson  v.  Clark  602,  613 

V.  Schoonmaker  228 

Wilkes  Barre  v.  Wyoming  Hist. 

Soc.  598,  649,  650 

Wilkin  V.  Wilkin  1963 

Wilkins  v.  Burton  1922 

V.  Vaslibinder  1619 

Wilkinson  v.  Hay  garth  1922 

V.  Joberns  1964 

V.  Pearson  56 

V.  Proud  1595 

V.  Rogers  789 

V.  Roper  402 

V.  Scott  295,  302,  303, 

309 

V.  Sherman  48 

V.  Stuart     1954,  1965,  1970. 

1981 

jj.  Wilkinson  664 

Wilks  V.  Back  1041,  1043 

Willard  V.  Cramer  1109,   1133, 

1161,  1442 

V.  Henry  704,    715,   722 

V.  Moulton  413 

V.  Willard     1954,  1955,  1956, 

1964,   1994 

Willcox  V.  Hill  -  1514 

Willets  V.  Burgess  962,   967 

Willey  V.  Haley  155,  613 

V.  Snj'der  352 

Williamette  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Bank 

of  British  Columbia  147 

Williams's  A])peal  1718 

Williams  v.  Ashton  1359 

V.  Baker      11 96,  1197,  1198, 

1200,  1206,  1444,  1447 

V.  Bass  1077 

V.  Baylcy  83,  86,  88 

V.  Beckham  441 

V.  Beeman  968,  971 

V.  Bennett  134,  135,  167 

V.  Bentley  665 

V.  Birbeck  1036,  1421, 

1465 

V.  r.ryant  218 

V.  Buchanan  480 

V.  Burs  924 


V.  Fryburger  868 

V.  Glover  481,  482 

V.  Graves  617,  618 

V.  Greer  1067,   1071 

V.  Hardie  252 

V.  Henderson  1917 

V.  Hichborn  613 

V.  Higgins  1303 

V.  Hyde  1375,  1600,  IGOl 
V.  Inabnet  78 

V.  Jackson  140,   729 

V.  Kerr  1130,  1133 

V.  Kivett  376 

V.  Latham  1234,   1273 

V.  Maber  31 

V.  McConico  233,  617, 

618 
V.  Moniteau  Nat.  Bank 

1555 
V.  New  York  4  71 

V.  Pomeroy  Coal  Co.  186  7 
V.  Pouns  1196,  1198,  1447 
V.  St.  Louis  450 

V.  Savannah  388 

V.  Schatz     1233,  1234,1236, 
1271,  1277,  1307,  1309 
V.  Smith  1387 

V.  Spaulding  432 

V.  Sprigg  1568,   1570 

V.  Springs  1248 

V.  Starr  1066,  1069 

V.  Sutton  1936,   1937 

V.  Tatnall  1403,   1529 

V.  Ten  Eyck  1 153 

V.  Thorn  1466 

V.  Tolbert  526 

V.  Wads  worth  1660 

V.  Walker  79,  85 

V.  Western    Union  Ry. 

Co.  323 

V.  Wetherbee  932 

V.  Williams     103,  108,  1220, 

1277,  1298 

V.  Winslow  335,  433 

V.  Young  1063 

Williamsburg  Boom  Co.  v.  Smith      484 

Williamson  v.  Brown  1510,  1514, 

1517,   1523,  1532, 

1564,  1565 

clxix 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Refereiifcs  are  to  Sections. 


Williamson  r.  Carskadden  1127, 

1207,  1444,  1447 

r.  Hall  407,  958,  962 

V.  Jones  1597 

V.   Kokoino    Building 

Asso.  1 76 

V.  Mason  609,   610 

r.  N.  J.   Southern  11. 

Co.     1672,  1681,  1729 
V.  Test  924,  948,   949, 

968,  969,  983 
('.  Yingling  780 

Williard  v.  Williard    '  1949 

Willinghara  v.  Hardin  1394 

Willink  r.  Miles  1153 

V.  Morris  Canal  &  Bank- 
ing Co.    1522,  1546,  1590 
Willis  V.  Adams  1547 

V.  Albertson  265,  271,  286, 

1205 
V.  Caldwell  1824 

V.  Gattman  1185,   1207 

V.  Gay  1547,   1552 

V.  Hulbert  744 

V.  Lewis  1018 

V.  Moore  1619,  1622,  1627 

V.  Morris  1668 

V.  Twanibly  29 

V.  Vallette        1514,  1531,  1532, 
1534 
Willison  V.  Watkins  1862 

Willougbby  v.  Middlesex  Co.  899 

V.  Willoughby  1389 

Wills  V.  Austin  89 

V.  Leverich  340 

V.  Palmer  607 

Willson  V.  Betts  297 

V.  Marsh  Co.  4  71 

V.  Willson  943,   952,  962, 

968,  970,  974 
Wilmarth  v.  Bancroft  1764 

Wilnier  v.  Currey  989 

Wilmot  r.  Lathrop  1853,    1856 

Wilms  V.  Jess  1596 

Wilsey  v.  Dennis  1291,   1294 

Wilson,  Ex  parte  1768 

Wilson  V.  Beckwith  1635,  1647 

i".  Bigger  74 

r.  Branch  2,  9,  24 

V.  Chandler  1936 

V.  Cochran     879,  885,  928,  930 
V.  Collishaw  1878 

V.  Curry  87 

V.  Darragh  14 

V.  Duncan  1981 

V.  Eigenbrodt  1426,  1585 

V.  Fairchild  271 

clxx 


AVilson  V.  Fleming  1781,  1793 

V.  Forbes       471,  481,  493,  953 

V.  Furness  Ry.  Co.  821 

V.  Gait  621,  678,  681 

V.  Getty  829 

V.  Gunning  364 

V.  Hart  373,  780,  1563 

V.  Hayes  1360,  1365 

V.  Hildreth  384,  390 

V.  Hunter  244,  1514,  1517, 

1527,  1651,  1832 

V.  Inloes  381,  385 

V.  Irish  90S,  953 

V.  Johnson  320,  337 

V.  Kearse  157 

V.  Kimmel  1109,  1122 

V.  King  305 

V.  Knight  1390 

V.  Logue  1807,  1810 

V.  McCullough  1513,  1517, 

1543 

V.  McJunkin  609 

V.  Md.  L.  Ins.  Co.  16 

V.  Miller         1511,  1512,  1513, 

1517,1522 

V.  Nance  140 

V.  O'Connell  155 

I'.  Peebles  943,  1409 

r.  Qnigley  1180 

V.  Ivussell  272,  1116 

V.  Shelton  303 

V.  Simpson  1159 

V.  Smith  335,  337,  339 

V.  South  Park  Com'rs        1201, 

1328 

V.  Taylor  936 

V.  Traer  1125,  1126 

V.  Troup  1465 

V.  Vaughan  1546 

V.  White  218,  229 

V.  AVidenham      843,  928,  929, 

933 

U.Williams  1523 

V.  Wilson     624,  635,  641,  643, 

646,  693,  711,  718,  1793, 

180O 

i;.  Wright  1113 

Wilt  V.  Cutler  321,  326 

V.  Franklin  1284 

Wiltshear  v.  Cottrell  1690,  1725 

Wimberly  v.  Collier  924 

V.  Jones  14, 21 

Wimbish    v.     Montgomery    Mut. 

Asso.  131 

Winans  c.  Cheney  398,  400 

r.  Peebles     40,  41,  44,  47,  263, 

265,  306 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Winborne  v.  Downing  582 

Winchester  v.  Baltimore  &  S.  R. 

Co.  1538,  1543 

Windom  v.  Scliuppel  1248,  1406 

"\Viiidt;more  v.  Hobart  573,  574 

Windsor  c.  Simpkins  1958,  19G3 

Windus  V.  James  3  75 

Wineni;iu  v.  Grummond  432 

AVinfield  i'.  lieiming  7  74,  780 

Wiiifield  Xat.  Bank  v.  Croco       79,  85, 

88 

Wino-  r.  Burgis  340 

V.  Hall  1455 

V.  McDowell  1498,  1506 

V.  llailey  731 

Winings  v.  Wood  1892 

Winkler  r.  Higgins  1136 

i:  Miller  1398 

Winn  V.  Cabot  410 

V.  Cole  723 

Winningham  i'.  Pennock  931 

A\'iunipesaukee  Asso.  v.  Gordon      500 

Winnipesaukee      Camp  -  Meeting 

Asso.  i'.  Gordon  733,  767 

Winnipiseogee  Paper  Co.  v.  Eaton  621, 
900,  944,  945,  968,  984 
Winrdpiseogee  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  H. 

Lead  Co.  323 

Winnipiseogee  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  H. 

Land  Co.  326,  388,  1454 

Winslow  V.  Broraich  1613,  16  72, 

1720 
V.  Cooper  405 

V.  King  453 

V.  McCall  975 

V.  Merchants'   Ins.    Co. 

1667,  1712,  1717,  1745, 

1746,  1748,  1765 

V.  Patten  476 

V.  Rand  1646 

V.  Winslow  230 

Winstandley  v.  Stipp  138 

Winsted  Sav.  Bank  v.  Spencer      1086, 

1099,  1100 

Winston  v.  Browning  398,  898 

V.  Hodges  1002 

V.  Vaughan  837,  840 

Winter  v.  Anson  1534 

V.  Gorsuch     526,  563,  564,  565 

u.  Pavne  449,4.^0,4  66 

V.  Pool  1338,  1340,  1365 

V.  Stock  244 

V.  White  418 

Winterbottom  r.  Pattison  1277 

Winterburn  r.  Chambers    1864,  1866, 

1868,  1870,  1873,  1881 

Wintermute  c.  Light  1619,  1624 


Wintermute  '■.  Reese 

1958 

Winters  v.  McGhee 

1928 

Winthrop  v.  Curtis 

386 

V.  Fairbanks  503,  505,  506, 

509,  549,  555 

Winton  r.  Freeman 

302 

Wisconsin    Planing    Mill 

Co.    i: 

Schuda 

1430 

Wise  V.  Burton 

439 

c.  Hyatt 

946,  1846 

r.  Postlewait 

1171 

V.  Tripp 

1532 

V.  Wheeler 

1649,  1652 

Wiseley  i\  Findlay 

1955 

Wiseman  v.  Hutchinson 

1547,  1552 

Wistar's  Ap  )eal 

1988 

Wiswall  r.  Hall 

472 

Witbeck  r.  Waine 

303 

f.  ^^'itbeck 

41,  103 

Witham  v.  Ciitts 

445 

Withers  c.  Atkinson 

1346,  134!) 

v.  Baird 

1125,  1128 

V.  Carter 

1404 

V.  Connor 

435 

?;.  Little 

1390,  1392 

Withnell  v.  Court  land  Wa 

gon  Co. 

1404 

Withrow  V.  Biggerstaff 

rJ37 

Withy  r.  Mumford 

936,  ^)39 

Witt  V.  Cutler 

1452 

V.  Harlan               348 

,  1148,  1440 

?;.  Railway  Co.          324,412,414 

Witter  r.  Biscoe 
Witty  V.  Hightower 
Woehler  v.  Endter 
Wofford  V.  McKinna 
Wolcott  V.  Knight 

V.  Winchester 
Wolf  r.  Fogarty 

V.  Wolf 
Wolfe  I'.  Dyer 


Ry.  Co.    410, 

516,  518 

828 

915 

1628,  1760 

404 

121 

1425,  1464 

1178,  1180 

194  2 

324,  334,  338,  352, 

400,  1436 

V.  Hauver  303 

V.  Hines  1058 

V.  Scarborough  432,  445 

Wolferman  v.  Bell  1359 

Wolford  r.  Baxter        1712,  1714,  1721 

r.  Mor-cMthal  580 

Wolvertoii  V.  Collins  1248 

Womack  v.  Womack  31 

Womble  V.  Battle  1501 

Wommack  v.  Whitmore         602,  1919 

Wonson  V.  Wonson  -i^-^ 

Wood's  Appeal  1451,  1472 

Wood  V.  Appal  481,  490 

clxxi 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Wood  r.  Bach  1177 

V.  Beach  264,  21)7 

I'.  Bedford,  &c.  R.  Co.  145 

V.  Bibbins  9G8 

r.  Boyd         503,  505,  506,  530, 

855 

V.  Broadlev         44,  45,  204,  295 

V.  Bryant  "  19(;6 

V.  Chapin  263,  265,  1110, 

13S0,  1386,  1392,  1408, 

1486,  1529,  1531 

V.  Cheshire  Co.  656 

r.  Cochrane      1172,  1442,  1447 

V.  Craft  91,  103 

V.  Fi.4ce  375 

V.  Fleet  1942,  1949 

V.  Foriicrook  919 

i\  Foster  375 

V.  Fowler  481 

V.  Goodridge  1014,  1030, 

1043 

V.  Griffin  1940 

V.  Hammond  179,  180 

I'.  Kelley  501 

V.  Kice  602,  614 

r.  Krebbs  1517,  1559 

V.  Lafayette  338,  354 

V.  Lake  1494 

V.  Lordier  1463 

V.  Mann  1527,  1529 

V.  Moriarty  295 

V.  Railroad  Co.  481 

V.  Rayburn         1525,  1527,  1532 

?;.  Rice  613 

V.  Robinson  285,  1390,  1393 

V.  Simons  1472 

V.  Sugg  1970 

V.  Trask  1585 

V.  Warner  1794,  1800 

V.  Whelen         144,  1082,  1745, 

1748 

V.  Willard  375,  376 

V.  Winnings  2000 

Woodall  V.  Kelly  1515 

Woodbeck  v.  Wilders  1942,  1945 

Woodbury  v.  Fisher  1269,  1276, 

1289,  1448 

I'.  Woodbury      98,  99,  104, 

115 

Woodcock  V.  Johnson         48,  55,  1014 

Wood  County  Petroleum  Co.  v. 

West  Virginia  Trans.  Co.  1598, 

1599 

Woodford  v.  Higly  1800 

';.  Leavenworth  921 

Woodham  v.  First  Nat.  Bank        1 706, 

1707 

clxxii 


Woodhoad  r.  Foulds 

1196 

Woodhull  r.  Longstreet 

1940 

r.  Rosenthal 

1635,  1637, 

1639 

Woodman  v.  Coolbroth 

1113,  1256 

V.  Francis 

1763 

V.  Lane 

410,  411 

V.  Smith 

351 

V.  Spencer 

448,  455,  490 

V.  York 

1066 

Woodruff  V.  Bowles 

41 

V.  McHarry 

1122,  1123 

V.  Railroad  Co 

6  75 

*'.  Trenton  Water-Power 

Co.     632,  638,  639,  731 

r.  Woodruff       211,  632,  731 

Woods  ('.  Farmere     1482,  1488,  1520, 

1563 
V.  Garnett 
V.  liilderbrand 


V.  Ja 


1499,  1504 
1340,  1346, 
1349 
1124,  1174 


V.  People's    Nat.  Bank  of 

Pittsburgh  174 

V.  Robinson  384 


V.  Wallace 
t'.  West 
V.  W^hitney 
V.  Wilson 
V.  Woods 
Woodson  V.  Allen 

V.  Collins 
Woodstock  Iron  Co.  v. 
Woodward  v.  Allan 
V.  Aston 
V.  Boro 
V.  Camp 
17.  Jewell 
V.  Nims 
V.  Pickett 
V.  Sartwell 


1439 

424,  435,  437,  438 

42 

25 

665,  670 

1451,  1472 

1408,  1566 

V.  Roberts      1866 

922,  924 

1346 

1451,  1472 

1234,  1267 

1394 

381 

1764 

1394,  1395, 

1400 

38,  316,  318 

274 

1964 


V.  Seaver 
V.  Wyman 
Wood  worth  i\  Campbell 

V.  Paige    1513,  1514,  1517 

i>.  Payne        632,678,688, 

68!> 

Wooldridge  v.  Miss.  Valley  Bank  15  78 

Woolever  t>.  Knapp  1884,  1887 

Wooley  r.  Constant  1331,  1356 

r.  Groton  1651 

Woolfolk   '•.   Graniteville  Manuf. 

Co.  1442 

Woolford  r.  Baxter  1721 

Wooliscroft  ('.  Norton  "86 

Woollen  r.  Ilillen  15«4 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Woolley  V.  Newcombe 

V.  Schrader 
Woohvick  V.  Forrest 
Wooster  v.  Butler 
Wooters  v.  Arledge 
Worcester  v.  Eaton 


849 
1887,  1890 
239 
380 
337 
■  95 


Worcester  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cheeney 

1455,  1474 

Word  V.  Drouthett  1867,  1874 

Work's  Appeal  86 

Work  r.  Brayton  285 

V.  Harper  1435,  1442 

Works  V.  State  323,  1506 

Worley  v.  Hinenian  931,  962 

Worman  v.  Teagarden  624,  641 

Wormley  v.  Wormley  1508,  1527 

Worrall's  Appeal  105 

Worrall  v.  Munn         1021,  1303,  1304, 

1313 

Worrell  v.  McDonald  1197,  1204 

Worsham  v.  Chisum  441 

V.  Freeman  1443 

V.  Morgan  441 

V.  Vignal  1829 

Worsley  v.  Scarborough  1559 

Worth  V.  Curtis  62 

Worthen  v.  Ratcliffe  708 

Worthington  v.  Campbell  48,  56,  73 

V.  Ginison  1658,  1663 

V.  Hiss  1902,  1906, 

1997 

V.  Hylyer  322,  326, 

423 

V.  Morgan  1583 

V.  Staunton  1979 

Worthy  r.  Caddell  1387 

V.  Johnson  253 

Wortraan  v.  Ayles  264 

Wotten  I).  Copeland  1960,1966 

Wray  v.  Wray  99 

Wrede  v.  Cloud  1568 

Wren  v.  Coffey  1232 

Wrenn  v.  Gibson  1994 

Wright  V.  Barrett  1601 

V.  Bates  1575 

V.  Briggs  305 

V.  Bundy  285,  1196,  1201 

V.  Cane  1940 

V.  Dame  1508 

V.  Douo-lass  594,  1408 

V.  Dufield  1188 

V.  Germain  27 

V.  Graham  1170,  1215 

V.  Herron  613 

V.  Howard  484 

V.  Jackson  49 

V.  Jones  1404 


Wright  V.  Kleyla  1879 

V.  Lee  143,  192 

V.  Mabry  410 

V.  Nipple  929,  943,  944 

V.  Player  8 

V.  Proud  99 

V.  Remington  84 

V.  Saddler       1794,  1800,  1879 

V.  Sadler  1792 

V.  Shorter  833 

V.  Sperry  1840 

V.  Yickers  1972 

V.  Wakeford  1000 

V.  Watson  1619 

V.  Wood  1565 

V.  Wright  281,  398,  577, 

898,  1094,  1900 

V.  Wilkin  640 

V.  Wilson  1133,  1145 

Wroten  v.  Armat  174 

Wunderle  v.  Wunderle  165 

Wunderlin  v.  Cadogan  1328 

Wyatt  V.  Barwell  1499,  1501 

V.  Duncan  441 

V.  Foster  381 

V.  Stewart  1407 

Wycherley  v.  Wycherley  108 

Wyckoff  V.  Gardner  1803,  1811 

r.  Remsen  1448,  1456 

V.  Stephenson  381,  386 

Wyllie  V.  Pollen  1536 

Wyman  v.  Ballard  930 

V.  Brigden  974 

I'.  BroAvn  525,  527 

r.  Russell  1464 

Wynn  r.  Carter  1380 

Wynne  v.  Parke  1030 

V.  Small  1184 

AVyse  v.  Leahy  426 


Xander's  Estate 
Xenos  V.  Wickham 


644 
1218,  1220 


Yakima  Nat.  Bank  v.  Knipe  1359 

Yale  V.  Flanders  106  7 

Yancey  v.  Greenlee  1937 

V.  Lewis  903 

V.  Radford  1799,  1953 

V.  Savannah  &  W.  R.  Co.   690 

V.  Tatlock  883,  967 

Yanish  v.  Tarbox  381,  383,  386 

Yarborough  v.  Avant  1947 

V.  Monday  1067 

Yard's  Appeal  660 

Yard  y.  Ocean  Beach  Asso.     409,435, 

472 
Yardley  v.  Cuthbertson  103 

clxxiii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  Sections. 


Yarnall's  Appeal  602 

YanioU  c.  Yarnell  1248 

Yates  V.  Shaw  354,  358,  359 

V.  Van  1)(>  Bogert  181,  488 

Yanger  v.  Skinner  53,  54,  G8,  G9 

Yeakor  r.  Yeaker  1()5,  16G 

Yeaklc  i\  Jacob  l(i03 

Yeanvorth  v.  Pierce  1 708 

Yeatman  r.  King  1591 
Yellow    Jacket    Silver  M.  Co.  r. 

Stevenson  1082 
Yerby  v.  Grlgsby  1041 
Yerger  i-.  Barz  1455,  1532 
Yocuni  V.  Haskins  381,  383 
Yoe  V.  McCord  97 
V.  Milam  County  Cotton  Alli- 
ance 1559 
York  V.  Hinkle  89 
V.  Merritt  1340 
V.  Stone  1777 
York,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Winans  142 
Yorty  V.  Paine  1108 
Yosti  r.  Lauglira-n  103 
Younians  v.  Caldwell  1624 
Young,  Petitioner  516,  528 
Young,  Ex  parte  250 
Young,  In  re  503,  516,  528 
Young's  Estate  1797,1798 
Young  V.  Adams  1848 
V.  Board  6  75 
V.  Cardwell  1243 
V.  Clement  632,  635 
V.  Clippinger  896,  1396 
V.  Cosgrove  430 
V.  De  Bruhl  1818,  1919 
V.  Devries  1407 
V.  Duval  1196,  1198,  1447 
V.  Edwards  1979,  1985 
V.  Guy     1391,  1559,  1563,  1571 
V.  Harrison  471 
V.  Hunter  677 
V.  Lego  1600 
V.  McKee  29 
V.  Mahoning  Co.  593 
V.  Raincock  260 

clxxiv 


Young  !'.  Ringo  271 

c.  Smiai  249,  250,  262 

r.  Stevens  54,  55,  68 

V.  Tarbell  1409 

V.  Thompson  1462,  1466 

V.  Triplett  933 

V.  Woolett  358 

V.  Young  288,  1090 

Youngblood  v.  Vastine  1383,  1385 

V.  Youngblood  1232, 

1235 
Younge  v.  Guilbeau     1217,  1220, 1267, 
1289,  1290,  1294 
V.  JNIoore  1230 

Youngman  v.  Elmira  &  Williams- 
port  R.  Co.  1559,  1729 
Youngs  V.  Heffner  1868,  1997 
V.  Simm  85 
V.  Wilson                  1482,  1483, 
1491 
Younkin  v.  Cowan                              389 
Youst  r.  Martin                                  1528 
Yokum  V.  Thomas             913,  974,  986 

Zabriskie  v.  Baudendistel  903 

Zann  v.  Haller  218,  1007 

Zapp  i'.  Miller  1887,  1892 

Zeibold  v.  Foster  387 

Zell  Guano  Co.  v.  Heatherly  1 284 

Zeller  t'.  Adam  1757 

V.  Eckert  1866,  1867 

Zent  V.  Pieken  842,  928,  943 

Zents  V.  Shaner  89 

Zie-ler  v.  Grim  1970 

Zimmerman  r.  Camp  1359,  1365 

Zink  V.  McManus  413 

Zirkle  v.  McCue  1995 

Zoebisch  i\  Ranch  14,  16 

ZoUer  y.  Ide  1050,  1080 

Zorn  V.  Railroad  Co.  285,  1390 

Zorntlein  v.  Bram      1792,  1802,  1803, 

1805 
Zouch  r.  Parsons  2,  10,  1024 

Zug  i\  Commonwealth  471 

Zuver  V.  Lyons  1522 


BOOK  I. 

CAPACITY  OF  PERSONS  TO  HOLD  AND   CONVEY  LAND. 


PART  I. 
CAPACITY   OF  PERSONS  AS  VENDORS. 

CHAPTER 

1,    DISABILITY   OF   INFANTS. 
II.   DISABILITY   OF   MARRIED   WOMEN. 

III.  DISABILITY   OF   INSANE   PERSONS. 

IV.  DISABILITY   FROM   DRUNKENNESS. 
V.   DISABILITY   FROM   DURESS. 

VI.  DISABILITY   FROM   UNDUE   INFLUENCE. 

VIL  DISABILITY   FROM   ADVERSE   POSSESSION. 

VIII.  CAPACITY   OF   CORPORATIONS   AS   VENDORS. 

IX.  CAPACITY    OF   TENANTS   IN   TAIL   AS   VENDORS. 

PART  II. 

CAPACITY  OF  PERSONS  AS  PURCHASERS. 

X.  CAPACITY  OF  PURCHASERS  IN  GENERAL. 
XL  CAPACITY  OF  ALIENS  AS  PURCHASERS. 
XU.  CAPACITY  OF  CORPORATIONS  AS  PURCHASERS. 


BOOK  L  — PART  I. 

CAPACITY   OF   PERSONS   AS   VENDORS. 


CHAPTER   I. 


DISABILITY   OF   INFANTS, 


I.  Deeds  of  infants  voidable,  not  void, 
2-4. 
11.  No  estoppel  by  declaration  of  age, 

5,  6. 
in.  Disability  of  married  women  under 

age,  7-9. 
IV.  Who  may  affirm  or  disaffirm  mi- 
nority, 10-13. 
V.  What   amounts  to   an   affirmance, 
14-16. 


VI.  What  amounts  to  a  disaffirmance, 

17-23. 
VII.  Affirmance  from    lapse    of  time, 
24-26. 
VIII.  Disaffirmance  within  a  reasonable 
time,  27,  28. 
IX.  Avoidance  of   mortgage   for  pur- 
chase-money, 29,  30. 
X.  Restoration    of    purchase  -  money, 
31-35. 


1.  In  general  any  person  who  has  the  legal  capacity  to  bind 
himself  by  contract  may  convey  his  real  estate  or  any  interest 
therein  by  deed.     The  power  of  alienation  is  one  of  the  usual  in- 
cidents of  ownership,  but  its  existence  depends  upon  the  unity  of 
title  with  capacity  to  contract.    The  absolute  owner  of  any  estate 
or  interest  in  land  may  sell  that  estate  or  interest,  if  he  is  under 
no  disability.     He  may  also  sell  a  less  estate  or  interest  than  that 
which  he  owns,  but  he  cannot  sell  a  greater  estate  or  interest. 
Thus  a  tenant  for  life  or  the  owner  of  a  limited  estate  or  interest 
may  sell  the  estate  or  interest  he  owns,  but  if  he  undertakes  to 
dispose  of  a  larger  estate  or  interest  his  sale  is  valid  only  to  the 
extent  of  his  estate  or  interest.     The  same  disabilities  which  in- 
capacitate one  from  making  a  valid  contract  incapacitate  him  from 
making  a  valid  deed.     These  disabilities  are  either  natural,  as  in 
the  case   of  insane   persons,  or  legal,  as  in  the  case  of  married 
women,  or  either  natural  or  legal,  or  perhaps  both,  according  to 
the  circumstances  of  tlie  case,  as  in  the  case  of  infancy.     There 
may  also  be  a  legal  disability  arising  from  the  relation  in  which  a 
person  stands  to  the  property,  as  in  case  the  property  is  held  in 
adv(M'se  possession  ;  or  a  legal  disability  arising  from  the  relation 
in  wliich  the  owner  stands  to  the  intended  purchaser,  as  in  the 
case  of  a  direct  conveyance  between  husband  and  wife.     The  dis- 
abilities to  be  considered,  in  reference  to  the  capacity  of  persons  to 

3 


§'-^-] 


DISABILITY    OF   INFANTS. 


dispose  of  property  by  deed,  arise  from  iufiincy,  coverture,  the 
various  kinds  and  degrees  of  mental  c:ipacity,  wliether  this  be 
from  insanity,  drunkenness,  duress,  or  undue  influence  ;  and  finally 
are  to  be  considered  the  capacity  to  convey  of  owners  whose  land 
is  adversely  held,  the  capacity  of  corporations  and  of  tenants  in 
tail. 

I.     Deeds  of  Infants  voidable,  not  void. 

2.  The  deed  of  a  minor  conveying  his  land  for  a  valuable 
consideration  is  voidable,   and   not  void.^      Formerly    various 


^  Zouch  u.  Parsons,  3  Burr.  1794;  Al- 
len V.  Allen,  2  Dr.  &  War.  307,  338;  Bur- 
uiiby  V.  Equitable  Revers.  Soc.  28  Ch.  D. 
416;  Keaue  v.  Boycott,  2  H.  Black.  511 ; 
Irvine  v.  Irvine,  9  Wall.  617;  Tucker  v. 
Moreland,  10  Pet.  58;  Hyer  v.  Hyatt,  3 
Cranch  C.  C.  276. 

Alabama:  Manning  v.  Johnson.  26  Ala. 
446,  62  Am.  Dec.  732;  McCarthy  v. 
Nicrosi,  72  Ala.  332,  47  Am.  Kep.  418. 
California :  Hastings  v.  DoUarhide,  24 
("al.  195.  Colorado:  Kcndrick  v.  Neisz, 
1 7  Colo.  506,  30  Pac.  245.  Connecticut : 
Kline  v.  Beebe,  6  Conn.  494 ;  Rogers  v. 
Hurd,  4  Day,  57,  4  Ara.  Dec.  182.  Del- 
aware :  Wallace  v.  Lewis,  4  Harr.  75. 
Georgia:  Code  1882,  §  2694;  Harris  v. 
Cannon,  6  Ga.  382  ;  Nathans  v.  Ark- 
wright,  66  Ga.  179.  Illinois :  Illinois 
Land  Co.  v.  Bonner,  75  111.  315;  Tunison 
V.  Chamblin,  88  111.  378;  Cole  v.  Pen- 
ney er,  14  111.  158  ;  Keil  v.  Healey,  84  111. 
104,  25  Am.  Rep.  434.  Indiana  :  Scran- 
ton  V.  Stewart,  52  Ind.  68 ;  Pitcher  v.  Lay- 
cock,  7  Ind.  398;  Law  v.  Long,  41  Ind. 
586;  Fetrow  v.  Wiseman,  40  Ind.  148. 
Iowa:  Green  V.  Wilding,  59  Iowa,  679,  13 
N.  W.  Rep.  761,  44  Am.  Rep.  696  ;  Jen- 
kins V.  Jenkins,  12  Iowa,  195.  Kentucky: 
Brpckenridge  v.  Ormsby,  1  J.  J.  IMarsh. 
236,  245,  19  Am.  Dec.  71  ;  Philips  v. 
Green,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  7,  13  Am.  Dec. 
124;  Vallandingham  v.  Johnson,  85  Ky. 
288 ;  Iloffert  v.  Miller,  86  Ky.  572,  6  S. 
W.  Rep.  447.  Maine  :  Davis  v.  Dudley, 
70  Me.  236,  35  Am.  Rep.  318;  Webb  v. 
Hall,  35  Me.  336.  Maryland:  Ridgeley 
V.  Crandall,  4  Md.  435 ;  Amcy  i-.  Cockcy, 

4 


73  Md.  297,  20  Atl.  Rep.  1071,  per  Alvey, 
C.  J.  Massachusetts:  Kendall  i;.  Law- 
rence, 22  Pick.  540;  Boston  Bank  v. 
Chamberlin,  15  Mass.  220.  Minnesota: 
Dixon  «.  Merritt,  21  Minn.  196.  Missis- 
sippi :  Allen  v.  Poole,  54  Miss.  323.  Mis- 
souri: Ferguson  v.  Bell,  17  Mo.  347; 
Peterson  v.  Laik,  24  Mo.  541 ;  Singer 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  81  Mo.  221  ;  Huth 
V.  Carondelet,  &c.  Co.  56  Mo.  202 ;  Baker 
V.  Kenuett,  54  Mo.  82  ;  Harris  v.  Ross,  86 
Mo.  89;  Craig  v.  Van  Bebber,  100  Mo. 
584,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  906  ;  Shipley  v.  Bunn 
(Mo.),  28  S.  W.  Rep.  754.  Nebraska: 
Englebert  v.  Troxell,  40  Neb.  195,  58  N. 
W.  Rep.  852.  New  Hampshire:  State  v. 
Pliasted,  43  N.  H.  413;  Roberts  v.  Wig- 
gin,  1  N.  H.  73, 8  Am.  Dec.  38.  New  York : 
Bool  V.  Mix,  17  Wend.  119,  31  Am.  Dec. 
285  ;  Palmer  v.  Miller,  25  Barb.  399  ;  Jack- 
son V.  Todd,  6  Johns.  257 ;  Jackson  v. 
Carpenter,  11  Johns.  539  ;  Fiinn  v.  Powers, 
36  How.  Pr.  289  ;  Voorhies  v.  Voorhies, 
24  Barb.  150.  North  Carolina:  McCor- 
mic  V.  Leggett,  8  Jones,  425.  Ohio: 
Drake  v.  Ramsay,  5  Ohio,  252.  Pennsyl- 
vania:  Logan  V.  Gardner,  136  Pa.  St.  588, 
20  Am.  St.  Rep.  939.  South  Carolina: 
Ihley  V.  Padgett,  27  S.  C.  300,  3  S.  E. 
Rep.  468.  Tennessee:  Scott  v.  Buchanan, 
11  Humph.  468;  Hook  v.  Donaldson,  9 
Lea,  56.  Texas  :  Searcy  v.  Hunter,  81 
Tex.  644,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  372,  26  Am.  St. 
Rep.  837  ;  Stuart  v.  Baker,  17  Tex.  417  ; 
Cumniings  v.  Powell,  8  Tex.  80;  Askey  v. 
Williams,  74  Tex.  294,  11  S.  W.  Rep. 
1101,  5  Lawyer's  Rep.  176.  Vermont: 
Bigelow  V.  Kinney,  3  Vt.  353,  21  Am.  Dec. 


DEEDS    OF   INFANTS    VOIDABLE,    NOT    VOID.  [§  2. 

distinctions  were  taken  between  void  and  voidable  contracts  of 
infants.  It  was  said  tliat  any  contract  wliich  the  court  could  de- 
clare to  be  to  their  prejudice  was  void.^  For  this  reason  it  was  held 
that  a  conveyance  by  a  minor  without  consideration  is  absolutely 
void,  and  not  voidable  merely.  But  now  such  distinctions  no 
longer  prevail.  It  is  the  settled  rule  that  all  contracts  of  infants, 
whether  made  personally  or  by  an  agent,  are  voidable  instead  of 
void.  After  coming  of  age  they  may  ratify  and  confirm  any  con- 
tract made  during  minority.  Even  a  deed  of  gift,  or  deed  without 
consideration,  is  voidable  rather  than  void.^ 

Their  contracts  for  necessaries  to  the  extent  of  their  reasonable 
value  are  valid  and  require  no  ratification ;  and  their  contracts 
made  in  pursuance  of  statutory  authorit)%  or  b}"  direction  of  court, 
are  of  course  valid.  And  so  are  their  deeds,  executed  under  such 
circumstances  that  the  law  would  have  compelled  their  execution, 
valid  and  cannot  be  avoided.^  Thus  an  infant  who  holds  the  legal 
title  to  real  estate  in  trust  may  be  compelled  to  execute  the  trust, 
and  his  deed  made  in  pursuance  of  such  obligation  cannot  be 
avoided.*  He  cannot  disaSirm  or  avoid  his  deed  in  execution  of 
that  trust  on  the  ground  of  his  minority,  since  the  execution  of 
the  trust  was  a  duty  which  a  court  of  equity  would  have  com- 
pelled him  to  perform  notwithstanding  his  infancy.^     An  infant 

589.     Virginia:  Wilson  i-.  Branch,  77  Va.  10  Pet.  58,  67;  Irvine  t\  Irvine,  9  Wall. 

65,  4G  Am.  Rep,  709;  Birch  v.  Linton,  617,  626;  Starr  v.  Wright,   20  Ohio  St. 

78    Va.    584,   49    Am.    Kep.    3S1.     West  97;  Elliott  y.  Horn,  10  Ala.  348,  44  Am. 

Virginia  :  Gillespie  v.  Bailey,  12  W.  Va.  Dec.  488  ;  Bridges  l-.  Bidwell,  20Xeb.  185, 

70,  29  Am.  Rep.  445.  29  N.  W.  Rep.  302. 

1  Kcane  v.  Boycott,  2  H.  Black.  511,  *  Sheldon  v.  Newton,  3  Ohio  St.  494; 
per  Lord  Chief  Justice  Eyre,  approved  in  Starr  v.  Wright,  20  Ohio  St.  97;  Lem- 
some  American  cases ;  Bloomingdale  v.  nion  v.  Beeman,  45  Oliio  St.  505,  15 
Chittenden,  74  Mich.  698,  42  N.  W.  Rep.  N.  E.  Rep.  476;  Trader  v.  Jarvis,  23  W. 
166.  Va.  100;  Prouty  j;.  Edgar,  6  Iowa,  3.53 

2  Slaughter   v.  Cunningham,   24   Ala.  Bridges  v.  Bidwell,  20  Xeb.  185,  29  N.  W 
260,  60  Am.  Dec.  463 ;  Oxley  v.  Tryon,  Rep.  302. 

25  Iowa,  95;  Harrison  v.  Adcoek,  8  Ga.  s  Zouch  v.  Parsons,  3  Burr.  1794, 1801 

68  ;  Nathans  v.  Arkwright,  66  Ga.  179, 187,  Tucker  v.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58,  67  ;  Nord 

179.     In  Tennessee  an  infant's  voluntary  holt   v.   Nordholt,    87  Cal.  552,   26    Pac 

deed   is   void.     Robinson   v.  Coulter,   90  Rep.  599;   Elliott  v.  Horn,  10  Ala.  348, 

Tenn.  705,  18  S.  AV.  Rep.  250,  25  Am.  St.  44  Am.  Dec.   488;    Starr  v.  Wright,  20 

Rep.  708;  Swafford  v.  Ferguson,  3  Lea,  Oliio  St.  97;   Proiity  v.  Edgar,  6  Iowa, 

292,  31  Am.  Rep.  639  ;  Scobey  v.  Waters,  353. 

10  Lea,  551,  557.  In   Amey  r.  Cockey,  73   Md.   297,    20 

3  Zouch  r.  Parsons,  3  Burr.  1794,  1801,  Atl.  Rep.  1071,  1073,  Alvey,  C.  J.,  seems 
per  Lord  Mansfield  ;  Tucker  v.  Moreland,  to  be  of  opinion  that  this  principle  applies 

5 


^^  3,  4. J  DISABILITY   OF   INFANTS. 

may  exercise  a  naked  power  relating  to  liis  own  estate,  if  in  the 
jnstnnuont  i^iving  the  power  it  is  expressly  provided,  or  the  in- 
tention is  indicated,  that  th3  power  may  be  exercised  during 
minority.^ 

3.  The  deed,  being  voidable  only  and  not  void,  operates  to 
transmit  the  title,  wiiicli  can  be  divested  only  by  some  act  of  the 
grantor,  after  he  has  come  of  age,  disaffirming  his  deed.^  He  can 
confirm  his  deed,  and  then  it  is  no  longer  voidable  ;  but  in  the 
first  instance  confirmation  is  not  necessai'y.  It  is  only  when  there 
has  been  an  effort  on  his  part  to  avoid  his  deed  that  it  becomes 
important  to  inquire  whether  there  has  been  any  act  of  confirma- 
tion which  has  put  it  out  of  his  power  to  disaffirm  his  deed.^ 
No  affirmative  act  is  required  to  continue  the  validity  of  his  deed, 
but  only  the  absence  of  any  disafiirming  acts.* 

4.  It  was  formerly  said  that  infants  could  not  delegate 
their  authority  to  contract,  and  that  in  cases  where  their  own 
deeds  would  be  voidable,  yet  their  deeds  made  under  powers  of 
attorney  were  absolutely  void.^^  The  early  cases  to  this  effect, 
both  in  England  and  in  this  country,  were  numerous.  Thus, 
in  an  early  case  in  Massachusetts,  Chief  Justice  Parker  said : 
"  Perhaps  it  cannot  be  contended,  against  the  current  of  author- 
ities, that  an  act  done  by  another  for  an  infant,  which  act  must 
necessarily  be  done  by  letter  of  attorney  under  seal,  is  not  abso- 
lutely void,  although  no  satisfactory  reason  can  be  assigned  for 
such  a  position.  But  as  this  is  a  point  of  strict  law,  somewhat 
incongruous  with  the  general  rules  affecting  the  contracts  of  in- 
fants, it  is  not  necessary  nor  reasonable  to  draw  inferences  which 
may  be  repugnant  to  the  principles  of  justice  which  ought  to  reg- 

to  a  deed  of  partition  made  by  a  minor,  <  Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  81  Mo 

when  the  partitiou  is  such  as  a  court  of  221. 

equity  will  sanction;  and  that, there  being  ^  Saunderson   v.   Marr,   1    H.   Bl.    75; 

nothing  to  impeach  the  fairness  and  equal-  Philpot    v.   Bingham,    55   Ala.   435    and 

ity  of  the  partition,  a  court  of  equity  will  cases  cited  ;  Cummiugs  v.  Powell,  8  Tex. 

rot  disiurb  it.  80;  Pickler  v.  State,  ]8  lud.  266;  Armi- 

1  Ilearle i-.  Grcenbank,  3  Atk.  695  ;  Hill  tage  v.  Widoe,  36  Mich.  124  ;  Fonda  v. 
V.  Clark,  4  Lea,  405.  Van  Home,  15  Wend.   631,  636,  30  Am. 

2  Irvine  V.  Irvine,  9  Wall.  617  ;  Drake  Dec.  77,  per  Bronson,  J. ;  Knox  v.  Flack, 
V.  Rnmsay,  5  Ohio,  252  ;  Law  v.  Long,  22  Pa.  St.  337 ;  Lawrence  v.  McArter, 
41  In.l.  586;  Ihley  v.  Padgett,  27  S.  C.  10  Ohio,  37,  42;  Pyle  v.  Cravens,  4  Litt. 
300  ;  Scott  V.  Buchanan,  11  Humph.  468.  17,  21  ;  Fairbanks  v.  Snow,  145  Mass.  153, 

3  Ihley  V.  Padgett,  27   S.  C.  300,  302,  156,  per  Holmes,  J. 
per  McGowan,  J. 

6 


NO   ESTOPPEL   BY   DECLARATION    OF   AGE.  [§§  5,  6. 

ulate  contracts  between  man  and  man."  ^  But  this  early  rule  has 
been  limited,  if  not  wholly  done  away  with,  by  some  courts  of  the 
highest  authority.  There  is  certainly  no  good  reason  why  such 
power  should  not  be  held  to  be  voidable  and  not  void.  If  the 
power  is  coupled  with  an  interest,  as  in  case  of  a  mortgage  with 
a  power  of  sale,  it  is  not  void,  but  voidable  only.^ 

II.     No  Estoppel  by  Declaration  of  Age. 

5.  A  declaration  by  an  infant  at  the  time  of  the  execution 
of  a  deed  that  he  was  then  of  age  does  not  estop  him  at  law 
from  taking  advantage  of  his  disability  after  coming  of  age.^ 
*'  An  estoppel  in  pais  is  not  applicable  to  infants,  and  a  fraudu- 
lent representation  of  capacity  cannot  be  an  equivalent  for  actual 
capacity.  A  conveyance  by  an  infant  is  an  assertion  of  his  right 
to  convey.  A  contemporaneous  declaration  of  his  right  or  of  his 
age  adds  nothing  to  what  is  implied  in  his  deed."  ^  The  infant's 
disaffirmance  of  his  deed  under  such  circumstances  may  be  a 
fraudulent  act  as  to  the  purchaser,  but  this  does  not  estop  him 
from  availing  himself  of  the  protection  which  the  law  attaches  to 
his  condition  of  disability.^ 

6.  This  rule  is  not  followed,  however,  in  equity,  but  a 
grantor  who  has  falsely  declared  at  the  time  of  executing  the  deed 
that  he  was  of  full  age,  and  has  thus  induced  the  purchaser  to 
accept  it,  may  be  estopped  by  his  own  fraud.^  But  where  this  is 
the  rule,  the  mere  failure  of  an  infant  at  the  time  of  executing  a 
deed  to  inform  a  grantee  of  his  disability  does  not  estop  him  from 

1  Whitney  v.  Dutch,  14  Mass.  457,  462,  man,  39  Pa.  St.  299,  302,  80  Am.  Dec. 
7  Am.  Dec.  229.  524. 

2  Askey  v.  Williams,  74  Tex.  294,  11  *  Sims  y.Everhardt,  102  U.  S.3G0,  313; 
S.  W.  Rep.  1101,  5  Law  Rep.  176.  Wieland  i-.  Kobick,  110  III.  16,  51   Am. 

3  Meniam  y.  Cunningham,  11  Cush.  40;  Rep.  676.  Sec  Utermchle  v.  McGreal,  1 
Baker  v.  Stone,  136  Mass.  405  ;  Burley  v.  D.  C.  App.  359. 

Russell,  10  N.  H.  184,  34  Am.  Dec.  146;  5  Tucker  v.  Morehmd,  10  Pet.  58,  77; 

Wielaud  v.  Kobick,   110  111.  16,  51  Am.  Brantley  y.  Wolf,  60  Miss.  420;  Ferguson 

Rep.  676;  Buchanan  v.  Hubbard,  96  Ind.  v.  Bobo,  54  Miss.  121. 

1  ;  Price  t;.  Jennings,  62  Ind.  Ill  ;  Car-  6  Thormaehlen  r.  Kaeppel,  86  Wis.  378, 

l)enter  v.  Carpenter,  45  Ind.  142  ;  Vallan-  56  N.  W.  Rep.  10?9,  jicr  Lyon,  C.  J. ;  Da- 

dingham  v.  Johnson,  85  Ky.  288,  3   S.  W.  vidson  v.  Young,  38  111.  145  ;  Schmithei- 

Rep.  173;  Conrad  r.  Lane,  26  Minn.  389,  mer  v.  Eiseman,  7  Bush,  298;  Brantley 

4  N.  W.  Rep.  695,  37  Am.  Rep.  412  ;  Stud-  v.  Wolf,  60  Miss.  420 ;  Ferguson  v.  Bobo, 

well  V.  Shapter,  54  N.  Y.  249  ;  Brown  v.  54  Miss.    121  ;  Bradshaw  v.  Van  Winkle, 

McCune,  5  Saudf.  224,  228 ;  Keen  v.  Cole-  1.33  Ind.  134 ;  Kilgore  v.  Jordan,  17  Tex. 

341. 

7 


§  6  1  DISABILITY    OF   INFANTS. 

afterwards  setting  up  such  disabilit}',  if  lie  made  no  misrepresen- 
tation of  fact  and  employed  no  artilice  to  mislead  the  grantee.^ 

If  the  grantee  knew  the  infant's  representation  that  he  was  of 
age  to  be  false,  the  infant  is  not  estopped  from  avoiding  his  deed 
upon  coming  of  age,  so  far  as  the  transaction  was  not  for  his 
benefit.^  "  At  law  it  is  conclusively  presumed  that  a  person  within 
the  age  of  twenty-one  is  unfitted  for  business,  and  that  every  con- 
tract into  which  he  enters  is  to  his  disadvantage,  and  that  he  is 
incapable  of  fraudulent  acts  which  will  estop  him  from  interpos- 
ing the  shield  of  infancy  against  its  enforcement.  In  equity,  how- 
ever, this  rigid  rule  has  its  exceptions.  Equity  will  regard  the 
circumstances  concerning  the  transaction  —  the  appearance  of  the 
minor,  his  intelligence,  the  character  of  his  representations,  the 
advantage  he  has  gained  by  the  fraudulent  representations,  and 
the  disadvantage  to  which  the  person  deceived  has  been  put  by 
them  —  in  determining  whether  he  should  be  permitted  to  invoke 
successfully  the  plea  of  infancy."^ 

But  if  one  conveying  land  falsely  represents  that  he  is  of  age, 
deceives  the  purchaser,  and,  after  becoming  of  age,  stands  by  for 
several  years,  knowing  that  the  land  is  being  conveyed  to  subse- 
quent purchasers,  he  is  estopped  to  disaffirm  his  conveyance.  His 
misrepresentation  as  to  his  age  makes  his  duty  the  greater  to 
assert  his  claim  seasonably.^ 

1  Tbormaehlen  v.  Kaeppel,  86  Wis.378,  infant  had  prevented  him  from  doing  by 
56  N.  W.  Rep.  1089  ;  Brantley  v.  Wolf,  conveying  some  or  all  of  them  away  to 
60  Miss.  420.  other  third  parties. 

2  Nelson  v.  Stocker,  4  De  Gex  &  J.  458,  Li  Indiana,  one  who  purchases  of  a 
5  Jur.  N.  S.  262,  7.51  ;  Charles  v.  Has-  minor,  with  knowledge  of  his  disability, 
tedt,  51  N.  J.  Eq.  171,  26  Atl.  Rep.  564.  cannot  demand  a  return  of  the  cousidera- 
And  see  Lacy  v.  Pixler,  120  Mo.  383,  25  tion  asa  condition  precedent  to  the  minor's 
S.  W.  Rep.  206.  right  to  disaffirm.  Shaul  v.  Rinker  (Ind.), 

3  Hayes  v.  Parker,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  630,  7  38  N.  E.  Rep.  593.  The  statute  of  this 
Atl.  Rep.  511,  631.  In  this  case  a  release  State,  R.  S.  1894,  §  3365,  provides  that,  in 
made  by  an  infant  to  his  guardian  was  all  sales  of  real  estate  by  an  infant,  a  con- 
sustained,  but  the  circumstances  of  that  ditiou  precedent  to  his  right  to  disaffirm 
case  were  peculiar.  The  infant  there  not  such  a  sale  shall  be  the  restoration  to  the 
only  made  the  fraudulent  representation  purchaser  of  the  consideration  therefor,  if 
as  to  his  age,  but  he  accepted  in  payment,  the  purchaser,  acting  in  good  faith,  relied 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  his  father,  upon  false  representations  by  the  in- 
certain  lands  at  a  fair  valuation,  and,  in  fant  that  he  was  of  age,  and  had  good 
order  to  obtain  those  lands,  the  guardian  reason  to  believe  such  representations  to 
was  obliged  to  execute  a  release  to  a  third  be  true. 

party,  from  which  he  could  not  be  relieved        *  Lacy  v.  Pixler,  120  Mo.  383, 25  S.  "W. 
except  by  returning  the  lands,  and  this  the     Rep.  206. 

8 


DISABILITY   OF   MARRIED   WOMEN    UNDER   AGE. 


[§7- 


III.     Disability  of  Married  Women  under  Age. 
7.  A  married  woman  under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  is 
subject  to  the  disabilities  of  infancy,^  save  only  in  Cd^es  where 


1  Infants  attain  their  majority  at  the 
a<;e  of  twentj-oue  years,  except  that  in 
tlie  following  named  States,  while  the  age 
of  majority  for  males  is  twenty-one  years, 
for  females  it  is  eigiiteen  years  :  — 

Arkansas:  Dig.  of  Stats.  1884,  §  3464. 
California  :  Civ.  Code,  §  25.  Colorado : 
Annot.  Stats.  1891,  §  2081  ;  Jackson  v. 
Allen,  4  Colo.  263.  Idaho:  R.  S.  1887, 
§  2405.  Illinois:  R.  S.  1889,  ch.  64,  §  1. 
Iowa:  Annot.  Code  1888,  §  3428.  But 
all  minors  attain  their  majority  by  mar- 
riage. Kansas:  G.  S.  1889,  §  3868. 
Minnesota:  G.  S.  1894,  §  4534;  Cogel  v. 
Kaph,  24  Minn.  194.  Missouri:  R.  S. 
1889,  §  5278.  Montana:  Comp.  Stats. 
1887,  p.  981,  §  1204.  Nebraska:  Comp. 
Stats.  1893,  ch.  34,  §  1.  But  in  case  a 
female  marries  between  the  age  of  six- 
teen and  eighteen,  her  minority  ends. 
Nevada:  G.  S.  1885,  §  4943.  North  Da- 
kota: Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  2509.  Ohio: 
R.  S.  1892,  §  3136.  Oklahoma:  Stats. 
1893,  §  3600.  Oregon  :  G.  L.  1892,  §  2951. 
A  female  is  deemed  as  having  arrived  at 
the  age  of  majority  upon  her  marriage. 
§  2953.  South  Dakota :  Comp.  Laws 
1887.  §  2.509.  Utah  :  2  Comp.  Laws  1888, 
§  2560.  But  all  minors  obtain  their  ma- 
jority by  marriage.  Vermont :  R.  L. 
1880,  §  2421.  Washington:  G.  S.  1891, 
§  1416.  All  females  married  to  a  person 
of  full  age  shall  be  deemed  and  taken  to 
\m  of  full  age.     §  1417. 

Other  provisions  as  to  minority  are 
made  in  the  following  named  States:  — 

Florida  :  A  relinquishment  of  dower  ex- 
ecuted and  acknowledged  by  a  wife  shall 
be  valid  notwithstanding  her  minority.  R. 
S.  1892,  §  1959.  Indiana:  Any  married 
woman  over  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  and 
under  the  age  of  twenty-one,  may  convey 
her  right  in  and  to  any  lands  of  her  hiis- 
l)and,  sold  and  conveyed  by  him,  by  ex- 
ecuting and  acknowledging  the  execution 


of  sucli  conveyance,  if  the  father  (or,  if 
there  be  no  father,  tiien  the  mother]  of 
sucl)  married  woman  shall  diclare,  befoie 
the  olBcer  taking  such  ackuowiedgmint, 
that  he  or  she  believes  that  such  convey- 
ance is  for  the  benefit  of  such  married 
woman,  and  that  it  would  be  prejudicial 
to  her  and  her  husband  lo  be  prevented 
from  disposing  of  the  lands  thus  con- 
veyed ;  wliich  declaration,  with  the  name 
of  such  father  or  mother,  shall  be  mserted 
as  a  part  of  the  certificate  of  the  Lfficer 
taking  such  acknowledgment.  If  tlie  in- 
fant wife  have  no  parent  living,  she  n)ay 
join  with  her  husband  in  conveyance  of 
real  estate,  with  consent  of  the  judge  of 
the  circuit  court  of  the  circuit  where  such 
husband  and  wife  reside.  Aimot.  Stats. 
1894,  §§  3359,  3360.  Louisiana:  Minor- 
ity for  both  sexes  continues  tdl  the  age  of 
twenty-one  years.  But  a  minor,  whether 
male  or  female,  is  emancipated  of  right 
by  marriage.  A  minor  over  the  age  of 
eighteen  years  may  be  relieved  of  minority 
on  petition  to  the  judge  having  jurisdic- 
tion. Civ.  Code  1889,  arts.  37,  379,  385. 
Maryland  :  A  married  woman,  at  whatever 
age  she  may  be,  may  relinquish  her  dower 
in  any  real  estate  by  the  joint  deed  of 
herself  and  husband,  or  by  her  separate 
deed.  Pub.  G.  L.  p.  804,  §  12.  Pennsyl- 
vania :  Evcrv  conveyance  executed  and 
acknowledged  by  a  wife  in  conjunction 
with  her  husband  of  his  real  estate  shall 
be  valid  and  effectual,  notwithstanding 
the  minority  of  the  wife.  1  Brightly's 
Purdon's  Dig  1 894,  p.  635,  §  33.  Texas  : 
A  minor  over  the  age  of  nineteen  years 
may  have  his  disabilities  as  a  minor  re- 
moved upon  petition  to  the  district  court 
showing  cause  and  a  decree  thereon.  For 
all  legal  purposes  the  minor  theren['f)n 
becomes  of  full  age.  2  Civ.  Stats.  1889, 
sirt.  3361a.  Wisconsin:  Every  marri-d 
woman  of  the  age  of  eighteen  years  and 


§  8.]  DISABILITY   OF   INFANTS. 

she  is  enabled  by  statute  to  make  a  valid  conveyance  at  an  earlier 
ao-e.^  It"  she  lias  made  a  deed  or  mortgage  of  her  land  during  her 
minority,  her  husband  joining  in  it,  she  may  repudiate  it  on 
comin<''  of  a<»e,  and  she  is  not  bound  to  return  the  consideration.^ 
The  fact  that  she  was  a  mother  at  the  time  of  executing  a  con- 
veyance and  appeared  of  full  age,  and  the  grantee  believed  she 
was  of  full  age  when  he  purchased,  does  not  estop  her  from  show- 
in  o-  her  infancy,  where  she  made  no  representations  as  to  her 
a<''e.^  Though  an  infant  wife  who  had  joined  her  husband  in  the 
conveyance  of  her  land,  the  consideration  of  which  was  paid  to 
him,  had  signed  a  written  statement  —  declared  to  be  made  as  an 
inducement  to  the  carrying  out  of  the  contract  —  that  she  was 
above  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  it  was  held  that  she  might  re- 
cover the  land  after  she  had  been  divorced  from  her  husband,  with- 
out paying  back  any  of  the  consideration.'* 

The  disability  of  infancy  is  not  removed  by  a  proviso  in  a  deed 
to  a  married  woman  that  nothing  is  to  prevent  her  from  selling 
said  land  if  she  shall  desire  to  do  so  and  her  husband  shall  unite 
in  the  deed.^ 

8.  A  relinquishment  of  dower  by  an  infant  feme  covert  by 


upwards  may  bar  her  dower  in  any  real 
estate  by  joining  with  her  husband,  or 
with  his  guardian,  in  a  conveyance  thereof 
duly  executed  and  acknowledged.  Annot. 
Stats.  1889,  §  2222. 

^  Alabama  :  Greenwood  v.  Colemnn,  34 
Ala.  150;  Schaffer  v.  Lavretta,  .57  Ala. 
14.  Arkansas:  Harrod  i;.  Myers,  21  Ark. 
592,  76  Am.  Dec.  409;  Watson  v.  Bil- 
lings, .38  Ark.  278,  42  Am.  Rep.  1.  Illi- 
nois: Hoyr  V.  Swar,  53  111.  134  Indiana  ; 
2  11.  S.  1888,  §§  2939-2943;  Scranton  v. 
Stewart,  52  Ind.  68;  Sims  v.  Smith,  86 
Ind.  577  ;  Bakes  v.  Gilbert,  93  Ind.  70. 
Maine:  "Webb  v.  Hall,  35  Me.  336.  Massa- 
chusetts: Walsh  V.  Younir,  110  Mass.  396. 
Minnesota:  I  G  S.  1888,  ch.  40,  §  2.  New 
York:  Hool  v.  Mix,  17  Wend.  119,31  Am. 
Dec.  285 ;  Sanford  v.  McLean,  3  Paige, 
117,23  Am.  Dec.  773.  North  Carolina: 
Epps  V.  Flowers,  101  N. C  158,  7  S.  E. 
Eep.  680.  Ohio:  Hughes  v.  Watson,  10 
Ohio,  127.  Pennsylvania  :  Logan  v.  Gard- 
ner, 136    Pa.    St.  588,  20   Am.   St.  Hep. 

10 


939.  South  Carolina  :  McMorris  r.  Webb, 
17  S.  C.  558,  43  Am.  Rep.  629.  Tennes- 
see: Mathersou  v.  Davis,  2  Coldw.  443; 
Scott  V.  Buchanan,  1 1  Humph.  468.  Texas: 
Burr  V.  Wilson,  18  Tex.  367;  Searcy  r. 
Hunter,  81  Tex.  644,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  372, 
26  Am.  St.  Rep.  838. 

^  Walsh  V.  Young,  110  Mass.  396;  Dill 
V.  Bowen,  54  lud.  204  ;  Losey  v.  Bond,  94 
Ind.  67;  Magee  v.  Welsh,  18  Cal.  155.- 
Dixon  V.  Menitt,  21  Minn.  196. 

3  Sewellr.  Sewell,92  Ky.  500,  18  S.  W. 
Rep.  162;  Buchanan  v.  Hubbard,  96  Ind. 
1.  See,  however,  Houston  v.  Houston 
(Tex  ),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  688. 

*  Sims  V.  Everhardt,  102  U.  S.  300. 

5  Sewell  V.  Sewell,  92  Ky.  500,  504,  18 
S.  VV.  Rep.  162  ;  Pryor,  J.,  saying  :  "This 
provision  does  not  remove  the  disability 
of  either  infancy  or  coverture,  and  she 
could  convey  only  in  the  same  manner  as 
if  that  provision  in  the  deed  had  been 
omitted." 


DISABILITY    OF   MARRIED   WOMEN   UNDER  AGE.  [§  9. 

joining  with  her  husband  in  a  conveyance  of  his  land  is  voidable 
by  her  on  arriving  at  full  age,  but  is  operative  until  avoided.^ 
The  deed  and  privy  examination  of  a  feme  covert,  taken  under 
modern  statutes,  have  no  longer  the  effect  of  an  assurance  of 
record,  like  a  fine,  but  may  be  collaterally  impeached,  on  the 
ground  of  infancy  or  other  disability.^  If  a  married  woman 
makes  a  deed  of  her  own  land  during  minority,  her  husband  join- 
ino-  to  make  the  deed  valid  under  a  statute  so  providing,  she  may 
disaffirm  the  deed  upon  coming  of  age,  and  the  deed  thereupon  is 
avoided  also  as  to  the  husband.'^  Even  under  statutes  which  give 
a  married  woman  power  to  disaffirm  her  deed  made  during  infancy, 
and  to  bring  an  action  to  recover  the  land,  without  the  assent 
and  even  against  the  will  of  the  husband,  she  is  not  estopped  from 
avoiding  her  deed  by  reason  of  her  omission  to  act  for  any  length 
of  time  during  her  coverture.^ 

9.  If  the  disability  of  coverture  is  joined  to  that  of  infancy, 
where  the  common  law  relative  to  the  husband's  rights  in  her 
property  prevails,  the  disability  of  coverture  enables  her  to  post- 
pone the  act  of  avoidance  to  a  reasonable  time  after  the  coverture 
is  ended ;  for  by  the  marriage  the  husband  acquired  a  vested  free- 
hold in  her  lands,  and  became  entitled  to  the  rents  and  profits  as 
long  as  the  marriage  relation  might  continue.  When,  therefore, 
such  grantor  became  of  age,  she  continued  powerless  to  disturb  the 
possession  of  the  grantor,  so  long  as  her  coverture  lasted.  An 
affirmance  or  disaffirmance  necessarily  implies  the  action  of  a  free 
mind,  exempt  from  all  constraint  or  disability.^ 

1  Law  V.  Long-,  41  Ind.  586;  Priest  v.  ton  v.  Stewart,  52  Ind.  68,13  criticised,  and 
Cummings,  16  Wend.  617;  Feitner  v.  Miles  v.  Lingerman  approved;  Sims  v. 
Lewis,  23  Jones  &  S.  519, 1  N.  Y.  Snpp.  1.  Bardoner,  86  Ind.  87,  44  Am.  Rep.  263  ; 

2  Epps  r.  Flowers,  101  N.C.I  58,  7  S.E.  Buchanan  v.  Hubbard,  96  Ind.  1;  Rich- 
Rep.  680 ;  Wright  v.  Player,  72  N.  C.  94.  ardson  v.  Pate,  93  Ind.  423,  47  Am.  Rep. 
Under  the  statute  of  1751,  giving  the  deed  374.  In  Texas,  where  a  married  woman 
of  an  infant  wife  acknowledged  on  a  privy  cannot  disaffirm  by  deed  without  the  con- 
examination  the  effect  of  a  fine  and  recov-  sent  of  her  husband,  but  may  do  so  by  suit, 
ery,  her  deed  might  be  impeached  during  the  court  thought  the  common-law  rule 
infancy,  but  not  afterwards.  Kidd  v.  should  not  apply,  but  still  that  coverture 
Venable,  111  N.  C.  535,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  should  be  considered  in  determining  what 
317.  is  a  reasonable  time  for  a  disaffirmance. 

3  Craig  V.  Von  Bebbcr,  100  Mo.  584,  13  Searcy  v.  Hunter,  81  Tex.  644,  17  S.  W. 
S.  W.   Rep.   906,18  Am.    St.   Rep.    569;  Rep.  372,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  837. 

Baglcy  ?;.  Fletcher,  44  Ark.  153.  ^  Sims  v.   Everhardt,    102  U.  S.  300; 

*  Miles  r.  Lingerman,  24  Ind.  385  ;  Sims     Sims  i\  Smith,  86  Ind.  577  ;  Sims  v.  Bar- 

V.  Eveihardt,  102  U.  S.  300,  where  Scran-     doner,  86  Ind.  87, 44  Am.  Rep.  263  ;  Miles 

11 


§§  10,  ii.J 


DISABILITY   OF   INFANTS. 


IV.    Who  may  affirm  or  disaffirm  Minority. 

10.  An  infant  cannot  affirm  or  disaffirm  his  deed  during 
his  minority,'  though  the  contrary  was  asserted  by  some  of  the 
early  authorities.  He  may  enter  and  take  the  profits,  if  he  can, 
until  he  has  the  h'gal  capacity  to  affirm  or  disaffirm  his  deed  ;  but 
his  deed  is  not  thereby  rendered  void  ;  it  may  still  be  confirmed 
after  he  is  of  full  age.^  Before  any  act  of  disaffirmance  can  be 
adjudged  to  have;  efiVct,  it  must  be  shown  affirmatively  that  the 
grantor  was  no  longer  a  minor  at  the  time  of  such  disaffirmance.'' 

11.  The  right  of  an  infant  to  avoid  his  deed  on  coming  of 
age   is  during  his  lifetime   a  personal  privilege.     A  creditor 


V.  Lingermau,  24  Ind.  385;  Richardson  v. 
Pate,  93  lud.  423,  47  Am.  Rep.  374  ;  Wil- 
son V.  Branch,  77  Va.  65, 46  Am.  Dec.  709 ; 
Stringer  v.  Northwestern  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  82 
Ind.  100;  Buchanan  v.  Hubbard,  96  Ind. 
1 ;  Stull  V.  Harris,  51  Ark.  294,  11  S.  W. 
Rep.  104  ;  Watson  v.  Billings,  38  Ark. 
278, 42  Am.  Rep.  1 ;  Dodd  v.  Bentbal,  4 
Heisk.  601  ;  Mathersoa  v.  Davis,  2  Coldw. 
443;  iSIcMorrisr.  Webb,  17  S.  C.  558,  43 
Am.  Rep.  629  ;  Epps  v.  Flowers,  101  N.  C. 
158,  7  S.  E.  Rep.  680;  Mcllvaine  v.  Ka- 
del,  30  How.  Pr.  193;  Temple  i;.  Hawley, 
1  Sandf.  Ch.  153.  See,  however,  Goodnow 
V.Empire  Lumber  Co.  31  Minn.  468,  18 
N.  W.  Rep.  283,  47  Am.  Rep.  798.  Of 
course,  a  statute  removing  all  the  dii^abili- 
ties  of  coverture,  the  rule  of  the  text  does 
not  apply,  as  in  Mississippi :  Brantley  v. 
Wolf,  60  Miss.  420.  In  Indiana  the  stat- 
ute, R.  S.  1881,  §  1285,  which  removes 
the  disability  of  coverture  on  the  avoid- 
ance of  deeds  by  infants,  does  not  apply 
where  an  infant  wife  has  joined  with  her 
husband  in  a  conveyance  of  his  land,  so  as 
to  render  necessary  a  disaffirmance  by  her 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  attaining 
majority,  since  her  only  interest  in  the  laud 
is  inchoate,  and  no  right  of  action  accrues 
either  to  her  to  enforce  her  interest,  or  to 
the  grantee  to  quiet  his  title,  till  the  death 
of  her  husband.  McClanahan  v.  Williams 
(Ind.),  35  N.  E.  Rep.  897. 

1  Zouch  V.  Parsons,  3  Burr.  1794  ;  Sims 
V.  Everhardt,   102    U.    S.    300,  313,  per 
12 


Strong,  J. ;  Chandler  v.  Simmons,  97 
Mass.  508,  512,  93  Am.  Dec.  117;  Bool 
V.  Mix,  17  Wend.  119,  31  Am.  Dec. 
285;  Shipley  v.  Bunn  (Mo.),  28  S.  W. 
Rep.  754;  Cummiugs  v.  Powell,  8  Tex. 
80;  Kilgore  v.  Jordan,  17  Tex.  341  ; 
Welch  i;.  Bunce,  83  Ind.  382;  Chapnuui 
V.  Chapman,  13  lud.  396  ;  McCormic  r. 
Leggett,  8  Jones,  425  ;  Singer  Manuf.  Co. 
V.  Lamb,  81  Mo.  221 ;  Armitage  v.  Widoe, 
36  Mich.  124  ;  Emmons  v.  Murray,  16  N. 
11.385  ;  Shipmau  c.  Horton,  17  Conn.  481, 
483,  per  Williams,  C.  J.;  McCarthy  v.  Ni- 
crosi,  72  Ala.  332, 47  Am.  Rej).  418  ;  Has- 
tings V.  DoUarhide,  24  Cal.  195.  But  now, 
in  California,  Civ.  Code,  §  35,  a  minor 
may  disaflirm  his  contract  before  his  ma- 
jority, or  within  a  reasonable  time  af- 
terwards. There  is  a  similar  statute  in 
Dakota,  Comp.  Laws,  1887,  §  2516.  A 
decision  not  in  hurmony  with  others  is 
Harrod  v.  Myers,  21  Ark.  592,  76  Am. 
Dec.  409. 

2  Bool  V.  Mix,  17  Wend,  119,  31  Am. 
Dec.  285  ;  Cummings  v.  Powell,  8  Tex.  80. 
No  case  has  been  cited  in  which  an  infant 
luis  by  liimself  or  his  guardian  attempted, 
while  under  age,  to  recover  lands  which 
have  been  passedfromhim  by  an  exeeiited 
conveyance  ;  and  it  is  probable  thr.t  no 
such  case  can  lie  shown.  Per  Kemphill, 
C.J. 

3  Irvine  v.  Irvine.  5  Minn.  61  ;  Kilgore 
V.  Jordan,  17  Tex.  341. 


WHO    MAY    AFFIRM    OR    DISAFFIRM    MINORITY. 


[§12- 


cannot  avoid  it  by  making  an  attachment  of  tlie  land  after  the 
minor  has  come  of  age.^  An  assignee  in  insolvency  cannot  dis- 
affirm a  deed  or  mortgage  made  by  the  insolvent  while  under  age, 
and  not  affirmed  or  disaffirmed  by  him  after  attaining  his  ma- 
jority. "  The  ground  upon  which  an  infant  is  allowed  to  void  his 
contract  is  for  his  personal  benefit,  and  for  protection  against 
the  improvidence  which  is  the  consequence  of  his  youth.  He  may 
therefore  avoid  his  contract  without  returning  the  consideration 
received,  but  it  is  not  easy  to  see  why  his  creditors,  or  the  as- 
signee as  representing  them,  should  have  this  right.  It  may  well 
be  that  the  estate  of  the  insolvent  has  been  augmented  to  that 
extent  by  the  very  sum  of  money  which  the  minor  received.  The 
fact  that  the  infant  may  rescind  without  returning  the  consider- 
ation indicates  that  the  right  is  strictly  a  personal  privilege,  and 
that,  as  the  rule  permitting  him  to  avoid  his  contract  is  established 
solely  for  his  protection,  so  he  alone  can  have  the  benefit  of  it."  ^ 

12.  A  guardian  of  a  minor  cannot  maintain  a  suit  to  avoid 
a  conveyance  by  his  ward,  for  the  guardian  has  no  title  to  the 
property,  but  is  merely  an  agent  or  attorney.^  The  ward  must 
be  made  a  party  to  any  suit  which  coucerus  his  title  to  property. 


1  Baldwin  u.  Rosier,  1  McCrary,  384. 

Alabama  :  Sharp  v.  Kobei  tson,  76  Ala. 
343.  Arkansas :  Bozeman  v.  Browning, 
31  Ark.  364.  California:  Hastings  v. 
Dollarhide,  24  Cal.  195.  Georgia:  Code 
1882,  §  2732.  Massachusetts:  Kendall 
V.  Lawrence,  22  Pick.  540;  Oliver  v. 
Houdlet,  13  Mass.  237,7  Am.  Dec.  134; 
McCarty  v.  Murray,  3  Gray,  .578 ;  King- 
man V.  Perkins,  1 05  Mass.  111.  Michi- 
gan:  Dunton  v.  Brown,  31  Mich.  182. 
Missouri :  Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  81 
Mo.  221.  New  Hampshire:  Roberts  v. 
Wiggin,  1  N.  H.  73,  8  Am.  Dec.  38.  New 
York:  Hartness  v.  Thompson,  5  Johns. 
I'M  ;  Beardsley  v.  Hotchkiss,  96  N.  Y.  201. 
North  Carolina:  Hoyle  v,  Stowe,  2  Dev.  & 
B.  320,  323.  South  Carolina:  Lester  v. 
l-'razer,  2  Hill  Eq.  528.  Texas  :  Harris  v. 
r.Iusgrove,  59  Tex.  401. 

A  trustee  under  a  marriage  settlement 
cannot  refuse  to  render  an  account  on  the 
ground  that  the  parties  to  it  are  infants, 
nei'lier  of  them  having  disaffirmed  it. 
Jouca  17.  Butler,  30  Barb.  641. 


-  Mansfield  v.  Gordon,  144  Mass.  168, 
10  N.  E.  Rep.  773,  per  Devens,  J. 

3  Lombard  v.  Morse,  155  Mass.  136,  29 
N.  E.  Rep.  205.  Barker,  J.,  says  :  "  The 
precedents  favoring  such  an  exception  are 
found  in  England  and  in  New  York,  where 
committees  are  ap])ointed  for  persons  of  un- 
sound mind,  and  arc  founded  in  part  u[ion 
the  doctrine  that  the  committee  acquires 
some  right  in  the  ward's  estate,  and  in 
part  upon  the  ancient  theory  that  no  man 
can  be  heard  to  stultify  himself.  1  Dan- 
iell  Ch.  Pr.  9,  83,  1  Story  Eq.  PI.  64,  65  ; 
Ortley  v.  Messere,  7  Johns  Ch.  139  ;  Gor- 
ham  V.  Gorham,3  Barb.  Ch.  24.  We  have 
seen  that  here  the  guardian  has  no  title 
or  interest  in  the  ward's  estate.  Boih  in 
England  and  New  York  the  lunatic  may  be 
joined  with  his  committee;  the  rule  against 
self-stultification  bein;;  held  inapplicable 
to  acts  done  to  the  prejudice  of  one's  self. 
Ridler  i-.  Ridler,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  275,  pi. 
5;  Gorhani  v.  Gorham,  ubi  supra."  And 
see  Lang  v.  Whidden,  2  N.  H.  435. 

13 


§§  13,  14.]  DISABILITY   OF  INFANTS. 

Neither  the  infant  nor  his  guardian  can  determine  during  the  con- 
tinuance of  infancy  whether  the  deed  shall  be  afllirnied  or  dis- 
atiiruied.  This  is  a  matter  for  the  grantor's  decision  after  he 
arrives  at  mature  age.^  But  if  the  guardiansliip,  by  reason  of 
any  disability  ft)r  which  an  adult  might  be  placed  under  guardian- 
ship, continues  after  the  ward  has  become  of  age,  tlu;  guardian 
may  avoid  any  conveyance  executed  by  the  ward  while  under  age 
which  might  be  avoided  by  the  ward  himself  if  capable  of  exer- 
cising the  right.- 

13.  The  heirs  of  an  infant  grantor  may  avoid  his  deed  in 
the  same  manner  and  within  the  same  time  that  such  grantor  him- 
self might  if  living.3  Privies  in  blood  may  take  advantage  of 
the  disability  of  infancy,  though  privies  in  estate  cannot.*  But  a 
purchaser  or  devisee  holding  his  right  from  the  iufant,  derived 
from  him  after  he  has  reached  full  age,  may  avoid  a  prior  deed  of 
the  same  land  made  by  the  infant  during  his  disability.^ 

V,    What  amounts  to  an  Affirmance. 

14.  An  infant  on  coming  of  age  affirms  his  deed  by  any  act 
whereby  he  recognizes  the  instrument  as  being  in  force  accord- 
ing to  its  purport. *5     Thus,  if,  having  made  a  mortgage  while  a 

1  Dunton  U.Brown,  31  Mich.  182.  dletoa  v.  Hoge,  5  Bush,  478;   Allen    v. 

2  Chandler  v.  Simmons,  97  Mass.  508,  Poole,  54  Miss.  323 ;  Wimberly  v.  Jones, 
93  Am.  Dec.  117.  1  Ga.  Dec.  91  ;  Hoyle  v.  Stowe,  2  Dev.  & 

3  Illinois  Land  Co.  v.  Bonner,  75  01.  B.  320;  Wheaton  v.  East,  5  Yerg.  41, 
315 ;  Person  v.  Chase,  37  Vt.  647,  88  Am.  26  Am.  Dec.  251. 

Dec.  63;    Veal  v.  Fortson,   57  Tex.  482;  In  Irvine  v.  Irvine,  9  Wall.   617,  627, 

Bozeman  v.  Browning,  31  Ark.  364  ;  Har-  Mr.  Justice  Strong,  referring  to  the  dis- 

vey  V.  Briggs,  68  Miss.  60,  8  So.  Rep.  274  ;  tinction  between  the  nature  of  those  acts 

Singer  Manuf.  Co.   v.  Lamb,  81  Mo.  221 ;  which  are  necessary  to  avoid  an  infant's 

Parsons  v.  Hill,  8  Mo.  135  ;  Sharp  v.  Rob-  deed  and  the  character  of  those  acts  that 

ertson,  76  Ala.  343.  are   sufficient  to  confirm    it  (acts   which 

*  Whittingham's   Case,  8  Coke,   42ft;  would   not  be  sufficient  to  avoid  a  deed 

Austin  V.  Charlestown  Female  Seminary,  being  sufficient  to  affirm  it),  said  :  "  There 

8  Met.  196,  203,  41  Am.  Dec.  497  ;  Boze-  is  reason  fur  this  distinction  between  the 

man  v.  Browning,  31  Ark.  364,  375  ;  Hoyle  effect  of  acts  in  avoidance  and  that  of  acts 

V.  Stowe,  2  Dev.  &  B.  320,  322.  of  confirmation.     We   have   seen   that  au 

6  Breckenridge     v.    Ormsby.    1    J.    J-  infant's   deed  is  not  void ;    it  passes  the 

Marsh.  236,  251,19  Am.  Dec.  71  ;  Shrock  title   of   the  land   to  his  grantee.     Now, 

V.  Growl,  83  Ind.  243;  Price  i;.  Jennings,  if  tlie  deed  be  avoided,  the  ownership  of 

62  Ind.    Ill;  Pitcher  v.  Laycock,  7   Ind.  the   land  is  retransferred.     The  seisin  is 

398;  Jackson  r.  Carpenter,  11  Johns.  539;  changed.  ...  On  the  other  hand,  a  con- 

Hoyle  y.  Stowe,  2  Dev.  &B.  320,  323.  fiirmation    passes  no   title;    it  effects   no 

«  Irvine  v.  Irvine,  9  Wall.  617;  Mid-  change  of  property;  it  disturbs  no  seisin. 

14 


WHAT   AMOUNTS   TO   AN   AFFIRMANCE.  [§  14. 

minor,  after  coming  of  age  lie  conveys  the  laud  subject  to  tlie 
mortgage,  he  thereby  confirms  the  mortgage;  ^  and  he  confirms  it 
also  by  a  part  payment  of  such  mortgage  or  of  interest  due  upon 
it ;  ^  or  by  procuring  releases  of  portions  of  the  land  mortgaged.-^ 
A  will  made  by  one  after  coming  of  age,  wherein  he  directs  the 
payment  of  a  debt  secured  by  a  mortgage,  would  doubtless  be 
taken  as  a  sufficient  confirmation  of  a  mortgage  made  by  the 
testator  during  his  infancy  to  secure  the  payment  of  such  debt. 
But  a  general  direction  for  the  payment  of  "  all  his  just  debts" 
might  not  be  sufficient.*  If,  after  coming  of  age,  the  grantor  ex- 
presses satisfaction  with  the  sale  and  receives  a  part  of  the  con- 
sideration money,  this  is  a  sufl&cient  ratification  of  the  deed.^ 
But  a  mere  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  grantor  had  made  a 
conveyance  is  not  of  itself  proof  of  a  confirmation  of  such  convey- 
ance.^ In  a  deed  of  a  part  of  a  tract  of  land  made  in  pursuance 
of  an  arrangement  to  convey  all  of  it,  a  refei'ence  to  a  prior 
conveyance  by  the  grantor,  made  while  a  minor,  amounts  to  a  con- 
firmation of  such  prior  conveyance.' 

Where  an  infant,  having  made  a  conveyance  of  land,  upon  arriv- 
ing at  full  age  joins  with  his  grantee  in  executing  a  mortgage  of 
the  land  to  secure  a  debt  of  the  grantee,  he  affirms  his  deed  of 
conveyance.^  A  mortgagor,  after  attaining  his  majority,  by  ac- 
cepting part  of  the  proceeds  of  a  foreclosure  sale  ratifies  the 
mortgage.^  If  a  mortgagor  after  coming  of  age  accepts  a  recon- 
veyance of  the  mortgaged  land,  and  makes  a  fresh  mortgage  to  the 
same  mortgagee  to  secure  the  original  debt  and  an  additional 
loan,  this  is  not  merely  a  ratification  of  the  mortgage  made  during 
his  minority,  but  is  a  new  contract  upon  a  good  consideration.^*^ 

It  is,  therefore,  itself  an  act  of  a  character  -  Kecgan  v.  Cox,  116  IMass.  289. 

less  solemn  than  is  the  act  of  avoiding  a  ^  Wilson  v.  Darragh,  28  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

deed,  and  it  may  well  be  effected  in  a  less  390,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  810. 

formal  manner."  *  Merchants'  F.   Ins.   Co.   v.  Grant,  2 

1  Story  V.  Johnson,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  586 ;  Edw.  Ch.   544 ;  Smith  v.  Mayo,   9   Mass. 

Boston  Bank  v.  Chamberlin,  15  Mass.  220  ;  62,  6  Am.  Dec.  28. 

Scott    V.    Buchanan,    11     Humph.    468;  •'''  Ferguson  u.  Bell,  17  Mo.  347. 

Palmer  v.  Miller,  25  Barb.  399;  Lynde  w.  «  Tucker  v.  Morelaud,  10  Pet.  58. 

Bi.dd,  2  Paige,  191,  21  Am.  Dec.  84;  Al-  7  PhiHips  v.  Green,  5  Mtu.  344. 

len  V.  Poole,  54  Miss.  323  ;  Losey  v.  Bond,  8  Watkins  v.  Wassell,  15  Ark.  73. 

94  lud.    67  ;    Phillips  v.  Green,   5   Mon.  »  Darraugh  v.  Blackford,  84  Va.  509, 

344,  355;  Ward  v.  Anderson,  111  N.  C.  5  S.  E.  l{ep.  .542. 

115,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  933  ;  American  Mortg.  i '  fn  rr  Foulkes,  3  Reports  (1893),  682, 

Co.  V.  Wright  (Ala  ),  14  So,  Rep.  399.  69  L.  T.  183, 

15 


§  15.]  DISABILITY   OF  INFANTS. 

A  minor's  conveyance  to  Lis  sister,  without  a  valuable  considei- 
atioi),  is  confirmed,  after  lie  becomes  of  age,  b}'-  his  acting  as  his 
sisti'r's  agent  in  selling  portions  of  the  hmd,  receiving  commissions 
therefor,  proclaiming  title  in  her  to  purchasers,  recognizing  the 
land  as  hers  in  making  settlements  with  her,  making  no  objections 
to  her  conveyances,  and  failing  to  assert  any  right  for  a  long 
period  after  attaining  his  majority. ^  A  minor's  lease  is  ratified 
by  his  receiving,  after  becoming  of  age,  the  rent  falling  due  under 
it.^  But  such  act  will  not  amount  to  a  ratification  unless  it  is 
done  with  a  knowledge  of  the  instrument  to  be  affected.^ 

The  voidable  deed  of  an  infant  is  not  ratified  by  mere  words; 
but  any  deliberate  act  done  by  him  after  coming  of  age,  by  which 
he  takes  benefit  under  a  deed  made  while  he  was  under  age,  or 
by  which  he  expressly  recognizes  its  validity,  is  a  ratification  of 
such  deed.  Thus,  if  he  receives  the  whole  or  a  part  of  the  pur- 
chase-money due  him  under  such  deed,  he  ratifies  the  deed.  He 
ratifies  it  by  accepting  a  reconveyance  from  his  grantee  of  a  part 
of  the  land.* 

15.  A  re-acknowledgment  or  redelivery  of  the  deed  after 
the  grantor  has  become  of  full  age  is  a  ratification  of  it  which 
relates  back,  in  effect,  to  the  original  delivery.  If  the  conve}'- 
ance  so  ratified  is  a  mortgage  the  ratification  will  cut  off  a  volun- 
tar}^  conveyance  by  the  mortgagor  in  trust  for  his  wife  and 
children,  executed  after  the  making  of  the  mortgage  and  before 
the  ratification,  for  the  purchaser  under  such  voluntary  deed  is  not 
a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value.'^ 

If  a  deed,  signed  and  acknowledged  by  a  person  during  his 
minority,  be  delivered  by  him,  or  by  his  iigent  with  his  consent, 
after  he  becomes  an  adult,  the  deed  cannot  be  avoided  on  account 
of  infancy,  for  the  deed  does  not  take  effect  till  the  time  of  its 
delivery;  and  in  such  case  there  is  no  disability  when  the  deed 
takes  effect.^ 

A  minor's  deed  is  not  ratified  by  his  offering,  after  coming  of 
age,  to  make  a  deed  of  ratification  upon  some  contingency,  such 

1  Houston  V.  Houston  (Tex.),  18  S.  ^  McCormic  v.  Lepgett,  8  Jones,  425; 
W.  Ik]).  688.  Ferguson  v.  Bell,  17  Mo.  347. 

2  Ashfield  V.  Ashficld,  W.  Jones,  1.57  ;  5  Palmer  i;.  Miller,  25  Barb.  399  ;  Da- 
Myers  V.  Coal  Co.  126  Pa.  St.  582,  17  Atl.  vidson  v.  Young,  38  111.  145  ;  Murray  v. 
Rep.  891.  Slianklin,  4  Dev.  &  B.  289. 

8  Zoobi-ich  V.  Kauch,  133  Pa.  St.  532,  ''  Sims  ;;.  Smith,  99  Ind.  469,  50  Am. 
19  Atl.  Rci..  415.  Rep.  99. 

16 


WHAT    AMOUNTS    TO    A    DISAFFIRMANCE.  [§§  16,  17. 

as  a  condition  that  the  unpaid  purchase-money  is  paid  or  secured 
to  him.^ 

If  an  infant,  on  coming  of  age,  repudiates  his  deed,  he  cannot  of 
course  recover  the  purchase-money  then  remaining  unpaid.^ 

16.  It  is  not  essential  to  a  ratification  that  it  should  have 
been  made  with  knowledge  that  the  grantor  had  a  legal  right 
to  repudiate  the  deed,^  though  there  are  many  cases,  paiticuhuly 
among  the  earlier  ones,  in  which  it  is  decUired  that  his  7-atific;ition 
must  be  with  full  knowledge  of  his  legal  rights.^  Theie  would 
at  least  seem  to  be  a  presumption  that  a  person  who  has  attained 
his  majoi'ity  is  aware  of  his  rights  in  regard  to  contracts  made  by 
him  during  his  minority.^ 

VI.     What  amounts  to  a  Disaffirmance. 

17.  One  may  disaflBrm  a  deed  made  during  infancy  by  any 
act  done  after  coming  of  age  which  is  inconsistent  with  such 


1  Craic:  V.  Van  Bebber,    100  Mo.   584, 

13  S.  \V.  Rep.  906  ;  Glamorgan  v.  Lane, 
9  Mo.  442. 

2  Crai-  V.  Van  Bebber,  100  Mo.  584,  13 
S.  W.  Rep.  906. 

3  Morse    v.    Wheeler,    4    Allen,    570; 
American  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Wright   (Ala.), 

14  So.  Rep.  399  ;  Anderson  v.  Soward,  40 
Ohio  St.  325,  48  Am.  Rep.  687  ;  Clark 
V.  Van  Court,  100  Ind.  113,  50  Am.  Rep. 
774,  disapproving  dictum  to  contrary  in 
Fetrow  v.  Wiseman,  40  Ind.  148  ;  Ring  v. 
Jamison,  66  Mo.  424,  2  Mo.  Ajip.  584; 
Turner  v.  Gaither,  83  N.  C.  357,  35  Am. 
Rep.  574. 

*  The  notion,  that  the  ratification  must 
have  been  made  with  knowledge  that  the 
grantor  was  not  bound  by  his  deed  made 
while  he  was  a  minor,  is  declared  by  Met- 
calf,  J.,  in  Morse  r.  Wheeler,  4  Allen,  570, 
to  have  had  its  origin  in  a  dictum  of  Lord 
Alvanley  in  Ilarmer  v.  Killing,  5  Esp. 
102.  "Yet  we  have  found,"  continues 
Judge  Metcalf,  "  no  case  in  the  Knglish 
reports  in  which  the  question  has  been 
raised,  whether  it  is  necessary  to  the  rat- 
ification of  such  contract  that  the  new 
])romise  should  be  made  witli  knowledge 
that  the  party  was  not  legally  liable  on 
his  original  contract.  And  we  find  only 
VOL.  I. 


one  instance  in  which  an  English  judge 
is  reported  to  have  expressed  an  opinion 
that  such  knowledge  is  necessary.  Maw- 
son  V.  Blane,  10  Exch.  212,  26  Eng.  L.  & 
Eq.  560.  Still  there  are  cases  in  the  state 
courts  in  which  judges  have  cited,  with 
apparent  ajiproval,  the  position  advanced 
by  Lord  Alvanley.  In  other  cases  judges 
have  advanced  the  same  position  without 
referring  to  any  authority.  Smith  v.  Mayo, 
9  Mass.  64  ;  Ford  v.  Phillips,  1  Pick.  203 ; 
Thing  V.  Libbey,  16  Me.  57;  Curtin  v. 
Patton,  11  S.  &  R.  31 1  ;  Reed  v.  Boshears, 
4  Sneed,  118;  Norris  v.  Vance,  3  Rich. 
168.  In  no  one  of  these  cases  was  a  de- 
cision of  that  point  necessary,  and  they 
were  all  decided  on  other  grounds." 

There  are,  however,  some  decisions  and 
more  dicta  following  Lord  Alvanley's  dic- 
tum. See  Ilinely  o.  Margaritz,  3  Pa.  St. 
428;  Zoebbish  i'.  Ranch,  133  Pa.  St.  .532 
19  Atl.  Rep.  415;  Turner  r.  Gaither,  83 
N.  C.  357  ;  Baker  v.  Kennett,  54  Mo.  82 
Davidson  r.  Young,  38  111.145;  Eureka 
Co.  V.  Edwards,  71  Ala.  248,  255,  46  Am 
Rep.  314,  per  Stone,  J. ;  Flexner  i>.  Dick 
erson,  72  Ala.  318,  323  ;  Wilson  t;.  Md.  L, 
Ins.  Co.  60  Md.  150. 

5  Hatch  r.  Hatch,  60  Vt.   172,   13  Atl. 
Rep.  791  ;  Taft  v.  Sergeant,  18  Barb.  320. 
17 


§  18.]  DISABILITY    OF   INl'AMTS. 

deed,  so  that  the  two  cannot  properly  stand  togetlier.^  Disaffirm- 
ance must  be  a  matter  both  of  act  and  intention.  No  particular 
act  is  necessary,  and  the  intention  need  not  be  expressed  in  any 
particular  manner  or  form.  The  ancient  doctrine  that  the  disaf- 
firmance should  be  of  as  high  and  solemn  a  character  as  the  act 
disaffirmed  has  no  place  in  modern  law.^  Any  act  unequivocally 
nijinifesting  an  intention  to  disaffirm  the  deed  is  sufficient.^  "  In 
respect  to  the  avoidance  of  deeds  made  by  infnnts,  the  current 
of  modern  decisions  is  to  a  liberal  extension  of  the  rule ;  and 
the  tendency  is  to  establish  one  simpler,  more  conservative,  and 
of  easier  and  more  general  application,  thereby  avoiding  many 
of  the  perplexing  and  refined  distinctions  under  the  strict  rule 
which  required  the  act  of  disaffirmance  to  be  of  equal  notoriety 
and  solemnity  with  the  original  act  or  conveyance,  but  which 
was  never  of  universal  application,  for  the  deed  could  always  be 
avoided  by  a  proper  plea."^  A  suit  to  recover  the  purchase- 
money  is  an  act  of  avoidance.  A  notice  or  letter  to  the  grantor 
requesting  the  return  of  the  purchase-money,  with  an  intention  to 
repudiate  the  purchase,  is  sufficient  though  the  notice  or  letter  be 
not  followed  by  a  suit  for  the  purchase-money.  An  offer  to  re- 
convey  is  not  essential  to  a  complete  disaffirmance.  After  suchi 
notice  the  purchaser  cannot  abandon  the  rescission  and  affirm  the 
purchase.  Though  such  rescission  does  not  of  itself  re-transfer 
the  legal  title  to  the  grantor,  so  as  to  enable  him  to  recover  the 
land  by  ejectment,  he  may  maintain  an  equitable  action  for  the 
cancellation  of  the  deed  to  the  grantee.^ 

18.  A  minor's  deed  is  disaflBrmed  by  his  bringing  a  suit  in 
equity  to  cancel  it  or  set  it  aside  on  the  ground  of  his  disability  ;  ^ 

1  Eureka  Co.  ?;.  Edwards,  71  Ala.  248;  J.  See,  also,  McCarthy  v.  Nicrosi,  72 
Illinois  Land   Co.    v.  Beem,   2   III.    App.     Ala.  332,  47  Am.  Kip.  418. 

390;    Bagley  v.  Fletcher,   44   Ark.    153;  ^  McCarty   v.  Woodstock  Iron  Co.  92 

Mustard  v.  Wohlford,  15  Gratt.  329,  76  Ala.  4G3,  8  So.  Kep.  417. 

Am.  Dec.  209;  Long  w.  Williams,  74  lud.  o  f^ms  v.  Evcrhardt,    102    U.   S.    300; 

115;  Law  I'.  Long,  41   Ind.  586  ;   Allen  v.  Schaffer  v.  Lavretta,  57  Ala.  14  ;  Hari<iil 

Poole,  54  Miss.  323;  Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Myers,  21  Ark.  592,  76  Am.  Dec.  409; 

V.  Lamb,  81  Mo.  221.  Watson  v.  Billings,  38  Ark.  278,  42  Am. 

2  Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  81  Mo.  Rep.  1;  Tunison  v.  Chamblin,  88  111.  378; 
221,  225,  per  Martin,  C. ;  Allen  v.  Poole,  Baker  v.  Kennett,  54  Mo.  82  ;  Engkbert 
54  Miss.  323.  v.  Troxell,  40  Neb.   195,  58   N.  W.  Rep. 

3  Bagley  v.  Fletcher,  44  Ark.  153;  852;  Bedinger  y.  Wharton,  27  Gratt.  857  ; 
Tunison  v.  Chamblin,  88  111.  378.  Gillespie  v.  Bailey,  12  W.  Va.  70,  89,  29 

*  McCarty  v.  Woodstock    Iron   Co.  92     Am.  Rep.  445. 
Ala.  463,  8  So.  Rep.  417,  418,  per  Clopton, 
18 


WHAT   AMOUNTS   TO   A   DISAFFIRMANCE.  [§§  19-21, 

or  by  his  bringing  a  writ  of  entry,  ejectment,  or  other  action  to 
recover  possession  of  the  land.^ 

19.  Notice  by  the  grantor  after  coming  of  age,  that  he  disaf- 
firms his  deed  made  during  infancy,  is  a  sufficient  act  of  avoid- 
ance.^ But  no  notice  of  disaffirmance  is  necessary  before  bring- 
ing a  suit  for  the  recovery  of  the  property,  or  for  the  avoidance  of 
the  deed.^ 

20.  A  reentry  is  an  act  showing  an  intention  to  disaffirm 
the  deed.  Where  a  valid  conveyance  cannot  be  made  of  hind 
held  adversely  to  the  grantor  at  the  time,  before  making  a  con- 
veyance which  will  disaffirm  a  deed  made  during  minority,  the 
grantor  must  first  make  an  entry  upon  the  land.*  But  generally, 
hovrever,  a  valid  conveyance  can  be  made  of  land  in  the  adverse 
possession  of  another.^ 

21.  A  deed  of  an  infant  may  be  avoided  by  his  absolute 
sale  after  he  is  of  age,  and  conveyance  of  the  same  land  to  a 
third  person.*'     The  effect  of  such  subsequent  deed  as  a  disaffirm- 

1  Cole  V.  Pennoyer,  14  111.  158  ;  Webb  does  not  constitute  any  part  of  our  law  of 
V.  Hall,  35  Me.  336  ;  Chadbourne  v.  Rack-  conve}•ancint,^  Our  registry  laws  supply 
liff,  30  Me.  354;  Haynes  v.  Bennett,  53  their  place,  and  furnish  the  notoriety  of 
Mich.  15,  18  N.  W.  Rep.  539;  Craig  v.  transfer  intended  to  be  given  by  that  an- 
Van  Bebber,  100  Mo.  584,  18  Am.  St.  cient  mode  of  passing  title,  and  the  making 
Rep.  569  ;  Harris  v.  Ross,  86  Mo.  89,  56  and  recording  of  the  second  deed  in  tbis 
Am.  Rep.  411;  Clark  v.  Tate,  7  Mont,  case  was  entirely  sufficient."  Per  Sher- 
171,  14  Pac.  Rep.  761  ;  Roberts  v.  Wig-  wood,  J.  Chadbourne  v.  Rackliff,  30 
gin,  1  N.  H.  73,  8  Am.  Dec.  38;  Birch  v.  Me.  354,  361 ;  Jackson  v.  Carpenter,  11 
Linton,  78  Va.  584,  49  Am.  Rep.  381.  Johns.  539  ;  Jackson  v.  Burchin,  14  Johns. 

2  McCarthy  v.  Necrosi,  72  Ala.  332;  124;  Cresinger  v.  Welch,  15  Ohio,  156, 
McCarthy  v.  Woodstock  Iron  Co.  92  Ala.  45  Am.  Dec.  565  ;  Allen  v.  Poole,  54 
463,8  So.  Rep.  417;  Long  v.  Williams,  Miss.  323,  331  ;  Norcum  v.  Sheahan,  21 
74lnd.  115, 119,  perNiblack,  J. ;  Scranton  Mo.  25,64  Am.  Dec.  214;  Mustard  v. 
V.  Stewart,  52  Ind.  68,  92.  And  see  Tuni-  Wohlford,  15  Gratt.  329,  76  Am.  Dec. 
son  V.  Chamblin,  88  111.  378.  209  ;  Green   v.   Green,  69   N.  Y.  553,  25 

8  Clark  V.  Tate,  7  Mont.  171,  14  Pac.  Am.    Rep.   233,   with    notice;    White  v. 

Rep.  761.  Flora,  2  Overt.  426,  431  ;  Pitcher  v.   Lay- 

*  Tucker  v.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58 ;  Rob-  cock,  7  Ind.  398  ;  Hoyle  v.  Stowe,  2  Dev. 

ens  V.  Wiggin,  1  N.  H.  73,  8   Am.  Dec.  &  B.  320.    Georgia:  Code  1882,  §§2694, 

38;  Riggs  V.  Fisk,   64  Ind.   100;  Bool  z;.  2695. 

Mix,  17  Wend.  119,  31  Am.  Dec.  285  ;  «  Frost  v.  Wolverton,  1  Strange,  94; 
Jackson  v.  Carpenter,  11  Johns.  539;  Tucker  w.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58;  Bool  v. 
Dominick  r.  Michael,  4  Sandf.  374,  421  ;  Mix,  17  Wend.  119,  31  Am.  Dec.  285; 
Murray  v.  Shanklin,  4  Dev.  &  B.  289;  Jackson  v.  Burchin,  14  Johns.  124;  Jack- 
Harris  V.  Cannon,  6  Ga.  382.  son  v.  Carpenter,  11  Johns.  539  ;  Chapiu  v. 

6  Ilayncs  r.   Bennett,   53   Mich.    15,  18  Shafer,  49   N.  Y.  407;  Eagle  Fire  Co.  v. 

N.  W.  Rep.  539.     "The  old  common-law  Lent,  6   Paige,  635;  Stater.  Plaisted,  43 

doctrine  of  feoffment  with  livery  of  stisin  N.  II.  413;    Riggs  v.  Fisk,  64  Ind.   100; 

19 


§§  ^^,  ^3.] 


DISABILITY    OF  INFANTS. 


anoe  is  a  question  for  the  court,  ami  should  not  be  submitted  to 
the  jury.^  The  subsequent  conveyance  is  not  a  disaffii-m;ince  of 
the  infant's  deed  unless  it  is  so  inconsistent  therewilh  that  bot'i 
deeds  cannot  pro])erly  stand  together.^  If  the  subsequent  convey- 
ance be  to  one  who  has  become  interested  in  tlu^  property  under 
the  earlier  conveyance,  the  subsequent  deed  will  opei-ate  us  a  con- 
firmation of  the  voidable  deed,  and  not  as  a  disaffirmance  of  it.'^ 

22.  A  mortgage  made  during  minority  is  not  disaffirmed  by 
a  quitclaim  deed  made  by  the  mortgagor  after  attaining  ma- 
jority, as  the  two  instruments  are  consistent  with  each  other  and 
can  stand  together,  for  such  deed  only  purports  to  convey  the 
estate  remaining  in  the  grantor  at  the  time  of  its  execution.^  For 
the  same  reason,  a  subsequent  mortgage  does  not  necessarily  avoid 
a  prior  one  made  during  minority.  The  two  mortgages  can  stand 
together.^  But  such  prior  mortgage  is  disaffirmed  by  the  mort- 
gagor's making,  after  coming  of  age,  an  absolute  conveyance  of 
the  same  land  to  another  with  covenants  of  warranty  ;  for  such  a 
deed  is  inconsistent  with  the  prior  mortgage.^ 

23.  The  grantor  on  coming  of  age  may  avoid  his  deed  as 
against  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  from  his  vendee,  as 
well  as  against  the  vendor  himself.     He  may  demand  and  recover 


Hastings  v.  Dollarhide,  24  Cal.  195;  Bag- 
ley?;.  Fletcher,  44  Ark.  153, 17  S.  W.  Rep. 
372;  Searcy  v.  Hunter,  81  Tex.  644,  17 
S.  W.  Rep.  372,26  Am.  St.  Rep.  837  ;  Mc- 
Gan  V.  Marshall,  7  Humph.  121  ;  White 
V.  Flora,  2  Overt.  426 ;  Vallandingham  v. 
Johnson,  85  Ky.  288  ;  Hayncs  v.  Bennett, 
53  Mich.  15;  Prout  v.  Wiley,  28  Mich. 
164;  Corhett  v.  Spencer,  63  Mich.  731, 18 
N.  W.  Rep.  539;  Dixon  v.  Merritt,  21 
Minn.  196  ;  Dawson  v.  Helms,  30  Minn. 
107,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  462;  Black  v.  Hills, 
36  111.  376,  87  Am.  Dec.  224  ;  Cresinger 
V.  Welch,  15  Ohio,  156,  45  Am.  Dec.  565; 
Pitcher  v.  Laycock,  7  lud.  398 ;  Losey  v. 
Bond,  94  Ind.  67  ;  Craig  v.  Van  Bebhcr, 
100  Mo.  584,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  906;  Singer 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  81  Mo.  221  ;  Peter- 
son ;;.  Laik,  24  Mo.  541 ,  69  Am.  Dec.  441  ; 
Hoyle  V.  Stowe,  2  Dev.  &  B.  320  ;  Mus- 
tard I'.  Woldford,  15  Gratt.  329,  76  Am. 
Dec.  209.     Georgia  ;  Code  1882,  §  2694; 

20 


Harris  u.  Cannon,  6  Ga.  382;  Wimberly 
I'.  Jones,  1  Ga.  Dec.  91. 

1  Peterson  v.  Laik,  24  Mo.  541,  69  Am. 
Dec.  441. 

-  Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  81  Mo. 
221  ;  Palmer  v.  Miller,  25  Barb.  399  ;  Phil- 
ips V.  Green,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  7,  13  Am. 
Dec.  124;  Stuart  v.  Baker,  17  Tex.  417, 
421. 

3  Eagle  Fire  Co.  v.  Lent,  6  Paige,  635, 
1  Edw.  Ch.  301  ;  Watkin.s  v.  Wassell,  15 
Ark.  73;  Bagiey  v.  Fletcher,  44  Ark.  153, 
157. 

*  Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  81  Mo. 
221.  In  Bagiey  v.  Fletcher,  44  Ark.  153, 
a  quitclaim  deed  was  held  to  be  a  disaffirm- 
ance, Eakin,  J.,  dissenting. 

5  McGan  v.  Marshall,  7  Humph.  121  ; 
Bagiey  v.  Fletcher,  44  Ark.  1.53,  157; 
Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  81  Mo.  221, 
226;  Buchanan  u.  Grigcs,  ISNeb.  121. 

6  Dixon  V.  Merritt,  21  Minn.  196;  Al- 
len v.  Poole,  54  Miss.  323. 


AFFIRMANCE   FROM   LAPSE   OF   TIME. 


[§  2i. 


the  property  from  the  person  in  possession,  whoever  he  may  be.^ 
Wei'e  the  rule  otherwise,  and  the  infant's  grantee  could  make  the 
deed  valid  by  a  mere  sale  to  an  innocent  purchaser,  this  would 
practically  destroy  a  rule  established  to  protect  minors  against  the 
consequences  of  improvident  conveyances  of  their  property.^  The 
fact  that  a  purchaser  from  one  wlio  is  disaffirming  liis  deed  made 
while  under  age  had  notice  of  such  prior  deed  does  not  make  him 
a  fraudulent  purchaser.^ 

If  an  infant,  after  attaining  his  majority,  ratifies  a  conveyance 
made  by  him  during  bis  minority  by  an  instrument  not  of  record, 
or  by  acts  in  pais,  and  then  conveys  the  same  land  for  a  valuable 
consideration  to  a  person  having  notice  of  the  deed  made  during 
the  minority  of  the  grantor,  but  without  notice  of  the  ratification, 
such  subsequent  purchaser  acquires  the  better  title.* 

VII.     Affirmance  from  Lapse  of  Time. 

24.  The  grantor's  affirmance  of  his  deed  is  not  to  be  pre- 
sumed merely  from  his  silent  acquiescence,  unless  this  be  con- 
tinued for  a  time  which  would  be  a  bar  to  an  action  of  ejectment.^ 


1  Price  V.  Furman,  27  Vt.  268,  270,  per 
Isham,  J.;  Hovey  v.  Hubson,  53  Me.  451, 
458,  per  Appleton,  J.;  Jenkins  v.  Jen- 
kins, 12  Iowa,  195;  Buchanan  v.  Ilubbaifl, 
96  Ind.  1  ;  Sims  v.  Smith,  86  Ind.  577  ; 
Miles  V.  Liugerman,  24  Ind.  385  ;  Mustard 
r.  Wohlford,  15  Gratt.  329,  76  Am.  Dec. 
209  ;  McMoi-ris  v.  Webb,  17  S.  C.  558,  43 
Am.  Rep.  629  ;  Vallandingham  r.  John- 
son, 85  Ky.  288,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  173  ;  Brant- 
ley V.  Wolf,  60  Miss.  420. 

2  Searcy  v.  Hunter,  81  Tex.  644,  17  S. 
W.  Rep.  372,  26  Am.  St.  Rej).  837  ;  Ilie- 
att  V.  Dixon  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W. 
Rep.  263. 

3  Mustard  v.  Wohlford,  15  Gratt.  329, 
76  Am.  Dec.  209  ;  Jackson  i'.  Burchin,  14 
Johns.  124  ;  Black  v.  Hills,  36  III.  376,  87 
Am.  Dec.  224.  In  the  latter  case,  Law- 
rence, J.,  said  :  "  Yet  the  right  would  be 
practically  of  little  value  to  the  minor  if 
the  person  buying  of  him,  after  he  be- 
comes of  age,  is  to  be  considered  as  incur- 
ring in  any  way  the  censure  of  the  law, 
and  to  be  therefore  denied  the  poj-ition  of 
an  innocent  purchaser.     It  does  not  de- 


volve upon  him  to  investigate  whether,  in 
the  particular  case.  Lis  grantor  ought  to 
disaffirm,  as  a  question  of  morals  between 
him  and  the  first  grantee." 

*  Black  V.  Hills,  36  111.  376,  87  Am. 
Dec.  224. 

s  Irvine  v.  Irvine,  9  Wall.  617,  626; 
Tucker  ;-.  ]Moreland,  10  Pet.  58;  Sims  v. 
Everhardt,  102  U.  S.  300,  312,  per  Strong, 
J.,  who  said :  "  We  think  the  preponder- 
ance of  authority  is  that,  in  deeds  executed 
by  infants,  mere  inertness  or  silence  con- 
tinned  for  a  period  less  than  that  j  re- 
scribed  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  unless 
accompanied  by  affirmative  acts  manifest- 
ing an  intention  to  assent  to  the  convey- 
ance, will  not  bar  the  infant's  right  to 
avoid  the  deed."  Wave  v.  Brush,  1  Mc- 
Lean, 533  ;  Wells  v.  Seixas,  24  Fed.  Rep. 
82.  Alabama :  Eureka  Co.  v.  Edwards, 
71  Ala.  248,46  Am.  Rep.  314 ;  McCav- 
thy  V.  Nicrosi,  72  Ala.  332,  47  Am.  Rop. 
418.  See  Schaffcr  v.  Lavretta,  57  Ala.  1 4. 
Arkansas  :  Vaughan  v.  P.trr,  20  Ark.  600; 
Konntz  V.  Davis,  34  Ark  590  ;  Stull  v.  Har- 
ris, 51  Ark.  294,  II  S.  W.  Rep.  104.  Indi- 
21 


§25.] 


DISABILITY    OF   INFANTS. 


"  TIio  reason  is,  tlnit  by  his  silent  acquiescence  lie  occasions  no 
iniuiy  to  otlier  persons,  and  secants  no  benefits  or  new  rights  to 
himself.  There  is  nothing  to  urge  him,  as  a  duty  towards  others, 
to  act  speedily.  Language  appropriate  in  other  cases,  requiring 
him  to  act  within  a  reasonable  time,  would  become  inappropriate 
here.  He  may  therefore,  after  years  of  acquiescence,  by  an  entry 
or  by  a  conveyance  of  the  estate  to  another  person,  disaffirm  and 
avoid  the  conveyance  made  during  his  infancy."  ^  Even  the  lapse 
of  a  longer  period  of  time  than  would  bar  the  recovery  of  the  land 
does  not  amount  to  an  acquiescence  if  the  purchaser  during  this 
whole  period  has  not  been  in  possession.^  Nor  will  the  lapse  of  a 
long  peinod  imply  a  ratification  when  there  has  been  an  express 
refusal  to  ratify.^ 

25.  But   acquiescence    in    connection   with    other    circum- 
stances will  amount  to  an  affirmance.*     Thus  if  the  grantor, 


ana :  Sims  v.  Bardoner,  86  lud.  87,  95,  44 
Am.  Rep.  263  ;  Stringer  v.  Nortliwestern 
Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  82  Ind.  100;  Moore  v. 
Abernathy,  7  Blackf.  442.  Kentucky :  Hof- 
fert  V.  Miller,  86  Ky.  572,  6  S.  W.  Rep.  447. 
Maine:  Boody  v.  McKenuey,  23  Me.  517  ; 
Davis  V.  Dudley,    70  Me.  236,   35  Am, 
Rep.  318;  Chadbourne  v.  RackliflF,  30  Me. 
354.     See,  however,  Robinson   v.  Weeks, 
56  Me.  102.     Michigan  •   Prout  v.  Wiley, 
28  Mich.  164;  Tyler  v.  Gallop,  68  Mich. 
185,  35  N.  W.  Kep.  902  ;  Ruudle  v.  Spen- 
cer,  67    Mich.   189  ;    Donovan  v.  Ward 
(Mich.),  59  N.  W.  Rep.  254.     Missouri: 
Huth  V.   Carondelet  Marine  Ry.  Co.  56 
Mo.  202;  Baker  v.  Kennett,  54  Mo.  82; 
Teterson  v.  Laik,  24  Mo.  541,  69  Am.  Dec. 
441 ;  Thomas  v.  Piillis,  56  Mo.  211  ;  Lacy 
r.   rixler,    120    Mo.   383,   25  S.  W.  Rep. 
206.    New  York :    Jackson  v.   Carpenter, 
11  Johns.  539,  541  ;  Yoorhies  v.  Voorhies, 
24  Barb.  150;  McMurray  v.  McMurray, 
66  N.  Y.    175  ;  Green  v.   Green,  7   Hun, 
492,  69  N.  Y.  553,  25  Am.  Rep.  233.     See 
Aldrich   v.  Funk,  48  Hun,  367,  1    N.  Y. 
Supp.  541.     See,  however,  Jones  v.  But- 
ler, 30  Barb,  641.     Ohio:  Drake  ij.  Ram- 
say, S  Ohio,  252;  Cresinger  v.  Welch,  15 
Ohio,  156,  45  Am.  Dec.  565.      Pennsylva- 
nia :  Urb.an  v.  Grimes,  2  Grant,  96;  Leu- 
hart  V.  Ream,  74  T'a.   St.  59,   rcco^uizing 

22 


the  first-named  case.  See,  however,  Dolph 
V.  Hand,  156  Pa.  St.  91,27  Atl.  Rep.  114. 
Virginia  :  Wilson  v.  Branch,  77  Va.  65, 
46  Am.  Rep.  371  ;  Birch  v.  Linton,  78  Va. 
584,  49  Am.  Rep.  381.  West  Virginia: 
Gillespie  o.  Bailey,  12  W.  Va.  70,  29  Am. 
Rep.  445. 

1  Boody  V.  McKenney,  23  Me.  517,  524. 

2  Gillespie  v.  Bailey,  12  W,  Va.  70,  91, 
29  Am.  Rep.  445.  In  this  case  27  years 
had  elapsed,  after  the  grantor  had  attained 
his  majority,  before  he  sought  to  avoid  the 
sale.  Green,  C.  J.,  delivering  judgment, 
carel':i!ly  s.nM  :  "  I  do  not  mean  to  say 
that  HKie  lapse  of  time,  though  the  pur- 
chaser was  not  in  continuous  possession, 
when  extended  far  beyond  the  time  in 
which  lands  can  be  recovered  when  in  ad- 
verse possession,  might  not  under  some  cir- 
cumstances amount  to  a  confirmation,  but 
simply  that  such  acquiescence  for  a  short 
time  beyond  the  period,  when  there  was  no 
possession  held  by  the  purchaser,  cannot 
be  held  to  be  an  affirmation  of  the  sale." 

3  Behm  v.  Molly,  133  Pa.  St.  614,  19 
Atl.  Rep.  421,  562. 

*  Irvine  v.  Irvine,  9  Wall.  617  ;  Cresin- 
ger  V.  Welch,  15  Ohio,  156,  45  Am.  Dec. 
565 ;  Drake  i'.  Ramsay,  5  Ohio,  252 ;  Lacy 
V.  Pixler,  120  Mo.  383,  25  S.  W,  Rep.  206  ; 
Thomas  v.  PuUis,  56  Mo.  211  ;  Dolph  v. 


AFFIRMANCE   FKOM   LAPSE    OF    TIME.  [§  26. 

after  coming  of  age,  for  a  long  time  without  objection  stands  by 
and  sees  the  purchaser  making  valuable  improvements  upon  the 
lands,  he  will  not  be  allowed  to  disaffirm  the  sale.^  He  must  act 
jjromptly  to  preserve  his  right  of  disaffirmance.  But  he  is  not  re- 
quired to  act  while  he  is  a  minor.  Until  he  becomes  of  age  his 
standing  by  while  the  purchaser  is  making  improvements,  and 
giving  no  notice  of  his  intention  to  disaffirm  upon  attaining  his 
majority,  does  not  estop  him  from  then  disaffirming.^ 

26.  The  lapse  of  time  may  frequently  furnish  evidence  of 
acquiescence,  and  thus  confirm  the  title  of  the  purchaser ;  ^  but 
of  itself  it  does  not  take  away  the  right  to  avoid  the  deed  until 
the  statute  of  limitations  has  run.  It  is  really  the  circumstances 
showing  the  grantor's  acquiescence  in  the  conveyance,  and  not  the 
mere  lapse  of  time,  that  cuts  of^  his  right  to  disaffirm  his  deed. 
*'  There  is  no  reason  in  principle  for  saying  that  the  right  to  dis- 
affirm a  deed  on  account  of  infancy  shall  be  cut  off  by  lapse  of 
time,  short  of  the  period  prescribed  in  the  statute  of  limitations  for 
bringing  an  action  to  recover  the  property,  unless  it  be  on  the 
principle  of  estoppel ;  and  it  must  be  an  exception  to  the  ordinary 
rule  if  there  can  be  an  estoppel  where  there  has  been  no  change 
ill  the  position  of  the  parties,  in  respect  to  the  matter  in  dispute, 
detrimental  to  the  one  who  pleads  the  estoppel."  ^     The  statute  of 

Hand,  156  Pa.  St.  91,  27  Atl.  Eep.  114;         »  Irvine  v.  Irvine,  9  "Wall.  617;  Drake 

Logan  V.   Gardner,   1"6    Pa.    St.  .588,  20  v.    Ramsay,    5    Ohio,   252;    Cresinger   v. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  939;  Woods  v.  Wilson,  37  Welch,   15  Ohio,  156,   193,  45  Am.  Dec. 

Pa.  St.  379.  565 ;  Trader  v.  Jarvis,  23  W.  Va.  100. 

1  Sims  V.  Bardoner,  86  Ind.  87,  95,  44        *    Stringer    v.    Northwestern    Mut.    L. 

Am.  Rep.  263,  per  Morris,  J.;   Stringer  Ins.  Co.  82  Ind.  100,  107,  per  Woods,  J. 

V.  North vi^cstern  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  82  Ind.  To  like  effect  the  same  court  in  Sims  v. 

100;   Hartman    v.    Kendall,   4    Ind.  403;  Bardoner,  86    lud.  87,    95,    44  Am.  Rep. 

Brantley  v.  Wolf,  60  Miss.  420;  Wallace  263,   said  :  "But  if  the   party  entitled  tu 

y.  Latham,  52   Miss.  291  ;  Allen  v.  Poole,  disaffirm    docs  not    stand   by,  if    he  does 

54  Miss.  323    330  ;  Wheaton    v.   East,    5  nothing  in  affirmance  of  the  deed,  and  is 

Ycrg.  41;  Birch  v.  Linton,   78   Va.  584,  not  called  upon  by  peculiar  circumstances 

49  Am.   Rep.    381  ;  Wallace  v.  Lewis,  4  to  assert  his  rights,   he  may  disaffirm  at 

llarr.  75;  Jones  y.  Phoenix  Bank,  8  N.  Y.  any   time   before    his   right    of   entry   is 

228,  235  ;  Bostwick  v.  Atkins,  3  N.  Y.  5'! ;  barred."     These  opinions  are  quoted  with 

Davis  j;.  Dudley,  70  Me.  236,  35  Am.  Rep.  approval  in  Richardson  v.  Pate,  93  Ind. 

318;  Lacy  i;.  Pixler,  120  Mo.  383,  25  S.  423,   47    Am.    Rep.   374:    "It  woiild  be 

W.  Rep.  206.  contrary  to  the  benign  principles  of  the 

^Buchanan    v.    Hubbard,    96    Ind.    1;  law,  by  which  the  imbecility  and  indiscre- 

Richardson  v.  Pate,  93  Ind.  423  ;  Brant-  tion  of  infants  are  protected  from  injury 

ley  r.    Wolf,   60   Miss.  420  ;  Davidson   v.  to  their   property,   that    a  mere   acipiies- 

Young,  38  III.  145.  cence,  without  any  intermediate  or  con- 

23 


§27.] 


DISABILITY    OF   INFANTS. 


limitations  is  the  proper  guide  as  reasonable  time  for  dlsaflirmance, 
except  in  cases  where  tlie  grantor  after  coming  of  age  does  some- 
thing totally  inconsistent  with  an  intention  to  disaffirm. ^ 

If  the  <n-antor  since  his  majority  has  done  no  affirmative  act  to 
ratify  his  deed,  has  remained  constantly  at  a  distance  from  the 
land,  and  is  not  shown  to  have  known  of  subsequent  conveyances, 
he  may  disaffirm  at  any  time  within  the  period  of  limitation.- 

VIII.     Disaffirmance  within  a  reasonable  Time. 

27.  On  the  other  hand,  in  many  cases  it  has  been  said  that 
the  disaffirmance  must  be  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the 
infant  has  attained  his  majority  ;  ^  and  in  some  States  there  are 


tinued  benefit  showing  his  assent,  should 
operate  as  an  extinguishment  of  his  title." 
Jackson  v.  Carpenter,  11  Johns.  539,  543, 
per  Yates,  J. 

1  Peterson  v.  Laik,  24  Mo.  541,  C9  Am. 
Dec.  441  ;  Huth  v.  Carondelet  Marine  Ry. 
&  Dock  Co.  56  Mo.  202  ;  Thomas  v.  Vu\- 
lis,  56  Mo.  211  ;  Sims  v.  Everhardt,  102 
U.  S.  300;  Gillespie  v.  Bailey,  12  W.  Va. 
70,  29  Am.  Rep.  445;  Lacy  v.  Pixler, 
120  Mo.  383,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  206. 

2  Lacy  V.  Pixler,  120  Mo.  383,  25  S. 
"W.  Rep.  206. 

8  Holmes  v.  Blogg,  8  Taunt.  35,  1 
Moore,  466,  a  dictum,  and  not  a  case  of 
an  infant's  deed ;  Dublin,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Black,  8  Exch.  181,  not  a  case  of  a  deed. 
California:  Hastings  v.  Dollarhide,  24 
Cal.  195.  Connecticut :  Kline  v.  Beebe, 
6  Conn.  494,  where  thirteen  years'  delay 
was  held  to  be  unreasonable  delay.  Geor- 
gia: Nathans  v.  Arkwright,  GG  Ga.  179. 
It  must  be  within  seven  years,  under  a 
statute  of  this  State.  Illinois :  Illinois 
Land  Loan  Co.  v.  Bonner,  75  III.  315; 
Black  V.  Hills,  36  111.  376  ;  Blankenship  v. 
Stout,  25  111.  132.  Maryland :  Amey  v. 
Cockey,  73  Md.  297,  20  Atl.  Rep.  1071, 
where  a  married  woman  delayed  five 
years  after  her  disability  of  coverture  was 
removed,  and  forty  years  after  the  execu- 
tion of  her  deed.  Minnesota:  Goodnow 
V.  Empire  Lumber  Co.  31  Minn.  468,  18 
N.  W.  Rep.  283,  47  Am.  Rep.  798.  Mis- 
sissippi :  Brantley  v.  Wolf,  60  Miss.  420, 

24 


holding  that  two  years  is  a  reasonable 
time;  Thompson  v.  Strickland,  52  Miss. 
574,  which  in  elfect  overrules  Wallace  v. 
Latliam,  52  Miss.  291.  Nebraska:  Engl- 
b  rt  V.  Troxell,  40  Neb.  195,  58  N.  W.  Rep. 
852;  O'Brien  v.  Gaslin,  20  Neb.  347; 
Ward  V.  Laverty,  19  Neb.  429,  27  N.  W. 
Rep.  393 ;  in  this  case  a  delay  of  three 
years  was  adjudged  too  long.  South  Car- 
olina :  Ihley  r.  Padgett,  27  S.  C.  300,  3 
S.  E.  Rep.  468 ;  Scott  v.  Scott,  29  S.  C. 
414,7  S.  E.  Rep.  811.  Tennessee:  Scutt 
V.Buchanan,  11  Humph.  468.  Texas: 
Hieatt  v.  Dixon  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W. 
Rep.  263  ;  Bingham  v.  Barley,  55  Tex. 
281;  Ferguson  v.  Houston,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  73 
Tex.  344,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  347,  holding 
that  two  years  was  not  a  reasonable 
time ;  Searcy  v.  Hunter,  81  Tex.  644, 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  372  ;  Askey  v.  Williams, 
74  Tex.  294,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  1101.  Ver- 
mont :  Bigelow  v.  Kinney,  3  Vt.  353, 
21  Am.  Dec.  589 ;  Richardson  v.  Bo- 
right,  9  Vt.  368.  Wisconsin  :  Thormaeh- 
len  V.  Kaeppd,  86  Wis.  378,  56  N.  W. 
Rep.  1089  ;  O'Dell  v.  Rogers,  44  Wis. 
136,  183.  The  grounds  for  this  doctrine 
are  forcibly  stated  in  Goodnow  v.  Emi)ire 
Lumber  Co.  31  Minn.  468,  472,  47  Am. 
Rep.  798,  by  Gilfillan,  C.  J. :  "The  only 
effect  of  giving  more  than  a  reasonable 
time  is  to  enable  the  mature  man,  not  to 
correct  what  he  did  amiss  in  his  infancy, 
but  to  speculate  on  tl  e  events  of  the  fu- 
ture,—  a  conaeiptence  entirely  foreign  to 


DISAFFIRMANCE   WITHIN   A   REASONABLE   TIME. 


[§27. 


statutes  to  this  effect.^  In  the  absence  of  a  statute,  however,  the 
hipse  of  time  after  the  disability  is  removed,  without  any  positive 
act  of  affirmance  or  disaffirmance  by  the  grantor,  only  raises  the 
question  of  affirmance  by  sucli  acquiescence.^     What  a  reasonable 


the  purpose  of  the  rule,  which  is  solely 
protection  to  the  infant.  Reason,  justice 
to  others,  public  policy  (which  is  not  sub 
served  by  cherishing  defective  titles),  and 
convenience  require  the  ri;;ht  of  disafSrm- 
ance  to  be  acted  upon  within  a  reasonable 
time." 

1  Iowa:  Code  1888,  §  3429;  Green  v. 
Wilding,  59  Iowa,  679, 13  N.  W.  Rep.  761, 
44  Am.  Rep.  696;  Wri,ij:ht  v.  Germain,  21 
Iowa,  585  ;  Stout  v.  Merrill,  35  Iowa,  47  ; 
Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  12  Iowa,  195  ;  Jones  v. 
Jones,  46  Iowa,  466,  473  ;  Weaver  v.  Car- 
penter, 42  Iowa,  343  ;  Sims  v.  Everhardt, 
102  U.  S.  300,  309,  per  Strong,  J. 

^  Delaware :  Four  years  after  majority 
is  not  a  reasonable  time.  Wallace  v. 
Lewis,  4  Harr.  75,  80.  In  Georgia  the 
time  is  limited  to  seven  years  after  the 
removal  of  the  disability,  after  the  analogy 
of  the  .statute  of  limitations,  applicable 
when  there  is  written  evidence  of  title. 
Nathans  V.  Arkwright,  66  Ga.  179.  Illi- 
nois: In  Mette  v.  Feltgen,  148  111.  357, 
36  N.  E.  Rep.  81,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  911, 
Blaukenship  v.  Stout,  25  111.  132  ;  and 
Cole  ''.  Pennoyer,  14  111.  158,  three  years 
after  majority  was  held  to  be  such  reason- 
able time.  Indiana  :  The  doctrine  of  a 
reasonable  time  for  disaffirmance  is  re- 
jected in  the  later  cases ;  but  in  some  cases, 
in  which  there  were  circumstances  to  be 
considered  other  than  mere  delay,  the  doc- 
trine has  been  taken  into  consideration. 
In  Scran  ton  v.  Stewart,  52  Ind.  68,  three 
years  and  a  half  after  the  grantor  became 
of  age  was  held  to  be  within  a  reasonable 
time.  In  Doe  v.  Abernathy,  7  Blackf. 
442,  a  disaffirmance  after  five  years  was 
held  to  be  within  a  reasonable  time.  In 
Ilartman  v.  Kendall,  4  Ind.  403,  thirteen 
years  was  an  unreasonable  delay:  "An 
examination  of  the  authorities  will  show 
tliat  the  time  required  ranges  from  one  to 
twenty  years,  according  to    the  peculiar 


circumstances  of  each  case  and  the  views 
of  different  judges  and  writers."  Per 
Franklin  J.  Wiley  v.  Wilson,  77  Ind.  596. 
And  see  Stringer  v.  Northwestern  Mat. 
L.  Ins.  Co.  82  Ind.  100  ;  Sims  v.  Bar- 
doner,  86  Ind.  87,  98,  44  Am.  Rep.  263; 
McClanahan  v.  Williams  (Ind.),  35  N.  E. 
Rep.  897.  Iowa:  Three  years  and  eight 
months  after  attiining  majority  was  not 
within  a  reasonable  time  under  the  stat- 
ute. Green  v.  Wilding,  59  Iowa,  679,  13 
N.  W.  Rep  761,  44  Am.  Rep.  696.  In 
Wright  V.  Germain,  21  Iowa,  585,  an  act 
of  disaffirmance  about  two  years  after  at- 
taining majority  was  too  late.  In  .Jones 
V.  Jones,  46  Iowa,  466,  a  disaffirm- 
ance about  two  years  after  majority  was 
held  under  the  circumstances  not  to  be 
within  a  reasonable  time.  Minnesota : 
A  delay  for  three  years  and  a  half  is  more 
than  a  reasonable  time.  Goodnow  v. 
Empire  Lumber  Co.  31  Minn.  468,  18  N. 
W.  Rep.  283;  47  Am.  Rep.  798.  New 
Hampshire  :  State  i;.  Plaisted,  43  N.  H. 
413.  Pennsylvania:  In  Dolph  v.  Hand, 
156  Pa.  St.  91,  27  Atl.  Rep.  174,  the 
court  say  :  "  It  seems  to  be  agreed  on  all 
sides  that  one  entitled  to  avoid  his  deed 
should  make  and  signify  his  election  with- 
in a  reasonable  time,  or  the  omission  so 
to  do  may  operate  as  an  affirmance.  The 
difficulty  has  been  with  the  application  of 
the  rule,  and  the  question,  '  What  is  a  rea- 
sonable time  "? '  has  received  different  an- 
swers in  different  jurisdictions."  In  the 
case  before  the  court  there  was  a  delay  for 
ei^'hteen  years  after  the  making  of  the 
deed,  and  for  fifteen  years  after  the  infant 
came  of  age.  There  were  the  further  cir- 
cumstances that  the  grantor  had  the  full- 
est knowledge  of  the  voidable  character 
of  the  deed,  of  the  erection  of  improve- 
ments on  the  land,  and  of  its  steady  in- 
crease in  value.  His  delay  was  held  un- 
reasonable, amounting  to  a  waiver  of  his 

25 


§§  28,  29.]  DISABILITY   OF   INFANTS. 

tinu'  is  uiuler  such  a  statute,  or  under  a  rule  of  court  to  the  same 
elTeet,  ilepeiuls  uptai  the  circumstances  of  each  c:ise.  "  Thus,  it 
would  be  material  to  incpiire  whether  the  minor  was  a  non-resi- 
dent of  the  State  on  attaining  his  majority  ;  to  ascertain  his 
capacity  for  transacting  business ;  what  influences,  if  any,  were 
brought  to  bear  upon  him  by  those  interested  in  preventing  a 
disaffirmance  ;  and  whether  any  suits  were  pending,  the  deter- 
inination  of  which  were  material  in  electing  to  disaffirm."  ^ 

28.  What  is  a  reasonable  time  may  be  either  for  the  court 
or  for  the  jury  to  determine.  Where  there  is  delay  merely,  with 
nothing  to  explain  or  excuse  it,  or  show  its  necessity,  it  is  a  mat- 
ter for  the  court  to  determine.^  Very  often,  however,  it  is  a 
mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  to  be  determined  from  the  circum- 
stances in  each  particular  case ;  ^  and  in  such  cases  the  question 
of  reasonable  time  is  for  the  jury  under  the  instructions  of  the 
court.* 

IX.     Avoidanee  of  Mortgage  for  Purchase-money. 

29.  An  infant  who  has  purchased  land,  and  given  back  a 
mortgage  for  the  purchase-money,  or  a  part  of  it,  may,  upon 
coming  of  age,  avoid  the  transaction ;  he  may  relinquish  tlie  prop- 
erty and  reclaim  the  money  paid  on  account  of  it.^  But  he  must 
surrender  and  reconvey  the  property.     If    he  continues  to  bold 

right,  and  equivalent  to  an  express  rati-  what  is  a  reasonable  time.    Vermont :  In 

ficiition.     But    in    Urban    v.    Grimes,    2  Bigelow   v.   Kinney,   3  Vt.  353,  21  Am. 

Grant,  96,  this  court  held  that  fourteen  Dec.  589,  it  was  held  that  eleven  years 

years  was  not  unreasonable.     lu  the  first-  after  majority  was  not  a  reasonable  time, 

named  case,  however,  the  court  said   they  ^  Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  12  Iowa,  195. 

would  not  disturb  Urban  v.  Grimes,  but  2  Qooduow  v.   Empire   Lumber  Co.  31 

were  not  willing  to  extend  the  rule  there  Minn.  468,  18  N.  W.  Rep.  283,  47  Am. 

laid  down.    Texas  :  Hieatt  v.  Dixon  (Tex.  Rep.  798  ;  State  v.  Phiisted,  43  N.  II.  413. 

Civ.  A  pp.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  263  ;  Searcy  v.  In  Wiley  v.  Wilson,   77   Ind.  596,  it  was 

Hunter,  81  Tex.  644,  17   S.  W.  Rep.  372,  declared   that  the  reasonableness  of  time 

26  Am.  St.  Rep.  837  ;  Binjrham  v.  Barley,  was  a  question  for  the  jury. 

55  Tex.  281  ;   Stuart   v  Baker,    17  Tex.  ^  Englebert  v.  Troxell,  40  Neb.  195,  58 

417;  Kilgorev.  Jordan,  17  Tex.  341.     In  N.  W.  Rep.  852;  Searcy  v.    Hunter,  81 

Ferguson  v.  Railway  Co.  73  Tex.  344,  11  Tex.  644,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  372,  26  Am.  St, 

S.  W.  Rep.  347,  after  two  years  was  held  Rep.  837. 

not  to  be  a  reasonable  time  for  the  minor  *  State  v.  Plai.sted,  43  N.  H.  413. 
to  bring  suit.    In  the  case  of  Askey  v.  Wil-  ^  Willis  v.  Twambly,  13  Mass.  204.   By 
liams,  74  Tex.   294,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  1101,  statute  in  Ohio  a  woman  of  tlie  age  of 
but  little  over  one  year  had  elapsed.    Each  eighteen  years  may  execute  a  valid  con- 
case  must  rest  upon  its  own  merits  as  to  vcyance.     R.  S.  1880,  §§  4106,  4107. 


AVOIDANCE    Ui--   MOKIGAGE   FOR   PURCHASE-MONEY.  [§  30. 

the  estate  and  apply  it  to  his  own  uses,  he  affirms  the  mortgage.^ 
He  must  do  this  within  a  reasonable  time.^  If  he  ratifies  the 
conveyance  to  himself,  he  ratifies  the  mortgage  for  the  purchase- 
money.  They  constitute  one  transaction,  and  he  cannot  enjo}^ 
the  one  without  being  bound  by  the  other.^  If  an  action  to  fore- 
close the  mortgage  be  brought  after  his  coming  of  age,  and  he 
allows  a  decree  of  sale  to  be  entered,  he  cannot  then,  upon  find- 
ing there  is  a  deficiency  instead  of  a  surplus,  escape  liability  for 
it  by  setting  up  his  disability.*  If  his  mortgage  be  foreclosed 
and  the  property  sold  under  judgment  in  the  suit,  by  bringing 
ejectment  against  the  purchaser  he  not  only  affirms  the  deed, 
but  the  mortgage,  because  he  thereby  claims  title  under  the 
deed.^ 

30.  The  same  rule  applies  in  case  the  deed  to  the  infant 
reserves  a  lien  for  the  purchase-money.  He  cannot  retain  the 
land  and  repudiate  the  lien,  which  is  in  effect  a  mortgage.^  In 
like  manner,  if  an  infant  has  purchased  land  and  given  his  unse- 
cured note  for  the  purchase-money,  or  some  part  of  it,  he  cannot, 
upon  coming  of  age,  retain  the  property  and  plead  infancy  as  to 
the  note.'^  If  the  infant's  guardian  has  given  a  note  and  mort- 
gage for  a  balance  of  the  purchase-money  for  land  conveyed  to 
the  infant,  and  the  infant  on  attaining  majority  repudiates  the 

1  Roberts  v.  Wiggin,  1  X.  H.  73,  8  Am.  Hook  v.  Donaldson,  9  Lea,  56  ;  Utermehle 

Dec.  38  ;  Robbins  v.  Eaton,  10  X.  H.  561 ;  v.  McGreal,  1  D.   C.  App.  359  ;   Langdou 

Heath  v.  West,  28  X,  H.  101;  Hubbard  v.  v.  Clayson,  75  Mich.  204,  42  X.  W.  Rep. 

Cummings,  1  Me.  11  ;  Dana  v.  Coombs,  6  805. 

Me.  89, 19  Am.  Dec.  194;  Badger  v.  Thin-  2  Rapid  Transit  Land   Co.  v.  Sanford 

ney,  15  Mass.  359,  8  Am.  Dec.  105  ;  Callis  (Tex.),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  587,  holding  that 

r.  Day,  38  Wis.  643;  Weed  y.  Beebe,  21  Vt.  four  months  after  becoming  of  age  is  a 

495  ;  Richardson  v.  Boright,  9  Vt.  368  ;  reasonable  time. 

Bigelosvu.  Kinney,  3  Vt.  353,  21  Am.  Dec.  ^  Dana  v.  Coombs,  6  Me.  89,  19  Am. 

589  ;    Langdon  v.  Clayson,  75  Mich.  204  ;  Dec.  194    Heath  v.  West,  28  X.  H.  101 ; 

Young  V.  McKce,  13  Mich.  552;  Henry  r.  Langdon  v.  Clayson,  75  Mich.  204. 

Root,  33  X.  Y.  526, 553 ;  Lynde  w.  Budd,  2  *  Flinn  v.   Tower-s,    35    How.  Pr.  279, 

Paige,  191,21  Am.  Dec.  84;  Kitchen  y.  Lee,  affirming    36    How.   Pr.    289;    Terry   v. 

11  Paige,  107,  42  Am.  Dec.  101  ;  Coutant  McClintock,  41  Mich.  492,  2  X.  W.  Rep. 

V.  Servoss,  3  Barb.  128;  r)ttman  v.  Moak,  787. 

3  Sandf.  Ch.  431  ;  Grace  v.  Whitehead,  7  ^  Kennedy  v.  Baker,   159  Pa.  St.   146, 

Grant  U.  C.  591  ;  Kennedy  v.  Baker,  159  28  Atl.  Rep.  352. 

Pa.  St.  146,  28  Atl.  Rep.  252  ;  Walsh  v.  <"'  Smith  v.  Henkel,  81  Va.  524. 

Powers,   43  X.  Y.   23,3  Am.   Rep.   654;  ^  Phil  pot  v.    Sandwich   Manuf.   Co.    18 

Betts  V.  Carroll,   6  Mo.  App.  518;    Mc-  Xeb.    54;  Weed    v.   Beebe,   21  Vt.    495; 

riure  u.  McClure,  74  Ind.  108;  Uecker /.'.  Kitchen  v.   Lee,  11    Paige,    107,  42  Am. 

Kovlm,  21  Xeb.  559,  59  Am.  Rep.  849;  Dec.  101 ;  Strain  t;.  Wright,  7  Ga.  568. 

27 


§  31.J  DlSAlULirV    OF    INFANTS. 

pureliasc,  the  nicutgage  m;iy  be  foreclosed  and  the  proceeds  ap- 
plied first  to  refunding  the  money  paid  by  tlu;  infant  at  the 
time  of  the  purchase,  and  next  to  the  payment  of  the  note  and 
mortirage.^ 

Where  the  infant's  mortgage  was  given  to  secure  the  payment 
of  money  borrowed  by  him,  and  not  for  purchase-money,  his 
continuing  in  possession  of  the  land  after  he  is  of  full  age,  and 
refusing  to  pay  the  note,  do  not  constitute  a  satisfaction  of  the 
mortgages.^  But  if  an  infant  buys  land  which  is  subject  to  a 
mortgage  which  he  assumes  as  a  part  of  the  consideration  of  the 
conveyance,  and  subsequently,  but  before  he  comes  of  age,  con- 
veys the  land  to  another  for  a  larger  price,  his  retention  of  the 
proceeds  of  such  sale  after  he  comes  of  age  is  not  such  an  affirm- 
ance of  his  contract  as  to  render  him  liable  on  his  covenant  to 
pay  the  mortgage.^ 

If  an  infant  purchasing  land  has  assumed  the  payment  of  liens 
upon  it,  and  to  pay  these  has  executed  during  his  minority  a 
mortgage  to  secure  a  loan,  he  cannot,  upon  arriving  at  full  age, 
ratify  his  purchase  of  the  land  without  at  the  same  time  ratifying 
the  mortgage.^ 

X.    Restoration  of  Purchase-money. 

31.  The  grantor  is  not  required  to  restore  the  purchase- 
money,  if  he  has  spent  it  or  lost  it,^  in  order  to  disaffirm  a  con- 

1  Scott  V.  Scott,  29  S.  C.  414.  Chandler  v.  Simtnojis,  97  Mass.  508,  514, 

2  Baker  v.  Stone,  136  Mass.  405.  93  Am.  Dec.  117.     Minnesota :  Dawson  v. 
8  Walsh  V.  rowers,  43  N.  Y.  23,  3  Am.     Helmes,  30  Minn.  107,  14  N.  W.  Kep.  462. 

Rep.  654.     And  see  Carrell  v.  Potter,  23  Mississippi :  Harvey  v.  Briggs,  68  Miss.  60, 

Mich.  377.  8  So.  Kep.  274  ;  Brantley  c.  Wulf,  60  Miss. 

*  Langdon  v.  Clayson,  75  Mich.  204,  42  420,  overruling  Fergu.soii  v.  Bobo,  54  Miss. 

N.  W.  Kep.  805.  121.     Missouri:  Craig  v.  Van  Bebber,  100 

^Tucker    v.    Moreland,    10    Pet.    58,  Mo.  584,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  906,   18  Am.  St. 

73;   Sims   i;.   Everhardt,    102   U.  S.  300.  Rep.  569,  overruling  Higliley  y.  Barron,  49 

Alabama:    Eureka    Co.  v.    Edwards,  71  Mo.  103;  Baker  f.  Kennett,  54  Mo.  82; 

Ala.  248,   46   Am.   Rep.  314;    Goodman  Kerr  w.  Bell,  44  Mo.  120.  Montana  :  Clark 

V.  Winter,  64  Ala.  410,  33  Am.   Rep.  13;  v.   Tate,  7  Mont.   171,  14  Pac.  Rep.  761. 

Manning  v.  Johnson,  26  Ala.  446,  62  Am.  Nebraska  :  Englebert  v.  Troxell,  40  Neb. 

Dec.  732.     Arkansas:  Stall  w.  Harris,  51  195,58  N.  W.  Rep.  852;  Rea   v.  Bishop 

Ark.  294,11  S.  W.  Rep.  104;  St.  Louis,  (Neb.),  59  N.  W.   Kep.   555.     New  York: 

&c.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Higgins,  44  Ark.  293.     lUi-  Green   v.   Green,  69  N.  Y.  553,  25  Am. 

nois :  Reynolds  v.  McCurry,  100  111.356.  Rep,    233.      Ohio:    Cresinger    v.   Welch, 

Indiana:  Pitcher  i-.  Laycock,  7  Ind.  398";  15   Ohio  156,   45   Am.  Dec.  565.    Penn- 

Dill  V.  Bowen,  54  Ind.  204;  Miles  v.  sylvania:  Shaw  v.  Boyd,  5  S.  &  R.  309, 
Liugerman,  24  Ind.  385.    Massachusetts  : 

28 


RESTORATION    OF  PURCHASE-MONEY. 


[§3t 


veyimcc  voiduble  on  account  of  infancy.  If  the  return  of  the 
consideration  were  a  condition  attached  to  the  right  of  the  grantor 
to  avoid  his  deed,  the  privilege  would  fail  to  protect  hiui  when  he 
most  needed  protection.^  But  if  the  grantor,  when  avoidhig  his 
conveyance  made  during  minority,  has  in  his  hands  any  of  its  fruits 
specifically,  such  as  a  note  or  mortgage,  or  other  property  taken 
in  exchange,  his  act  in  avoiding  the  conveyance  will  divest  him  of 
all  right  to  retain  such  securities  or  property,  and  the  other  party 
may  reclaim  it.^  As  already  observed,  if  he  retains  and  uses 
such  property  or  collects  such  securities  after  coming  of  age,  this 
is  an  affirmance  of  the  conveyance,  and  he  is  deprived  of  his 
right  to  avoid  it.  The  cases  go  to  the  extent  of  holding  that  he 
must  return  such  part  of  the  consideration  or  money  as  he  has  not 
used  or  wasted  at  the  time  he  attains  full  a<ie.^     To  contest  his 


9  Am.   Dec.  368.     Virginia :  Bedinger  v. 
Whaiton,  27  Gratt.  857. 

In  Nev7  Hampshire  and  Texas  it  is  held 
that  complete  restoration  of  the  purchase- 
mom  y  must  be  made  in  all  instances, 
whetlier  tlie  grantor  has  it  ia  kind  or  not. 
Carr  r.  Clough,  26  N.  H.  280,  59  Am.  Dec. 
345  ;  Heath  v.  Stevens,  48  N.  11.  251 ;  Hall 
V.  Butterfield,  .59  N.  H.  354,  47  Am.  Rep. 


be  deiidcd  in  accordance  with  its  own 
peculiar  facts.  Tlie  infant  s!:oii!d  be  fully 
protected  from  those  who  deal  with  him, 
knowing  his  infancy,  and  with  intent  to 
overreach  him,  or  who,  with  an  eye  single 
to  their  own  advantage,  disregard  his  ap- 
parent disability,  or  his  known  improvi- 
dence and  recklessness,  and  do  him  real 
injury,  though  it  may  be  in  no  other  way 


209 ;  Fitts  v.  Hall,  9  N.  H.  441 ;  Bingham     than  by  placing  it   within   his  power  to 


V.  Barley,  55  Tex.  281,  40  Am.  Rep.  801; 
Ferguson  v.  Houston,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  73  Tex. 
344;  Stuart  v.  Baker,  17  Tex.  417  ;  Wo- 
mack  V.  Womack,  8  Tex.  397,  58  Am. 
Dec.  119 ;  Wade  v.  Love,  69  Tex.  522. 

In  Utermehle  v.  McGreal,  1  D.  C.  App. 
359,  375,  very  nearly  the  same  view  is 
taken,  and  it  is  declared  that  it  is  imma- 


stimulate  and  gratify  inclinations  and  ap- 
petites which  he  has  not  the  discretion  or 
strength  of  character  to  control." 

1  Craig  V.  Van  Bebber,  100  Mo.  584,  590, 
13  S.  W.  Rep.  906,  per  Black,  J. 

8  Chandler  v.  Simmons,  97  Mass.  .508, 
514,  93  Am.  Dec.  117  ;  Boody  v.  McKen- 
ney,  23  Me.  517;  Brantley  v.  Wolf,  60  Miss. 


terial  that  the  consideration  has  changed  420,433;  Wilie  u.  Brooks,  45   Miss.  542; 

form  bincc  the  conveyance,  and  is  not  on  Gillespie  v.  Bailey,  12  W.  Va.  70,  92,  29 

hand  ill  sjjccie,     Shepard,  J.,  said:  "We  Am.  Rep.  445;  Price  y.  Furman,  27  Vt. 

arc  of  the  opinion    that  the  safer  course  268,  270, 65  Am.  Dec.  194  ;  Kline  r.  Beebe, 

lies  between  the  extreme  rule  prevailing  in  6  Conn.  494;  Thormachlen  v.  Kaeppel,  86 

Texas,  and  jjrobably  in  New  Hampshire,  Wis.  378,  56  N.  W.  Rep.  1089;  Callis  v. 

that  the  consideration  must  in  all  cases  Day,  38  Wis.  643;  Knaggs  v.  Green,  48 

be   restored   before  disaffirmance   can   be  Wis.  601,  4  N.  W.  Rej).  760,  33  Am.  Rep. 


made  effective,  and  the  other  that  the  re- 
turn will  be  required  only  where  the  infant 
has  it  in  species,  or  has  retained  and  dis- 
posed of  it,  with  full  knowledge,  after  ar- 
riving at  his  majority.     It  is,  in  our  view. 


838  ;  Manning  v.  Johnson,  26  Ala.  446, 
62  Am.  Dec.  732  ;  Kerr  v.  Bell,  44  Mo. 
120;  Bailey  v.  Bamberger,  11  B.  Mon. 
113  ;  Ilillyer  v.  Bennett,  3  Edw.  Ch.  222. 
•3  Green  v.  Green,  69  N.  Y.  553,  25  Am. 


impracticable  to  attempt  to  make  a  geii-    Rep.  233  ;  Craig  v.  Van  Bebber,  100  Mo. 
eral  rule  applicable  to  all  rases ;  e.uh  must     584, 13  S.  W.  Rep.  906  ;  Manning  v.  John- 

29 


DISABILITY    OF  INFANTS. 


disatlirmance  of  the  deed,  however,  on  the  grouiul  tliatthe  grantor 
has  not  returned  the  consideration,  one  must  show  what,  if  any, 
consideration  he  did  receive,  and  what  remained  in  his  hands 
when  he  came  of  age ;  ^  but  he  is  not  required  to  retui-n  an  equiv- 
alent for  such  part  thereof  as  he  may  have  disposed  of  during 
his  minority.^  A  conveyance,  by  a  person  of  full  age,  of  lands 
which  he  had  received  in  exchange,  while  under  age,  for  lands  con- 
veyed by  him  while  under  age,  may  be  held  to  be  a  confirmation 
of  the  deed  made  by  him  while  under  age.^ 

32.  A  return  of  the  consideration  is  not  a  condition  prece- 
dent to  a  disaflQrmance  of  an  infant's  deed.     "  If  it  were  so,  the 


son,  26  Ala.  44f),  fi2  Am.  Dec.  732 ;  Shurt- 
lef£  V.  Millard,  12  R.  I.  272,  34  Am.  Rep. 
640 ;  Dill  v.  Bowen,  54  Ind.  204 ;  Bedin- 
ger  V.  Wharton,  27  Gratt.  857. 

1  Lacy  y.  Pixie r,  120  Mo.  383,  25  S.  W. 
Eep.  206;  Euglcbert  v.  Troxell,  40  Neb. 
195,  58  N.  W.  Eep.  852  ;  Bloomer  v.  No- 
lan, 36  Neb.  51,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  1039  ;  Rey- 
nolds V.  McCurry,  100  111.  355;  Miller  v. 
Smith,  26  Minn  248,  2  N.  W.  Rep.  942, 
37  Am.  Rep.  407. 

2  Dill  V.  Bowen,  54  Ind.  204 ;  Engle- 
bert  f.  Troxell,  40  Neb.  195,  58  N.  W.  Rep. 
852. 

In  California  it  is  provided  by  statute, 
Civ.  Code,  §  35,  that  the  contract  of  a 
minor,  if  made  while  he  is  under  the  age 
of  eighteen,  may  be  disaffirmed  by  him 
either  before  his  majority,  or  within  a  rea- 
sonable time  afterwards;  and  if  made  by 
a  minor  over  the  age  of  eighteen,  it  may 
be  disaffirmed  in  like  manner  upon  restor- 
ing the  consideration  or  paying  its  equiv- 
alent. In  the  latter  case,  the  statute  is 
regarded  as  making  the  restoration  of  the 
consideration  or  its  equivalent  a  condition 
j.reeedent  to  a  disaffirmance;  but  if  the 
convcy.nncc  was  made  by  a  minor  under 
eighteen  years,  the  return  of  the  consid- 
eration is  not  a  condition  precedent  to  a 
disaffirmance.  Combs  v.  Ilawes  (Cal.),  8 
Pac.  Rej).  597.  For  a  similar  statute  in 
Dakota,  sec  Civ.  Code,  §  17,  Comp.  Laws 
1887,  §  2516. 

In  Indiana,  2  R.  S.  1888,  §  2945,  it  is 
provided  that  an  infant  shall  not  be  per- 

30 


mitted  to  disaffirm  his  sale  without  first 
restoring  the  consideration  received,  if  he 
falsely  represent  himself  or  herself  to  the 
purchaser  to  be  of  age,  and  the  purchaser 
acting  in  good  faith  relied  upon  such  rep- 
resentation, and  had  good  cause  to  believe 
such  infant  to  be  of  full  age.  As  to  res- 
toration of  consideration  by  an  infant 
feme  covert,  see  2  R.  S.  1S88,  §  2944. 

In  Iowa  the  Code,  §  2238,  provides  that 
a  minor  is  bound  bv  his  contract,  unless  he 
disaffirms  it,  and  restores  to  the  other  party 
all  money  or  property  received  by  him 
by  virtue  of  his  contract,  and  remaining 
within  his  control.  Construing  this  sec- 
tion of  the  Code,  the  Supreme  Court,  in 
Hawes  v.  Railroad  Co.  64  Iowa,  315,  20 
N.  W.  Rep.  717,  held  that,  where  a  minor 
had  disaffirmed  a  contract,  he  was  only 
required  to  return  the  identical  money  or 
property  received  by  him  for  the  execution 
of  such  contract  reinniiiing  in  his  posses- 
sion at  the  time  of  his  disaffirmance  thereof. 
The  court  said  :  "  It  is  not  shown  or  pre- 
tended that  he  had  remaining  under  his 
control,  at  any  time  aft  r  attaining  his 
majority,  the  money  or  jiroperty  received 
by  him  by  virtue  of  thi'  contract,  and  it  is 
only  such  money  or  property  as  may  thus 
remain  that  he  is  bound  to  restore."  And 
see,  tosarae  effect,  Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  12 
Iowa,  195  ;  Leacox  v.  Griffith,  76  Iowa,  89, 
94,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  109. 

3  Williams  v.  Maber,  7  N.  J.  Eq.  500 ; 
Buchanan  r.  Hubbard,  119  Ind.  187,  21 
N.  E.  Ro".  ri.38. 


RESTORATION   OF   PURCHASE-MONEY.  [§  33. 

privilege  would  fail  to  protect  him  wlien  most  needed.  It  is  to 
guard  him  against  the  improvidence  which  is  incident  to  his 
immaturity  that  this  right  is  maintained.  If  the  minor,  when 
avoiding  his  contract,  have  in  his  hands  any  of  its  fruits  specifi- 
cally, the  act  of  avoiding  the  "contract  by  which  he  acquired  such 
property  will  divest  him  of  all  right  to  retain  the  same,  and  the 
other  party  may  reclaim  it.  He  cannot  avoid  in  part  only,  bnt 
must  make  the  contract  wholly  void  if  at  all,  so  that  it  will  no 
longer  protect  him  in  the  retention  of  the  consideration.  Or,  if 
he  retain  and  use  or  dispose  of  such  property  after  becoming  of 
age,  it  may  be  held  as  an  affirmance  of  the  contract  by  which  ho 
acquired  it,  and  thus  deprive  him  of  the  right  to  avoid.  But  if 
the  consideration  has  passed  from  his  hands,  either  wasted  or  ex- 
pended during  his  minority,  he  is  not  thereby  to  be  deprived  of 
his  right  or  capacity  to  avoid  his  deed,  any  more  than  he  is  to  avoid 
his  executory  contracts.  And  the  adult  who  deals  with  him  must 
seek  the  return  of  the  consideration  paid  or  delivered  to  the 
minor  in  the  same  modes  and  with  the  same  chances  of  loss  in 
the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  It  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  give 
effect  to  the  disaffirmance  of  the  deed  or  contract  of  a  minor,  that 
the  other  party  should  be  placed  in  statu  quo^  ^  To  like  effect 
the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York  said  :  "  The  right  to  rescind 
is  a  legal  right  established  for  the  protection  of  the  infant ;  and  to 
make  it  dependent  upon  performing  an  impossibility,  which  im- 
possibility has  resulted  from  acts  which  the  law  presumes  him 
incapable  of  performing,  would  tend  to  impair  the  right  and  with- 
draw the  protection.  Both  upon  authority  and  principle,  we 
think  a  restoration  of  the  consideration  could  not  be  exacted  as 
a  condition  to  a  rescission  on  the  part  of  the  defendant."  ^ 

For  the  same  reason,  the  deed  of  an  insane  person  which  he 
has  never  ratified  may  be  avoided  without  first  restoring  the  con- 
sideration to  the  grantee.^ 

33.  It  is  undoubtedly  the  general  rule  that  a  party  seeking 
to  rescind  a  contract  must  restore  the  consideration,  or  put 

1  Chandler  r.  Simmons,  97  Mass.  503,  cedent  to  the  recovery  of  the  estate,  that 
514,  93  Am.  Dec.  117,  per  Wells,  J.  woiihl  be  clone  indirectly  which  the  law 

2  Green  v.  Green,  G9  N.  Y.  S.'j.S,  556,  25  does  not  permit  to  he  done  directly,  and 
Am.  Kep.  23.3,  per  Church,  Ch.  J.  the  2;reat  purpose  of  the  law  in  avoiding 

3  Gibson  v.  Soper,  6  Gray,  279,  282,  66  such  contracts,  the  protection  of  those  who 
Am.  Dec.  414.  "If  the  law  required  res-  cannot  protect  themselves,  defeated."  Per 
tiution    of  the  price  as   a  condition  pre-  Thomas,  J. 

31 


§§  34,  35.] 


DISABILITY   OF   INFANTS. 


the  other  party  in  statu  quo.  But,  without  doing  this,  an  infant 
may  be  relieved  of  his  executod  contract.  This  exception  to  the 
rule  is  founded  on  the  deficient  capacity  of  the  infant  to  enter 
into  a  binding  contract.  In  some  decisions  the  general  rule  has 
been  applied  to  the  case  of  infants  seeking  to  avoid  their  executed 
contracts.^  But  the  weight  of  authority  as  well  as  the  weight  of 
argument  supports  this  exception,  that  to  give  effect  to  a  disaffirm- 
ance of  an  infant's  deed  it  is  not  necessary  that  his  grantee  should 
be  placed  in  statu  quo  by  the  restoration  of  the  consideration  he 
has  paid.^ 

34.  If  the  infant's  conveyance  was  made  without  consider- 
ation, or  the  consideration  was  paid  to  some  one  else,  of  course 
when  the  infant  comes  of  age  he  may  disaffirm  his  deed  without 
offering  to  restore  any  consideration.^ 

One  who  deals  with  a  minor  with  full  knowledge  of  his  minor- 
ity cannot  demand  a  return  of  the  consideration  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  minor's  right  to  disaffirm  his  deed.* 

35.  If  the  grantor  goes  into  equity  to  have  his  conveyance 
set  aside  on  account  of  his  infancy  at  the  time  he  made  it. 


1  Bal•tlett^•.  Cowles,  15  Gray,  445. 

2  Alabama:  Manningy.  Johnson, 2G  Ala. 
446,  62  Am.  Dec.  732  ;  Eureka  Co.  v.  Ed- 
wards, 71  Ala.  248.  Arkansas;  St.  Louis, 
&c.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Higgins,  44  Ark.  293,  297. 
Georgia :  Shuford  v.  Alexander,  74  Ga. 
293.  Illinois  :  Reynolds  v.  McCurr}',  100 
111.356.  Indiana:  Law  v.  Long,  41  Iiid. 
586  ;  Richardson  v.  Pate,  93  Ind.  423,  47 
Am.  Rep.  374;  Dill  r.  Bowen,  54  Ind. 
204;  Shirk  ;•.  Shultz,  113  Ind.  571.  Ken- 
tucky: Vallandingham  v  Johnson,  85  Ky. 
288,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  288.  Maine :  Robin- 
son V.  Weeks,  56  Me.  102.  Massachusetts : 
Chandler  v.  Simmons,  97  ]\Iass.  508,  514, 
93  AtD.  Dec.  117;  Bartlett  z;.  i:)rake,  100 
Mass.  174, 176,  97  Am.  Dec.  92,  per  Wells, 
J.  ;  Walsh  v.  Young,  110  Mass.  396. 
Michigan :  Corey  v.  Burton,  32  Mich.  30. 
Minnesota:  Dawson  v.  Helmcs,  30  Minn. 
107,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  462  ;  Miller  v.  Smith, 
26  Minn.  248,  37  Am.  Rep.  407.  Missis- 
sippi:  Cook  V.  Toumbs,  36  Mi'^s.  685; 
Brantley  v.  Wolf,  60  Miss.  420,  423.  Mis- 
souri :  Craig  /•.  Van  Bobber,  100  Mj.  584, 
13  S.  W.  Rep.  906,  Lacv  v.   Pixler,  120 

32 


Mo.  383,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  206.  Montana: 
Clark  V.  Tate,  7  Mont.  171,  14  Pac.  Rep. 
761.  New  York:  Green  v.  Green,  69  N. 
y.  .j53,  25  Am.  Rep.  233,  7  Hun,  492. 
Ohio :  Lemmou  i'.  Beeman,  45  Ohio  St.  505. 
Pennsylvania:  Ruchizky  v.  De  Haven, 
97  Pa.  St.  202,  210.  Vermont:  Price  v. 
Furmau,  27  Vt.  268,  65  Am.  Dec.  194; 
Weed  V.  Beebe,  21  Vt.  495. 

3  Vogelsang  v.  Null,  67  Tex.  465,  3  S. 
W.  Rep.  451  ;  Englebert  v.  Troxeil,  40 
Neb.  195,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  852.  In  this  case 
an  infant  conveyed  his  real  estate  in  con- 
sideration uf  $240  in  cash  paid  t6  the  in- 
fant's father.  The  father  purchased  a 
piano  for  the  infant  with  the  money.  The 
infant,  on  coming  of  age,  had  in  his  pos- 
session the  piano  and  disaffirmed  the  deed. 
It  was  held  that,  as  a  condition  precedent 
to  his  right  to  disaffirm  the  deed,  he  was 
under  no  legal  obligation  to  tender  or  sur- 
render tlie  piano,  nor  repay  the  money 
which  the  grantee  had  paid  the  infant's 
father. 

*  Shaul  V.  Rinker(Ind.),38  N.E.  Rep. 
593. 


RESTORATION   OF   PURCHASE-MONEY.  [§  35. 

some  authorities  hold  that  he  must  do  equity  to  the  gi-antee  by 
refunding  the  consideration  received. ^  But  the  better  rule  is,  that 
the  disability  of  infancy  will  be  recognized  in  equity  to  the  same 
extent  that  it  is  recognized  at  law ;  that  if  the  grantor,  when  he 
seeks  to  obtain  relief  in  equity  from  his  deed  made  during  minor- 
ity, retains  the  consideration  or  any  part  of  it,  he  maybe  required 
to  restore  such  consideration  to  the  grantee ;  but  that,  if  he  no 
longer  has  in  his  hands  the  consideration  received,  he  is  not  re- 
quired to  restore  it  or  its  equivalent.'^ 

1  Hillyer  v.  Bennett,  3  Edw.  Ch.  222  ;  46  Am.  Rep.  314  ;  Stull  v.  Harris,  51  Ark. 
Gray  i;.  Lessington,  2  Bosw.  257 ;  Stout  V.  294,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  104;  Brandon  v. 
Merrill,  35  Iowa,  47  ;  Smith  v.  Evans,  5  Brown,  106  111.  519  ;  Reynolds  v.  Mc- 
Humph.  70;  Bozeman  v.  Browning,  31  Curry,  100  111.  356;  Weed  v.  Beebe,  21 
Ark.365  ;  Folts  v.  Ferguson,  77  Tex.  301,  Vt.  495  ;  Bedinger  v.  Wharton,  27  Gratt. 
13  S.  W.  Rep.  1037.  857  ;  Gillespie  v.  Bailey,  12  W.  Va.  70,  29 

2  Eureka  Co.  v.  Edwards,  71  Ala.  248,  Am.  Rep.  445. 


VOL.  I. 


33 


CHAPTER   II. 


DISABILITY    OF    MAKRIED    WOMEN. 


I.  Common-law  disability    and  statutes 
removing,  36-39. 
II.  Disability  of  husband    and    wife    to 


convey  to  each  other  at  law,  40- 
44. 
III.  Conveyance    between    husband    and 
wife  good  in  equity,  45-47. 


I.      Common-laiv  Disability  and  Statutes  removing. 

36.  By  the  common  law  a  married  woman  could  not  con- 
vey her  land  either  by  her  separate  deed  or  by  joining  in  a  con- 
veyance with  her  husband.  This  disability  was  an  incident  to  her 
coverture.  The  fictitious  proceeding  of  a  fine  and  common  recov- 
ery was  resorted  to  for  the  conveyance  of  the  real  estate  of  a 
married  woman,  and  this  method  prevailed  in  England  until  the 
year  1833,  when  she  was  authorized  to  convey  her  lands  by  deed 
and  judicial  acknowledgment.^  It  was  not  competent  to  levy  a 
fine  without  the  concurrence  of  the  husband.  In  the  United 
States,  during  the  early  colonial  period,  fines  and  recoveries 
were  sometimes  resorted  to ;  but  by  usage,  from  the  first  settle- 
ment of  several  of  the  colonies,  a  married  woman  might  convey  her 
real  estate  by  deed  with  the  assent  and  joinder  of  her  husband. 
This  usage  early  became  a  part  of  the  common  law  of  New  Eng- 
land, New  York,  and  Pennsylvania,  and  the  statutes  soon  recog- 
nized and  confirmed  the  common  usage.^ 

At  common  law,  even  as  modified  by  usage  in  this  country,  both 
the  husband  and  the  wife  were  seised  of  her  real  estate,  he  of  the 
freehold  and  she  of  the  fee  therein.  A  conveyance  could  only  be 
made  by  botli  joining  in  the  grant.     "In  a  sale  or  grant  of  real 

1  Stat.  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  ch.  74.  Colcord   v.   Swan,  7  Mass.  291 ;  Lithgow 

2  Manchester  7J.  Hough,  5  Mason,  67,  68,  v.  Kavenngh,  9  Mass.  161;  Albany  F. 
per  Story,  J. ;  Durant  v.  Ritchie,  4  Mason,  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bay,  4  N.  Y.  9  ;  Van  Winkle 
45,  per  Story,  J. ;  Elliott  v.  Peirsol,  1  Pet.  v.  Constantine,  10  N.  Y.  422  ;  Jackson  v. 
328;  Davey  u.  Turner,  1  Dall.  11;  Lloyd  Gilchrist,  15  Johns.  89, 110  ;  Blyther.Dar- 
V.  Taylor,  I  Dall.  17;  Fowler  v.  Shearer,  gin,  68  Ala.  370;  Gordon  v.  Haywood,  2 
7  Mass.  14,  where   Chief  Justice  Parsons  N.  H.  402. 

said  it  had  been  an   immemorial  usage; 

34 


CO.MMUxN-LAW    DISABILITY    AND    STATUTES    REMOVING,      [§  37. 

eritcile,  where  the  title  proceeds  from  her,  the  husbuiid  and  wife 
are  as  one  grantor.  They  act  together  in  herright,  his  concurrence 
being  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  conveyance ;  and  she  is  to  be 
joined  with  him  in  the  operative  words  and  stipulations  of  the 
conveyance."  ^ 

37.  At  the  present  time  there  are  statutes  in  all  the  States 
regulating  conveyances  by  married  ■women.  The  course  of 
modern  legislation  has  constantly  tended  towards  giving  to  mar- 
ried women  full  control  over  their  property  without  the  assent  or 
concurrence  of  their  husbands.  These  statutes  are  in  derogation 
of  the  common  law,  inasmuch  as  they  confer  a  capacity  to  con- 
tract and  convey  upon  persons  who  formerly  had  no  capacity  at 
all;  and  therefore  all  requirements  of  the  enabling  statutes, 
whether  in  regard  to  the  execution  or  acknowledgment  of  the 
deed,  must  be  strictly  complied  with.^ 

In  about  half  in  number  of  the  States  a  married  woman  can 
convey  her  land  only  with  the  assent  and  concui*rence  of  her  hus- 
band manifested  by  his  joining  with  her  in  the  conveyance.'^       In 

1  Lithgow  V.  Kavenagh,  9  Mass.  161,  Idaho:  R.  S.  1887,  §  2922.  Illinois:  R. 
173,  per  Sewall,  J.  See,  also,  Jewett  v.  S.  1SS9,  ch.  30,  §  18.  Indiana:  R.  S. 
Davis,  10  Allen,  68;  Clark  v.  Clark,  16  1894,  §  3340.  Kentucky:  G.  S.  1894, 
Oreg.  224,  18  Pac.  Rep.  1;  Trimmer  v.  §§  506,  2128.  Maryland:  Laws  1888, 
Heagy,  16  Pa.  St.  484;  Stoops  v.  Black-  ch.  329.  Minnesota:  G.  S.  1894,  §4161  ; 
ford,  27  Pa.  St.  213;  Glidden  i;,  Strupler,  Althen  v.  Tarbox,  48  Rlinn.  18,  50  K 
52  Pa.  St. 400.  W.  Rep.  1018.    Missouri:  1  R.  S.   1889, 

2  Elliott  V.  Peirsol,  1  Pet.  328 ;  Glidden  §  2396.  Under  §  6864,  which  enables  a 
V.  Strupler,  52  Pa.  St.  400;  Good  r.  Zcr-  married  woman  to  contract,  a  mortgage 
cher,  12  Ohio,  364 ;  James  v.  P'isk,  9  Sra.  by  a  married  woman  on  land  which  she 
&M.  144  ;  Lewis  I'.  Waters,  3  Har.  &  McH.  owned,  but  which  was  not  her  separate 
430;  Rake  v.  Lawshee,  24  X.  J.  L.  613;  property  as  defined  by  §  6869,  though 
Spencer  v.  Reese  (Pa.  St.),  30  Atl.  Rep.  void  as  a  conveyance  because  her  hus- 
722,  relating  to  acknowledgment  by  wife  ;  band  did  not  join  therein,  as  provided 
Louisville,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stephens  (Ky.),  by  §  2396,  is  good  as  a  contract  to  convey 
29  S.  W.  Rep.  14.  or  an  equitable  mortgage.  Brown  r.  Dress- 

8  Alabama:    Code  1886,  §  2348.     The  ler  (Mo.),    29  S.  W.  Rep.  13.     Montana: 

distinction   which  formerly  prevailed  be-  Comp.  Stats.  1887,  p.  656,  §  236.     Nevada: 

tween    equitable   and   statutory   separate  G.  S.  1885,  §  2570.  New  Hampshire  :  P.  S. 

e-states   is  abrogated   unless  the  property  1891,  ch.  176,  §  3.     New  Jersey:  R.  S. 

is  held  by  an  active  trustee ;  in  that  case  1877,  p.   639.     But  the  married  woman 

alone  the  wife  cannot  disj.ose  of  her  sepa-  may  convej-  without  her  husband  joining, 

rate  estate  without  the  assent  of  her  hus-  provided   the  deed  is  in  execution  of   a 

band.     Scharf   v.   Moore    (Ala.),    14  So.  written  contract  by  her  to  which  her  hus- 

Rep.  879;    Rooney   v.    Michael,  84   Ala.  band  is  a  party  or  has  assented  in  writing, 

585,4  So.  Rep.  421.     Connecticut:  G.  S.  an  1  the  contract  is  duly  acknowledged  by 

1888,  §  2960.     Delaware:  R.    Code  1893,  both  and  recorded.     Laws  1892,  ch.  170. 

ch.  83,  §4.     Florida  :  R.  S.  1892,  §  1956.  She  may  release  dower  without  her  hus- 

35 


^  ^^^8. J  DISABILITY    OF   MARRIED    WOMEN. 

several  States  it  is  (Icclarod  that  a  nuirried  woman  may  convey  her 
land  in  the  same  manner  and  with  like  eifeet  as  if  she  were  not 
married.^  In  a  few  States  it  is  expressly  declared  that  a  married 
woman  m:iy  convey  her  land  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  and  with- 
out the  consent  or  joinder  of  her  husband  in  the  conveyance.^ 

38.  A  provision  requiring  the  joinder  of  the  husband  in  a 
deed  by  the  wife  of  her  real  estate  is  generally  met  by  his 
expressing  his  assent  thereto  under  his  hand  and  seal  without 
joining  in  the  granting  clause  of  the  deed.^  In  some  States  the 
statutes  provide  that  the  deed  must  be  made  with  the  husband's 
assent  or  written  assent  If  the  statute  requires  joinder  of  the 
husband,  it  is  not  that  he  has  anything  to  convey,  unless  it  be 
his  tenancy  by  the  curtesy,  but  to  prevent  an  improvident  convey- 
ance by  the  wife  of  property  which  she  presumably  holds  to  some 


band  joining  in  land  conveyed  by  him,  or 
sold  under  judgment  or  decree.  Supp. 
1886,  p.  447.  New  Mexico:  Comp.  Stats. 
1884,  §  1088.  North  Carolina:  Const. 
art.  10,  §6;  Code  1883,  §  12.56;  Eay  v. 
Wilcoxon,  107  N.  C.  .514,  12  S.  E.  Rep. 
443.  Oregon :  G.  L.  1802,  §  3003  ;  Elliott 
V.  Teal,  5  Saw.  249.  Pennsylvania :  Brit,^ht- 
ley's  Turdon's  Dig.  1894,  p.  1299;  Laws 
1893,  p.  344,  §  1 ;  Hirsch  v.  Tillman,  2  I'a. 
Dist.  662  ;  Dunham  v.  Wright,  53  Pa.  St. 
167 ;  Buchanan  v.  Ilazzard,  95  Pa.  St. 
240.  Tennessee:  Code  1884,  §  2891. 
Texas:  R.  Civ.  Stats.  1889,  art.  559; 
Cannon  v.  Boutwell,  53  Tex.  626.  Ver- 
mont :  R.  L.  1880,  §  1923.  W.  Virginia  : 
Acts  1893,  ch.  3,  §  3. 

1  Arkansas  :  Dig.  of  Stats.  1884,  §  4621. 
Colorado:  G.  S.  1883,  §  2278.  Georgia: 
Code  1882,  §  2706  a.  Iowa :  In  same  man- 
ner and  to  same  extent  as  any  other  per.son. 
R.  S.  1888,  §  3106.  Massachusetts  :  Except 
that  a  married  woman  cannot,  without  the 
written  consent  of  her  husband,  impair  his 
tenancy  by  the  curtesy  or  his  tenancy  for 
life,  in  one  half  her  real  estate,  in  case  the 
husband  and  wife  have  had  no  issue  born 
alive  which  might  have  inherited  such  es- 
tate. P.  S.  1882,  ch.  147,  §  1  ;  Acts  1889, 
ch.  204.  Michigan:  2  Annot.  Stats.  1882, 
§  6295.  Nebraska :  In  same  manner,  to 
the  same  extent,  and  with  like  effect,  as 

?s 


a  married  man  mavo  Comp.  Stats.  1893, 
ch.  53,  §  2.  New  York:  R.  S.  1889, 
p.  2603.  Ohio  :  R.  S.  1890,  §  3112.  Okla- 
homa T.  :  G.  S.  1893,  §  1616.  South  Car- 
oUna:  G.  S.  1882,  §  2036.  Utah  :  In 
same  manner  as  any  other  person.  Comp. 
Laws  1888,  §  2640.  Virginia  :  Code  1887, 
§  2286.  Washington :  To  same  extent 
and  in  same  manner  that  her  husband  can. 
G.  S.  1891,  §  1398.  Wisconsin:  By  joint 
or  separate  deed  as  if  unmarried.  Annot. 
Stats.  1889,  §  2221.  Wyoming:  R.  S. 
1887,  §  2. 

2  Arizona  T. :  R.  S.  1887,  §  225.  Cali- 
fornia :  Civ.  Code,  §  162.  Maine:  R.  S. 
1883,  ch.  61,  §  1.  North  Dakota  :  Comp. 
Laws  1887,  §  2593.  South  Dakota  :  Comp. 
L.aws  1887,  §  2593. 

3  Schley  v.  Pullman  Car  Co.  25  Fed. 
Rep.  890  ;  Dentzel  v.  Waldie,  30  Cal.  138  ; 
Bray  v.  Clapp,  80  Me.  277,  13  Atl.  Rep. 
900 ;  Woodward  v.  Seaver,  38  N.  H.  29  ; 
Elliot  V.  Sleeper,  2  N.  H.  525;  Hills  v. 
Bearsc,  9  Allen,  403 ;  Evans  v.  Summer- 
lin,  19  Fla.  858;  Stone  v.  Montgomery, 
35  Miss.  83  ;  Armstrong  v.  Stovall,  26 
Miss.  275 ;  Thompson  v.  Lovrein,  82  Pa. 
St.  432;  Clark  v.  Clark,  16  Oreg.  224, 
18  Pac.  Rep.  1;  Friedenwald  v.  Mullan, 
10  Heisk.  226 ;  Mount  v.  Kesterson,  6 
Coldw.  452;  Ochoa  v.  Miller,  59  Tex- 
460,  462. 


COMMON-LAW    DISABILITY    AND    STATU lES    KEMOVING.       [§  39. 

extent  for  their  common  use  and  benefit.  But  there  are  many 
decisions  to  the  etfect  that  a  joinder  in  the  deed  means  joining  as 
a  grantor ;  and  that  the  husband's  signing,  sealing,  and  acknow- 
ledging an  instrument,  which  the  wife  has  executed  for  the  con- 
veyance of  her  land,  is  not  sufficient.  It  is  said  that  the  execu- 
tion of  the  instrument  in  this  way  by  the  husband  may  sufficiently 
manifest  his  consent  to  the  conveyance,  but  that  such  an  execu- 
tion of  it  is  not  a  joinder  in  the  conveyance.^  In  order  to  make  a 
joint  conveyance  it  is  not  necessary  that  both  liusband  and  wife 
should  sign  and  acknowledge  simultaneously.  Thus,  the  fact 
that  the  wife  signs  and  acknowledges  the  deed  two  years  after  it 
is  signed  and  acknowledged  by  her  husband  does  not  invalidate 
the  deed,  in  the  absence  of  any  intervening  rights  of  third  per- 
sons.^ It  is  not  essential  that  they  should  both  acknowledge 
before  the  same  officer,  or  that  their  acknowledgments  should  be 
certified  by  a  single  certificate.^ 

39.  There  are  statutes 'in  some  States  providing  for  the 
execution,  in  certain  cases,  of  a  separate  deed  by  a  married 
woman,  as  in  case  her  husband  is  insane,  or  has  deserted  jier,  or 
is  living  separate  from  her  ;  but  where  the  statute  enabling  a 
married  woman  to  convey  her  property  by  deed  provides  for  the 
joinder  of  her  husband  in  her  deed  of  conveyance,  her  separate 
deed  is  void  though  her  husband  be  insane,  or  has  deserted  her,  or 
is  living  separate  from  her,  unless  special  exceptions  be  made  for 
these  cases.  Thus,  in  case  the  husband  has  deserted  the  wife 
without  providing  for  her  support,  though  the  sale  of  her  real 
estate  is  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  herself  and  family,  she 
cannot  make  a  valid  separate  deed  even  for  a  full  consideration 
paid.*  Even  where  a  married  woman,  whose  husband  had  de- 
serted her,  bought  a  tract  of  land  and  immediately  mortgaged  it 
back  to  secure  the  purchase-money,  her  mortgage  was  declared 
void  at  law,  notwithstanding  the  apparent  want  of  equity  in  so 
holdinff.^ 

1  Blythe  v.  Dargin,  68  Ala.  370  ;  Gray        *  Richards   v.  McClelland,   29   Pa.  St. 
V.  Mathis,  7  Jones,  .502 ;  Warner  v.  Peck,    385. 

IIR.  I.  431.  i  Conroid    Bank    v.    Bellis,    10    Cnsh. 

2  Ilalbert  i'.  Il^ndrix  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  276;  Eaton    v.  George,  40  N.   H.  258,  42 
26  S.  W.  Rep.  911.  N.  H.  375  ;  Pike  v.  Clark,  40  N.  H.  9,  77 

3  Ludlow  V.  O'Neil,  29  Ohio  St.  181.  Am   Dec.  698;  Leach  v.  Noyes,  45  N.  H, 

364. 

37 


§§  40,  41.J 


UISAini.lTY    OF    JIAURIED    WOMKN. 


II.  Disability  of  Eusband  and  Wife  to  convey  to  each  other  at  Law. 

40.  A  conveyance  by  the  husband  to  the  wife  or  by  the 
wife  to  the  husband  is  void  at  law,  because  the  letral  existence 
of  the  wife  is  merged  in  the  husband.  It  does  not  pass  the  legal 
title.^ 

A  husband  and  wife  cannot  make  partition  of  land  held  in 
common  by  releasing  to  each  other  their  respective  interests.^ 

41.  The  statutes  and  constitutional  provisions  empowering 
a  married  woman  to  convey  as  if  she  were  unmarried  are  held 
to  remove  her  disability  and  empower  her  to  convey  directly  to 
her  husband,  and  the  husband  to  convey  directly  to  his  wife.^ 


1  Co.  Litt.  112a;  Smith  u.  Seibeiliug, 
3.5  Fed.  Rep.  677. 

Alabama:  Prior  to  February  28,  1887  : 
Maxwell  v.  Grace,  85  Ala.  .577,  .5  So.  Rep. 
.310;  Gaston  v.  Weir,  84  Ala.  193,  4  So. 
Rep.  258  ;  Powe  v.  McLeod,  76  Ala.  418  ; 
Meyer  v.  Sulzbacher,  75  Ala.  423 ;  Mc- 
Millan V.  Peacock,  57  Ala.  127;  Manning 
V.  Pippen,  86  Ala.  357,  5  So.  Rep.  572. 
Arkansas:  Ogden  v.  Ogden  (Ark.),  28 
S  W.  Rep.  796.  California  :  Prior  to  tlie 
statute  of  1891  :  Rico  v.  Braiidnistein 
(Cal.),  33  Pac.  Rep.  480.  Connecticut: 
Underhill  v.  Morgan,  33  Conn.  105.  Flor- 
ida :  Waterman  v.  Iliggins,  28  Fla.  660, 
10  So.  Rep.  97.  Illinois:  Dale  v.  Lin- 
coln, 62  hi.  22.  Indiana  :  Sims  v.  Rick- 
ets, 35  Ind.  181,  9  Am.  Rep.  679.  Ken- 
tucky: Doty  V.  Cox  (Ky.),  22  S.  W. 
Rep  321.  Maine  :  Prior  to  act  of  1847,  ch. 
27,  and  act  of  1852,  ch.  227:  Savage  v. 
Savage,  80  Me.  472,  15  Atl.  Rep.  4T  ; 
Johnson  v.  Stillings,  35  Me.  427  ;  Allen 
V.  Hooper,  50  Me.  371.  Maryland  :  Pres- 
ton !•.  Fryer,  38  Md.  221  ;  Gebb  v.  Rose, 
40  Md.  387,  husband  may  convey  directly 
to  wife;  Laws  1892,  eh.  586.  Michigan: 
Ran.«om  v.  Ransom,  30  Mich.  328.  Min- 
nesota:  Wilder  v.  Brook.s,  10  Minn.  50, 
54,  S8  Am.  Dec.  49.  Mississippi:  Wells 
V.  Wells,  35  Miss.  638  ;  Ratcliffc  v.  Dough- 
erty, 24  Miss.  181.  Missouri:  Crawford  u. 
Whitmoro,  125  Mo.  144,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  365, 
overruling  Banger t  ?•.  Bangerr,  13  Mo. 
App.   144;    Cooper    f.    Standlev,   40  Mo. 

38 


Ajip.  138.  Nebraska :  Furrow  v.  Athey, 
21  Neb.  671,  59  Am.  Rep.  867;  Johnson 
V.  Vandervort,  16  Neb.  144;  Smith  v. 
Dean,  15  Neb.  432.  New  York:  Shepard 
V.  Shepard,  7  Johns.  Ch.  57,  11  Am.  Dec. 
396 ;  Voorhees  v.  Presbyterian  Church,  17 
Barb.  103;  Simmons  v.  McElwain,  26 
Barb.  419;  Winans  v.  Peebles,  32  N.  Y. 
423  ;  Dempsey  v.  Tylee,  3  Duer,  73 ;  Berk- 
owitz  V.  Brown,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  792,  3 
Misc.  1  ;  Dean  v.  Metropolitan  Ky.  Co. 
119  N.  Y.  540,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  1054,  before 
statute  1887,  ch.  537.  North  Carolina: 
W^\rliek  v.  White,  86  N.  C.  139,  41  Am. 
Rep.  453.  Ohio :  Crooks  v.  Crooks,  34 
Ohio  St.  610;  Fowler  v.  Trebeiu,  16 
Ohio  St.  493.  Oregon:  Miller  v.  Miller, 
17  Greg.  423,  21  Pac.  Rep.  938.  Penn- 
sylvania: Stickney  v.  Borman,  2  Pa.  St. 
67;  Coates  v.  Gerlach,  44  Pa.  St.  43. 
South  Carolina :  Trustees  r.  Bryson,  34 
S.  C.  401, 13  S.  E.  Rej).  619.  Texas:  Stiles 
V.  Japhet,  84  Tex.  91,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  4.50; 
Graliam  v.  Stuve,  76  Tex.  533.  Wiscon- 
sin:  Kinney  v.  Dexter,  81  Wis.  80,  51  N. 
W.  Rep.  82;  Putnam  v.  Bicknell,  18  Wis. 
333  ;  Albright  v.  Albright,  70  Wis.  528, 
36  N.  W.  Rep.  254. 

2  Frissell  v.  Rozier,  19  Mo.  448. 

^  Colorado :  Wells  v.  Caywood,  3  Colo. 
487,  Iowa :  Blake  v.  Blake,  7  Iowa,  46 ; 
Robertson  ik  Robertson,  25  Iowa,  350. 
Maine:  Allen  v.  Hooper,  50  Me.  371; 
Johnson  v.  Stillings,  35  Me.  427  ;  Savage 
V.  Savage,  80  Me.  472,  15  Atl.  Rep.  43. 


DISABILITY    OF    HUSBAND    AND    WIFE    TO    CONVEY.        [§  42. 


But  in  New  York  the  statute  enabling  a  married  woman  to 
convey  her  land  as  if  she  were  unmarried  is  held  not  to  remove 
her  disability  to  make  a  conveyance  directly  to  her  husband.^ 
Though  the  intention  of  such  statutes  was  undoubtedly  to  confer 
upon  the  wife  the  legal  .capacity  of  a  feme  sole  in  respect  to 
conveyances  of  her  property,  it  does  not  follow  that  she  can  con- 
vey to  her  husband,  for  no  such  question  could  possibly  arise  in 
respect  to  ?i  feme  sole.  Such  statutes  were  intended  to  remove 
the  disability  of  coverture,  and  enable  the  wife  to  make  convey- 
ances not  forbidden  by  special  provisions  of  law.  It  is  not  the 
disability  of  the  wife  alone  that  renders  void  her  conveyance  to 
her  husband.  The  husband  is  as  much  disabled  to  take  under 
such  a  conveyance  as  she  is  to  convey.^ 

42.  If  the  wife  is  under  disability  to  convey  her  lands  ex- 
cept by  a  deed  in  which  her  husband  joins,  she  cannot  con- 
vey to  him  directly,  but  only  through  a  third  person,  though  in 
the  same  State  the  husband  may  convey  directly  to  his  wife.^ 


Michigan  :  Burdeno  v.  Amperse,  14  Mich. 
91,  90  Am.  Dec.  225;  Witbeck  v.  Wit- 
beck,  25  jMich.  439;  Eausom  v.  Ransom, 
30  Mich.  328  ;  De  Vries  v.  Conklin,  22 
Mich.  255.  North  Carolina :  Const,  art. 
10,  §  6  ;  Walker  v.  Long,  109  N.  C.  510, 
14  S.  E.  Rep.  299.  It  is  unnecessary  to 
the  validity  of  the  husband's  conveyance 
to  his  wife  that  it  should  be  made  in  con- 
sideration of  her  support  and  mainte- 
nance. Fort  V.  Allen,  110  N.  C.  183,  14 
S.  E.  Rep.  685  ;  Woodruff  v.  Bowles,  104 
N.  C.  197,  10  y.  E.  Rep.  482.  Tennessee: 
Yick  V.  Gower  (Tenn.),  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
677.  Wisconsin :  Beard  v.  Dedolpb,  29 
Wis.  1S6. 

Probaiily  the  statutes  in  Arizona,  Cali- 
fornia, North  Dakota,  and  South  Dakota 
also  enable  husband  and  wife  to  convey 
to  each  other. 

1  White  V.  Wager,  25  N.  Y.  328  ;  Wi- 
nans  v.  Peebles,  32  N.  Y.  423  ;  Dean  v. 
Metropolitan  E.  Ry.  Co.  119  N.  Y.  540, 
23  X.  E.  Rep.  10.')4;  Graham  v.  Van 
Wyck,  14  Barb.  531. 

■i  White  i;.  Wa;;er,  25  X.  Y.  328,  332, 
per  Denio,  J.,  who  further  says  :  "  We 
would  not  expect  to  find,  in  a  law  passed 
profet^sedly  to  shield  the  property  of  mar- 


ried women  from  the  control  of  their  hus- 
bands, a  provision  making  it  more  easy 
for  the  latter  to  acquire  such  control.  Be- 
yond all  doubt,  the  greatest  peril  to  which 
the  separate  estate  of  the  wife  is  exposed 
is  her  disposition  to  acquiesce  in  placing 
the  title  to  it  in  the  hands  of  her  hus- 
band. This  the  common  law  prevented 
to  a  certain  extent  by  rendering  her  direct 
conveyance  to  him  void." 

^  Such  is  the  case  in  California :  Rico 
V.  Brandenstein  (Cal.),  33  Pac.  Rep.  480, 
though  husband  may  convey  to  wife ; 
Barker  v.  Koneman,  13  Cal.  9  ;  Peck  v. 
Brummagim,  31  Cal.  441,  89  Am.  Dec. 
195;  Dow  V.  Mining  Co.  31  Cal.  629; 
Woods  V.  Whitney,  42  Cal.  358  ;  Higgins 
V.  Iliggins,  46  Cal.  259 ;  Taylor  ;;.  Opper- 
man,  79  Cal.  468,  21  Pac.  Rep.  869.  In- 
diana:  Cook  IK  Walling,  117  Ind.  9,  19 
N.  E.  Rep.  532;  Johnson  v.  Jouchert,  124 
Ind.  105,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  580;  Luntz  v. 
Grove,  102  Ind.  173,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  128; 
Kinnamau  v.  Pyle,  44  Ind.  275,  though 
deed  of  husband  direct  to  wife  is  good ; 
Thompson  v.  Mills,  39  Ind.  528;  Brook- 
bank  V.  Kennard,  41  Ind.  339  ;  Enyeart 
V.  Kepler,  1 18  Ind.  34,  20  X.  E.  Rep.  539. 
Maryland:    Gebb   v.   Rose,  40  Md.  387. 

39 


§§  43,  44.]  DISABILITY  OF  mai;kii;i)  women. 

43.  The  common-law  disability  of  husband  and  wife  to  con- 
vey to  each  other  directly  is  obviated  by  the  intervention  of 
a  third  person  through  whom  the  (U)nveyance  is  made.  Such  a 
conveyance,  if  executed  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law  and  duly 
delivered,  is  valid.^  Though  the  deed  of  a  wife  conveying  her  land 
in  this  manner  to  her  husband  is  for  his  benefit,  and  is  made  with- 
out any  adequate  money  consideration,  it  is  valid,  unless  fraud  or 
undue  influence  on  the  part  of  the  husband  is  sliown.  This  is  so 
although  the  law  provides  that  the  husband  shall  join  in  a  con- 
veyance by  his  wife  of  her  land,  in  order  that  he  may  protect  her 
from  the  undue  influence  of  others,  and  give  to  her  his  counsel 
and  advice  in  relation  to  the  transaction.  But  while  courts  of 
equity  are  watchful  of  every  such  transaction  between  husband 
and  wife,  and  will  set  it  aside  when  it  appears  that  the  wife's  free 
will  was  overcome  by  undue  influence  or  duress  on  the  part  of 
the  husband,  it  is  the  settled  doctrine  that  no  legal  disability 
attaches  to  such  transaction,  but  that  the  wife  may  in  this  way 
convey  her  property  to  her  husband  with  the  same  effect  as  she 
may  convey  to  a  stranger.  When  she  executes  a  deed  in  the 
manner  prescribed  by  law  to  a  third  person,  intending  that  he 
shall  convey  to  her  husband,  she  has  all  the  protection  the  law 
deems  essential  to  her  freedom  of  action  and  power  to  convey.^ 

44.  The  disability  of  husband  and  wife  to  convey,  the  one 
to  the  other,  has,  however,  been  expressly  removed  by  statute 

Texas:  Bohannon  i-.  Travis  (Tex.),  21  Gray,  .322 ;  Atlantic  Nat.  Bank  v.  Tave- 
S.  \V.  Rep.  354;  Riley  r.  Wilson,  86  ner,  130  Mass.  407  ;  Grove  !\  Jeager,  60 
Tex.  240,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  394;  Graham  111.249;  Gebb  r.  Rose,  40  iMd.  387;  Scar- 
V.  Stuve,  76  Tex.  533,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  borough  v.  Watkius,  9  B.  Men.  540,  546, 
381,  where  it  has  long  been  settled  that  1  Am.  Dec.  528;  Todd  v.  Wiikliffe,  18 
the  husband  may  convey  to  his  wife  di-  B.  Mun.  866;  Stevens  y.  Stevens,  16  Johns, 
recily;  Smith  v.  Boquet,  27  Tex.  507;  109;  Tyler  t'.  Dempsey,  3  Diier,  73 ;  Mc- 
Story  V.  Mar.-diall,  24  Tex.  305,  76  Ana.  Cartee  v.  Society,  9  Cow.  437  ;  Meriam  i-. 
Dec.  106  ;  Reynolds  v.  Lansford,  16  Tex,  Harsen,  2  Barb.  Ch.  232,  4  Edw.  Ch.  70; 
286;  Fitts  f.  Fitts,  14  Tex.  443;  Swear-  Garvin  v.  Ingram,  10  Rich.  130;  Shep- 
ingcn  V.  Reed  (Tex.),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  383.  person  r.  Shepprrson,  2  Gratt.  501 ;  GrifEu 
So  probably  in  Alabama:  Maxwell  v.  ?'.  Birkhead,  84  Va.612,  5  S.  E.  Rep.  685; 
Grace,  85  Ala.  577,  5  So.  Rep.  319.  Long  v.  Cro-son,  119  Ind.  3,  21  N.  E. 
1  Story  Eq.  Jur.  §  1395;  Durant  v.  Rep.  450 ;  Warden  v.  Lyons,  118  Pa.  St. 
Ritcliie,  4  Mason,  45;  Ilaiissman  v.  Burn-  396,  12  Atl.  Rep.  408  ;  Townsend  y.  May- 
ham,  59  Conn.  117,  22  Atl.  Rep.  1065;  nard,  45  Pa.  St.  198. 

Riley  v.  Wilson,  86  Tex.  240,  24  S.  W.  2  Ri]ey  v.  Wilson,  86  Tex.  240,  24  S. 

Rep.  394,  per  Stayton,  C.  J.  ;  Thatcher  v.  W.  Rep.  394,  per  Staytou,  C.  J. 
Omans,-3  Pick.  521  ;  Motte  v.  Alger,   15 

40 


CONVEYANCE  BETWEEN  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE  GOOD  IN  EQUITY.       [§  45. 

in  some  States.^  But  even  such  a  statute,  declaring  in  g  ucral 
terms  that  a  conveyance  executed  by  either  husband  or  wile  to 
or  in  favor  of  the  other  sliall  be  valid  to  the  same  extent  as  be- 
tween other  persons,  relates  only  to  property  owned  absolutely 
by  the  husband  and  wife  in  their  own  right,  and  not  to  the  inter- 
est one  may  have  in  the  lands  of  the  other  growing  out  of  the 
marriage  relation.  Conveyances  between  husband  and  "wife  in- 
tended to  rt-linquish  the  right  of  dower  or  curtesy,  or  to  release 
any  estate  or  interest  growing  out  of  the  marriage  relation,  are 
void.  These  estates  have  their  origin  in  public  policv,  for  they 
tend  to  strengthen  the  marriage  relation,  and  to  some  extent  pre- 
serve to  the  survivor  valuable  property  riglits.^ 

III.      Conveyance  between  Husband  and  Wife  good  in  Equity. 

45.  In  equity,  however,  a  deed  from  a  husband  to  his  wife 
may  be  sustained  and  enforced,  especially  in  case  of  a  voluntary 
settlement  upon  her,  when  the  rights  of  creditors  or  other  third 
parties  are  not  in  any  way  interfered  with.-^     When  the  fact  that 


1  Iowa  :  R.  S.  1888,  §  3397  ;  Linton  v. 
Crosby,  54  Iowa,  478,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  726; 
Robert.son  v.  Robertson,  25  Iowa,  350. 
New  -York:  Laws  1S87,  ch.  537,  4  R.  S. 
1889,  p.  2606.  A  deed  dated  prior  to  tliat 
statute,  but  delivered  after  its  passage,  is 
valid.  Reynolds  v.  City  Nat.  Bank,  71 
Hun,  386,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  1134.  North 
Carolina  :  No  contract  between  husband 
and  wile  is  valid  to  affect  or  change  any 
part  of  the  real  estate  of  the  wife  unless 
it  be  in  writing,  and,  upon  a  separate  ex- 
amination by  the  ofiicer,  it  shall  appear 
that  she  freely  consented  thereto,  and  that 
the  same  is  not  injurious  to  her.  The  offi- 
cer must  stale  the  conclusions  in  his  cer- 
tificate. Code  1883,  §  1835  ;  Sims  v.  Ray, 
96  N.  C.  87.  Ohio  A  husband  or  wife 
may  enter  into  any  transaction  with  the 
other  which  either  might  if  unmarried, 
subject  to  the  general  rules  which  control 
the  actions  of  persons  occupying  confi- 
dential relations.  R.  S.  1890,  §  3112. 
Oregon  :  IliU's  Code,  §  3871  ;  Jenkins  v. 
Hull  (f)reg.),37  Pac.  Rep.  62.  Washing- 
ton: G.  S.  1891,  §  1443. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Georgia  it  is  ex- 


pressly provided  that  a  sale  by  a  married 
Woman  of  her  separate  estate  to  her  hus- 
band is  invalid  without  the  order  of  the 
superior  court  of  the  county  of  her  domi- 
cile. Code,  §  1785  ;  Cain  v.  Ligon,  71  Ga. 
692,  51  Am.  Rep.  281.  But  there  is  no 
restriction  as  to  her  making  a  gift  to  him. 
Cain  V.  Ligon,  supra  ;  Hood  v.  Perry,  75 
Ga.  310;  Ful^'ham  v.  Pate,  77  Ga.  454. 
In  Massachusetts  it  is  expressly  provided 
that  nothing  contained  in  the  statutes  in 
relation  to  husband  and  wife  shall  au- 
thorize them  to  transfer  property  one  to 
the  other.     Laws  1884,  ch.  132. 

-  Linton  v.  Crosby,  54  Iowa,  478,  6  N. 
W.  Rep.  726;  House  v.  Fowl?,  20  Orcg. 
167,  25  Pac.  llcp.  376  ;  Jenkins  v.  Hall 
(Oreg.),  37  Pac.  Rep.  62;  Maclin  v.  Hay- 
wood, 90  Tcnn>  195,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  140; 
Ring  r.  Burt,  17  Mich.  46.5,  97  Am.  Dec. 
200;  Wilber  v.  Wilbcr,  52  Wis.  298,  9 
N.  W.  Rep.  163 ;  Ely  v.  Wilcox,  20  Wis. 
523,  91  Am.  Dec.  436. 

3  Slanning  v.  Style,  3  V.  Wms.  334; 
Freemantle  v.  Bankes,  5  Ves.  79 ;  Arun- 
dell  V.  I'hipps,  10  Ves.  139,  149;  Jones 
V.  Cliftun,  101  U.  S.  225;  Moore  v.  Page, 

41 


§  -t^'-] 


DISAlUI-llY    OF    MAUKIKl)    WOMKN. 


such  conveyiince  is  intended  as  a  scUlenieut  is  dectlared  iii  the 
iiistiunuMit,  or  othei'wise  cleuvly  established,  it  Avill  be  sustained 
afninst  the  chduis  of  creditors,  if  it  does  not  depiive  them  of  any 
existing  rights.^     Any  good   and    meritorious  eonsi(h;ratiou   will 


111  U.  S.  117,4  S.  Ct.  388;  Walliiigs- 
ford  V.  Alleu,  10  Pot.  583 ;  Smith  v.  Sei- 
bcrliiig,  35  Fed.  Rep.  677.  Alabama: 
McMillan  r.  Peacock,  57  Ala.  127  ;  Meyer 
V.  Sulzbadicr,  75  Ala.  423 ;  Turner  v. 
Kelly,  70  Ala.  85 ;  Washburn  v.  Gard- 
ner, 76  Ala.  597;  Powe  v.  McLeod,  76 
Ala.  418  ;  Maxwell  v.  Grace,  85  Ala.  577, 
5  S.  "W.  Rep.  319.  Arkansas  :  Ogden  v. 
Ogden  (Ark  ),  28  S.  W.  Rep.  796;  Dyer 
V.  Bean,  15  Ark.  519.  Colorado:  Craig  v. 
Chandler,  6  Colo.  543.  Connecticut :  Dem- 
ing  V.  Williams,  2G  Conn.  226,  68  Am.  Dec. 
386.  Illinois :  Dale  v.  Lincoln,  62  111.  22. 
Indiana:  Sims  v.  Rickets,  35  Ind.  181,  9 
Am.  Rep.  679;  Thompson  v.  Mills,  39 
Ind.  528;  Brookbank  r.  Kenuard,  41  Ind. 
339.  Kansas  :  Ogden  v.  Walters,  12  Ivans. 
282.  Kentucky  :  Maramau  ^\  Maraman, 
4  Met.  (Ky.)  84;  Bohannon  v.  Tiavis,  94 
Ky.  59,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  354.  Maryland: 
Bowie  !".  Stonestreet,  6  Md.  418,  61  Am. 
Dec.  318.  Massachusetts:  Adams  v. 
Brackett,  5  Met.  280  ;  Phelps  v.  Phelps, 
20  Pick.  556 ;  Bancroft  v.  Curtis,  108 
^lass.  47.  Michigan :  Jordan  v.  White, 
38  Mich.  253  ;  Loomis  v.  Brush,  36  Mich. 
40.  Minnesota:  Wilder  v.  Brooks,  10 
Minn.  50,  88  Am.  Dec.  49.  Mississippi: 
Wells  V.  Wells,  35  Miss.  638;  Ratcliffe  v. 
Dougherty,  24  Miss.  181  ;  Wells  v.  Trcad- 
wcll,  28  Miss.  717  ;  Warren  v.  Brown,  25 
Miss.  66,  57  Am.  Dec.  191.  Missouri: 
Crawford  v.  Whitmore,  120  Mo.  144, 25  S. 
W.  Rep.  365;  Pitts  v.  Sheriff,  108  Mo. 
110,  18  S.W.  Rep.  1071  ;  Small  w.  Field, 
102  Mo.  104;  Turner  v.  Shaw,  96  Mo.  22, 
8  S.  W.  Rep.  897 ;  Wood  v.  Broadley,  76 
Mo.  23,  31,  43  Am.  Rep.  754.  The  cases 
of  Cooper  v.  Standley,  40  Mo.  App.  138, 
and  Rangert  v.  Bangert,  13  Mo.  App.  144, 
are  overruled.  Nebraska  :  Smith  v.  Dean, 
15  N'jb.  432;  Furrow  v.  Athey,  21  Neb. 
671,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  208,  59  Am.  Rep. 
867.      New   Hampshire  :   Chailboiirue    v. 

42 


Gilman,  64  N.  II.  353  ;  Jewell  v.  Porter, 
31  N.  H.  34.  New  Jersey  :  Vouglit  v. 
Vought,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  177,  27  Atl.  Rej). 
489 ;  Sipley  v.  Wass,  49  N.  J.  Eq.  463,  24 
Atl.  Rep.  233.  New  York  :  Hunt  v.  John- 
son, 44  N.  Y.  27,  4  Am.  Rep.  631  ;  Towns- 
hend  v.  Townshend,  1  Abb.  N.  C.  81 ; 
Diefendorf  v.  Diefendorf,  8  N.  Y.  Supp. 
617;  Shepard  v.  Shepard,  7  Johns.  Ch. 
57,  41  Am.  Dec.  396;  Simmons  v.  Mc- 
Elwain,  26  Barb.  419  ;  Tidlinger  v.  Mande- 
\\\h\  113  N.  Y.  432;  Dean  v.  Metrojiol- 
itau  E.  Ry.  Co.  119  N.  Y.  540,  23  N.  E. 
Rep.  1054,  per  O'Brien,  J.  The  cases  of 
Winans  v.  Peebles,  32  N.  Y.  423,  and 
White  V.  Wager,  25  N.  Y.  328,  are  ex- 
plained in  later  decisions.  North  Caro- 
lina: Warlick  v.  White,  86  N.  C  139,  41 
Am.  Rep.  453.  Ohio  :  Crooks  v.  Crooks, 
34  Ohio  St.  610;  Fowler  v.  Trebein,  16 
Ohio  St.  493,  91  Am.  Dec.  95;  Huber  v. 
Huber,  10  Ohio,  371.  Oregon:  Miller  v. 
Miller,  17  Oreg.  423,  21  Pac.  Rep.  938. 
Pennsylvania  :  Coates  v.  Gerlach,  44  Pa. 
St.  43.     Ehode  Island :  Barrows  v.  Kccne, 

15  R.  I.  484,  486.  South  Carolina:  Trus- 
tees V.  Bryson,  34  S.  C.  401,  13  S.  E. 
Rep.  619.  Tennessee  :  McCampbell  r.  Mc- 
Campbell,  2  Lea,  661,  31  Am.  Rep.  623. 
Texas:  Story   v.  Marshall,  24  Tex,  305, 

16  Am.  Dec.  lOn.  Vermont:  CardcU  v. 
Ryder,  35  Yt.  47  ;  Barron  v.  Barron,  24 
Vt.  375.  Virginia:  Savers  v.  Wall,  26 
Gratt.  354,  21  Am.  Rep.  303;  Jong's  v. 
Obenchain,  10  Gratt.  259.  West  Virginia  : 
Humphrey  v.  Spencer,-  36  W.  Va.  11,  14 
S.  E.  Rep.  410;  McKenzie  v.  IJailroad 
Co.  27  W.  Va.  306.  Wisconsin  :  Albright 
V.  Albright,  70  Wis.  528,  36  N.  W.  Rep. 
254;  Ilannan  w.  Oxley,  23  Wis.  519;  Car- 
penter V.  Tatro,  36  Wis.  297  ;  Putnam  v. 
Bicknell,  18  Wis.  333 ;  Strocbe  v.  Fthl,  22 
Wis.  337  ;  Kinney  i;.  Dexter,  81  Wis.  80. 

1  Moore  V.  Page,   111  IJ.  S.  117.  4  S. 
Ct.  388,  per  Field,  J. ;  Jones  v.  Clifton, 


CONVEYANCE  BETWEEN  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE  GOOD  IN  EQUITY.       [§  46. 

support  sucli  a  deed.  In  equity  an  inquiry  will  be  made  into  the 
motives,  consideration,  and  objects  to  be  accomplished  by  such 
conveyance. 1  If  the  conveyance  is  from  the  wife  to  the  husband, 
there  may  be  a  presumption  against  its  vahdity  on  account  of  the 
confidential  relation  of  husband  and  wife,  and  the  supposed  domi- 
nant influence  of  the  husband ;  but  this  presumption  is  overcome 
by  proof  that  the  wife  received  adequate  consideration  ;  that  the 
conveyance  was  to  her  advantage,  and  was  not  obtained  by  duress 
or  undue  influence.^  When,  however,  the  conveyance  is  from  a 
husband  to  his  wife,  there  is  a  presumption  that  it  was  intended 
for  the  wife's  support,  and  is  valid  in  equity,  unless  it  was  made 
in  violation  of  the  rights  of  creditors.^ 

46.  A  conveyance  directly  by  the  husband  to  the  wife 
creates  in  the  wife  a  separate  estate  vesting  in  her  the  entire 
interest,  without  the  use  of  the  technical  words  necessary  to  create 
a  separate  estate  in  conveyances  to  her  from  persons  other  than 
the  husband,^  "  since  otherwise  the  transaction,  which  was  meant 
to  have  some  effect,  can  have  none  in  law  or  equity."  °  The 
separate  estate  so  created  is  the  equitable  separate  estate,  which  is 
limited  to  the  "  sole  and  separate  use  and  benefit  "  of  a  married 
woman.  A  trustee  is  ordinarily  essential  to  the  existence  of  this 
estate.  When  the  conveyance  is  from  a  third  person  to  a  married 
woman  to  hold  to  her  sole  and  separate  use,  the  law  gives  to  the 
husband  a  life  interest  in  the  land  ;  "  but  at  the  same  time  equity 

101   U.  S.  225;  Miller  u.  Miller,  17  Oreg.  23  N.  Y,  Snpp.  792  ;  Farmer  i'.  Farmer, 

423,  21   Pac.  Rep.  938;  Trustees  v.  Bry-  39  N.  J.  Eq.  211. 

son,  34  S.C.401,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  619.  3  Fitzpiitrick  v.  Burchill,  7  Misc.  Rep. 

1  Smith  V.  Seiberlin-,  35  Fed.  Rep.  463,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  389  ;  Miller  v.  Miller, 
677  ;  Waterman  v.  Higgins,  28  Fla.  660,  17  Oreg.  423, 21  Pac.  Rep.  938  ;  Wilder  v. 
10  So.  Rep.  97  ;  Dean  v.  Metropolitan  Brooks,  10  Minn.  50,  55,  88  Am.  Dec.  49  ; 
E.  Ry.  Co.  119  N.  Y.  540,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  Thompson  v.  Allen,  103  Pa.  St.  44,  49 
1054;  Diefendorf  i-.  Diefendorf,  8  N.  Y.  Am.  Rep.  116,  if  only  a  reasonable  pro- 
Sup]).  617;  Hunt  v.  Johnson,  44  N.  Y.  vi.-ion  for  her;  Coatcs  v.  Gerlach,  44  Pa. 
27,  4  Am.  Rep.  631 ;  Albright  v.  Albright,  St.  43  ;  Crooks  v.  Crooks,  34  Ohio  St.  610; 
70  Wis.  528,  36  N.  W.  Rep.  254 ;  Crooks  Wood  i-.  Broadley,  76  Mo.  23,  43  Am. 
V.  Crooks,  34  Ohio  St.  610;  Wilder  v.  Rep.  754;  Warlick  v.  White,  86  N.  C. 
Brooks,  10  Minn.  50,  88  Am.  Dec.  49  ;  139,  41  Am.  Rep.  453,  if  a  reasonable 
Furrow  r.  Atliey,  21  Neb.  671,  33  N.  W.  provision  and  the  wife  is  not  unworthy. 
Rep.  208,  59  Am.  Rep.  867;  Siuis  v.  *  McJIillan  v.  Peacock,  57  Ala.  127; 
Rickets,  35  Ind.  181,  9  Am.  Rep.  679;  Pitts  i-.  Sheriff,  108  Mo.  110,115;  Small 
Thompson  v.  Mills,  39  Ind.  528;  Wells  v.  Field,  102  Mo.  104;  Turner  r.  Shaw, 
V.  Wells,  35  Jliss.  638;  Chadl)Oiirne  v.  9G  Mo.  22  ;  Doming  )?.  Williams,  26  Conn. 
Oilman,  64  N.  H   353.  226,  68  Am.  Dec.  386. 

2  Berkowitz  v.  Brown,  3  Mi.sc.  Rep.  1,  ^  Bishop  on  Mar.  Women,  §  838. 

43 


§  47. J  DI8AUII.I1Y    OF    MAi;i;i).l)    WUMEN. 

sti'}>3  in  Jiiul  cliiuges  wluitever  Kgiil  ownership  is  vested  in  the 
husband  with  the  trust  to  hold  for  the  separate  use  of  the  wife."  ^ 
This  equitable  sepai'ate  estate  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
sejnirate  estate  of  a  married  woman  created  by  h'gislation.  This 
is  an  estate  which  without  legislation  would  not  have  been  sepa- 
rati%  but  subject  to  the  common-law  marital  rights  of  the  hus- 
band ;  and  not  an  estate  which,  by  the  instrument  creating  it,  is 
freed  from  those  rights,  and  is  a  separate  estate  in  contemplation 
of  a  court  of  equity .^  All  that  is  necessary  to  create  an  equitabh? 
separate  estate  is  the  expression,  in  the  conveyance,  of  a  clear 
intention  to  vest  in  the  wife  the  entire  property  and  interest 
conveyed.  "  ^V  conveyance  by  the  husband  directly  to  tht;  wife, 
without  reservation,  is  necessarily  a  clear,  unequivocal  manifesta- 
tion and  declaration  of  the  intention  to  relinquish  his  own  rights, 
and  to  clothe  the  wife  with  them,  and  that  intention  a  court  of 
equity  will  carry  into  effect."  ^ 

47.  A  deed  from  the  wife  to  the  husband  may  be  valid  in 
equity  where  a  consideration  has  been  paid,  or  the  husband  is  en- 
titled to  equitable  relief  for  improvements  made  by  him  upon  his 
wife's  land.*  While  at  law  a  conveyance  by  a  husband  to  his 
wife  is  equally  void  as  a  conveyance  by  a  wife  to  her  husband, 
they  do  not  necessarily  stand  upon  the  same  basis  in  equity.  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  husband  to  provide  an  assured  support  for  his 
wife,  but  no  such  duty  rests  upon  the  wife  to  provide  for  her 
husband  ;  and  therefore  his  deed  might  be  sustained  in  equity  as 
a  settlement,  while  her  deed  would  be  invalid  for  want  of  a  con- 
sideration. 

1  Bishop  on  Mar.  Women,  §  800.  *  Winans   v.   Peebles,   32   N.   Y.  423 ; 

2  McMillan  v.  Peacock,  57  Ala.  127.  Brooks  v.  Keams,  86  111.  547. 
8  Mc:Mil!an    i;.  Peacock,  57    Ala.    127, 

130,  per  Bricknell,  C.  J. 

44 


CHAPTER   III. 

DISABILITY  OF  INSANE  PERSONS. 

I.  Presumption  and  proof  regarding  in-     IV.  Confirmation    and    disaffirmance    of 
sanity,  48-51.  deed  of  insane  grantor,  59-66. 

II.  Deed    of  insane  perj;on  under  guar-      V.  Restoring  consideration  on  disaffirm- 
dianship  void,  52-54.  ance,  67-69. 

III.  Burden  of  proof  where  there  is  no  i  VI.  Title  of  purchaser  in  good  faith,  70- 
guardianship,  55-58.  I  73. 

I.     Presumption  and  Proof  regarding  Insanity. 

48.  Sanity  is  presumed  until  insanity  is  proved.^  It  is 
difficult  to  fix  the  exact  line  where  sanity  euds  and  insanity  be- 
gins. The  common  law  has  not  drawn  any  discriminating  liue.^ 
It  may  be  said  in  general  that  a  person  has  a  legal  capacity  to 
contract  when  he  is  in  the  possession  of  mental  capacity  sufficient 
to  transact  his  business  with  intelligence.^  It  is  not  requisite, 
however,  that  he  should  be  able  to  manage  his  business  with  judg- 


1  Jones  V.  Jones,  137  N.  Y.  610,  33  N 
E.  Rep.  479,  affirming  17N.  Y.  Supp.479: 
Jackson  v.  King,  4  Cow.  207,  15  Am.  Dec 
354  ;  Argo  v.  Coffin,  142  111.  368,  32  N.  E 
Rep.  679  ;  Myatt  v.  \Yalker,  44  111.  485  ; 
Menkins  v.  Lightner,  18  111.  282;  Guild 
V.  Hull,  127  111.  523,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  665; 
Titcomb  v.  Vantyle,  84  111.  371  ;  Buckey 
V.  Buckey,  38  W.  Va.  168,  18  S.  E.  Rep. 
383;  Hiett  v.  Shall,  36  W.  Va.  563,  15 
S.  E.  Rep.  146 ;  Perkins  v.  Perkins,  39 
X.  II.  163  ;  Dennett  v.  Dennett,  44  N.  H. 
531,  .539,  84  Am.  Dec.  97. 

2  Jackson  v.  King,  4  Cow.  207,  218,  15 
Am.  Dec.  354,  per  Woodworth,  J. 

8  Creagh  v.  Blood,  2  Jones  &,  Lat. 
509;  Ex  parte  Barnsby,  3  Alk.  1G8,  per 
Lord  Hardwicke  ;  Ilovey  v.  Chase,  52  Me. 
304,  83  Am.  Dec.  514;  Hill  v.  Nash,  41 
Me.  585,  66  Am.  Dec.  266  ;  Darby  r.  Ilay- 
ford,  56  Me.  246;  Moffit  v.  \Yithers;,oon, 
10  Ired.    185;  Crowther   i;.  Rowiandsou, 


27  Cal.  376  ;  Seerley  v.  Sater,  68  Iowa,  375, 
27  N.  W.  Rep.  262  ;  Marshall  v.  Marshall, 
75  Iowa,  132,  39  N.  W.  Rep.  230;  Cocke 
V.  Montgomery,  75  Iowa,  259,  39  N.  W. 
Rep.  386  ;  Stewart  i;.  Lispenard,  26  Wend. 
255  ;  Dennett  v.  Dennett,  44  N.  H.  531, 
84  Am.  Dec.  97 ;  Valentine  v.  Lunt,  51 
Hun,  544,  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  906 ;  Van  Deu- 
sen  V.  Swift,  51  N.  Y.  378 ;  Searle  v.  Gal- 
brath,  73  Dl.  269 ;  De  Witt  v.  Mattison, 
26  Neb.  655,  42  N.  W.  Rep.  742;  Wil- 
kinson V.  Sherman,  45  N.J.  Eq.  413,  18 
Atl.  Rep.  228. 

In  Crowther  v.  Rowlandson,  supra,  a 
conveyance  was  set  aside  upon  proof  thut 
the  grantor  was  not  capable  of  taking 
rational  care  of  his  property  by  reason  of 
a  mental  delusion;  Sanderson,  C.  J.,  dis- 
senting on  the  ground  that  the  grantordid 
some  sane  acts  at  the  time  of  the  convey- 
ance. 

45 


§  48.] 


DISABILITY    OF    INSANE    TERSONS. 


niojit  ami  iVisciTinnent,  or  in  u  proper  :uk1  prudent  manner  ;  for 
many  sane  men  cannot  do  tliis.  A  man  is  of  unsound  mind,  and 
disqualilled  to  enter  into  a  contract,  when  he  is  without  an  intel- 
limMit  understanding  of  wdiat  he  is  doing,  —  when  he  is  without 
what  in  the  old  phraseology  was  termed  "  discourse  of  reason." 
In  other  words,  unsoundness  of  mind  imports  an  entire  want  of  in- 
telligent understanding,  not  a  mere  weakness  of  understanding.^ 

In  general  terms  it  may  be  said  that,  to  make  a  valid  deed,  the 
<Tantor's  mental  capacity  must  be  such  as  to  enable  him  in  a 
reasonable  manner  to  understand  the  nature  and  effect  of  the 
deed,  and  to  comprehend  the  transaction  of  which  the  deed  is  a 
part.2  He  must  have  a  mind  capable  of  assent  to  the  act.'^  He 
is  not  capable  of  assent  if  he  has  no  mind,  or  his  mind  is  unsound, 
or  he  is  not  able  to  exercise  it  by  reason  of  duress,  coercion, 
threats,  compulsion,  or  any  undue  influence.'^ 

One  seeking  to  set  aside  a  deed  on  the  ground  of  insanity  must 
show  that  the  grantor  had  not  mind  enough  to  comprehend,  in  a 
reasonable  manner,  the  nature  and  effect  of  what  he  was  doing.^ 
""  Before  a  complainant  can  claim  a  decree,  in  the  absence  of 
undue  influence,  he  must  show  such  a  degree  of  mental  weakness 
as  renders  a  party  incapable  of  understanding  and  protecting  his 


1  Famam  v.  Brooks,  9  Pick.  212;  Van 
Alst  V.  Hunter,  5  Johns.  Ch.  148  ;  Aiinan 
V.  Stout,  42  Pa.  St.  114;  Cain  v.  War- 
ford,  33  Md.  23  ;  Maddox  v.  Simmons,  31 
Ga.  512,  523  ;  Miller  v.  Craig,  36  lU.  109  ; 
Taylor  v.  Patrick,  1  Bibb,  168  ;  McDaniel 
V.  McCoy,  68  Mich.  332,  36  N.  W.  Rep. 
84 ;  Dickson  v.  Kempinsky,  96  Mo.  252, 
9  S.  W.  Rep.  618;  Warfield  v.  Warfidd, 
76  Iowa,  633,  41  N.  W.  Rep.  383  ;  Clark 
V.  Kirkpatrick  (N.  J.  Eq),  16  Atl.  Rep. 
309. 

2  Stewart  v.  Flint,  59  Vt.  144,  8  Atl. 
Rep.  801 ;  Day  v.  Seely,  17  Yt.  542  ;  Hovey 
V.  Hobson,  55  Me.  256  ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  17 
N.  Y.  Supp.  905,  affirmed  137  N.  Y.  610, 
33  N.  E.  Rep.  479;  Lozear  v.  Shields,  23 
N.  J.  Eq.  509 ;  Blakelcy  v.  Blakeley,  33 
N.  J.  Eq.  502  ;  Dicken  v.  Johnson,  7  Ga. 
484 ;  Carpenter  v.  Carpenter,  8  Bush, 
283  ;  McEiwain  v.  Ru.sscU  (Ky.),  12  S.  W. 
Rep.  777  ;  Sabledowsky  v.  Arbuckle,  50 
Minn.  475,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  920. 

46 


3  Cole  V.  Cole,  21  Neb.  84,  31  N.  W. 
Rep.  493.  In  this  case  a  man  past  seventy 
years  of  age,  afflicted  with  senile  cerebral 
atrophy  to  such  an  extent  that  his  mind 
and  memory  were  so  impaired  that  he 
often  did  not  know  his  own  sons  with 
whom  he  resided,  and  often  became  lost 
in  his  own  house,  dooryard,  and  orchard, 
made  a  voluntary  deed  of  a  valuable  farm, 
his  only  property,  to  the  children  of  his 
hist  wife,  which  was  set  aside  upon  the 
application  of  the  children  of  a  former 
wife. 

4  Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet,  51  N.  Y.  378; 
Clark  y.  Kirkpatrick  (N.  J.  Eq.),  16  Atl. 
Re]).  309. 

e  Blakeley  v.  Blakeley,  33  N.  J.  Eq. 
502  ;  Stewart  v.  Flint,  5'J  Vt.  144,  8  AtL 
Rep.  801 ;  Guest  v.  Beeson,  2  Iloust.  246 ; 
Jones  V.  Thompson,  5  Del.  Ch.  374; 
Crowther  v.  Rowlandson,  27  Cal.  376; 
Worthington  v.  Campbell  (Ky.),  1  S.  W. 
Rep.  714. 


PEESUMPTIOX    AND    PROOF    EEGAKDIXG    INSANITY.  [§  49. 

own  interests.  The  circumstance  that  the  intellectual  powers 
have  been  somewhat  impaired  by  age  is  not  sufficient,  if  the  con- 
tracting party  still  retains  a  lull  comprehension  of  the  meuiiiiig, 
design,  and  etfects  of  his  acts."  ^  Upon  this  issue,  evidence  of  the 
grantor's  business  transactions  at  or  about  the  time  of  making  the 
deed,  and  of  his  declarations,  oral  or  written,  tending  to  show  his 
comprehension  or  want  of  comprehension  of  daily  occurrences  in 
his  business,  is  admissible.^ 

49.  Weakness  of  understanding  does  not  of  itself  incapaci- 
tate one  to  make  a  valid  contract.  It  is  only  when  a  grantor 
has  not  strength  of  mind  sufficient  to  understand  the  nature  and 
consequence  of  his  act  in  giving  a  deed  that  this  can  be  avoided 
on  the  ground  of  insanity.'^  If  his  mind  is  so  impaired  that  his 
memory  cannot  recall  the  necessary  facts,  and  his  judgment  form 
correct  conclusions,  his  power  of  disposing  of  his  property  is 
gone  ;  but,  to  have  the  effect  of  depriving  him  of  this  power  of 


1  Lindsey  v.  Lindsey,  50  111.  79,  99  Am. 
Dec.  489.  And  see  Kimball  v.  Cuddy, 
117  111.  213,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  .589  ;  Argo  v. 
Coffin,  142  111.  .368,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  679; 
Elcessor  v  Elcessor,  146  Pa.  St.  359,  23 
Atl.  Rep.  230. 

2  Woodcock  V.  Johnson,  36  Minn.  217, 
30  N.  W.  Rep.  894. 

3  Creagh  v.  Blood,  2  Jones  &  Lat.  509. 
Alabama:  In  re  Carmichael,  36  Ala.  514. 
Connecticut:  Hale  v.  Hills,  8  Conn.  39. 
Delaware:  Jones  v.  Thompson,  5  Del.Ch. 
374.  Illinois :  Miller  v.  Craig,  36  111.  109 ; 
Lindsey  v.  Lindsey,  50  111.  79,  99  Am. 
Dec.  489  ;  Baldwin  v.  Duuton,  40  111.  188  ; 
Stone  V.  Wilbern,  83  111.  105;  Burt  v. 
Quisenberry,  132  111.385,  24  N.  E.  Rep. 
622.  Indiana :  Somers  v.  Pumphrey,  24 
lud.  231.  Iowa:  -Marmon  r.  Marmon,  47 
Iowa,  121  ;  Corbit  ;•.  Smith,  7  Iowa,  60, 
71  Am.  Dec.  431.  Kentucky:  Speors  v. 
Sewell,  4  Bush,  239.  Maine  :  Hill  v.  Nash, 
41  Me.  585,  66  Am.  Dec.  266  ;  Hovey  i-. 
Hobson,  55  Me.  256  ;  Darby  v.  Hayford, 
56  Me.  246.  Maryland:  (ireonwade  v. 
Grcenwade,  43  Md.  313.  Massachusetts: 
Brigham  v.  Fayerweatber,  144  Mas>.  4«, 
10  N.  E.  Rep.  735.  Michigan  :  Sponable 
».   Hanson,  87  Mich.  204,  49  N.  W.   Rep. 


644;  Leonardson  v.  Kulia,  64  ^lich.  1,  31 
N.  W.  Rep.  26.  Nebraska :  John.«on  v. 
Phifer,  6  Neb.  401  ;  MuUoy  v.  Ingalls,  4 
Neb.  115  ;  Cole  v.  Cole,  21  Neb.  84,  31  N. 
W.  Rep.  493.  New  Hampshire  :  Dennett 
r.  Dennett,  44  N.  H.  531,  84  Am.  Dec.  97. 
New  Jersey  :  Blakeley  v.  Blakeley,  33  N.  J. 
Eq.  502.  New  York :  Jacksun  v.  King, 
4  Cow.  207,  15  Am.  Dec.  354;  Sprague 
V.  Duel,  Clarke,  90  ;  Jones  v.  Hughes, 
15  Abb.  N.  C.  141;  Davis  v.  Culver,  13 
How.  Pr.  62  ;  Odell  v.  Buck,  21  Wend. 
142;  Sprague  v.  Duel,  11  Paige,  480; 
Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet,  51  N.  Y.  378. 
North  Carolina:  Goodman  ?'.  Sapp,  102 
N.  C.  477.  9  S.  E.  Rp.483.  Pennsyl- 
vania: Aiman  i-.  Stout,  42  Pa.  St.  114. 
Rhode  Island:  Anthony  i;.  Hutcbins.  10 
R.  I.  165.  Texas:  Beville  i'.  Jones,  74 
Tex.  148,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  1128.  Vermont: 
King  I'.  Cummintrs,  60  Vt.  502,  11  Atl. 
Rep.  727.  Virginia:  Beverley  v.  Walden, 
20Gratt.  147.  West  Virginia  :  Whittaker 
V.  Southwestern  Va.  Imp.  Co.  34  W.  Va. 
217,  224,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  507.  Wisconsin: 
Wright  V.  Jackson,  59  Wis.  569,  18  N. 
AV.  Rep.  486 ;  Hender.son  v.  McGregor,  30 
Wis.  78. 

4T 


§^50,51.]  DISAI'.ILIIV    OK    IXSANE    PhliSON'S. 

dis[>os:il,  the  evuK'Uce  must  show  that  liis  luiinl  is  so  far  iiupaired 
that  he  cannot  transact  business  in  a  rational  iiuiiiiiii-. 

Old  age  alone  is  no  proof  of  incapacity  to  exiciite  a  deed.^ 
Tims  a  deed  will  not  be  sit  aside  on  the  nieie  evidence  that 
the  grantor  was  ninetj'-two  years  old,  and  was  afflicted  with  the 
usual  bodily  infirmities  of  a  man  of  his  age.^  Mere  difficulty  of 
speech,  following  an  attack  of  paralysis,  is  no  evidence  of  mental 
condition.^ 

60.  The  deed  of  a  monomaniac  cannot  be  avoided  on  the 
ground  of  the  monomania,  unless  he  was  incapacitated  from  ex- 
ercising his  judgment  in  the  transaction.*  Thus,  one  who  is  a 
monomaniac  on  tlie  sul>ject  of  religion  may  be  wholly  competent 
to  transact  general  business  and  to  execute  a  deed.  The  question 
in  such  case  is,  has  the  transaction  been  affected  by  the  grantor's 
mania?  Proof  that  his  mind  was  in  a  morbid  condition  on  a 
subject  wholly  disconnected  with  the  transaction  is  irrelevant.^ 
But  proof  of  a  specific  monomania  which  might  influence  him  in 
regard  to  a  particular  conveyance,^  or  an  insane  delusion  that 
the  world  was  about  to  come  to  an  end,  which  rendered  him 
wholly  indifferent  about  property,  will  invalidate  his  conveyance 
executed  while  subject  to  such  delusion.'^ 

51.  A  person  deaf  and  dumb  from  his  birth  is  not  for  that 
reason  legally  incapacitated  from  executing  a  deed ;  but  the  deed 

1  Buckey  v.  Buckey,  38  W.  Va.  168,  N.J.  Eq.  502;  Lozear  u.  Shields,  23  N.  J. 
18  S.  E.  Kep.  383  ;  Iverr  v.  Lunnsford,  Eq.  509;  Eatou  v.  Eaton,  37  N.  J.  L.  108, 
31  W.  Va.  659,8  S.  E.  Rep.  493 ;  Greer  18  Am.  Rep.  716;  Alston  v.  Boyd,  6 
r.  Greer,  9  Gratt.  330;  Jarrett  v.  Jarrett,  Humph.  504. 

11  W.  Va.  584;  Burt   v.  Quisenberry,  132  «  Lemon  f.  Jenkins,  48  Ga.  313. 

111.   385,  24  N.   E.  Rep.  622;  "Walton   r.  "^  Bond  i;.  Bond,  7  Allen,  18,  per  Bige- 

Northin{rton,  5  Sneed,  282.  low,  C.  J. :  "  If  it  apjieared  that  she  was 

2  Puine  v.  Aldrich,  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  affected  with  mental  disease,  which  had 
538,  affirmed  133  N.  Y.  544,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  culminated  in  a  delusion  that  she  and  those 
725.  who  would    inherit    her    property,   or  for 

^  Doran  v.  McConlogue,  150  Pa.  St.  98,  whose  ))ecuniary  interest  and  welfare  she 

24  Atl.  Rep.  357.  would  in  the  exercise  of  her  reason  have 

*  Dennett  v.  Dennett,  44  N.  II.  531,  84  provided,  were  about  to  jierLih,  and  that 
Am.  Dec.  97  ;  Burgess  r.  Pollock,  53  Iowa,  thereby  she  was  rendered  indifferent  to 
273,5  N.  W.  Rep.  179,  36  Am.  Rep.  218;  property,  and  incapableof  appreciating  its 
Hovey  v.  Hobson,  55  Me.  256;  Ekin  v.  uses  and  value,  and  had  become  reckless  of 
MrCracken,  11  I'hila.  534,  32  Leg.  Int.  or  insensible  to  her  own  interests,  or  the 
405.  interests  of  those  dependent  upon  her  or 

*  Oeagh  V.  Blood,  2  Jones  &  Lat.  509  ;  connected  with  her,  she  certainly  was  not 
Campbell  V  Hill,  22  U.  C.  C.  P.  526,  23  competent  to  make  a  valid  disi)Osition  of 
U.  C.  C.  P.  473  ;  Biakelev  v-  Blakelev,  33  her  properfv  bv  deed." 

48      ' 


DEED    OF    INSANE    PERSON    UNDER    GUARDIANSHIP    VOID.         [$  62. 

of  such  a  person  is  good  if  he  in  fact  had  an  understanding  and 
capacity  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  make  such  conveyance.^ 

II.  Deed  of  Insane  Person  under  Guardianship  void. 

52.  The  deed  of  an  insane  man  under  guardianship  is  abso- 
lutely void.  The  guardianship  is  conclusive  respecting  the  ward's 
disability,  whatever  may  have  been  the  cause  of  his  insanity.^ 
The  assent  of  the  guardian  of  such  ward  to  the  deed  of  the  latter 
confers  no  element  of  validity  upon  that  instrument.  Where  a 
guardian  has  been  appointed  of  a  person,  in  consequence  of  an 
inquisition  that  has  found  him  to  be  of  unsound  mind  and  inca- 
pable of  managing  his  own  affairs,  the  decree  is  notice  to  all  the 
world  of  his  incapacity  to  contract,  and  this  incapacity  is  pre- 
sumed to  continue  so  long  as  the  guardianship  continues.^  His 
contract  while  under  guardianship  cannot  be  supported  by  evi- 
dence of  his  lecover}'-  or  of  a  lucid  interval. 

A  decree  of  a  surrogate  that  a  testator  was  of  unsound  mind, 
and  incapable  of  executing  a  will  at  the  time  of  its  execution,  is 
prima  facie  but  not  conclusive  evidence  of  the  invalidity  of  a 
deed  executed  by  the  decedent  on  the  same  day  as  the  will* 

But  proceedings  under  a  statute,  authorizing  a  judge  or  other 
officer  to  commit  a  person  to  a  hospital  or  an  insane  asylum  for 
care  and  treatment,  are  not  evidence  of  mental  incapacity  to  make 


1  Brown  v.  Brown,  3  Conn.  299,  8  Am.  280 ;  White  v.  Palmer,  4  Mass.  147.  Mis- 
Dec.  187.  "If,  superadded  to  the  depri-  souri :  Rannells  v.  Gemer,  80  Mo.  474. 
vation  of  the  two  senses  before  mentioned.  New  York:  Fitzhugh  y.  Wilcox,  12  Barb, 
the  grantor  had  been  blind,  he  would  be  235;  Brown  v.  Miles,  61  Hun,  453,  16 
considered  in  law  as  incapable  of  any  un-  N.  Y.  Supp.  251;  Griswold  v.  Miller,  15 
durstanding,  being  deficient  in  those  inlets  Barb.  520  ;  Wadswovth  v.  Sherman,  14 
which  furnish  the  human  mind  with  ideas."  Barb.  169;  Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet,  51 
Per  Hosmer,  C.  J.  Barnett  v.  Barnett,  I  N.  Y.  378.  Pennsylvania :  Imhoff  v.  Wit- 
Jones  Eq.  221  ;  Brower  i-.  Fisher,  4  Johns,  mer,  31  Pa.  St.  243;  Klohs  v.  Klohs,  61 
Ch.  441.  Pa.  St.  245;  Rogers  v.  Walker,  6  Pa.  St. 

2  Connecticut:  Griswold  v.  Butler,  3  371,  47  Am.  Dec.  470.  Texas:  Elston 
Conn.  227.  Indiana:  Copenrath  v.  Kien-  v,  Jasper,  45  Tex.  409;  Grimes  v.  Shaw 
by,  83  Ind.  18.  Kansas:  New  England  (Tex.),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  718.  Wisconsin: 
L.  &  T.   Co.  V.  Spider  (Kans.),  38  Pac.  Mohr  r.  Tulip,40  Wi.s.66. 

Rep.    799.      Kentucky:    Pearl    v.    Mc-  8  Imhoff  v.  Witmer,   31    Pa.  St.  243; 

Dowell,  3  J.  J.  :Marsh.  658,  20  Am.  Dec.  Rannells  v.  Gerner,  80  Mo.  474.     And  see 

199.     Maine:  Hovey   v.  Hobson,  53  Me.  Thomas  y.  Hatch,  3  Sumn.  170. 

451,  89   Am.   Dec.  705.     Massachusetts:  *  Baxter  v.  Baxter,  76  Hun,  98,  27  N. 

Wait  V.   Maxwell,  5   Pick.  217,   16  Am.  Y.  Supp.  834. 

Dec.  391  ;  Leonard  v.  Leonard,  14   Pick. 

VOL.  I.  49 


§  6o.]  DlSAr.lLIlY    OF    INSAN1-;    TKHSONS. 

contracts  on  the  part  of  the  person  committed  to  the  hospital  or 
asyhim.  The  proceedings  are  quite  different fiom  those  which  au- 
thorize the  appointment  of  a  guardian  of  an  insane  person.  'J'he 
statutory  proceedings  for  this  purpose  are  not  materiall}'  different 
from  those  on  the  writ  de  lunatieo  inquirendo  at  common  hiw,  ex- 
cept that  the  hearing  is  before  the  court,  instead  of  before  commis- 
sioners with  a  jar}'.  Such  proceedings,  foHowed  by  a  finding  of 
insanity  and  the  appointment  of  a  guardian,  are  evidence  of  the 
ward's  insanity  in  any  transaction  and  in  colUiteral  proceedings.^ 

Whether  the  owner  of  hind  is  capable  of  executing  a  deed,  or 
should  have  a  guardian  appointed,  may  also  be  determined  in 
equity  upon  the  appointment  of  a  commission  de  lunatieo  inqui- 
rendo? The  court  has  jurisdiction  to  issue  a  commission,  either  in 
case  the  alleged  lunatic  is  a  resident  of  the  State  or  is  the  owner 
of  property  in  the  State,  though  a  non-resident.^ 

53.  An  adjudication  of  insanity  made  after  the  execution 
of  a  conveyance  is  not  conclusive  but  only  presumptive  evi- 
dence of  incapacity.  Even  when,  after  the  execution  of  the  deed, 
the  grantor  is  found  upon  an  inquisition  to  have  been  of  unsound 
mind  from  a  time  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  deed,  such  inqui- 
sition and  finding  are  presumptive  but  not  conclusive  evidence  of 
the  grantor's  incapacity  to  execute  the  deed.^  If  the  transaction 
was  a  fair  one,  for  a  full  consideration  and  without  notice  of  the 
lunacy  to  the  purchaser,  the  deed  will  not  be  set  aside  merely  on 
the  ground  that  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  deed  is  over- 
reached by  the  inquisition  of  lunacy.^ 

If  the  guardianship  has  been  practically  abandoned  without 
judicial  action,  and  the  grantor  is  in  fact  of  sound  mind  at  the 
time  of  executing  the  deed,  this  will  not  be  conclusively  presumed 

1  Knox  V.  Hang,  48  Minn.  58,  50  N.  W.  Mainwaring,  2  Beav.  115;  Niell  v.  Mor- 
Rep.  934.  ley,  9  Ves.  478  ;  Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet,  51 

2  In  re  Farrell  (N.  J.  Ch.),  27  Afl.  Rep.  N.  Y.  378  ;  In  re  Christie,  5  Paige,  242 ; 
'813.  L'Amoureaux  v.  Crosby,   2    Paige,   422, 

3  Ex  parte  Southcote,  1  Amh.  109,  2  427,  22  Am.  Dec.  655;  Osterlioutw.  Shoe- 
Ves.  Sr.  401  ;/«  re  Duchess  of  Chandois,  maker,  3  Hill  (X.  Y.),  513;  Hirsch  v. 
1  Sehoales  &  L.  301;  In  re  Houstoun,  1  Trainer,  3  Abb.  N.  C.  274;  Yaugcr  v. 
Russ.  312  ;  In  re  Perkins,  2  Johns.  Ch.  Skinner,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  389  ;  Hunt  v.  Hunt, 
124  ;  In  re  Fowler,  2  Barb.  Ch.  305;  In  re  13  N.  J.  Eq.  161  ;  Miskey's  App.  107  Pa. 
Child,  16  N.J.  Eq.  498;  In  re  Devausney  St.  611  ;  McGinnis  v.  Commonwealth,  74 
(N.  J.  Eq.),  28  Atl.  Rep.  459.  Pa.  St.  245  ;  Klohs  v.  Klohs.  61   Pa.  St. 

*  Snooks  V.  Watts,   11  Beav.  105  ;   Ja-     245  ;  Arnold  v.  Townsend,  14  Phila.  216. 
cobsr.  Richards,  18  Beav.  300  ;  Frank  v.         ^  Yaiiger  v.  Skinner,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  389. 
50 


DEED    OF    INSANE    PERSON    UNDEK    GUARDIANSHIP    VOID.       [§  54. 

to  be  void.  The  burden  in  such  case,  of  proving  the  teiniinntion 
of  the  guardianship  and  the  actual  restoration  of  the  lunatic,  is 
upon  tlje  party  relying  upon  the  deed.^ 

54.  But  the  deed  of  an  insane  man,  before  he  is  adjudged 
insane  and  put  under  guardianship,  is  not  void  but  voidable, 
and  may  be  confirmed  or  avoided  by  him  when  he  afterwards  be- 
comes sane,  or  by  Ijis  heirs.^  By  force  of  statutory  provisions  in 
exceptional  cases,  the  insanity  of  a  grantor  may  render  a  deed 
void  and  not  merely  voidable.  Thus,  under  a  statute  which  pro- 
vides that  the  husband  must  join  in  a  deed  made  by  his  wife  to 
convey  her  land,  if  her  husband  joins  in  such  deed  while  insane, 


1  Elston  V.  Jasper,  45  Tex.  409  ;  Mohr 
V.  Tulip,  40  Wis.  66. 

'^  Thomjjsou  V.  Leach,  3  Mod.  296, 
2  Kent  Com.  451  ;  Tucker  v.  Moreland, 
10  Pet.  58 ;  Thomas  v.  Hatch,  3  Sumii. 
170.  Illinois:  Scanlan  o.  Cobb,  85  HI. 
296;  Burnbam  v.  Kidwell,  113  111.  425. 
Indiana:  Freed  v.  Brown,  55  Ind.  310; 
Nichol  V.  Thomas,  53  Ind.  42  ;  Schuff  v. 
Ransom,  79  Ind.  458 ;  Musselman  v.  Cra- 
vens, 47  Ind.  1 ;  Croiise  v,  Holman,  19 
Ind.  30 ;  Somers  v.  Pumphrey,  24  Ind.  231 ; 
Fay  V.  Burditt,  81  Ind.  433,  42  Am.  Rep. 
142;  Copenrath  v.  Kienby,  83  Ind.  18; 
Beyer  v.  Bcnyman,  123  Ind.  451,  24  N. 
E.  Rep.  249 ;  Northwestern  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Blankenship,  94  lud.  535,  48  Am.  Rep. 
185 ;  Physio-Medical  College  v.  Wilkin- 
son, 108  Ind.  314,  317.  Kansas  :  Gribben 
V.  Maxwell,  34  Kans.  8,  7  Pac.  Rep.  584. 
Kentucky :  Breckeuridge  i^.  Ormsby,  1  J. 
J.  Marsh.  236,  19  Am.  Dec.  71  ;  Rusk  v. 
FentoD,  14  Bush,  490,  29  Am.  Rep.  413. 
Maine:  llovey  v.  Hobson,  53  Me.  451,  89 
Am.  Dec.  705 ;  Ilovey  v.  Chase,  52  Me. 
304,83  Am.  Dec.  514.  Massachusetts: 
Wait  V.  Maxwell,  5  Pick.  217, 16  Am.  Dec. 
391;  Seaver  v.  Phelps,  11  Pick.  304,  22 
Am.  Dec.  372;  Allis  v.  Billings,  6  Mete. 
415,  39  Am.  Dec.  744;  Arnold  v.  Rich- 
mond Iron  Works,  1  Gray,  434 ;  Gibson 
V.  Soper,  6  Gray,  279,  66  Am.  Dec.  414. 
Maryland :  Evans  v.  Iloran,  52  Md.  602 ; 
Key  V.  Davis,  1  Md.  32  ;  Chew  v.  Bank, 
14  Md.  299.  New  Hampshire :  Young  v. 
Steven.s,  48  N.  II.   13;5,  2  Am.  Rep.  202, 


97  Am.  Dec.  592.  New  Jersey :  Blakeley 
V.  Blakeley,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  502 ;  Eaton  v. 
Eaton,  37  N  J.  L.  108,  18  Am.  Rep.  716  ; 
Yauger  v.  Skinner,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  389.  New 
York:  Ingraham  v.  Baldwin,  9  N.  Y.  45; 
Jackson  v.  Gumacr,  2  Cow.  552.  In  Van 
Deusen  v.  Sweet,  51  N.  Y.  378,  it  is  broadly 
stated  that  such  a  deed  is  void;  l)ut  in 
that  case  the  deed  was  executed  at  a  time 
when  the  grantor,  as  afterwards  adjudged, 
was  insane,  and  therefore  the  case  is  an 
authority  only  that  the  deed  of  an  insane 
person,  made  at  a  time  when  he  was  a  lu- 
natic as  afterwards  adjudged,  is  absolutely 
void.  Brown  v.  Miles,  61  Hun,  4.53,  16 
N.  Y.  Supp.  251,  is  a  similar  case.  See, 
also,  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hunt,  79  N. 
Y.  54 1 .  North  Carolina  :  Odom  v.  Rid- 
dick,  104  N.  C.  515,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  609  ; 
Riggan  v.  Green,  80  N.  C.  236,  30  Am. 
Rep.  77.  Pennsylvania :  Snowden  v. 
Dunlavey,  11  Pa.  St.  522;  Crawford  v. 
Scovell,  94  Pa.  St.  48,  39  Am.  Rep.  766. 
Texas :  Elston  v.  Jasper,  45  Tex.  409 ; 
Pearson  v.  Cox,  71  Tex.  246,  9  S.  W. 
Rep.  124. 

There  are  a  few  decisions  to  the  effect 
that  the  deed  of  an  insane  person  is  ab- 
solutely void,  and  not  merely  voidable, 
though  he  had  not  been  adjudged  insane. 
Elder  v.  Schumacher,  1 8  Colo.  433, 33  Pac. 
Rep.  175,  Elliott,  J.,  dissenting  ;  Goodyear 
V.  Adam.s,  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  275,  affirmed  119 
N.  Y.  6.50,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  1149;  Rogers 
V.  Blackwell,  49  Mich  192, 13  N.  W.  Rep. 
512. 

51 


§  55.]  DISABILITY    OF   INSANP:   PERSONS. 

the  cUhmI  is  void  to  the  same  extent  that  it  would  have  been  liad 
tlie  liusband  not  joined  in  it.  If  the  deed  of  the  wife  alone  would 
be  void,  her  deed,  with  the  assent  of  her  husband  when  he  was 
incapable  of  giving  assent,  is  also  void.  His  subsequent  assent 
to  the  deed,  or  his  ratification  of  it,  would  not  fulfil  the  require- 
ments of  the  statute,  or  give  validity  to  the  deed  of  the  wife.^ 

The  deed  of  an  insane  person  not  under  guardianship  is  bind- 
ing until  it  is  disaffirmed  •,'^  and  it  can  be  disaffirmed  only  by  the 
grantor  or  his  heirs  or  devisees. 

III.  Burden  of  Proof  where  there  is  no  Guardianship. 

55.  The  burden  of  proof  that  the  execution  of  a  deed  was 
procured  while  the  grantor  was  of  unsound  mind  is  upon  the 
party  who  alleges  the  insanity .^  This  is  the  rule  in  case  a  prior 
continuous  mental  incapacity  has  not  been  shown.  In  case  his 
incapacity  has  been  only  occasional  and  temporary,  and  his  deed 
is  not  lacking  in  consideration,  and  was  not  obtained  by  fraud  or 
other  unfairness,  and  the  act  was  reasonable  and  natural,  the 
burden  of  proving  incapacity  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  is  on 
the  party  claiming  that  the  deed  is  invalid.^  If  in  any  case  the 
evidence  in  regard  to  the  grantor's  mental  condition  is  conflicting, 
the  fact  that  the  transaction  is  unnatural  and  unreasonable  may 
be  decisive  of  the  question  of  capacity."  Insanity,  like  any  other 
fact,  must  be  proved.  It  is  a  question  for  the  jury."  Neighbor- 
hood reports  or  rumors  are  wholly  inadmissible  in  evidence.^ 
Such  evidence,  being  inadmissible  to  prove  the  fact,  is  inadmissible 
to  prove  that  a  subsequent  purchaser  in  good  faith  had  notice  of 

1  Leggate  v.  Clark,  111  Mass.  308.  And  ^  Bressey  v.  Gross  (Ky.),  7  S.  W.  Rep. 
Bee  Elliot  v.  Ince,  7  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  475.     150. 

Now,  in  Massachusetts,  a  married  woman  ^  Young  v.   Stevens,  48   N.  H.   133,  2 

may  convey  her  land  in  the  same  manner  Am.  Rep.  202,  97   Am.  Dec.  592  ;  Ploob- 

as  if  she  were  .sole,  only  that  the  husband  ler  v.  Iloobler  128  111.  645,  21  N.  E.  Rep. 

cannot  be  deprived  of  his  estate  by  the  571  ;   West  v.  Douglass,  145  111.  164,  34 

curtesy  without  his  consent.     Pub.  Stats.  N.  E.  Rep.  141. 

ch.  1 47,  §  1 .  ''  Ashcraf  t  v.  De  Armond,  44  Iowa,  229 ; 

2  Howe  i\  Howe,  99  Mass.  88.  Myers  ?•.  Knabe,  51   Kans.  720,  33  Pac. 
»  Howe  I'.  Howe,  99  Mass.  88 ;  Kennedy  Rep.  602.     The  findings  of  a  master  as  to 

V.  Marrast,   46   Ala.  161,  168;    Elcessor  the   mental  condition   of  a  grantor,  con- 

r.  Elcessor,  146  Pa.  St.  359,  23  Atl.  Rep.  firmed  by  the  court  below,  are  to  be  treated 

2.30.  as  if  established  by  the  verdict  of  a  jury, 

■*  Stewart  v.  Flint,  59  Vt.   144,8  Atl.  and  not  to  be  disregarded  except  for  a  plain 

Rep.  801.  mistake.     Doran  »;.  McConlogne,  150  Pa. 


St.  98,  24  Atl   Rep.  357. 


52 


BURDKN    OF    PROuF    WHEKE    THERE    IS    NO    GUARDIANSHIP.        [§  66. 

such  faet.^  But  a  witness,  though  not  an  expert,  who  has  had 
an  opportunity  to  form  an  opinion  as  to  the  grantor's  capacity  to 
transact  business  from  a  knowledge  of  his  acts,  m;iy  give  in  evi- 
dence his  opinion,  based  on  these  facts,  of  the  grantor's  mental 
capacity.^  The  witness  should,  however,  in  the  first  place  testify 
to  specific  facts  showing  mental  unsoundness  on  the  part  of  the 
grantor  before  giving  any  opinion  in  regard  to  his  mental  un- 
soundness.^ 

56.  The  question  of  insanity  is  one  that  relates  to  the  time 
of  making  the  deed,*  though,  if  a  person  has  been  placed  under 
guardianship  as  one  no7i  compos  mentis,  so  long  as  the  guardian- 
ship continues  it  is  presumed  that  he  remains  in  that  condition, 
and  that  his  deed  made  while  under  guardianship  is  void.  But 
the  fact  that  a  guardian  was  appointed  of  a  grantor  nearly  a  year 
after  the  execution  of  his  deed  is  not  admissible  evidence  that  he 
was  insane  at  the  time  of  making  the  deed.^  To  establish  the 
fact  that  the  grantor  was  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  he  executed 
the  deed,  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  he  had,  either  before 
or  after  that  tiuie.  on  an  inquisition  been  found  to  be  iiisane  and 
placed  under  guardianship.^  If  no  guardian  has  been  appointed, 
and  it  is  shown  that  the  grantor  has  been  insane  at  intervals,  the 
grantee  can  establish  the  validity  of  the  deed  only  by  clear  and 
satisfactory  evidence  that  it  was  executed  by  the  grantor  during 
a  lucid  interval." 

Evidence  of  the  grantor's  insanity  at  a  time  either  prior  or 
subsequent  to  the  execution  of  the  deed  is  admissible  as  tending 
to  prove  his  insanity  at  the  time  of  its  execution,  provided  the 
matters  offered  in  evidence  are  not  too  remote  from  that  time, 
and  are  connected  by  other  evidence  with  the  time  of  the  execu- 
tion of  the  deed.^ 

1  Greenslade  u.  Dare,  20  Beav.  284.  514;     Nichol    v.   Thomas,    53    Ind.   42; 

2  Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  t;.  La-  O'Neill  v.  Nolan,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  222,  68 
throp,  111  U.S.  612,  4  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 533;     Hun,  631. 

Woodcock  V.  Johnson,  36  Minn.  217,  30  ^  Ilovcy  v.  Chase,  52  Me.  304,  83  Am. 

N.  W.  Rep.  894  ;  Finney's  Will,  27  Minn.  Dec.  514. 

280,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  791,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  144  ;  »  Freed  v.  Brown,  55  Ind.  310. 

Fisliburne  i-.  Fur<,Mison,  84  Vn.  87,  4  S.  F.  ''  Ripley  v.  Bubeock,  13  Wis.  425. 

Rfp.  575.  '^  Nichol   v.  Thomas,   53  Ind.  42 ;  Wil- 

3  Doriin  r.  McConluf^ue,  150  I'a.  St.  'J8,  Liiison  u.  I\a-son,  23  Pii.  St.  117  ;  Ash- 
24  Atl.  Rep.  357.  craft  v.  De  Armond,  44  Iowa,  229  ;  Grant 

*  Fkin  r.  McCraeken,  11  Rhila.  534;  v.  Thompson,  4  Conn.  203,10  Am.  Dec. 
Hovey  r.  Ciiase,  52  Me.  304,  83  Am.  Dec.     119;    Hendrix   t'.   Money,  1    Bush,  306; 

63 


§  57.]  DISABILITY    OF    INSANE    PERSONS. 

A  iIchhI  will  not  be  set  aside  on  account  of  the  mental  unsound- 
ness of  the  g-rantor  upon  evidence  of  such  unsoundness  so  great, 
six  months  after  the  execution  of  the  deed,  as  to  incajjucitate  him 
to  transact  any  business,  when  there  is  no  direct  evidence  as  to  his 
condition  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  deed,  and  all  the 
evidence  shows  that  his  malady  was  of  a  progressive  nature,  and 
that  it  was  not  until  three  months  after  executing  the  deed  that 
it  became  so  serious  as  to  incapacitate  him.^ 

If  a  mortgagor  was  of  sufficient  mental  capacity  at  the  time  of 
executing  the  mortgage,  his  subsequent  insanity  does  not  affect 
the  remedy  by  foreclosure,  or  suspend  a  power  of  sale  contained 
in  the  mortgage.^  And  so  the  insanity  of  a  purchaser  of  the 
equity  of  redemption  does  not  invalidate  a  sale  under  a  deed  of 
trust  to  which  the  proj^erty  was  subject.^ 

57.  Because  a  person  has  been  insane  at  some  period  of  his 
life,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  remains  insane,  and  cannot 
afterwards  make  a  valid  contract.  His  insanity  may  have  been 
temporary.  It  may  have  been  the  result  of  a  violent  disease 
which  affected  his  mental  faculties  only  so  long  as  the  disease 
itself  lasted.  Therefore,  to  avoid  a  deed  on  the  ground  of  the 
grantor's  insanity,  proof  of  insanity  at  an  earlier  period  is  not 
effectual  unless  accompanied  by  proof  that  the  insanity  continued 
to  a  point  of  time  which  bears  directly  upon  the  execution  of  the 
deed  in  question.* 

On  the  other  hand,  a  decree  of  a  probate  court  dismissing  a 
petition  for  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  of  a  person  alleged  to 
be  insane,  and,  on  appeal  from  such  decree,  a  verdict  of  a  jury 
and  a  judgment  of  a  supreme  court  in  favor  of  his  sanity  are  not 
conclusive  evidence  of  his  sanity  at  a  time  intermediate  between 
such  decree  and  verdict,  in  an  action  to  set  aside  a  deed  made  by 
him  between  such  dates;  but  such  decree  and  verdict  are  admis- 
sible in  evidence  tending  to  prove  his  sanity.^ 

"Worthington  v.  Campbell  (Ky.)- 1  S.  W.  E.   Kep.  753;  Vanmeter  v.  Darrah,  115 

liep.  714;   Jerry   v.  Townshend,  9   Md.  Mo.    153,   22    S.  W.  Rep.  30;  Meyer  r. 

145  ;  Harden  I'.  Hays,  14  Ta.  St.  91  ;  Wat-  Knecliler,    10   Mo.  App.   371  ;    Bevia    v. 

sun  V.  Anderson,  11  Ala.  43.  rowcll,  83  Mo.  365,  11  Mo.  App.  216. 

1  Ilasbroiiek  v.  Young,  61  Hun,  626,  ^  Bensieck  i-.  Cook,  110  Mo.  173,  19  S. 
15  N.  y.  Supp.  919.     And  see  O'Neill  v.  W.  Rep.  642. 

Nolan,  21   N.  Y.  Siipp.  222,  66  Hun,  631  ;  *  Turner  v.  Rusk,  53  Md.  65. 

West  V.  Douglass,  145  111.  164,  34  N.  E.  6  Gibson  v.  Soper,  6  Gray,  279,  66  Am. 

Hep-  1-*1.  Dec.  414. 

2  Laughlin  r.  Hibben,  129  Iml.  5,  27  N, 

54 


DEED   OF   INSANE    GRANTOR.  [§§  58,  59. 

58.  There  is  a  presumption  of  the  continuance  of  insanity 
where  this  is  apparently  confirmed,  and  does  nut  result  from  a 
temporary  or  trausient  cause  ;  and  therefore,  when  such  insanity 
is  shown,  it  will  be  presumed  to  continue,  unless  subsequent  sanity 
is  shown. ^  But  a  return  of  sanity  may  be  proved  by  evidence 
sufficient  to  overcome  the  presumption  of  continued  insanity  ;  and, 
though  the  person  may  again  become  insane,  his  deed  executed 
during  the  lucid  interval  is  good.^  The  burden  of  showing  a 
lucid  interval  or  a  return  of  sanity  is  upon  the  purchaser,  or  party 
who  claims  the  validity  of  the  deed.^ 

IV.  Confirmation  mid  Disaffirmance  of  Deed  of  Insane  Grantor. 

59.  A  confirmation  by  the  grantor  must  be  his  intelligent 
act.  Such  act  to  be  effectual  must  be  done  by  the  grantor  after 
his  restoration  to  sanity,  with  such  knowledge  of  the  fact  as  to 
make  his  acts  binding.  It  has  been  asserted  that  the  act  of  con- 
firmation must  be  done  with  a  knowledge  of  the  voidable  char- 
acter of  the  deed  and  with  the  intention  to  confirm  it.*  But  this 
is  too  rigid  a  rule.  The  law  assumes  that  every  sane  man  know- 
ing the  facts  is  bound  by  his  acts  and  contracts,  and  will  not  allow 
him  to  excuse  himself  from  ordinary  liability  on  the  ground  of 
his  ignorance  of  the  law.  Therefore,  if  the  grantor,  being  in  his 
riglit  mind,  receives  consideration  for  the  conveyance,  his  inten- 
tion to  ratify  and  confirm  his  deed  may  be  inferred ;  and  it  is 
immaterial  that  at  the  time  of  receiving  such  payment  he  did  not 
actually  know  that  he  had  the  right  to  avoid  the  deed,  and  that 

1  Physio-]Meclical  College  v.  Wilkinson,  title  to  the  purchaser.     New  England  L. 

108  Ind.  314,  9  N.  E.  Kep.  167 ;  Grouse  v.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Spitler  (Kans.),  38  Pac.  Rep. 

Holman,  19  Incl.  30;  Wade   v.  State,  37  799. 

Ind.  180  ;    Corbit  v.  Smith,  7  Iowa,   60,  2  Towart  v.  Sellers,  5  Dow,  231  ;  Hall 

71    Am.  Dec.   431;    Curtis  v.   Brownell,  v.  Warren,  9  Ves.  60.') ;  Selby  i;.  Jackson, 

42   Mich.   165,  3  N.  W.    Rep.   936;    Ro-  6  Bcav.  192;  Es.sex  v.  Daniell,  L.  R.  10 

gcrs  I'.  Walker,   6  Pa.    St.  371,  47   Am.  C.  P.  .543 ;   Cropp  y.  Cropp,  88  Va.  753, 14 

Dec.  470;  State  v.  Wilner,  40  Wis.  304;  S.  E.  Rep.  529., 

Ricketts  V.  Joliiff,  02    Miss.  440;    Clark  »  Titcomb  v.  Vantyle,  84  111.  371  ;  Ro- 

I'.  Kirk  Patrick   (N.  J.  E(^  ),   10  Atl.  Kej).  gers  u.  Walker,  6  Pa.  St.  371,  47  Am.  Dec. 

309,  314.  470;  Ricketts  v.  Joliiff,  62  Miss.  440;  Cur- 

A  deed  made  by  an  insane  person  and  lis   v.  Brownell,  42  Mich.  165,3   N.  W. 

his  wife,  after  he  has  bicn  tluly  adjudged  Rep.  936;  Fishburne  v.  Furguson,  84  Va. 

insane    and   ])laced    under   guardianship,  87,  4  S.  E.  Rep.  575. 

while  he  is  out  on  a  temporary  leave  of  *  Tuckers.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58;  Eaton 

absence,  after  having  been  confined  in  the  v.  Eaton,  37  N.  J.  L.  108,  18  Am.  Rep. 

insane   asylum,  is  void,  and  conveys  no  716. 


5 


§§  60-62.]  DISABILITY   OF   INSANE   PERSONS. 

he  iHliiujuislied  this  right  by  receiving  payment.     This  is  an  ig- 
norant'c  of  tlie  law  which  he  cannot  set  nj).^ 

60.  The  deed  may  be  confirmed  by  the  grantor  after  his 
restoration  to  sanity  in  various  ways.  It  may  he  by  a  ni'w 
deed,  by  contract,  by  his  acts  in  relation  to  the  conveyance,  or  by 
liis  failure  to  act.^  Any  distinct  and  decisive  act  of  recoo-nition 
of  the  deed  as  valid  is  competent  evidence  of  ratification.  A 
new  deed  or  a  new  delivery  of  the  old  deed  is  not  reqnisite,  as 
would  be  the  case  if  that  deed  were  void.^ 

A  grantor  may  ratify  his  deed  after  liis  restoration  to  sanity  by 
receiving  and  accepting  the  consideration,  or  any  part  of  it;  as, 
for  instance,  by  receiving  support  from  the  grantee.  Of  course 
such  ratification  must  be  the  intelligent  act  of  the  grantor,  know- 
ing that  he  was  receiving  such  support  under  the  provisions  of 
the  deed,  and  intending  to  avail  himself  of  such  provisions.*  If 
the  grantor  has  taken  notes  for  the  purchase-money,  his  intention 
to  ratify  the  conveyance  will  be  inferred  from  his  receiving  pay- 
ment of  such  notes,  or  any  of  them,  after  being  restored  to  his 
right  niind.^ 

61.  The  deed  of  an  insane  man  not  under  guardianship 
may  be  confirmed  by  him  during  a  lucid  interval,  if  he  is  then 
in  condition  to  well  understand  the  nature  of  the  instrument  and 
the  transaction  which  led  to  its  execution.^  The  acts  of  con- 
firmation must  show  that  the  grantor  intended  to  confirm  the 
deed. 7 

62.  The  guardian  or  committee  of  an  insane  person  has  no 
power,  by  his  own  affirmative  acts  or  by  his  acts  of  omission, 
to  ratify  the  deed  of  his  ward.  He  cannot  dispose  of  his  ward's 
lands  except  by  proceedings  required  by  statute.  The  guardian 
cannot,  without  the  direction  of  court,  do  that  which  his  ward 
was  powerless  to  do  before  coming  of  age,  or  before  restoration 
to  reason.     The  guardian  cannot  without  express  authority  affirm 

1  Arnold    v.    Kichmond    Iron    Works,  <  Bond  r.  Bond,  7  Allen,  1 . 

1    Gray,  4.34  ;    Jones  v.   Evans,    7  Dana,  ^  Arnold  v.  Richmond    Iron  Works,   1 

96.  Grny,  4.34. 

-  Arnold  v.  Richmond  Iron   Works,  1  ^  ^^n;,^  ^  Billings,  6  Met.  415,  39  Am. 

Gray.  434;  Tucker  v.  Morchind,  10    Pet.  Dee.    744;     Blakeley   v.  Blakeley,  33  N. 

58;  Jones  u.  Evans,  7  Dana,  9B.  J.  Kq.   502;  Eaton  r.  Eaton,  37  N.  J.  i^. 

3  Howe  V.   Howe,  99  Mass.  88;    Allis  108,  18  Am.  Rep.  716. 

f.   Billings,  6    Met.  415,  39    Am.    Dec.  7  Eaton  v.  Eaton,  37  N.  J.  L.   108,  18 

744.  Am.  Rep.  716. 

56 


DEED   OF   INSANE   GRANTOR. 


[§§  63,  64. 


the  voidable  conveyance  of  his  ward  so  as  to  convert  a  voidable 
title  into  a  valid  and  unimpeachable  title. ^ 

63.  The  heirs  or  devisees  of  a  grantor  under  guardianship, 
who  has  died  without  being  restored  to  sanity,  may  ratify  his 
deed.  If  such  deed  is  not  ratified  either  by  the  grantor,  his  heirs 
or  devisees,  it  is  ineffectual  to  convey  any  title.^ 

Such  deed  may  also  be  disaifirmed  after  the  death  of  such 
grantor  by  his  heirs  or  devisees,^  or  by  his  executors  or  adminis- 
trators, if  they  require  the  real  estate  for  the  payment  of  debts. 
It  also  seems  that  the  administrator  of  such  grantor  may  avoid 
his  deed  without  showing  that  there  are  creditors  of  his  estate.* 

The  heirs  of  the  grantor  may  avoid  his  deed  on  the  ground  of 
insanity,  either  at  law  or  in  equit}^,  without  first  showing  that  he 
or  they  have  made  an  entry  upon  the  land,  or  done  any  other  act 
to  avoid  the  deed.^ 

64.  The  deed  of  an  insane  grantor  will  not  be  set  aside  at 
the  instance  of  a  stranger,  such  as  a  creditor,  or  other  person  not 
his  privy  in  blood  or  his  legal  representative.^  Lord  Coke  says 
that  neither  one  who  is  privy  in  estate  nor  one  who  is  privy 
in  tenure  can  set  up  the  disability  and  take  advantage   of   the 


1  Funk  V.  Reotchler,  134  Ind.  68,  33 
N.  E.  Rep.  364 ;  New  England  L.  &  T. 
Co.  D.  Spitler  (Kans),  38  Pac.  Rep.  799. 
Even  a  guardian's  contract  to  sell  his 
ward's  lands,  without  authority  to  make 
such  sale,  is  void.  "Worth  v.  Curtis,  1.5 
Me.  228;  Fitzhugh  v.  Wilcox,  12  Barb. 
235. 

^  Valpej  i;.  Rea,  130  Mass.  384;  Brig- 
ham  V.  Fayerweatlier,  144  Mass.  48,  10  N. 

E.  Rep.  735. 

8  Brown  f.  Freed,  43  Ind.  253;  Schuff  v. 
Ransom,  79  Iiid.  458;  Northwestern  JIut. 

F.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Blankeiiship,  94  Ind.  53.5, 
544,  48  Am.  Rpp.  18.5,  189.  Bicknell,  C. 
C,  said  :  "  Wlicn  a  contract  is  made  by  an 
insane  person  who  remains  insane  continu- 
ally thereafter  until  his  death,  and  an  ac- 
tion is  then  brought  against  his  heirs  to 
enforce  it,  they  may  by  a  jiroper  pleading 
di.-affnm  the  contract;  and  that  it  is  not 
a  good  reply  to  such  a  pleading  that  the 
party  was  ajip  irently  of  sound  mind ;  uor 
that  he  had  not  been  judicially  declared 
insane;    nor   that   the   other    party   con- 


tracted in  good  faith,  and  without  suspi- 
cion of  insanity ;  nor  that  no  previous 
effort  had  been  made  to  disafBrm  the  con- 
tract ;  nor  that  the  family  of  the  insane 
person  had  permitted  him  to  go  unattended 
and  transact  ordinary  business." 

*  Judge  of  Probate  v.  Stone,  44  N.  H. 
593. 

5  Valpey  v.  Rea,  130  Mass.  384.  Contra, 
Schuff  V.  Ransom  79  Ind.  458. 

fi  Breckcnridge  v.  Ormsby,  1  J.  J.  Marsh. 
236,  248,  19  Am.  Dec.  71  ;  Hunt  v.  Weir, 
4  Dana,  347;  Kilbee  v.  Myrick,  12  Fla. 
419;  Ingraham  u  Baldwin,  9  N.  Y.  45, 
48  ;   Hoyle  v.  Stowc,  2  Dev.  &  B.  320,  323. 

In  Massachusetts  a  jud;;ment  creditor  of 
a  devisee  may  recover  land  in  possession 
of  another  to  whom  the  testator,  after 
making  his  will,  conveyed  the  land  while 
insane.  This  is  by  virtue  of  a  statute 
which  makes  the  devisee's  right  of  entry 
subject  to  lie  taken  on  execution,  and  under 
the  levy  the  creditor  acquires  the  right  to 
recover  tlie  land  and  to  avoid  the  deed. 
Valpey  v.  Rea,  130  Mass.  384. 

67 


§§  Go,  iSij-l  DISABILITY    OK    INSANE    I'EKSONS. 

insanity  of  the  grantor,  and  be  puts  this  case  by  way  of  ilbistra- 
tiun  :  "  If  donee  iu  tail,  being  non  compos  mentis,  makes  a  feoff- 
ment in  fee  and  dies  without  issue,  he  in  reversion  or  remainder 
shall  not  enter  or  take  advantage  of  the  insanity  of  the  donee."  ^ 
A  wife  cannot  maintain  a  bill  in  equity  to  set  aside  a  conveyance 
by  her  husband  on  the  ground  that  he  was  insane  and  incapaci- 
tated to  execute  a  conveyance.^ 

65.  The  grantor  himself  may  avoid  his  deed  on  account  of 
his  insanity  at  the  time  of  its  execution,^  though  the  old  doctrine 
was  that  a  man  should  not  be  heard  to  stultify  himself  by  plead- 
ing his  own  insanity.'*  But  if  the  grantor  has  no  mind  he  cannot 
agree  in  mind  with  another  in  making  a  conveyance  or  other  con- 
tract.^ The  capacity  to  so  agree  is  the  essence  of  a  contract,  and 
without  it  there  is  no  contract.  If  one  has  made  a  conveyance 
without  a  consenting  mind,  so  that  in  effect  it  is  not  his  convey- 
ance, he  does  not  stultify  himself  in  saying  that  it  is  not  his  deed. 
There  is  no  good  reason  why  he  should  not  in  law  set  up  his 
incapacity  in  defence  where  such  a  deed  is  sought  to  be  enforced, 
or  why  he  should  not  set  it  up  as  ground  for  affirmative  relief 
in  equity. 

A  committee  cannot  be  appointed  for  a  sane  man  because  he 
was  at  one  time  insane.  He  must  bring  suit  himself  to  recover 
his  rights,  and  may  prove  insanity  to  avoid  a  deed  set  up  against 
him,  on  the  same  terms  as  if  he  were  defendant  in  the  action,  and 
the  plaintiff  were  supporting  his  case  with  the  same  deed.^  If  he 
continues  a  lunatic,  he  may  not  apjsear  and  plead  by  attorney  ;  and 
if  it  so  appears  on  examination,  the  plea  by  attorney  may,  before 
judgment,  be  treated  as  a  nullity,  and  a  guardian  be  appointed, 
who  will  be  entitled  to  plead  de  novo.'^ 

66.  A  deed  will  not  be  set  aside,  on  the  ground  of  the 
incompetency  of  the  grantor,  after  a  long  acquiescence  of  the 
parties  in   interest.     It  was  so  held  where  the  deed  \vas  by  a 

1  Beverley's  Case,4  Coke,  124 a.  This  v.  Rusk,  53  Md.  65;  Musselman  v.  Cra- 
doctrine  is  iidopted  iu  Maryland.     K(.y  v.     vcns,  47  Ind.  1. 

Davis,  1  Md.32.  *  Beverley's  Case,  4  Coke,  123  i  ;  Mur- 

2  Kilbec  V.  Myrick,  12  Fla.  419.  ley  v.  Sherrcn,  8  Ad.  &  El.  754. 

2  Moltou    V.    Camroux,    2    Exch.    487;  -^  1    Parsons  Cont.    383;     Crawford    v. 

Bensell  v.  Chancellor,  5  Wliart.  371,  34  Hcovell,  94  Pa.  St.  48,  39  Am.  Rep.  766. 

Am.  Dec.  561 ;  Rogers   v.  Walker,  6  Pa.  «  Crawford  v.  Scovell,  94  Pa.  St.  48,  52, 

St.371,47  Am.  Dec.  470;  Grant  r.  Thomp-  39  Am.  Rep.  766,  per  Tninkey,  J. 

Bon,    4   Conn.    203,    10    Am.   Dec.   119;  "  Mitchell  r.  Kingman,  5  Pick.  431. 
Mitchell  f.  Kingman,  5  Pick.  431  ;  Turner 

58 


RESTORING   CONSIDERATION    ON   DISAFFIRMANCE.  [§  67. 

father  to  one  of  his  suns  in  considerution  of  support,  and  the 
grantee  faithfully  furnished  such  support  for  muny  yeiir.s  during 
the  father's  lifetime.^  But  a  delay  of  three  years  by  an  heir  or 
devisee  of  a  grantor  alleged  to  be  mentally  incompetent  to  make  a 
deed  is  not  fatal  to  the  action,  though  the  land  has  in  the  mean 
time  been  transferred  to  an  innocent  purchaser.^ 

V.     Restoring  Consideration  on  Disaffirmance. 

67.  Whether  a  grantor  or  his  heirs  may  disaflSrm  his  deed 
made  "while  the  grantor  was  insane,  without  restoring  the 
consideration  to  the  grantee,  is  a  question  upon  which  the  deci- 
sions are  not  in  harmony.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  held  that  the 
consideration  need  not  be  restored.^  "  To  say  that  an  insane  man, 
before  he  can  avoid  a  voidable  deed,  must  put  the  grantee  in 
statu  quo,  would  be  to  say  in  effect  that,  in  a  large  majority  of 
cases,  Ijis  deed  shall  not  be  avoided  at  all.  The  more  insane  the 
grantor  was  when  the  deed  was  made,  the  less  likely  will  he  be  to 
retain  the  fruits  of  his  bargain,  so  as  to  be  able  to  make  restitu- 
tion. If  he  was  so  far  demented  as  not  to  know  or  recollect  what 
the  bargain  was,  the  difficulty  will  be  still  greater.  One  of  the 
obvious  grounds  on  which  tiie  deed  of  an  insane  man  or  an  infant 
is  held  voidable  is  not  merely  the  incapacity  to  make  a  valid  sale, 
but  the  incapacity  prudently  to  manage  and  dispose  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sale.  And  the  same  incapacity  which  made  the  deed 
void  may  have  wasted  the  price,  and  rendered  the  restoration  of 
the  consideration  impossible."  ^ 

This  rule  applies  even  after  the  grantor  has  been  restored  to 

1  Adair  i-.  Cook  (Ky.),  5  S.  W.    Rep.  48,  10  N.  E.  Rep.  735.   Mississippi:  Rick 
412.  etts  V.  Joliff,  02  Miss.  440.     See  Fiizger 

2  Paine  v.  Aldrich,  133  N.  Y.  544,  30  aid  v.  Rued,  9  Sm.  &  M.  94.     Nebraska 
N.  E.  Rep.  725.  Dewey  v.  Allgire,  37    Neb.  6,  55  N.  W 

»  Indiana:  Nichol  u.  Thomas,  53  Ind.  Rep.27G;  Rca  t\  Bishop  (Neb.),  59  N.  W 

42;  Soniers   v.   Pumi)hrey,  24    lud.  231;  Rep.  555.     New  Hampshire:  Flauders  i; 

riiysio-Medical  College  v.  Wilkinson,  108  Davis,  19 N.  H.  139.  Pennsylvania:  Craw 

Ind.  314  ;  Northwestern  JMut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  ford  v.  Scovell,  94  Pa.  St.  48,  39  Am.  Rep 

I'.  BLinkenship,  94  Ind.  185,  48  Am,  Rep.  7G6  ;   Rogers  v.   Walker,  6  Pa.  St.  371,  47 

185.     Maine:    Ilovey  v.   Ilobsou,  53  Me.  Am.  Dec.  470;  Tn  re  Desilver,  5  Rawle, 

451,  89  Am.  Dec.  705.    Maryland  :  Chew  v.  111. 

Bank,  14  Md.  299.     Massachusetts:  Gib-  <  Gibson  v.  Sopcr,  6  Gray,  279,  66  Am. 

son  i;.  Sopcr,  6Gray,  279,  66  Am.Dec.  414;  Dec.  414,  per    Thomas,    J.,    followed   in 

Fos.sy.  Ilildicth,  10  Allen,  "/fi  ;  Chandler  ii.  Crawford  v.  Scovell,  94  Pa.  St.  48,  39  Am. 

Simmons,  97  Mass.  508,  514,  93  Am.  Dec.  Dec.  766. 
117;  Brigliam  v.  Fayerweather,  144  Mass. 

69 


§  ^■•^^•J 


DISAIULIIY    OF    INSANE   PEKSONS. 


siiiiitv,  if  lie  lias  done  no  act  to  ;illirin  tlie  det'tl  prior  to  his  pro- 
ceedings to  avoid  it  and  to  recover  the  property.  If,  however, 
being  restored  to  the  full  possession  of  his  mind,  he  retains  notes, 
contraets,  or  specific  property  given  by  the  grantee  for  the  con- 
veyance, such  retention  is  evidence  of  a  ratification. ^  It  is  also 
heki  in  some  cases,  particuhirly  in  thuse  derided  in  Indiana,  that 
where  the  consideration  was  necessary  or  benelicial  to  tlie  grantor 
it  should  be  restored  upon  a  disaffirmance  of  the  conveyance. 
Where  a  mortgage  was  given  to  secure  the  re])ayn)ent  of  money 
obtained  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  the  mortgagor,  in  that  it 
was  applied  in  payment  of  a  bona  fide  debt  of  the  insane  mort- 
gagor, it  was  held  that  the  consideration  must  be  restored  upon 
disaffirmance.^ 

68.  On  the  other  hand,  the  English  rule,  followed  also  in 
some  American  States,  is  that  a  deed  made  in  good  faith  for 
a  full  consideration,  the  grantor  apparently  being  of  sound  mind,. 
and  the  grantee  not  knowing  or  suspecting  the  contrary,  cannot 
be  avoided  on  the  ground  of  insanity  without  making  restoration 
of  the  consideration  paid  for  the  conveyance.^ 

This  rule,  first  applied  where  the  consideration  was  necessaries 


1  Gibsou  V.  Soper,  6  Gray,  279,  66  Am. 
Dec.  414,  in  which  the  case  of  Arnold  v. 
Richmond  Iron  Works,  1  Gray,  434,  is 
examined,  and  shown  to  be  in  nccord  when 
limited  to  the  actual  case  decided. 

2  Copenrath  i;.  Kienhy,  83  Ind.  18. 

3  Story's  Eq.  .Jur.  §  228  ;  Biiswell  on 
Insanity.  §  413  ;  Bagster  v.  Earl  of  Ports- 
mouth, 7  Dow.  &  Ry.  614;  Addison  v. 
Dawjion,  2  Vern.  678;  Selby  v.  Jackson, 
6  Beav.  192  ;  Molton  v.  Camroux,2  Exch. 
487,4  Exch.  17;  Elliot  v.  Ince,  7  De  G., 
M.  &  G.  475  ;  Price  v.  Berrington,  3  Macn. 
&  G.  486  ;  Campbell  v.  Hill.  23  U.  C.  C. 
P.  47.3,  affirming  22  U.  C.  C.  P.  526. 
Colorado:  Elder  v.  Schumacher,  18  Colo. 
433,  33  Pac.  Rep.  175.  Illinois  :  Scanlan 
V.  Cobb,  85  111.  296;  Meukins  i-.  Light- 
ner,  18  111.  282;  Burnham  v.  Kidwell,  113 
111.  425.  Indiana :  Freed  v.  Brown,  fjS 
Ind.  310;  Fay  v.  Burditt,  81  Ind.  433,  42 
Am.  Hep.  142;  Boyer  i-.  Beiryman,  123 
Ind.  451,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  249;  Copcnnith 
V.  Kienby,  83  Ind.  18.  Iowa:  Alexander 
r.  Haskins,  68   Iowa,  73,  25   N.  W.   Rep. 

60 


935  ;  Abbott  v.  Crcal,  56  Iowa,  175,  9  N. 
W.  Rep.  115;  Behrens  v.  McKcnzie,  23 
Iowa,  333,  92  Am.  Dec.  428;  Corbit  v. 
Smith,  7  Iowa,  60,  71  Am.  Dec.  431  ; 
Allen  V.  Berryhill,  27  Iowa,  .534,  1  Am. 
Rep.  309.  Kansas:  Gribben  y.  Maxwell, 
34  Kans.  8,  7  Pac.  Rep.  584;  Myers  v. 
Knabe,  51  Kans.  720,  33  Pac.  Rep.  602; 
Leavitt  v  Files,  38  Kans.  26,  15  Pac.  Rep. 
89 1 .  Kentucky  :  Rusk  c.  Fenton,  1 4  Bush, 
490,  29  Am.  Rep.  413.  Michigan  :  Davis 
Sewing-Machine  Co.  v.  Barnard,  43  Mich. 
379.  Nev/ Hampshire  :  Young  v.  Steven.s, 
48  N.  H.  133,  2  Am.  Rep.  202,  97  Am. 
Dec.  592.  New  Jersey  :  Eaton  v.  Eaton, 
37  N.  J.  L.  108,  18  Am.  Rep.  716  ;  Yiiuger 
V.  Skinner,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  389.  New  York  : 
Loomis  V.  Spencer,  2  Paige,  153.  North 
Carolina:  Odom  v.  Riddick,  104  N.  C. 
515,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  609;  Riggan  v.  Green, 
80  N.  C  236,  30  Am.  Rep.  77  ;  Carr  v. 
Ilollidny,  1  D<v.  &  B.  Eq.  344,  5  Ired.  Eq. 
167.  Vermont:  Lincoln  v.  Buckmat^ter, 
3-2  V(.  6.^)2.  Wisconsin:  Blodgett  v.  Ilitt, 
29  Wis.  169  ;  xMohr  v.  Tuliji,  40  Wis.  06. 


RESTORING    CONSIDERATION   ON   DISAFFIRMANCE.  [§  6'J. 

furnished  to  an  insane  grantor  without  knowledge  of  his  infirm- 
ity,^ has  been  extended  to  cases  where  the  consideration  was  not 
actually  necessaries,  or  even  beneficial  to  the  lunatic,  but  the 
consideration  was  money  which  he  squandered.  Of  course,  if 
the  lunatic  received  no  cons-ideration  for  the  conveyance,  there  is 
nothing  to  be  restored  upon  a  disaffirmance  of  the  conveyance,  as 
when  a  mortgage  is  executed  for  the  sole  benefit  of  a  husband  or 
other  person.  If  the  purchaser  knew  at  the  time  of  the  purchase 
that  the  grantor  was  mentally  incapable  of  executing  a  deed,  in  an 
action  to  set  aside  the  deed  he  is  not  entitled  to  a. return  of  the 
purchase-money.^ 

69.  If  the  parties  cannot  be  placed  in  statu  quo,  the  title  of 
the  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  will  remain  good  against  the 
insane  grantor  and  against  his  heirs. ^  The  right  to  set  aside  the 
deed  of  an  insane  person  who  has  not  previously  been  declared  in- 
sane is  based  upon  the  ground  of  fraud ;  and  the  court  will  not 
usually  interfere,  unless  there  has  been  fraud  or  a  knowledge  of 
the  insanity  by  the  other  party,  and  will  then  place  the  parties  in 
statu  quo.  Therefore,  even  when  the  grantee  knew  of  the  mental 
incapacity  of  the  grantor,  but  it  is  found  as  a  fact  that  no  fraud 
was  practised  upon  the  grantor,  or  undue  influence  exercised  to 
induce  him  to  make  the  deed  ;  that  he  acted  under  the  advice  of 
counsel ;  that  the  price  paid  was  a  full  and  fair  consideration  for 
the  land  ;  and  that  the  grantor  was  benefited  by  the  making  of 
the  deed,  —  a  court  of  equity  will  not  set  aside  such  conveyance 
even  as  between  the  parties  thereto,  and  certainly  not  without 
restoring  the  status  quo  ante.*  Inadequacy  of  consideration  is 
of  itself  some  evidence  of  fraud.^ 

1  Bagster  v.    Earl    of    Portsmonth,   7  Elder  v.  Schumacher,  18   Colo.   433,  33 

Dow.  &  Ry.  614.  Pac.  Rep.   175;  Scanlan  v.  Cobb,  85  HI. 

^  Elder  v.  Schumacher,  18  Colo.  433,33  296;  Alexander  v.  Haskins,  68  Iowa,  73, 

Pac.  Rep.  175.  25  N.  W.  Rep.  935  ;  Ashcraft  v.  De  Ar- 

=J  Molton  ?;.  Camroux,  2  Exch.  487,  af-  mond,  44  Iowa,  234;  Warfield  v.  War- 
firmed  4  Exch.  17  ;  Niell  v.  Morley,  9  Ves.  field,  76  Iowa,  633,  41  N.  W.  Rep.  383; 
478;  Price  v.  Berrin<,'ton,  3  Macn.  &  G.  Rusk  r.  Fenton,  14  Bush,  490,  29  Am. 
486,  per  Lord  Chancellor  Truro;  Elliot  Rep.  413;  Giibben  r.  Maxwell,  34  Kans. 
V.  Ince,  7   De  G.,  M.  &  G.  475,  per  Lord  8,  7  Pac.  Rep.  584. 

Cranworth;    Selby    v.   Jackson,   6  Hear.         *  Odom   v.  Riddick,  104  N.  C  515,  10 

192,  per  Lord  Langdale ;  Yuwger  v.  Skin-  S.  E.  Rep.  609,  per  Clark,  J. 
ner,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  389 ;  Odom  v.  Riddick,         '  Leonardson  v.  Ilulin,  64  Mich.  1,  31 

104  N.  C.  515,  10  S.  E.  Rpp.  609  ;  Ri<r<ran  N.  W.  Rep.  26. 
V.  Green,  80  N.  C.  236,  W   Am.  Rep.  77; 

61 


§§  70,  71.]  DISAIULITY    OK    INSANK    TEKSONS. 

VI.    Title  of  Purchaser  in  good  Faith. 

70.  It  is  immaterial  that  in  taking  the  deed  the  purchaser 
acted  in  good  faith,  and  witliout  knowledge  of  thu  grantor's  in- 
sanity, and  that  this  had  not  been  judicially  declared.  One;  who 
duals  with  an  insane  person,  as  one  who  deals  with  an  infant,  does 
so  at  his  peril. ^  The  fairness  of  the  purchaser's  conduct  Ciuinot 
supply  the  grantor's  want  of  capacity.  Insanity  is  not  always 
apparent ;  nor  is  the  minority  of  an  infant  always  apparent ;  and 
there  may  be  a  loss  in  dealing  in  good  faith  with  either;  but  the 
rules  of  law  cannot  be  changed  in  order  to  avoid  all  possible  loss 
in  either  case.^ 

Where  the  grantee  of  an  incompetent  person  mortgaged  the 
premises  to  secure  a  loan  to  one  who  had  no  knowledge  of 
the  grantor's  condition,  a  portion  of  the  money  being  paid  to  the 
grantor,  but  a  brother  of  the  mortgagee  drew  the  deed,  and  was 
present  at  its  execution,  and  acted  as  agent  of  the  mortgagee  in 
negotiating  the  loan,  it  was  held  that  the  mortgage  would  not  be 
considered  as  having  been  taken  in  good  faith  without  notice,  and 
was  invalid,  except  as  to  the  portion  received  by  the  grantor.^ 

71.  The  deed  of  an  insane  person  not  under  guardianship 
may  be  avoided  not  only  as  against  the  grantee,  but  as  against 
subsequent  bona  fide  purchasers  from  the  latter.*  "  Whtn  a 
man  is  defrauded,  he  may,  as  against  his  grantee,  avoid  his  deed, 
but  not  against  those  deriving  in  good  faith,  and  for  an  adequate 

1  District    of    Columbia:     Sullivan    v.  2  t^eaver  u.  Phelps,  II  Pick.304,  22  Am. 

Flynn,  20  D   C.  39G.     Indiana:    Somers  Dec.  372,  per  Wilde,  J. 

V.  Pumphrey,  24  Ind.  231  ;   Northwestern  ^  Sponable  v.  Hanson,  87  Mich.  204,  49 

Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Blankenship,  94    lud.  N.  W.  Kej).  644. 

535, 48  Am.  Pep.  185  ;  Physio-Medical  Col-  •*  Hovey  v.  Hobsou,  53  Me.  451 ,  89  Am. 

legCf.  Wilkinson,  108  Ind.  314,  320;  Hull  Dec.    705  ;  Mohr  i-.    Tulip,    40  Wis.    66; 

V.  Louth,  109  Ind.   315,  58  Am.  Rep.  405.  Somers  v.  Pumphrey,  24   Ind.  231 ;  Hull 

Maine:    Hovey   r.  Hobson,  53  Me.   451,  r.  Louth,  109  Ind.  315,  10  N.  E.  Rep.  270, 

89  Am.  Dec.  705.     Massachusetts:  Brig-  58  Am.  Rep.  405  ;  Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet, 

ham   V.  Fayerweather,  144  Mass.  48,    10  51   N.  ¥.378;  Goodyear  v.  Adams,  5  N. 

N.  E.  Rep.  735  ;  Gibson  v.  Soper,  6  Gray,  Y.  Supp.  275 ;  Dewey  v.  Allgire,  37  Neb. 

279,   282,  66   Am.   Dec.   410;    Seavcr  v.  61,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  276  ;  Rogers  v.  Black- 

Phelps,  11   Pick.  .304,  306,  22  Am.  Dec.  well,  49  Mich.  192,  13  N.  W.  Rep.  512,  per 

372.     New  York :  Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet,  Marston,  J. :  "  If  the  acts  of  an  insane 

51   N.  Y.  378.     Pennsylvania:  Crawford  person  can  thus  be  made  valid  and  bind 

V.  Scovell,  94  Pa.  St.  48,  39  Am.  Rep.  ing,  an  easy  method  is  thereby  found  for 

766  ;  Rogers  v.  Walker,  6  Pa.  St.  371,  47  disposing  of  his  property." 
Am.  Dec.  470. 

62 


TITLE    OF   PURCHASER    IN    GOOD    FAITH.  [§   72. 

considenition,  a  title  from  such  grantee.  He  has  the  ahility  to 
convey  an  indefeasible  title,  and  he  does  convey  such  title  to  all 
5owa^V?e  purchasers  from  his  grantee.  The  msane  man  has  nut 
the  power  to  convey  suoh  indufeiisible  title.  This  incapacity 
inheres  in  all  titles  derived  from  him.  The  grantee  whose  title 
is  thus  derived  must  rely  on  the  covenants  of  his  deed.  Pie  risks 
the  capacity  to  convey  of  all  through  whom  his  title  has  passed. 
The  right  of  infants  and  of  insane  alike  to  avoid  their  contracts  is 
an  absolute  and  paramount  right,  superior  to  all  equities  of  other 
persons,  and  may  be  exercised  against  bona  fide  purchasers  from 
the  grantee."  1 

72.  It  has  been  held,  however,  in  a  few  cases,  that  the  title 
of  a  purchaser  in  good  faith  from  the  grantee  will  not  be  dis- 
turbed, though  the  deed  to  the  grantee  be  voidable  on  account  of 
the  insanity  of  the  grantor.^  Of  course,  to  entitle  such  purchaser 
to  protection,  it  must  appear  that  he  purchased  without  notice  of 
the  insanity  of  the  prior  grantor,  and  that  he  paid  a  full  and  fair 
price  for  the  conveyance  to  himself. ^  The  presumption  of  the 
law  is  in  favor  of  sanity.  "  When,  therefore,  a  purchaser  sees 
a  regular  chain  of  title,  formal  in  all  particulars,  upon  the  regis- 
tration books,  executed  by  grantors  of  full  age,  and  not  femes 
covert,  he  has  a  right  to  rely  upon  the  presumption  of  sanity  ;  and 
if,  without  any  notice,  or  matter  to  put  him  upon  inquiry,  and  for 
fair  value,  he  takes  a  deed,  he  should  be  protected.  Any  other 
doctrine  would  place  all  titles  upon  the  hazard.  If  the  title  of  an 
innocent  purchaser  for  value  and  without  notice  can  be  upset 
for  the  alleged  mental  incapacity  of  one  grantor,  it  can  be  done 
though  the  grantor  may  have  been  a  very  remote  one."  * 

Where  the  immediate  grantee  of  an  insane  person  took  for 
value  and  without  notice  of  the  grantor's  insanity,  a  subsequent 
purchaser  from  such  innocent  grantee  for  value,  though  with 
notice  of  the  original  grantor's  incapacity,  is  not  affected  by  it, 
but  obtains  a  good  title.'^ 

1  Hovey  v.  Hobson,  53  Me.  451,  458,  89  As  to  evidence  of  notice  of  insanity,  see 
Am.  Dec.  705,  per  Appleton,  C.  J.  Beavan  v.  M'Donnell,  10  Exch.  184. 

2  Greenslade    v.   Dare,   20  Beav.  284;         *  Odom  v.  Riddick,  104  N.  C.  515,  10 
Odom  V.  Riddick,  104  N.  C.  515,  10  S.  E.  S.  E.  Rep.  609. 

Rep.  G09.  6  Aslicraft  v.  De  Armond,44  Iowa,  229; 

»  Odom  V.  Riddick,  104  N.  C.   515,  524,  Odom  v.  Riddick,  104   N.  C.  515,  524,  10 

10  S.  E.  Hep.  609  ;  New  England  L.  &  T.  S.  E.  Rep.  609. 
Co.  V.  Spitler  (Kans.),  38  Pac.  Rep.  799. 

63 


§  73.]  DISAIULITY    OF    INSANE    TEBSONS. 

73.  Account  of  rents  and  profits. —  When  a  couveyaiue  is 
set  aside  on  account  of  the  grantor's  insanity,  tlu;  giantee  or  other 
jHM-son  in  2)ossession  is  onlinarily  obliged  to  account  for  the  rents 
and  profits  chuing  the  time  he  has  had  possession.^  ]f  the  ])rop- 
erty  is  not  rented,  the  grantee  is  held  to  account  for  the  actual 
rental  value  of  it  from  the  time  he  came  into  possession. 

1  I'ricei'.  Bcrriuytou,  7  Ilarc,  394;  Fitz-     iugton  v.  Campbell  (Ky.),  1   S.  W.  Rep. 
gerald  v.  Reed,  9  Sm.  &  M.  94;  Worth-    714. 

64 


CHAPTER   IV. 

DISABILITY   FROM   DRUNKENNESS. 

74.  Intoxication.  —  The  incompetence  of  a  drunkard  to  make 
a  deed  is  unlike  that  of  a  person  generally  insane;  for  the 
drunkard's  incompetency  must  be  shown  by  proof  that,  at  the 
time  of  his  execution  of  the  deed,  his  understanding  was  clouded 
or  his  reason  dethroned  by  actual  intoxication.^  Of  course,  inca- 
pacity may  be  induced  by  a  long  course  of  drunkenness  ;  but  in 
such  case  the  incapacity  is  that  of  insanity  rather  than  that  of 
temporary  intoxication.^  It  must  be  shown,  moreover,  that  the 
grantor  was  so  intoxicated  that  he  was  incapable  of  comprehend- 
ing the  effect  of  what  he  was  doing.'^  A  moderate  degree  of 
intoxication,  which  does  not  deprive  the  mind  of  the  power  of 
rational  consent,  does  not  of  itself  avoid  a  deed.  But  a  deed 
made  by  one  not  excessively  intoxicated  may  be  avoided  in  equity, 
on  the  ground  of  fraud,  upon    proof  that  the  grantee  drew  the 


1  Cooke  V.  Clay  worth,  18  Ves.  15  ;  Pitt 
V.  Smith,  3  Camp.  33;  Ayrey  v.  Hill,  2 
Addam's  Ecc.  206 ;  Gore  i'.  Gibson,  13 
Mces.  &  W.  623  ;  Van  Wyck  v.  Brasher, 
81  N.  Y.  260  ;  Peck  v.  Caiy,  27  N.  Y.  9, 
84  Am.  Dec.  220  ;  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  22 
Wend.  526,  34  Am.  Dec.  340;  Jenners  v. 
Howard,  6  Blackf.  240 ;  Cummings  v. 
Henry,  10  Ind.  109  ;  Arnold  v.  Hickman, 
6  Munf.  15;  Taylor  v.  Patrick,  1  Bibb, 
168;  Shackelton  v.  Sebree,  86  111.  616. 

2  Wilson  V.  Bigger,  7  Watts  &  S.  HI 
Miskcy's  App.  107  Pa.  St.  611;  Wiley  w. 
r.walt,  66  111.  26  ;  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  22 
Wend.  526,  34  Am.  Dec.  340;  Samuel  v. 
Marshall,  3  Leigh,  567. 

2  Sliackclton  i-.  Sebree,  fi6  III.  616; 
Reinskoff  v.  Rogge,  37  Ind.  207  ;  French 
V.  French,  8  Ohio,  214,  31  Am.  Dec.  441 ; 
Donelson  v.  Posey,  13  Ala.  752;  Caulkins 
I'.  Fry,  35  Conn.  170;  Foot  v.  Tewksbnry, 
2  Vt.  97  ;  Biidsong  v.  Bird.iong.  2  Head, 
VOL.   I. 


289;  Mansfield  v.  Watson,  2  Iowa,  111; 
Pickett  I'.  Sutter,  5  Cal.  412;  Peck  v. 
Gary,  27  N.  Y.  9,  84  Am.  Dec.  220; 
Prentice  v.  Achorn,  2  Paige,  30;  Newell 
V.  Fisher,  19  Miss.  431,  49  Am.  Dec.  66  ; 
Morris  v.  Clay,  8  Jones,  216;  Bursinger 
V.  Bank,  67  Wis.  75,  30  N.  W.  Rep.  290. 

"  Where  the  party,  when  he  enters  into 
the  contract,  is  in  such  a  state  of  drunken- 
ness as  not  to  know  what  he  i8  doing,  and 
particularly  when  it  appears  that  this  was 
known  co  the  other  party,  the  contract  is 
void  altogether,  and  he  cannot  be  com- 
pelled to  ])erform  it.  A  person  who  takes 
an  obligation  from  another  under  such 
circumstances  i.s  guilty  of  actual  fraud. 
The  modern  decisions  have  qualified  the 
old  doctrine  that  a  man  shall  not  he  al- 
lowed to  allege  his  own  lunacy  or  intoxi- 
cation, and  total  drunkenness  is  now  held 
to  be  a  defence."  Gore  v.  Gibson,  13  M. 
&  W.  623,  626,  per  Parke,  B. 
65 


vj§  TT),  7(>.]  PlSARILll'Y    FKOM    DUUNKENXKSS. 

i:;ianli>r  into  ilriiik,  :aul  took  tulvuiiUigc,  of  his  intoxication  to  get 
liini  to  oxocute  the  deocl.^ 

75.  The  fact  to  be  proved  is  the  condition  of  the  grantor 
at  the  time  the  deed  was  executed.  From  the  nature  of  the 
disqualifying  cause,  the  proof  is  much  more  closely  limited  to  the 
time  of  the  transaction  of  the  business  than  the  proof  is  in  case 
of  insanity. 2  Intoxication  is  a  temporary  disability ;  insanity 
is  permanent,  or,  usually  at  least,  long  continued.  But  evidence 
of  the  condition  of  the  grantor,  several  hours  after  the  transaction, 
may  be  received  as  tending  to  throw  light  on  his  condition  when 
the  deed  was  executed.^ 

Wlien  incapacity  by  reason  of  drunkenness  is  set  up  as  a 
ground  for  annulling  a  deed,  the  vital  inquiry  is  as  to  his  ca- 
pacity when  the  deed  was  executed,  not  as  to  his  capacity 
when  drunk.  If  the  evidence  shows  that,  on  the  occasion  when 
the  deed  was  executed,  the  grantor  was  perfectly  sober,  and 
possessed  sufficient  capacity  to  dispose  of  his  property  with  an 
intelligent  understanding  of  what  he  was  doing,  it  does  not  matter 
that  it  appears  that  he  was  often  intoxicated,  and  that  when  in 
that  condition  he  was  incapacitated  to  transact  business  ;  nor  does 
it  matter  that  it  also  appears  that  the  grantor,  from  habitual 
dissipation,  was  in  such  an  enfeebled  condition  of  mind  or  body, 
immediately  before  or  immediately  after  the  execution  of  the 
deed,  as  to  render  him  incompetent  to  transact  business.  Such 
evidence  throws  the  burden  of  proof  as  to  his  capacity  at  the  date 
of  the  execution  of  the  deed  upon  the  grantee  who  claims  title 
under  it.  This  burden  is  met  by  evidence  of  undoubted  capacity 
at  that  particular  time.* 

76.  Ordinarily  the  grantee  would  know  of  the  grantor's 
intoxication,  when  this  had  gone  to  the  extent  of  rendering 
him  incapable  of  transacting  business  intelligently  ;  and  on  this 
ground  his  dealing  with  a  person  excessively  intoxicated  may  be 

'  Mansfield   v.    Watson,  2   Iowa,    111  ;  -  Peck  v.  Gary,  27  N.  Y.  9,  17,  84  Am. 

Birdsonfj  v.  Birdsonp;,  2  Head,  289.  Dec.  220 ;  Andress  v.  Weller,  3  N.  J.  Eq. 

A  case  in  equity  to  set  aside  a  deed  on  604. 

account  of  the  grantor's  intoxication  at  ^  phelan  v.  Gardner,  43  Cal.  306. 

the  time,  amounting  to  incapacity  on  his  *  Ralston  v.  Tnrpin,  129  U.  S.  663,  671, 

part,  must  be  decided  on  its  own  merits,  9  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  420,  per  Harlan,  J.    And 

without  regard    to   previous  deci.sions  in  see  Conley  r.  Nailor,  118  U.   S.  127,131, 

cases   differing   in   the   facts.     Conley  v.  6  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1001. 
Nailor,  11 8  U.S.  127,6  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1001. 
66 


DISABILITY    FROM    DRUNKENNESS.  [§  77. 

regarded  as  prima  facie  fraudulent.  When  such  knowledge  is 
shown,  or  when  it  is  shown  that  the  grantor's  intoxication  was 
produced  by  the  art  or  connivance  of  the  grantee,  or  that  the 
latter  took  undue  advantage  of  the  grantor's  situation,  equity  will, 
in  behalf  of  the  grantor,  relieve  against  the  conveyance.^  But 
equity  will  not  ordinarily  assist  the  grantee,  who  has  obtained  a 
deed  from  the  grantor  while  intoxicated,  in  avoiding  the  deed.^ 
In  some  cases  it  is  said  that  equity  will  not  relieve  the  grantor 
from  his  conveyance  made  while  intoxicated,  unless  it  be  shown 
that  the  grantee  connived  at  the  intoxication,  or  took  undue  ad- 
vantage of  the  grantor  in  consequence  of  his  condition."^ 

But  the  better  rule  is,  that  the  grantor  may  avoid  his  deed  in 
such  case  although  the  intoxication  was  voluntary,  and  not  in  any 
way  })rocuied  by  the  connivance  of  the  other  party .^  If  it  is  shown 
that  the  grantor  was  intoxicated  at  the  time  of  executing  a  deed, 
inadequacy  of  price  is  direct  evidence  of  fraud.^  But  if  a  person, 
while  intoxicated,  voluntarily  executes  a  deed  of  trust  for  the 
benefit  of  his  wife  and  children,  the  state  of  intoxication  not  being 
induced  by  them  or  on  their  behalf,  equity  will  not  set  it  aside.*^ 

Where  one  purchased  land  and  took  a  conveyance  with  full 
knowledge  that  proceedings  had  been  instituted  in  the  court  of 
chancery  against  the  grantor  as  an  habitual  drunkard ;  that  a 
commission  had  been  issued  to  inquire  as  to  his  incapacity  to  man- 
age his  affairs  ;  and  that  the  sheriff  was  then  summoning  a  jury 
to  try  such  inquisition,  —  the  conveyance  was  set  aside,  with  costs, 
on  a  bill  filed  by  the  committee  of  the  person  and  estate  of  the 
habitual  drunkard.'^ 

77.  The  burden  of  proving   intoxication  is  upon  the  party 

1  Burroughs  v.  Richman,  13  N.  J.  L.  *  Pitt  v.  Smith,  3  Camp.  33 ;  Barrett 
233,  23  Am.  Dec.  717;  Warnock  u.  Camp-  v.  Buxton,  2  Aik.  167,  16  Am.  Dec. 
bell,  2.5  N.  J.  Eq.  485  ;  Jolinson  v.  Phifer,  691  ;  Mansfield  v.  Watson,  2  Iowa,  111  ; 
6  Xeb.  401  ;  State  Bauk  v.  McCoy,  69  Pa.  French  v.  French,  8  Ohio,  214,  31  Am. 
St.  204,  8  Am.  Rep.  246.  Dec.  441. 

2  Cooke  i;.  Clay  worth,  18  Ves.  Jr.  12.  &  Crane  v.  Coriklin,  1   N.  J.  Eq.  346,  22 
'Johnson   v.   Medlicott,  cited  in  3   P.     Am.  Dec.  519  ;  Mead  f.  Coombs,  2  N.J.  Eq. 

Wms.   130;   Cory    v.   Cory,    1    Ves.  19;  173;  Reynolds  v.  Waller,  1   Wash.  (Va.) 

Dunnage  v.  White,  1  Swanst.  137;  Pitten-  164;  Hutchinson  v.  Tindall,  3  N.  J.  Eq. 

ger  V.  Pittengtr,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  156  ;  Hutch-  357. 

in.son  v.  Tindall,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  357 ;  Rod-  «  Hutchinson  v.  Tindall,  3  N.   J.   Eq. 

man   v.  Zilley,  1   N.  J.  Eq.  320;    Crane  357. 

V.  Conklin,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  346,  22   Am.  Dec.  "i  Griswold  v.  Miller,  15  Barb.  520.  And 

519     Campbell  v.  Ketcham,  1  Bibb,  406  see  Frost  !\  Beavan,  17  Jur.  369. 

67 


§  78.] 


DISABILITY    FROM    DRUNKENNESS. 


who  sets  up  this  fact  in  defence.^  Bat  uiuKt  a  statute  whereby 
a  person  is  adjiulu'iiti'd  an  habitual  drunkard  from  a  time  prior  to 
the  incjut'st,  the  burden  of  proof  is  shifted,  as  to  contracts  made 
within  the  period  covered  by  the  finding,  to  tlie  other  party,  and 
the  drunkard  is  prima  facie  incompetent  to  contract;  and,  as  to 
contracts  made  after  sucli  finding,  the  adjudication  is  conclusive 
evidenci'  of  his  incapacity.^ 

78.  The  deed  of  a  person  rendered  incompetent  by  intoxi- 
cation is  voidable  only,  and  not  void.  He  may  ratify  or  disaf- 
firm the  deed  on  becoming  sober.^  Any  unreasonable  delay  in 
avoidinsf  the  deed  will  be  taken  as  a  confirmation  of  it.'* 

The  defence  of  drunkenness,  moreover,  like  that  of  duress, 
infancy,  or  insanity,  is  a  personal  one ;  and  if  the  grantor,  who 
has  made  a  deed  while  drunk,  chooses  to  abide  by  it  when  sober, 
no  third  person  can  interpose  the  defence.^ 

A  deed  may  be  avoided  at  law  on  the  ground  of  the  grantor's 
incompetency  ;  but  when  it  is  sought  to  avoid  it  on  the  ground  of 
the  fraud  of  the  grantee  in  connection  with  the  grantor's  drunk- 
enness, the  remedy  is  in  equity.^ 


1  Black  V.  Ellis,  3  Hill  (S.  C),  68. 

2  Klohs  V.  Klohs,  61  Pa.  St.  245  ;  Lcckey 
V.  Cunningham,  56  Pa.  St.  370;  Imhoify. 
Witmer,  31  Pa.  St.  243  ;  Clark  v.  Caldwell, 
6  Watts,  139. 

8  Matthews  v.  Baxter,  L.  R.  8  Exch. 
132;  Joest  r.  Williams,  42  lud.  565,  13 
Am.  Rep.  377;  McGuire  i'.  Callahan,  19 
Ind.  128;  Jenners  v.  Howard,  6  Blackf. 
240 ;  Eaton  v.  Perry,  29  Mo.  96  ;  Broad- 

68 


water  v.  Dame,  10  Mo.  277 ;  Arnold  v. 
Hickman,  6  Munf.  15;  Williams  r.  Inab- 
net,  1  Bailey  (S.  C),  343. 

4  Williams  V.  luabnet,  1   Bailey  (S.  C), 
343 ;  Cummings  r.  Henry,  10  Ind.  109. 

5  Cole    V.  Gibbons,   3    P.    Wms.   290; 
Eaton  u.  Perry,  29  Mo.  96. 

<'  Mansfield  v.  Watson,    2   Iowa,    111; 
Birdsong  v.  Birdsong,  2  Head,  289. 


CHAPTER  V. 


DISABILITY   FROM   DURESS. 


IV.  Defence  and  proof  of  duress,  90-92. 
V.  Duress  renders   deed  voidable  only, 
93-96. 


I.  Duress  by  imprisonment,  79.  80. 
II.  Duress  by  threats,  81-88. 
III.  Duress  of  property,  89. 

I.  Duress  hy  Imprisonment. 
79.  Duress  by  imprisonment  occurs  where  there  is  detention 
of  the  person  without  warrant  of  law;  where  there  has  been  an 
abuse  of  legal  process  by  arrest  upon  a  false  charge,  or  without 
probable  cause  ;  where  there  has  been  a  lawful  arrest,  but  for  an 
unlawful  purpose  ;  or  where  there  has  been  an  arrest  legal  in  its 
inception,  but  followed  by  maltreatment  of  the  prisoner.  An 
arrest  for  an  improper  purpose  without  a  just  cause,  or  an  arrest 
for  a  just  cause  without  lawful  authority,  or  an  arrest  for  a  just 
cause  and  under  lawful  authority  for  unlawful  purposes,  may  be 
construed  a  duress.^ 


1  Stepney  v.  Lloyd,  2  Cro.  Ellz.  647; 
Brown  v.  Fierce,  7  Wall.  205,  215.    Ala- 
bama: Hatter  v.  Greenlee,  1  J'ort.  222,  26 
Am.«  Dec.   370.     Colorado  :    Lighthall  v. 
Moore,  2  Colo.  App.  554,  31   Fac.  Rep. 
511.    Illinois:  Taylor  v.  Marcum,  16  111. 
93  ;  Shenk  v.  Fhelps,  6  111.  App.  612.     In- 
diana: Brooks   V.  Berryliill,  20   Ind.  97. 
Kansas  :  Winfield  Nat.  Bank  v.  Croco,  46 
Kans.   620,  26  Fac.  Kep.   939.     Maine 
Crowell   V.   Gleason,    10   Me.   325,   3.33 
Whitefield  v.   Longfellow,    13   Me.    140 
Soule  V.  Bonney,  37  Me.  128.    Massachu- 
setts :  Watkins   v.  Baird,  6  Ma.ss.  506,  4 
Am.  Dec.  170;  Morse  v.  Woodworth,  155 
Mass.  233,  251,  27  N.  E.   llcp.  1010,  29 
N.   E.  Rep.  525.      Michigan:    Seibev   r. 
Price,  26   Mich.   518.     New  Hampshire: 
Richard.son  r.  Duncan,  3  N.  II.  508  ;  Brcck 
i;.  Blaiichard,  22  N.  II..^03,  51   Am.  Dec. 
222 ;  Severance  v.  Kimball,  8  N.  II.  386. 


New  York :  Osborn  v.  Robbins,  36  N.  Y. 
305;  Strong  i;.  Grannis,  26  Barb.  122; 
Richards  v.  Vanderpoel,  1  Daly,  71  ; 
Thompson  v.  Lock  wood,  15  Johns.  256; 
Foshay  v.  Ferguson,  5  Hill,  154,  158,  per 
Bronson,  J. :  "  If  a  deed  might  be  avoided 
nearly  three  centuries  ago  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  procured  by  threats  and  the  fear 
of  illegal  imprisonment,  there  can  be  no 
room  for  doubt  upon  the  question  at  the 
present  dav.  As  civilization  has  advanced, 
the  law  has  tended  much  move  strongly 
than  it  formerly  did  to  overthrow  every- 
thing which  is  built  upon  violence  or 
fraud."  North  Carolina :  Ware  v.  Nesbit, 
94  N.  C.  004,  6G8.  Pennsylvania:  Stouffer 
r.  Latshaw,  2  Watts,  105,  27  Am.  Dec.  297. 
Tezas:  yi>aulding  v.  Crawford,  27  Tex. 
155;  Fhelps  f.  Zuschlag,  34  Tex.  371. 
Wisconsin  :  Biown  v.  Feck,  2  Wis.  261  ; 
Fav  f.  Oatlev.O  Wis.  42,45. 

69 


§§  80,  81.]  DISABILITY    FROM    DURESS. 

Though  an  arrest  is  made  under  a  legal  warrant,  if  one  of  the 
objects  of  the  arrest  was  to  extort  money,  or  enforce  the  settle- 
ment of  a  civil  claim,  such  arrest  is  a  false  imprisonment,  and  a 
release  or  conveyance  of  property  obtained  thereby  is  void.  The 
discharge  of  the  person  arrested  without  examination  before  a 
m.igistrate,  and  without  a  return  of  the  warrant,  is  a  circum- 
stance to  be  considered  by  the  jury  as  bearing  upon  the  question 
of  duiess.^  Security  obtained  in  this  manner  may  be  avoided, 
although  the  chiim  secured  was  just  in  itself.^ 

80.  There  is  no  duress  where  the  imprisonment  is  under 
legal  process  properly  obtained  for  a  probable  cause,  with  no 
ulterior  purpose,  and  a  deed  voluntarily  executed  by  the  pi-isoner 
to  obtain  his  deliverance  cannot  be  avoided  on  the  ground  of 
duress.^  A  deed  executed  in  accordance  with  a  decree  of  court 
cannot  be  said  to  be  executed  under  duress.* 

A  gold-refiner,  who  had  confessed  that  he  had  taken  gold  in- 
trusted to  him  by  his  employers,  while  under  arrest  at  the  police 
station  executed  a  mortgage  of  his  lands  to  secure  repayment  of 
the  value  of  the  gold  so  taken.  He  was  afterwards  indicted  for 
the  offence,  pleaded  guilty,  and  was  sentenced.  In  an  action  to 
foreclose  the  mortgage,  it  was  held  that  it  was  not  void  on  the 
ground  of  duress.^ 

II.     Duress  hy  Threats. 

81.  Threats  m.ay  constitute  duress,  and  invalidate  a  deed 
procured  by  that  means.  Actual  violence  or  imprisonment  is  not 
necessary  to  constitute  duress.  Consent  is  of  the  essence  of  a 
valid  contract,  and  there  is  no  consent  when  a  party  acts  by  com- 

1  Hackett  y.  Kinp,  8  Allen,  144,  85Am.  Massachusetts  :  Felton  v.  Gregory,  130 
Dec. 695;  Morse i\  Woodwonh,  155  Mass.  Mu-s.  17G.  Michigan:  Kood  v.  Winslow, 
233,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  525;  Williams  v.  2  l)uu<;l.  68;  Prichard  r.  Sharp,  51  Mich. 
Walker,  18  S.  C.  577  ;  Seiher  v.  Price,  26  432,  16  N.  W.  Hep.  798;  State  Buuk  v. 
Mich.  518;  Phelps  y.  Zuschlag,  34  Tex.  CliappelIe,40Mich.447.  Missouri:  Holmes 
371.  I'.   Hill,    19   Mo.   159.     New  Hampshire : 

2  Osborn  i;.  Robbins,  36  N.  Y.  365.  Nealley  v.  Greenough,  25  N.  H.  325 ;  Al- 
See,  however,  Diller  v.  Johnson,  37  Tex.  exander  v.  Pierce,  10  N.  H.  494.  New 
47.  Jersey:    Smillie  v.  Smith,  32  N.   J.  Eq. 

3  Plant  V.  Gunn,  2  Woods,  372.  Ala-  51 ;  Clark  v.  Turnbull,  47  N.  J.  L.  26.5. 
bama :  Hatter  v.  Greenlee,  1  Port.  222,  Pennsylvania:  Stouffer  v.  Latshair,  2 
26  Am.  Dec.  370.  Georgia:  Smith  v.  Watts,  167,  27  Am. Dec.  297.  Wisconsin: 
Atwood,    14   Ga.  402.      Illinois:     Heaps  Oconto  Co.  r.  Hall,  42  Wis.  59. 

V.  Dunham,  95  111.  583.    Maine  :  Eddy  v.        *  Eld  ridge  v.  Trustees,  111  111.  576. 
Herrin,  17  Me.  338,  35  Am.   Dec.   261.        '  Smillie  v.  Smith,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  51. 
70 


DURESS    BY    THREATS.  [§  81. 

pulsion.  Moral  compulsion,  produced  by  threats  of  great  bodily 
harm  or  of  arrest,  is  sufficient  to  destroy  a  party's  free  agency, 
without  which  he  can  give  no  consent  and  make  no  valid  contract. 
To  constitute  duress,  the  threats  must  be  such  as  to  strike  the 
threatened  pei'son  with  such  fear  as  to  take  away  his  free  agency. 
They  must  afford  a  reasonable  ground  of  fear  of  bodily  injury  or 
of  restraint  of  liberty. ^  Duress  by  mere  advice,  direction,  influ- 
ence, and  persuasion,  or  pressure  of  public  opinion,  is  unknown  to 
the  law.2 

In  a  case  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Mr. 
Justice  Clifford  said:"  ''Decided  cases  may  be  found  which  deny 
that  contracts  procured  by  menace  of  a  mere  battery  to  the  per- 
son, or  of  trespass  to  lands,  or  loss  of  goods,  can  be  avoided  on 
that  account,  as  such  threats,  it  is  said,  are  not  of  a  nature  to 
overcome  the  will  of  a  firm  and  prudent  man  ;  but  many  other 
decisions  of  high  authority  adopt  a  more  liberal  rule,  and  hold 
that  contracts  procured  by  threats  of  battery  to  the  person,  or  of 
destruction  of  property,  may  be  avoided  by  proof  of  such  facts, 
because,  in  such  a  case,  there  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  a  contract 
without  the  substance.  Positive  menace  of  battery  to  the  person, 
or  of  trespass  to  lands,  or  of  destruction  of  goods,  may  undoubt- 

1  Bakery.  Mortou,  12  Wall.  150;  United  Bell  (Ky.),  2  S.  W.  Rep.  675;  Gabbey  v. 

States  V.   Huckabee,  16  "Wall.   414,  431,  Forgeus,  38  Kans.  62,  15  Pac.  Rep.  866 ; 

per  Clifford,  J. ;  Brown  v.  Pierce,  7  Wall.  Dolman  v.  Cook,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  56. 

205,   215;   Radich  v.  Ilutchins,  95  U.S.  In  Harshaw  ?;.  Dobson,  64   N.  C.  384, 

210 ;  McClair  v.  Wilson  (Colo.),  31  Pac.  where  the   owners   of  land  had  given  a 

Rep.   502;    Barrett    v.  French,    1    Conn,  bond  to  convey  upon  the  payment  of  a 

354,  6  Am.  Dec.  241 ;  Love  v.   State,  78  certain  sum  of  money  in  coin,  the  debtor, 

Ga.  66,   3  S.   E.  Rep.  893 ;  Hamilton  v.  during   the  war  of   the   Rebellion,  asked 

Smith,  57  Iowa,  15,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  276 ;  the  court  to  be  allowed  to  pay  the  debt  in 

Harmon  v.  Harmon,  61  jMe.  227,  14  Arn.  Confederate   money,  and  the  judge  sent 

Rep.  556;    Taylor   i-.  Jaques,  106  Mass.  word  to  the  creditor  that,  if  he  did  not  re- 

291  ;  Goodrich  v.  Shaw,  72  Mich.  109,40  ceive  this  money  and  execute   a  deed,  he 

N.  W.  Rep.   187;  Goodrich  v.  Cushman,  would  have  him  sent  to  Richmond,  where- 

34  Xeb.  460,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  1041  ;  Barrett  upon  the  creditor,  being  under  fear  and 

V.  Weber,  125  N.  Y.  18,  25  N.  E.   Rep.  infirm,  received  the  money  and  executed 

1068  ;  Richards   v.   Vanderpoel,   1   Daly,  a  deed.     It  was  held  that  the  deed  was  in- 

71  ;  Doolittie  v.  McCnllough,  7  Ohio  St.  valid.      So  where  a  deed  was   executed 

299;   Bueter  v.  Buetcr,  1  S.  D.  94,  45  N.  under  a  threat  of  death  unless  the  owner 

W.  Rep.  208.  accepted  Confederate  money  in  payment. 

^  Barrett  v.  French,  1  Conn.  354,  6  Am.  Bogle  v.  Hammons,  2  Ileisk.  136. 

Dec.  241 ;  State  v.   Sluder,  70  N.  C.  55  ;  *  United   States  v.  Huckabee,  16  Wall. 

Wallach  v.  lioexter,   17  Abb.  N.  C.  267  ;  414,  432. 
Jonea  v.  Rogers,  36  Ga.  157;    Rittcr  v. 

71 


^  SJ.l  DISAl'.llJl  Y    IKOM    Dl'KESS. 

odlv  hi\  in  many  cases,  siillicient  to  overcoiiio  tlie  miiiil  aiul  will 
of  a  poison  entirely  competent  in  all  other  respects  to  contract  ; 
iinil  it  is  clear  that  a  contract  made  under  such  circumstances  is 
as  utterly  without  the  voluntary  consent  of  the  party  menaced  as 
if  he  were  induced  to  sign  it  by  actual  violence." 

82.  Threats  constitute  duress  when  they  are  such  as  to 
overcome  the  free  agency  of  the  person  threatened.  It  has 
sometimes  heen  said  that  the  fear  which  will  invalidate  a  contract 
executed  under  its  influence  must  be  such  as  would  inllnenee  a 
mind  of  the  greatest  constancy,  or  at  an}'  rate  a  mind  of  ordinary 
firmness  and  force.^  But  the  doctrine  now  generally  approved  is, 
that,  while  the  fear  must  be  such  as  to  destroy  the  free  agency  of 
the  person  threatened,  yet  the  threats  that  would  be  sufhcient  to 
overcome  the  free  agency  of  one  person  might  have  little  or  no 
influence  upon  another.  Therefore,  whether  the  threats  used  in 
any  particular  case  constitute  duress,  and  are  a  defence  to  an  in- 
strument executed  at  the  time,  must  depend  very  much  upon  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  physical  and  mental  condition 
of  the  person  threatened.^  The  age,  temperament,  health,  expe- 
rience, and  sex  of  the  person  to  whom  the  threats  are  directed 
may  properly  be  considered.  This  was  the  decision  in  a  Pennsyl- 
vania ease,  where  it  was  held  that,  if  the  threats  employed  were 
such  as  were  calculated  to  deprive  the  person  threatened  of  his 
freedom  of  will,  he  will  be  relieved  from  the  obligation  of  a  con- 
tract executed  under   their  influence,  although  the  threats  were 

1  Barrett  v.  French,  1  Conn.  354,  6  sufficient  to  release  Mrs.  Elliott  from  her 
Am.  Dec.  241  ;  "Walbridge  v.  Arnold,  21  contract.  For,  according  to  Blackstone, 
Conn.  424  ;  Bosley  v.  Shanner,  26  Ark.  the  threats  to  produce  such  an  effect  must 
280.  be  of  such  a  character  as  to  induce  a  well- 

2  Morse  v.  Woodworth,  155  Mass.  233,  grounded  fear  in  the  mind  of  a  firm  and 
29  N.  E.  Rep.  525 ;  Parmenter   v.  Pater,  courageous  man  of   the   loss   of    life  or 

13  Oreg.  121  ;  Blair  v.  Coffman,  2  Overt,  limb  ;  and  the  rule  of  the  civil  law  was  of 
176,  5  Am.  Dec.  659  ;  Cribbs  v.  Sowle,  87  like  import :  the  fear  must  be  of  that  kind 
Mich.  340,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  587,  24  Am.  St.  which  would  influence  a  man  of  the  great- 
Rep.  172;  Miller  w.  Miller,  68  Pa.  St.  486,  est  constancy.  .  .  .  Pothier  regards  this 
per  Agnew,  J. ;  Motz  v.  Mitchell,  91  Pa.  rule  as  too  rigid,  and  ajiproves  the  better 
St.  114.     See  article   by   W.  TI.   riiillips,  doctrine,  that  regard  must  be  had  to  the 

14  Am.  L.  Reg.  N.  S.  201  ;  Jordan  r.  Elli-  age,  sex,  and  condition  of  the  parties; 
ott,  12  W.  N.  C.  56,  59,  15  Cent.  L.J.  since  that  fear,  which  would  be  insuffi- 
232.  And  see  15  Cent.  L.  J.  262.  The  cientto  influence  a  man  in  the  prime  of 
court  said  :  "We  are  aware  that  neither  life  and  of  military  character,  might  be 
under  the  rule  of  the  civil  nor  common  law,  deemed  sufficient  to  avoid  the  contract  of 
as   formerly  expressed,   would    there   be  a  woman  or  man  in  the  decline  of  life." 

72 


DURESS    BY    THREATS.  [§  83. 

not  of  such  a  character  as  would  produce  a  like  effect  upon  a  firm 
and  courageous  man. 

Whether  a  deed  has  been  obtained  by  duress,  ^j»er  minas,  is 
usually  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  and  not  one  of  law  to  be 
determined  by  the  court.  It  is  not  sufiicient  in  such  a  case  to  sat- 
isfy the  trial  court  that  threats  were  uttered,  but  it  must  also  be 
shown  that  they  constrained  the  will  of  the  promisor  and  induced 
the  promise.^ 

83.  There  need  be  no  direct  threats  of  prosecution  to  ren- 
der invalid  a  deed  or  mortgage  given  to  prevent  a  prosecu- 
tion. Thus,  where  a  son  forged  his  father's  name  upon  notes, 
and  the  bankers  who  held  them  insisted  that  the  father  should 
make  a  settlement,  saying  to  him  that  they  did  not  wish  to  exer- 
cise pressure  if  the  matter  could  be  satisfactorily  arranged  ;  that 
it  was  "  a  serious  matter  ;  "  that,  if  the  notes  are  the  father's,  "  we 
are  all  right ;  if  they  are  not,  we  have  one  course  to  pursue  ;  we 
cannot  be  parties  to  compounding  a  felony  ;  "  and  the  father  there- 
upon took  up  the  notes,  giving  an  agreement  which  was  in  effect 
an  equitable  mortgage,  —  it  was  held  that  the  agreement  was 
invalid.^  Lord  Westbury  said :  "  The  question,  therefore,  my 
lords,  is,  whether  a  father  appealed  to  under  such  circumstances 
to  take  upon  himself  an  amount  of  civil  liability,  with  the  know- 
ledge that,  unless  he  does  so,  his  son  will  be  exposed  to  a  crimi- 
nal prosecution  with  the  certainty  of  conviction,  can  be  regarded 
as  a  free  and  voluntary  agent.  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying 
that  no  man  is  safe,  or  ought  to  be  safe,  who  takes  a  security  for 
the  debt  of  a  felon  from  the  father  of  tlie  felon,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances. A  contract  to  give  security  for  the  debt  of  another, 
which  is  a  contract  without  consideration,  is,  above  all  things,  a 
contract  that  should  be  based  upon  the  free  and  voluntary  agency 
of  the  individual  who  enters  into  it.  But  it  is  clear  that  the 
power  of  considering  whether  he  ought  to  do  it  or  not,  whether  it 
is  prudent  to  do  it  or  not,  is  altogether  taken  away  fioni  a  father 
when  brought  into  the  situation  of  refusing,  or  leaving  his  son 

1  Dunham  v.  Griswold,  100  N.  Y.  224,  717,  explained  in  McClatchie  v.  Haslam, 
226,  227,  3  N.  E.  Rep.  76,  ])Ct  Earl,  J.;  65  L.  T.  Kcp.  N.  S.  691,  17  Cox  Ciim. 
Gates  u.  Dundon,  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  149;  Cas.  402,  63  L.  T.  Hep.  N.  S.  376;  Foley 
Ingersoll  r.  Roe,  65  Barb.  rufi.  v.   Greene,    14    R.   I.  618,   51  Am.   Rej). 

2  Williams  v.  Baylcy,  L.    R.   1    H.  L.  419. 
200,  218,  14   L.  T.  Rep.  S02,  35  L.  J.  Cli. 

73 


§§  84,  85.]  DISAIUMTY    FROM    DURESS. 

in  that  perilous  condition,  or  of  taking  on  himself  the  anjount  of 
that  civil  obligation." 

84.  Relief  may  sometimes  be  had  in  equity  against  threats 
which  do  not  amount  to  legal  duress.  Such  relief  may  be 
granted  when  a  deed  has  been  fraudulently  procured  through  the 
fears,  alToctions,  or  sensibilities  of  the  grantor  excited  by  threats; 
as,  for  instance,  where  the  grantor  has  made  a  conveyance  in 
consequence  of  threats  of  a  criminal  prusecution  of  his  brother.^ 
Equity  will  grant  relief  in  such  cases,  though  there  would  be  no 
remedy  at  law.  Cases  of  this  kind,  however,  more  properly  come 
under  the  description  of  cases  of  undue  influence,^  from  which 
cases  of  duress  are  sometimes  hardly  to  be  distinguished.^  When 
the  coercion  is  only  a  social  or  domestic  force,  and  not  a  menace 
to  life  or  limb  or  of  imprisonment,  it  more  properly  comes  under 
the  designation  of  undue  influence.* 

The  threat  of  a  husband  to  abandon  his  wife,  unless  she  exe- 
cutes a  mortgage  of  her  separate  property  to  secure  his  debt,  is  an 
improper  pressure,  and  the  mortgage  may  be  avoided  by  her  on 
the  ground  of  duress,  if  the  threat  induced  the  execution  of  the 
mortgage,  and  was  made  with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the 
mortgagee,  or  lie  knew  at  the  time  of  taking  the  mortgage  that  it 
was  executed  by  reason  of  such  threat.^  But  the  threat  of  a  hus- 
band against  his  own  life  made  to  induce  his  wife  to  execute  a 
contract  does  not  amount  to  duress,  and  is  no  defence  to  an  action 
acrainst  the  wife  on  her  contract.^ 

85.  A  threat  of  an  unlawful  arrest  is  duress  which  will 
avoid  a  deed  or   mortgage    procured  thereby.'^     A  threat  of    an 

1  Meech  v.  Lee,  82  Mich.  274,  46  N.  32  Am.  Rep.  180,  18  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.  S.) 
W.  Rep.  383  ;  Davis  v.  Luster,  64  Mo.  743 ;  Remington  v.  Wright,  43  N.  J.  L. 
43;  Sdiultz  V.  Catiin,  78  Wis.  611,  47  451;  Lefebvre  r.  Dutruit,  51  Wis.  326,  8 
N.  W.  Rep.  946.  N.  W.  Rep.  149,37  Am.  Rep.  833 ;  Metro- 

2  Pomeroy's  Eq.  Jur.  §§  950,  951.  politan  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Meelier,   85  N.  Y. 

3  Lighthall  v.  Moore,  2  Colo.  App.  554.  614. 

*  Ilartnetti;.  Hartnett  (Neb.),  60  N.  W.  ''  Foss  v.  Hiklreth,  10  Allen,  76  ;  Foshay 

Rep.  362;  Edwards  ;;.  Bowden,  107  N.  C.  i;.  Ferguson,  5  Hill,  154;  Knapp  v.  Hyde, 

58,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  58.  60  Barb.  80;    Richards  v.  Vanderpoel,  I 

5  Line  ;;.  Blizzard,  70  Ind.  23,  Kocou-  Daly,  71  ;  Bush  v.  Brown,  49  lud.  573,  19 
rek  I).  Marak,  54  Tex.  201,  33  Am.  Rep.  Am.  Rep.  695;  Bane  v.  Detrick,  52  111. 
623;  Tapley  v.  Tapley  10  Minn.  448,  88  19  ;  Thurman  v.  Burt,  53  111.  129;  Helm 
Am.  Dec.  76.  See,  however,  Kdwards  v.  r.  Helm,  11  Kans.  19;  Winfield  Nat. 
Bowden,  107  N.  C.  58,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  58  ;  Bank  v.  Croco,  46  Kans.  620,  26  Pac. 
Wallach  v.  Hoexter,  17  Abb.  N.  C.  267.  Rep.  939;   Hullborst  v.  Scharner,  15  Ntb. 

6  Wright  V.  Remington,  41    N.  .T.  L.  48,  57,  i7  N.  W.  Rep.  259  ;  Churchill  v.  Scott, 

74 


DURESS    BY    THREATS.  [§  86. 

arrest  on  a  criminal  charge  may  amount  to  such  duress  as  will 
avoid  a  conveyance,  if  it  is  made  with  knowledge  that  no  offence 
has  been  committed,  and  for  the  wrongful  purpose  of  exciting  the 
fears  and  overcoming  the  free  will  of  him  to  whom  the  threat  is 
addressed. 1  The  threat  of  a  criminal  prosecution  used  to  compel 
the  giving  of  a  deed  or  contract  may  constitute  duress,  although 
no  threats  were  made  at  the  time,  if  they  were  made  a  few  days 
before  and  had  not  been  retracted ;  provided  they  induced  a 
reasonable  and  well-grounded  belief  that  the  person  threatened 
would  be  arrested  and  prosecuted  on  a  criminal  charge  if  he  did 
not  execute  such  deed  or  contract.^ 

In  some  cases  it  has  been  held  that  threats  of  criminal  prosecu- 
tion do  not  constitute  duress  unless  accompanied  by  threats  of  im- 
mediate imprisonment,  or  thi'eats  which  induce  a  reasonable  fear 
of  immediate  imprisonment.'^  The  distinction  is,  that  a  threat  of 
prosecution  merely,  before  the  commencement  of  any  proceedings, 
does  not  necessarily  include  imprisonment.  The  threat  must 
imply  imprisonment,  and  an  imprisonment  which  is  illegal. 

86.  A  threat  of  arrest  or  imprisonment  which  is  lawful  or 
justifiable  is  not  duress  which  will  invalidate  a  deed  executed  in 
order  to  avoid  it.  A  threat  to  cause  the  arrest  and  imprisonment 
of  a  person  on  a  criminal  charge  does  hot  amount  to  such  menace 
as  will  serve  to  invalidate  a  deed  made  by  him  to  prevent  such 
arrest,  although  it  is  executed  under  the  pressure  of  such  threat, 

65  Mich.  479,  32  N.  W.  Rep.  6.53  ;  Hoyt  be  actual  imprisonment,  and  not  threats 

V.  Dewey,  .50  Vt.  463  ;  James  v.  Roberts,  merely. 

18  Ohio,  548;  Meadows  y.  Smith,  7  Ired.  ^  Jaylor  v.  Jaques,  106  Mnss.  291; 
Eq.  7  ;  Williams  v.  Walker,  18  S.  C.  577 ;  Yoimgs  v.  Simra,  41  111.  App.  28  ;  Wells 
Landa  v.  Obert,  78  Tex.  33, 14  S.  W.  Rep.  v.  Sluder,  70  N.  C.  55. 
29" •  3  Plant?;.  Gann,2  Woods,  372;  Harmon 
i  Baker  v.  Morton,  12  Wall.  150;  Brown  v.  Harmon,  61  Me.  227,  14  Am.  Rep.  556  ; 
r.  rieree,  7  Wall.  205  ;  Eadie  v.  Slimmon,  Higgins  v.  Brown,  78  Me.  473,  5  Atl.  Rep. 
26  N.  y.  9,  82  Am.  Dec.395;  Alexander  269;  Seymour  v.  Prescott,  69  Me.  376; 
V.  Pierce,  10  N.  H.  494,498;  Compton  v.  Hilboru  v.  Bucknam,  78  Me.  482,  7  Atl. 
Buuker  Hill  Bank,  96  Til.  301,  36  Am.  Rep.  272;  Moore  v  Adams,  8  Oiiio,  372, 
Rej).  147;  Bane  v.  Detrick,  52  III.  19;  32  Am.  Dec.  723  ;  Landa  y.  Obert,  45  Tex. 
Sanford  v.  Sornborger,  26  Neb.  295,  41  N.  539;  Catlin  v.  lleuton,  9  Wis.  476  ;  Hor- 
W.  Rep.  1102;  Gregor  v.  Hyde,  62  Fed.  ton  v.  Bloedorn,  37  Neb.  666,  56  N.  W. 
Rep.  107,  per  Thayer,  J. ;  Eddy  r.  Herrin,  Rep.  321  ;  Claflin  v.  McDonough,33  Mo. 
17  Me.338;  James  y.  Roberts,  1 8  Ohio,  548,  412,  84  Am.  Dec.  54;  Buchanan  v.  Sah- 
praetically  overruling  Moore  i\  Adams,  8  leiu,  9  Mo.  App.  552  ;  Fulton  v.  Hood,  34 
Ohio,  372,  32  Am.  Dec.  723,  where  it  was  Pa.  365,  75  Am.  Dec.  664  ;  Miller  v.  Mil- 
held  thiit,  to  set  aside  a  deed  on  the  ground  ler,  68  Pa.  480  ;  Youngs  v.  Simm,  41  111. 
of   duress   of    im()risonmeiu,    there   must  App.  28. 

75 


§  so.]  DISABILITY    FHOM    DURESS. 

if  lie  AViis  justly  amenable  to  criminal  prosecution  and  there  are 
no  circumstances  of  oppression  or  fraud,  or  he  was  in  good  faith 
believed  to  be  liable  to  such  prosecution.^  What  constitutes  a 
lawful  arrest  or  imprisonment  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is 
some  variance  of  opinion.  The  views  expressed  by  Mr.  Justice 
Knowlton  in  a  recent  decision  in  Massachusetts  seem  to  be  sound : 
"  It  has  sometimes  been  held  that  threats  of  imprisonnKMit,  to 
constitute  duress,  must  bc^  of  unlawful  imprisonment.  But  the 
question  is,  whether  the  threat  is  of  imprisonment  which  will  be 
unlawful  ill  reference  to  the  conduct  of  the  threatener  who  is 
seeking  to  obtain  a  contract  by  his  threat.  Imprisonment  that  is 
suffered  through  the  execution  of  a  threat,  which  was  made  for  the 
purpose  of  forcing  a  guilty  person  to  enter  into  a  contract,  may  be 
lawful  as  against  the  authorities  and  the  public,  but  unlawful  as 
against  the  threatener,  when  considered  in  reference  to  his  effort 
to  use  for  his  private  benefit  processes  provided  for  the  protection 
of  the  public  and  the  punishment  of  crime.  One  who  has  over- 
come the  mind  and  will  of  another  for  his  own  advantage,  under 
such  circumstances,  is  guilty  of  a  p(M'version  and  abuse  of  laws 
whicii  were  made  for  another  purpose;  and  he  is  in  no  position  to 
claim  the  advantage  of  a  formal  contract  obtained  in  that  way,  on 
the  ground  that  the  rights  of  the  parties  are  to  be  determined  by 
their  language  and  their  overt  acts,  without  reference  to  the  influ- 
ences which  moved  them.  In  such  a  case,  there  is  no  reason  why 
one  should  be  bound  by  a  contract  obtained  by  force,  which  in 
reality  is  not  his,  but  another's."  - 

1  Crowne  v.  Bay  lis,  31  Beav.  351  ;  Greg-  Claflin  v.  McDonougli,  33  Mo.  41 2,  84  Am. 

or  V.  Hyde,  62  Fed.  Rep.  107  ;  Sanford  v.  Dec.  54;  Davis  v.  Luster,  64  Mo.  43. 
SornboPfrer,  26   Neb.  295,  41    N.  W.  Ivep.         ^  Morse  v.  Woodworth,  155  Mass.  233, 

1102;  Thorn  1-.  Piiikliiun,  84  Me.  101,24  251,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  525.     "  We  arcaware," 

All.  Rep.  718,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  335 ;  Ilil-  further    say   the   court,    "that   there  are 

born  V.  Bucknam,  78  Me.  482,7  Atl.  Rep.  cases  which  tend  to  support  the  contention 

272,57  Am.  Rep.  816;  Eddy  v.  Ilerrin,  of  tlie  defendant.     Harmon  v.   Harriion, 

17  Me.  338,  35  Am.  Dec.  261  ;  WhitcfK^ld  61  Me.  227  ;  Bodine  i'.  Morgan,  10  Htew. 

V.  Longfellow,  13  Me.   146  ;  Alexander  ;-•.  426,428;  Landa  v.  Obcrt,  45  Tex.  539; 

Pierce,  10  N.  H.  494;  Compton  v.  Bun-  Kua])])  r.  Hyde,  60  Barb.  SO.     But  we  are 

ker  Hill  Bank,  96  111.  301,  36  Am.  Roj).  of  opinion   that   the  view   of  the  subjeft 

147;    Legg   v.    Leyman,  8   Biuckf.    148;  hcretolFore  taken  by  this  court,  which  we 

Work's  A  pp.  59  Pa    St.  444;  Fulton  v.  have  followed   in   this   opinion,   rests  on 

Hood,  34  Pa.  St.  365,  75  Am.   Dec.  664;  sound  principles,  and  is  in  couf;jrmity  with 

Stouffer  V.  Latsliaw,  2  Watts,  165,  27  Am.  most  of  the  recent  decisions  in  such  cases, 

l>ec.  297  ;  Bodine  i'.  Morgan,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  both  in  Eiif;laiid  and   America.     Hackct: 

426;  Sickles  r.  Carson,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  440  ;  r.   King,  6    .Mln,  58  ;  Taylor  v.  JjiqiHS, 

76 


DURESS   BY    THREATS. 


[§§  87,  88. 


87.  It  is  not  duress  for  one  who  believes  that  he  has  a 
good  cause  of  action,  or  has  been  wronged,  to  threaten  tiie 
wrong-doer  with  a  civil  suit.^  And  if  the  wrong  includes  a  vio- 
lation of  the  criminal  law,  it  is  not  duress  to  threaten  him  with  a 
criminal  prosecution.^  It  Is  not  duress  to  threaten  the  foreclosure 
of  an  existing  mortgage  upon  the  property  in  order  to  induce  a 
wife  to  execute  a  new  mortgage.^  A  threat  to  bring  a  civil  suit 
to  compel  the  execution  of  a  deed,  unless  the  person  threatened 
make  such  deed,  does  not  constitute  such  duress  as  will  avoid  the 
deed.'^ 

The  threat  of  a  judgment  creditor  to  levy  execution  on  the 
property  of  his  judgment  debtor,  or  to  arrest  him  on  such  execu- 
tion, is  not  such  a  duress  as  will  render  a  deed  or  other  contract 
made  by  the  latter  to  avoid  such  levy  invalid.^  But  a  contract 
extorted  by  the  illegal  use  of  an  execution,  and  under  circum- 
stances showing  oppression  on  the  part  of  the  creditor,  m;iy  be 
avoided.^ 

88.  A  husband  and   wife  or  parent    and   child  may    each 


106  Mass.  291  ;  Harris  v.  Carmodj,  131 
Mass.  51  ;  Bryant  v.  Peck,  &c.  Co.  154 
M.1SS.  460,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  678  ;  Williams  y. 
Bayley,  L.  R.  1  II.  L.  200,  4  Giff.  638,  663, 
note;  Eadie  c.  Slimmon,  26  N.  Y.  9;  Ad- 
ams V.  Irving  National  Bank,  116  N.  Y. 
606,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  7  ;  Foley  v.  Greene,  14 
R.  I.  618 ;  Sharon  v.  Gager,  46  Conn.  189  ; 
Bane  v.  Detrick,  52  111.  19  ;  Fay  i;.  Oatley, 
6  Wis.  42."  See,  also,  Barrett  v  Weber, 
125  N.  Y.  18,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  1068. 

1  Joues  V.  Houghton,  61  N.  H.  51 ;  Mas- 
colo  V.  Montesrtnto,  61  Conn.  50,  23  Atl. 
Rep.  714;  Dixon  v.  Dixon,  22  N.  J.  Eq. 
91 ;  Tooker  v.  Sloan,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  394 ; 
Hunt  V.  Bass,  2  Dev.  Eq.  292,  24  Am. 
Dec.  274  ;  Dausch  v.  Crane,  109  Mo.  323, 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  61  ;  Harris  r.  Tyson,  24  Pa. 
St.  347,  64  Am.  Dec.  661  ;  Dunham  v.  Gris- 
wol.l,  100  N.  Y.  224,3  N.  E.  Rep.  76; 
Clafliu  I'.  McDonoiigh,  33  Mo.  412,  84 
Am.  Dec.  54;  Peckham  v.  Ilendren,  76  Ind. 
47;  Wilson  v.  Curry,  126  Ind.  161,  25  N. 
E.  Rep.  896;  Snyder  r.  Braden,  58  Ind. 
143;  Landa  v.  Ohert,  45  Tex.  539  ;  Waller 
V.  Cralle,  8  B.  Mon.  11  ;  Hi)lt  v.  Thomas 
(Cal.),  38  Pac.    Rep.  891  ;   Brumagim  v. 


Tillinghast,  18  Cal.  265  ;  Kohler  v.  Wells, 
&c.  Co.  26  Cal.  606  ;  Bucknall  v.  Story, 
46  Cal.  589 ;  Mayor,  &c.  v.  LefFerman,  4 
Gill,  425. 

And  this  is  true  even  if  the  claim  be  an 
illegal  one.  Preston  v.  City  of  Boston,  12 
Pick.  7,  12. 

In  Brownell  v.  Talcott,  47  Vt.  243,  a 
civil  process  maliciously  sued  out,  which 
induced  one  through  fear  of  arrest  and 
imptisonment  to  make  a  sale,  was  held  to 
be  duress. 

2  Hilborn  i;.  Bucknam,  78  Me.  482,  7 
Atl.  Rep.  272,  57  Am.  Rep.  816,  per  Wal- 
ton, .J. 

3  Buck  V.  Axf,  85  In  1.  512  ;  Edwards 
V.  Bowden,  107  N.  C.  58,  12  S.  E.  Rep. 
58 ;  Vereycken  i".  Vandenbrooks  (Mich.), 
60  N.  W.  Rep.  687. 

*  Whittaker  v.  Southwest  Va.  Imp.  Co. 
34  W.  Va.  217,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  507. 

6  Wilcox  u.  Ilaviland,  23  Pick.  167; 
Grimes  v.  Briggs,  110  Mass.  446  ;  Waller 
V.  Cralle,  8  B.  Mon.  11  ;  Bunker  v.  Stew- 
ard (Me.),  4   At!.  Rep.  558. 

6  Thurman  i-.  Burt,  53  111.  129. 

77 


§  8^^-] 


DISAIULITY    FUOM    DURESS. 


avoid  a  contract  induced  by  threats  of  the  imprisonment  of 
the  other,  whether  such  iinprisotmieiit  would  be  lawful  or  unlaw- 
ful. This  is  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  that  duress  which 
will  avoid  a  contract  must  be  ollered  to  the  person  wlio  seeks  to 
take  advantage  of  it.^  Except  in  the  cases  mentioned,  it  is  gener- 
ally held  that  a  deed  or  contract  cannot  be  avoided  by  reason  of 
the  duress  of  a  third  person  ;  ^  though  there  are  a  few  cases  in 
which  it  has  been  held  that  a  deed  may  be  avoided  because  it  was 
obtained  by  the  duress  of  a  dear  friend,  or  near  relative  othei-  than 
a  parent  or  child."  The  distinction  is  also  taken  that,  while  a 
threat  of  lawful  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  a  person  justly  amen- 
able thereto  is  not  duress  when  addressed  to  the  person  liable 
to  such  arrest  or  imprisonment,  yet  the  same  threat  made  to  a 
wife  to  obtain  the  arrest  of  her  husband  on  a  criminal  charge,  or 
to  a  parent  to  obtain  the  arrest  of  his  child,  does  constitute  such 
duress  as  will  serve  to  vitiate  a  conveyance  if  the  threat  in  fact 
overcomes  the  will  and  occasions  a  forced  assent,  without  refer- 
ence to  the  question  whether  it  was  or  was  not  a  threat  of  a  law- 
ful arrest  for  adequate  cause.^    "  The  exception  in  favor  of  husband 


1  Huscombe  v.  Standingr,  Cro.  Jac.  187  ; 
Robinson  e;.  Gould,  11  Gush.  55;  Plum- 
mer  v.  People,  IC  111.  358,  holding  that  a 
surety  cannot  plead  the  duress  of  bis 
principal.  Thom])Son  v.  Lockvvood,  15 
Johns.  256 ;  Spaulding  v.  Grawford,  27 
Tex.  155,  lioliling  that  one  obligor  cannot 
avoid  his  bond  by  reason  of  the  duress  of 
hi«  co-obligor. 

-  Gaines  v.  Poor,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  503,  79 
Am.  Dec.  559. 

*  Sharon  v.  Gager,  46  Gonn.  189,  where 
an  aunt  executed  a  mortgage  fearing  the 
imprisonment  of  her  nephew;  Bradley  i». 
Irish,  42  111.  App.  85,  the  case  of  the  duress 
of  a  grandparent  on  account  of  her  grand- 
son, who  was  also  an  adopted  son ; 
Schultz  V.  Gatlin,  78  Wis.  611,  47  N.  VV. 
Rep.  946,  the  duress  of  a  sister  whose 
brother  was  threatened  ;  Rau  v.  Von  Zed- 
litz,  132  Ma.ss.  164,  duress  of  a  woman 
whose  intended  husband,  on  the  eve  of 
marriage,  was  threatened. 

*  M'Glintick  v.  Gummins,  3  McLean, 
158. 

Alabama :  Holt  v.  Agnew,  67  Ala.  300. 

78 


Georgia:  Small  r.  Williams,  87  Ga,  681, 
13  S.  E.  Rep.  589  ;  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v. 
Duffy,  48  Ga.  358.  Illinois  :  Bradley  v. 
Iri<h,  42  111.  App.  85.  Indiana :  Brooks 
V.  Bcrryhill,  20  Ind.  97.  Iowa:  Smith  v. 
Steely,  80  Iowa,  738,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  912  ; 
Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Rawson,  50  Iowa, 
634;  Koehler  i'.  Wilson,  40  Iowa,  183; 
Gohegan  v.  Leach,  24  Iowa,  509;  First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Bryan,  62  Iowa,  42,  17  N. 
W.  Rep.  165;  Green  w.  Scranage,  1 9  Iowa, 
4G1.  Kansas  :  Wintield  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gro- 
co,  46  Kans.  620,  26  Pac.  Rep.  939.  Mas- 
sachusetts :  Harris  v.  Garmoily,  131  Mass. 
51,  41  Am.  Rep.  188  ;  Rau  v.  Von  Zedlitz, 
132  Mass.  164  ;  Bryant  v.  Peck,  154  Mass. 
460,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  678.  Michigan  >  Meech 
V.  Lee,  82  Mich.  274,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  383 ; 
Miller?;.  Minor  Lumber  Co.  98  Mich.  163, 
57  N.  W.  Rep.  101.  Missouri:  Davis  v. 
Luster,  64  Mo.  43 ;  McCoy  v.  Green,  83 
Mo.  626.  Nebraska :  Beindorff  v.  Kauff- 
man  (Neb.),  60  N.  W.  Rep.  101.  New 
Jersey  :  Lomcrson  v.  .Johnston,  44  N.  J.  Eq. 
93,  13  Atl.  Rep.  8.  New  York:  Schoener 
f.  Llssaiier,  107  N.  Y.  Ill,  13  N.  E.  Rep. 


DURESS    BY    THREATS. 


u 


and  wife  is  not  based  solely  upon  the  legal  fiction  that  they  are 
in  law  one  person,  but  rather  upon  the  nearness  and  tenderness  of 
the  relation.  The  substantial  reasons  of  the  exception  apply  as 
strongly  to  the  case  of  a  parent  and  child  as  to  that  of  husband 
and  wife.  No  more  powerful  and  constraining  force  can  be 
brought  to  bear  upon  a  man  to  overcome  his  will,  and  extort  from 
him  an  obligation,  than  threats  of  great  injury  to  his  child."  ^ 

In  some  cases,  however,  it  has  been  held  that,  if  the  debt  was 
actually  due  and  the  criminal  accusation  well-founded,  or  believed 
upon  reasonable  grounds  to  be  so,  a  mortgage  or  deed  executed 
by  a  wife  or  son  under  threats  of  criminal  prosecution  is  not 
invalid  as  given  under  legal  duress.^ 

Where  a  mortgage  was  executed  by  a  wife  to  secure  the  debt 


741  ;  36  Hun,  100;  Metropolitan  L.  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Meeker,  85  N.  Y.  614;  Adams  r.  Ir- 
ving Nat.  Bank,  116  N.  Y.  606,  23  N.  E. 
Eep.  7,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  447  ;  Eadie  v. 
Slimmon,  26  N.  Y.  9,  82  Am.  Dec.  395 ; 
Osborn  v.  Robbing,  36  N.  Y.  365 ;  Haynes 
u.Rudd,  30  Hun,  237  ;  Strang  v.  Peterson, 
10  N.  Y.  Snpp.  139,  56  Hun,  418.  North 
Carolina:  Ware  v.  Nesbit,  94  N.  C.  6G4  ; 
Simms  v.  Barefoot,  2  Hayw.  402.  Ohio: 
Western  Av.  Build.  Asso.  v.  Walters,  7 
Ohio  C.  C.  202.  Pennsylvania  :  :McGror7 
V.  Reillej,  14  Phila.  Ill  ;  National  Bank 
V.  Kirk,  90  Pa.  49  ;  Jordan  v.  Elliott  (Pa.), 
12  Week.  N.  C.  56.  See,  however,  Fulton 
V.  Hood,  34  Pa.  St.  365.  Rhode  Island: 
Foley  V.  Greene,  14  R.  I.  618,  51  Am. 
Rep.  419.  Tennessee:  Coffman  ?j.  Look- 
out Bank,  5  Lea,  232,  40  Am.  Rep.  31. 
Wisconsin  :  McCormick  Harvesting  Mach. 
Co.  V.  Hamilton,  73  Wis.  486,  41  N.  W. 
Rep.  727  ;  Schultz  v.  Culbertson,  46  Wis. 
313,  1  N.  W.  Rep.  19,  49  Wis.  122,  4  N. 
W.  Rep.  1070;  Schultz  i-.  Catlin,  78  Wis. 
611,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  946,  where  a  sister 
signed  a  note  because  of  threats  to  prose- 
cute a  brother  for  a  crime  ;  City  Nat.  Bank 
I'.  Kusworm  (Wis.),  59  N.  W.  Rep.  564. 

1  Harris  v.  Carmody,  131  Mass.  51,  41 
Am.  Rep.  188  ;  Williams  v.  Bayley,  L.  R. 
1  H.  L.  200.  In  Bailey  v.  Williams,  4 
Giff.  638,  659,  the  Vice-Chancellor  in  the 
Chancery  Court  said  :  "  If  the  fear  of  the 
criminal  prosecution  against  the  plaintiff's 


son,  or  if  the  result  of  the  diricovery  of  a 
criminal  act  for  which  the  plaiuiiff  was 
not  liable,  was  used  by  the  defendants 
against  the  plaintiff  to  operate  upon  his 
fears,  so  as  to  induce  him  to  give  a  secu- 
rity which  would  relieve  his  son  from  a 
criminal  prosecution,  according  to  the  law 
of  this  court  a  security  obtained  under  such 
circumstances  cannot  stand.  The  inequal- 
ity in  the  situation  of  the  parties,  the  one 
exacting  a  security  which  the  other  is 
driven  to  give  in  order  to  save  his  son  from 
exposure,  disgrace,  and  ruin,  taints  the 
security  obtained  under  the  influence  of 
such  fears.  If  the  main  and  influencing 
purpose  was  the  relief  of  the  son  from  the 
consequences  of  his  crime,  —  if  this  was 
the  main  consideration  operating  on  the 
father's  mind  and  was  the  origin  and  real 
cause  of  the  transaction, —  the  intervention 
of  other  circumstances  or  other  collateral 
advantages  to  the  father  will  not  be 
enough  to  justify  the  court  in  ujiholdine 
such  a  security."  See,  however,  Harmon 
V.  Harmon,  61  Me.  227,  14  Am.  Rep. 
556. 

-  Smith  V.  Rowley,  66  Barb.  502 ;  Mnn- 
dy  f.  Whittemore,  15  Neb.  647;  Green  v. 
Scranage,  19  Iowa,  461,  87  Am.  Dec.  447  ; 
Gohegan  v.  Leach,  24  Iowa,  509,  an  ex- 
ceptional and  peculiar  decision.  These 
earlier  cases  in  Iowa  seem  to  be  practically 
overrtilcd  in  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bryan,  62 
low.i,  4  J.  17  N.  W.  Rep.  165. 

79 


§  >^-M 


DISAlULirV    l-KOM    DUKKSS. 


of  lior  luisbaiul,  by  reason  of  threats  of  ciiiiiiiial  proceedings 
against  liiin  muler  false  charges  of  embezzh^meiit,  tlie  fact  that 
the  iiiortgagi'd  ])i-operty  was  purchased  by  the  husband  with  the 
nidiiey  oi"  the  party  making  the  threats,  and  fraudulently  con- 
Yi'vcd  to  the  wife,  has  no  tendency  to  show  the  mortgage  valid. ^ 

III.     Duress  of  Property. 

89.  Duress  of  property  exists  where  there  is  a  threat  to  do 
some  act  respecting  the  property  of  another  which  the  threaten- 
ing party  has  no  legal  right  to  do,  involving  the  loss,  destruction, 
or  injury  of  his  property.  To  constitute  such  duress,  there  must 
be  some  illegal  exaction,  or  some  fraud  or  deception,  in  regard  to 
such  property.  The  restraint  must  be  imminent,  and  such  as  to 
destroy  free  agency  in  a  mind  of  ordinary  firmness  without  pres- 
ent means  of  protection.^  There  is  no  duress  where  the  threat  in 
regard  to  property  is  to  do  something  which  the  party  threatening 
has  a  legal  right  to  do  •,^  or  to  do  something  which  he  manifestly 


1  Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Rawson,  ,50 
Iowa,  634.  See,  however,  Smith  v.  Eow- 
lej,  66  Barb.  502. 

■^  Astley  V.  Keyuolds,  2  Strange,  915 ; 
Gates  j;.  Hudson,  6  Exch.  346  ;  Close  v. 
riiipps,  7  Man.  &  G.  586;  United  States 
V.  Iluckalile,  16  "Wall.  414;  Robertson  v. 
Prank,  132  U.  S.  17,  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  5. 
Colorado:  Adams  v.  Schiffer,  11  Colo.  15, 
17  Pac.  Rep.  21,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  202. 
Georgia:  Crawford  v.  Cato,  22  Ga.  594. 
Illinois :  Peraberton  v.  Williams,  87  111.  16 ; 
Spaids  V.  Barrett,  57  111.  484,  11  Am.  Rep. 
10.  Maine:  Chamberlain  r.  Reed,  13  Me. 
3.'-)7,  29  Am.  Dec.  506.  Maryland :  Cen- 
tral Bunk  v.  Copeland,  18  :Md.305,81  Am. 
Dec.  597.  Massachusetts :  Chandler  v. 
Sanger,  114  Mass.  364,  19  Am.  Rep.  367; 
McMnrtrie  v.  Kecnan,  109  Mass.  185. 
Michigan:  Ilncklcy  v.  Headlov,  45  Micb. 
569, 8  N.  W.  Rep.  51 1 .  New  York :  Foshay 
V  Ferguson,  5  Hill,  154  ;  Peyser  v.  Mayor, 
70  N.  Y.  497,  26  Am.  Rep.  624  ;  Schoiey  i\ 
Mumfonl,  60  N.  Y.  498  ;  Briggs  r.  Boyd, 
56  N.  Y.  289  ;  Gates  v.  Dundon,  18  N.  Y. 
Siipp.  149.  Pennsylvania:  Heysbam  v. 
Dettre,  89  Pa.  St.  .50f. ;  Miller  v.  Miller, 
68  Pa.  St  486  ;  White  y.  Heyliniin,34  I'a. 
St.  142;  Motz  f.  Miteh.ll,  91  Pa.  St.  114. 
8U 


South  Carolina :  Sasportas  v.  Jennings, 
1  Bay,  470;  Collins  v.  Westbury,  2  Bay, 
211,  1  Am.  Dec.  643.  Wisconsin:  York 
V.  Hinkle,  80  Wis.  624,  50  N.  W.  Rep.  895, 
27  Am.  St.  Rep.  73 ;  Macloon  v.  Smith, 
49  Wis.  200,  5  N.  W.  Rep.  336. 

That  there  is  no  duress  of  property  suf- 
ficient to  avoid  a  deed  or  contract,  see 
Sliep.  Touch.  61;  Coke,  2  Inst.  483; 
Skeate  «.  Beale,  11  Ad.  &  El.  983,  990; 
Bingham  v.  Sessions,  14  Miss.  13  ;  Hiizil- 
rigg  V.  Donaldson,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  445  ;  Ed- 
wards V.  Handley,  Hardin  (Ky.),  602,  3 
Am.  Dec.  745. 

3  Skeate  v.  Beale,  1 1  Ad.  &  El.  983;  Hack- 
ley  y,  Headlcy,  45  Mich.  569,  8  N.  W.  Rep. 
511,  21  Am.  L.  Reg.  N.  S.  109;  Preston 
V.  Boston,  12  Pick.  714;  Zents  v.  Shaner 
(Pa),  7  Atl.  Rep.  197;  Burke  w.  Gould 
(Cal),  38  Pac.  Rep.  733,  per  Searles,  J. : 
"  The  whole  question  is  in  a  nutshell.  To 
pursue  or  threaten  to  pursue  the  usual 
le'.;iil  steps  for  the  collection  of  a  debt  in 
the  manner  provided  by  law  does  not  con- 
stitute duress  of  property."  And  see  Kob- 
ler  I'.  Wells,  26  Cal.  606.  In  Buck  v.  Axt, 
85  Ind.  512,  which  was  an  action  to  fore- 
close a  mortgage  executed  by  Buck  and 
wife  to  secure  an  antecedent  debt  owing 


DEFENCE   AND    PROOF   OF   DURESS. 


[§90. 


has  no  power  to  do,  and  the  threatened  act  would  be  wholly  inef- 
fectual.^  Money  paid  by  a  mortgagee  in  excess  of  the  amount  due 
on  the  mortgage,  to  stop  foreclosure  proceedings,  is  a  voluntary 
payment,  and  not  one  made  under  duress.^ 

A  deed  of  trust  between  husband  and  wife  settling  certain  prop- 
erty belonging  to  the  wife  upon  the  husband,  executed  by  her  on 
competent  advice,  cannot  be  set  aside  for  duress  of  goods  by 
reason  of  his  having  held  property  which  she  asserts  was  hers, 
and  of  which  she  desired  to  recover  as  much  as  possible,  it  appear- 
ing that  she  had  conveyed  such  property  to  him  through  a  third 
person,  and  her  testimony  that  such  conveyance  was  a  fraud  on 
her  being  contradicted.^ 

IV.  Defence  and  Proof  of  Duress. 

90.  It  is  no  defence  that  a  deed  was  procured  by  threats 
if  the  grantee  was  ignorant  of  the  fact,  and  the  threats  were 
made  by  a  third  person  who  was  not  in  any  way  the  agent  of  the 
grantee  ;  as  for  instance  where,  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
grantee,  a   husband   had   induced   his  wife  by  threats  to  execute 


by  the  husband,  the  wife  pleaded  duress, 
and  averred  she  executed  the  mortgage 
under  a  threat  that  if  she  refused  "  they 
would  sell  her  out  of  house  and  home,  and 
Frazier  would  prosecute  her  at  once." 
The  court,  in  holding  the  allegation  of 
duress  insufficient,  said :  "  The  threats 
alleged  were  not  such  as  to  constitute  du- 
ress. The  evident  meaning  of  the  threats 
used  was  that  Frazier  would  at  once  seek 
his  legal  remedies  against  her  and  her  hus- 
band, and  so  sell  them  out  of  house  and 
home  ;  and  if  more  than  this  was  meant, 
the  facts  should  have  been  alleged  to  show 
it." 

1  Wills  V.  Austin,  53  Cal.  152. 

2  Vereycken  v.  Vandenhrooks  (Mich.), 
60  N.  W.  He]).  687.  Montgomery,  J.,  said  : 
"  Some  courts  have  held  that  there  can  be 
no  duress  of  real  property  which  remains 
in  the  possession  of  the  payor,  but  most 
courts  hold  the  contrary.  State  v.  Nelson, 
41  Minn.  25,  42  N.  W.  Hep.  548;  Pember- 
ton  V.  Williams,  87  111.  15  ;  White  v.  Ileyl- 
man,  34  Pa.  St.  142  ;  Joannin  v.  Ogilvic,  49 
Minn.  564,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  217.     So  it  has 

VOL.  I. 


been  held  that,  if  the  mortgagee  of  land  re- 
quire that  the  mortgagor  pay  more  than  is 
legally  due,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
a  foreclosure  by  advertisement,  this  is  such 
a  compulsory  payment  as  entitles  the  party 
to  sue  and  recover  back  the  excess.  But 
it  i.s  to  be  noted  that  in  such  a  case  the 
mortgagee,  by  his  own  act,  unaided  by  any 
process  of  court,  has  it  within  his  power  to 
deprive  the  mortgagor  of  his  title  Such 
was  not  the  case  here.  All  that  the  plain- 
tiff had  done  was  to  file  a  bill  to  obtain  a 
decree  of  the  court  fixing  the  amount  due. 
Before  any  decree  could  pass  against  the 
present  plaintiff,  he  was  entitled  to  his  day 
in  court.  Under  these  circumstances,  we 
think  there  was  no  duress  of  property  such 
as  the  law  recognizes.  See  Forbes  v.  Ap- 
pleton,  5  Cu.sh.  115;  Benson  v.  Monroe, 
7  Cush.  125;  Taylor  v.  Board,  31  Pa.  St. 
7.'5 ;  Oceanic  Steamship  Co.  v.  Tappan,  16 
Blatchf.  296,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,405  ;  Mari- 
posa Co.  r.  Bowman,  Deady,  228,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  9,089. 

3  Chase  v.  Phillips,  1.53  Mass.  17,  26  N. 
E.  Rep.  136. 

81 


5;^  iU,  92.]  DISAUILITY    FROM    DUIIKSS. 

tlu'  cli'Cil.^  Tlio  mortgagee  has,  liowever,  been  held  responsible 
for  the  husbamrs  acts  in  such  case,  on  the  ground  that  he  had 
allowed  the  Iiusband  to  ac^t  as  his  agent.- 

91.  A  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  from  the  grantee  in  a 
deed  obtained  through  duress  of  the  grantor  is  not  aflfected 
by  such  duress.  Duress  and  fraud  are  causes  for  annulling  a 
deed  procured  thereby  only  between  the  parties,  or  against  sub- 
sequent purchasers  having  notice."^  But  a  purchaser  who  has 
knowledge  that  the  deed  was  procured  by  duress,  or  has  not  paid 
in  good  faith  actual  consideration  therefor,  is  in  no  better  con- 
dition than  the  original  grantee  to  resist  the  avoidance  of  the 
deed.* 

92.  The  proof  of  duress  must  be  clear.  The  evidence  must 
be  such  that  a  conclusion  of  duress  must  inevitably  follow.  It  is 
not  enough  that  the  facts  lead  to  a  strong  inference  of  duress. 
The  testimony  of  the  grantor  in  contradiction  of  other  witnesses 
is  not  sufficient  to  prove  that  the  execution  of  the  deed  was  not 
voluntary.^  It  must  be  shown  that  the  duress  was  effective  in 
the  particular  transaction  under  consideration.  To  render  the 
deed  of  a  wife  invalid  for  duress  on  the  part  of  her  husband,  it  is 
not  sufficient  to  prove  that  he  was  a  violent,  turbulent,  and  in- 
temperate man  in  his  habits ;  that  he  was  domineering  towards 
his  wife  ;   that  she  was  afraid  of  him,  and  was  in  the  habit  of 


1  Fairbanks  v.  Snow,  145  Mass.  153,  261;  Deputy  r.  Stapleford,  19  Cal.  302; 
154,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  596,  per  Plolmes,  J.;  Cook  v.  Moore,  39  Tex.  255;  Wood  v. 
Morse  v.  Woodworth,  155  Mass.  233,  29  Craft,  85  Ala.  260,  4  So.  Rep.  649.  See, 
N.  E.  Rep.  525,  per  Knowlton,  J. ;  Fijiht-  however,  Belote  v.  Henderson,  5  Coldw. 
master  v.  Levi  (Ky.),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  195;  471,  98  Am.  Dec.  432. 

Thompson  v.  Niggley,  53   Kans.  664,  35  •*  Osboni  v.  Robbins,   36   N.   Y.   365; 

Pac.  Rep.  290;  Rogers  v.  Adams,  66  Ala.  Brown  v.  Teck,  2  Wis.  261,  279;  Goodrich 

600;  Compton   v.   Bunker  Hill  Bank,  96  v.  Cushman,  34  Neb.  460,  51   N.  W.  Rep. 

111.   301,  36  Am.  Rep.    147;  Comegys  f.  1041;  McCandless  v.   Engle,  51    Pa.  St. 

Clarke,  44  Md.    108 ;    Central    Bank  v.  309. 

Copeland,   18  Md.   305;  Lefebvre  r.  Du-  ^  Insurance  Co.  v.  Nelson,  103  U.  S. 

truit,  51  Wis.  326,  8  N.  W.  Rep.  149,  37  544;  Snyder  v.  Snyder,  95  Mich.  51,  54 

Am.  Hep.  833  ;  iEtna  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Franks,  N.  W.  Rep.  721 ;  Feller  v.  Green,  26  Mich. 

53  Iowa,  618,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  9;   Line  v.  70;  Lefebvre  z;.  Dutruit,  51  Wis.  326,  37 

Blizzard,  70  Ind.  23;  Cook  v.  Moore,  39  Am.  Rep.  833;   Holt  v.  Agnew,  67  Ala. 

Tex.  255.                                 .  360  ;  Post  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  138  111.  559, 

2  Central  Bank  v.  Copeland,  18  Md.  28  N.  E.  Rep.  978;  Brower  w.  Callender, 
305,  81  Am.  Dec.  597.  105  111.  88;  Hamilton  v.  Smith,  57  Iowa, 

8  Eberstein  v.  Willets,  134  111.  101,  24  15,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  276;  Davis  y.  Fox,  59 

N.  E.  Rep.  967;  Brown  v.  Peck,  2  Wis.  Mo.  125. 

82 


DURESS  RENDERS  DEED  VOIDABLE  ONLY.    [§§  93,  94. 

obeying  all  his  commands.^  It  must  be  shown  that  the  duress 
was  effective  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  conveyance,  the 
validity  of  which  is  called  in  question. ^ 

The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  party  who  seeks  to  set  aside  a 
conveyance  on  account  of  duress. ^  Thus,  in  an  action  brought 
by  a  married  woman  to  set  aside  a  mortgage  of  her  property  to 
trustees  of  a  land  society  to  secure  moneys  which  had  been  mis- 
appropriated by  her  husband,  who  was  the  secretary  of  the  soci- 
ety, on  the  ground  that  the  security  was  given  under  threats  of 
a  criminal  prosecution  against  her  husband,  it  was  held  that  the 
burden  was  on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  pressure  or  undue  influence.* 

After  a  delay  of  several  years  by  the  grantor  before  taking 
action  to  set  aside  a  deed  obtained  from  him  by  duress,  it  requires 
undoubted  and  conclusive  evidence  of  such  duress  to  induce  a 
court  of  equity  to  interfere.^ 

V.     Duress  renders  Deed  voidable  only. 

93.  If  the  duress  consists  of  threats  only,  the  deed  is  not 
void  but  merely  voidable.*'  Such  duress  is  distinguished  from 
the  case  where  the  grantor's  signing  and  delivering  of  the  instru- 
ment are  not  his  acts,  as,  for  instance,  where  the  signing  and 
delivering  are  compelled  by  actual  physical  force.  Duress  by 
imprisonment,  when  used  to  procure  the  execution  of  a  deed,  may 
make  it  void  ;  but  the  statement  of  the  rule  by  Sheppard  needs 
qualification.'' 

94.  A  deed  given  under  duress  may  be  ratified  and  made 

1  Freeman    v.    Wilson,    51     Miss.  329.  of  no  distinct  adjudication  of  binding  au- 

And  see  Insurance  Co.  j;.  Nelson,  103  U.S.  thority  that  mere  threats  by  a  stranger, 

544.  made  without  knowledge  or  privity  of  the 

*  Jackson  v.  Ashton,  11  Pet.  229;  Fisk  party,  are  good  ground  for  avoiding  a 
V.  Stubbs,  30  Ala.  33.5.  contract  induced  by  them."    Lyon  t;.  Wal- 

*  Insurance  Co.  v.  Nelson,    103    U.  S.  do,  36  Mich.  34.5,  court  equally  divided. 
544.  7  Touchstone,  61  :  "A  deed,  therefore, 

*  McCIatchie  v.  Haslam,  65  L.  T.  Rep.  .  .  .  that  is  made  or  obtained  by  menace 
(N.  S.)  691,  63  L.  T.  Rep.  (N.  S.)  376,  17  or  duress,  /.  e.,  when  one  doth  threaten 
Cox  Crim.  Cas.  402.  See,  also,  Barrett  another  to  kill  or  maim  him  if  he  will  not 
W.Weber,  125  N.  Y.  18,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  make  him  such  a  deed,  or  doth  imprison 
1068.  another  until  he  make  him  such  a  deed, 

^  Davis  V.  Fox,  59  Mo.  125.  and  tliereupon  he  make  the  deed,  —  a  deed 

*  Eberstein  v.  Willets,  134  III.  101,  24  thus  obtained  by  force  and  through  fear, 
N.  E.  Rep.  967  ;  Fairbanks  v.  Snow,  145  to  avoid  danger,  is  void,  and  will  not  bind 
Mass.  153,  155,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  596,  1  Am.  him  that  made  it,  nor  avail  him  to  whom 
St.  Rep.  446,  per  Holmes,  J. :  "  We  know  it  is  made." 

83 


5^  ;).").]  DISABILITY    FROM   DURESS. 

valid  by  the  acts  of  the  grantor  after  his  release  from  duress.-' 
Where  a  person  arrested  for  hirceny  conveys  land  to  a  person 
causing  his  arrest  in  satisfaction  for  the  stolen  property,  after 
being  released  from  arrest,  and,  having  consulted  with  counsel, 
surrenders  possession  of  tlie  property  conveyed,  this  constitutes  a 
ratification  of  the  conveyance.^ 

A  deed  by  a  wife  executed  under  duress,  by  threats  of  a  crim- 
inal prosecution  against  the  grantor's  husband  for  embezzlement 
from  the  grantees,  is  not  void  but  voidable,  and  is  ratified  by  the 
wife  when,  with  full  knowledge  of  its  invalidity,  and  of  the  fact 
that  her  husband  has  escaped  to  a  foreign  country  and  is  beyond 
the  reach  of  a  criminal  prosecution,  she  voluntarily  executes  an- 
other deed  to  the  grantees  to  induce  them  to  purchase  a  lot  of 
household  furniture  on  the  premises.^ 

The  grantor  may  allow  the  deed  to  stand  if  he  chooses.  The 
privilege  of  avoiding  it  is  a  personal  one,  and  cannot  be  availed 
of  by  the  grantor's  creditors  or  by  any  stranger.^ 

95.  One  who  seeks  to  avoid  a  deed  on  account  of  duress 
must  not  sleep  upon  his  rights,  but  must  move  promptly. 
Clear  and  conclusive  evidence  in  explanation  of  the  delay  is  re- 
quired.^ Long  delay  raises  a  presumption  of  acquiescence  and 
ratification,  and  when  unexplained  may  have  the  effect  of  defeat- 
ing a  recovery  of  the  land.  Thus,  an  unexplained  delay  of  three 
years  in  bringing  suit  to  set  aside  a  deed  alleged  to  have  been 
obtained  by  duress,  during  which  time  the  property  has  passed 
into  the  hands  of  innocent  purchasers,  has  been  held  to  bar  the 
right  to  sue.^ 

1  Ormes  v.  Beadel,  2  De  G.,  F.  &  J.  333  ;  ler  v.  Minor  Lumber  Co.  98  Mich.  1 63, 
Bodine  v.  Morgan,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  426 ;  Ed-  57  N.  W.  Rep.  101 ;  Heckman  v.  Swartz, 
wards  v.  Bowden,  103  N.  C.  50,  9  S.  E.  50  Wis.  267,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  891  ;  Doolittle 
Rep.  194,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  487.  v.  McCullough,  7  Ohio  St.  299  ;  Reed  v. 

3  Eberstein  v.  AVillets,  134  111.  101,  24  Exum,  84  N.  C.  430,  432,  per  Smith,  C. 

N.  E.  Rep.  967.  J. ;  Murphy  v.  Paynter,  1  Dill.  333.     In 

2  Miller  v.  Minor  Lumber  Co.  98  Mich.  Murphy  v.  Paynter  a  bill  to  set  aside  a 
153, 57  N.W.  Rep.  101.  And  see  Edwards  deed  for  duress  was  dismissed  for  an  un- 
V.  Bowden,  103  N.   C.  50,  9  S.   E.  Rep.  explained  delay  of  twelve  years. 

194,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  487.  6  Eberstein  v.  Willets,  134  111.  101,  24 

*  Lewis  I'.  Bannister,  16  Gray,  500;  Mc-  N.  E.    Rep.    967.     See,  also,   Bouldin  v. 

Clintick    V.    Cummins,    3    McLean,   158;  Reynolds,   58  Md.  491  ;    Lefebvre  v.  Du- 

Thompson  v.  Lockwood,  15  Johns.  256.  Unit,  51   Wis.  32G,   8  N.  W.  Rep.  149,  37 

^  Eberstein   u.  Willets,   134  111.101,24  Am.  Rep.  833,  a   delay  of  two   years  was 

N.  E.  Rep.  967;  Lyon  i;.  Waldo,  36  Mich,  declared  to  be   not  without   significance, 

345  ;  Hunt  v.  Ilardwick,  68  Ga.  100  ;  Mil-  but  not  to  be  a  controlling  fact. 

84 


DUEESS   RENDERS    DEED    VOIDABLE    ONLY.  [^  96. 

In  Massachusetts  such  a  deed  may  be  avoided  by  the  entry  of 
the  grantor  or  his  heirs  within  twenty  years.^ 

96.  When  a  court  of  equity  sets  aside  a  deed  executed 
under  duress,  it  will  compel  a  reconveyance  upon  terms  just 
to  both  parties.  In  a  case  where  there  had  been  a  delay  of 
fourteen  years,  the  court  said :  ^  "  All  that  the  plaintiff  is  en- 
titled to  is  the  restoration  of  his  laud  in  the  state  in  which  it 
was  taken  from  him,  with  compensation  for  the  use  meanwhile, 
and  for  any  damages  it  may  have  sustained.  On  the  other  hand, 
its  increase  of  value  from  improvements  is  a  proper  counter-claim 
against  the  wronged  owner.  But  this  counter-claim  should  be 
discharged  from  the  earlier  annual  rents,  as  well  as  the  purchase- 
money  paid ;  and  when  the  successive  rents  have  absorbed  the 
amount  of  these  demands  of  the  defendant,  the  remaining  rents 
of  the  land  as  improved  (not  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations) 
will  be  the  measure  of  the  plaintiff's  recovery.  This  increased 
rent  is  given  because  the  improvements  will  then  have  been  dis- 
charged out  of  the  plaintiff's  funds." 

1  Worcester  v.  Eaton,  13  Mass.  371,  7        8  Rged  v.  Exum,  84  N.  C.  430,  433. 
Am.  Dec.  155. 

85 


CHAPTER   VI. 


DISABILITY   FIIOM   UNDUE    INFLUENCE. 


I.  What    constitutes    undue   influence, 
97-102. 
II.  Contidential   relation  of   the  parties, 
103-107. 
III.  Kelatiou   of   parent  and  child,  1  OS- 
Ill. 


IV.  llelation  of  husband  and  wife,  112, 
113. 
V.  Presumption  and  proof  of  undue  in- 
fluence, 114-116. 

VI.  Deed  procured  by  undue  influence  is 
voidable  only,  117,  118. 


I.      What  constitutes  undue  Influence. 

97.  Undue  influence  means  wrongful  influence.  The  influ- 
ence which  will  render  a  conveyance  voidable  is  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  deprive  the  grantor  of  his  free  agency.  If  the  influence, 
however  exerted,  has  the  effect  to  control  the  grantor's  volition 
and  to  induce  him  to  do  what  he  otherwise  would  not  have  done, 
it  is  undue  or  wrongful,  and  may  be  taken  advantage  of  by  the 
grantor  himself,  or  by  others  injuriously  affected,  to  have  the  deed 
set  aside.^  "  Where  coercion  is  not  suflicient  to  amount  to  duress, 
but  a  social  or  domestic  force  is  exerted  on  a  party  which  con- 
trols the  free  action  of  his  will,  and  prevents  any  true  consent 
in  the  making  of  a  contract  or  execution  of  deed,  equity  may 
relieve  against  the  same  on  the  ground  of  undue  influence."  ^ 


1  Conley  v.  Nailor,  118  U.  S.  127,  6 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1001  ;  Ralston  v.  Turpin,  129 
U.  S.  663,25  Fed.  Rep.  7  ;  Burt  v.  Quisen- 
berry,  132  111.  385,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  622; 
Sturtevant  i-.  Sturtevant,  116  III.  340; 
Yoe  V.  McCord,  74  111.  33,  relating  to  a 
will ;  Webber  v.  Sullivan,  58  Iowa,  260, 
12  N.  W.  Rep.  319;  Davis  v.  Calvert,  5 
Gill  &  J.  269,  302,  relating  to  a  will ; 
Kithcart  v.  Larimore,  34  Neb.  273,  51  N. 
W.  Rep.  768  ;  Smith,  in  re,  95  N.  Y.  516  ; 
Eckert  r.  Flowry,  43  Pa.  St.  46,  relating 
to  a  will ;  Chappell  v.  Trent  (Va.),  19  S. 
E.  Rep.  314,  relating  to  a  will. 

Undue  influence  is  defined  by  statute 
in  California,  Civ.  Code,  §  1575  :    "1.    In 

86 


the  use  by  one  in  whom  a  confidence  is 
reposed  by  another,  or  who  holds  a  real  or 
apparent  authority  over  him,  of  such  con- 
fidence or  authority  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  an  advantage  over  him  ;  2.  In 
taking  an  unfair  advantage  of  another's 
weakness  of  mind ;  or  3.  In  taking  a 
grossly  oppressive  and  unfair  advantage 
of  another's  necessities  or  distress."  And 
see  DoUiver  v.  Dolliver,  94  Cal.  642,  30 
Pac.  Rep.  4. 

2  Munson  v.  Carter,  19  Neb.  293,  27  N. 
W.  208,  approved  and  followed  in  Hart- 
nett  V.  Hartnett  (Neb.),  60  N.  W.  Rep. 
362.  And  see  Edwards  v.  Bowden,  107 
N.  C.  58,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  58. 


WHAT   CONSTITUTES   UNDUE   INFLUENCE.  [§  98. 

Where  any  relation  exists  by  virtue  of  which  one  person  is  able 
to  exercise  doininion  over  anotlier,  the  court  will  annul  a  transac- 
tion under  which  a  person  possessing  that  power  takes  a  benetit, 
unless  he  can  show  the  transaction  was  a  righteous  one.^  Thus, 
where  a  young  woman  transferred  her  property  to  her  intended 
husband,  who  had  no  affection  for  her,  and  refused  to  marry  her 
on  any  terms  other  than  an  absolute  conveyance  to  him  of  all 
her  property,  and  her  letters  showed  an  infatuation  on  her  part 
which  might  impel  her  to  give  him  all  her  estate  free  from  any 
conditions,  the  transfer  was  not  sustained.^ 

The  influence  usually  denominated  undue  influence  is  a  wrong- 
ful influence  upon  the  mind  and  will  of  a  person  through  per- 
suasion and  artful  effort,  so  that  the  will  is  controlled  and  the 
person  is  constrained  to  act  in  subjection  to  the  will  of  another. 
When  this  influence  is  obtained  by  physical  coercion,  or  by  threats 
of  personal  harm,  it  is  usually  called  duress.  "  Influence  properly 
gained,  although  used  for  a  selfish  purpose  and  to  obtain  an  un- 
just and  unfair  advantage,  will  not  avoid  a  deed  thereby  obtained, 
unless  there  is  fraud  or  duress,  or  the  influence  is  exerted  by  a 
stronger  mind  over  a  weak  one,  in  such  a  manner  and  to  such  a 
degree  as  to  substitute  the  will  of  the  person  exerting  the  influ- 
ence in  place  of  that  of  him  upon  whom  it  is  exerted,  so  that 
the  latter  is  no  longer  a  free  agent."  ^  Moderate  solicitation  by 
one  to  induce  another  to  execute  a  deed  in  favor  of  the  former, 
even  when  accompanied  with  tears,  does  not  constitute  undue 
influence.* 

98.  Evidence  and  presumptions. — Where  no  confidential 
relation  exists  between  the  parties  and  the  grantor's  capacity  is 
undoubted,  the  fact  of  undue  influence  must  be  established  by 
satisfactory  evidence;  and  until  so  established  the  ordinary  pre- 
sumption attaches  as  to  the  validity  of  the  deed,  and  the  disposing 
capacity  of  the  grantor ;  and,  on  proof  of  due  and  pi'oper  execu- 
tion of  the  instrument,  the  burden  is  on  the  attacking  party  to 

1  Cooke  V.  Lamotte,  15  Beav.  234.  6  N.  E.  Rep.  428  ;  In  re  Carroll,  ,50  Wis. 

2  Shaw  V.  Shaw,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  897.  437,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  434  ;  Carty  v.  Connolly, 

3  Howe  y.  Howe,  99  Mass.  88,  per  Hoar,  91  Cal.  1.5,  27  Pac.  Rep.  599;  Miilicau 
J.  See,  aLso,  Conley  v.  Nailor,  118  U.  S.  v.  Millican,  24  Tex.  427  ;  Simmerman  v. 
127,  134,  6  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1001  ;  Ralston  v.  Songcr,  29  Gratt,  9,  24. 

Turpin,  129  U.  S.  663,  9  Sup.  Ct.   Rep.         *  Doran  v.  MoConlogue,  150  Pa.  St.  98, 
420 ;  Sturtevant  v.  Sturtevant,  1 16  111.  340,     24  Atl.  Rep.  357. 

87 


§  tjtj  1  DISABILITY    FUOM    UiNDUK    liNFLUKNCE. 

prove  bis  cusl'.'  Tiie  allegation  of  uiiilue  iulliience  is  tantamount 
to  an  allegalion  of  fraud.  It  is  an  aflfirmative  fact  that  must  be 
provL'il  by  the  party  alleging  it.^  "  What  constitutes  undue  influ- 
ence is  a  question  depending  upon  the  circumstances  of  each  par- 
ticular case.  It  is  a  species  of  constructive  fraud  which  the  courts 
will  not  undertake  to  define  by  any  fi.Kcd  principles,  lest  the  very 
di4inition  itself  furnish  a  fiuger-boaid  pointing  out  the  path  by 
which  it  may  be  evaded.  But  it  is  evident  that  its  exercise  may 
be  inferreil  in  all  cases  of  confidential  or  quasi-confiilential  rela- 
tionship, where  the  power  of  the  person  receiving  a  gift  or  other 
like  benefit  has  been  so  exerted  upon  the  mind  of  the  donor  as, 
by  improper  arts  or  circumvention,  to  have  induced  him  to  confer 
the  benefaction  contrary  to  his  deliberate  judgment,  reason,  and 
discretion."  ^  Whether  a  deed  was  procured  by  undue  influence 
may  properly  be  shown  by  proof  of  the  circumstances  attending 
the  transaction  ;^  and  evidence  of  other  transactions  between  the 
parties,  not  connected  with  or  relating  to  the  transaction  in  ques- 
tion, but  occurring  at  about  the  same  time,  is  admissible  as  bear- 
ing upon  the  relation  of  trust  and  confidence  existing  between 
them.^  A  deed  is  not  invalidated  by  evidence  of  declarations  by 
the  grantor  that  he  did  not  execute  the  deed  willingly  or  volun- 
tarily. Such  evidence  is  not  competent  and  should  be  wholly 
excluded.^ 

99.  Weakness  of  mind  furnishes  ground  of  suspicion  of 
improper  influence,  and  therefore,  if  any  unfair  advantage  over  a 
grantor  can  be  shown  or  inferred  from  the  circumstances  of  the 
transaction,  a  court  of  equity  will  afford  relief  against  it.^     If  the 

1  Jones  r.  Jones,  137  N.  Y.  610,  33  N.  *  Graham  r.  Burch,   44  Minn.  33,   46 

E.  Kep.    479,   affirming  17  N.   Y.    Snpp.  N.  W.  Rep.  148 ;  Woodbury  ?;.  Woodbury, 

905  ;  Fisher  v.  Bishop,   108  N.  Y.  25,  15  141  Mass.  329,  5  N.  E.  Rep.  275;  Driike's 

N.  E.  Rep.  331 ;  Arnold  v.  Whitcomb,  83  Appeal,  45  Conn.  9;  Tyler  v.  Gardiner, 

Mich.  19,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  1029;  Hamilton  35  N.  Y.  559,  594. 

V.  Armstrong  (Mo.),  25  S.  W.  Rep.  545  ;  ^  Jones  v.  Jones,  120  N.  Y.  580,  24  N. 

Ireland   v.   Geraghty,    15    Fed.  Rep.  35;  E.  Rep.  1016;  Woodbury  v.  Woodbury, 

Kopp  V.  Gunther,  95  Cal.  63,  30  Pac.  Rep.  141  Mass.  329,  5  N.  E.  Rep.  275. 

301.  ^  Dickie  v.   Carter,  42  111.   377,   389; 

•^  Roe  V.  Taylor,  45  111.  485;  Guild  v.  Burt  v.  Quisenberry,  132  111.  385,  24  N. 

Hull,   127   111."  523,   20  N.  E.  Rep.    665;  E.  Rep.  622 ;  Guild   t>.  Hull,  127  111.   523, 

Taylor  v.  Crockett  (Mo.),  27   S.  W.  Rep.  20  N.  E.  Rep.  665. 

620;  Le  Gendre  v.  Goodridgc,   46  N.   J.  "^  Allore  v.  Jewell,  94  U.  S.  506  ;  Hard- 

Eq.  419,  19  Atl.  Rep.  543.  ing  v.  Handy,   11  Wheat.  103,  2   Mason, 

3  Shipman  v.  Furniss,  69  Ala.  555,  565,  378.      In    Harding   v.   Handy,   2    Mason, 

44  Am.  Rep.  528,  per  Somerville,  J.  378,  386,  Story,  J.,  said  :  "  Extreme  weak- 


WHAT    CONSTITUTES    UNDUE   INFLUENCE. 


[§99. 


consideration  was  inadequate,  and  the  gi'antee  occupied  a  situation 
of  confidence  or  authority  with  respect  to  the  grantor,  the  deed 
will  not  be  allowed  to  stand. ^     The  unnaturalness  and.  injustice  in 


ness  will  raise  an  almost  necessary  pie- 
sumption  of  imposition,  even  when  ifstops 
short  of  legal  incapacity;  and  though  a 
contract,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things, 
reasonably  made  with  such  a  person, 
might  be  admitted  to  stand,  yet,  if  it 
should  appear  to  be  of  such  nature  as  that 
such  a  per;ou  could  not  be  capable  of 
measuring  its  extent  or  importance,  its 
reasonableness  or  its  value,  fully  and  fair- 
ly, it  cannot  be  that  the  law  is  so  much  at 
variance  with  common  sense  as  to  uphold 
it."  California :  Carty  v.  Connolly,  91 
Cal.  15,  27  Pac.  Rep.  599;  Richards  v. 
Donner,  72  Cal.  207,  13  Pac.  Rep.  584. 
Delaware :  Guest  v.  Beeson,  2  Houst.  246. 
Georgia :  Frizzell  v.  Reed,  77  Ga.  724 ; 
Causey  v.  Wiley,  27  Ga.  444.  Indiana: 
Ashmead  i'.  Reynolds,  134  Ind.  139,  33  N. 
E.  Rep.  763,  127  Ind.  441,  26  N.  E.  Rep. 
80  ;  Wray  v.  Wray,  32  Ind.  126  ;  Ikerd  v. 
Beavers,  106  Ind.  483,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  326. 
And  see  Jagers  v.  Jagers,  49  Ind.  428. 
Iowa:  Corbit  v.  Smith,  7  Iowa,  60,  71 
Am.  Dec.  431  ;  Marmon  v.  Marmon,  47 
Iowa,  121  ;  Harris  v.  Wamsley,  41  Iowa, 
671  ;  Oakey  v.  Ritchie,  69  Iowa,  69,  28 
N.  W.  Rep.  448;  Sparguri;.  Hall,  62  Iowa, 
498,  17  N.  W.  Rep.  743.  Kentucky: 
Hounshell  v.  Sams  (Ky.),  9  S.  W.  Rep. 
410.  Michigan:  Case  v.  Case,  26  Mich. 
484  ;  Warteniberg  v.  Spiegel,  31  Mich. 
400  ;  Crips  v.  Towsley,  73  Mich.  395,  41 
N.  W.  Rep.  332.  Missouri:  Crowe  v.  Pe- 
ters, 63  Mo.  429;  Turner  v.  Turner,  44 
Mo.  535  ;  Bowles  v.  Wathan,  54  Mo.  261. 
Nebraska:  MuUoy  v.  lugalls,  4  Neb.  115; 
Cole  V.  Cole,  21  Neb.  84,  31  N.  W.  Rep. 
493.  New  Hampshire:  Dennett  v.  Den- 
nett, 44  N.  II.  531,  538,84  Am.  Dec.  97, 
per  Bell,  C.  J.  New  Jersey :  Mead  v. 
Coombs,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  173;  Collins  v. 
Collins  (N.  J.  Eq.),  15  Atl.  Rep.  849; 
Martling  v.  Martling,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  122; 
Morton  v.  Morton  (N.  J.  Eq.),  8  Atl. 
Rep.  807.  New  York :  Jackson  v.  King, 
4  Cow.   216,   15   Am.    Dec.  354.     Ehode 


Island:  Anthony  v.  Hutchins,  10  R.  I. 
165,176.  Brayton,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  It  is  not 
sufficient  to  suggest  mere  weakness  or  in- 
discretion of  the  party,  unless  it  also  be 
shown  that  there  was  fraud  in  the  party 
contracting,  or  some  undue  means  made 
use  of  to  induce  the  agreement  and  con- 
trol that  weakness.  The  degree  of  mental 
weakness  may  be  below  that  which  would 
justify  a  commission  of  lunacy,  or  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  guardian,  if  it  has  been 
taken  advantage  of  for  the  purpose.  The 
cause  of  the  weakness  is  not  material.  It 
may  be  from  duress,  general  imbecility, 
accidental  depression,  constitutional  de- 
spondency, or  the  result  of  sudden  fear  or 
apprehension."  Soutli  Carolina:  Buncli 
V.  Hurst,  3  Desaus.  (Eq.)  273,  5  Am.  Dec. 
551.  Texas:  Beville  v.  Jones,  74  Tex. 
148,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  1128.  Washington: 
Kennedy  v.  Currie,  3  Wash.  St.  442,  28 
Pac.  Rep.  1028.  Wisconsin:  Encking  v. 
Simmons,  28  Wis.  272 ;  Davis  v.  Dean, 
66  Wis.  100,  26  N.  W.  Rep.  737. 

1  Kempson  v.  Ashbee,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  15; 
Osmond  v.  Fitzroy,  3  P.  Wms.  130; 
Wiight  V.  Proud,  13  Ves.  138  ;  Huguenin 
V.  Baseley,  14  Ves.  273  ;  Dent  v.  Burnett, 
4  Jlyl.  &  C.  2G9 ;  Harvey  v.  Mount,  8 
Beav.  439  ;  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  8  How.  183 ; 
Jenkins  v.  Fye,  12  Pet.  241.  Alabama: 
Waddell  v.  Lanier,  62  Ala.  347.  Califor- 
nia :  Klose  v.  Hillenbrand,  88  Cal.  473, 
26  Pac.  Rep.  352  ;  Moore  v.  Moore,  81  Cal. 
195,  22  Pac.  Rep.  589.  Georgia  :  Frizzell 
V.  Reed,  77  Ga.  724.  Iowa :  Clough  v. 
Adams,  71  Iowa,  17,  32  N.  W.  Rep.  10; 
Gardner  v.  Lightfoot,  71  Iowa,  577,  32  N. 
W.  Rep.  510.  Maryland:  Highberger  v. 
Stiffler,  21  Md.  338,  83  Am.  Dec.  593; 
Cherbonnier  v.  Evitts,  56  Md.  276.  Mas- 
sachusetts :  Woodbury  v.  Woodbury,  141 
.Mass.  329,  5  N.  E.  Rep.  275.  Michigan: 
Hemphill  v.  Holford,  88  Mieli.  293,  .iO  N. 
W.  Rep.  300;  Smith  v.  Smith,  90  Mich. 
97,51  N.  W.  Kep.  361.  Minnesota  :  (ira- 
ham  V.  Burch,  44  Minn.  33,  46  N.  W.  Rep. 
89 


§§   100,  101.]        DISABILITY    FROM    UNDUE    INFLUENCE. 

the  traiisiiction  may  be  enough  to  uuike  a  fair  preponderance  of 
eviilence  on  the  side  of  the  grantor's  incompetency .^  The  fact 
that  a  grantor  of  weak  mind,  in  making  a  conveyance  for  an  inad- 
equate consideration,  acted  without  independent  advice,  is  a  clr- 
ounistance  that  will  be  taken  into  account  in  interfering  to  set 
aside  the  sale.^ 

100.  When  mental  -weakness  on  the  part  of  the  grantor  is 
shown,  his  voluntary  conveyance  can  be  sustained  only  upon 
affirmative  evidence  that  the  conveyance  was  not  procured  by 
any  undue  influence.  A  voluntary  conveyance  by  a  father  of  sub- 
stantially all  his  property  to  his  daughter  to  the  exclusion  of  his 
other  children  will  be  set  aside,  where  it  is  shown  that  the  grant- 
or's weakness  of  mind  was  extreme,  and  that  in  other  business 
transactions  he  was  wholly  controlled  by  the  grantee.  Such  a 
conveyance  could  only  be  sustained  by  affirmative  evidence  that  it 
was  made  without  the  exercise  of  any  influence  on  the  part  of  the 
grantee  or  in  her  behalf  to  procure  it,  and  that  the  grantor  fully 
understood  the  legal  effect  of  his  act.'^  A  deed  by  an  aged  and 
infirm  woman  in  consideration  of  love  and  affection  to  all  her 
children  except  one  daughter,  in  whose  favor  she  expressed  a  de- 
sire to  make  some  provision,  but  was  overborne  by  the  influence 
of  some  of  the  children  in  whose  care  she  was,  and  who  were  at 
enmity  with  this  daughter's  husband,  was  properly  set  aside  as 
procured  by  undue  influence.^ 

101.  Though  the  grantor  was  of  great  age,  if  he  was  fully 
competent  to  transact  all  his  business,  and  capable  of  a  rational 
disposition  of  his  property,  a  voluntary  conveyance  will  not  be  set 

148.    New  York  :  Fisher  r.  Fisher,  9  N.  Y.  N.  W.  Rep.  300  ;  Paddock  v.  Pulsifer,  43 

Supp.  4.     North  Carolina:  Futrill  v.  Fu-  Kuiis.  718,  23  Pac.  Hep.  1049. 

trill,  5  Jones  Eq.  61.     Pennsylvania  :  Ar-  ^  Allore  i\  Jewell,  94  U.  S.  506  ;  Kemp- 

nold  i;.  Town  send,  14  Phiiii.  216.     South  son  i'.  Ashbee,  L.  11.  10  Ch.  15;  Peebles 

Carolina  :  Sims  v.  McLure,    8   Kich.  Eq.  v.  Ilorton,  64  N.  C.  374  ;  Potter  v.  Wood- 

286,  70  Am.  Dec.  196;  Gaston  v.  Bennett,  ruff,  92  Mich.  8,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  83. 

30  S.  C.  467,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  515.     Texas:  ^  Yhd\  v.  Reiser,  79    Iowa,  34,  44   N. 

Millican  v.   Millican,  24  Tex.  426.     Vir-  W.  llep.  214;  Norton  r.  Norton,  74  Iowa, 

ginia.  Fishburne  v.  Ferguson,  84  Va.  87,  161,  37  N.  W.  Rep.  129  ;  Paddock  v.  Pul- 

4  S.  E.  Rep.  575.     Wisconsin:    Kelly  v.  sifer,  43  Ivans.   718,  23   Pac.  Rep.  1049; 

Smith,  73  Wis.  191,  41   N.  W.  Rep.  69;  Clark  u.  Kirkpatiick  (N.  J.  Eq.),  16  AtL 

Konrad  v.  Zimmerman,  79   Wis.  306,  48  Rep.  309;  Smith  v.  Smith,  90  Mich.  97, 

N.  VV.  Rep.  368.  51  N.  W.  Rep.  361. 

1  Hemphill  )•.  Ilolford,  8S  Mich.  293,50  •*  Miller  v.  Miufield,   79    Iowa,    64,  44 


N.  W.  Kei).  540. 


90 


WHAT    CONSTITUTES    UNDUE   INFLUENCE.  [§  102. 

aside  on  the  ground  of  a  presumption  of  improper  influence.^ 
"  Wiiile  extreme  age  will  not  authorize  the  presumption  of  a  want 
of  mind  or  of  mental  power  sufficient  to  enable  one  to  conduct  his 
business  affairs,  the  chancellor  will  always  scrutinize  with  vigi- 
lance the  character  of  the  transactions  resulting  in  voluntary  dona- 
tions or  grants  to  those  who  are  likely,  from  their  surroundings, 
to  have  exercised  an  influence  over  the  aged  and  infirm  when 
thus  disposing  of  their  estate."  ^  Evidence  that  a  daughter  in 
various  ways  directed  and  controlled  the  actions  of  her  aged 
father,  whose  mind  was  not  as  vigorous  as  it  had  been,  and  whose 
intimacy  with  a  married  woman  in  the  neighborhood  was  distaste- 
ful to  his  wife  and  other  members  of  the  family,  but  was  ap- 
proved by  his  daughter,  who  spoke  of  her  mother  and  the  others 
in  unfriendly  terms,  is  sufficient  to  justify  a  finding  that  the  deed 
was  procured  by  undue  influence.^ 

102.  A  conveyance  which  seems  unnatural  and  unjust 
towards  the  grantor's  relatives  does  not  of  itself  afiford  any 
ground  for  impeaching  its  validity,  if  the  grantor's  capacity  is 
undoubted,  and  there  is  no  ground  for  presuming  undue  influence, 
and  there  is  no  proof  of  such  influence.  A  grantor  has  the  legal 
right  to  make  an  unequal,  unjust,  unnatural,  or  unreasonable  dis- 
position of  his  property.  It  is  only  when  the  gx-antor's  capacity  is 
properly  questioned,  or  improper  influence  is  proved  or  presumed, 
or  his  relations  to  the  grantee  are  confidential  or  unlawful,  that  his 

1  Creswell  v.  Welchman,  95  Cal.  359 ;  347;  Graham  v.  Burch,  44  Minn.  33,46 
Burt  ?;.  Quisenberry,  132  III.  385,  24N.  E.  N.  W.  Rep.  148;  Martini;.  Martin,  1 
Eep.  622  ;  Arnold  v.  Whitcomb,  83  Mich.  Heisk.  644  ;  Kelly  v.  Smith,  73  Wis.  191, 
19,  46  N.  W.  Hep.  1029;  Brockway  v.  41  N.  W.  Rep.  69 ;  Le  Gendre  u.  Byrnes 
Harrington,  82  Iowa,  23,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  (N.  J.),  23  Atl.Rep.  581, 19  Atl.  Rep.  543; 
1013;  Buckey  v.  Buckey,  38  W.  Va.  168,  Haydock  v.  Haydock,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  570, 
18  S.  E.  Rep.  383;  Likins  i;.  Likins  (Mo.),  574,38  Am.  Rep.  385,  Reed,  J.,  saying: 
27  S.  W.  Rep.  531.  "I  take  the  rule  lo  be  settled  that  where 

2  Sullivan  v.  Hodgkin  (Ky.),  12  S.  W.  a  ])crson,  enfeebled  in  mind  by  disease  or 
Rep.  773,  per  Pryor,  J.  And  see  Teabody  old  age,  is  so  placed  as  to  be  likely  to  be 
I'.  Kendall,  145  111.  519,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  subject  to  the  influence  of  another,  and 
674;  Kimball  v.  Cuddy,  117  111.  213,  7  makes  a  voluntary  disposition  of  that 
N.  E.  Rep.  589 ;  Hill  v.  Miller,  50  Ivans,  property  in  favor  of  that  ])erson,  the 
659,  32  Pac.  Rep.  354;  Paddock  v.  I'ul-  courts  require  jiroof  of  the  fact  that  the 
sifer,  43  Kans.  718,  33  Pac.  Rep.  1049;  donor  understood  the  nature  of  the  act, 
Weller  v.  Weller,  112  N.  Y.  655,  19  N.  E.  and  that  it  was  not  done  through  the  in- 
Rep.  433,  nffirnn'ng  44  Ilun,  172  ;  Todd  v.  flucnce  of  the  donee." 

(irovc,  33  Md.  188;  Ilighberger  r.  Stiiiler,  »  Peabody  u.  Kendall,  145  111.  519,  32 
21  Md.  338;  Waddell  v.  Lanier,  62  Ala.     N.  E.  Rep.  674. 

91 


§  103.]  DISABILITY    I-'KOM    liNDl  K    INILUKNCK. 

clisieoaiil  of  the  nutunil  und  usual  nioiles  of  disposing  of  property 
is  of  consequence.^  The  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  may 
fully  and  satisfactorily  explain  the  conduct  of  the  grantor.  Thus, 
if  an  only  son  has  for  a  long  time  neglected  his  mother,  and 
has  not  attempted  to  treat  her  as  a  mother,  but  she  has  lived 
with  her  nephews,  who  have  kindly  cared  for  her  during  many 
years,  a  conveyance  to  them  of  all  her  real  estate,  made  shortly 
before  her  death,  to  the  exclusion  of  her  son,  may  be  properly 
sustained.^ 

II.    Confidential  Relation  of  the  Parties. 

103.  A  voluntary  conveyance  to  one  who  holds  a  confiden- 
tial relation  to  the  grantor  is  looked  upon  with  suspicion,  and  it 
is  pi'esumed  that  the  grantee  obtained  the  conveyance  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  an  influence  unduly  to  his  own  advantage.  Such  a  con- 
veyance will  not  be  upheld,  unless  it  is  shown  that  the  grantor 
acted  under  independent  advice  and  fully  understood  the  result 
and  effect  bf  his  act.  In  the  words  of  Lord  Langdale,^  the  ine- 
quality between  the  transacting  parties  is  so  great  "  that,  without 
proof  of  the  exercise  of  pov/er  beyond  that  which  may  be  inferred 
from  the  nature  of  the  transaction  itself,  this  court  will  impute 
an  exercise  of  undue  influence."  The  burden  is  upon  the  grantee 
who  receives  a  conveyance  from  a  pei'son  who  confides  in  him,  or 
is  under  the  dominion  of  his  influence,  to  show  that  a  reasonable 
use  has  been  made  of  such  confidence  or  influence.^     "  In  many 

1  Campbell  v.  Campbell,  75  Mich.  53,  tagnie,  73  N.  Y.  498;  Comstock  v.  Com- 
42  N.  W.  Rep.  670;  Salisbury  v.  Aldrich,  stock,  57  Barb.  453  ;  Yosti  i;.  Laughran, 
118  111.  199,  8  N.  E.  Rep.  777;  Hale  v.  49  Mo.  594;  Muiison  v.  Carter,  19  Neb. 
Cole,  31  W.  Va.  579,  8  S.  E.  Rep.  516  ;  293,  27  N.  W.  Rep.  208;  Waddell  v.  La- 
Bledsoe  v.  Bledsoe  (Ky.),   1  S.  W.  Rep.  nicr,  62  Ala.  347. 

10.                                    "  *  Parfitt  V.  Lawless,  L.  R.  2  Probt.  &  D. 

2  Hale  i;.  Cole,  31  W.  Va.  579,  8  S.  E.  468,  per  Lord  Penzance;  Gibson  v.  Jeyes, 
Rep.  516.  And  see  Callery  v.  Miller,  1  N.  6  Vts.  27t<,  per  Lord  Eldon ;  Huguenin  v. 
Y.  Supp.  88.  Baseby,  14  Ves.  273,  300.  [ler  Sir  Samuel 

3  Casborne  r.  Barsharn,  2  Beav.  76.  Romilly  ;  Dent  i-.  Bennett,  4  M.vl.  &  C.  269, 
And  see  Iloghton  v.  Hoghton,  15  Beav.  per  Lord  Cottenham ;  Ralston  r.  Turpin, 
278;  Rhodes  v.  Bate,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  App.  129U.  S.663,  9  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  420.  Ala- 
252,  per  Lord  Justice  Turner;  Savery  v.  bama  :  Burke  v.  Taylor,  94  Ala.  530,  10 
King,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  627;  Parker  v.  Dun-  S.  E.  Rep.  129  ;  Lyons  i'.  Campbell,  88 
can,  88  L.  T.  326 ;  Lyon  i-.  Home,  L.  R.  Ala.  462,  7  So.  Rep.  250;  Shipman  v. 
6  Eq.  Cas.  655;  Miskey's  App.  107  Pa.  Furniss,  69  Ala.  555  ;  Wood  v.  Craft,  85 
St.  611 ;  Watkins  v.  Brant,  46  Wis.  419,  Ala.  260,  262,  4  So.  Rep.  649.  California: 
I  N.  W.  Rep.  82 ;    Bovd  i;.  De  La  Mon-  Ross  v.  Conway,  92  Cal.  632,  636,  28  Par. 

92" 


CONFIDENTIAL   RELATION   OF   THE    PARTIES. 


[§  104. 


cases,"  said  the  Master  of  the  Rolls,  Rorailly,  "  the  court,  from 
the  relations  existing  between  the  parties  to  the  tiansaetion,  in- 
fers the  probability  of  such  undue  influence  having  been  exerted. 
These  are  the  cases  of  guardian  and  ward,  of  solicitor  and  client, 
spiritual  instructor  and  pupil,  medical  adviser  and  patient,  and  the 
like  ;  and  in  such  cases  the  court  watches  the  whole  transaction 
with  great  jealousy,  not  merely  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  that 
the  person  likely  to  be  so  influenced  fully  understood  the  act  he 
was  perforaiing,  but  also  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  that  bis 
consent  to  perform  that  act  was  not  obtained  by  reason  of  the 
inflaence  possessed  by  the  person  receiving  the  benefit :  not  that 
the  influence  itself,  flowing  from  such  relations,  is  either  blamed 
or  discountenanced  by  the  court ;  on  the  contrary,  the  due  exer- 
cise of  it  is  considered  useful  and  advantageous  to  society  ;  but 
this  court  holds,  as  an  insepai-able  condition,  that  this  influence 
should  be  exercised  for  the  benefit  of  the  person  subject  to  it,  and 
not  for  the  advantage  of  the  person  possessing  it."  ^ 

104.  The  confidential  relation  is  not  confined  to  the  usual 


Rep.  785,  per  Harrison,  J. :  "  This  rule 
finds  its  application  with  peculiar  force  in 
a  case  where  the  effect  of  the  transaction 
is  to  divert  an  estate  from  those  who,  by 
the  ties  of  nature,  would  be  its  natural 
recipients,  to  the  person  through  whose 
influence  tlie  diversion  is  made,  whether 
such  diversion  be  for  his  own  personal 
advantage,  or  for  the  advantage  of  some 
interest  of  which  he  is  the  representative. 
It  has  been  more  frequently  applied  to 
transactions  bstween  attorney  and  client, 
or  guardian  and  ward,  than  to  any  other 
relation  between  the  parties;  but  the  rule 
itself  has  its  source  in  principles  wliich 
underlie  and  govern  all  confidential  rela- 
tions, and  is  to  be  applied  to  all  tran.«ac- 
tions  arising  out  of  any  relation  in  which 
the  principle  is  apidicable."  Connecticut: 
Richmond's  App.  ^d  Conn.  226,  22  Atl. 
Rep.  82.  Iowa  :  Spargur  v.  Hall,  02  Iowa, 
498;  Gardner  v.  Lightfoot,  71  Iowa,  .')77, 
32  N.  W.  Uep.  .510.  Kansas  :  Paddock  v. 
I'illsifer,  43  Kans.  718,  23  Pac.  Rcf).  1049. 
Kentucky:  McElwain  v.  Rtisscll  (Ky.), 
12  S.  W.  Rep.  777.  Maryland:  Todd  v. 
Grove,  33  Md.  188;  IIi;;hberger  c.  Stifiler, 


21  Md.  338;  Williams  v.  Williams,  63 
Md.  371.  Michigan  :  Smith  v.  Cuddy,  96 
Mich.  562,  56  N.  W.  Rep.  89  ;  Seeley  v. 
Price,  14  Mich.  541  ;  Witbeck  v.  Wit- 
beck,  25  Mich.  439  ;  Wartemberg  v.  Spie- 
gel, 31  Mich.  400;  Barnes  v.  Brown,  32 
Mich.  146;  Buncombe  v.  Richards,  46 
Mich.  166,  9  N.  W.  Rep.  149;  Jacox  v. 
Jacox,  40  Mich.  473  ;  Fiuegan  v.  Theiseu, 
92  Mich.  173,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  619.  Mis- 
souri: Armstrong  v.  Logan  (Mo.),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  384.  New  Jersey:  Pironi  v. 
Corrigan,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  135,  20  Atl.  Rep. 
218  (N.  J.  L.),  23  Atl.  Rep.  355.  New 
York:    Fisher  v.   Bishop,  108    N.  Y.  25, 

15  N.  E.  Rep.  331  ;  Ford  v.   Harrington, 

16  N.  Y.  285;  Freelove  v.  Cole,  41  Barb. 
318;  Mason  v  Ring,  2  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S. 
322;  Ross  v.  Ross,  6  Hun,  80;  Marx  v. 
McGlynn,  88  N.  Y.  357.  Pennsylvania: 
Yardley  v.  Cuthbertaon,  108  Pa.  St.  395, 
1  Atl.  Rep.  765,  56  Am.  Rep.  218,  relating 
to  a  will;  Miskey's  App.  107  Pa.  St.  611. 
Washington:  White  y.  Johnson,  4  Wash. 
St.  113,  29  Pac.  Rep.  932. 

1  Iloghton  V.  Iloghton,   15  Beav.  278, 
299. 

93 


§  105.]  PISAIULITY    FIIOM    UNDUK    IXILUENCE. 

relations  between  persons  which  are  so  designated,  but  em- 
braces every  ])Ossible  fulueiary  n^lution.  Lord  Kingsdown,  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  said:  "  Equity  is  especially  jealous  to  guard  the 
welfare  of  the  weaker  party  in  all  contracts  between  parent  and 
child,  guardian  and  ward,  attorney  and  client,  trustee  and  cestui 
que  trust,  and,  indeed,  in  all  persons  standing  in  fiduciary  rela- 
tions to  each  other.  It  is  especially  active  and  searching  with 
gilts,  voluntary  conveyances,  and  deeds  without  due  considera- 
tion; though  its  range  is  so  wide  as  to  cover  all  possible  dealings 
between  persons  holding  such  relations,  or  any  relations  in  which 
dominion,  whether  physical,  intellectual,  moral,  religious,  domes- 
tic, or  of  any  sort,  may  be  exercised  by  one  party  over  the  other, 
or  in  which  the  parties  contracting  are  not  at  arm's-length."  ^ 
Confidential  relations  may  exist  outside  of  the  usual  ones  arising 
from  the  position  of  guardian  and  ward,  attorney  and  client,  pas- 
tor and  churchman,  physician  and  patient,  and  the  like.^  "  The 
confidential  relation  is  not  at  all  confined  to  any  specific  associa- 
tion of  the  parties  to  it.  While  its  more  frequent  illustrations  are 
between  persons  who  are  related  as  trustee  and  cestui  que  trust, 
guardian  and  ward,  attorney  and  client,  parent  and  child,  hus- 
band and  wife,  it  embraces  partners  and  copartners,  principal 
and  agent,  master  and  servant,  physician  and  patient,  and,  gen- 
erally, all  persons  who  are  associated  by  any  relation  of  trust  and 
confidence.  When  the  relation  exists,  the  consequent  duties  and 
obligations  are  perfectly  well  established  by  long-settled  law."  ^ 

But  the  courts  will  not  interfere  to  set  aside  a  trifling  gift  or 
benefit  conferred  upon  a  person  standing  in  a  confidential  relation 
to  the  giver,  upon  mere  proof  of  the  confidential  relation,  but  only 
in  case  there  is  distinct  proof  of  mala  fides,  or  of  undue  exercise 
of  influence.^ 

105.  Where  the  relation  is  one   of  special  trust,   such  as 

1  Smith   V.   Kay,    7    H.  L.    Cas.   750  ;  to  be  most   freely  exercised."     And  Bee 

White  &  T.  Lead.   Cas.   Eq.   (cd.  1887)  Jones  r.  Jones,  137  N.  Y.  610,  33  N.  E. 

1184.  Rep.  479,  affirming  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  905; 

'-  In  the  case  of  Dent  w.  Bennett,  4  Myl.  Fisher  v.  Bishop,  108  N.  Y.  25,  15  N.  E. 

&  C.    269,    Lord    Chancellor  Cottenham  Rep.  331 ;  Bowe  v.  Bowe,  42  Mich.  195, 

said  :  "  I  will  not  narrow  the  rule,  or  run  3  N.  W.  Rep.  843. 

the  risk  of   in  any  degree   fettering   the  ^  Darlington's  Est.  147  Pa.  St.  624, 629, 

exercise  of  the  beneficial   jurisdiction  of  23  Atl.  Rep.  1046,  per  Green,  J. 

this  court,  by  any  enumeration  of  the  de-  ■•  Rhodes  v.  Bate,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  App.  252, 

scription  of  persons  against  whom  it  ought  per  Turner,  L.  J. 

94 


CONFIDENTIAL    RELATION    OF    THE  PAKTIES.  [§  106. 

arises  between  a  trustee  and  the  beneficiary,  between  guardian 
and  ward,  attorney  and  client,  principal  and  agent,  physician  and 
patient,  any  benefit  secured  by  the  first-named  party  in  either  of 
these  relations  is  presumed  to  have  been  improperly  secured,  and 
it  will  be  sustained  only  upon  satisfactory  evidence  that  it  was 
the  free  and  voluntary  act  of  the  other  party.  In  dealings  be- 
tween  principal  and  agent,  guardian  and  ward,  trustee  and  cestui 
que  trust,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  agent,  the  guardian, 
or  the  trustee,  who  claims  a  benefit  arising  from  the  transaction, 
to  show  the  utmost  good  faith  on  his  part,  that  iie  took  no  advan- 
tage of  his  influence  or  knowledge,  and  that  he  brought  every- 
thing to  the  knowledge  of  the  other  party  which  he  himself 
knew.^  Thus,  a  provision  in  a  deed  of  trust  which  gave  a  large 
compensation  to  the  trustees,  one  of  whom  was  the  lawyer  who 
wrote  the  deed,  although  the  grantor  was  perfectly  competent, 
was  set  aside  because  the  compensation  was  excessive,  and  affirma- 
tive proof  was  not  given  that  full  explanation  was  made  to  the 
grantor  of  the  character  and  effect  of  the  provision. ^ 

A  deed  by  a  young  man  to  a  woman  who  had  been  for  some 
years  his  nurse  and  attendant  was  set  aside  because  the  relation 
was  regarded  as  of  a  confidential  nature,  and  there  was  no  af- 
firmative proof  in  support  of  the  conveyance,  though  the  grantor 
was  mentally  competent  and  no  undue  influence  was  brought  to 
bear  upon  him,  and  he  acted  under  advice.^ 

Of  course,  if  the  person  holding  the  relation  of  trustee,  agent, 
or  other  place  of  confidence,  purchases  with  the  consent  of  the 
party  beneficially  interested,  given  with  a  full  knowledge  of  all 
the  circumstances  affecting  the  purchase,  the  conveyance  will  be 
sustained,  though  it  will  be  set  aside  if  there  was  any  fraud  or 
unfair  advantage  taken  of  the  confidential  relation.* 

1  Ralston   v.  Turpin,  129   U.    S.    603;  bury  f.  Aldrich,  118  111.  199,  8  N.  E.  Rep. 

9  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  420 ;    June  v.  Willis,  30  777. 

Fed.  Rep.  11  ;  Darlington's  App.  86  Pa.  2  Greenfield's  Est.   14  Pa.  St.  489,  per 

St.   512,   per   Trunkey,  J.;    Darlington's  Bell,  J. :  "  An  attorney  or  other  confiden- 

Est.  147  Pa.  St.  624  ;  Woodbury  v.  Wood-  tial  adviser  is  not  permitted  to  avail  him- 

bury    141  Mass.  329,  .5  N.  E.  Rep.  275;  self  either  of  the  necessities  of  his  client,  or 

Sears  v.   Hicklin,  13  Colo.   143,  21    Pac.  of  his  good  nature,  liberality,  or  credulity, 

Rep.  1022;  Taucre  v.  Reynolds,  35  Mitin.  to  obtain   undue  advantages,  bargains,  or 

47G  ;  20  N.  W.  Rep.  171  ;   Dunn  v.  Dunn,  gratuities." 

42  N.  J.  Eq.  431,  7  At).  Rep.  842  ;  Whip-  3  Worrall's  App.  110  Pa.  St.  349. 

pie  V.  Barton,  63  N.  II.  613,  3  AtL  Rep.  *  Ilawley  v.   Tesch  (Wis.),  59   N.   W. 

922  ;  McHarry  v.  Irvin,  85   Ky.  322,  4  S.  Rep.  670. 

W.   Rep.   800,  .-?    S.  W.  Rep.   374  ;   Salis-  95 


§§  100,  107.]       DISAIULIIY    FROM    UNDUH    INFLUKNCK. 

106.  If  it  is  shown  that  a  grantee  to  whom  one  has  made 
a  gift  of  land  had  a  spiritual  ascendency  over  the  grantor, 
the  burden  of  proof  is  shifted  upon  the  grantee  to  show  that 
the  grantor  knew  the  legal  olfect  of  the  tiansiiction.^  Thus,  where 
a  liomau  Catholic  woman,  old,  eccentric,  and  illiterate,  being 
uniible  either  to  read  or  write,  made  a  will  devising  certain  land 
to  a  priest  who  was  her  spiritual  adviser,  which  she  afterwards 
revoked,  and  by  deed,  reserving  to  herself  a  life  estate,  conveyed 
the  land  as  a  gift  to  the  priest,  who  thereupon  gave  her  a  thou- 
sand dollars,  to  be  expended  in  im[)roving  the  land,  it  was  held 
that  the  burden  was  on  the  priest  to  prove  that  his  grantor  was 
fully  apprised  of  the  legal  effect  of  her  act  when  she  signed  the 
deed,  and  that  she  was  not  influenced  by  her  confidential  rela- 
tions with  him.  Because  of  the  failure  of  such  proof,  the  convey- 
ance was  set  aside  upon  the  refunding  of  the  money  paid  by  the 
priest.^ 

107.  "Where  the  only  relation  between  the  parties  is  that 
of  friendly  habits,  or  habitual  reliance  on  advice  and  assistance 
in  some  mutters,  the  relation  can  hardly  be  called  a  confidential 
one,  though  care  must  be  taken  that  no  undue  advantage  shall 
be  made  of  the  influence  thus  acquired.  The  mere  circumstance 
that  a  deed  of  gift  is  made  to  a  friend  of  long  standing,  who  has 
been  accustomed  to  advise  the  grantor  in  certain  business  matters, 
does  not  warrant  the  court  in  ascribing  the  deed  to  undue  influ- 
ence improperly  exercised  over  the  grantor,  making  him  the  dupe 
of  his  friend's  artifices,  the  victim  of  his  contrivances,  the  subject 


1  Norton  v.  Relly,  2  Eden,  286,  where  exercised    upon   the   human  mind,  espe- 

the    gift    of    an  annuity   obtained   by  a  cially  if  such  mind  is  impaired  by  physi- 

preacher  who  had  a  spiritual  ascendency  cal  weakness,  is  so  consonant  with  human 

over  the  donor,  a  woman,  was  set  aside  experience   as    to  need  no  more  than  its 

upon  principles  of  public  policj'.    And  see  statement ;    and   in    any   transaction    be- 

Ford  V.  Hennessy,  70  Mo.  580.  tween  them,  wherein  the  adviser  receives 

'^  Carrif^an  v.  Peroni  (N.  J.  L.),  23  Atl.  any  advantage,  a  court  of  equity  will  not 

Rep.  3b^),  reversing   47    N,    J.    Eq.   135,  enter  into  an  investigation  of  the  extent 

20  Atl.    Rep,    218;   Finegan   v.  Theisen,  to  which  such  influence  lias  been  exercised. 

92  Mich.  173,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  619.     For  Any  dealing  between   them,  under  such 

a   similar  case   see  Ross   v.  Conway,    92  circumstances,  will  beset  aside  as  contrary 

Cal.  632,  28  I'ac.  Rep.  785.     In   this  case  to   all    principles    of  equity,  whether   the 

Harrison,  .J.,  said  :  "  That  the  influence  benefit  accrue  to  the  adviser,  or  to  some 

which  the  spiritual   adviser  of   one  who  other  recipient  who,   through   such   influ- 

is    about    to   die    has    over   such    person  ence,  may  have  been  made  the  beneficiary 

is  one  of   the  most  powerful  that  can  be  of  the  transaction." 

96 


RELATION    OF    PARENT    AND    CHILD.  [§  108. 

of  his  sway.^  But  where  a  relation  of  confidence  is  shown  to 
exist,  slight  proof  of  fraud  or  undue  influence  will  be  ground  for 
setting  the  deed  aside.^  Where  deeds  of  gift  were  drawn  by  the 
husband  of  one  of  the  grantees,  the  other  being  his  wife's  sister, 
at  the  positive  direction  of  the  donor,  who  was  an  intelHgent  man 
with  mind  unimpaired,  though  sick  at  the  time,  no  presumption 
of  invalidity  arises  from  the  relation  in  which  the  husband  stood 
to  the  grantor,  though,  if  the  husband's  conduct  in  this  matter 
had  been  tainted  with  the  slightest  injustice  or  wrong-doing,  it 
would  have  avoided  the  deed,  notwithstanding  his  wife  and  her 
sister  were  guilty  neither  of  fraud  nor  any  undue  influence  in 
procuring  the  deeds.-^ 

The  mere  relation  of  master  and  servant,  or  of  boarder  and 
landlord,  raises  no  implication  of  a  confidential  relation  which 
the  courts  will  consider  in  proceedings  in  equity  to  set  aside  a 
conveyance.* 

III.  Relation  of  Parent  and  Child. 
108.  The  influence  of  a  father  over  a  child  is  such  that  if  the 
father  takes  a  voluntary  conveyance,  or  one  upon  an  inadequate 
consideration,  from  his  son  or  daughter,  the  burden  of  proof  is 
upon  him  to  show  that  he  did  not  unfairly  take  advantage  of  his 
influence  and  authority  in  the  transaction.^  As  said  by  Lord 
Chancellor  Hatherly:^  "If  the  father  himself  takes  a  benefit, 
then  arises  the  jealousy  of  the  court,  and  we  have  to  consider  how 
the  child's  intention  was  produced  ;  and  even  if  we  find  the  inten- 
tion which  the  instrument  describes,  still  the  question  arises,  how 

1  Pratt  V.  Barker,  1  Sim.  1,4  Russ.  507,  Lord  Cottenham  ;  Archer  v.  Hudson,  7 
per  Lord  Brougbam  ;  Hiiuter  v.  Atkins,  3  Bcav.  551,  per  Lord  Langdale ;  "\Vychevl.>y 
MyL  &  K.  113,  per  Lord  Brougham.  v.  Wvcheiley,  2  Eden,  175,  180,  per  Lord 

2  Bavliss  V.  Williams,  6  Coldw.  440.  Noithington  ;    Muzzy    v.   TompkinsoD,  2 
8  Hamilton  v.  Armstrong,  120  Mo.  597,     Wash.  St.  616,  27  Pac.  Rep.  456,  28  Pac. 

25  S.  W.  Rep.  545,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1054.  Rep.    G52  ;    Miskey's   App.    107    Pa.    St. 

*  Doran  ;;.  McConlogne,  1.50  Pa.  St.  98,  61 1  ;  Williams  v.  Williams,  63  Md.  371  ; 

24  Atl.  Rep.  357.  It  seem?,  too,  that  there  Knox  v.  Singmaster,  75  Iowa,  64  ;  Toms 
is  no  special  confidential  or  fiduciary  re-  r.  Greenwood,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  606  ;  Bergeu 
lation  hetween  an  officer  of  a  corporation  v.  Udall,  31  Barb.  9  ;  Noble  v.  Moses,  74 
aud  a  person  from  whom  smh  officer  Ala.  604,  1  So.  Rep.  217;  Baldock  v. 
purchases  the  stock  of  the  corporation.  Johnson,  14  Oreg.  542,  13  Pac.  Rep.  434 ; 
Krumbhaar  v.  Griffidi.s,  151   Pa.  St.  223,  Beville  ;;.  Jones,  74  Tex.  148,   11    S.  W. 

25  Atl.  Rep.  64.  Rep.  1 1 28. 

6  Iloghton  V.  Iloghton,  15  Benv.  278;  «  Turner  v.  Collins,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  App. 
Bellamy  v.  Sabine,  2  PhiU.  425,  439,  per    329,  339. 

VOL,  I.  97 


§   108.]  DISABILITY    KKOM    UNDUE   INKLUKNCE. 

lias  that  intention  been  produced  ?  Influence  is  :i  thing  which  is 
assumed  as  between  father  and  ehikl,  not  that  the  influence  is 
assiiineil  to  be  unduly  exercised,  but  that  the  inihience  is  assumed  ; 
and  it  is  then  thrown  upon  the  fatlier,  if  ho  takes  any  benefit, 
to  prove  what  is  called  the  righteousness  of  the  transaction,  and 
the  court  has  to  see  that  every  pro])er  protection  was  thrown 
around  the  child,  and  that  the  child  has  deliberately  and  ad- 
visedly, and  under  protection,  done  that  by  which  his  father  has 
obtained  a  benefit." 

Where  a  son,  recently  after  attaining  his  majority,  makes  over 
property  to  his  father  without  consideration,  or  for  an  inadequate 
consideration,  a  court  of  equity  expects  that  the  father  shall  be 
able  to  justif}'-  what  has  been  done ;  to  show,  at  all  events,  that 
the  son  was  really  a  free  agent,  that  he  had  adequate  independent 
advice;  that  he  was  not  taking  an  imprudent  step  under  paren- 
tal influence,  and  that  he  perfectly  understood  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  sacrifice  he  was  making,  and  that  he  was  desirous 
of  making  it.^ 

Where  a  man  enfeebled  in  mind  and  body  made  a  voluntary 
conveyance  of  all  his  estate,  worth  seventy  thousand  dollars  or 
more,  to  his  father,  for  the  benefit  of  his  father,  his  mother,  and 
sister,  with  the  exception  of  a  trust  for  his  wife  and  son  of  the  sum 
of  ten  thousand  dollars,  and  the  transaction  was  made  under  the 
professional  advice  of  the  father's  attorney,  without  the  know- 
ledge of  the  son's  private  attorney,  the  deed  was  set  aside  in  favor 
of  the  grantor's  widow. ^ 

When  a  parent  takes  the  benefit  of  a  voluntary  conveyance 
from  a  child,  two  things  are  required  to  be  proved  by  the  parent 
setting  up  the  deed  :  first,  that  the  deed  is  the  real  deed  of  the 
child,  and  was  intended  to  have  the  operation  which  it  legally 
has  ;  and  secondly,  that  such  intention  was  fairly  produced.^ 

1  Savery  v.  King,  5  II.  L.  Cases,  627,  artifice  or  contrivance  was  made  use  of  to 

657.     Lord   Chancellor  Cranwortli   said  :  induce  him  to  do  the  act  complained  of; 

"I  must  not  be  understood  as  question-  and  that  the  son  had  competent  means  of 

ing  the  position  that  a  son  may  give  uj)  forming  an  independent  judgment."     See, 

all  or  any  portion  of  his  property  to  his  also,  Williams  v.  Williams,  6.3  Md.  371  ; 

father   without   consideration.     Undoubt-  Koble  v.  Moses,  81    Ala.  530,  1  So.  Rep. 

edly  he  may  do  so:   but  then  it  is  incum-  217;  Ashton  v.  Thompson,  32  Minn.  25, 

bent  on  the  fatlier,  accepting  such  a  ben-  18  N.  W.  Rep.  918. 

efit,  to  .satisfy  the  court  before  which  the  ^  Miskey's  App.  107  Pa.  St.  611. 

transaction  is  impeached  that  the  son  fully  "  Hoghton   v.  Hoghton,    15  Beav.  278, 

understood  what  he  was  doing  ;  that  no  302 ;  Turner  v.  Collins,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  App. 

98  329. 


RELATION    OF    PAKENT    AND    CHILD.  [§109. 

109.  A  deed  made  by  a  parent  to  a  child  at  his  solicita- 
tion, and  because  of  partiality  induced  by  affection,  is  nut 
procured  by  undue  influence,  because  it  is  not  a  wrongful  influence. 
A  deed  m  ide  under  such  influence  will  nut  be  invalidated  on 
the  crround  of  undue  influence,  unless  the  court  is  convinced  that 
the  free  agency  of  the  grantor,  at  the  time  he  executed  the  deed, 
was  so  .far  destroyed  that  he  would  not  have  made  the  deed  if 
left  to  himself.^  As  between  parents  and  children,  the  law  makes 
no  presumption  of  undue  influence  which  the  children  are  bound 
to  explain  in  order  to  obtain  the  benefit  of  a  voluntary  convey- 
ance of  property  to  them.  The  parental  relation  alone  is  enough 
to  rebut  any  such  presumption.^ 

A  deed  of  gift  by  a  motlier  to  her  daughters,  who  execute  in 
return  a  conveyance  to  her  of  a  life  estate  in  the  same  property, 
will  not  be  set  aside  on  her  own  application,  where  the  evidence 
shows  that  when  the  deed  was  made  the  grantor  declared  that 
she  made  the  conveyance  so  that  her  daughters  might  have  a 
home ;  that  there  was  no  exercise  of  undue  influence  by  the 
grantees  in  procuring  the  execution  of  the  deed  ;  that  there  was 
no  advantage  taken  of  any  confidential  relation  ;  and  that  there 
was  no  mental  unsoundness  or  feebleness  on  the  part  of  the 
gran  tor. 3 

When  a  husband  and  wife  separate,  and  one  son  remains  with 
the  father,  taking  his  part,  sharing  his  confidence  and  affection 
and  assisting  him  in  his  affairs,  and  the  other  children  go  with 
the  mother,  taking  her  part  in  the  family  differences,  and  this 
state  of  things  continues  for  years,  until  terminated  by  the  death 
of  the  father,  it  is  natural  and  reasonable  that  the  fatlier,  in 
disposing  of  his  estate,  should  desire  to  specially  provide  for  the 
son  who  remained  with  him  and  took  his  part ;  and  a  deed  made 
by  him  with  this  object,  and  under  the  natural  influences  spring- 
ing from  such  relationship,  will  be  sustained,  unless  it  be  made 

1  Le  Gendre   v.  Goodridge,    46    N.  J.  W.  Hep.  465  ;  Carty  v.  Connolly,  91  Cal. 

Eq.  419,   19   Atl.   Rep.    543;   Sullivan  ;;.  15,  27  Tac.  Rep.  599  ;  Burt  y.  Quisenberry, 

Ilodgkin  (Ky.),  12  S.  W.  Rep.  773  ;  Bush  132  III.  385,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  622  ;  Hansen 

V.   Johnson    (Ky.),    12  S.   W.  Rep.  758;  ?;.  Berthelson,  19  Neb.  43.3,  27  N.  W.  Rep. 

Fitz  ratrick  v.  Fitz  Patrick,  91  Mich.  394,  423. 

51  N.  W.  Rpp.  1058  ;  Lynch  v.  Doran,  95  ^  Simon   v.  Simon   (Pa.    St.),   29    Atl. 

Mich.  395,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  882  ;  Brockway  lie]).  657,  per  Green,  J. 

r.  IIarrinf,^ton,  82low.i,  23,  47  N.  ^y.  Rep.  »  Simon   t;.    Simon    (Pa.   St.),    29    Atl. 

1013;  Moss  y.  Moss,  78  Iowa,  645,  43    N.  Rep.  657. 

99 


§  110.]  DISABILITY    FKOM    UNDUK    INFLUKNCE. 

further  to  n[)i>fai'  tliat  the  son  pi-acLised  ii[)()u  the  fatlier  iinpo- 
oition,  fraud,  iinportunity,  duress,  or  somctliiug  of  that  nature,' 
iu  order  to  secure  its  execution.^ 

AVhere  a  woman  made  a  conveyance  to  the  widow  of  her  de- 
ceased son  of  hiiid  inherited  by  the  grantor  from  her  son,  the 
evidence  showed  that  the  grantor  was  a  woman  of  ordinary  intel- 
ligence ;  that  she  understood  her  rights  as  heir  of  her  son  ;  that 
she  made  the  conveyance  on  the  advice  and  solicitation  of  her 
daughter,  who  pressed  upon  her  the  claims  of  her  son's  wife  to  all 
the  property  acquired  by  the  son;  and  that  there  was  no  decep- 
tion used.  It  was  held  that  there  was  no  ground  for  annulling 
the  deed  on  the  ground  of  undue  influence. ^ 

110.  It  is  true,  nevertheless,  that  the  natural  position  of 
parent  and  child  may  become  changed,  and  the  parent  may- 
become  subject  to  the  dominion  of  the  child  to  such  an 
extent  that  any  deed  of  gift  from  tlic  parent  to  the  child  will  be 
viewed  with  great  suspicion  and  set  aside,  unless  satisfactory  evi- 
dence is  produced  that  the  deed  was  not  obtained  by  wrongful 
influence.  When  it  is  once  shown  that  this  influence  exists,  there 
is  a  presumption  of  its  continuance,  and  the  burden  of  proof  will 
be  upon  the  child  to  show  that  it  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of  the 
deed  of  gift.^  Where  a  son  has  maintained  a  long  intimacy  with 
his  father,  and  has  had  the  management  of  his  affairs,  a  con- 
fidential relation  between  the  father  and  son  is  induced,  which, 
resembling  that  between  client  and  attorney,  principal  and  agent, 
parishioner  and  priest,  compels  proof  of  a  valuable  consideration 
and  bona  fides  in  order  to  sustain  a  deed  from  one  to  the  other.^ 

A  father,  according  to  a  long-fixed  and  often-expressed  inten- 
tion, conveyed  a  part  of  his  laud  to  his  natural  daughter,  to 
whom  he  was  deeply  attached.  His  legitimate  daughter  and  her 
husband  importuned  him,  with  threats,  to  have  the  land  recon- 
veyed  to  him.  He  thereupon  went,  with  the  counsel  of  his  son- 
in-law,  to  the  first-mentioned  daughter,  and,  in  the  absence  of  any 
one  to  represent  and  advise  her,  persuaded  her  to  sign  unwillingly 

1  Mackall   v.   Mackall,    135   U.  S.    107,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  122,  20  Atl.  IJep.  41  ;  Spar- 

168,  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  70.5,  per  Brewer,  J.  gur  v.  Hall,  62  Iowa,  498,  500,  17  N.  W. 

^  Beith   V.  Beith,  76  Iowa,  601,   41    N.  Rep.  743  ;  Raddock  v.  Pulsifer,  43   Kaus. 

W.  Rep.  371.  718,  23  I'ac.  Rep.  1049. 

••  B'lrt   V.  Quisenbcrry,    132  111.  385,  24  *  Mackall  v.  Mackall,  135  U.  S.  167,  10 

N.  E.  Rep.  622;    Martling    r.  Martliiifr,  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  705,  per  Brewer,  J. 
100 


RELATION   OF   HUSBAND   AND   WIFE.         [§§  111,  112. 

a  deed  which  he  had  taken  with  him,  already  prepared.  The 
father  was  at  the  time  old  and  feeble,  and  died  a  few  days  after- 
wards.    It  was  held  that  the  deed  should  be  set  aside.' 

111,  A  voluntary  conveyance  made  by  a  father  to  a  son, 
in  consideration  that  the  latter  will  support  his  father  and 
mother  during  life,  will  nut  be  set  aside  upon  the  application  of 
the  parents  or  of  the  other  children,  in  the  absence  of  proof  that 
undue  influence  was  used  to  obtain  the  conveyance.^  If  the  cir- 
cumstances surrounding  the  transaction  tend  strongly  to  show 
that  the  execution  of  the  deed  was  the  offspring  of  the  grantor's 
own  mind,  and  was  in  accordance  with  an  intention  and  desire 
lono"  expressed,  and  the  testimony  in  regard  to  his  capacity  is 
conflicting,  the  validity  of  the  deed  will  be  sustained,  especially 
if  there  has  been  an  acquiescence  of  all  parties  in  interest  in  the 
act  of  the  grantor  for  a  considerable  period. ^ 

IV.     Relation  of  Husband  and  Wife. 

112.  The  relation  of  husband  and  wife,  though  confidential, 
does  not  of  itself  warrant  a  presumption  of  undue  influence. 
Such  a  presumption  arises  only  when  there  is  something  suspicious 
in  the  circumstances,  or  the  nature  or  magnitude  of  the  gift  is  such 
that  it  ought  not  to  have  been  made  and  accepted.*  A  gift  by 
the  wife  to  the  husband  has  been,  however,  regarded  by  the  courts 
with  much  jealousy,  and  will  not  be  sustained  if  evidence  of  undue 
influence  is  shown  and  the  gift  was  improvident.^    In  an  action  by 

1  Davis  V.  Strange,  86  Va.  793,  II  S.  51  ;  Fiulayson  v.  Fiulayson,  17  Oreg.  347, 
E.  Rep.  406.  21  Pac.  Tlep.  .57  ;  Kennedy  i;.  Ten  Broeck, 

2  Collins  u.  Collins,  45  N.J.  Eq.  813, 18  11    Bush,  241;  Scarborough  v.  Watkins, 
Atl.   Kep.  860 ;    Bush  v.  Johnson   (Ky.),  9  B.  iMon.  540,  1  Am.  Dre.  528 ;  Sneathen 
12  S.  W.  Rep.  758;  Argo  w.  Coffin,  142  111.  v.  Sneathen,  104  Mo.  201,  16  S.  W.  Rep. 
368,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  679  ;  Marshall  v.  Mar-  497  ;  Latham  v.  Udell,  38  Mich.  2.'58. 
shall,  75  III.  132.  ^  Boyd  v.   Dc  La  Montngnie,  73  N.  Y. 

s  Adair  v.  Cook  (Ky.),  5  S.  W.  Rep.  49S,  502 ;  Smyley  v.  Reese,  53  Ala.  89,  25 

412.    And  see  Bowen  v.  Hughes,  5  Wash.  Am.  Rep.  598  ;  McRae  v.  Battle,  69  N.  C. 

St.  442,  32  Pac.  Rep.  98  ;  Lynch  v.  Doran,  98  ;  Stiles  v.  Stiles,  14  Mich.  72  ;  Converse 

95  Mich.  395,54  N.  W.  Rep.  882;   Falls  r.  Converse,  9   Rich.    Eq.  535;  Sharpe  v. 

V.  FalLs,   78    Iowa,   756,  42   N.  W.  Rep.  McPike,  62  Mo.  300.      Some  of  these  au- 

511.  tlioritie.s  go  to  the  extent  of  holding  that, 

*  Ilndden  v.  Lamed,  87  Ga.  634,  13  S.  in  a  gift  by  a  wife  to   her  husband,  the 

W.  Rep.  806;  Shipman  v.  Furniss,  69  Ala.  slightest  evidence  of  influence  on  the  part 

555,   564,    44    Am.    Rep.    528;    Small    v.  of    the    hii.sband    will  invalidate    it;    and 

Small,  4   Me.  220  ;   Gunthcr   v,  Giinther,  some  of  them  assert  a  presumption  of  in- 

69  .Md.  560;  Golding  f.  Golding,  82  Ky.  validity  because  of  tlu-  confidential  rela- 

101 


^  ii;>.] 


DISAl'.lLIl  Y    FROM    UNDUK    INI'LUP:NCE. 


a  wife  to  set  as'ule  a  deed  of  land  not  her  separate  property,  made 
by  her  at  the  request  of  her  husband,  evidence  tliat  her  husband 
was  a  man  of  imperious  will  and  positive  convictions,  and  tlnit  his 
personal  influence  over  his  wife  was  such  that  his  request  was 
equivalent  to  a  command,  is  no  evidence  of  undue  influence.^  In  an 
action  by  a  wife  to  set  aside  a  conveyance  by  her  to  her  husband 
of  her  lands  mivde  without  consideration,  it  appeared  that,  while 
she  was  sick  and  in  an  enfeebled  condition,  she  was  subjected  to 
continued  persuasion  and  urgency  by  her  husband,  from  which 
she  finally  sought  relief  by  executing  the  conveyance,  without  time 
for  reflection,  or  opportunity  to  take  advice  from  any  disinterested 
person,  and  the  conveynnce  was  set  aside.^ 

113.  Undue  influence  will  not  be  inferred  from  the  mere 
fact  of  the  execution  of  a  voluntary  deed  in  favor  of  a  wife, 
son,  daughter,  or  other  near  relative  not  standing  in  a  position 
of  authority  or  special  influence  in  regard  to  the  grantor.  The 
fact  that  an  old  man  conveyed  his  farm  to  his  second  wife,  when 
he  had  several  years  previously  made  a  will  in  which  he  liad 
given  her  only  a  life  interest  in  it,  affords  no  evidence  of  undue 
influence.^  The  mere  relation  of  parent  and  child  is  not  sufficient  to 


tion.  These  cases  are  criiiuised  in  Iladden 
V.  Lamed,  87  Ga.  634,  13  S.  E.  Tiep.  806, 
where  it  was  held  that  such  a  gift  is  prima 
facie  valid,  and  Bleckley,  C.  J.,  said: 
"  That,  in  the  jiresent  state  of  the  law,  a 
wife  is  legally  competent  to  malie  a  gift 
to  her  husband,  is  not  questionable.  When 
she  exercises  this  power  by  a  solemn  deed 
of  conveyance,  would  it  not  conflict  with 
all  the  analogies  of  the  law  to  treat  tlie 
deed  as  prima  facie  void,  and  require  it 
to  be  upheld  by  extrinsic  evidence  before 
any  fact  whatever  tending  to  impeach  it 
has  been  adduced  ?  " 

1  Allen  V.  Drake,  109  Mo.  626,  19  S. 
W.  Rep.  41.  In  this  case  the  evidence 
showed  that  the  husband  had  settled  an 
ample  se])arate  estate  on  his  wife,  an<l,  as 
her  trustee,  managed  and  kept  a  separate 
account  of  it;  that  he  purchased  certain 
land,  and  directed  the  deed  to  be  made  to 
his  wife  J  that  he  paid  for  the  property 
himself,  and  personally  assumed  an  in- 
cumbrance thereon ;  that  the  deed  was 
delivered  to  him,  but  never  delivered  by 

102 


hiai  to  his  wife;  that  he  requested  his  wife 
to  deed  the  property  to  a  third  person,  in 
order  that  such  person  might  transfer  the 
legal  title  to  him ;  that  the  wife  executed 
a  deed  as  requested,  and  declared,  on  "  an 
examination  separate  and  a])art  from  her 
husband,  that  she  executed  the  same  freely 
and  without  fear,  compulsion,  or  undue 
influence  ;  "  and  tliat  the  husband  did  not 
have  the  deed  to  his  wife  recorded  till 
after  her  deed  was  filed  for  record.  It 
was  held  that  there  was  no  evidence  of 
undue  influence  on  the  part  of  the  hus- 
band. See,  however.  Fowler  v.  Butterly, 
78  N.  Y.  68,  34  Am.  Rep.  507. 

2  Aldridge  v.  Aldridge,  liiO  N.  Y.  614, 
24  N.  E.  Rep.  1022. 

3  Shepardson  v.  Potter,  .53  Mich.  106, 
18  N.  W.  Rep.  575;  Hodges  v.  Cook,  93 
Mich.  577,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  823.  And  see 
Ellis  V.  Ellis,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  46,  23  S. 
W.  Rep.  996 ;  Brockway  v.  Harrington, 
82  Iowa,  23,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  1013  ;  Sam- 
son V.  Samson,  67  Iowa,  253,  25  N.  W. 
Rep.  233. 


PRESUMPTION    AND   PROuF   OF    UNDUE   INFLUENCE.        [^  114. 

create  a  presumption  of  undue  influence,  so  as  to  avoid  a  transfer 
of  property,  or  to  sliift  the  burden  of  proof  that  the  transaction 
was  fair  and  equitable  upon  the  person  benefited  ;  but  if  such  re- 
lation be  established,  and  the  circumstances  proved  show  that  the 
beneficiary  has  reaped  an  undue  advantage,  or  if  it  appears  that 
the  capacity  of  the  grantor  is  such  that  the  parties  did  not  deal  on 
terms  of  equality,  then  the  burden  is  shifted,  and  the  transaction 
is  presumed  fraudulent,  unless  it  be  affirmatively  established  that 
the  grantee  practised  no  deception  and  used  no  undue  influence.^ 
The  influence  of  affection  and  kind  offices,  unconnected  with  fraud 
or  contrivance,  though  it  induces  gratitude  and  recompense,  is  not 
undue.2 

V.     Presumption  and  Proof  of  Undue  Influence. 

114.  There  is  a  ■wellrecognized  distinction,  as  to  the  pre- 
sumption of  undue  influence,  between  a  gift  by  deed  and  a 
gift  by  will.  In  the  case  of  a  gift  by  deed,  the  presumed  undue 
influence  proceeds  upon  the  natural  assumption  that  a  person 
while  living  has  need  of  his  property  and  a  desire  to  retain  it,  un- 
less he  is  to  receive  an  adequate  equivalent  for  it.  With  respect 
to  a  testamentary  gift  this  ground  of  presumption  is  lacking. 
]\Ioreover,  in  the  case  of  a  gift  by  deed  the  transaction  is  one 
inter  vivos,  and  the  donee  knows  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
transaiition  ;  but  in  the  case  of  a  gift  by  will  the  beneficiary  is  not 
a  piirty  to  the  transaction,  and  does  not  necessarily  know  any- 
thing of  the  circumstances  which  induced  the  gift,  and  it  would 
be  manifestly  unfair  to  cast  upon  him  the  burden  of  showing  that 
the  gift  came  about  without  any  undue  influence.  "  The  very 
considerations  which  lead  to  suspicion,  which  must  be  removed  in 
transactions  inter  vivos,  —  friendship,  trust  and  confidence,  affec- 
tion, personal  obligations,  —  may,  and  generally  do,  justly  and 
properly,  give  direction  to  testamentary  dispositions."  ^    Stronger 

1  Green  v.  Koworth,  113  N.  Y.  462,  21  v.  Starr,  47  N..  J.  E<].  244,  20  Atl.  Rep. 
N.  E.  Rep.  165;  In  re  Smith's  Will,  9.5  87.5;  Carty  v.  Connolly,  91  Cal.  15,  27 
N.  Y.  516  ;  Toms  v.  Greenwood,  30  N.  Y.  Pae.  Rep.  599 ;  Eakle  v.  Reynolds,  54  Md, 
St.  Rep.  478,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  G66  ;  Niiilor  305  ;  Hamilton  v.  Armslroiifr,  120  Mo.  597, 
V.  Njiilor,  5  Mackey,  93.  25  S.  W.  Rep.  545,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1054. 

2  Le  Gcndre  v.  Goodridj^o,  46  N.J.  Eq.  »  Bancroft  v.  Otis,  91  Ala.  279,  8  So. 
419,19  Atl.  Hep.  543  ;  Clifton  r.  Clifton,  Rep.  286,  per  McClellan,  J.  And  see 
47  N.  J.  Eq.  227,  21  Atl.  Rep.  333 ;  White  Shipman  v.  Furniss,  69  Ala.  555,  564. 

103 


§  115,]  DISABILITY    FROM    UNDUE    INFLUENCK. 

proof  is  therefore  required  to  raise  a  presumption  of  undue  influ- 
ence in  the  case  of  a  will  than  in  the  case  of  a  deed,^ 

115.  The  fact  that  one  under  disability  of  any  kind  has 
acted  without  the  advice  of  counsel  or  friends  has  a  strong 
bearing  upon  ihc;  question  of  the  validity  of  the  transaction.^  Thus, 
where  an  aged  and  illiterate  woman  had  made  a  deed  of  gift  to 
her  priest,  who  liad  })roposed  to  her  that  he  would  bring  about  a 
separation  from  her  husband,  which  she  desired,  if  she  would  con- 
vey her  real  estate  to  him  subject  to  her  use  for  bfe,  and  she  acted 
without  the  advice  of  counsel,  it  was  held  that  the  burden  of 
proving  that  she  knew  the  legal  effect  of  her  act  rested  upon  the 
donee.  The  court  in  giving  judgment  said:  "The  first  sugges- 
tion of  making  this  conveyance  occurred  in  a  private  conversation 
between  herself  and  her  donee,  no  one  else  being  present.  Her 
instructions  to  draw  the  necessary  instruments  were  conveyed  to 
his  own  lawyer  by  the  donee,  she  having  no  personal  interview 
with  such  scrivenei-,  and  the  papers  were  finally  executed  in  the 
presence  and  under  the  supervision  of  the  counsel  of  the  donee : 
so  that  from  first  to  last,  with  respect  to  this  all-important  trans- 
action, she  had  no  adviser  of  any  kind,  either  legal  or  lay.  In- 
deed, there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that,  from  the  commencement 
of  the  business  to  its  close,  she  had  spoken  to  any  one  about  it  but 
the  appellant  himself.     The  crucial  question  therefore  occurs,  did 

1  Shipraan  v.  Furniss,  69  Ala.  555,  564.  upon  them,  unless  they  can  show  to  the 

2  Taylor  i;.  Taylor,  8  How.  183;  Koii-  satisfaction  of  the  court  that  the  person 
rati  V.  Zimmcrmann,  79  Wis.  306,  48  N,  by  whom  the  benefits  have  been  conferred 
W.  Kep.  368;  Ross  v.  Conway,  92  Cal.  had  competent  and  independent  advice  in 
632,  28  Pac.  Kep.  785  ;  Biukc  i'.  Tay-  conferring  them.  This,  in  my  opinion, 
lor,  94  Ala.  530,  10  So.  Rep.  129;  Moore  is  a  settled  and  general  principle  of  the 
V.  Moore,  81  Cal.  195,  22  Pac.  Rep.  589;  court;  and  I  do  not  think  that  cither  the 
Klose  V.  Hillenbrand,  88  Cal.  473,  26  Pac.  age  or  capacity  of  the  per.son  conferring 
Rep.  352 ;  Martling  v.  Martling,  47  N.  J.  the  benefit,  or  the  nature  of  the  benefit 
Eq.  122 ;  Shaw  ;•.  Shaw,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  897 ;  conferred,  affects  this  principle-  Age  and 
Woodbury  v.  Woodbury,  141  Mass.  329,  capacity  are  considerations  which  maybe 
5  N.  E.  Rep.  275.  The  rule  is  strongly  of  great  importance  in  cases  in  which  the 
stated  in  Rhodes  v.  Bate,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  Ai>p.  principle  does  not  apply  ;  but  I  think  they 
252,  257,  by  Lord  Justice  Turner,  who  are  of  but  little,  if  any,  importance  in  cases 
says:  "I  take  it  to  be  a  well-established  to  which  the  principle  is  applicable.  They 
principle  of  this  court  that  persons  stand-  may  afford  a  sufficient  protection  in  ordi- 
ing  in  a  confidential  relation  towards  oth-  nary  cases,  but  they  can  afford  but  little 
ers  cannot  entitle  themselves  to  hold  ben-  protection  in  cases  of  influence  founded 
efits  which  those  others  may  have  conferred  upon  confidence." 

104 


PRESUMPIION    AND    PROOF    OF    UNDUE    INFLUENCE.        [§  116. 

this  woman,  thus  old  and  ignoniut,  know  the  legal  effect  of  the 
act  she  then  did  ?  "  ^ 

But  the  mere  fact  that  one  has  made  a  conveyance  for  an  in- 
adequate consideration,  or  even  without  any,  to  another  standing 
in  a  confidential  relation  to  the  grantor,  without  taking  inde- 
pendent advice,  does  not  of  itself  show  that  the  conveyance  was 
induced  b}'^  undue  influence  or  oppression.  Such  circumstance, 
however,  throws  the  burden  of  proving  that  the  conveyance  was 
voluntarily  made,  with  full  knowledge  of  its  effect,  and  without 
undue  influence  or  undue  advantage  arising  out  of  the  confiden- 
tial relation,  upon  the  grantee  who  claims  the  benefit  of  the 
conveyance.^ 

Where  a  woman,  owning  land  subject  to  mortgages  made  by 
others,  who  was  unacquainted  with  business,  weak,  nervous,  and 
troubled,  under  the  advice  of  one  who  was  either  ignorant  or  false 
to  her  interests,  made  a  deed  to  the  mortgagees  conveying  the  land 
in  payment  of  the  mortgages,  which  did  not  amount  to  half  the 
value  of  the  land,  the  deed  was  set  aside.  Tlie  mortgagees  were 
men  of  affairs  and  were  aided  by  legal  counsel,  and  the  mortgagor 
was  made  to  believe  that  the  property  could  not  be  sold  with  the 
mortgages  on  it.  The  parties  did  not  deal  on  equal  terms.  The 
woman  was  misled  as  to  her  legal  rights,  and  over-persuaded  to 
convey  her  property.^ 

116.  Influence  obtained  by  the  use  of  unlawful  or  immoral 
means  is  undue  influence,  and  no  one  should  be  permitted  to 
derive  benefit  therefrom.^     The  exercise  of  such  influence  will  be 

1  Corrigan  v.  Pironi,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  607,  ^  Carty  i;.  Connolly,  91  Cal.  15,  27  Pac. 

23  Atl.  Rep.  355  ;  Pironi  v.  Corrigan,  47  N.  Rep.  599. 

J.  Eq.  135,  157,  20  Atl.  Rep.  218.     Pitney,  3  Tolantl  v.  Corey,  G  Utah,  392, 24  Pac. 

V.-C.,  in  the  court  of  cliancery,  said  :  "  It  Rep.  190. 

seems  to  me  that  the  complainant,  labor-  *  Lcighton  v.  Orr,  44  Iowa,  679;  Hanna 

ing  as  bhe  did  under  the  combined  disad-  v.  Wilcox,  53  Iowa,  547,  N.  W.  Rep.  717  ; 

vantages  of  great  age  and  of  dens^e  igno-  Dean  v.  Negley, 41  Pa.  St. 312,  80  Am.  Dec. 

ranee  and  inexperience,  and  dealing  with  620;  Kessinger  r.  Kessinger,  37  Ind.  341 ; 

a  person    in    whom  she   had  the   utmost  Shipman  v.  Furniss,  69  Ala.  555,  44  Am. 

confidence,  had  especial  need  of,  and  wa."?  Rep.  528;  Bivins  v.  Jarnigan,  3  Bax.  282  , 

especially  entitled  to,  and  should  have  had  Valentino  v.  Lunt,  51   Ilun,  544,  3  N.  Y. 

the  benefit  of,  a  full,  free,    and    private  Supp.  906. 

preliminary  conference  with  a  competent  In  Shipman  u.  Furniss,  69  Ala.  555, 565, 
lawyer  or  business  man  who  was  em-  Somerville,  J.,  deduces  the  following  prin- 
ployed  and  paid  by  her,  and  in  whom  she  ciple  as  being  sound  in  law  and  in  morals, 
had  confidence,  and  who  would  be  devoted  and  sustained  by  the  more  modern  au- 
to her  interests,  and  hers  onlv  "  thorities  :  "  When  one,  living  in  illicit  sex- 

105 


§  117.]  DISABILITY    FROM    UNDUK    INFU'ENCE. 

prcsuim'cl  Avliore  the  grantor  and  grantee  live  in  unlawful  c<>liabi- 
tation.  In  such  case,  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  a  valid  consid- 
eration for  the  conveyance,  the  burden  is  upon  the  party  asserting 
its  validity  to  show  that  it  was  not  procured  by  undue  influence.^ 
As  declared  by  Lord  Eldon  :  ^  "  Whenever  a  person  obtains  by 
voluntary  donation  a  large  pecuniary  benefit  from  another,  the 
bunlen  of  proving  that  the  transaction  is  righteous  falls  on  the 
j)(>rson  taking  the  benefit."  The  improvidence  of  the  donation  is 
always  a  circumstance  strongly  tending  to  show  fraud  or  undue 
inliuence,  especially  where  the  donor,  in  making  the  gift,  ex- 
cludes natural  and  legitimate  objects  of  his  bounty .^ 

A  deed  by  a  father  to  an  illegitimate  child,  or  to  such  child's 
mother,  with  whom  he  lives  in  illegal  intercourse  though  he  has 
a  wife  and  legitimate  children,  is  good  if  there  was  no  fraud  or 
undue  influence,  and  will  be  sustained  as  against  the  legitimate 
children.  Although  a  deed  made  between  parties  living  in  illegal 
sexual  relations  is  open  to  suspicion  of  fraud  or  undue  influence, 
it  will  be  sustained  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  it  was  pro- 
cured by  either  means.* 

YI.      Deed  procured  hy  undue  Influence  is  voidable  only. 

117.  A  deed  procured  by  undue  influence  is  voidable  and 
not  absolutely  void.^  if  the  grantor  desires  to  avoid  the  deed, 
he  must  act  with  promptness  before  the  land  has  increased  in 
value,  or  valuable  improvements  have  been  made  by  the  pur- 
chaser.^ 

There  may  be  a  ratification  of  such  a  deed  by  the  acts  and 
conduct  of  the  grantor  in  relation  to  the  transaction  ;  as  where 

nal  relations  with  another,  makes  a  larrje  "^  Gibson  v.  Jeyes,  6  Ves.  206. 

gljt  of  his  property  to  the  latter,  especially  ^  Shipman  v.  Furniss,  69  Ala.  5.").5,  44 

in  ca;es  where  the  donor  excludes  natural  Am.  Rep.  528  ;  Staley  v.  Houeel,  35  Neb. 

objects  of  his  bounty,  the  transaction  will  ICO,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  888, 

be  viewed  with  such  suspicion  by  a  court  of  *  Conlej'  v.  Nailor,   118   U.  S.    127,  6 

equity  as  to  cast  on  the  donee  the  burden  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1001. 

of  proving  that  the  donation  was  the  re-  *  Shipman   v.   Furniss,   69    Ala.    555 ; 

suit  of  free  volition,  and  was  not  superin-  Burt  v.  Quisenberry,  132  111.  385,  24  N.  E. 

duced  by  fraud  or  undue  infiuence."  Rep.  622. 

1  Coulson  V.  Allison,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  ^  Dent  v.  Long,  90  Ala.  172,  7  So.  Rep. 

521  ;  Lf'ightfin  v.  Orr,  44  Iowa,  679  ;  Ilauna  640  ;   Burkle  v.  Levy,  70  Cal.  250,  1 1  Tac. 

V.  Wilcox,  53  Iowa,    547,  5  N.  W.  Rep.  Rep.  643. 
717  ;  Staley  v.  Ilou-el,  35  Neb.  160,  52  N. 
W.  Rep.  888. 

106 


DEED    PROCURED    BY    UNDUE    INFLUENCE   IS    VOIDABLE    ONLY.    [§   118. 

one  wlio  had  made  a  conveyance  to  his  wife,  through  undue  influ- 
ence, after  her  death  treated  the  land  as  belonging  to  her  children, 
and  asked  an  attorney  if  the  deed  was  sufficient  to  give  them 
title,  stating  that,  if  it  was  not,  he  wanted  to  make  it  so.^ 

If  the  grantor  received  other  land  in  exchange  for  that  con- 
veyed through  undue  influence,  the  transaction  is  ratified  by  a 
sale  of  a  part  of  the  land  taken  in  exchange.^ 

A  deed  obtained  by  undue  influence,  or  alleged  to  have  been 
so  obtained,  is  validated  by  the  grantor's  will  referring  to  and 
confirming  the  deed  after  the  alleged  influence  had  been  wholly 
removed.^ 

118.  A  conveyance  obtained  by  the  undue  injQuence  of  a 
third  person  will  not  be  set  aside  as  against  a  purchaser  for 
fuU  value  who  had  no  knowledge  or  notice  that  the  conveyance 
was  so  obtained.'^  Thus,  a  conveyance  by  a  married  woman,  exe- 
cuted through  the  undue  influence  of  her  husband,  to  a  grantee 
who  was  not  in  any  way  informed  of  the  means  by  which  the 
deed  was  procured,  cannot  be  impeached  by  her  because  of  such 
undue  influence.^ 

1  Ellis   V.  Ellis,  5   Tex.  Civ.  App.  46,  *  Dent  v.  Long,  90  Ala.  172,  7  So.  Rep. 

23  S.  W.  Rep.  996.  640;  Moog  v.  Strang,  69  Ala.  98. 

■■^  Dent  y.  Long,  90  Ala.  172,  7  So.  Rep.  5  White   v.   Graves,    107  Mass.   .325,  9 

€40.  Am.   Rep.   38;  Moses  v.   Dade,  58  Ala. 

3  Burt  V.  Quisenberry,  132  111.  385,  24  211. 
N.  E.  Rep.  622. 

107 


CHAPTER   VII. 

DISABILITY   FROM  ADVERSE    POSSESSION. 


I.  At  common  law  and  by  statute,  119- 
121. 


II.  What  constitutes  adverse  possession, 
122-1.30. 
III.   Ajjplication  of  the  rule,  131-140. 

I.    At  Common  Law  and  by  Statute. 

119.  At  common  law  the  conveyance  of  land  in  the  adverse 
possession  of  another  was  void.  When  livery  of  seisin  was 
essential  to  a  conveyance  of  land,  it  was  of  course  impossible  to 
make  livery  when  the  land  was  in  the  possession  of  another.^  In 
this  country  livery  of  seisin,  though  used  as  a  mode  of  conveying 
land  in  the  colonies  at  a  very  early  period,  was  never  generally 
adopted,  and  quite  soon  gave  place  to  the  mode  which  now 
prevails,  —  by  deed  duly  delivered  without  entry  upon  the  land. 
There  is,  therefore,  no  good  reason,  founded  on  livery  of  seisin, 
why  a  person  who  has  any  right  or  interest  in  lands  should  not 
convey  this  by  deed,  notwithstanding  that  another  holds  adverse 
possession. 

But  another  reason  for  the  common-law  rule  is  found  in  the 
policy  of  the  law  to  prevent  the  sale  of  pretended  titles  whereby 
litigation  is  encouraged.  If  a  grantor  was  out  of  possession, 
and  another  claimed  adverse  possession,  liis  deed  transferred  to 
his  grantee  only  a  right  of  action.  This  was  prohibited  by  the 
statute  of  Henry  Vin.,^  which  is  said  to  have  been  enacted  in 

^  Dexter  v.  Nelson,  6  Ala.  68  ;  Cassedy  danger  of  the  statute,  whether  he,  who  so 

?••  Jackson,  45  Miss.  397, 402;  McMahan  iv  bargains,  sells,  or  promises,  have  a  good 

Bowe,  114  Mass.  14, 144,  19  Am.  Rep.  321.  and  true  right  and  title  or  not;  and  on 

2  32  Henry  VIII.  ch.  9.     This  statute  this  point  the  statute  has  not  altend  the 

is  in  affirmance  of  the  older  common  law.  law,  for  the  common  law  before  this  stat- 

The  statute  was  held  to  applv  as  against  ute  was,  that  he  who  was  out  of  pos^es- 

the  true  owner  out  of  possession.     "  If  he  sion   might  not  bargain,  grant,  or  let  his 

whoisoutof  possession  bargains  or  sells,  or  right   or  title,   and  if  he  had  done  so  it 

makes  any  covenant  or  promise  to  ])art  with  snould  have  been  void."    1  Plowd.  88,  per 

the  land  after  he  shall  have  obtained  the  Montague,  C.  J.     By  statute  8  &  9  Vict, 

possession  of  it,  this  shall  be  within  the  ch.  106,  §  6,  a  right  of  entry  may  be  di.s- 
108 


AT  COMMON  LAW  AND  BY  STATUTE.         [§  119. 

consequence  of  the  prevalence  of  the  buying  of  pretended  titles 
after  the  introduction  of  uses.^  "  Its  creation  is  probably  at- 
tributable more,  however,  to  the  exigency  attending  the  tiniu  of 
enactment,  and  consequent  upon  sudden  revolution,  accompanied 
with  a  change  of  title  of  perhaps  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
property  of  the  kingdom.  Those  thus  acquiring  power  and  prop- 
erty would  naturally  desire  to  place  every  possible  barrier  in  the 
way  of  a  claim  by  the  former  owner,  or  by  one  claiming  through 
him.  In  our  country,  however,  no  such  reason  has  existed.  Nor 
under  a  government  like  ours,  where  caste  does  not  exist,  and 
titled  name  does  not  in  itself  confer  power,  is  it  necessary  to 
enact  a  law  for  the  benefit  of  the  weak  as  against  the  strong. 
The  reason  for  its  enactment  with  us  is  to  prevent  litigation,  and 
the  purchase  of  doubtful  claims  by  strangers  to  them.  If  the 
owner  is  not  disposed  to  attempt  the  enforcement  of  a  doubtful 
claim,  public  policy  requires  that  he  should  not  be  allowed  to 
transfer  it  to  another  party,  and  thus  encourage  strife  and  litiga- 
tion. It  has,  therefore,  been  deemed  beneficial  to  the  public  in- 
terest to  prohibit  it ;  and  time  has  manifested  that  it  works  no 
injury  to  the  honest  man,  while  it  may,  and  in  fact  does,  often 
interfere  with  the  interests  of  keen-sighted  speculators,  and  pre- 
vent a  practice  of  purchasing  doubtful  titles."^ 

The   public  policy  of  this  doctrine  is  declared   by  Chancellor 

posed  of  by  deed.  "  This  would  appear  to  sion  of  right,  and  stirring  up  of  suits  :  and 
amount  to  a  statutory  sanction  to  the  trans-  therefore  nothing  in  action,  entry,  or  reen- 
fer  of  the  right  to  bring  an  action  for  tlie  try  can  be  granted  over ;  for  so,  under  col- 
recovery  of  every  kind  of  real  property  in  our  thereof,  pretended  titles  might  be 
respect  of  which  such  a  riijht  of  entry  may  granted  to  great  men,  whereby  right  might 
exist.  Such  a  construction  of  the  statute  be  trodden  down  and  the  weak  oppressed, 
would  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  which  the  common  law  forbiddeth  as  men 
continued  assertion  of  illegality  iu  regard  to  grant  before  they  be  in  possession."  2 
to  the  transfer  of  what    have  been   held  Co.  Litt.  214  a. 

to  be  pretended  rights  under  the  statute  of  According  to  Blackstone,  the  rule  was 

Henry  VIII.,  and  would  go  far  to  render  partly  at    least  founded  on  consideration 

the  latter  statute  itioperative."    Tay)p  on  of    public    policy,  "lest    ineti'iidcd    titles 

Maintenance,  p.    49.     And    see    Hunt    v.  might  be  granted   to  great  men,  whereby 

Bishop,  8  Excli.   G7.">  ;    Hunt  v.  Remnant,  jn.stice    might  be  trodden  down,  and  the 

9  Excli.  6.35.  weak  oppressed."     2  Bl.  Com.  290.     And 

Coke,  commenting  on  the  text  of  Little-  see  Loud  v.  Darling,  7  Allen,  20.5,206 

ton  that   no  entry   can   lie    reserved   to  a  '  Shortall  r.  Hinckley,  31  111.  219,  229, 

stranger  upon  a   feoffment,  says:    'Here  per  Walker,    J.;  Hall  v.  Ashby,  9  Ohio, 

Littleton    reciteth  one  of  the  maxims  of  96. 

the  common  law  ;  and  the  reason  hereof  -  Ilus.sell  ;;.  Doyle,  84  Ky.  .386,389,  1  S. 

is,  for  avoiding  of  maintenance,  snppres-  W.  Rep.  604,  per  Holt,  .1. 

lOJ 


§  120.] 


DISABILITY    KKOM    ADVERSK   POSSESSION. 


Ki'iit,  who  savs  :  "It  seems  to  be  the  general  sense  and  usage  of 
iiKinkinil  that  the  transfer  of  real  property  should  not  he  valid 
unless  the  giantor  hath  the  capacity  as  well  as  the  intention  to 
deliver  possession."^ 

120.  Statutes  removing  the  disability  of  adverse  posses- 
sion.—  Accordingly  it  is  provided  by  statute  in  several  of  the 
States  that  a  person  claiming  title  to  real  property  in  the  adverse 
possession  of  another  may  transfer  it  with  the  same  effect  as  if 
he  were  in  actual  possession. "-^  The  effect  of  the  statutes  remov- 
ing the  disability  of  an  owner  of  land  out  of  possession  is  simply 

1  -i   Kent   Com.   448.      The  reason  of    statiue  is  regarded  as  in  a  great  measure 
public  policy  is  also  declared  in  Vandiveer    obsolete   in    this   State.     The   courts  say 
V.   Stickuey,    75    Ala.    22.5 ;  Bernstein   v. 
Humes,  60   Ala.  582 ;  Clay  v.  Wyatt,  6  J. 
.J.  Marsh.  583. 

-  Arkansas  :  Digest  of  Stats.  1884, 
§  644.  California:  Civ.  Code,  §§  1047, 
2921.    Colorado  :  G.  S.  1883,  §  202.    Geor- 


that  they  are  not  aware  of  any  case  in 
that  State  where  the  provisions  of  the  stat- 
ute have  been  enforced.  Schaferman  v. 
O'Brien,  38  Md.  565.  New  Hampshire  : 
The  doctrine  does  not  prevail :  Whitte- 
more  v.  Bean.  6  N.  H.  47,  50  ;  Hadduck  v. 
gia  :  Code  1882,  §  2695.  The  common-law  Wilmarth,  5  N.  H.  181. 
doctrine  foi'merly  prevailed.  Gresham  v.  In  Ohio,  there  being  no  statute  against 
Webb,  29  Ga.  320;  King  v.  Sears,  91  Ga.  maintenance,  it  is  held  that  a  valid  con- 
577, 18  S.  E.  Rep.  830.  Idaho  :  U.  S.  1887,  veyance  may  be  made  of  land  in  the  ad- 
§  2902.  Illinois  :  R.  S.  1889,  ch.  30,  §  4  ;  verse  jiossession  of  another.  Hall  v.  Ashby, 
Fetrow  v.  Merriwether,  .53  El.  275;  Tor-  9  Ohio,  96,  34  Am.  Dec.  424;  Cressin- 
reuce?;.  Shedd,  112  111.  466.  Iowa:  1  An-  ger  v.  Welch,  15  Ohio,  190;  Borland  u. 
not.  Code  &  Stats.  1888, §  3103.  Kansas:  Marshal],  2  Ohio  St.  308,  314;  Key  v. 
1  G.  S.  1889,  1"  1115,  p.  3.54.     Maine:  R.     Vattier,  1  Ohio,  132. 

S.  1883,  ch.  73,  §  1  ;  Hovcy  v.  Hobson,  51  In  Pennsylvania  a  conveyance  by  a  per- 
Me.  62 ;  Pratt  v.  Pierce,  36  Me.  448,  58  son  of  lands  of  which  he  is  not  in  posses- 
Am.  Dec.  758.  Michigan  :  2  Annot.  Stats,  sion,  but  which  are  held  adversely,  is  legal. 
1882,  §  5657  ;  Crane  v.  Reeder,  21  Mich.  Murray's  Estate,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  70;  Humes 
24  ;  Roberts  v.  Cooper,  20  How.  467.  v.  McFarlane,  4  S.  &  R.  435  ;  Storer  v. 
Minnesota:  G.  S.  1894,  §  4165.  Missis-  Whitman,  6  Biss.  420;  Cresson  y.  Miller, 
sippi:  Annot.  Code  1892,  §  2433;  Cas- 
sedy  V.  Jackson,  45  Miss.  397  ;  Sessions 
V.  Reynolds,  7  Sm.  &  M.  130  ;  Bledsoe  v. 
Doe,  4  How.  13.  Missouri:  R.  S.  1889, 
§  2400.  Montana:  Comp.  Stats.  1887, 
p.  6f.3,  §  268.  Nevada  :  G.  S.  1885,  §  2603. 
Oregon:  G.  L.  1892,  §  3009.  Wisconsin: 
Annot.  Stats.  §  2205.  Wyoming:  R.  S. 
1887,  §  7. 

In  the  following  named  States  the  stat- 
ute of  32  Henry  VIII.  was  never  adopted, 
nor  was  any  statute  in  place  of  it  ever  en- 
acted. Georgia  :  Webb  v.  Camp.  26  Ga. 
354  ;  Cain  v.  Monroe,  23  Ga.  82  ;  Harring 
V.   Hiirwick.   24   (ia..  59.     Maryland:  The 


2  Watts,  272. 

In  South  Carolina,  though  the  statute 
32  Hcnrv  VIII.  ch.  9,  prohibiting  the  sale 
of  pretended  titles,  was  included  in  the  table 
of  English  statutes  in  force  in  this  State, 
it  has  always  been  held  that  one  having 
title  but  not  possession  may  make  a  valid 
conveyance,  and  that  the  common  law  on 
this  subject  was  never  in  force  in  this 
State.  Poyas  v.  Wilkins,  12  Rich.  420, 
428. 

Texas  :  The  statute  of  32  Henry  VIII. 
was  never  adopted  in  this  State.  Ben- 
tiiuk  V.  Franklin,  38  Tex.  458,  473. 


AT    COMMON    LAW    AKD    BY    STATUTE. 


[§  121. 


to  enable  him  to  invest  the  gnintee    witii   all   the  rights   of  the 
owner  precisely  as  he  hekl  tliem.^ 

121.  The  common-law  doctrine  has  been  afifirmed  by  statute 
and  by  judicial  decisions  in  a  minority  of  the  States.'^  The 
strict  doctrine  wiiich  anciently  prevailed  has  been  greatly  modified. 
Even  in  those  States  in  which  the  doclrine  is  retained,  inasmuch  as 
the  reasons  for  it  have  in  a  great  measure  ceased  to  exist,  the 
tendency  of  the  later  decisions  is  to  modify  it  so  as  to  make  it  rea- 
sonable and  just.^  Thus,  the  deed  of  a  grantor  out  of  possession 
is  not  absolutely  void,  but  void  only  as  against  the  adverse  claim- 
ant in  possession.  It  is  good  as  between  the  parties,  and  persons 
standing  in  legal  privity  with  them.*  Tiie  grantee  is,  moreover, 
entitled,  even  as  against  the  person  in  adverse  possession,  to  an 
action  in  the  name  of  the  grantor  to  recover  the  land ;  and  if  he 
is  able  to  get  possession  peaceably  without  an  action,  he  may  hold 
the  land  by  virtue  of  his  deed.^ 

1  Shortall  V.  Hinckley,  31  111.  219.  Henry  VIH.  as  modified  by  the  decisions 

^  In  several  States,  by  statute,  a  convey-     of   the  courts,  prevails   in   a  few  States. 

ance  of  land  in  the  possession  of  a  person     Alabama :   Bernstein    v.   Plumes,  75  Ala. 


claiming  adverse  title  is  absolutely  void  as 
against  such  person.  Connecticut:  G.  S. 
1888,  §  2966  ;  Ilarral  v.  Leverty,  .50  Conn. 
46,  87  Am.  Rep.  608.  Kentucky :  Stats. 
1894,  §  210;  Combs  v.  McQuinn  (Ky.), 
9  S.  W.  Rep.  495  ;  Luen  v.  Wilson,  85 
Ky.  503,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  911  ;  Cardwell 
V.  Sprigg,  7  Dana,  36.  New  York  :  4  K. 
S.  1889,  p.  2453;  Becker  v.  Church,  115 
N.  Y.  562,  2-2  N.  E.  Rep.  748.  North  Da- 
kota: Comp.  Stats.  1887,  §  ;J303.  Okla- 
homa :  G.  S.  1893,  §  6137.  South  Dakota  : 
Comp.  Stats.  1887,  §3303.  Tennessee: 
A  grant  is  void  if  the  grantor  has  not,  been 


241,  60  Ala.  582;  Johnson  v.  Cook,  73 
Ala.  537.  Florida :  Nelson  v.  Brush,  22 
Fla.  374  ;  Doe  r.  Roe,  13  Fla.  602 ;  Gara- 
hlo  V.  Hamilton,  31  Fla.  401  ;  Levy  v.  Cox, 
22  Fla.  546.  Indiana  :  Webb  v.  Thomp- 
son, 23  lud.  428,  432,  although  there  is 
no  statute  against  champerty  and  mainte- 
nance ;  German  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Grim,  32 
Ind.  249.  257  :  Patterson  r.  Nixon,  79  Ind. 
251.  Massachusetts:  Sobier  n.  Coffin.  101 
Mass.  179;  Brinley  v.  Whiting,  5  Pick. 
348;  Swptt  V.  Poor,  11  Mass.  553;  Wol- 
cot  I'.  Kniirht,  6  Mass  424  ;  Loud  v.  Dar- 
ling,  7  Allen,  205.      Rule  now  changed, 


in  actual  possession  for  one  whole  year  next     Acts  1 891 ,  cli.  354.     North  Carolina  :  Jius- 


before  the  sale.  Champerty  is  jiresnmed 
until  the  purchaser  shows  the  sale  was 
bona  fide,  if  the  land  is  adversclv  held 
under  color  of  title.  Code  1884,  §§  2445- 
2449  ;  Pickens  v.  Delozier,  2  Humph.  400  ; 
Hard  wick  v.  Beard,  10  Ileisk.  659.  Ver- 
mont:  R.  L.  1880,  §  1953.  "The  statute 
was  enacted  to  carrv  out,  a  principle  of  the 


tice  ('.  Eddings,  75  N-  ('.  581  ;  lldppiss  r. 
Ei-kridge,  2  Ired.  Eq.  54.  Ehode  Island : 
Burdick  v.  Burdick,  14  R.  I.  574  ;  Hall  v. 
Westcott,  15  R.  I.  373,  5  All.  Rep.  629. 
Virginia  :  Hopkins  r.  Ward,  6  Mun.  38  ; 
Allen  (;.  Smith,  1  Ldgh,  231. 

"  McMaban   v.  Bowe,  114  Mass.    140; 
Sparhawk   r.  Bagg,  16  Gray,  583;  Webb 


common  law  which  forbids  the  traffic  and  v.  Thompson,  23  Ind   428. 

speculation  in  matters  of  dispute  and  lit-  *  Steeple  r.  Downintr,  60  Ind.  478  ;  Pat- 

igation     and  this  cut  up  by  the  roots  the  tcr.son  i\  Nixon,  79  Ind.  251. 

business  of  breedin?  lawsuits."     Stacy  r.  *  Sparhawk  v.  P>atig,  16  Gray,  583,  per 

Bostwick.  48  Vt.  192.  per  Redfield,  J.  Chapman,  J. 

The  common-law  rule,  or  the  statute  of  111 


§§  122-124.]       DISABILITY    FKOM    ADVEHSK    POSSl-.SSION, 

II.    What  constitutes  Adverse  Possession. 

122.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  title  of  the  disseisor  be 
valid  to  constitute  an  adverse  possession  under  the,  rule.  His 
titK'  may  be  bad,  or  his  original  entry  may  have  been  by  j)ermis- 
sit)n  of  the  true  owner.^  It  is  only  necessary  that  he  should  have 
color  of  title,  and  that  this  color  of  title  should  purport  to  give 
him  a  freehold  estate  adverse  to  that  of  the  grantor."'^  He  must 
have  title,  or  eolor  of  title,  as  distinguished  from  a  mere  claim  of 
title.^  Tiierefore,  if  the  adverse  claimant  be  the  mortgagor,  or 
some  one  holding  under  him  after  the  mortgage  has  been  fore- 
closed, his  title  is  extinguished,  and  he  has  neither  title  nor  color 
of  title.^  If  the  person  in  possession  of  a  mine  has  no  title,  but 
only  an  executory  contract  for  the  purchase  of  the  products  of  the 
mine,  he  is  not  in  possession  of  it  under  an  adverse  title  ■which 
would  invalidate  the  owner's  deed.  Such  person  is  at  best  only 
a  licensee,  and  his  license  is  revoked  by  the  owner's  deed.^ 

123.  But  a  deed  obtained  by  fraud  or  forgery  will  not  serve 
as  the  foundation  of  an  adverse  possession.  It  is  essential 
that  the  adverse  claimant,  in  making  his  entry  upon  the  land, 
should  have  acted  in  good  faith  in  the  belief  that  he  had  title.*^ 
He  must  rely  upon  his  title  and  have  some  ground  for  reliance. 
A  deed  is  not  available  for  such  purpose  in  case  it  was  executed 
by  an  attorney  of  the  grantor  without  authority,  and  the  want  of 
authority  was  known  to  th(i  grantee." 

124.  To  render  a  deed  void  on  account  of  adverse  posses- 
sion, the  adverse  claimant  must  have  actual  exclusive  pos- 
session under  claim  of  a  specific  title,  and  not   under  a  general 

1  Barry  v.  Adams,  3  Allen,  493  ;  Hall  186;  Crary  v.  Goodman,  22  N.  Y.  170; 
r.  Stevens,  9  Met.  418;  Pearce  r.  Moore,  Bowie  v.  Brahe,  3  Duer,  35;  Crooked 
114  N.  Y.  256,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  419  ;  Thur-  Lake  Nav.  Co.  v.  Keuka  Nav.  Co.  37  Hun, 
man  j^  Cameron,  24  Wend.  87.  12;    Monnots   v.   Husson,  39    How.   Pr. 

2  Smith    V.   Faulkner,   48    Hun,    186;  447. 

Crooked  Lake  Nav.  Co.  v.  The  Kenka  Nav.  *  Barley  v.  Roosa,  20  N.  Y.  Civ.  Proc. 

Co.  37  Hun,  12.    In  Selleck  v.  Starr,  6  Vt.  113,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  209. 

194,  it  was  held  that  a  claim  of  an  estate  "  Moore  v.  Brown,  62  Hun,  618,  16  N. 

for  the  life  of  the  grantor  is  not  sufficient  Y.  Supji.  502. 

to  make  the  grantor's  deed  mnAe  during  ^  Livingston  i'.  Peru  Iron  Co.  9  Wend. 

such  possession  void.  511  ;  Smithwick  v.  Jordan,  15  Mass.  113; 

'  Granger  I!.  Swart,  1  Woolw.  88;  Church  Moore  v.  Worley,  24  Ind.  81. 

V.  Schoonmaker,  42  Hun.  225 ;  Dawley  v.  ''  Livingston  v.  Peru  Iron  Co.  9  Wend. 

Brown,   79   N.  Y.   39');  Fish   v.  Fish.   39  311. 
Barb.  513;    Smith   r.   Fiiulkner,  48  Hun, 

112 


WHAT    CONSTITUTES    ADVERSE   POSSESSION.  [§  125. 

assertion  of  ownership. ^  Wiiat  the  title  is  must  be  disclosed,  that 
the  court  may  see  that  it  is  adverse  to  that  of  tlie  grantor  in  the 
deed  assailed.^  Accordingly,  where  one  occupied  a  hundred  and 
thirty  acres  of  land,  having  title  to  only  one  hundred  acres,  but 
supposed  the  entire  tract  so  occupied  to  contain  only  one  hundred 
acres,  his  possession  of  the  thirty  acres  was  held  not  to  be  adverse 
so  as  to  render  a  grant  by  the  true  owner  void.  A  mere  mistake 
in  location  or  in  quantity  without  a  specific  title  or  claim  of  such 
title  does  not  create  an  adverse  possession.^ 

Possession  under  a  tax  deed  is  possession  under  a  title,  or  color 
of  title.4 

The  cases  are  not,  however,  in  harmony  on  this  point ;  for  it  is 
held  that,  instead  of  an  adverse  possession  under  a  title  or  color  of 
title,  it  is  sufficient  that  it  is  asserted  under  a  claim  of  title.  It 
need  not  be  asserted  under  an  honest  belief  that  the  claimant  has 
a  title  or  good  claim  to  the  land.^  He  may  even  know  that  his 
title  is  defective,  as  where  he  is  in  possession  under  a  parol  gift.^ 

125.  To  render  a  deed  void  on  account  of  adverse  posses- 
sion at  the  time  of  its  delivery,  the  land  must  be  in  the  actual 
possession  of  one  claiming  adversely.'^  A  constructive  possession 
is  not  enough.  But  a  deed  is  not  void  for  the  reason  that,  at  the 
time  of  its  delivery,  a  small  part  of  the  land  described  is  not 
in  the  actual  possession  of  the  grantor,  but  is  held  adversely  by 
reason  of  a  disputed  boundary  line,  the  greater  part  of  the  land 
being  in  the  grantor's  actual  possession.^     In  other  cases  construc- 

1  Dawley  v.  Brown,  79  N.  Y.  390;  v.  Davis,  28  Abb.  N.  C.  135,  19  N.  Y. 
Crary  v.  Goodman,  22  N.  Y.  170  ;  Snyder  Supp.  191  ;  Parks  v.  Hendricks,  11  Wend. 
V.  Church,  70  Ilun,  428;  Sands  r.  Church,  442;  Sherwood  v.  Waller,  20  Conn.  262; 
70  Hun,  483,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  251.  See  Load  r.  Darling,  7  Allen,  205;  Bowling 
Matter  of  Department  of  Parks,  73  N.  v.  Roark  (Ky.),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  4;  John- 
Y.  5G0;  Hi.^Mnbotham  v.  Stoddard,  72  son  v.  Hurst  (Ky.),  9  S.  W.  Rep.  828; 
N.  Y.  94  ;  Christie  i;.  Gage,  71  N.  Y.  189,  Baley  v.  Deakins,  5  B.  Mon.  159 ;  Chiles 
192.  r.  Conley,  9  Dana,  385;  Norton  v.  San- 

2  Dawley  v.  Brown,  79  N.  Y.  390,  per  ders,  1  Dana,  14,  17. 

Rapallo,  J. ;  Crary  r.  Goodman,  22  N.  Y.  8  Danziger   v.   Boyd,   120  N.   Y.  628; 

170.  Allen  i;.  Welch,  18  Hun,  226;  Clark  v. 

3  Crary  v.  Goodman,  22  N.  Y.  170.  Davis,   28    Abb.   N,    C.    1S5,    19    N.   Y. 
*  Gatclyr.  Weldon  (Ky.),  14  S.  W.  Rep.  Supp.    191;    Harris   v.   Oakley,   2  N.   Y. 

680;  Swett  v.  Poor,  11  Mass.  549.  Supp.  305,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  232;  Cinry  v. 

6  Vaiuliveer  v.  Stickney,   75  Ala.  225;  Goodman,  22  N.  Y.  170;  Smith  v.  Faulk- 

Bcrnstcin  I'.  Humes,  71  Ala.  260;Eunk:i  ner,  48  Hun,    186.     See,    however,    Lillie 

Co.  y.  Edwards,  71  Ala.  248.  v.    Hickman    (Ky.),   25   S.  W.  Rep.  1062 ; 

'^  Vandiveer  y.  Stickney,  75  AIm.  2-25.  Smith   r.  Price  (Ky.),  7  S.  W.    Pep.  918; 

"  Dawley  v.  Brown,  79  N.  Y.  390  ;  Clark  Mitchell  v.  Churchman,  4  Humph.  218. 


vo  ..  r. 


113 


§§  126,  127.]       DISAUILITY    FHOM    ADVKKSK    POSSESSION. 

tive  possession  of  :i  part  or  residue  is  suflicieiit  when  tlio  part  not 
actually  possessed  is  for  use  with,  or  is  subservient  to,  the  part 
that  is  held  in  possession,  and  has  some  necessary  connection 
therewith.^ 

Where  a  deed  of  land  bounds  it  by  the  land  of  an  adjoinlnij^ 
owner,  it  conveys  all  the  grantor's  title  up  to  the  true  boundary  of 
such  adji>ining  owner,  and  is  not  void  as  to  land  belonging  to  the 
grantor,  but  held  adversely  by  such  owner  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
veyance, in  consequence  of  an  erroneous  location  of  the  division 
fence.2  While  for  some  purposes  the  possession  of  wild  and  un- 
cultivated forest  lands  may  be  regarded  as  being  in  the  owner  of 
tlie  legal  title,  without  any  actual  visible  occupation  by  him,  such 
possession  is  constructive  merely,  and  is  no  notice  of  an  adverse 
claim  to  a  purchaser,  and  no  impediment  to  the  delivery  of  actual 
possession  to  him,  and  is  not  therefore  within  the  reason  of  the 
rule  against  selling  pretended  titles.^ 

The  grantor's  possession  must  be  something  more  than  a  tem- 
porary occupancy  of  a  portion  of  the  land  at  the  time  of  the  exe- 
cution of  the  conveyance,  after  an  adverse  possession  of  the  whole 
by  another  has  commenced.* 

126,  Whether  possession  is  actually  held  adversely  to  the 
grantor  at  the  time  of  the  sale  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the 
jury .5  And  so  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  one  who  has 
been  disseised,  and  has  subsequently  entered  upon  the  land,  has 
made  such  a  reentry  as  will  enable  him  to  convey  his  estate  by 
deed.*^  An  entry  on  land  by  a  person  disseised,  merely  for  the 
purpose  of  seeing  if  there  is  any  evidence  of  an  adverse  occupation, 
is  not,  as  matter  of  law,  conclusive  evidence  of  an  interruption  of 
the  disseisor's  possession  ;  but  this  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  to  be 
determined  upon  all  the  evidence  in  the  case.^ 

127.  If  a  disseisor  abandons  his  possession,  and  the  grantee 
rightfully  enters  and  occupies,  he  takes  title  under  the  deed ;  and 
so,  if  the  grantee  is  in  possession  when  the  deed  is  made,  the  latter 
acquires  an  indefeasible  title.^     The  owner  of  land  held  in  adverse 

1  Thompson  v.  Burhans,  79  N.  Y.  93.  ''  Bowen  v.  Guild,  130  Mass.  121. 

2  Sparh.iwk  v.  Bagg,  16  Gray,  583;  8  guow  v.  Orleans,  126  Mass.  453; 
Cleaveland  v.  Flagg,  4  Gush.  76.  McMahan  v.  Bowe,  114  Mass.  140;  Far- 

8  Hanna  v.  Renfro,  32  Miss.  125.  num  v.  Peterson,  HI  Mass.  148;  Oakes  v. 

*  Vandiveer  v.  Stickney,  75  Ala.  225.  Marcy,   10  Tick.   195  ;  Knox  v.  Jenks,  7 

6  "Whitcsides  v.  Martin,  7  Yerg.  384.  Mas.s.  488. 
0  Brickett  v.  Spoflord,  14  Gray,  514. 

114 


WHAT   CONSTITUTES   ADVERSE    POSSESSION.  [§  128. 

possession  may  make  a  valid  conveyance  of  the  land  to  the  ad- 
verse holder,^  or  to  another  with  the  consent  of  the  adverse 
holder.^ 

When  a  trust  relation  subsists  between  the  grantor  and  the 
person  in  possession,  a  conveyance  by  either  to  the  other  which 
merges  the  legal  and  equitable  estates  is  not  within  the  prohibi- 
tion of  the  common-law  doctrine,  or  a  statute  founded  upon  it.^ 

128.  An  entry  by  the  disseisee,  and  delivery  of  a  deed  upon 
the  land,  purges  the  disseisin,  and  makes  the  deed  effectual  to 
pass  all  the  title  originally  acquired  and  held  by  the  grantor  at 
the  time  of  his  conveyance.*  His  peaceable  entry  restores  the 
possession  to  the  grantor  for  the  time  being,  so  that  the  technical 
difficulty  of  a  want  of  capacity  to  convey,  in  one  who  is  disseised, 
no  longer  exists.  The  mere  fact  that  the  owner's  title  is  ques- 
tioned does  not  prevent  his  conveying  the  land  if  he  can  deliver 
the  deed  upon  the  land.^ 

If  the  grantee  of  one  who  was  disseised  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
veyance enters  upon  the  land  he  is  a  trespasser,  and,  having  gained 
possession  by  his  own  tortious  act,  he  cannot  justify  his  entry 
in  defence  to  an  action  of  trespass  ;  and  it  has  been  held  that  he 
cannot  avail  himself  of  his  deed  to  render  his  continuance  in  pos- 
session lawful.^  But  the  better  rule  is,  that  such  grantee  who  has 
obtained  possession  can  unite  that  possession  to  the  title  acquired 
by  his  deed,  and  so,  by  way  of  estoppel  and  to  prevent  circuity  of 
action,  defeat  a  real  action  brought  by  the  disseisor  to  recover  the 
land."  The  same  result  follows  when  the  disseisor  abandons  his 
possession,  because  the  abandonment  inures  to  the  benefit  of  the 


1  Famum  v.  Peterson,  111   Mass.  148;  conveyance  of  the  estate  and  a  release  of 

Betsey  v.  Torrance,  34  Miss.  132;   Wil-  the   right,   and   completes  the    title."    2 

Hams  V.  Council,   4   Jones  (N.  C),  206;  Shep.  Touch,  p.  240. 

Webb    V.    Marsh,    22   Can.    S.    C.   437 ;  2  Mclntire  v.  Patton,  9  Humph.  447. 

Schwartz  v.  Kuhn,  10  Me.  274,  25  Am.  3  Stacy  r.  Bostwick,  48  Vt.  192.    And 

Dec.  239.  see  Falls  v.  Carpenter,   1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq. 

"It  is  a  maxim  in  law  that  every  right,  237,  28  Am.  Dec.  592. 

title,  or  interest  in  jmp.setdi  or  infuturo,  hy  ^  Farwell  v.  Rogers,  99  Mass.  33,  36  ; 

the  i(nnt  act  of  all  them  that  may  claim  "Warner  v.  Bull,  13  Met.  1. 

any  such   right,  title,  or  interest,  may  be  ^  Warner  v.  Bull,  13  Met.  I ;  Knox  v. 

barred  or  extinguished,  i.  p.,  every  estate  Jenks,  7  Mass.  488;  Oakes  v.  Marcy,  10 

is   grantalile   or  transferable,  and   every  Pick.  195. 

right  is  ielea.s;ible;  and  a  conveyance  by  ®  Hathorne  r.  Haines,  1  Me.  238. 

the   person  who   has   the  estate,   and    the  "^  Rawson  c.  Putnam,  128  Mass.  552. 
person  who  has  the  right,  amounts  to  a 

115 


§§  129-131.]      DISABILITY    FROM    ADVERSE    POSSESSION. 

t^ranteo,  :uul  oivt's  him  a  seisin  and  a-  title  valid  against  a  stranger 
wlio  sul>sc(]iiently  disseises  Iiim.^ 

The  owner  may  make  a  valid  conveyance  of  land  held  in  actual 
possession  by  another,  provided  such  actual  possession  is  not 
adverse  to  the  owner. '-^ 

129.  It  is  not  requisite,  under  this  doctrine,  that  the  pur- 
chaser or  mortgagee  should  have  actual  notice  of  the  adverse 
holding  in  order  to  vitiate  the  grantor's  conveyance,^  though 
knowledge  of  such  adverse  possession  would  be  material  under 
a  statute  imposing  a  penalty  for  selling  pretended  titles.* 

It  has  been  held,  however,  that  a  disseisin  which  will  defeat 
the  operation  of  the  owner's  deed  must  be  by  occupancy  of  a 
part  of  the  land  under  a  deed  of  conveyance  recorded,  or  such 
an  open  and  visible  occupancy  that  tlie  owner  may  at  once  be 
presumed  to  know  the  extent  of  the  disseisor's  claim  and  occu- 
pation.^ 

130.  It  does  not  require  any  length  of  adverse  possession 
to  make  a  conveyance  by  a  disseised  owner  void.^  It  does 
not  matter  that  the  adverse  possession  has  continued  no  longer 
than  four  months  at  the  time  of  the  convey ance.'''  The  fact  that 
the  land  is  held  adversely  at  the  time  is  sufficient  to  render  the 
conveyance  void,  and  it  does  not  matter  whether  it  has  been  so 
held  for  one  day  or  one  year. 

III.     Aj)plication  of  the  Rule. 

131.  An  adverse  possession  must  be  a  possession  inconsis- 
tent with  the  title  of  the  grantor,  and  not  subordinate  thereto. 
If,  on  an  agreement  to  sell  land,  the  consideration  is  paid,  and 
the  owner  consents  that  the  buyer  may  enter  and  hold  the  land  as 
his  own,  the  entry  and  possession  of  the  buyer  cannot  be  deemed 
subordinate  to  the  title  of  the  seller,  but  as  adverse  and  a  disseisin. 
But  the  case  is  difiPerent  where  the  consideration  is  not  paid,  and 
the  party  contracting  to  buy  enters  into  possession,  inasmuch  as 

1  McMaluin  v.  Bowe,  114  Mass.  140.  *  Jackson  v.  Demont,  9  Johns.  .55 ;  Jack- 

2  Gamlple  v.  Hamilton,  31   Fla.  401,  12  son  W.Andrews,  7   Wend.   152;  Hassen- 
So.  Rep.  229  ;  Levy  v.  Cox,  22   Fla.  546  ;  frats  v.  Kelly,  13  Johns.  466. 
"Whitcsides  v.  Martin,  7  Yorg.  384;  Bled-  ^  Foxcroft  v.  Barnes,  29  Me.  128. 

see  V.  Kofrers,  3  Sneed,  466.  ®  Kincaid  v.  Meadows,  3  Head,  188. 

8  Vandivccr  v.  Stickney,  75  Ala.  225  ;         ">  Sohier  v.  Coffin,  101  Mass.  179. 
BernsUiii  v.  Humes,  71  Ala.  260  ;  Jackson 
V.  Demont,  9  Johns.  55. 

IIG 


APPLICATION    OF   THE   RULE.  [§§  132,  133. 

the  fair  inference  then  is,  that  the  entry  and  possession  are  in  sub- 
ordination to  the  title  of  the  party  contracting  to  sell,  until  the 
stipulated  payment  is  made.^  And  so,  where  the  vendor  of  land 
retains  the  title  as  security  for  the  purchase-money,  his  possession 
is  presumptively  subservient  to  the  equitable  ownership  of  the 
vendee,  and  lieiice  does  not  render  void  a  conveyance  by  the 
latter  to  a  third  person. ^ 

A  deed  made  to  carry  into  effect  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land 
is  not  void,  if  there  was  no  adverse  possession  at  the  time  the  con- 
tract was  made,  although  the  land  was  held  adversely  at  the  time 
of  the  delivery  of  the  deed  ;  and  this  rule  has  been  applied  even 
to  an  executory  verbal  contract  of  sale.^ 

132.  A  conveyance  by  a  remainder-man  or  reversioner  dur- 
ing the  continuance  of  the  life  estate  of  a  tenant  for  life  is  valid, 
although  a  grantee  of  the  life  tenant  is  in  possession,  claiming 
under  a  grant  purporting  to  be  a  grant  in  fee.  "  The  statute 
ought  not  to  be  construed  so  as  to  prevent  a  reversioner  or  re- 
mainder-man making  a  conveyance  of  his  estate  before  he  be- 
comes entitled  to  the  possession.  But  a  conveyance  after  the 
termination  of  the  particular  estate,  when  the  lands  are  held  at 
the  time  under  claim  of  an  adverse  title,  is  void  within  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  the  statute."  ^ 

A  cestui  que  trust  cannot  claim  to  hold  adversely  to  his  own 
trustee,  and  certainly  a  trustee  cannot  hold  adversely  to  his 
cestui  que  trust.^ 

133.  A  mortgage  is  usually  regarded  as  a  conveyance 
within  the  meaning  of  the  rule  against  conveying  land  held  in 
adverse  possession.^  Although  a  mortgage  is  for  most  purposes 
only  a  lien,  it  is  a  conveyance  of  the  legal  title  in  terms,  and  the 
mortgagee  is  regartled  as  the  legal  owner  as  against  the  mortgagor 

1  Brown  v.  King,  5  Met.  173;  Hart  v.  ^  Harral  r.  Leverty,  50  Conn  46,  47 
Bostwick,  14  Fla.  162,  177;  Drew  v.  Am.  Rep.  608;  Grecff.  Wintersmith,  85 
Towle,  SON.  H.  531  ;  Jackson  ^^.Tolmson,  Kv.  516,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  232;  Thacker  v. 
5  Cow.  74,  15  Am.  Dec.  433  ;  .Jackson  v.  Belcher  (Ky.),  11  S.  W.  Rep.  3  ;  Sims  v. 
Spear,  7  Wend.  401  ;  Brings  i>.  Prosser,  14  Cro.ss,  10  Yerg.  460;  McCoy  v.  Williford, 
Wend.  227 ;  Devyr  v.  Schaefer,  55  N.  Y.  2  Swan,  642. 

446;  In  Matter  of  Department  of  Parks,  *  Christie  v.  Gage,  71  N.  Y.  189,  193, 

73  N.  Y.  5P0  ;  Turner  r.  Thomas,  13  Bush,  per  Andrew.s,  J. 

518  ;  Paxton  i-.  Baihy,  17  Ga.  600 ;  Wim-  ^  Clark  v.  McLean,  41  Barb.  285. 

bish  V.  Montgomery  Mut.  Asso.  69  Ala.  ®  Vandiveer  c.  Stickney,  75  Ala.  225  ; 

575.  Redman  r.  Sanders,  2  D:ina.  68  ;  Gunny. 

2  Ashurst  V.  Peck,  14  So.  Rep.  541.  Scovil,  4  Day,  234,  241 .  per  Reeve,  J. 

117 


§  133.]  DISABILITY    FKOM    ADVERSE    TOSbESSION. 

for  the  purpose  of  protectinj^  and  onfuning  his  riglits.  The 
mortgagor  is  regarded  as  the  leg;il  owiu-r  as  against  every  other 
person.  In  many  States,  however,  even  as  against  the  niortgagoV, 
the  mortgage  is  regarded  as  giving  the  mortgagee  merely  a  lien 
upon  the  land,  with  merely  equitable  rights  and  remedies.  The 
fee  simple  of  the  land  mortgaged  is  in  the  mortgagor ;  and  the 
mortgagee,  before  entry  or  foreclosure,  has  at  most  a  chose  in  ac- 
tion, and  a  right  to  the  possession  in  order  to  render  the  mort- 
gage available  to  the  payment  of  his  debt.  Therefore  it  is  held 
in  Connecticut  that  a  mortgage  is  not  an  alienation  "for  years, 
life,  lives,  or  forever,  or  for  any  other  term  of  time  whatsoever," 
within  the  terms  of  the  statute  for  the  prevention  of  maintenance.^ 
Though  the  terms  of  the  statute  have  been  changed,  and  it  is  now 
directed  against  "all  conveyances,  and  leases  for  any  term  of  lands 
or  tenements,"  still  a  mortgage  is  not  regarded  as  a  "  convey- 
ance "  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.  It  is  apparent  that 
these  decisions  are  based  upon  the  peculiar  terms  of  the  statute, 
and  that  they  are  not  of  general  application.^ 

In  case  a  deed  is  void  for  the  reason  that  the  land  was  held 
adversely  to  the  grantor,  a  mortgage  executed  at  the  same  time 
as  a  part  of  the  transaction,  to  secure  a  part  of  the  purchase- 
money,  is  also  void.^ 

In  New  York  it  is  provided  that  every  person  having  a  just 
title  to  lands  of  which  there  shall  be  an  adverse  possession  may 
execute  a  mortgage  on  such  lands;  and  such  mortgage,  if  duly  re- 
corded, shall  bind  the  lands  from  the  time  the  possession  thereof 
shall  be  recovered  by  the  mortgagor  or  his  representatives.^ 

1  Leonard   v.  Bosworth,    4   Conu.  421.  no  part  of  the  object  of  this  statute  to  al- 

Hosmer,  C.  J.,  remarks  that  "  mortgages  low  the  mortgagee  to  maintain  a  suit  as 

are  within  the  mischief  at  which  the  stat-  such  mortgagee  to  recover  possession.  His 

.ute  is   aimed,"   but  that   they   "are   not  mortgage  does  not  bind  the  land  until  the 

within  the  literal  construction  of  the  act."  mortgagor  recovers  possession.    Lowbery. 

-  HaiTal  y.  Leverty,  ,50  Conn.  46,  47  Am.  Kelly,  17  Abb.  Pr.  4,52,  460.     The  revis- 

Rep.  608.    Loomis,  J.,  said  :   "  Were  the  ers  of  the  statutes,  in  a  note  to  3  R.  S.  2d 

question  entirely  a  new  one,  we  should  not  ed.    (1S36),  p.    596,  §  185,  state  that  the 

regard  it   as  free  from   difficulty.     It  is  purpose  of  this  provision  was  to  allow  the 

manifest   that   the  statute  can  easily  be  person  whose   land   is   adversely  held  to 

evaded  under  the  cover  of  a  mortgage.  .  .  .  avail  himself  of  the  property  to  defray  the 

We  regard  the  question,  however,  as  set-  expenses  of  litigation  necessary  to  recover 

tied  by  the  former  deci-sions  of  our  own  possession.     They  therefore  allowed  him 

court."  to  mortgage  his   lands,  though  held  ad- 

8  Pepper  v.  Ilaight,  20  Barb.  429.  versely. 

♦  4  R.  S.   1889,   p.  2453,  §   148.     It  was 
118 


APPLICATION    OF    THE    RULE.  [§§  134,  135. 

134.  If  the  mortgagor  is  disseised  by  a  stranger  the  mort- 
gagee is  also  disseised,  and,  so  long  as  the  disseisin  continues, 
neither  the  mortgagor  nor  the  mortgagee  can  pass  any  title  by- 
deed. ^  In  accordance  with  this  rule,  it  is  held  that  a  mortgagee 
who  is  so  disseised  cannot  make  a  valid  assignment  of  his  mort- 
gage.2  Other  decisions  have,  however,  held  that  an  assignment 
of  a  mortgage,  when  a  third  person  is  in  possession  of  the  mort- 
gaged property,  is  not  within  the  rule.  The  mortgage  is  only  an 
incident  to  the  debt,  which  is  the  principal  subject  of  the  as- 
signment. It  would  be  manifestly  foreign  to  the  purpose  of  the 
statute  to  restrain  the  transfer  of  the  mortgage  debt.^ 

It  is  true  in  general,  however,  that,  if  the  land  is  held  adversely 
to  both  the  grantor  and  the  grantee,  the  rule  applies.  Thus,  where 
a  tenant  by  the  curtesy  and  the  heir  are  out  of  possession,  and 
the  land  is  held  adversely  to  both,  the  tenant  by  the  curtesy  can- 
not convey  or  release  to  the  heir ;  and  it  will  make  no  difference 
that  the  heir  is  a  child  of  the  tenant  by  the  curtesy.* 

135.  In  the  cases  of  mortgagor  and  mortgagee,  landlord 
and  tenant,  heir  at  law  and  tenant  in  dower,  the  possession 
of  the  mortgagee,  tenant,  or  tenant  in  dower  is  not  adverse 
to  the  title  in  fee,  but  consistent  therewith.^  The  possession  of 
the  mortgagee  is  no  obstacle  to  a  conveyance  by  the  mortgagor  of 
his  equity  of  redemption.^  It  is  familiar  doctrine  that  the  pos- 
session of  the  tenant  is  possession  of  the  landlord.''  The  land- 
lord may  make  a  valid  conveyance  pending  a  suit  in  ejectment  by 
him  to  oust  the  tenant.^  The  possession  of  a  grantor  or  mort- 
gagor is  not  adverse  to  that  of  his  own  alienee  and  those  claiming 
under  hira.^  The  possession  of  the  heir  at  law,  or  widow  of  a 
grantor  or  mortgagor,  is  not  adverse  to  the  grantee  or  mortgagee, 
or  an  assignee  of  the  mortgagee.  Both  the  heir  and  the  widow 
are  bound  by  the  estoppel  of  the  grantor  or  mortgagor,  the  former 
as  privy  in  blood,  the  latter  as  privy  in  estate.     They  continue  the 

1  Poignand  v.  Smith,  8  Pick.  272  ;  Hunt  «  Converse  v.  Seails,  10  Vt.  578,  581, 
V.  Hunt,    14   Pick.  374,  385;  Dadmun  v.     per  Ivoyce,  J. 

Lamson,  9  Allen,  85.  "  Vandiveer  t>.  Stickney,  75  Ala.  225; 

2  Dadmun  i\  Lamson,  9  Allen,  85.  Whiting  v.  Edmunds,  94  N.  Y.  309. 

8  Williams  v.  I5ennett,  4  Ired.  122  ;  Con-  «  Webb  v.  Bindon,  21  Wend.  98  ;  Camp 

verae  v.  Searls,  10  Vt.  578.  v.  Forrest,  13  Ala.  114. 

*  Vrooman  r.  Sheithcrd,  14  Barb.  441.  »  Rowe  v.  Beckett,  30  Ind.  154;  Wil- 

^  Chairs  v.    H'jl)son,  10  Humph.  354;  liam's  u.  Bennett,  4  Ired.  122. 
Vance  v.  Johnson,  10  Humph.  214,  221. 

119 


§§  136-138.]         DISABILITY    FliOM    ADVF.KSK    I'OSSKSSION. 

estate  and  possession  of  the  liusbaiul,  :>iul  cannot  set  up  an 
estate  in  themselves,  or  in  any  otlier  person,  as  against  the  hus- 
baml's  grantee  or  mortgngee.^ 

136.  The  possession  of  a  tenant  in  common  of  lands,  wlio 
has  ousted  his  co-tenant  anil  holds  adversely  to  him,  does  not 
impair  a  conveyance  by  the  hitter.  The  possession  of  one  tenant 
in  ciimnion  is  constructively  the  possession  of  all.  A  purchaser 
from  one  tenant  in  common  may  assume  that  the  possession  of  a 
co-tenant  is  the  possession  of  all,  and  for  the  benefit  of  all,  what- 
ever the  real  facts  may  be  as  to  the  possession.^ 

The  rule  does  not  apply  in  case  of  a  conveyance  by  one  tenant 
in  common  to  his  co-tenant  of  his  undivided  interest  in  the  land 
which  is  held  adversely.  In  such  a  case  no  stranger  to  the  title 
is  introduced,  but  merely  one  who  is  already  interested,  who  may 
sue  for  the  recovery  of  the  property  with  an  increased  interest.^ 
But  the  case  is  quite  different  where  all  the  tenants  in  common  of 
a  parcel  of  land  except  one  sold  the  whole  land,  including  the 
interest  of  such  one,  who  did  not  join,  to  a  stranger  to  the  title,  and 
the  latter  entered  upon  the  land  in  his  own  right,  and  was  holding 
the  actual  adverse  possession  of  the  whole  parcel,  when  the  ten- 
ant in  common,  who  did  not  join  in  the  conveyance,  sold  and  con- 
veyed his  interest  to  another  stranger ;  it  was  held  that  the  deed 
of  such  tenant  in  common  was  void.'* 

137.  One  in  possession  of  land  under  a  conveyance  from  an 
infant  does  not  hold  adversely  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule. 
The  inTant,  upon  arriving  at  full  age,  may  disaffirm  his  deed  made 
during  his  minority  by  merely  making  another  conveyance  of  the 
same  land  to  a  tliiixl  person.  A  purchaser  from  an  infant  takes 
his  deed  w^ith  knowdedge  that  the  infant  seller  had  the  right  to 
disaffirm  his  deed  upon  attaining  his  majority,  and  he  therefore  is 
regarded  as  holding  the  land  in  the  interim,  not  adversely,  but 
subject  to  the  right  of  the  infant  seller  to  disffiaim.^ 

138.  This  doctrine  has  no  application  to  judicial  or  official 
sales,  or  convevances  made  by  public  officers  or  agents  in  the 
line  of  their  oflficial  duty.      Such  sales  and  cimveyances  :ire  valitl 

1  Williams  v.  Bennett,  4  Ired.  122  ;  Mix-  Kep.  604  ;  Adkius  v.  Wlialin,  87  Ky.  153, 
terv.  Woodcock,  154  Mass.  535,  28  N.  E.     7  S.  W.  Kep.  912. 

Rep.  907.  <  Adkiiis  i\  Whalin,   87  Ky.   153,   7  S. 

2  Paiier.son  r.  Nixon,  79  lud.  251.  W.  Kep.  912. 

2  Russell  V.  Doyle,  84  Ky.  380,  1  S.  W.         s  .Moore  v.  Baker,  92  Ky.  518,  18  S.  W. 

Rep.  3G3. 

120 


APPLICATION   OF    THE   RULE.  [§  138. 

althmigh  there  was  an  adverse  possession  at  the  time  of  the 
decree  and  sale.^ 

Moreover,  the  possession  of  tlie  debtor  whose  hind  is  seized 
upon  execution,  or  of  any  one  claiming  under  him,  is  not  deemed 
to  be  adverse  to  the  purchaser  under  the  execution  sale,  but  he  may 
transmit  to  his  vendee  whatever  estate  was  acquired  by  the  pur- 
chase.2  Nor  is  the  possession  of  an  officer  under  a  writ  of  attach- 
ment such  an  adverse  possession  as  to  avoid  a  conveyance  made 
by  the  owner  of  the  land  affected. ^ 

This  limitation  is  fully  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ver- 
mont :  *  '^  Where  the  conveyance  is  by  operation  of  law,  as  by  levy 
of  execution,^  or  by  an  officer  of  the  State  or  the  United  States,^ 
or  where  a  trust  estate  is  conveyed  to  the  uses  for  which  it  was 
originally  created,"  or  where  a  conveyance  is  made  by  a  trustee  to 
his  cestui  que  trust,  as  in  the  case  of  an  administrator  holding  the 
title  for  the  benefit  of  the  heirs,  and  where  a  court  of  chancery 
would  compel  a  conveyance,^  the  conveyance  has  not  been  consid- 
ei'ed  as  falling  within  the  spirit,  import,  or  operation  of  the  stat- 
ute, or  as  being  within  the  mischief  sought  to  be  remedied  by  it, 
notwithstanding  there  was,  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the 
conveyance,  an  adverse  possession  by  a  stranger  of  the  real  estate 
conveyed.  A  conveyance  by  an  administrator  under  the  order 
of  the  probate  court,  or  by  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy,  or  by  a  col- 
lector on  the  sale  of  land  for  taxes,  would  fall  within  the  same 
rules  of  decision." 

Sales  by  assignees  or  trustees  under  bankrupt  or  insolvent  laws 
are  in  the  nature  of  judicial  sales,  and  are  not  open  to  objection 
because  the  land  is  adversely  held  at  the  time.^ 

1  Tuttle  V.  Jackson,  6  Weud.  213  ;  Webb  son,  23  lud.  428,  432  ;  Foust  v.  Moornnan, 
r.  Tliompson,  23  lud.  428 ;  McGlll  y.  Doe,  2  Ind.  17;  Mitchell  u.  Lipe,  8  Yerg.  179, 
9  Ind.  306  ;  Viuinoy  v.  Ble>siug,  36  Ind.  29  Am.  Dec.  116;  Snowden  v.  McKiuney, 
349;    raiteison  v.  Nixon,    79    lud.    251;  7  B.  Mon.  258. 

Hauna  c  Ucnfro,  32  Mi^s.  125;   Arnold  ^  Winstandley  y.  Stipp,  132  Ind.  548,  32 

u.  Stephens  (Ky.),    17    S.    W.   Rep.  859;  N.  E.  Rep.  302. 

Preston  V.  Bn  ckiuridge,  86  Ky.  619,  6  S.  <  Wliite  v.  Fuller,  38  Vt.  193,  203,  per 

W.  Rep.  641  ;  Frizzles.  Veach,  1    Dana,  Kellogg,  J. 

211  ;  Violett  y.  Violett,  2  Dana,  323;  Little  ^  pj^rnsworth  v.  Converse,  1   D.  Chip. 

V.  Bishop,    9  B.  Mon.  240 ;  Batterton  v.  139. 

Chiles,  12  B.  Mon  348;  Sims  ;.•.  Cross,  10  '^  Aldis  v.  Burdick,  8  Vt.  21. 

Yerg.  400;  Mitchell  v.  Lipe,  8  Ycrg.  179;  '  Mitcliell  v.  Stevens,  1  Aik.  16. 

Jarrett  v.  Tondinsnn,  3  Watts  &  S.  114.  »  Appleton  v.  Edson,  8  Vt.  239. 

2  Jackson  w.  Collins,  3  Cow.  89  ;  Cook  ^  Iloyt  v.  Thompson,  5  N.  Y.  320; 
V.  Traxis,  20  N.  Y.  400;  Webb  v.  Thonip-  Smith  i:  Scholtz,  68  N.  Y.  41. 

121 


§§  130,  140.]       DISABILITY    FHOM    ADVERSE    POSSESSION. 

Deeds  of  executors,  julministrators,  nnd  i;iianli:ins  o-iven  in  ex- 
roulion  of  tlicir  trusts  are  valid  notwitlistandiiiu,-  tln^  jiossession  of 
adverse  claimants.^ 

But  a  sale  and  conveyance  of  land  in  the  adverse  possession  of 
a  third  person,  made  by  commissioners  under  an  order  of  court 
in  a  suit  for  partition,  to  which  the  person  holding  adverse  pos- 
session was  not  a  party,  is  void.^ 

The  fact  that  a  religious  corporation,  having  only  a  limited 
capacity  to  convey,  makes  a  conveyance  in  pursuance  of  an  order 
of  court  obtained  on  its  application,  does  not  make  the  transac- 
tion a  judicial  sale,  so  as  to  take  it  out  of  the  operation  of  the 
statute.^ 

A  grant  of  land  by  a  State  will  pass  the  title  notwithstanding 
the  land  is  held  in  adverse  possession,  for  the  State  cannot  be 
disseised.* 

139.  It  seems  to  have  been  uncertain  whether  the  doctrine 
of  adverse  possession  has  any  application  to  wills.  In  Mas- 
sachusetts, in  early  cases,  it  was  held  that  a  devise  of  land  of 
which  the  devisor  was  disseised  was  void.^  But  it  was  afterwards 
provided  by  statute  that  land  of  which  the  devisor  is  disseised, 
and  to  which  he  had  only  a  right  of  entry,  shall  pass  to  the  de- 
visee in  like  manner  as  it  would  have  descended  to  the  testa- 
tor's heirs  if  he  had  died  intestate.^  In  Kentucky  the  statute 
against  the  conveyance  of  pretended  titles  was  held  to  have  no 
application  to  wills.'^ 

140.  A  deed  by  a  person  disseised  is  valid  as  to  the  grantor 
and  his  heirs,  and  as  against  every  one  but  the  disseisor  and  his 
privies  in  estate.^  It  entitles  the  grantee  to  maintain  an  action 
to  recover  the  land  in  the  name  of  the  grantor,  but  to  his  own  use, 

1  Barney  V.  Cuttler,  1  Root,  489.  8  McMahan  v.  Bowe,   114  Mass.  140; 

2  Jackson  v.  Vrooinan,  13  Johns.  488 ;  Brinley  v.  Whiting,  .5  Pick.  348;  Wil- 
Martin  v.  Pace,  6  Blackf.  99.  Hams  v.  Jackson,  5  Johns.  489 ;  Van  Hoe- 

3  Christie  r.  Gage,  71  N.  Y.  189.  sen  v.  Benham,  15  Wend.  164  ;  Livingston 
*  Ward   V.  Bartholomew,  6   Pick.  409  ;     v.  Proseus,  2  Hill,  b2&;  University  of  Ver- 

People  V.  Mayor  of  New  York,  28  Barb,  mont  v.  Joslyn,  21  Vt.  52 ;  Park  v.  Pratt, 

240;   Jackson    v.   Giimaer,   2  Cow.    552;  38   Vt.   545;  Johnson    v.    Cook,   73    Ala. 

Allen  V.  Hoyt,  Kirby  (Conn.),  221.  537,  541  ;    Betsey  v.  Torrance,  34  Miss. 

5  Poori;.  Bobinson,  lOMass.  131  ;  Ward  132;  Patterson  v.  Nixon,  79  Ind.  251; 
V.  Fuller,  15  Pick.  185.  Hall   v.  Westcott,   15    R.    I.   373,  5  Atl. 

6  R.  S.  1882,  ch.  127,  §  26;  Brown  v.  Rep.  629;  Stockton  v.  Williams,  1  Doug. 
Wells,  12  Met.  501,  503.  (Mich.)  546;  Webb  v.  Marsh,  22  Can.  S. 

'  May   V.   Slaughter,    3    A.  K.    Mar.sh.     C.  437. 
505,  507. 

122 


APPLICATIuN   OF   THE   RULE. 


[§  140. 


even  against  the  disseisor.^  For  this  purpose  the  title  remains  in 
the  legul  grantor,  wliile  the  equitable  title  is  in  the  giantee,  and 
this  title  will  be  protected  against  any  interference  on  the  part  of 
the  grantor.2 

The  grantor  cannot  be  heard  to  allege  against  his  own  deed 
that  at  the  time  of  its  execution  the  land  was  adversely  held  by 
another.^ 


1  McMahan  v.  Bowe,  114  Mass.  140; 
Snow  V.  Orleans,  126  Mass.  453,  457  ;  Far- 
num  V.  Peterson,  111  Mass.  148;  Wade  v. 
Lindsey,  6  Met.  407,  414  ;  Sparhawk  v. 
Bagg,  16  Gray,  583  ;  Cleaveland  v.  Flagg, 
4  Gush.  76 ;  Brinley  v.  Whiting,  5  Pick. 
348 ;  University  of  Vermont  v.  Joslyn, 
21  Vt.  52;  Edwards  v.  Roys,  18  Vt.  473; 
Parkr.  Pratt,  38  Vt.  545,  553;  Key  v. 
Snow,  90  Tenn.  663,  671,  18  S.  W.  Rep. 
251 ;  Steeple  v.  Downing,  60  Ind.  478,484; 


Pearce  v.  Moore,  114  N.  Y.  256,  21  N.  E. 
Rep.  419;  Livingston  v.  Prose  us,  2  Hill, 
526  ;  Van  Voorhis  v.  Kelly,  31  Hun,  293; 
Nelson  v.  Brush,  22  Fla.  374;  Betsey  v. 
Torrance,  34  Miss.  132,  138;  Wilson  v. 
Nance,  11  Humph.  189  ;  Fowler  v.  Nixon, 
7  Heisk.  719,  729;  Justice  v.  Eddings,  75 
N.  G.  581. 

'•^  Edwards  v.  Parkhurst,  21  Vt.  472; 
Park  V.  Pratt,  38  Vt.  545,  553. 

8  Kuffin  V.  Johnson,  5  Heisk.  604. 

123 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

CAPACITY    OF    COKPOKATIONS   AS    VENDOKS. 
L  Power  to  sell  and  convey,  141-143.        |  II.  rower  to  mortgage,  144-153. 

I.     Power  to  Sell  and  Convey. 

141.  Every  private  corporation  having  no  public  functions 
has  the  absolute  right  to  dispose  of  its  property  in  the  same 
maiiner  that  an  individual  has.  It  may  convey  its  real  property 
acting  by  a  majority  of  its  stockholders;  and  this  right  is  not 
limited  as  to  objects,  circumstances,  or  quantity,  unless  restrained 
by  statute  or  by  public  policy .^  It  may  dispose  of  all  its  property 
and  close  its  business.^  It  may  dispose  of  any  interest  in  its 
property.  Having  an  estate  in  fee,  it  can  grant  a  lesser  inter- 
est, such  as  an  estate  for  life  or  for  years.  To  carry  out  the 
specific  purposes  for  which  the  corporation  was  created,  it  may 
deal  with  its  property  and  convey  it  as  an  individual  might,^ 

142.  The  power  of  a  corporation  to  alienate  its  property 
depends  very  much  upon  its  character,  whether  it  is  public, 
quasi-public,  or  strictly  private.  Thus,  public  municipal  corpora- 
tions cannot  alienate  property  of  a  public  nature,  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  a  public  square  or  street,  in  violation  of  the  trusts,  ex- 
press or  implied,  upon  which  it  is  held,  except  under  legislative 
authority.^  The}^  may,  however,  thspose  of  their  lands  which  are 
of  a  private  nature,  unless  restrained  by  charter  or  by  statute. 

1  Tread  well  v.  Salisbury  Manuf.  Co.  7  Vallette,  21  How.  414,  425,  per  Camp- 
Gray,  39.3,  66   Am.  Dec.  490  ,  Sar^^ent   v.  bell. 

Webster,  13  Met.  497;  Burton's  App.  57  ^  Treadwell  v.  Salisbury  Manuf.  Co.  7 

Pa.  St.  213;  Walker  v.  Vincent,  19  Pa.  St.  Gray,  393,  66  Am.  Dec.  490;    Dupee  v. 

369;  Hodges  t\  New  England  Screw  Co.  Boston  Water  Power  Co.  114  Mass.  37; 

1  R.I.  312,  347;  Pierce  v.   Emery,  32  N.  Miners'  Ditch   Co.  v.  Zellerbach,  37  Cal. 

H.    486,  .'J03 ;    Keichwald   v.  Commercial  543. 

Hotel  Co.  106  111.  439,  5  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  ^  Barry  v.  Merchant  Exch.  Co.  1  Sandf. 

Cas.  248  ;  Reynolds   r.  Stark  Co.  5  Ohio,  Ch.  280. 

^04,  205  ;   Binney's  Case,  2  Bland  Ch.  99,  *  Dillon's  Municipal  Corp.  §  575. 
142;    White    Water   Val.    Canal    Co.  v. 

124 


POWER    TO    SELL    AND    CONVEY.  [§  142. 

A  corporation  may  be  technically  private,  and  yet,  by  reason  of 
having  by  legislative  authority  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  may 
have  a  quasi-public  character,  and  be  subject  to  a  like  obligation 
with  a  public  municipal  corporation  to  hold  and  use  its  property, 
acquired  by  public  authority,  as  a  trust,  to  a  certain  extent,  for 
the  public.  Such  a  corporation  caii  sell  and  convey  its  lands  so 
acquired,  which  are  essential  to  the  carrying  out  of  the  purposes 
for  which  the  corporation  was  created,  only  by  legislative  author- 
ity. A  charitable  or  religious  corporation  may  be  under  an  obli- 
gation to  discharge  its  corporate  duties,  and  may  be  compelled  to 
appropriate  its  property  to  the  specific  uses  for  which  it  was 
allowed  by  its  charter  or  by  statute  to  acquire  it.  But  a  cor- 
poration of  a  strictly  private  character,  one  which  has  derived 
nothing  from  the  government  except  its  charter,  and  has  no 
public  function,  but  whose  sole  object  is  to  promote  the  private 
interests  of  its  stockholdeis,  has  the  same  power  as  a  natural 
person  to  convey  its  lands  as  its  interests  may  demand. 

The  public  may  have  an  interest  in  the  continued  existence  of 
a  private  corporation,  though  it  has  not  strictly  any  public  func- 
tions. Thus  a  corporation  organized  for  the  purpose  of  owning 
ditches  and  selling  water  is  a  strictly  private  corporation,  and 
may  at  its  own  discretion  sell  and  convey  any  part  or  all  of  its 
property.^  The  public  have  no  right  to  say  that  a  private  corpo- 
ration shall  not  dispose  of  its  property,  however  convenient  or 
desirable  it  may  be  that  it  shall  continue  to  exercise  its  corporate 
functions,  miless  the  corporation  has  acquired  its  property  through 
the  sovereign  authority  of  the  State. 

But  a  railroad  company  is  a  quasi-public  corporation,  and  is  not 
allowed  to  divest  itself  of  its  right  of  way,  and  land  necessary 
for  the  exercise  of  its  franchise,  without  legislative  permission.^ 

1  Miner's  Ditch  Co  v.  Zellerhncli,  37  1  McCrary,  541  ;  Richards  ;•.  Merrimack, 
Cal.  543,  99  Am.  Dec.  300.  &c.  R.  44  N.  H.  127  ;  Tread  well  v.  Salis- 

2  Gardner  v.  London,  C.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.  bury  Manuf.  Co.  7  Gray,  393,  66  Am. 
L.  R.  2  Ch.  App.  201  ;  Myatt  v.  St.  Hel-  Dec.  490 ;  Middlesex,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bos- 
en's,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  2  Q.  B.  364;  Beman  v.  ton,  &c.  R.  Co.  115  Mas.s.  347  ;  Sinji^lcton 
Rufford,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  5.50;  Hart  i-.  East-  v.  Southwestern  R.  70  Ga.  464,  48  Am. 
cm  Union  Ry.  Co.  7  Ex.246;  Penn  Co.  Rep.  574;  Hays  v.  Ottawa,  &c.  R.  Co. 
);.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  118  U.S.  290;  61  III.  422;  State  y.  Consolidation  Coal 
Thomas  v.  Railroad  Co.  101  V.  S.  71  ;  Co.  46  Md.  1  ;  Tippecanoe  Co.  v.  Lafay- 
Branch  v.  Jesup,  106  U.  S.  468;  York,  ctte,  &c.  R.  Co.  50  lud.  85  ;  McAllister  v. 
&c.  R.  Co.  y.  Winans,  17  How.  .30  ;  Atlan-  I'lant,  54  Mias.  106,  119  ;  Arthur  r.  Corn- 
tic  &  Pac.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  mercial  &  R.  Bank,  9  S.  &  M.  394,  431,  48 

125 


§§  143,  141.]       CAPACITY    OK    COKl'UKATIONS    AS 


VENDORS. 


To  jiormit  siu-h  ;i  transfer  of  its  property  is  contrary  to  public 
policy.  It  wonld  necessarily  disable  the  corporation  from  per- 
forniini;"  its  duty  to  the  public.^ 

143.  A  foreign  corporation  authorized  to  hold  real  estate 
may  convey  or  mortgage  it  according  to  the  form  in  use  in  the 
State  where  the  land  is  situated.  The  law  of  the  place  where 
the  land  is  situated  governs  as  to  the  mode  of  transfer,  but  the 
authority  to  make  the  transfer  is  derived  from  the  State  cre- 
ating the  corporation.^ 

A  foreign  corporation  may  make  a  valid  assignment  of  its 
propei'ty  for  the  benefit  of  its  creditors,  although  it  has  not 
complied  with  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  State  in  relation 
to  transacting  business  and  owning  and  disposing  of  property 
within  such  State.^  The  acts  of  such  a  corporation  are  not  void, 
and  cannot  be  questioned  and  determined  collaterally.  As  re- 
gards any  usurpation  of  power  by  such  a  corporation,  it  rests 
with  the  State  in  a  direct  proceeding  to  prevent  it  from  exercis- 
ing its  franchises  within  the  State  until  it  has  fidly  complied  with 
its  constitution  and  laws. 

II.     Power  to  Mortgage. 

144.  Ordinary  private  corporations  having  no  public  func- 
tions may  mortgage  their  real  property  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  their  legitimate  debts,  or  to  secure  loans  obtained  for 
transacting  their  legitimate  business.*     This  power  is  incidental, 

Am.  Dec.  719;  Tray,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  *  Bank   of   Australasia    v.   Breillat,   6 

17  Barb.   .581;  Black  i;.  Del.  &  R.  Canal  Moore  P.  C.   152;    In  re   General  Prov. 

Co.  22  N.  J.   Eq.  130,  399,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  Ass.  Co.  L.  R.  14  Eq.  507  ;  In  re  General 

455  ;  Stewart's  App.  56  Pa.  St.  413  ;  Rus-  So.   Am.  Co.  L.  R.  2  Ch.  D.  337  ;  In  re 

sell  V.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  68  Tex.  646,  Patent  File  Co.  L.  R.  6  Ch.  App.  83,  88  ; 

5  S.  W.  Rep.  686  ;  Gulf,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nelson  v.  Eaton,  26  N.  Y.  410 ;  Barnes  v. 

Morris,  67  Tex.  692,  4  S.  W.  Rep.   156;  Ontario  Bank,   19  N.   Y.   152;  Curtis  v. 

Naglee  v.  Alexandria  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  83  Va.  Leavitt,  15  N.  Y.  9  ;  Partridge  v.  Badger, 

707,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  369.  25    Barb.    146  ;    Jackson    v.   Brown,    5 

1  Pierce  v.  Emery,  32  N  H.  486,  504  ;  Wend.  590 ;  Barry  v.  Merchants'  Exch. 
Richards  v.  Merrimack  &  C.  R.  44  N.  H.  Co.  1  Sandf.  Ch.  280 ;  Hackensack  Water 
127,  136.  Co.  V.  De  Kay,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  548  ;  Gordon 

2  Saltmarsh  v.  Spaulding,  147  Mass.  v.  Preston,  1  Watts,  385,  26  Am.  Rep. 
224,  20  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  514,  17  N.  75  ;  Watt's  App.  78  Pa.  St.  370  ;  Detroit 
E.  Rep.  316.  V.   Mut.   Gas    Light  Co.  43   Mich.  594,  5 

3  Wright  V.  Lee,  2  S.  Dak.  596,  51  N.  N.  W.  Rep.  1039  ;  Thompson  v.  Lambert, 
W.  Rep.  706,  and  on  rehearing,  55  N.  W.  44  Iowa.  239  ;  Keichwald  v.  Commercial 
Rep.  931.  Hotel  Co.   106   111.  439,  5  Am.   &   Eng. 

126 


POWER   TO   MUKTGAGE.  [§  145. 

and  need  not  be  expressl}'  conferred.  Corporations  not  expressly 
or  impliedly  restrained  by  the  nature  of  their  undertaking  may 
borrow  money  to  carry  out  the  legitimate  objects  of  their  incor- 
poration, and  secure  the  payment  of  it  by  a  mortgage  of  their 
property.^  Thus,  for  instance,  a  cor})oration  organized  for  the 
purpose  of  manufacturing  and  supplying  gas  to  the  inhabitants 
of  a  city  or  village  is  under  no  restriction  in  this  respect  arising 
by  implication  from  the  nature  of  the  business  it  was  created  to 
engage  in.^  This  restriction  upon  the  right  of  a  corporation  to 
alienate  its  property  arises,  not  from  the  fact  that  it  subserves  a 
public  use  and  is  beneficial,  or,  it  may  be,  necessary  to  the  gen- 
eral public,  but  it  applies  only  when  the  State,  in  view  of  the 
public  purpose  of  a  coi-poration,  has  conferred  upon  it  special 
privileges,  of  which  the  right  of  eminent  domain  is  generally  the 
most  important. 

In  many  States,  express  authority  to  mortgage  is  given  by 
statute,  though  in  some  States  this  authority  is  coupled  with  re- 
strictions. Foreign  corporations  in  some  States  are  not  permitted 
to  mortgage  to  the  exclusion  or  injury  of  citizens  of  the  State. 

145.  A  corporation  created  for  a  public  purpose  cannot 
mortgage  its  land,  acquired  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
eminent  domain,  without  legislative  authority.  Inasmuch  as 
every  mortgage  may  in  the  end  result  in  an  absolute  transfer  of 
the  mortgaged  property,  it  follows  that  such  a  corporation  cannot 
without  special  authority  mortgage  its  property  and  give  to  the 
mortgagee,  upon  default,  the  right  to  exercise  its  public  duties 
and  functions,  or  the  power  to  sell  and  convey  these  privileges  to 
another.^     A  mortgage  made   by  such   a  corporation   of  all   its 

Corp.  Cas.  248  ;  Wood  v.  Wlielen,  93  111.  ^  Jones'  Corp.  Bonds  and  Mortjrages, 
153  ;  West  v.  MadL^on  Co.  Ag.  Hoard,  82  §§  1-26  ;  Carpenter  v.  Black  Hawk  G.  M 
111.  205  ;  Aurora  Ag.  Soc.  v.  Paddock,  80  Co.  65  N.  Y.  43,  50 ;  Pullan  v.  Cincinnati, 
111.  263  ;  Bradley  v.  Ballard,  55  111.  413  ;  &c.  R.  Co.  4  Biss.  35  ;  Susquehanna  Canal 
7  Am.  Rep.  656;  Rockwell  v.  Elkhorn  Co.  i;.  Bonham,  9  W.  &  S.  27, 42  Am.  Dec. 
Bank,  13  Wis.  653;  Burt  v.  Rattle,  31  315;  Pierce  y.  Emery,  32  N.  H.  484 ;  Ar- 
Ohio  St.  116;  Larwell  y.  Hanover  Sav.  thur  y.  Commercial  &  R.  Bank,  9  S.  &  M. 
Fund  Soc.  40  Ohio  St.  274,  282;  Leh-  394,48  Am.  Dec.  719;  Atkin.son  v.  Ma- 
man  V.  Tallassee  Manuf.  Co.  64  Ala.  567.  rictta,  &c.  R.  Co.  15  Ohio  St.  21  ;  Stewart 

1  Curtis  V.  Leavitt,  15  N.  Y.  9  ;  Straus  v.  Jones,  40  Mo.  140  ;  New  Orleans,  &c. 
V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  5  Ohio  St.  59;  Monu-  i;.  Co.  v.  Harris.  27  Miss.  517;  Hall  v. 
ment  National  Bank  v.  Globe  Works,  101  Sullivan  R.  Co.  21  Law  Rep.  138;  Dan- 
Mass.  57,  3  Am.  Rep.  322.  iels  v.  Hart,  118  Mass.  543  ;  Wood  v.  Bed- 

2  Hays  V.  Galion  Gas,  &c.  Co.  29  Ohio  ford,  &c.  R.  Co.  8  Phila.  94  ;  State  v. 
St.  330.  Mexican  Gulf  Ry.  Co.  3  Rob.  (La.)  513; 

!27 


§>;    140,   147.  J       OAPACIIY    OF    CORI'OKATIONS    AS    VENDORS. 

})io|)LMty,  witliout  ilistiiK't  legislutive  uiitliority,  is  wliolly  void  and 
iiioperutivf,  beeiiuse  it  is  in  violiitioii  of  the  piiUlic  jiolic}^  of  the 
Stiite.i 

146.  Land  of  a  railroad  company  not  acquired  under  the 
delegated  right  of  eminent  domain,  or  so  connected  with  tlie 
fijUK'hise  to  operate  and  manage  a  railroad  that  the  alienation 
would  tend  to  disable  the  cor|)oration  from  performing  the  public 
duties  imposed  upon  it,  and  in  consideration  of  which  its  chartered 
privileges  had  been  conferred,  may  be  convey(>d  or  mortgaged  by 
the  company  without  special  authority,  under  the  general  right  of 
corporations  at  common  law  to  dispose  of  whatever  property  they 
have  power  to  acquire.-  If  the  company  should  include  in  one 
deed  or  mortgage  both  real  estate  not  connected  with  its  fran- 
chises and  real  estate  essential  to  the  exercise  and  enjoyment  of 
its  franchises,  as  for  instance  a  portion  of  its  roadway,  the  con- 
veyance might  be  upheld  as  to  the  former,  and  treated  as  inop- 
erative and  void  as  to  the  latter.  The  ordinary  rule  is  applied 
that,  if  the  part  of  the  subject  of  the  conveyance  which  is  valid 
can  be  separated  from  that  which  is  void,  the  conveyance  will  be 
carried  into  effect  so  far  as  it  can  be.  As  to  property  not  ac- 
quired for  the  purposes  of  the  road,  the  corporation  stands  in  the 
relation  of  an  ordinary  trading  corporation  which  has  no  public 
obligations. 

147.  A  power  to  sell  generally  includes  a  power  to  mort- 
gage.'^ Thus  a  charter  conferring  the  right  "  to  acquire,  aliene, 
transfer,  and  dispose  of  property  of  every  kind,"  confers  the  power 
to  mortgage  it.  But  this  is  affirmed  of  the  property  of  the  com- 
pany as  distinguished  from  its  franchises.*  The  power  to  mort- 
gage would,  however,  generally  include  the  franchises  necessary 
to  use  and  enjoy  the  property,  as  distinguished  from  the  franchise 

Commonwealth  v.  Smith,  10  Allen,  448,  Piatt  v.   Union   Pac.  R.  Co.  99  U.  S.  48, 

87  Am.   Dec.  672.     And  see  East  Boston,  58  ;    Branch    v.    Jesup,    106    U.   S.  468, 

&c.  R.  Co.  i;.  Eastern,  &c.  R.  Co.  13  Allen,  478,  1    S.   Ct.    Rep.   495;    Farnsworth  v. 

422;  Richardson   v.   Sibley,   11  Allen,  65,  Minn.   &c.  R.  Co.  92  U.  S.  49;  Tucker  v. 

87  Am.  Dec.  700.  Ferf,'Uson,   22  Wall.  527,  572. 

This  doctrine  is  substantially  denied  in  ■*   VViiiamette    Manuf.   Co.  v.   Bank   of 

Maine.     Shepley  v.  Atlantic,   &c.   Co.   55  British  Columbia,  119  U.  S.  191,  7  S.  Ct. 

Me.  395;   Kennebec,   &c.   R.  Co.  y.  Port-  Rep.  187. 

land,  &c.  Co.  59  Me.  9,  23.  *  McAllister    v.   Plant,   54    Miss.    106; 

1  Richardson  v.  Sibley,  11  Allen,  65,  87  Branch    v.   Atlantic,  &c.  R.  Co.  3  Woods, 
Am.  Dec.  700.  481. 

2  Hendee  i;.  Pinkerton,  14   Allen,  381  ; 

128 


POWER  TO    MORTGAGE.  [§§   148,  149. 

to  be  a  corporation.^  The  words  "dispose  of"  used  in  the  act 
incorpi>r;iting  the  Union  Pacific  Raih-oad  Compan}',  in  reference 
to  lands  granted  to  the  company,  are  apt  words  to  indicate  a  trans- 
fer by  mortgage.  They  contemphite  a  use  of  the  lands  granted 
ilifferent  from  the  sale  of  theai.^ 

148.  A  corporation  may  have  authority  to  mortgage  its 
property,  but  no  authority  to  mortgage  its  franchises.  Legis- 
lative authority  to  mortgage  may  apply  to  the  pi'operty  of  a  cor- 
jjoration  and  not  to  its  franchises.  If  a  corporation,  having  power 
by  its  charter  to  pledge  its  real  estate  or  its  property  and  profits, 
executes  a  mortgage  covering  not  only  these,  but  also  its  fran- 
chises to  be  a  corporation,  such  mortgage  is  not  for  that  reason 
entirely  vf)id,  but  it  operates  to  convey  the  property  of  the  com- 
pany,^  while  it  is  ineffectual  to  transfer  its  franchises.^  Under  a 
statute  providing  that  corporations  fur  manufacturing,  mining, 
mechanical,  or  chemical  purposes  shall  not  mortgage  any  pro{ierty 
except  real  estate,  and  shall  not  do  this  except  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  debts,  a  mortgage  by  such  corporation  to  secure  bonds  is 
valid  so  far  as  the  bonds  are  used  for  the  payment  of  its  debts, 
even  though  invalid  so  far  as  the  bonds  are  used  to  raise  money 
to  carry  on  its  operations.^  It  is  doubtless  true  that  the  bonds 
not  used  for  this  purpose  would  be  valid  in  the  hands  of  bona  fide 
holders,  and  that  as  against  such  holders  the  compan}'^  would  be 
estopped  from  claiming  the  invalidity  of  the  mortgage.^ 

149.  Under  a  power  to  mortgage  expressly  conferred,  it  is 
suflacient  that  the  scope  and  purpose  of  the  power  are  sub- 
stantially met.  Under  authority  conferred  to  mortgage  for  the 
purposes  of  the  business  of  the  corporation,  a  mortgage  may  be 
made  to  secure  future  advances."  Under  a  statute  authorizing 
any  railroad  corporation  to  borrow  money  "  for  completing,  fur- 
nishing, and  operating  its  road,"  and  to  issue  bonds  therefor, 
secured  by  a  mortgage  of  its  property  and  franchise,  a  mortgage 
wliich    appeared    upon  its   face   to   be   "  made  to  consolidate  its 

1  Branch    v.    Atlantic,   &c.    R.   Co.    3     65  N.  Y.  43  ;  Central  G.  Min.  Co.  v.  Piatt, 
Woods,    481  ;    Wayne    v.    Myddleton,   2     3  Daly,  263. 

Kelly  (Ga.),  383.  6  Carpenter  v.  Black  Hawk  G.  Min.  Co. 

2  riatt  V.  Union,  &c.   U.  Co.  99  U.  S.     &f>  N.  Y.  43. 

48.  c  Dimpfel  v.  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  9  Biss. 

•''  Randolph  v.  W.  &c.  R.  Co.  11    Phila.  127. 

502.  "  Jones  v.   Guaranty  &  Indemnity  Co. 

*  Carpenter  v.  Black  Hawk  G.  Min.  Co.  101  U.  S.  622. 

VOL.  I.  129 


§  150.]  cArACiTY  OF  cur.roi;ATU)NS  as  vkndors. 

fiimK'il  ili'bt,  obtain  the  nionoy  and  material  iiecessar}'  for  per- 
fecting its  line  of  railway,  enlarging  its  capacities,  and  extending 
tlie  facilities  thereof,''  is  within  the  scope  of  the  powers  conferred. 
Without  other  proof  of  the  object  of  the  mortgage,  no  suit  to 
restrain  the  making  of  it,  or  the  issuing  of  bonds  under  it,  can  be 
maintained  by  a  common  stockholder,  or  by  a  preferred  stock- 
holder, of  the  corporation.  For  aught  that  appears  in  the  case, 
the  funded  debt  and  other  debts  may  have  been  incurred  in  con- 
structing and  operating  the  road,  and  the  excess  of  money  sought 
to  be  obtained  by  such  bonds  may  be  necessary  further  to  complete 
and  operate  the  same.^ 

But  authority  to  mortgage  for  the  purpose  of  constructing 
a  raih'oad  confers  no  right  to  secure  by  mortgage  the  debt  of 
another.  A  railroad  company  having  authority  to  borrow  such 
sums  of  money  as  might  be  expedient  for  completing,  maintain- 
ing, and  working  the  railway,  and  to  make  bonds,  debentures,  or 
other  securities,  and  sell  the  same,  and  to  hypothecate,  mortgage, 
or  pledge  the  hinds,  tolls,  revenues,  and  other  property  of  the 
company,  for  the  due  payment  of  such  sums  and  the  interest 
thereon,^  cannot  make  a  mortgage  for  any  purpose  not  embraced 
in  the  terms  of  the  act,  and  therefore  cannot  make  a  mortgage 
to  secure  a  debt  which  is  not  a  debt  of  the  company.  When  the 
express  purpose  for  which  a  mortgage  is  authorized  to  be  given  is 
the  repayment  of  a  loan  of  money  for  the  completion  or  mainte- 
nance of  the  road,  a  mortgage  to  secure  the  debt  of  another,  though 
it  may  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  company  to  make  it,  is  ultra  vires 
and  void.^ 

Under  an  authority  given  by  charter  or  by  statute  to  borrow 
money,  a  corporation  has  no  right  to  raise  money  by  the  issue  of 
irredeemable  bonds  entitling  the  holder  merely  to  a  share  of  the 
earnings  after  the  payment  of  certain  dividends  to  the  stockhold- 
ers. Money  so  obtained  could  not  be  regarded  as  borrowed,  be- 
cause that  term  implies  reimbursement.^ 

150.  An  express  authority  to  mortgage  for  certain  pur- 
poses does  not  necessarily  negative  or  qualify  a  general 
authority  to   borrow  and  mortgage   for    other  purposes,  for 

1  Thompson  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.  42  How.  "  Grand  Junction  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bickford, 
Pr.  68,  11  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  188.  23  Grant's  Ch.  (Ont.)  302. 

2  Railway  Act  of  Ontario,  §  9,  sub-sec.  *  Taylor  v.  Phila.  &c.  R.  Co.  7  Fed 
1 1 .  Rep.  386. 

130 


l^OWLR    TO  MORTGAGE.  [§  161. 

which  the  implied  powers  of  a  corporation  are  usually  sufficient.^ 
But  an  express  power  to  mortgage  would  seem  to  negative  an  im- 
plied power  for  the  same  purpose.  If  there  is  an  express  power 
to  mortgage  for  a  certain  amount,  there  can  be  no  implied  power 
beyond  this  amount.^  Under  authority  given  to  a  corporation  to 
mortgage  its  real  and  personal  property  to  secure  the  payment  of 
any  debt  contracted  by  it  in  the  business  for  which  it  was  incor- 
porated, a  mortgage  may  be  given  to  secure  a  debt  contracted 
simultaneously  with  the  giving  of  the  security,  if  incurred  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  legitimate  business  of  the  company.^  A  mort- 
gage may  be  given  also  to  secure  bonds  issued  and  delivered  to 
creditors  of  the  company,  or  sold  to  raise  money  to  pay  them,  or  to 
raise  money  for  its  legitimate  business  purposes.*^ 

151.  If  a  corporation  makes  a  sale  or  mortgage  "which  is 
ultra  vires,  it  cannot  avail  itself  of  the  illegality  of  the  trans- 
action to  defeat  the  conveyance.^  An  executed  transaction 
must  be  allowed  to  stand  against  the  corporation  when  the  rules 
of  good  faith  require  it.^  Although  a  transfer  of  the  property  of 
a  corporation  may  have  been  ultra  vires,  the  corporation  cannot 
upon  its  own  motion,  without  due  process  of  law  and  a  return  of 
the  consideration  received,  take  possession  of  the  property.  A 
court  of  equity  will  restrain  it  by  injunction.'^ 

A  mortgage  made  by  a  corporation  whose  articles  of  incorpo- 
ration provide  "  that  it  shall  be  competent  to  mortgage  the  pi'op- 
erty  of  the  company  to  the  amount  of  not  exceeding  one  half  of 
the  capital  stock  actually  paid  in,"  is  not  ultra  vires  and  invalid 
though  given  for  a  greater  amount.^  "■  The  general  rule  is,  that 
the  plea  of  ultra  vires  shall  not  prevail  when,  instead  of  advancing 
justice,  it  would  accomplish  a  wrong  ;  and  it  makes  no  difference, 
in  this  respect,  whether  it  is  interposed  for  or  against  a  corpo- 
ration." '•* 

1  Allen  V.  Mout;,'omery  R.  Co.  1 1  Ala.  ^  Miners'  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zellerbach,  37 
437;  Mobile,   &c.   R.   Co.   v.  Talman,  15     Cal.  543,  99  Am.  Dec.  300. 

Ala.  472  ;  Phillips  i-.  Wiuslow,  18  B.  Mon.         «  Parish  v.  Wheeler,  22  N.  Y.  494. 
431,  68  Am.  Dec.  729.  '  Atlantic   &   Pac.    Tel.   Co.   v.    Union 

2  Brice,  Ultra  Vires,  2d  Eng.  ed.  273.        Pac.  Ry.  Co.  1  McCrary,  541. 

«  Lord  V.  Yonkers  Fuel  Gas  Co.  99  N.  ^  Warfield  v.  Marshall  Canning  Co.  72 

Y.  547.  Iowa,  666,  34  N.  W.  Rep.  467,  19  Am.  & 

*  Carpenter  v.  Black  Hawk  Min.  Co.  65  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  194,  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  263; 

N.  Y.  43;  Lord  v.  Yonkers  Fuel  Gas  Co.  Garrett  v.  Burlinstou  Plow  Co.  70  Iowa, 

99  N.  Y.  547.     And  see  Jones  v.  Guaranty  697,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  395,  59  Am.  Rep.  461. 

and  Indemnity  Co.  101  U.  S.  622.  »  Darst  v.  Gale,  83  111   136, 140  ;  Alexan- 


§§  152,  153.]       CAPACITY   OF   CORrORATIONS   AS    VENDORS. 

It'  a  corporation  is  restricted  to  borrowing  a  limited  amount 
upon  mortgage  of  its  lands,  the  I'estriction  is  strict!}^  enforced  by 
the  English  courts,  and  a  mortgage  by  such  corporation  for  a 
greater  amount  is  good  for  only  the  amount  named.  There  is  in 
such  case  an  implied  restriction  against  mortgaging  the  land  for 
more  than  the  sum  mimed  in  the  statute  or  the  act  of  incorpora- 
tion.' A  mortgage  beyond  the  borrowing  powers  of  the  corpora- 
tion cannot  be  ratified  by  the  individual  members  of  the  corpora- 
tion, even  if  every  one  expressly  assents  to  it.  They  cannot  ratify 
an  act  which  the  corporation  is  not  clothed  with  any  capacity  to 
do.  They  cannot  make  valid  against  the  corporation  a  mortgage 
which  it  had  no  capacity  to  make. 

152.  Though  an  individual  cannot  question  the  power  of  a 
corporation  to  acquire  and  hold  land,  he  can  question  its  right 
to  dispose  of  it,  when  his  rights  would  be  interfered  with  by  the 
corporation's  divesting  itself  of  the  powder  to  perform  its  duties  to 
the  public.  "  The  right  and  power  of  such  a  corporation  to  dis- 
pose of  the  property  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  its  franchise, 
and  the  right  of  such  corporation  to  hold  j^i'operty  conveyed  to 
it  which  by  the  terms  of  its  charter  it  is  not  authorized  to  pur- 
chase, so  far  as  individuals  are  concerned,  stand  on  different 
grounds.  In  the  one  case  the  individual  has  no  interest  in  the 
question,  while  in  the  other  it  is  his  right  to  have  the  corporation 
discharge  its  duty  to  the  public  ;  and,  for  any  failure  to  do  so, 
by  which  he  receives  injury,  he  may  look  to  the  corporation  and 
its  property  for  compensation,  notwithstanding  the  corporation 
has  attempted  to  divest  itself  of  its  corporate  existence,  franchise, 
and  property."  2 

153.  A  mortgage  by  a  corporation  made  "without  the  assent 
or  vote  of  a  certain  portion  of  its  stockholders,  as  required  by 
statute,  can  be  attacked  only  by  the  corporators.  Objection  to 
its  validity  cannot  be  made  by  the  corporation  itself  in  defence  to 
a  suit  to  foreclose  the  mortgage.  Such  a  provision  is  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  stockholders,  and  they  alone  are  wronged  by  the 

der  V.  ToUeston  Club,  110  111.  65  ;  Third  R.  36  Ch.  D.  674  ;  Regina  v.  Reed,  L.  R. 
Av.  Sav.  Bk.  V.  Dimock,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  26  ;  .5  Q.  B.  Div.  483,  488 ;  M'Cormick  v.  Parry, 
Beekman  v.  Hudson  River,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  7  Exch.  35.5  ;  Chapleo  v.  Brunswick  Build. 
35  Fed.  Rep.  3  ;  Texas  Western  Ry.  Co.  Soc.  6  Q.  B.  Div.  696,  713. 
V.  Gentry,  69  Tex.  625,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  98.  ^  Russell  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  68 
1  Jones  on  Corp.  Bonds  &  Mortg.  §  20 ;  Tex.  646,  653,  5  S.  W.  Rep.  686,  per  Stay- 
Baroness  Wcnlock  V.  River  Dee  Co.  L.  ton,  J. 
132 


POWER    TO   MORTGAGE.  [§  153. 

execution  of  a  mortgage  in  violation  of  the  statute,  and  they  alone 
can  raise  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  mortgage.  The  cor- 
poration is  estopped  from  setting  up  the  defence  of  ultra  vires 
when  the  party  dealing  with  it  could  not,  from  anything  appear- 
ing upon  the  face  of  the  paper,  be  presumed  to  know  that  the  cor- 
poration had  exceeded  its  power. ^ 

1  Beecher  v.  Rolling  Mill  Co.  45  Mich.     Gas  Coal  Co.  37    W.  Va.  73,  16  S.  W. 
103,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  695  ;  Boyce  v.  Montauk     Rep.  501. 

133 


CHAPTER   IX. 

CAPACITY   OF   TENANTS   IN  TAIL  AS  VENDORS. 

154.  An  estate  tail  under  the  statute  de  donis  was  inalien- 
able. The  tenant  in  tail  could  convey  no  interest  greater  than 
his  life  estate,  and  after  him  the  estate  descended  to  "the  heirs 
of  his  body,"  or  to  other  lineal  heirs  described  in  the  deed  of  the 
donor.  Before  the  enactment  of  this  statute  in  1285,  an  estate 
granted  to  one  "  and  the  heirs  of  his  body  "  was  a  conditional 
fee.  The  condition  was  an  implied  one,  that,  if  the  grantee 
should  die  without  issue  of  the  prescribed  class,  or  if  there  should 
be  a  subsequent  failure  of  such  issue,  the  land  should  revert  to  the 
donor.  Until  the  happening  of  this  event  the  estate  of  the 
grantee  was  in  effect  an  estate  for  his  life,  though  coupled  with  a 
further  estate  of  inheritance,  conditional  on  there  being  issue  of 
the  prescribed  class  to  inherit  according  to  the  terms  of  the  gift. 
The  heir,  however,  did  not  take  by  virtue  of  the  deed  to  his  an- 
cestor, but  by  descent  from  him.  This  was  the  rule  as  early 
as  the  reign  of  Henry  111.^  Inasmuch  as  an  ordinary  grant 
to  a  man  and  his  heirs  enabled  him  to  convey  the  land  in  fee 
simple,  so  a  grantee  of  a  conditional  fee,  such  as  described  above, 
upon  the  birth  of  issue  who  could  inherit,  became  entitled  to  con- 
vey the  land  absolutely  in  fee  simple,  and  thus  bar  not  only  his 
own  issue,  but  also  his  donor's  right  of  reverter.  "  These  estates, 
therefoi-e,  upon  the  happening  of  the  condition,  differed  from 
ordinary  estates  in  fee  simple  only  in  the  restricted  character  of 
their  devolution  to  the  class  of  heirs  named  in  the  gift.  So  soon 
as  the  condition  was  performed  by  the  birth  of  issue,  the  tenant 
could  alienate  and  convey  an  estate  in  fee  simple.  ...  If,  how- 
ever, the  land  was  not  alienated,  it  would  descend,  not  according 
to  the  ordinary  rules  affecting  inheritances,  but  according  to  the 
mode  expressed  in  the  gift.  It  can  hai'dly  be  doubted  that  this 
strained  construction  was  put  upon  such  gifts  in  order  to  favor 

1  Bracton,  Lib.  3,  cap.  6,  fol.  17  A. 

134 


CAPACITY  OF  TENANTS  IN  TAIL  AS  VENDORS.     [§  154. 

the  practice  of  iilienation,  which  was  dear  to  the  common  lawyer 
and  to  the  great  mass  of  landowners,  though  abhorrent  to  the 
domini  capitales.''^  ^ 

To  stop  the  practice  of  alienating  these  conditional  estates,  the 
statute  de  donis  conditionalihus  was  passed  in  the  year  1285.^ 
The  statute,  after  reciting  at  length  the  I'easons  for  its  enactment, 
says:  "Wherefore  our  lord  the  king,  perceiving  how  necessary 
and  expedient  it  should  be  to  provide  remedy  in  the  aforesaid 
cases,  hath  ordained  that  the  will  of  the  giver,  according  to  the 
form  in  the  deed  of  gift  manifestly  expressed,  shall  be  from  hence- 
forth observed,  so  that  they  to  whom  the  land  was  given  under 
such  conditions  shall  have  no  power  to  aliene  the  land  so  given, 
but  that  it  shall  remain  unto  the  issue  of  them  to  whom  it  was 
given  after  their  death,  or  shall  revert  unto  tiie  giver  or  his  heirs, 
if  issue  fail,  either  by  reason  that  there  is  no  issue  at  all,  or  if 
any  issue  be,  it  fail  by  death,  the  heir  of  such  issue  failing." 

Tlie  effect  of  the  statute  was  to  render  the  estate  inalienable, 
and  descendible  onl}'^  to  the  issue  named  in  the  grant.  The 
grantee  could  convey  a  title  good  only  to  the  extent  of  his  own 
interest,  that  is,  an  estate  for  his  life  determinable  by  the  entry 
of  the  heir,  if  such  there  should  be,  or,  in  default  of  such  issue,  by 
entry  of  the  donor.  The  estate  of  such  grantee  was  designated 
an  estate  VaW^  feudum  tcdliatum,  being  a  portion  of  an  estate  cut 
off  from  the  fee.  "  As  time  went  on,  the  great  inconvenience  of 
such  a  restriction  was  strongly  felt.  Titles  were  insecure,  for  an 
old  entail,  of  which  nothing  was  known,  might  be  brought  to 
light ;  nor  would  any  period  of  enjoyment,  however  long,  afford 
an  answer  to  such  a  claim.  '  Farmers  were  ousted  of  their  leases, 
creditors  defrauded  of  their  debts,'  The  free  alienation  of  land 
was  restrained,  a  grievance  which  was  probably  felt  with  increas- 
ing severity  in  consequence  of  the  impoverishment  of  the  land- 
owners caused  by  the  Wars  of  the  Roses.  The  king,  too,  suffered 
by  the  protection  against  forfeiture  which  the  practice  afforded 
to  the  issue  of  a  traitor.  Thus  all  members  of  the  community, 
except  perhaps  the  great  landowners  themselves,  were  interested 
in  obtaining  a  relaxation  of  the  practice  of  strictly  entailing 
lands."  3 

1  Digby's  Hist.  Law  of  Real  Prop.  4th  ^  Digby's  Hist.  Law  of  Real  Prop.  4th 
ed.  p.  221.  ed.  p.  250. 

2  13  Edw.  I.  ch.  1. 

135 


§  155.]  CAPACITY    OF    TENANTS   IN    TAIL   AS    VKNDOKS. 

AltiM-  the  restriction  upon  the  free  alieuiition  of  estates  had  eon- 
tiiuuil  lor  two  hiindreel  years,  it  was  liiially  in  i;reat  part  broken 
down  by  the  courts,  fii'st  by  the  [)rocess  of  ''•levying  a  iine,"  and 
afterwarils  by  the  more  eifectual  tneaiis  of  a  "•coninion  recov- 
ery/" which  came  into  use  after  the  famous  Taltai  iinrs  Case  in 
1472.^  In  England,  from  this  time  till  188-1,  the  common  mode 
of  barring  an  entail  ;ind  making  a  conveyance  of  the  estate  in  fee 
sim[)le  was  "  to  sufier  a  recovery."  After  tlie  hitter  date  tlie 
tenant  in  tail  migiit  convey  the  estate  absolutely  in  fee  simple 
by  deed. 

155.  In  this  country  estates  tail  -were  early  introduced  as  a 
part  of  the  common  law,  and  with  them  came  the  remedy  of  a 
conmion  recovery.  This  mode  of  barring  the  entail  and  convert- 
ing the  title  into  an  estate  in  fee  simple  was  in  use  during  the 
colonial  period,  and  in  some  of  the  States  long  after  the  Revolu- 
tion. Entailed  estates  were  never  at  any  period  in  much  favor, 
and  as  time  has  gone  on  they  have  become  less  in  favor  than 
formerly.  At  the  present  day,  estates  tail  in  most  of  the  States 
either  have  been  by  statute  converted  into  estates  in  fee  simple, 
or  the  tenant  in  tail  has  been  empowered  to  bar  the  entail  by  a 
conveyance  in  fee  simple. 

In  many  States  all  estates  which  at  common  law  would  be 
adjudged  to  be  estates  in  fee  tail  are  declared  by  statute  to  be 
estates  in  fee  simple.^  The  grantee  in  tail  has  the  same  power 
over  such  an  estate  as  over  an  absolute  estate  in  fee. 

1  See  Alienation    of   Estates   Tail,  by  estate.     §  3380     Mcllhinny  v.  Mcllhinny 

Howard   W.  Elphinstone,   6  Law  Quart.  (Ind.),  37  JS'.  E.  Rep.  147  ;  Allen  v.  Craft, 

Rev.  280.  109  Ind.  476,  9  N.  E.  919,  58   Am.  Rep. 

■■2  Alabama:  Code  1886,  §1825;  Sullivan  42.5.      Kentucky:    G.  L.    1894,   §  2343; 

V.  McLauixhiin,  99   Ala.  60,   11    So.  Rep.  Bieckinridj^e    v.    Denny,    8    Busli,    523; 

477.     California :  Civil  Code,  §  763.    The  Brann  r.  Elzey,  83  Ky.  440.     The  statute 

statute  doe.s  not  apply  to  an   instrument  does   not   a])ply  to   a  life  estate  merely, 

conveying  only  a  life  estate.     Baruett  v.  Bodine  l\   Arthur,   91    Ky.   53,  14  S.  W. 

Barnett  (Cai.),  37  Pac.  Rep.    1049.      A  Rc|i.  904.     Michigan :  Annot.  Stais.  1882, 

vesied    remainder  in  fee  may   be  limited  §    5519.     A    remainder    may    he    limited 

upon  such  e.state.     §  764.     Florida:  R.  S.  upon  such  estate,  §  .5520.     Minnesota  :  G. 

1892,  §1818.    Georgia:  Code  1882,  §  2250;  S.    1894,    §    4364.      Mississippi:     Annot. 

Baird   v.  Brookin,  86   Ga.   709,   12   S.  E.  Code  1892,  §  2436;  .Jordan    r.   Roach,  32 

Rep.  981;  Beers  v.  Estill  (G^.),  9  S.E.  Rep.  Miss.  481;    Dibrell  v.   Carlisle,  48  Miss. 

596.     Indiana  :  R.  S.  1894,  §  3378.     A  re-  691.     But  a  conveyance  or  devise  may  be 

mainiler  may  be  limited  on  a  continjCfency  made  to  a  succession  of  donees  then  liv- 

whicli,  in  case  it  should  happen,  will  opiT-  in<j,  not  exceeding   two,  and  to  the  heirs 

ate  to  abridge  or  determine  the  precedent  of  the  hotlv  of  the  remainder-man,  and,  in 

136 


CAPACITY    OF   TENANTS   IN    TAIL   AS    VENDORS.  [§  155. 

In  several  States  a  person  seised  of  lands  as  tenant  in  tail  may 
convey  them  in  fee  simple  by  a  deed  in  common  form,  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  he  were  seised  of  the  same  in  fee  simple.  Such  con- 
veyance bars  the  estate  tail,  and  all  remainders  and  reversions 
expectant  tliereon.^  In  these  States,  estates  tail  when  created 
continue  until  the  grantee  conveys  the  land  in  fee  simple.  The 
statute  does  not  itself  convert  estates  tail  into  estates  in  fee 
simple,  but  empowers  the  grantee  to  do  so. 

A  quitclaim  deed  is  as  effectual  as  any  other  to  bar  the  en- 
tail, for  it  is  sufficient  to  convey  an  estate  in  fee  simple.^ 

Only  the  tenant  in  tail  in  possession,  and  not  one  in  remainder, 
can  bar  the  entail  by  his  deed.^ 

A  deed  of  an  undivided  interest  bars  the  entail  to  the  extent  of 
such  interest.^ 

Where  lands  are  held  by  one  person  for  life  with  a  remainder 
in  tail  in  another,  the  tenant  for  life  and  remainder-man  may  bar 
the  entail  by  joining  in  a  conveyance  of  the  land  in  fee.  But  the 
tenant  for  life  alone  cannot  by  his  deed  bar  the  entail.^ 

In  several  other  States  the  tenant  in  tail  has  no  power  of  aliena- 
tion beyond  his  life  interest,  the  statutes  declaring  that,  in  cases 
where  by  common  law  any  person  may  become  seised  in  fee  tail 
of    any   lands,  such  person,  instead  of  being  or  becoming  seised 

default   thereof,  to  the  n'sht  heirs  of  the  i  Delaware:  R.  Code  1893,  p.   631,  ch. 

donor,  iu  fee  simple.     New  HampsMre  :  83,  §  27.     Maine  :  R.  S.  1883,  ch.  73,  §  4  ; 

The  statute  de   donis  was   impliedly   re-  Willey  i;.  Haley,  60  Me.  176.     Maryland: 

pealed  hy  statute  of  1789,  and  estates  tail  Pub.  G.  L.   1888,  art.   21,  §  24.     Massa- 

aholished.     Jewell  v.   Warner,  35  N.  H.  chusetts:  P.  S.  1882,  ch.  120,§  15.     Penn- 

176;  Dennett  r.  Dennett,    40  N.  H.  498,  sylvania :  Brightly's  Purdon's  Dig.  1894, 

500.     New  York:  R.    S.    1889,    p.  2431,  p.  809.     The  deed  must  express  an  intent 

§§  3,  4.     A  remainder  in  fee  may  be  liin-  to  bar  the  entail.     Rhode  Island  :    P.  S. 

ited  upon  such  estate.     See  Van  Reussel-  1882,  ch.  172,  §  3.    And  .see  ch.  182,  §§  1, 

aer  v.  Kearney,  1 1  How.  297.     North  Car-  2  ;  Manchester  r.  Durfee,  5  R.  I.  549. 

olina  :  Code  1883,  §  1325.     Oklahoma:  G.  •^  Coombs  v.  Anderson,  138  Mass.  376  ; 

S.  1893,  §§  3700,  3701.     North   Dakota:  Allen  u.  Ashley  School  Fund,  102  Mass. 

Comp.  Laws   1887,   §   2736.     There   may  262. 

be  a  vested   remainder  limited  upon  such  "  Whittaker  v.  Whittaker,  99  Ma8s.364  ; 

estate.     §   2737.     South   Dakota:    Comp.  Holland   v.  Cruft,  3  Gray,  162,   182;  Al- 

Laws    1887,  §  2736.     Tliere    may    be   a  len  v.   Ashley    School  Fund,    102  Mass. 

vested  remainder  limited  upon  such  estate.  262. 

§3737.     Tennessee:    Code   1884,  §  2813.  *  Coombs  v.  Anderson,  138  Mass.  376; 

Virginia:   Code  1887,  §  2421.     West  Vir-  Hall  y.  Thayer,  5  Gray,  523. 

ginia:  Code   1891,  ch.  71,  §§  8,  9.     Wis-  •>  Wilson  v.  O'Connell,  147  Mass,  17,  16 

consin:     Annot.    Stats.    1889,    §§    2027,  N.  P].  Rep.  578. 
2028. 

137 


§  155.]  OArACITY    OF   TENANTS   IN    TAIL   AS    VENDORS. 

theivol"  in  foe  tail,  sliall  bo  ad  judged  to  be  and  become  seised 
thereof  for  his  natural  life  only,  and  the  remainder  shall  pass  iu 
fee  simple  absolute  to  the  person  to  whom  the  estate  tail  would 
first  pass,  according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law,  by  virtue  of 
such  devise,  gift,  grant,  or  conveyance.^ 

There  are  no  statutory  provisions  in  regard  to  estates  tail  in 
Idaho,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Montana,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  Oregon,  South 
Carolina,  Texas,  and  Washington,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether 
estates  tail,  as  at  common  law,  are  preserved  in  any  of  them.  In 
Wyoming  it  is  provided  that,  in  an  action  by  the  tenant  in  tail, 
the  court  may  authorize  a  sale  of  the  property  when  satisfied 
that  a  sale  would  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  person  holding  the 
first  and  present  estate,  and  that  no  substantial  injury  would  be 
done  to  the  heirs  in  tail.^ 

'Arkansas:  Dig.  of  Stats.  1884,  §  643.  Descent,   p.   299,    §    11.      New   Mexico: 

Colorado:     Annot.    Stats.     1891,    §    432.  Comp.  L.  1884,  §  1423.    Ohio:  R.  S.  1892, 

Connecticut :  G.  S.  1888,  §  2952.    Illinois  :  §  4200.     An  ordinary  deed  docs  not  bar. 

K.  S.  1889,  ch.  30,  §  6  ;  Frazer  v.  Peoria  Tollock  v.  SpeiJel,  17  Ohio  St.  439.     Ver- 

Co.  74  111.  282;  Blair  v.  Vanblarcum,  71  mont :  K.  L.  1880,  §  1916. 

111.  290;  Lehndorf  y.  Cope,   122  111.317,  In  New  Jersey,  New  Mexico,  and  Ohio 

13  N.  E.  Rep.  50.5.     Missouri:  R.  S.  1889,  the  remainder  goes  to  the  children  of  the 

§  8836;  Reed  v.   Lane    (Mo.),  26  S.  W.  first  donee  as  tenants  in  common. 

Rep.  957.     New  Jersey:    1  R.  S.    1877;  a  r.  s.  1887,  §§  3009-3019. 
138 


BOOK  I.  — PART  11. 

CAPACITY  OF   PERSONS  AS  PURCHASERS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

CAPACITY  OF  PERSONS  IX  GENERAL. 

156.  No  disability  on  the  part  of  an  individual  grantee 
stands  in  the  "way  of  his  taking  title  under  a  deed,  though 
the  disability  be  such  that  a  deed  made  b}^  him  would  be  invalid.^ 
Thus  a  conveyance  may  be  made  directly  to  an  infant,  and  the 
title  will  vest  in  him  upon  the  delivery  of  the  deed.^  Although 
the  grantee  even  in  a  deed  poll  becomes  a  party  to  it  by  accepting 
it,  yet  its  efficacy  as  a  grant  and  conveyance  is  not  derived  from 
the  act  of  the  grantee  in  accepting  it,  but  from  the  act  of  the 
grantor  in  executing  it.  The  acceptance  of  a  conveyance  by  the 
grantee  is  presumed,  unless  it  imposes  burdens  upon  him.  The 
delivery  may  also  be  to  a  third  person  for  the  use  of  the  grantee  ; 
it  therefore  follows  that  the  efficacy  of  a  deed  does  not  depend  upon 
the  legal  capacity  of  the  grantee  to  transfer  an  estate  by  deed.^ 

157.  A  deed  to  an  infant  is  of  course  voidable  by  him  upon 
his  coming  of  age.^  If  he  repudiates  his  purchase  he  must  re- 
convey  the  land  ;  and  he  would  doubtless  be  precluded  from  repu- 
diating, and  reclaiming  the  purchase-money,  if  anything  has 
occurred  to  prevent  his  returning  the  property  in   substantially 

1  Concord  Bank  !\  Bellis,  10  Cusli.  276,  Iowa,  241,  4  Am.  Rep.  174;  Mitchell  v. 
278,  per  Shaw,  C.  J.  ;  Campbell  v.  Kuhn,  Ryan,  3  Ohio  St.  377,  386  ;  Spencer  v. 
45  Mich.  513,  40  Am.  Rep.  479  ;  Melvin  Carr,  45  N.  Y.  406,  410,  6  Am.  Rep.  112; 
V.  Proprietors  of  Locks  &  Canals,  IGPick.  Jackson  v.  Bodle,  20  Johns.  184;  Rivard 
161,  167,  38  Am.  Dec.  384.  v.    Walker,    39    111.   413;    Masterson    v. 

2  Scanlan  v.  Wrij^ht,  13  Pick.  523,  25  Cheek,  23  111.  72;  Peavey  v.  Tilton,  18 
Am.  Dec.  344  ;  Annis  v.  Wilson.  15  Colo.  N.  H.  151,  45  Am.  Dec.  365,  per  Gilchrist, 
236,  25  Pac.  Rep.  304  ;  Rivard  /•.  Walker,  J. :  "  '  While  a  man  cannot  have  an  estate 
39  III.  413 ;  Cecil  y.  Beaver,  28  Iowa,  241,  put  into  him  iu  spite  of  his  teeth,'  his 
4  Am.  Rep.  174;  Griffith  v.  Schwender-  assent  to  a  conveyance  is  a  lejral  prcsump- 
man,  27  Mo.  412.  tion  until  the  contrary  appears  " 

3  Concord  Bank  v.  Bellis  10  Cu-h.276,  *  Seanlan  v  Wri;,'ht,  13  Pick.  523,  25 
278,  per  Siiaw,  C.  J.  ;  Cecil  '•.  IJeaver.  28  Am.  Dec.  344. 

139 


$§  l.')8,  159.]        CAPACITY    OF    PKRSONS   IN    GENEKAL. 

the  same  coiulitit)!!  it  was  when  it  was  eonveyeil  to  liim.^  It  has 
been  hiid  il>wn,  liowever,  that  an  infant  cannot  recover  money 
actnally  }>aiil  by  him.- 

158.  An  infant  grantee,  by  silently  remaining  in  possession 
of  the  property  after  attaining  his  majority,  affirms  the  con- 
veyance. If  he  wishes  to  di^^affiim  the  transaction  lie  shonlcl 
yive  notice  of  his  intention  to  do  so  within  a  reasonahhi  time 
after  lie  lias  come  of  age.'^  This  rnlc  differs  from  that  which  ap- 
plies in  some  States  to  a  ratification  by  a  grantor  of  his  deed 
made  during  minority,'*  because  the  silent  acquiescence  of  such 
grantor  ordinarily  occasions  no  injury  to  other  persons,  and  se- 
cures no  benefit  to  himself;  but  a  grantee,  by  liis  silent  acquies- 
cence, obtains  an  advantage  for  himself  in  the  enjoyment  of  the 
property,  and  consequently  common  justice  imposes  upon  him  a 
duty  to  make  his  election  to  disaffirm  the  purchase  within  a 
reasonable  time.^  If  an  infant  makes  an  exchange  of  land,  and 
after  attaining  full  age  continues  to  occupy  the  lands  taken  in 
exchange,  he  affirms  the  exchange.^ 

159.  An  insane  person  is  capable  of  taking  title  by  deed.'' 
Although  he  may  be  incapable  of  making  an  intelligent  accept- 
ance of  the  deed,  if  the  conveyance  is  beneficial  to  him  his  ac- 
ceptance may  be  presumed ;  and  a  good  delivery  may  always  be 
made  to  a  third  person  for  the  use  of  such  grantee.  If  the  deed 
imposes  a  liability  or  obligation  upon  the  grantee,  there  is  no 
presumption  of  acceptance  by  him.  His  purchase  is  of  course 
voidable  by  him  upon  liis  recovery  of  a  sound  mind  ;  and  it  is 
voidable   by  his  heirs   after  his  death,  or  by  his  guardian  during 

1  5  Bythewood's  Precedents,  4tli  ed.  89,  r.  Barrett,  4   M'Cord,  241,   17  Am.  Dec. 

citing  Blackburn  v.  Smith,  2  Exch.  783.  735  ;  Cuilis  r.  Day,   38  Wis.    643  ;  Kline 

-  Wilson  V.  Kearse,  2  Pcake  N.  P.  C.  v.   Beebe,    6    Conn.    494 ;    Middleton    v. 

196;  Ex  parte  Taylor,  8  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  Hoge,  5  Bush,  478;  Hook  v.  Donaldson, 

254.  9  Lea,  56  ;  Ellis  v.  Alford,  64  Miss.    8,  1 

3  Boyden  y.  Boyden,  9  Met.  519;   Hub-  So.    Rep.    155;    Johnston   v.  Furnier,   69 

bard   v.   Cummings,    1    Me.   11;  Dana  v.  Pa.  St.  449. 

Coombs,  6   Me.  89,   19   Am.    Dec.    194;  "  §  27. 

Boodyr.  McKenny,  23  Me.  517;  Hastings  ^  Boody  i-.  McKenny,  23  Me.  517,  per 

V.  Dollarhide,  24   Cal.  195,  216,  per  Shaf-  She].ley,  J. 

ter,  J. ;  Baxter  v.  Bush,  29  Vt.  465,   70  6  Ellis  v.  Alford,  64  Miss.  8,  1  So.  Rep. 

Am.  Dec.  429;  Robbins  v.  Eaton,  10  N.  155. 

H.  561 ;    Henry  v.  Root,  33  N.  Y.   526 ;  ^  Campbell  v.  Kuhn,  45    Mich.  513,  8 

Walsh  V.  Powers,  43  N.  Y.  23,  3  Am.  Rep.  N.  W.  Rep.  523,  40  Am.  Rep.  479  ;  Con- 

654;  Dewey  «.  Burbank,  77  N.  C.  2.59;  cord  Bank    v.   Bellis,    10  Cush.   276,  per 

Baker  v.  Kennett,  54  Mo.  82 ;  Cheshire  Shaw,  C.  J. 

140 


CAPACITY    OF   PERSONS   IX   GENERAL.        [§§  160,  161. 

his  lifetime.  He  miiy  also  eonfirin  his  purchase  after  he  has  been 
restored  to  his  right  mental  condition,  and  then  neither  he  nor 
his  heirs  would  afterwards  be  able  to  avoid  it.^ 

160.  At  common  law  a  married  woman  could  take  a  con- 
veyance as  grantee  without-  her  husband's  consent,  though  the 
liusband  might  avoid  it  by  some  act  declaring  his  dissent,  and  the 
wife,  after  her  husband's  death,  could  avoid  it.^  But  under  the 
modern  statutes,  which  in  general  confer  upon  a  married  woman 
the  same  rights  in  regard  to  her  property  that  she  would  have 
were  she  not  married,  save  only  that  in  making  conveyances  of 
her  property  her  husband  must  join  in  them,  her  husband's  assent 
to  her  purchase  of  land  is  not  requisite  to  make  the  conveyance 
indefeasible  either  by  her  husband  or  by  herself. 

161.  Persons  holding  property  in  a  fiduciary  character  are 
not  competent  to  purchase  it,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  This 
rule  is  of  wide  application.  It  applies  not  only  to  persons  who 
are  strictly  trustees,  but  also  to  agents,  confidential  advisers, 
partners,  directors  and  promoters  of  corporations,  mortgagees 
with  a  power  of  sale,  and  all  persons  "  who,  by  being  employed  or 
concerned  in  the  affairs  of  another,  have  acquired  a  knowledge  of 
his  propert}'."  ^ 

The  cestui  que  trust  can  insist  upon  a  reconveyance  from  the 
purchasing  trustee,  or  from  a  third  person  who  purchased  with 
knowledge  of  the  trustee's  sale  for  his  own  benefit.  If  the  cestui 
que  trust  has  received  the  proceeds  of  such  sale,  he  must,  in  the 
first  place,  return  the  money  so  received  with  interest.^  If  the 
purchasing  trustee  has  made  permanent  improvements,  where 
there  has  been  no  actual  fraud  he  will  be  allowed  for  such  expen- 
ditures as  have  been  of  substantial  benefit  to  the  property.     If 

^  Steed  t'.  Galley,  1   Keen,  620;  Bever-  relation    that,   while   it   continues,   confi- 

ley's  Case,  4  Coke,  123  6.  dence  is  necessarily  reposed  by  one,  and 

■■^  2   Kent  Com.  150;  Nichoil  v.  Jones,  the   influence  which  naturally   giows  out 

\j.  U.  3  Eq.  696  ;  Field  v.  Moore,  19  Beav.  of  that  confidence  is  possessed  by  the  other, 

176  ;  Emery  v.  Wase,  5  Vcs.  848  ;  Granby  and  tl'is  confidence  is  abused,  or  tlie  influ- 

V.   Allen,   1    Ld.   Raym.  'J24 ;  Scanlan   v.  ence  is  e.xerted  to  obtain  an  advantajre  at 

Wri<,rlit,  13   Pick.  523,  530,  25  Am.  Dec.  the  expense  of  tiie    coufidini;  party,   the 

344  ;  Baxter  v.  Smith,  6  Binn.  427.  person  so  availinjj  himself  of  his  ])o-ition 

•^  Suf^den   Vend.   &  Pur.  688  ;   1    Perry  will  not  be  permitted  to  retain  the  advan- 

on  Trusts.  §195;   5    Bythewood's   Prece-  ta{?e,  although   the   transaction   could  not 

dents,  4th  ed.  95;  Ex  parte  James,  8  Ves.  have   been  impeached  if  no  such  confiden- 

337  ;  Tate    c.    Williamson,    L.    H.  2   Ch.  tial  relation  had  exi.-ted." 

55.     In   this  case  Lord  Chelmsford  said  :  *  Ex   parte  James,    8    Ves.    .337,    351  ; 

"  Wherever  two  persons  stand  in  such  a  Morse  v.  Hill,  136  Mass.  60,  64. 

141 


§  1(>2.]  CAPACITY    OF   I'KKSOXlS   IN    GKNERAL. 

the  I'rstiii  (jKc  trust  does  not  wish  for  a  reconveyance,  the  property 
can  be  jiut  up  for  sale,  either  absohitely  or  at  a  niinimiini  [)rice. 
If  the  purchasing  trustee  has  sold  the  property,  he  can  be  held 
to  account  as  trustee  for  the  price  received.  If  thi^  pro})erty 
remains  unsold  in  his  hands,  the  cestui  que  trust,  if  he  so  elect, 
can  Compel  hira  to  account  for  its  actual  value  at  the  time  of  the 
purchase.^ 

162.  The  trustee  may  purchase  from  his  cestui  que  trust,  or 
with  his  full  knowledge  and  consent.  "  He  may,  if  he  pleases," 
says  Lord  Eldon,-  "  retire  from  being  a  trustee,  and  divest  him- 
self of  that  character,  in  order  to  qualify  himself  to  become  a 
purchaser;  and  so  he  may  purchase,  not  indeed  from  himself  as 
trustee,  but  under  a  specific  contract  with  his  cestui  que  trust. 
But,  while  he  continues  to  be  a  tiustee,  he  cannot,  witliout  the 
express  authority  of  his  cestui  que  trust,  have  anything  to  do 
with  the  trust  property  as  a  purchaser." 

The  prohibition  is,  that  the  trustee  shall  not  buy  from  himself, 
using  for  his  own  advantage  the  information  about  the  property 
acquired  by  him  in  his  trust  capacity.^  It  is  t  ssential,  however, 
to  the  validity  of  a  purchase  by  a  trustee  from  his  cestui  que  trust, 
that  there  should  be  "•  no  fraud,  no  concealment,  no  advantage 
taken  by  the  trustee  of  the  information  acquii'ed  by  him  in  the 
character  of  a  trustee."*  The  burden  of  proof  lies  on  the  trustee 
to  establish  the  propriety  of  the  transaction,  and  to  show  that  he 
has  acted  fairly  and  openly  in  dealing  with  his  cestui  que  trust.^ 

A  purchase  by  a  trustee  may  be  confirmed  bj'  the  person  bene- 
ficially interested  under  the  trust,  either  expressly  or  by  implica- 
tion, provided  the  confirmation  was  made  with  full  knowledge  of 
the  facts  of  the  case,  and  especially  with  knowledge  that  the  trus- 
tee had  purchased  and  that  his  purchase  was  improper.^  A  pur- 
chase by  a  trustee  can  be  set  aside  only  at  the  option  or  for  the 
benefit  of  the  cestui  que  trust.  The  trustee  himself  cannot  repu- 
diate his  own  purchase." 

1  1  Perry  on  Trusts,  §  197  ;  Ex  parte  *  Lord  Eldon  in  Coles  v.  Trecothick,  9 
Hughes,  6  Ves.  617;  Morse  v.  Hill,  136  Ves.  234,  246;  Randall  v.  Errington,  10 
Mass.  60,  64,  per  Field,  J.  Ves.   423 ;  Denton  v.   Donner,  23   Beav. 

2  Downes  v.   Grazebrook,  3  Mer.  200,  285;  Tate  v.  Williamson,  L.  R.  2  Cii.  55. 
208.  6  Luff  V.  Lord,  34  Beav.  220 ;  Wlielp- 

3  1  Perry  on  Trusts,  §   195  ;    Coles  v.  dale  v.  Cookson,  1  Ves.  Sen.  9. 
Trecothick,  9  Ves.  2.34  ;  Ex  parte  Lacey,  6  e  Charter  v.  Trevelyan,  11  CI.  &  F.  714; 
Ves.  625  ;  Clark  v.  Swaile,  2  Eden,  134.  Barwell  v.  Barwell,  34  Beav.  371. 

142  ■  Perry  on  Trusts,  §  198. 


CHAPTER  XL 

CAPACITY   OF    ALIENS    AS    PURCHASERS. 

163.  At  common  law,  aliens  could  not  acquire  and  hold 
land  by  a  secure  title.  The  crown  or  the  state  could  ciaim  land 
held  by  them  or  for  their  benefit.^  Coke  says  :  "  If  an  alien, 
Christian  or  infidel,  purchase  houses,  lands,  tenements,  or  here- 
ditaments to  him  and  his  heirs,  albeit  he  can  have  no  heirs,  yet  he 
is  of  capacity  to  take  a  fee  simple,  but  not  to  hold.  For  upon  an 
office  found,  the  king  shall  have  it  by  his  prerogative  of  whom- 
soever the  land  is  holden.  And  so  it  is,  if  the  alien  doth  pur- 
chase land  and  die,  the  law  doth  cast  the  freehold  and  inheritance 
upon  the  king.  If  an  alien  purchase  any  estate  of  freehold  in 
houses,  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments,  the  king  upon  office 
found  shall  have  them."^ 

In  England  exceptions  to  this  rule  were  made  by  statute,  until 
in  1870  it  was  provided  that  all  property  may  be  acquired,  held, 
and  disposed  of  by  aliens  in  the  same  manner  as  by  natural-born 
British  subjects.'^  In  this  country  the  disability  of  alienage  is 
now  in  many  States  wholly  reuioved,  so  that  aliens,  whether  resi- 
dents or  not,  may  take  and  hold  real  property  by  purchase  or 
otherwise,  and  dispose  of  the  same,  in  like  manner  as  can  citizens 
of  the  United  States.  In  other  States  the  disability  is  limited  or 
restricted.* 

1  Barrow  v.  Wadkin,  24  Beav.  1  ;  Sharp  Territory :  Act  of  Congress,  March  3, 
V.  St.  Sauveur,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  343;  Dunion-  1887,  applies.  Alien.s  may  inherit  in  >|ie- 
cel  V.  Duinoucel,  13  Ir.  Eq.  92;  Norris  v.  cial  eases.  R.  S.  1887,  §  1472.  Arkansas: 
Hoyt,  18  Cal.  217;  Farrell  r.  Enright,  12  Dig.  of  Stats.  1884,  §  233.  California: 
Cal.  450.  Civ.  Code,  §  671  ;  Estate  of  Billings,  65  Cal. 

2  1  Co.  Litt.  2  h.  593,  4  Pac.  Itep.  639.     Colorado  :  If  bo'ia 

*  33  Vict.  ch.  14.  Jide  residents.     Const.  1876,  art.  2,   §   27. 

*  The  constitutional  or  statutory  pro-  See  McConville  v.  Howell,  17  Fed.  Kep. 
visions  of  those  States  in  which  the  dis-  104.  Connecticut:  If  residents  of  any  of 
ability  is  wholly  removed  are  merely  re-  the  United  States,  or  citizens  of  France, 
ferred  to,  and  the  restrictions  in  otliei-  so  long  as  France  shall  accord  the  same 
States  arc  briefly  and  ])artially  stated,  privilege  to  citizens  of  the  United  State.') 
Alabama;  Code    1886,   §    1914.     Arizona  Non-resident  aliens  mav  acquire  and  hold 

148 


§  103.] 


CAPACIIY    OF    ALIENS    AS    rURCHASERS. 


Hv  act  of  Congress  it  is  prov'ulcd  that  it  shall   bo  unlaAvrul   for 
auv  luMsoii   or  persons  not  citizens  of  the  l^nitid  Stati's,  or  who 


liiiitl  for  miniiii:  or  <iuarryiiij?  purposes 
only.  G.  S.  1SS8,  §§  15-17.  Delaware: 
If  resilient,  jiiul  liave  inade  declaration  of 
iiueiitiou  to  become  citizens  of  the  Uuitetl 
States.  K.  Code  1893,  ch.  81,  §  1,  p.  617. 
All  conveyances  to  aliens  before  Feb.  1, 
1693,  validated.  Laws  1893,  vol.  19,  cli. 
709.  Florida:  11.  S.  1892,  §  181G.  Geor- 
gia: Code  1882,  §  1661.  Idaho:  K.  S. 
1887,  §  2827.  By  Laws  of  1891,  p.  108, 
aliens  are  proliibited  from  acquiring  or 
holding  real  estate  other  than  niiueral 
lands.  Illinois  :  If  residents  of  the  United 
States,  and  have  declared  their  intention 
to  become  citi/x-ns.  Heirs  of  aliens  may 
take  by  iulieritance,  provided  they  become 
residents  within  a  limited  time.  Corpora- 
tions organized  under  the  laws  of  any 
foreign  country  cannot  acquire  or  hold 
real  property.  U.S.  1889,  ch.  6;  Laws 
1891,  p.  3.  Prior  to  July  1,  1887,  aliens 
had  the  same  rights  as  citizens  to  hold 
property.  Indiana:  Provided  they  are 
bona  fide  residents  of  the  United  States. 
Acts  1885,  p.  79;  K.  S.  1894,  §  3328; 
Murray  v.  Kelly,  27  Ind.  42.  An  Indian 
who  is  a  bonajide  resident  of  the  United 
States,  though  not  a  citizen,  may  convey 
real  estate.  Parent  v.  Walmsly,  20  Ind. 
82  ;  Steeple  v.  Downing,  60  Ind.  478.  In- 
dian Territory :  Act  of  Congress  March  3, 
1887,  applies.  Kansas  :  The  Constitution 
provides  that  the  rights  of  aliens  in  refer- 
ence to  the  purchase  of  property  may  be 
regulated  by  law.  Adopted  1888.  The 
Laws  of  1891,  ch.  iii.,  provide  that  non- 
resident aliens  shall  not  acquire  or  hold 
lauds  by  purchase  or  otherwise,  except 
that  the  heirs  of  aliens  may  hold  for  a 
limited  period.  No  corporation,  more  than 
twenty  per  centum  of  the  stock  of  which 
is  owned  by  persons  not  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  shall  hold  any  real  estate. 
See  Buffington  v.  Grosvenor,  46  Kans. 
7.30,27  Pac.  Rep.  137.  Kentucky:  Comp. 
Stats.  1894,  §§  3.34-339.  By  the  common 
law,  aliens  cannot  inherit.  This  law  is  iii 
force  in   Kentuckv,   though  modified    by 

144 


statute.  White  v.  White,  2  Met.  185; 
Kustaehe  r.  Rodiiquesf,  11  Bu.sli,  42. 
Louisiana:  Aliens  have  the  same  rights 
as  citizens  to  hold  and  trimsmit  jirop- 
erty.  Maine:  U.  S.  1883,  ch.  73,  §  2. 
Maryland  :  If  not  etsemics.  Pub.  G.  L. 
188S,  art.  3,  p.  9.  Massachusetts:  P.  S. 
1882,  ch.  126.  Michigan:  2  Annot.  Stat. 
1882,  §  5775.  Minnesota:  Persons  not 
citizens,  and  who  have  not  declared  their 
intention  to  become  such,  and  corjjora- 
tions  not  created  under  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  or  any  State  thereof,  caimot 
hold  real  estate,  except  actual  settlers 
upon  farms  of  not  more  than  one  hundred 
and  sixty  acres,  or  not  exceeding  six  lots 
of  fifty  feet  frontage  by  three  hundred 
feet  in  depth  each.  G.  S.  1878,  ch.  7.5, 
§  41;  Laws  1887,  p.  323;  Laws  1889.  p. 
210.  Mississippi :  If  resident.  Code  1892, 
§  2439.  Missouri:  1  R.  S.  1889,  §  183. 
An  alien  may  take  by  descent  from  an 
alien.  Burke  v.  Adams,  80  Mo.  504. 
Montana  :  If  resident,  may  take  by  descent 
or  succession,  as  citizens.  Prob.  Prac.  Act, 
§  553.  Nebraska:  If  resident.  Const. 
1875,  art.  1,  §  25;  Laws  1889,  ji.  483. 
Non-resident  aliei^s,  and  corporations  not 
organized  under  the  laws  of  the  State, 
are  prohibited  from  acquiring  title  to  lands 
by  descent,  devise,  purchase,  or  other- 
wise. There  are  exceptions  in  favor  of 
the  widow  and  heirs  of  aliens.  Consol. 
Stats.  1891, §§  4396-4399.  Nevada:  G.S. 
1885,  §  2655.  See  Const,  art.  1,  §  16; 
State  V.  Preble,  18  Nev.  251,  2  Pac.  Rep. 
754.  New  Hampshire  :  If  resident.  P.  S. 
1891,  ch.  137,  §§  16,  17.  New  Jersey: 
R.  S.  1877,  p.  6.  New  York:  If  they  de- 
pose that  they  are  resident  of, and  always 
intend  to  reside  in,  the  United  States,  and 
to  become  citizens  thereof.  4  R.  S.  1889, 
pp.  2420,  2425.  Non-resident  aliens  may 
inherit  from  citizens.  LawS  1893,  ch.  207. 
Heirs  and  devisees  of  aliens  may  inherit; 
but  the  title  of  an  alien  male  heir  of  full 
age  is  defeasible  by  the  State  unless  he 
makes  and  files  tlie  deposition  required  as 


CAPACITY    OF    ALIENS   AS   PURCHASERS. 


[§  163. 


have  not  lawfully  declared  their  intention  to  become  such  citizens, 
or  for  any  corporation  not  created  by  or  under  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  or  of  some  State  or  Territory  of  the  United  States, 
to  hereafter  acquire,  hold,  or  own  real  estate  so  hereafter  acquired, 
or  any  interest  therein,  in  any  of  the  Territories  of  the  United 
States  or  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  except  such  as  may  be 
acquired  by  inheritance,  or  in  gocjd  faith  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  justice  in  the  collection  of  debts  heretofore  created.  This  pro- 
hibition does  not  apply  to  cases  in  which  tlie  right  to  hold  or  dis- 
pose of  lands  is  secured  by  existing  treaties  to  the  citizens  of  for- 
eign Countries.  No  corporation  or  association,  more  than  twenty 
per  centum  of  the  stock  of  which  is  or  may  be  owned  by  any  per- 
son or  persons,  corporation  or  corporations,  association  or  associa- 


above.  4  R.  S.  jj.  2426  ;  Kilfoy  r.  Powers, 
3  Den)arest.  198.  As  to  riy:hts  of  alien 
heirs,  see  Ettenheimer  v.  HLffernati,  66 
Barh.  374;  Ma}nar(l  '•.  Mnyii;ir(l,36  Hun, 
227;  Kull  V.  Kiill,  37  Hun,  476.  North 
Carolina:  Coile  1883,  eh.  2.  North  Da- 
kota: Civ.  Code  Dakota,  §  2686  of 
Conip.  Laws  1887.  Ohio:  li.  S.  1890, 
§  41 73.  Oklahoma  Territory :  Act  of  Con- 
gress March  3,  1887,  applies.  Oregon: 
2  Annot.  Laws  1892,  §  2988.  Pennsyl- 
vania: If  not  enemies,  and  are  resident 
of  the  State  and  have  declared  their  in- 
tention to  become  citizens,  aliens  may 
purchase  lands  not  exceediiijj  in  quantity 
five  thousand  acres,  nor  in  net  annual  in- 
come twenty  thousand  dollars.  1  Bright- 
ly's  I'urdon's  Dig.  1894,  p.  91.  Rhode 
Island:  P.  S.  1882,  ch.  172,  §  6.  South 
Carolina:  G.  S.  1882,  §  1768.  South  Da- 
kota: Laws  1890,  ch.  123.  Tennessee: 
Act  of  Feb.  11,  1875  ;  Code  1884,  §  2804  ; 
Baker  v.  Shy,  9  Heisk.  85 ;  Einmett  v. 
Emmett,  14  Lea,  369.  Texas  :  Aliens  who 
arc  inhabitants  of  the  State  may  acquire 
and  hold  land.s  during  residence,  with 
ri^ht  to  alienate  the  same  within  ten  years 
after  ceasing  to  be  an  inhabitant.  This 
restriction  does  not  apj)ly  to  persons  hold- 
ing lan<l  in  any  incorporated  or  platted 
city,  town,  or  village.  Act  of  April  12, 
1892  ;  Laws  1892,  pp.  6,  7.  Utah:  Act  of 
Congress  of  March  3,  1887,  applies.  Ver- 
mont: There  is  no  constitutional  orstatu- 

VUL.    I. 


tory  provision  on  the  subject,  and  none  for 
declaring  a  forfeiture  for  alienage.  In 
Stale  V.  Boston,  &c.  11.  Co.  25  Vt.  433,  the 
court  say  that  such  forfeiture  is  a  possible 
right  of  sovereignty,  but  one  that  has  al- 
ways remained  dormant.  Virginia  :  Code 
1873,  §  43.  Washington  :  If  they  have  de- 
clared their  intention  to  become  citizens  of 
the  United  States.  This  restriction  does 
not  apply  to  lands  containing  mines  or  min- 
erals. A  corporation,  a  majority  of  whose 
stock  is  held  by  aliens,  is  considered  an 
alien  within  this  ])rovision.  Const,  art. 
11,  §  33;  1  G.  S.  1891,  §  2955.  West 
Virginia:  Not  enemies.  Const,  art.  11, 
§  5;  Acts  1882,  ch.  56;  Code  1891,  p. 
632.  Wisconsin  :  Non-resident  aliens  can- 
not acquire  by  ])urchase  more  than  three 
hundred  and  twenty  acres.  Tliis  restric- 
tion api)lies  to  corporations  of  which  more 
than  twenty  ))ercent.  of  the  stock  is  owned 
by  non-residents  of  the  United  States.  1 
Annot.  Stats.  1889,  §  2200a.  Wyoming: 
No  distinction  between  resident  aliens  and 
citizens  as  to  the  possession  and  descent  of 
property.     Const.  1889,  art.  1,  §  29. 

In  England  the  disabilities  of  alienage 
were  removed  by  statute  May  12,  1870,  34 
Vict.  ch.  14,  §  2,  which  provides  that  real 
and  personal  property  of  every  description 
may  be  taken,  acquired,  held,  and  disposed 
of  by  an  alien  in  the  same  manner  in  all 
respects  as  by  a  natural-born  British  sub- 
ject. 

145 


§§   lt>4,  1G5.]       CAPACMY    OF    AI.IKNS    AS    I'UHCHASKKS. 

tions,  not.  citizens  of  tlie  United  St:ites,  shall  hereafter  acquire 
or  hold  or  own  any  real  estate  hereafter  acquired  in  any  of  the 
Territories  of  the  United  States  or  of  the  District,  of  Colunil>ia.^ 

164.  A  constitutional  provision  that  aliens  shall  have  cer- 
tain rights  in  regard  to  property  does  not  inhibit  legislation 
conferring  greater  rights.  Thus  a  constitutional  [irovision,  giv- 
ing bona  fide  resident  aliens  the  same  rights  as  to  the  possession 
and  inheritance  of  property  as  native-born  citizens  have,  is  a  limi- 
tation of  tiie  legislative  power,  so  that  these  rights  could  not  be 
denied  by  the  legislature  ;  but  it  does  not  prevent  the  legislature 
from  conferring  additional  rights  and  privileges  upon  aliens .2 

A  legislative  grant  of  land  by  the  United  States  or  by  a  State 
to  an  alien  would  doubtless  confer  the  power  to  enjoy  and  trans- 
mit it,  but  this  rule  does  not  hold  good  as  to  patents  issued  by 
ministerial  officers  upon  ordinary  purchases  by  an  alien  of  the 
]-)ublic  domain.-'^ 

165,  As  affected  by  treaties.  —  The  title  to  real  property  is 
acquired,  held,  and  passed  according  to  the  lex  rei  sitce.  This 
principle  is  applicable  not  only  as  between  countries  entirely  for- 
eign to  each  other,  but  also  to  the  States  of  the  American  Union. 
It  follows  that  the  title  of  aliens  to  land  within  the  limits  of  the 
several  States  is  a  matter  of  state  regulation.*  Under  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  treaties  made  under  its  authority 
are  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  the  treaty-making  power 
properly  extends  to  provisions  in  regard  to  the  transfer,  devise,  or 
inheritance  of  property.  Hence  a  treaty  will  control  or  suspend 
the  statute  of  any  State  which  contravenes  the  treaty  ;  and  a 
treaty  which  confers  upon  citizens  of  a  foreign  country  the  right 
to  take,  hold,  and  transfer  real  property  will  suspend  or  control 
the  laws  of  a  State  disqualifying  or  restricting  the  right  of  aliens 
in  this  respect.^ 

1  Act  March  3, 1887,24  Stats,  at  Large,  State  where  the  landis  situated.     Prince- 

pp.  476,  477.  ton  M.  Co.  ?•.  First  Nat.  Bank,  7  Mont. 

There  is  legislation  in  a  few  State.';,  also,  .530,  19  Pac.  Rep.  210. 
that  corporation.s,  whose  stock  or  a  consifi-         2  people  v.  Roger.s,  13  Cal.  159  ;  Estate 

erable  part  of  it  is  held  by  aliens,  shall  not  of  Billings,  6.5  Cal.  593,  4  Pac.  Rep.  639. 
acquire  an<l  hold  real  estate.     Aside  from         ^  Etheridge  v.  Doe,  18  Ala.  565. 
such  legislation,  the  fact  that  such  stock         *  Wunderle  v.  Wunderle,   144  III.  40, 

is  held  by  aliens  does  not  invalidate  the  33   N.   E.  Rep.  195,  per   Magruder,   J. ; 

title  of  corporations  to  land  acquired  ;  and  United  States  v.  Fox,  94  U.  S.  3)5  ;  Eth- 

snch  title  could  be  questioned  only  by  the  eridge  v.  Doe,  18  Ala.  565. 

146  !i  Geofroy  v.  Riggs,   133  U.  S.  258,  10 


CAPACITY    OF   ALIENS    AS    PURCHASERS.  [§  166. 

A  state  statute  restricting  the  right  of  aliens  to  acquire  and 
hold  real  estate  is  not  invalidated  by  treaties  between  the  United 
States  and  foreign  countries,  except  in  regard  to  citizens  of  coun- 
tries who  are  by  treaty  given  the  right  of  holding  lands  in  the 
United  States.  A  treaty  -which  will  suspend  or  override  the 
statute  of  a  State  must  be  a  treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  the  government  of  the  particular  country  of  which  the  alien 
is  a  citizen  or  subject.^ 

Where  a  treaty  invests  aliens  with  an  interest  in  land,  provided 
it  is  asserted  within  a  limited  time,  or  allows  an  alien  heir  to  take 
by  inheritance  and  hold  for  a  limited  time,  such  alien  has  an  in- 
violable right  during  such  time,  but  after  its  expiration  the  state 
law  comes  into  force  and  controls  the  disposition  to  be  made  of 
such  land.'-^ 

166.  The  comraon  law  made  a  distinction  between  the  dis- 
ability of  an  alien  to  take  by  purchase  and  his  disability  to 
take  by  inheritance;  for,  while  an  alien  could  acquire  a  defeas- 
ible title  to  land  by  devise  or  deed,  he  could  take  no  title  what- 
ever by  mere  operation  of  law,  as  by  descent,  by  right  of  curtesy, 
or  by  right  of  dower.*^ 

The  title  which  an  alien  acquired  by  purchase  or  devise  he 
could  hold  until  office  found,  and  he  could,  until  such  proceedings 
were  taken,  convey  the  land  and  confer  title  upon  a  purchaser.* 
If  the  alien  dies  without  having  made  a  conveyance,  the  land  vests 

Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  295;    Hauenstein  v.  Lyn-  14  Lea,  369,  371  ;  Smith  u.  Zaner,  4  Ala. 

ham,  100  U.  S.  483;  Ware  v.   Hyltou,  3  99;  Montgomery  v.  Dorion,  7  N.  H.  475; 

Dall.   199;  Chirac   v.  Chirac,    2    Wlieat.  People  w.  Conklin,  2  Hill,  67 ;  Wadsworth 

259;     Orr  v.   Hodgson,   4    Wheat.   453;  v.   Wadsworth,   12  N.  Y.  376;    State  v. 

Hughes  V.  Edwards,  9  Wheat.  489;  Kull  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  25  Vt.  433;  McCIeua- 

V.  Kull,  37  Hun,  476;  Wuuderle  v.  Wun-  ghan  v.  McClenaghan,  1   Strob.  Ecj.  295, 

derle,  144  111.  40,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  195;  Jo.st  47  Am.  Dec.  532;  Laurens  v.  Jenney,  1 

V.  Jost,  1  Mackey,  487.  Speer,  356;  Norris  v.  Hoyt,  18  Cal.  217; 

1  Wunderle  v.    Wunderle,   144    111.  40,  Elmendorff  v.  Carmichael,  3  Litt.  472,  14 
33  N.  E.  Rep.  195.  Am.  Dec.  86;  Yeaker   v.  Yeaker,  4   Met. 

2  Schultze  V.  Schiiltzc,  144  111.  290,  -33  (Ky.)  33,  81  Am.  Dec.  .5.30. 

N.   E.  Rep.  201,  36  Am.  St.   Rep.   432;         ■*  Sheaffe  r.  O'Ncil,  1  Mass.  256  ;  Mont- 

Yeaker  v.  Yeaker,  4   Met.   (Ky.)  33,  81  gomery  v.  Dorion,  7  N.  H.  475 ;  Hnlstoad 

Am.  Dec.  5.30  and  note.  v.    Lake   Co.    56    Ind.   363;  Marshall   v. 

3  Fairfax   v.   Hunter,  7    Cranch,    603;  Conrad,  5  Call,  364;    Foxwell    v.   Crad- 
Slater  v.  Nason,  15   Tick.  345;   Sheaffe  v.  dock,  1  Pat.  &  II.  250. 

O'Ncil,    1    Mass.   256;  Foss   v.   Cii,'*p,    20  Rut  an  alien  can  convey  only  a  defeasi- 

Pick.   121;  Ilarley  ^^  State,  40  Ala.  689  ;  ble  title.     Purczcll  y.  Smidt,  21  Iowa,  540; 

Sutliff  V.  Forgey,  1  Cow.  89;  Jackson  v.  Harley  i'.  State,  40  Ala.  689. 
Green,  7  Wend.  333 ;  Emmett  v.  Emmett, 

147 


§  167.] 


CAPACITY    OF    ALIENS   AS   PURCHASERS. 


iiunu'diutely  by   escheat    iu    the   Slate    without    any    inquest   of 
orti.-e.i 

167.  Statutes  restricting  or  denying  the  right  of  aliens  to 
bold  real  property  can  be  enforced  only  by  a  direct  proceed- 
ing by  the  attorney-general  to  enforce;  a  forfeiture.  An  ahen's 
right  to  hold  land  cannot  be  questioned  by  an  individual  in  any 
colhiteral  action.  It  is  a  matter  between  the  Slate  or  supreme 
authority  and  the  alien.^  Until  office  found,  or  an  offi(;ial  nscer- 
tainnient  of  alienage  and  a  judgment  of  forfeiture,  an  alien  may 


1  Craue  v.  Keeder,  21  Mich.  24,  4  Am. 
Kep.  430;  Sands  v.  Lyiihani,  27  Gratt. 
291,  21  Am.  Rep.  348;  Moutgomery  v. 
Doiion,  7  N.  H.  475 ;  Mooers  v.  White,  6 
Johns.  Ch.  360,  366,  Kent,  Chancellor, 
saying  :  "  No  one  can  take  by  inheritance 
when  he  must  deduce  his  title  through 
an  alien  who  has  no  inheritable  blood ; 
and  upon  the  death  of  the  alien  the  land 
instantly  and  of  necessity,  without  any 
inquest  of  office,  escheats  to  the  people." 
Wilbur  V.  Tobey,  16  Pick.  177, 180,  Shaw, 
C.  J.,  saying :  "  An  alien  cannot  take  by 
act  of  law,  as  descent,  because  the  law  will 
be  deemed  to  do  nothing  in  vain,  and  there- 
fore it  will  not  cast  the  descent  upon  one 
who  cannot  by  law  hold  the  estate.  Ui^on 
the  decease  of  an  alien,  therefore,  as  he 
l\as  no  inheritable  blood,  he  can  have  no 
legal  heirs,  and  no  one  can  hold  or  take 
the  estate  by  descent;  the  law  will  not 
deem  it  to  be  in  abeyance,  unless  in  case 
of  absolute  necessity,  and,  therefore,  the 
fee  is  deemed  to  vest  in  the  common- 
wealth presently.  The  commonwealth, 
therefore,  upon  the  fact  of  the  seisin, 
alienage,  and  death  of  the  intestate  being 
shown,  have  a  complete  title,  without  in- 
quest of  office." 

In  State  v.  Boston,  C.  &  xM.  R.  Co.  25 
Vt.  433,  438,  Redfield,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  The 
escheat  of  estates  to  the  sovereign,  in 
consequence  of  a  conveyance  to  an  alien, 
is  a  result  of  purely  feudal  characier.  It 
was  80  held  because  an  alien,  owing  a  for- 
eign allegiance,  was  regarded  as  incapable 
of  performing  the  feudal  military  services 
to  the  king  as  lord  paramount  of  all  the 
land   in    the   realm.     Hence,   the  convey- 

148 


ance  having  carried  the  title  out  of  the 
former  proprietor,  and  the  grantee  being 
incapable  of  taking  the  estate,  it  was  held 
to  vest  in  the  king  absolutely  at  the  death 
of  the  first  grantee,  as  an  alien  could  have 
no  heirs  to  be  invested  with  his  bare  pos- 
session, which  was  all  the  estate  which 
ever  existed  in  him,  and  which  was  always 
liable  to  be  divested  at  any  moment  upon 
office  found,  as  it  was  termed." 

^  Phillips  V.  Moore,  100  U.  S.  208;  Os- 
terman  v.  Baldwin,  6  Wall.  116  ;  Cro.-s  v. 
DeValle,  1  Wall.  1,  1  Cliff.  282;  Gover- 
neur  ;;.  Robertson,  11  Wheat.  332;  Ilam- 
mekin  v.  Clayton,  2  Woods,  336 ;  Johnson 
V.  Elkins,  1  D.  C.  App.  430;  Ferguson  v. 
Neville,  61  Cal.  356;  Merle  r.  Mathews, 
26  Cal.  455;  Racouillat  v.  Sansevain,  32 
Cal.  376;  Hamires  v.  Kent,  2  Cal.  558; 
Norris  v.  Hoyt,  18  Cal.  217;  Mooers  v. 
White,  6  Johns.  Ch.  360;  Munro  v.  Mer- 
chant, 28  N.  Y.  9  ;  Stamm  v.  Bostwick,  40 
Hun,  35,  38  ;  Jackson  v.  Adams,  7  Wend. 
367 ;  Maynard  v.  Maynard,  36  Hun,  227  ; 
Marx  V.  McGlynn,  88  N.  Y.  357  ;  Hall  v. 
Hall,  81  N.  Y.  130;  Elmendorff  v.  Car- 
michael,  3  Litt.  472,  14  Am.  Dec.  86  ;  Car- 
low  V.  Aultman,  28  Neb.  672,  44  N.  W. 
Rep.  873;  Baker  v.  Westcott,  73  Tex. 
129,11  S.  W.  Rep.  157;  Gray  v.  Kauff- 
man,  82  Tex.  65,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  513; 
Sands  v.  Lynham,  27  Gratt.  295,  21  Am. 
Rep.  348 ;  American  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Ten- 
nille,  87  Ga.  28,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  158,  12 
Lawyer's  Rep.  529;  Waugh  v.  Riley,  8 
Met.  290;  Scanlan  v.  Wright,  13  Pick. 
523,  25  Am.  Dec.  344 ;  Halstead  v.  Lake 
Co.  56  Ind.  363. 


CAPACITY    OF    ALIENS    AS    PURCHASERS.  [§  168. 

hold  real  estate  against  every  one,  and  even  against  the  state  or 
government.^  If  he  becomes  a  citizen,  or  otherwise  becomes  qual- 
ified to  hold  Lmd,  before  a  forfeiture  is  declared  in  favor  of  the 
state  or  government,  his  title  becomes  perfect  even  as  against  the 
state  or  government.  ^ 

Until  office  found,  an  alien  may  maintain  ejectment  or  otlier 
action  for  the  recovery  of  land  acquired  by  purchase  ;3  or  may 
maintain  a  suit  in  partition  to  have  his  interest  set  aside  in 
severalty.'^ 

An  alien  may  acquire  title  by  possession,  which,  if  continued 
long  enough  without  the  interposition  of  the  state,  will  establish 
an  indefeasible  title. ^ 

168.  Where  a  woman  who  is  an  alien  intermarries  w^ith  a 
citizen,  by  virtue  of  the  marriage  she  becomes  a  citizen,  and 
capable  of  taking  and  holding  lands,  under  a  statute  limiting  the 
right  to  acquire  and  hold  land  to  citizens.^ 

1  People  V.  Folsom,  5  Cal.  373  ;  Norris  once  in  the  state.  Heeney  r.  Brooklyn 
V.  Hoyt,  18  Cal.  217  ;  Merle  v.  Matthews,  Benev.  Soc.  33  Barb.  360;  Vaux  v.  Nes- 
26  Cal.  45.T  ;  Quigley  v.  Bird.seye,  1 1  Mont,      bit,  1  McCord  Ch.  352,  372. 

439,  28  Pac.  Rep.  741  ;  Williams  v.  Ben-  ^  Airhart    v.    Massieu,  98    U.   S.   491  ; 

nett,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  498,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  Norris  v.  Hoyt,  18  Cal.  217  ;  Bradstreet  v. 

8.56  ;  Baker  v.  Westcott,  73  Tex.  129,  134,  Oneida,  13  Wend.  546  ;  Sheaffe  v.  O'Xeil, 

II  S.  W.  Rep.  157.  1  Mass.  256  ;  Courtney  v.  Turner,  12  Nev. 

2  Osterraau  v.  Baldwin,  6  Wall.  116;  345.  C'o«?ra,  Laurens  i-.  Jenney,  1  Speer, 
Foss  V.   Crisp,   20   Pick.    121  ;   Harley   v.  356. 

State,  40  Ala.  689 ;  Jackson  v.  Green,  7  *    Schultze   v.   Schultze,    144   111.   290, 

Wend.  333  ;  People   v.  Conklin,    2    Hill,  33    N.    E.    Rep.    201,   36    Am.    St.    Rep. 

67;  Baker  v.  Westcott,  73  Tex.  129,  11  432. 

S.  W.  Rep.  157.     But  this  rule  does  not  ^  Piper  v.  Richardson.  9  Met.  155. 
apply  to  the  heirs  of  aliens,  for  upon  the  ^  Luhrs  v.  Eiraer,  80  N.  Y.  171 ;  Head- 
death  of  their  ancestor  the  estate  vests  at  man  v.  Rose,  63  Ga.  458. 

149 


CHAPTER   XII. 

CAPACITY    OF    CORPORATIONS   AS    PURCHASERS. 

I.  Restrictions    upon  domestic  corpora-  i  II.    Restrictious    upon    foreign    corpora- 
tions, 169-181.  1  tions,  182-192. 

I.  Restrictions  upon  Domestic  Corporations. 

169.  At  common  law,  the  power  to  acquire  and  hold  real 
estate  for  the  purposes  for  which  they  are  organized,  without 
restriction  or  limitation,  is  an  incident  of  all  civil  corporations.^ 
"As  to  a  corporate  capacity  to  make  contracts,  the  common  law 
never  discriminated  between  a  conti-act  for  land  and  a  contract 
for  any  other  thing.  And  no  doctrine  of  the  common  law  is 
more  clearly  and  undeniably  established  than  that  which  concedes 
to  corporations  an  inherent  or  resulting  right  to  acquire  and  hold 
titles  to  land  by  contract,  except  so  far  only  as  they  may  be  re- 
stricted by  the  objects  of  their  creation,  or  the  limitations  of  their 
chai'ters."  ^ 

If  it  is  shown  that  a  corporation  is  duly  organized  under  legis- 
lative authority,  there  is  a  presumption,  in  the  absence  of  any 
showing  to  the  contrary,  that  it  has  the  common-law  right  to 
purchase  and  hold  land,  and  that  it  is  exercising  a  proper  and 
legitimate  authority  in  acquiring  it.^ 

1  Blanchard's,  &c.  Factory  v.  Warner,  Wend.  20,  25 ;  M'Cartee  v.  Orijhan  Asy- 

1  Blatchf.  258,  277,  per  Nelson,  J.;  Old  lum  Soc.  9  Cow.  437,  462  ;  First  Baptist 

Colony  R.  Co.  v.  Evans,  6  Gray,  25,  38  ;  Church  v.  Brooklyn  F.  Ins.  Co.  19  N.  Y. 

Boston  V.  Sears,  22  Pick.  122  ;  First  Par-  305  ;  Reynolds  v.  Stark  Co.  5  Ohio,  204, 

ish  V.  Cole,  3   Pick.  232,  239,  per  Parker,  205;  Overmyer  v.  Williams,  15    Ohio,  26, 

C.  J.;  New  England  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  31  ;  State  v.  Madison,  7  Wis.  688  ;  Banks 

Robinson,   25   Ind.  536,  .541;    Thompson  v.   Poitiaux,  3  Rand.   136,  15   Am.   Dec. 

V.  Waters,  25  Mich.  214,  227,  ])er  Chris-  706;  Page  v.  Heinehcrg,  40  Vt.   81,  94 

tiancy,  C.  J. ;  Auerbach  v.  Le  Sueur  Mill  Am.  Dec.  378. 

Co.  28  Minn.  291,   41    Am.    Rep.    285;  '^  Lathrop  y.  Commercial  Bank,  8  Dana, 

Callaway  M.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Clark,  32  Mo.  114,  119,  per  Robert.son,  C.  J. 

.105  ;  Sherwood  v.  American  Bible  Soc.  4  ^  Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

Abb.  App.  Dec.  227  ;  Moss  v.  Averill,  10  117   Mo.  261,  290,  22   S.  W.   Rep.  623  ; 

N.  Y.   449,  461  ;  Spear  v.  Crawford.   14  Stockton    Sav.  Bank  v.  Staples,  98  Cal. 
150 


RESTRICTIONS    UPON   DOMESTIC    CORPORATIONS.  [§  170. 


170.  In  England,  statutes  of  mortmain  formerly  restrained 
or  prohibited  corporations  from  holding  land  without  the 
license  of  the  king.  The}'  began  with  Magna  Cliarta,  in  the 
time  of  Henry  III.,  and  continued  down  to  the  time  of  George 
II.  These  statutes  applied  .equally  to  ecclesiastical  and  to  lay 
corporations.  "  These  statutes,"  says  Chancellor  Kent,i  "  are 
known  by  the  name  of  the  statutes  of  mortmain,  and  they  ap- 
plied only  to  real  property  ;  and  were  introduced  during  the 
establishment  and  grandeur  of  the  Roman  Church  to  check  the 
ecclesiastics  from  absorbing  in  perpetuity,  in  hands  that  never 
die,  all  the  lands  of  the  kingdom,  and  thereby  withdrawing  them 
from  public  and  feudal  charges." 

Statutes  of  mortmain  have  not  been  enacted  in  this  country, 
and  the  British  statutes  were  never  assumed  to  be  in  force  in  any 
colony  or  State  with  the  exception  of  Pennsylvania;^  and  they 
were  considered  to  be  operative  there  only  because  the  charter  of 
Penn  was  understood  to  adopt  them.  The  policy  of  these  stat- 
utes was  for  a  time  partially  adopted  in  some  of  the  colonies.^ 
189,  32   Pac.    Rep.    936;    People   v.   La     the  realm,  were  unduly  withdrawn,  and 


Rue.  67  Cal.  526,  8  Pac.  Rep.  84;  Ha- 
gar  V.  Board,  47  Cal.  222 ;  Tarpey  v. 
Deseret  Salt  Co.  5  Utah,  494,  17  Pac. 
Re|..  631. 

1  2  Kent  Com.  282.  Shelford,  in  his 
treatise  on  The  Law  of  Mortmain,  p.  2, 
says  :  "  Alienation  in  mortmain,  in  mor- 
tua  manu,  is  an  alienation  of  lands  or  ten- 
ements to  any  corporation,  sole  or  aggre- 
gate, ecclesiastical  or  temporal.  But  these 
purchases  having  been  chiefly  made  by 
religious  houses,  in  consequence  whereof 
the  lands  became  perpetually  inherent  in 
one  dead  hand,  tliis  hath  occasioned  the 
general  appellation  of  mortmain  to  be  ap- 
plied to  such  alienations,  and  the  reli- 
gions houses  themselves  to  be  principally 
considered  in  forming  the  statutes  of 
mortmain.  2  Bl.  Com.  268.  Lord  Coke, 
after  inentioninic  the  conjectures  of  oth- 
ers upon  the  origin  of  the  term,  says 
that  the  true  cause  and  meaning  thereof 
was  taken  from  the  effects,  as  it  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  statute  itself  (7  ICdw.  I. 
Stat.  2,  ch.  1)  ;  that  the  services  that  were 
due  out  of  such  fees,  and  which  in  ti'c 
beginning  were  created  for  the  defence  of 


the  chief  lords  did  lose  their  escheats, 
wardships,  reliefs,  and  the  like,  so  as  the 
lands  were  said  to  come  to  dead  hands  as 
to  the  lords,  for  that  a  dead  hand  yield- 
eth  no  service.  Co.  Litt.  2  b.  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Blackstone  observes,  1  Bl.  Com.  47.5, 
that,  of  the  conjectures  offered  by  Sir  Ed- 
ward Coke,  the  one  that  seems  most  prob- 
able is,  that  these  purchases  being  usually 
made  by  ecclesiastical  bodies,  the  mem- 
bers of  which  (being  professed)  were  reck- 
oned dead  i)ersons  in  law ;  land,  therefore, 
holden  by  them,  might  with  great  pro- 
priety, be  said  to  be  held  in  mortua 
manu." 

2  2  Kent  Com.  282 ;  Lathrop  v.  Com- 
mercial Bank,  8  Dana,  114,  125,  33  Am. 
Dec.  481  ;  Potter  v.  Thornton,  7  R.  I. 
252;  Page  v.  Heirieberg,  40  Vt.  81,  94 
Am.  Dec.  378  ;  Chambers  v.  St.  Louis,  29 
Mo.  543,  575  ;  First  Parish  v.  Cole,  3 
Picis-.  232,  239,  per  Parker,  C.  J. ;  White 
i;.  Howard,  38  Conn.  342,  361  ;  Methodist 
Church  V.  Remington,  1  Watts,  218,  26 
Am.  Dec.  61  ;  -Miller  v.  Porter,  53  Pa.  St. 
292. 

•'  In    the    Province   of    Massachusetts 

151 


§171.]  CAl'ACUY    OF    COKl'OKATIONS    AS    I'L'KCllASKRS. 

171.  In  the  nature  of  mortmain  acts  are  some  of  the  restric- 
tions adopted  in  different  States  in  regard  tn  tlie  capacity  of 
various  coiporatioiis  to  acquire  and  hold  [)roperty.  Such  was 
the  foruicr  statute  of  wills  of  the  State  of  New  York,  which  pro- 
vided tliat  '"  no  devise  to  a  corporation  shall  be  valid  unless  such 
corporation  be  expressly  authorized  by  its  charter  or  by  statutt; 
to  take  by  devise."  The  Court  of  Appeals  iu  relation  to  this 
matter  said  :  "  It  is  said  we  have  no  mortmain  policy  or  statutes. 
But  this  is  Jiot  so.  The  exception  in  the  former  statute  of  wills 
was  with  us  intended  to  prevent  devises  of  real  estate  from  be- 
ing made  to  corporate  bodies,  where  it  would  be  locked  up  in 
perpetuity,  and  also  to  prevent  languishing  and  dying  persons 
from  being  imposed  upon  by  false  notions  of  duty  prompting 
them  to  disregard  the  claims  of  family  and  kindred.  The  posi- 
tive statute  we  now  have  is  still  more  distinctly  founded  in  that 
policy,  and  it  was  enacted  to  solve  the  doubts  which  great  learn- 
ing and  ingenuity  had  suggested.  It  is  a  statute  of  mortmain, 
resting  on  a  mortmain  policy,  as  distinctly  as  any  act  of  the 
British  Parliament.  The  condition  of  society  and  the  freedom 
of  religious  opinion  in  this  country  have  rendered  the  necessity  of 
still  greater  restrictions  on  the  power  of  acquiring  real  estate  by 
corporations  less  apparent  than  formerly  in  England.  lUit  the 
necessity  is  recognized  of  forbidding  the  acquisition  by  will,  unless 
the  legislature,  in  granting  the  charter,  and  in  full  view  of  the 
reasons  for  so  doing,  tliink  proper  to  confer  the  power  in  express 
terms.  The  legislative  grant  of  the  power  is  the  equivalent  to 
the  license  from  the  crown,  which,  according  to  an  act  of  Par- 
liament, might  dispense  with  the  mortmain  statutes  in  (jreat 
Britain."  ^ 

Bay  a  mortmain  act  was  passed  (Prov.  St.  part  of  a  vast  wilderness,    and  all  prop- 

of  29  Geo.   II.  ch.  9),  but  it  was  repealed  erty,  real  and  personal,  was  in  the  Indian 

directly  after  the  Revolution.     St.    178.5,  tribes  or  in  tlie  British  crown,  the  statute 

ch.  51  ;    Odell  v.   Odell,   10   Allen,   1,  6.  of  mortmain  was  not  merely  inaiiplicable, 

It  has  heen  doubted  whether  the  Enjrlish  hut  had  no  possil)le  office  to  fulfil.     If  the 

statute  of  mortmain  had  any  application  English   statute  of  mortmain  was  not  in 

at  :dl  to   the   British  colonics.     Attorney-  force  in  Wiscon.sin  while  it  was  part  of  or 

General  v.  Stewart,  2  Mer.  14.3  ;  Whicker  appendant  to  an  English  colony,  it  seems 

V.  Hume,  1    l)e  G.,  M.  &  G.  .506,  affirmed  very  certain  that  it  has  never  since  had 

7  II.  L.  Cas.  124.     The  statute  was  never  any  force  here." 

in  force  in  Wisconsin.   Dodge  v.  Williams,  i  Downing  v.  Marshall,  23  N.  Y.  3G6, 

46   Wi;;.  70,  50   N.   W.  IJep.  1103,  Ryan,  386,    80   Am.    Dec.    290,    per    Comstock, 

C.   J.,    saying  :    "  When   this    State   was  C.  J. 

152 


RESTRICTIONS    UPON    DOMESTIC    CORPORATIONS. 


[§  172. 


172.  By  general  statute  in  almost  every  State,  the  right 
of  corporations  to  acquire  and  hold  real  estate  is  expressly 
conferred.  This  right  is  generally  limited,  either  by  implication 
or  in  express  terms.  Corporations  organized  for  religious,  chari- 
table, or  educational  purposes  are  generally  much  restricted  in 
their  cjipacity  to  acquire  and  hold  real  estate.  Private  business 
corporations  in  nearly  every  State  may  acquire,  hold,  and  convey 
so  much  real  estate  as  may  be  necessary  or  proper  for  the  trans- 
action of  their  business.^     The  statutes  in  the  several  States  are 


1  Alabama :  Such  as  may  be  necessary 
for  tlicir  use.  Code  1886,  §  1664.  Ari- 
zona :  Possess  the  same  powers  as  ])rivate 
indiviiliials  as  to  acquirinjj  and  transfer- 
ring property.  R.  S.  1887,  §  233.  Arkan- 
sas: Necessary  for  their  use.  Dig.  of 
Stats.  1884,  §  973.  California:  Such  as 
the  purposes  of  corporation  may  require. 
Civ.  Code,  §  3.54.  Colorado  :  Necessaiy 
for  transaction  of  their  busiues.s.  Annot. 
Stats.  1891,  §  476.  Connecticut:  Xeces^^ary 
and  convenient.  1'.  S.  18S7,  g§  I'JOB, 
19.52.  Delaware:  May  hold  for  ihi'  ])iir- 
poses  of  tlieir  incorporation.  R.  Code 
1874,  eh.  70,  §  1.  District  of  Columbia: 
Necessary  to  carry  on  \',s  ljiisines>.  li.  S. 
1873,  §  554.  Florida  :  Such  as  purposes 
of  c(;rp()ration  require.  R.  S.  1892,  §  2121. 
Georgia :  Necessary  for  the  purpose  of 
tluir  organization.  Code  1882,  §  1679. 
Idaho  T. :  Such  as  purposes  of  corpora- 
tion require.  R.  S.  1887,  §2633.  Illinois: 
Necessary  for  their  business.  But  all  real 
estate  acquired  in  satisfaction  of  any  liabil- 
ity or  indebtedness,  unless  the  same  is  ne- 
ce.ssary  or  suitable  for  the  business  of  such 
corporation,  shall  be  offered  at  ]jub!ic  auc- 
tion at  least  once  every  year  and  sold, 
whenever  the  price  offered  is  not  less  than 
the  cbiini  upon  it;  and  if  it  is  not  solil 
within  fiv(!  years  the  State's  attorney  shall 
proceed  by  information  against  the  corpo- 
ration to  ()bt;iin  a  sale  of  such  land.  R. 
S.  1889,  eh.  32,  §  5.  lowa  :  May  acquire 
with  tlie  same,  power  as  ])rivate  imlividu- 
als.  Annot.  Code  1888,  §  1609.  Kansas: 
Such  as  purposes  of  corporation  require. 
G.  S.  18S9,  §  1 107.  Kentucky:  Shall  not 
hold   real  estate,  except  such  as  may  be 


necessary  for  carrying  on  its  legitimate 
business,  for  a  longer  period  than  five 
years,  under  penalty  of  escheat.  G.  S. 
1894,  §  567.  Louisiana:  May  hold  and 
convey  real  property.  R.  L.  1884,  §  684. 
Maine :  May  hold  and  convey  lands.  R. 
S.  1883,  ch.  46,  §  2.  Maryland:  Neces- 
sary or  proper.  Pub.  G-  L.  1888,  art.  23, 
§  53.  Massachusetts :  May  hold  such 
real  estate  as  is  necessary  for  the  purposes 
of  its  organization.  P.  S.  1882,  ch.  106, 
§  50.  Michigan:  May  hold  land  to  an 
amount  authorized  by  law  and  convey  the 
same.  Annot.  Stats.  1882,  §  4866.  A 
corporation  for  acqniriui;  and  selling  real 
estate  may  hold  such  as  may  be  necessary 
for  carrying  on  its  business,  and  may 
mortgage  and  dispose  of  the  same  with 
pleasure ;  but  such  corporation  shall  not 
hold  at  one  time  more  than  one  thousand 
acres,  and  the  title  shall  not  remain  in  the 
corporation  for  a  term,  exceeding  seven 
years.  Pub.  Acts  1891,  p.  63.  Minnesota : 
Necessary  or  convenient  for  the  purpose 
of  its  business.  G.  S.  1894,  §  2798. 
Mississippi :  Real  and  personal  property 
necessary  and  proper  for  its  purposes,  not 
exceeding  .$250,000,  though  manufactur- 
ing companies  and  banks  miiy  hold  prop- 
erty to  the  amount  of  $1,000,000.  Annot. 
Code  1892,  §  838.  "  May  take  a  lien  on  a 
larger  amount  of  property  as  security 
or  in  payment  of  a  debt,  but  shall  not 
hold  the  same  longer  than  five  years. 
§838.  Missouri:  Shall  not  hold  real  es- 
tate for  any  longer  period  than  six  years, 
except  such  as  may  be  necessary  and 
proper  for  its  legitimate  business.  Const, 
art.  12,  §  7  ;  R.  S.  1889,  §  2508.    Montana: 

158 


§  173.]  CAPACITY   OF   CORPORATIONS   AS    PURCHASERS. 

not  prooist>ly  uliko  in  terms,  some  describing  the  reul  estate  wliicli 
eorporiitions  may  hold  as  "necessary,"  otliers  as  "proper,"  or 
"•necessary  and  convenient,"  or  "required"  for  the  purposes  of 
the  incorporation  ;  but  there  is  little  if  any  difference  in  the 
nu'aning  of  these  statutes. 

173.  A    deed    to    a  corporation  ■which   is  forbidden  by  its 
charter  to  purchase  and  hold  real  estate  is  void.^    In  such  case. 


May  hold  and  convey  such  real  property 
as  its  purposes  may  require.  Com)).  Laws 
1887,  §§  447,482.  Nebraska:  Necessary 
for  legitimate  luisiuess.  Coiup.  Stats. 
1893,  ch.  1(1,  §  124.  Nevada:  Such  real 
estate  as  the  purposes  of  tlie  corj)oratiou 
require.  G.  S.  1885,  §  805.  New  Hamp- 
shire: Necessary  and  proper.  P.  S.  1891, 
eh.  14S,  §  8.  New  Jersey:  Such  as  pur- 
poses of  corporation  require.  R.  S.  1877, 
Corp.  Act,  §  1.  New  Mexico  :  May  hold, 
mortgage,  and  convey  such  as  purposes  of 
corporation  require.  Comp.  Laws,  1884, 
§  195.  New  York  :  Such  as  the  purposes 
of  tlie  corjjoration  require.  Laws  1892, 
ch.  687,  §  II.  North  Carolina  :  May  hold 
and  convey  land  not  exceeding  three  hun- 
dred acres,  or  for  longer  than  thirty  years, 
except  mining,  manufacturing,  and  water 
supjjly  companies.  Code  1883,  §  666. 
North  Dakota  :  Such  as  its  purposes  may 
require.  Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  2919.  Ohio: 
Necessary  and  convenient  for  the  objects 
of  the  incorporation.  R.  S.  1892,  §  3239. 
Oklahoma  :  Such  as  purjwses  of  the  cor- 
poration may  require.  Stats.  1893,  §  949. 
Oregon :  Necessary  and  convenient  to  carry 
into  effect  its  objct.s.  Annot.  Laws  1892, 
§3221.  Pennsylvania:  Such  as  purposes 
of  the  corijoration  require.  Briglitly's 
Purdon's  Dig.  1894,  p.  405.  Rhode  Is- 
land :  May  hold  and  convey  real  estate. 
P.  S.  1882,  cli.  152,  §  1.  South  Carolina : 
Such  as  may  be  required  for  tlieir  ]iur- 
poses.  Acts  1886,  ch.  288,  §§  22,  26. 
Sonth  Dakota  :  Shall  not  hold  any  real 
estate,  except  such  as  may  be  necessary 
and  proper  for  its  legitimsite  business. 
Const,  art.  17,  §  7.  Tennessee  :  Neces- 
sary for  the  corporate  bu-ities.-.  Code 
1884,  §   1704.     Texas:  Such  as  the  pur- 

lo4 


poses  of  the  corporation  shall  require. 
R.  Civ.  Stats.  1889,  art.  575.  Utah: 
Necessary  for  its  general  business,  but 
shall  not  engage  in  business  of  buying  and 
selling  real  estate.  Comp.  Laws  1888, 
§  2272.  Vermont :  Necessary  for  the  pur- 
poses of  the  corporation.  R.  L.  1880, 
§3282.  Virginia:  May  hold  and  grant 
real  estate.  Code  1887,  §  1068.  Washing- 
ton :  May  hold,  mortgage,  and  convey 
real  estate.  G.  S.  1891,  §  1500.  West 
Virginia :  May  hold  and  grant  real  estate. 
Code  1887,  ch.  52,  §  1.  Wisconsin:  To 
hold  real  jiroperty  to  an  amount  author- 
ized by  law.  Annot.  Stats.  1 889,  §  1 748. 
Wyoming :  May  hold  and  convey  any  real 
estate  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the 
corporation.  R.  S.  1887,  §  502.  United 
States  Territories  :  No  corporation,  other 
than  those  organized  for  the  construction 
or  operation  of  railways,  canals,  or  turn- 
pikes, shall  acquire,  hold,  or  own  more 
than  five  thousand  acres  of  land  in  any  of 
the  Territories  of  the  United  Stales;  and 
no  railroad,  canal,  or  turnpike  corporation 
shall  hereafter  acquire,  hold,  or  own  lands 
in  any  Territory  other  than  as  may  be  ne- 
cessary for  the  proper  operation  of  its  rail- 
road, canal,  or  turnpike,  except  such  lands 
as  may  have  been  granted  to  it  by  act  of 
Congress.  U.  S.  Stats.  1887,  ch.  340,  §  3. 
1  St.  Peter's,  &c.  Cong.  v.  Germain,  104 
III.  440  ;  United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  Lee, 
7;i  III.  142,  24  Am.  Rep.  236;  Stark- 
weather V.  Am.  Bible  Soc.  72  111.  50,  22 
Am.  Rep.  133  ;  Carroll  v.  East  St.  Louis,  67 
111.  568, 16  Am.  Rep.  632  ;  Fowler  v.  Scully, 
72  Pa.  St.  456, 13  Am.  Rep.  699  ;  Leazure 
V.  Ilillega.s,  7  S.  &  R.  313,  319 ;  Matthews 
V.  Skinker,  62  Mo.  329,  21  Am.  Rep.  425  ; 
Ilavward  v.  Davidson,  41  Ind.  212. 


RESTRICTIONS    UPON   DOMESTIC   CORPORATIONS.  [§  174. 

the  corporation  being  prohibited  to  take  and  hold  real  estate  for 
any  purpose,  it  would  seem  to  be  wholly  wanting  in  the  capacity 
to  take  title  under  a  deed.^ 

But  probably  the  better  view  is,  that  even  in  such  case  the  deed 
is  not  absolutely  void,  but  only  voidable  at  the  instance  of  the 
State.2  l^  jy  valid  until  assailed  by  the  sovereign  power.  Thus, 
where  a  New  York  corporation  took  a  deed  to  real  estate  in 
Pennsylvania,  where  by  statute  a  foreign  corporation  is  forbidden 
to  acquire  and  hold  real  estate,  it  was  held  that  the  deed  to  the 
corporation  was  not  void,  but  conveyed  title  to  it  under  which  it 
could  maintain  ejectment,  and  that  the  State  of  Pennsylvania 
alone  could  object  to  the  legal  capacity  of  the  corporation  to  hold 
the  land.'^ 

174.  A  mortgage  to  a  national  bank  which  is  prohibited  to 
loan  on  such  security  is  not  void  but  may  be  enforced.  A 
bank  organized  under  tlie  national  banking  act  *  is  authorized  to 
take  and  hold  a  mortgage  of  real  estate  by  way  of  security  for 
debts  previously  contracted,^  but  not  to  take  such  a  mortgage  as 
security  for  a  debt  contracted  at  the  time  or  for  future  advances. 
Such  a  mortgage  was  till  recently  regarded  as  invalid.^  There- 
fore a  mortgage  made  to  a  national  bank  by  a  customer,  as  col- 
lateral security  for  the  payment  of  all  notes  then  discounted  and 
held  by  the  bank,  "  or  for  any  other  indebtedness  now  due,  or 
that  may  hereafter  become  due,"  was  regarded  a  valid  security 
only  for  the  indebtedness  existing  when  it  was  given;  and  upon 
the  payment  of  such  indebtedness,  and  the  surrender  of  the  spe- 
cific notes  constituting  such  indebtedness,  the  mortgage  was  dis- 
charged.''     The  Supreme  Coui't  has  recently,  however,  established 

1  Angell  &  Ames  on  Corp.  §  152  ;  Gil-  &  Allen  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Xenia, 
bert  V.  Hole,  2  S.  D.  164,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  23  Ohio  St.  97  ;  Heath  v.  Second  Nat. 
1,  4  Atn.  R.  &  Corp.  Kep.  683,  per  Kel-  Bank  of  Lafayette,  70  Ind.  106;  Scofield 
lam,  v.  J.  r.  State  Nat.  Bank,  9  Neb.  316,  2  N.  W. 

2  National    Bank  ;;.  Matthews,  98  U.  S.  Kep.  888,  31  Am.  Rep.  412. 

621,   628;  Tarpey   v.  Desseret  Salt   Co.  .5  «  Kansn.s  ValleyBank  u.  Rowell,  2  Dill. 

Utah,  494,   17    Pac.   Rep.  631  ;  Missonri  371  ;  Crocker  v.  Whitney,  71   N.  Y.  161  ; 

Val.  Land  Co.  v.  Bnshnell,  11  Neb.  192,8  Fowler  v.  Scully,  72  Pa.  St.  456,  13  Am. 

N.  W.   Rep.  389  ;   Myer.s  r.  McGavock,  39  Rop,  699  ;  Ripley  v.  Harris,   3  Bi?s.   199  ; 

Neb.  84.3,  58  N.  W.  \le\K  522  ;   Russell  v.  First  Nat.  Bunk  v.  Maxfield,  83  Me.  576, 

Railway  Co.  68  Tex.  646,  5  S.  VV.  Rep.  686.  22  Atl.  Rrp.  479. 

3  Hickory  Farm  Oil  Co.  v.  Buffalo,  &c.  v  Crocker  r.  Whitney,  71  N.  Y.  161  ; 
R.  Co.  32  Fed.  Rep.  22.  Woods   >j.   People's   Nat.   Bank  of   Pittrt- 

*  June  3,  1864,  §§  8,  28.  burfrh,  83  Pa.  St.  57. 

155 


§  IT.-..] 


CArAClTV    ()!•■    CC)i;l'()KATI()NS    AS    rUHCHASERS. 


:i  (lilTi'ioiit  ;iiul  iiMre  reasonable  eoustruclion  ol'  the  prohibition  in 
the  national  banking  act  of  a  loan  made  upon  real  estate  security^ 
declaring  that,  although  such  a  loan  is  prohibited,  it  is  not  void. 
A  mortgage  taken  in  violation  of  the  prohibition  is  valid  and  may 
b(>  cMit'oreed.  Tlic  remedy  for  the  violation  is  a  forfeiture  of  the 
bank's  charter.' 

175.  The  question  whether  a  corporation  has  exceeded  its 
powers  in  acquiring  real  estate  is  generally  one  between  the 
State  and  the  corporation. "-^  The  right  of  a  corporation  to  hold 
real  estate  cannot  be  questioned  collaterally,  but  only  by  the 
State  in  a  direct  proceeding  instituted  for  the  purpose.^     Thus,  in 


1  Fortier  v.  New  Orleans  Bank,  112 
U.  S.  439,  5  Sup.  Ct.  Kep.  234  ;  National 
Bank  v.  Matthew-s,  98  U.  S.  621, 19  Alb. 
L.  J.  1.32,  18  West.  Jur.  176,  8  Cent.  L.J. 
131  ;  National  Bank  v.  Whitney,  103  U. 
S.99  ;  Swope  v.  Leffingwell,  105  U.  S.  3  ; 
Kisner  y.  Trigji,  98  U.  S.  50;  Thornton  v. 
Nat.  Exchange  Bank,  71  Mo.  221  ;  First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Elmore,  52  Iowa,  541,  3  N. 
W.  Kep.  547  ;  Wroten  r.  Armat,  31  Gratt. 
228  ;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Roberts,  9  Mont. 
323,  331,  23  Pac.  Rep.  718. 

2  Cowell  V.  Springs  Co.  100  U.  S.  55; 
National  Bank  v.  Whitney,  103  U.  S.  99; 
National  Bank  v.  Matthews,  98  U.  S.  621, 
628;  Reynolds  v.  Crawfordsville  Bank, 
112  U.  S.  405,  413,  5  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  213  ; 
Runyan  v.  Coster,  14  Pet.  122. 

California  :  Natoma  Water  &  M.  Co. 
?•.  Clarkin.  14  Cal.  544,  552;  California 
State  Tel.  Co  v.  Alta  Tel.  Co.  22  Cal. 
398.  Illinois :  Hough  v.  Cook  Co.  Land 
Co.  73  111.  23,  24  Am.  Rep.  230  ;  Alexan- 
der V.  Tolleston  Club,  1 10  111.  65  ;  Barnes 
V.  Suddard,  117  111.  237,  7  N.  E.  Rep. 
477,  13  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  7.  In- 
diana :  Baker  v.  Neff,  73  Ind.  68  ;  Hay- 
ward  V.  Davidson,  41  Ind.  212.  Iowa: 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  53 
Iowa,  101,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  842.  Missouri : 
Ragan  v.  McRIroy,  98  Mo.  349,  352,  11 
S.  W.  Rep.  735  ;  Mclndoe  );.  St.  Louis,  10 
Mo.  576;  Chambers  v.  St.  Loui«,  29  Mo. 
.543;  Shewalter  r.  Pirner,  55  Mo.  218, 
233.  Mississippi  :  Wade  v.  Am.  Col  Soc. 
7  S.  &  M.  663,  697,  45  Am.  Dec.  324. 
156 


Nevada:  Whitman  Min.  Co.  i'.  Baker,  3 
Nev.  386.  Nebraska :  Watts  v.  Gantt 
(Neb.),  61  N.  W.  Rep.  104  ;  Missouri  Val. 
Land  Co.  v.  Bushnell,  11  Neb.  192,  8  N. 
W.  Rep.  ."^S'.t  ;  Carlow  i\  Aultman,  28  Neb. 
672,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  873;  Myers  v.  Mc- 
Gavock,  39  Neb.  843,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  522 ; 
Hanlon  r.  Union  P.  R.  Co.  40  Neb.  52,  58 
N.  W.  Rep.  590.  New  Jersey  :  De  Camp 
V.  Dobbins,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  36,  31  N.  J.  Eq. 
67 1 ,  691.  New  York :  Bogardus  v.  Trinity 
Church,  4  Saudf.  Ch.  633,  758.  North 
Carolina  :  Mallett  r.  Simpson,  94  N.  V,.  37, 
55  Am.  Rep.  595.  Peuusylvania :  Grant 
r.  Henry  Clay  Coal  Co.  80  I'a.  St.  208  ; 
Bone  V.  Delaware  &  II.  Canal  Co.  (Pa.)  5 
Atl.  Rep.  751  ;  Gonndie  v.  Northampton 
W.  Co.  7  Pa.  St.  233,239  ;  Baird  ;;.  Bank 
of  Washington,  11  S.  &  R.  41 1  ;  Leazure  v 
Hillegas,  7  S.  &  R.  313.  Tennessee  :  Bar- 
row I'.  Nashville  &  C.  T.  Co.  9  Humph.  304. 
Virginia:  Banks  v.  Poitiaux,3  Rand.  136, 
15  Am.  Dec.  706.  Texas  :  Russell  v.  Texas 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  68  Tex.  646,  5  S.  W.  Hep.  686. 
3  Seymour  o.  Slide  &  Spur  Gold  Mines, 
153  U.  S.  523, 14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  847  ;  Cowell 
V.  Springs  Co.  100  U.  S.  55,  60;  Friits  v. 
Palmer,  132  U.  S.  282,  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  93  ; 
National  Bank  v.  Whitney,  103  U.  S.  99 ; 
Jones  V.  Habersham,  107  U.S.  174,  188,  2 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  336  ;  Watts  v.  Gantt  (Neb.), 
61  N.  W.  Rep.  104  ;  Davis  v.  Old  Colony 
R.  Co.  131  Mass.  258,  273,  41  Am.  Rep.  221„ 
per  Gray,  C.  J.;  Butte  Hardware  Co.  i>. 
Schwab  (  Mont.),  34  Pac.  Rep.  24  ;  Galves- 
ton Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Perkins  (Te.x.  (^i''. 


RESTRICTIONS    UPON    DOMESTIC    CORPORATIONS.       [§§  176,  177. 

an  iictioii  by  a  corporation  to  recover  possession  of  land,  it  is  no 
defence  for  the  defendant  to  answer  that  a  recovery  by  the  cor- 
poration would  vest  in  it  more  land  than  it  was  entitled  to  hold,^ 
"It  would  lead  t(j  infinite  inconveniences  and  embarrassments  if, 
in  suits  b}'  corporations  to  recover  the  possession  of  their  property, 
inquiries  were  permitted  as  to  the  necessity  of  such  property  for 
the  purposes  of  their  incorporation,  and  the  title  made  to  rest 
upon  the  existence  of  that  necessity."  ^ 

The  only  exception  to  this  rule  is  where  a  collateral  attack 
by  a  private  party  is  expressly  authorized  by  legislative  per- 
mission.^ 

176.  A  corporation  de  facto  may  take  a  conveyance  of  land, 
and  its  corporate  existence  and  right  to  hold  the  land  can  be 
questioned  only  by  the  State  in  direct  proceedings  to  inquire 
into  its  right  to  exercise  corporate  functions.^  In  an  action  by  it 
to  recover  possession  of  land,  no  private  person  will  be  allowed 
to  inquire  collaterally  into  the  regularity  of  its  organization.  A 
suit  by  such  a  corporation  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  cannot  be  de- 
feated by  a  junior  mortgagee  by  showing  that  the  corporation 
was  defectively  organized.'^ 

177.  But  the  rule,  that  the  limitation  of  the  power  of  a  cor- 
poration to  acquire  and  hold  land  concerns  the  State  alone, 
applies  only  when  the  land  has  been  acquired :  it  does  not 
apply  when  a  corporation,  as  plaintifl,  is  seeking  to  acquire  land 
w^hich  it  is  not  authorized  to  acquire.  This  distinction  is  made 
clear  in  a  judgment  delivered  by  Mr.  Justice  Miller  in  a  case  be- 

App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  256;    Connecticut  &c.  R.  Co.  60  Mo.  508  ;  Connecticut  Mut. 

Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Smith,  117  Mo.  261,  22  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith,  117  Mo.  261,  22  S. 

S.  W.  Rep.  623 ;  Ragan  v.  McElroy,  98  W.  Rep.  623. 

Mo.  349,  352,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  735  ;  Hovel-  *  Doyle  v.  San  Diego  Land  Co.  46  Fed. 

man  v.   Kansas  City,  &c.  R.    Co.  79  Mo.  Rep.  709  ;   East  Norway  Lake  Church  v. 

632;  Thorntons.  Nat.  Exch.  Bank.  71  Mo.  Froislie,  37    Minn.   447,  35  N.   W.  Rep. 

221  ;  Athmtic  &  P.   R.  Co.  r.   St.  Louis,  260;  People  v.  La  Rue,  67   Cal.   526,    8 

66  .VIo.  228,  251  ;  Shnwalter  v.  Pirner,  55  Pac.  Rep.  84  ;   Baker  v.  Neff,  73  Ind.  68; 

Mo.  219,  233;    Land  r.   Toffman,  .50  Mo.  Thompson  v.  Candor,  60  111.244  ;  Hudson 

243;   Chambers  ?;.  St.  Louis,  29  Mo.  543,  v.    Green    Hill    Seminary,    113    111.   618; 

573.  Granby   M.  Co.  i'.  Richards,  95  Mo.  106  ; 

1  Bone  V.  Delaware   &   H.    Canal   Co.  Finch   v.   Ullman,   105   Mo.   255,263,  16 

(Pa.)  5  Atl.  Rep.  751.  S.   W.    Rep.   863;  Crenshaw  v.   Ullman, 

-  Naioma  Water  &   M.  Co   v.  Clarkin,  113  Mo.  633,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1077. 

14  Cal.  544,  552,  per  Field,  C.  J.  "  Williamson  v.  Kokomo  Build.  Asso. 

■'  Kinealy  j;.  St.  Louis  &c.  Ry.  Co.  69  89  Ind.  389. 
Mo.  658,  663  ;  Martindale  v.  Kansas  City, 

157 


§  ITS.]        cAi'Acrrv  of  cokpoijations  as  purchasers. 

fore  llio  Siii>r>'im»  Court  of  tlie  Unit(^d  States:^  "We  lued  not 
stc)[>  here  to  iiupiire  wliellier  this  couiimiiy  can  hold  titU'  to  lands, 
which  it  is  impliedly  forbidden  to  do  by  its  charter,  because  the 
case  before  us  is  not  one  in  which  the  title  to  the  lands  in  ques- 
tion has  ever  been  vested  in  the  railroad  company,  or  attempted 
to  be  so  vested.  The  railroad  company  is  plaintiff  in  this  action, 
and  is  seeking  to  obtain  the  title  to  such  lands.  It  has  no 
authority  by  the  statute  to  receive  such  title  and  to  own  such 
lauds  ;  and  the  question  here  is,  not  whether  the  courts  would 
deprive  it  of  such  lands  if  they  had  been  conveyed  to  it,  but 
whether  they  will  aid  it  to  violate  the  law  and  obtain  a  title 
which  it  has  no  power  to  hold.  We  think  the  questious  are  very 
dift'erent  ones,  and  that,  while  a  court  might  hesitate  to  declare 
the  title  to  lands  received  already,  and  in  the  jiossession  and  own- 
ership of  the  company,  void  on  the  principle  that  they  had  no 
authority  to  take  such  lands,  it  is  very  clear  that  it  will  not  make 
itself  the  active  agent  in  behalf  of  the  company  in  violating  the 
law,  and  enabling  the  company  to  do  that  which  the  law  forbids." 
178.  Corporations  have  generally  no  power  to  acquire  and 
hold  real  estate  for  purposes  other  than  those  for  which  they 
were  organized.-  They  cannot  purchase  and  hold  real  estate 
indefinitely,  without  regard  to  the  uses  to  be  made  of  it.  Thus 
a  railroad  corporation  authorized  to  acquire  and  hold  lands  for  its 
I'ight  of  way  and  for  other  purposes  particularly  enumerated  con- 
nected with  the  use  and  management  of  the  railroad,  cannot  ac- 
quire lands  for  speculative  or  farming  purposes,  or  for  any  other 
purposes  than  those  mentioned.  The  enumeration  of  pur))Oses  is 
necessarily  exclusive  of  all  other  purposes.^  The  corporation  is 
limited  to  the  holding  of  such  lands  as  are  necessary  for  the  loca- 
tion of  its  road,  its  stations,  and  necessary  buildings. 

1  Case  V.  Kelly,  133  U.  S.  21,  28,   10  1  Doujr.  401,  41  Am.  Dec.  575;  Hayward 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  216.  V.  Davidson,  41    Iiid.  212;  State  Bank  v. 

2  Case  V.  Kelly,  133  U.  S.  21,  10  Sup.  Brackenridf,'e,  7  Blackf.  395;  Pacific  R. 
Ct.  Rep.  216;  Morgan  v.  Donovan,  58  Co.  v.  Seely,  45  Mo.  212,  100  Am.  Dec. 
Ala.  241  ;  Occum  Co.  v.  Sprague  Manuf.  369  ;  State  v.  Mansfield,  23  N.  J.  L.  510. 
Co.  34  Conn.  529;  Coleman  t'.  San  Ra-  ^  Case  v.  Kelly,  133  U.  S.  21,  10  Sup. 
phael  Tnrnp.  Co.  49  Cal.  517;  Metropol-  Ct.  Rep.  216;  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Seely,  45 
itan  Bank  v.  Godfrey,  23  111.  579  ;  Waldo  Mo.  212,  100  Am.  Dec.  369  ;  Rensselaer, 
V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  14  Wis.  575 ;  First  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  43  N.  Y.  137  ;  State 
Parish  v.  Cole,  3  Pick.  232;  Rens.selaer,  v.  Mansfield,  23  N.  J.  L.  510;  Hamilton  v. 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Davis,  43  N.  Y.  137  ;  Bank  Annapolis,  &c.  R.  Co.  1  Md.  553  ;  El- 
of  Michigan  v.  Nilcs,  Walker  (Mich.),  99,  dridgc  v.  Smith,  34  Vt.  484. 

158 


RESTHICTIOXS    UPON    DOMHSTIC    CORPORATIONS.  [§  179. 

179.  "Whether  a  limitation  by  the  charter  of  a  corporation 
as  to  the  amount  of  property  it  may  hold  is  operative  only 
in  favor  of  the  State,  and  the  corporation  can  hold  property  in 
excess  of  the  limitation  as  against  the  rest  of  the  world,  is  a  ques- 
tion upon  which  there  is  some  apparent  conflict  of  opinion  ;  though 
t'le  weight  of  authority  is  to  the  effect  that  such  a  corporation 
cannot  take  beyond  the  amount  limited,  and  that  any  person 
entitled  may  invoke  tlie  limitation  unless  precluded  by  estoppel. 
The  doctvine,  that  a  corporation  may  take  property  in  excess  of 
the  amount  limited  by  its  charter,  has  been  declared  for  the  most 
part  in  cases  where  the  property  has  been  acquired  by  purchase 
for  value,  "and  consequently  where  the  vendor  was  estopped  by 
his  own  conveyance  from  contesting  the  title  conveyed,  and 
equally  so  his  heirs;  or  where  the  persons  challenging  the  title 
were  mere  strangers  to  it,  and  as  such  in  no  position  to  question 
its  validity."  ^  This  doctrine  has,  however,  been  declared  in 
some  cases  in  which  there  was  no  estoppel,  the  property  having 
been  given  by  will.^ 

In  cases  where  there  is  no  estoppel,  as  where  the  property  is 
given  by  will  to  a  corporation  in  excess  of  its  capacity  by  its 
cliarter  or  by  statute  to  hold  property,  the  doctrine  generally  de- 
clared is  that  the  gift  is  invalid  so  far  as  it  exceeds  the  limit,  and 
to  that  extent  goes  over  under  the  will,  or  descends  as  intestate 
property  to  the  heirs  or  next  of  kin  of  the  testator.'^  In  the  well- 
considered  case  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Rhode  Island, 
Chief  Justice  Durfee  said  :  "  It  seems  to  us  that  the  natural  and 
logical  conclusion,  independently  of  authority,  is,  that  an  artificial 
body  created  by  law,  without  capacity  to  take  or  hold  property 
beyond  a  certain  limit,  cannot,  by  reason  of  the  very  law  of  its 
being,  take  or  hold  property  beyond  that  limit,  and  consequently 
that  the  courts  ought  to  recognize  the  fact  in  favor  of  any  person 
who  is  entitled,  on  supposition  of  the  incapacity  of  the  corpoi-a- 
tion,  unless,  by  estoppel  or  otlierwise,  such  person  is  precluded 
from  making  claim." 

'   Wood  V.  Iliimmond,  16  R.  I.  98,  116,  fered  or  repealed  before  the  will  went  into 

17  Atl.  Kep.  324,  per  Durfee,  C.  J.  effect. 

2  As  in  Jones  v.  IlabersliMm,  107  U.  S.         ^  Wood  v.  Hammond,  16  R.  I.  98,  118, 

174,  18.'?,  2  S.  Ct.  Rep.  336  ;  and  l)e  Camp  17  Atl.  Rep.  324  ;  Matter  of  McGraw,  111 

V.  Dobbins,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  3.5,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  N.  Y.  60,  19   N.  E.  Rep.  233  ;   Chamber- 

671,    690.       In  each    of    these    cases  the  l:iin  r.  ('haiiibcrlMin,  43  N.  Y.  424  ;  Cromie 

act  imposing  the  limitation   had  been  al-  v   Louisville  Orphans'  Soc.  3  Bush,  365. 

159 


■§  180.]  (WrACIlY    OF    COKrOKAllONS    AS    I'URCIIASKKS. 

Ill  tlu'  Icailiiig-  ease  in  New  York  it,  was  lielii  that  a  limitation 
bv  cliarUT  ;!S  to  the  auiount  oF  luopntv  a  coipoiati.ui  may  liohl 
joiiders  any  gift  to  it  by  will  beyond  that  amount  wholly  void. 
Thus  the  eharter  of  Cornell  University,  having  })rovided  tluit  it 
might  hold  pi'operty  not  exceeding  three  million  dollars  in  the 
aggregate,  was  held  to  be  prohibited  from  holding  ])r()perty  beyond 
that  amount ;  and  it  api)earing  thal<  the  university  already  lield 
property  up  to  this  limit,  a  further  gift  to  it  by  will  was  declared 
void,  and  that  tht;  heirs  or  next  of  kin  of  the  testator  could  raise 
the  question.' 

180.  The  distinction  recognized  in  relation  to  the  English 
mortmain  acts  between  the  taking  and  holding  of  property 
by  corporations  is  not  ap[)licable  in  respect  to  the  restrictions 
upon  the  capacity  of  corporations  in  this  country.  Under  the  old 
mortmain  laws  the  title  vested  in  the  corporation,  and  this  was 
indefeasible  except  by  the  reentry  of  the  person  entitled  to  take 
by  reason  of  the  forfeiture.  The  superior  lord  or  the  king  might 
grant  a  license  to  the  coi-poration  to  hold  the  land  ;  but  the  supe- 
rior lord,  or  ultimately  the  king,  might  insist  upon  a  forfeiture. 
But  in  case  the  forfeiture  was  not  insisted  upon,  the  corporation 
could  hold  as  against  all  the  world.  In  an  important  case  before 
the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York  it  was  ai-gued,  from  the  vest- 
ing of  title  under  the  mortmain  acts,  and  the  title  remaining  in 
the  corporation  except  in  case  of  a  reentry  of  the  person  entitled 
to  claim  a  forfeiture,  that  under  the  charter  of  the  Cornell  Univer- 
sit3%  granted  by  the  State  of  New  York,  limiting  the  amount  of 
property  the  corporation  might  hold,  property  in  excess  of  the 
limitation  given  by  will  would  vest  in  the  cor[)oration,  and  that 
the  restriction  applied  only  to  its  holding  the  property  in  excess 
of  the  amount  limited.  Replying  to  this,  Mr.  Justice  Peckham, 
delivering   the   opinion   of    the   court,   said  :  ^    "  But   the  circum- 

1  Matter  of  McGraw,  111   N.  Y.  66,  19  In  Pennsylvania,  however,  the  doctrine 
N.  E.  Rep.  233.  of  Leazure  -.  Ilillc^ras,  7  S.  &  R.  313,  and 

2  In  Matter  of  McGraw,  111  N.  Y.  66,  other  cases  following  that,  is  that,  al- 
9.3,  9.5,  19  N.  E.  Rep.  233.  See,  also,  though  corporations  ina}'  take  real  estate 
Bank  of  Mich.  v.  Niles,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  except  for  superstitious  uses,  they  cannot 
401,  41  Am.  Dec.  .575;  and  Wood  v.  Ham-  hold  it,  in  consequence  of  the  statutes  of 
mond,  le  R.  I.  98,  119,  17  Atl.  Rep.  324,  mortmain  ;  l)ut,  as  the  title  has  passed  to 
18  Atl.  Rep.  198.  The  latter  case,  in  the  corporations,  it  must  remain  there 
which  the  same  point  was  considered,  until  the  State  enforces  the  forfeiture. 
fully  approves  the  decision  in   Matter  of 

McGraw. 

160 


RESTKICTIOXS    UPON    DOMESTIC    CORPORATIONS.  [§  181. 

stances  under  which  lands  are   held   by   citizens  of  New  York, 
where  their  tenure  is  so  wholly  different  from  that  which   pre- 
vailed in  England  when  the  early  mortmain  acts   were  enacted, 
render  unv  argument   in   regard  to  those  acts  and  their  effect  to- 
tall  v  inapplicable  to  the  case  .of  a  corporation  of  this  State.     Tak- 
in"  the   law  as   it  exists    in  our   statutes,   including   the   special 
i)rovision  upon   the  subject;  in   the  ciiarter  of   the  university,  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  provision   tlierein    limiting  the  holding  of 
property  is,  as  I  have  said,  a  restriction  also  upon  the  power  to 
take  in  excess  of   the  specified  amount.      As,  at  common  law,  a 
corporation  could  take  real  property  in  the  same  way  as  an  indi- 
vidual, the  consequence  was  that,  in   England,  large  landed  pos- 
sessions  were  held   by  religious  corporations,  and,  by  reason   of 
alienations  of  real  estate  to  them,  the  services  due  by  the  vassal 
to  the  lord  were  partially  if  not  totally  paralyzed,  and  the  chief 
lords   lost    their   escheats.     Tiiis  was  a  constantly  growing  and 
alarming  evil.     To  remedy  the  difficulty,  the  first  act  was  placed 
in  Magna  Charta,  which  declared  all  such  alienations  to  corpora- 
tions entirely  void,  and  that  the  lands  should  revert  to  the  lord  of 
the  fee.     It  was  held,  however,  that  the  reversion  must  be  accom- 
plished by  an  entry,  and  then  and  from  that  time  there  was  a  for- 
feiture, the  corporation  having  taken  the  title  and  held  the  prop- 
erty until  such  forfeiture  by  reentry.   .  .  .  There  is,  by  reference 
to  our  laws,  no  such  necessaiy  and  universal  distinction  between 
taking  and  holding  property   by  corporations  as  is  seen  in  the 
laws  of  England  relating  to  alienations  in  mortmain.     Whether 
tiie  legislature,  when  using  language  providing  for  a  limitation 
upon  holding  property,  meant  to  permit  an  unlimited  taking,  is  a 
question  of  legislative  intent ;   and  I  think  the  general  inference 
would  be,  in  the  absence  of  some  plain  and  contiolling  circum- 
stance to  the  contrary,  that  the  legislative  body  meant  to  limit  a 
taking  as  well  as  a  holding  beyond  the  specified  amount." 

181.  A  deed  to  a  corporation  authorized  for  some  purposes, 
or  to  a  limited  extent,  to  hold  real  estate,  is  not  void  though 
the  lands  were  purchased  for  other  purposes,  or  beyond  the  limit 
allowed.  The  deed  passes  the  title  as  between  the  ])arties  to  the 
deed.i     Whether  the  corporation  has  exceeded  its  powers  in  mak- 

1  Dillon  on  Municipal  Corporations,  4th  S.  (121,  628  ;  Natoina  W.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Glar- 
ed. 574;  Cowell  v.  Sprinj-s  Co.  100  U.  S.  kin,  14  Cal.  .544;  Barnes  v.  Suddard,  117 
55,  60;  National  Bank  i'.  Matthews,  98  U.  111.  237,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  477  ;    Hamsher  v, 
VOL.  I.  161 


§  182.] 


CAPACITY  OF  CORPORATIONS  AS  PURCHASERS. 


hv^  llio  iuucliiiso  Is  a  question  which  the  State  iilouo  can  inquire 
into  in  a  direct  proceeding-  against  the  corporation. 

There  is  a  presumption  that  a  conveyance  to  a  corporation  is 
for  a  purpose  for  which  it  is  autliorized  to  acquire  and  hold  real 
property.' 

AVhen  a  corporation  is  limited  to  acquiring  and  holding  lands 
to  a  certain  value,  any  increase  in  the  value  of  lands  after  they 
have  been  acquired,  so  that  they  afterwards  exceed  the  prescribed 
amount  in  value,  does  not  affect  its  title  to  such  lands.^ 

II.  Restrictions  upon  Foreign  Corporations. 

182.  A  foreign  corporation,  authorized  to  hold  real  estate 
by  the  State  creating  it,  may  purchase  and  hold  real  estate  in 
another  State  in  which  it  is  permitted  to  transact  business,  un- 
less restricted  or  prohibited  by  the  statute  or  manifest  policy  of 
the  latter  State. ^  Upon  the  principle  of  comity,  a  foreign  corpo- 
ration may  exercise  within  another  State  the  general  powers  con- 
ferred by  its  own  charter,  provided  these  are  not  inconsistent  with 
the  laws  or  public  policy  of  such  other  State.^    The  law  ol'  comity 


Hamsher,  132  111.  273,  286,  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
1123  ;  Hayward  v.  Davidson,  41  Ind.  212; 
Bogardiis  v.  Trinity  Church, 4  Sandf.  Ch. 
633  ;  De  Camp  v.  DoMiins,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  36, 
31  N.  J.  Eq.  671,  691  ;  Goundie  v.  North- 
ampton W.  Co.  7  Pa.  St.  233.  Contra,  St. 
Peter's  Cong.  v.  Germain,  104  111.  440, 
446,  per  Mulkey,  J. 

1  Yates  V.  Van  De  Bogert,  .56  N.  Y.  526  ; 
Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Curtis,  7  N.  Y. 
466;  Chautauqua  Co.  Bank  tJ.  Risley,  19 
N.  Y.  369  ;  Ex  parte  Peru  Iron  Co.  7  Cow. 
540;  Lancaster  v.  Amsterdam  Imp.  Co. 
140  N.  Y.  576,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  964,  9  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  155,  161  ;  Alward  v. 
Holmes,  10  Abb.  N.  C.  96;  Farmers'  & 
Millers'  Bank  v.  Detroit,  &c.  R.  Co.  17 
Wis.  372;  New  England  F.  &  M.Ins.  Co. 
V.  Robinson,  25  Ind.  536. 

2  Bogardus  ;;  Trinity  Church,  4  Saudf. 
Ch.  633  ;  Humt)crt  v.  Trinity  Church,  24 
Wend.  587,  639. 

3  Barnes  v.  Suddard,  117  111.  237,  7  N. 
E.  Rep.  477,  13  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
7  ;  Santa  Clara  Academy  v.  Sullivan,  116 
111.  375,  6  N.  E.  Rep.  183,  56  Am.  Rep. 

182 


776,  13  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  11; 
White  V.  Howard,  38  Conn.  342  ;  New 
Hampshire  Land  Co.  v.  Tilton,  19  Fed. 
Rep.  73  ;  Lumbard  v.  Aldrich,  8  N.  H.  31, 
28  Am.  Dec.  381 ;  Carlow  v.  Aultman,  28 
Neb.  672,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  873  ;  Newburg 
Petroleum  Co.  v.  Weare,  27  Ohio  St.  343 ; 
Alward  v.  Holmes,  10  Abb.  N.  C.  96; 
Claremont  Bridge  v.  Royce,  42  Vt.  730; 
State  V.  Boston,  C.  &  M.  R.  Co.  25  Vt. 
433;  Taylor  v.  Alliance  Trust  Co.  71 
Miss.  694,  15  So.  Rep.  121;  Missouri 
Lead  Min.  Co.  v.  Reinhard,  114  Mo.  218, 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  488. 

*  Christian  Union  v.  Yount,  101  U.  S. 
352 ;  Cowell  v.  Springs  Co.  100  U.  S.  55 ; 
Runyan  v.  Coster,  14  Pet.  122;  Bank  of 
Au},Mista  V.  Earle,  13  Pet.  519,  592  ;  New 
Hampshire  Land  Co.  v.  Tilton,  19  Fed. 
Rep.  73 ;  Northern  Transp.  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
7  Bi.<s.  45  ;  New  York  Dry  Dock  v  Hicks, 
5  McLean,  111;  Santa  Clara  Female 
Academy  v.  Sullivan,  116  111.  375,  6  N.  E. 
Rep.  183,  56  Am.  Rep.  776  ;  Columbus 
Buggy  Co.  >'.  Graves,  108  111.  4.')9 ;  Clare- 
mont Bridge  Co.  ?'.  Royce,  42   Vt.  730; 


RESTRICTIONS   UPON   FOREIGN    CORPORATIONS. 


[§  183. 


between  States  will  not  autliorize  a  corporation  to  exercise  powers 
witliin  the  State  whicli  a  domestic  corporation  would  not  be  per- 
niitted  to  exercise  under  the  Constitution  and  policy  of  the  State.i 
But  on  the  otlier  hand,  the  rule  is  almost  universal  that  a  foreign 
cor|  oration  may  transact,  in  pursuance  of  its  charter,  any  business 
which  the  laws  and  policy  of  a  State  encourage  a  domestic  cor- 
poration to  engage  in,  and  may  exercise  any  powers  which  such 
domestic  corpoi-ation  might  exercise.^ 

183.  What  the  public  policy  of  a  State  is  upon  this  matter 
is  determined  by  its  constitution,  laws,  and  judicial  decisions.^  If 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  a  State  are  silent,  it  may  properly  be 
inferred  that  the  general  law  of  comity  between  States  lias  scope 
for  operation,  and  that  a  foreign  corporation  legally  constituted, 
with  sufficient  chartered  powers,  may  acquire  and  hold  lands  in 
the  State  of  its  domicile.^ 

The  fact  that  foreign  corporations  have  in  particular  cases  pro- 
cured acts  enabling  them  to  hold  real  estate,  the  general  laws 
being  silent  on  the  subject,  does  not  disprove  the  general  right 


Thompson  v.  Waters,  25  Mich.  214,  223, 
12  Am.  Rep.  243,  per  Christiancy,  C.  J.  ; 
Taylor  v.  Alliance  Trust  Co.  71  Miss. 
694,  1.5  So.  Rep.  121  ;  Whitman  Mining 
Co.  V.  Baker,  3  Nev.  386  ;  Tarpey  v.  Des- 
eret  Salt  Co.  5  Utah,  494,  17  Pac.  Rep. 
631  ;  Fisk  v.  Patton,  7  Utah,  399,  27  Pac. 
Rep.  1  ;  Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Cross,  18  Wis.  109;  Reorj^anized  Church 
V.  Church  of  Christ,  60  Fed.  Rep.  937, 
941. 

1  Clarke  v.  Central  R.  Co.  50  Fed.  Rep. 
338. 

■^  Taylor  v.  Alliance  Trust  Co.  71  Miss. 
694,  15  So.  Rep.  121. 

3  Vidal  V.  Girard,  2  How.  127,  per 
Story,  J. 

*  Lancaster  v.  Amsterdam  Imp.  Co. 
140  N.  Y.  576,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  964,  per 
Gray,  J.;  Bard  i;.  Poole,  12  N.  Y.  495; 
Taylor  ;;.  Alliance  Trust  Co.  71  Miss. 
r.94,  15  So.  Rep.  121  ;  Lebanon  Sav.  Bank 
V.  Ilollenheck,  29  Minn.  322,  13  N.  W.  Rei>. 
145  ;  New  York  Dry  Dock  v.  Ilicks,  5 
McLean,  111;  Missouri  Lead  Co.  v.  Rein- 
hard,  114  Mo.  218,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  488; 
Reorganized  Church  v.  Church  of  Chri.st, 
60  Fed.  R<'p.  937,  941. 


In  Lancaster  v.  Amsterdam  Imp.  Co. 
140  N.  Y.  576,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  964,  Mr. 
Justice  Gray  said  :  "  If  we  turn  to  the 
decisions  of  this  court  in  our  investigation 
of  what  has  been  the  public  policy  of  this 
State  towards  foreign  corporations,  we 
find  them  interpreting  and  applying  the 
principle  of  state  comity  in  the  broad- 
est spirit.  In  People  v.  Fire  Association, 
92  N.  Y.  31 1,  it  was  observed  that  '  where 
a  State  does  not  forfiid,  or  its  public  pol- 
icy, as  evidenced  by  its  laws,  is  not  in- 
fringed, a  foreign  corporation  may  trans- 
act business  within  its  boundaries,  and  be 
entitled  to  the  protection  of  its  laws.'  In 
Mollis  V.  Drew  Seminary,  95  N.  Y.  166, 
it  was  held  that,  '  unless  the  legislature 
forbids,  they  [foreign  corporations]  can 
come  here  as  freely  as  natural  persons,  and 
exercise  here  all  the  powers  conferred 
upon  them  by  their  charter,  subject  to  the 
limitation  imposed  upon  natural  persons, 
that  is,  they  can  do  no  acts  in  violation  of 
our  laws,  or  of  our  public  policy  ;  but, 
unless  prohibited  by  law,  they  can  do 
here,  within  the  limits  of  their  chartered 
powers,  ])recisely  what  domestic  corpora- 
tions can  do.' " 

163 


^§  184,  185.]       CAPACITY    OK    CORPORATIONS    AS    PURCHASERS. 

of  such  0(>ri)i)ratiinis  to  hold  himl  without  such  cnubling  nets,  nor 
does  it  show  that  th.'  public  policy  is  against  such  gc-ncral  right. ^ 

184.  The  policy  of  a  State  not  to  allow  foreign  corpora- 
tions to  acquire  and  hold  real  estate  must  be  expressed  in 
some  aflfirmative  way  by  the  legislature.  Though  it  is  provided 
thai  fori'ign  eor[)()rations  shall  exercise  no  greater  or  different 
powei's  than  those  exercised  by  domestic  corporations,  the  fact 
that  the  legislature  has  made  no  provision  for  the  formation  of  cor- 
porations authorized  to  loan  money,  and  take  mortgages  upon  real 
property  to  secure  them,  is  no  indication  of  a  policy  to  prohibit 
tlie  exercise  of  these  powers  by  a  foreign  corporation  organized 
for  such  purpose.^ 

Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  foreign  corporations  shall 
not  acquire  and  hold  real  estate  unless  specially  authorized  to  do 
so,  a  purchase  by  a  railroad  company,  by  legislative  authority,  of 
the  stock  of  a  raining  company  authorized  by  law  to  hold  real 
estate  is  not  invalid,  and  the  land  cannot  be  forfeited  to  the 
State  under  a  proceeding  for  that  purpose.^ 

Although  a  constitutional  provision  prohibits  a  non-resident 
railroad  company  from  acquiring  lands  for  the  use  of  the  road  by 
condemnation  or  appropriation,  still  it  may  acquire  such  lands  by 
purchase.^ 

185.  Any  State  may  repeal,  restrict,  or  refuse  to  recognize 
this  law  of  comity,  for  foreign  corporations  are  not  citizens 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 

1  Lancaster  u.  Amsterdam  Imp.  Co  140  privileges  had  never  been  accorded  by 
N.  Y.  .576,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  964.  Illinois  to  her  own  domestic  corporations, 

2  Cowell  V.  Springs  Co.  100  U.  S.  55  ;  and  were  inconsistent  with  her  settled 
Christian  Union  i;.  Yount,  101  U.  S.  352  ;  public  policy  against  perpetuities,  as  indi- 
Hards  v.  Conn.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  8  Biss.  2.34  ;  cated,  not  by  express  enactment,  but  with 
Stevens  v.  Pratt,  101  111.  206,  overruling  absolute  certainty,  by  the  general  course 
United  States  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Gross,  93  111.  of  its  legislation  from  the  very  orgauiza- 
483.  The  latter  case  was  decided  on  the  au-  tion  of  the  State.  This  decision  is  dis- 
thority  of  Carroll  v.  East  St.  Louis,  67  111.  carded  by  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
568.  In  that  case  it  was  held  that  a  for-  Court  of  the  United  States,  and  by  the 
<'ign  corporation,  created  for  the  sole  pur-  later  decisions  in  Illinois. 

po>e  of  buying  and  selling  lands,  had  no  ^  Commonwealth  v.  New  York,  &c.  R. 

power  to  purchase  and  hold  lands  in  Illi-  Co.  132  Pa.  St.  591,  19  Atl.  Rep.  291,  re- 

Dois  ;  that  such  corporation,  if  permitted  affirmed  139  Pa.  St.  457,21  Atl.  Rep.  528, 

to  exercise  its  functions  in  Illinois  to  the  reversing  114  Pa.  St.  340,  7  Atl.  Rep.  756, 

full  extent  authorized  by  its  charter,  could  15  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  410. 

acquire  lands  without  limit  as  to  quantity,  *  St.  Louis  &   S.  F.  R.  Co.  i;.  Foltz,  52 

and  hold   them  in   perpetnitv  ;  that  such  Fed.  Rep.  627. 

164 


RESIRICTIONS   UPON    FOREIGN   CORPORATIONS. 


[§  186. 


;ire  not  entitled  to  tlie  protection  guaranteed  to  citizens.^  Under 
u  statute  which  provides  tliat  no  corporation  shall  have  power  to 
enter  into  the  business  of  buying  and  selling  real  estate,  a  for- 
eign corporation  which  engages  in  this  business  and  buys  real 
estate  in  the  name  of  a  trustee  acquires  the  beneficial  interest  in 
such  land  and  may  enforce  the  trust. '-^ 

186.  A  foreign  corporatioa  may  take  a  mortgage  to  secure 
a  demand  on  ■which  it  could  maintain  an  action,  thoutrh  it  is 
not  authorized  by  its  charter,  or  by  the  laws  of  the  TState  in  which 
it  is  acting,  to  take  mortgages  or  hold  real  propert}.-^ 

A  foreign  corporation  may  take  a  mortgage  as  additional  secu- 


1  Elston  V.  Piggott,  94  Ind.  185;  Car- 
roll 1-.  Ea.st  St.  Louis,  67  111.  568,  16  Am. 
Rep.  632;  United  States  Trust  Co.  v. 
Lee,  73  111.  142,  24  Am.  Rep.  236  ;  U.  S. 
Mortj;.  Co.  v.  Gross,  93  111.  483,  493. 

-  Fisk  V.  Prttton,  7  Utah,  399,  27  Pac. 
Rep.  1.  See  Carroll  i:  East  St.  Louis,  67 
111.  568,  where  it  was  held  that  a  foreign 
corporation,  organized  for  this  purpose, 
could  not  take  title  in  Illinois,  this  being 
in  contravention  of  the  policy  of  the  law 
of  that  State.  In  Bard  r.  Poole,  12  N.  Y. 
495,  upon  the  question  of  the  right  of  a 
coriioration  of  the  State  of  Maryland  to 
take  mortgages  of  real  estate  within  the 
State  of  New  York,  the  Court  of  Appeals 
of  the  latter  State  said  :  "  Any  of  the 
States  of  the  Union  may,  as  tliis  and  sev- 
eral of  the  otiier  States  have  done,  inter- 
dict foreign  corporations  from  performing 
certain  single  acts,  or  conducting  a  par- 
ticular d.:scription  of  business,  within  its 
jurisdiction.  But  in  the  absence  of  laws 
of  that  character,  or  in  regard  to  transac- 
tions not  within  the  purview  of  any  pro- 
hiijitory  law,  and  not  inconsistent  with  the 
jiolicy  of  the  State  as  indicated  by  the 
general  scope  of  its  laws  or  institutions, 
corponitions  arc  permitted  by  the  comity 
of  nations  to  make  contracts  and  transact 
business  in  other  States  than  those  by 
\irtue  of  whose  laws  they  were  created, 
and  to  enfoice  tliosc  contracts,  if  need  be, 
in  the  courts  of  such  other  States.  It  is, 
of  course,  implied  that  the  contract  innt 
be  one  wiiich  the  foreign  corporation  is 


permitted  by  its  charter  to  make ;  and  it 
must  also  be  one  which  would  be  valid  if 
made  at  the  same  place  by  a  natural  per- 
son not  a  resident  of  that  State.'' 

In  United  States  v.  Fox,  94  U.  S.  315, 
320,  holding  void  a  devise  of  land  to  the 
United  States,  Mr.  Justice  F'ield  said : 
"  The  power  of  the  State  to  regulate  the 
tenure  of  real  property  within  her  limits, 
and  the  modes  of  its  acquisition  and  trans- 
fer, and  the  rules  of  its  descent,  and  the 
extent  to  which  a  testamentary  disposition 
of  it  may  be  exercised  by  its  owners,  is 
undoubted.  It  is  an  established  princi- 
ple of  law,  everywhere  recognized,  arising 
from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  that  the  dis- 
position of  immovable  property,  whether 
by  deed,  descent,  or  any  other  mode,  is 
exclusively  sul)ject  to  the  government 
within  whose  jurisdiction  the  property  is 
situated."  Athrming  Matter  of  Will  of 
Fox,  52  N.  Y.  530,  63  Barb.  137,  11  Am. 
Rep.  751. 

3  American  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Owen, 
15  Gray,  491  ;  Lebanon  Savings  Bank  v. 
Ilollenheck,  29  Minn.  322;  Columbus 
Buggy  Co.  V.  Graves,  108  III.  459;  Silver 
Lake  Bank  v.  North,  4  Johns.  Ch.  370 ; 
Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  McKinney,  6 
McLean,  1  ;  New  York  Dry  Dock  Co.  v. 
Hicks,  5  McLean,  111  ;  Connecticut  Mut. 
L.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Cross,  18  Wis.  109;  Con- 
necticut Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Albert,  39 
Mo.  181  ;  Elston  V.  PigL'Ott.  94  Ind.  14; 
Lumbard  r.  Akhich,  8  N.  II.  31,  28  Am. 
Dec.  381. 

165 


§   KST.J  CAI'ACIIV    OF    COIU'OI.'ATIONS    AS    rURCHASERS, 

lily,  tli(>UL;li  iLs  c'liaiU-r  does  not  autliovizo  it  to  take  mortgages  in 
allot Ikt  Stale.  riiiis,  wlicre  a  New  ^'ork  corjioiation  was  uutlior- 
izeil  by  its  charter  to  take  'Mnortgages  on  uniiicuinbered  real 
estate  in  the  State  of  New  York  worth  doiibh;  tlie  aiuouiit  loaned 
thereon,**  it  may  take  a  mortgage  of  hind  in  New  Jersey  to 
secure  a  loan  ah-eady  legitimately  made  to  the  mortgagor.  If  it 
be  conceded  that  the  charter  forbids  the  making  of  an  invest- 
ment on  a  mortgage  of  real  estate  not  in  the  State  of  New  York, 
it  does  not  {)rohibit  the  taking  of  further  security  for  an  invest- 
ment already  made  within  the  authority  of  the  charter.' 

One  who  deals  with  a  foreign  corporation  by  borrowing  money 
of  it,  and  giving  a  mortgage  as  security,  is  estopped  to  claim  that 
it  had  no  authority  to  take  mortgages  in  that  State,  and  cannot 
set  up  this  answer  in  a  foreclosure  suit  upon  the  mortgage.^ 

187.  In  a  few  States  foreign  corporations  have  at  different 
times  been  prohibited  from  making  loans  and  taking  security 
upon  real  estate  therefor.  A  mortgage  within  such  a  prohibi- 
tion is  invalid  from  its  delivery,  and  consequently  a  sale  and  con- 
veyance under  it  is  nugatory,  and  does  not  divest  the  owner  of  his 
interest  in  the  mortgaged  premises.'^ 

A  constitutional  or  statutory  provision  that  no  foreign  corpora- 
tion shall  do  "any  business  "  in  a  State,  without  having  at  least 
one  known  place  of  business  and  an  authorized  agent  therein,  is 
violated  by  a  single  act  of  making  one  loan  of  money,  and  taking 
a  mortgage  to  secure  it,  by  a  foreign  corporation  engaged  in  the 
business  of  loaning  money  on  mortgages,  when  it  has  no  place 
of  business  or  agent  in  the  State.  In  such  case  the  promise  of 
the  mortgagor  to  pay  is  void,  and  a  bill  to  foreclose  the  mortgage 
cannot  be  maintained.'^     In  a  suit  under  such  a  provision  to  fore- 

1  National  Trust  Co.  v.  Murphy,  30  Assurance  Co.  6  Bradw.  551  ;  United 
N.  J.  Kq.  408.  States    Mortf^age    Co.    v.    Gross,    93    111. 

2  Pancoast  v.  Traveller's  Ins.  Co.  79  483.  And  sec  Hards  r.  Conn.  i\Iut.  L. 
Ind.  172;  Leasiire  v.  Union  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Ins.  Co.  8  Biss.  234.  In  Pennsylvania  a 
Co.  91  Pa.  St.  491.  foreign   corporation    may  enforce  a  mort- 

^  Alabama:  Const.  §  4,  art.   14;  New  gage  upon  lands  in  that  State.     Leasure 

England   Mortg.  Co.  v.  Powell,  94   Ala.  v.   Union   Mut.   Life  Ins.  Co.  91   Pa.  St. 

423,  10  So.  Rep.  324,  97  Ala.  483,   12  So.  491. 

Rep.   55.     Illinois :   Prior   to    the    act   of         <  Farrior  v.  Security  Co.   88   Ala.  275, 

1875  (Laws  of  1875,  \).  65)    repealing  the  7  So.   Rej).  200,  92    Ala.  176,  9   So.   Rep. 

former  statute,  and   confirming   and  vali-  532  ;  Dudley  v.  Collier,  87  Ala.  431,  6  So. 

dating  prior  loans  made  in  contravention  Rep.  304. 
of  it.     Scammon   v.   Commercial    Union 

166 


RESTRICTIONS    UPON    FOREIGN   CORPORATIONS. 


[§  188. 


close  a  corporate  mortgage,  the  complaint  must  aver  that  the 
corporation  was  authorized  to  do  business  in  the  State  at  the  time 
the  mortgage  was  executed  and  delivered.  A  complaint  which 
states  that  complainant  has  complied  with  the  laws  of  the  State 
which  authorize  a  foreign  corporation  to  do  business  in  the  State, 
and  that  the  mortgage  sued  on  was  executed  and  delivered  in  the 
State,  is  not  sufficient. ^  But  though  a  mortgage  was  originally 
invalid  by  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  mortgagee,  a  foreign  cor- 
poration, to  comply  with  such  laws,  after  the  contract  evidenced 
by  the  mortgage  has  been  fully  executed  by  a  sale  and  convey- 
ance under  the  mortgage  the  mortgagor  cannot  thereafter  avail 
himself  of  the  objection.'-^ 

188.  lu  many  of  the  States  foreign  corporations  are,  by 
statute  or  by  public  policy,  placed  upon  an  equal  footing  with 
domestic  corporations  as  to  the  transaction  of  corporate  busi- 
ness and  the  holding  of  real  property.  In  only  a  part  of  the 
States  are  there  statutes  expressly  conferring  or  restricting  the 
power  of  such  corporations  to  acquire  and  hold  landr^  and  where 


1  Mullens  V.  Mortgage  Co.  88  Ala.  280, 
7  So.  Re]i.  201. 

•■i  Gamble  v.  Caldwell,  98  Ala.  577,  12 
So.  Rl-p.  424. 

^  Arizona  T. :  Any  foreign  corporation, 
upon  complying  with  the  laws  in  respect 
to  transacting  business  in  the  Territory, 
may  acquire,  hold,  and  dispose  of  all  kinds 
of  real  and  per.sonal  property,  and  enjoy 
the  same  rights  and  privileges  that  do- 
mestic corporations  have ;  provided  that 
no  such  corporation  shall  hold  or  own  at 
any  one  time  more  than  three  hundred 
and  twenty  acres  of  laud,  exclusive  of 
mines  and  mineral  lands,  and  land  neces- 
sary fi)r  reducing  or  working  ores,  or  for 
manufacturing  or  commercial  purposes. 
R.  S.  1887,  §  3.52.  Colorado:  Shall  not 
hold  real  estate  except  such  as  may  he 
iicces-ary,  as  for  the  transaction  of  its 
business.  Annot.  Stats.  1891,  §  499. 
Georgia:  Shall  not  own  more  than  five 
thousand  acres  of  land  in  this  State,  ex- 
cept upon  the  condition  of  becoming  a 
corporation  under  the  laws  of  the  State. 
This  provision  does  not  ajiply  to  any  cor- 
poraiion  engaged  in  the  bnsinr.ss  of  lend- 


ing money  on  real  estate,  nor  to  any  such 
corporation  which,  holding  a  lien  upon 
real  estate  for  security,  is  compelled  to 
become  the  purchaser  of  such  real  estate. 
Laws  1893,  p.  33.  Idaho  :  Have  all  the 
rights  and  privileges  of  domestic  corpora- 
tions, including  the  right  to  exerci.se  the 
right  of  eminent  domain.  R.  S.  1887, 
§  2653.  Illinois  :  Are  subjected  to  all  the 
liabilities  and  restrictions  imposed  upon 
domestic  corporations  of  like  character, 
and  have  no  other  or  greater  powers.  R. 
S.  1889,  ch.  32,  §  26;  Stevens  i'.  Pratt, 
101  111.  206,  217;  Santa  Clara  Female 
Academy  r.  Sullivan,  116  III.  375,  6  N.  E. 
Rep.  183.  Indiana:  The  right  to  hold 
titles  to  or  liens  upon  real  estate  is  made 
conditional  upon  their  complying  with  the 
laws  of  the  State  in  regard  to  appointing 
an  ai^ent  within  the  State.  Annot.  Stats. 
1894,  §3461.  Iowa:  Cannot  exercise  the 
ri;;ht  of  eminent  domain,  or  auy  of  the 
rights  and  privileges  conferred  upon  do- 
mestic corporations,  until  they  have  re- 
ceived permit  to  transact  business  in  the 
State.  Annot.  Code  1888,  §  1642.  Ken- 
tucky: Are  subject  to  the  laws  relating  to 

107 


§  1>'-^-] 


CArACITY    OF    CUKI'OIJATIONS    AS    I'UHCHASERS. 


tlu'it'   are    no   statutes   upon   the   subject,  the   liglit   of  comity   is 
generally  recognized. 

189.  The  power  and  right  of  a  foreign  corporation  to 
acquire  and  hold  real  property  is  determined  by  its  charter 
and  the  laws  of  the  State  in  which  the  property  is  situated.^ 
The  laws  of  the  State  in  which  tlio  corporation  was  organized  are 
not  recognized  as  ali'eeting  the  capacity  of  the  corporation  in  this 
respect.  ''  A  corporation  '  must  dwell  in  the  place  of  its  creation, 
and  ciinnot  migrate  to  another  sovereignty,'  ^  though  it  may  do 


doinesiic  relations  of  similar  character. 
No  fora<;u  railroad  company  is  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  eminent  domain,  or  has 
power  to  acquire  real  estate,  nntil  it  shall 
have  become  a  body  corporate  under  the 
laws  of  the  State.  Const.  1891,  §§  202, 
211;  G.  S.  1894,  pp.  139,  Ul.  Massa- 
chusetts :  Cannot  engage  in  any  kind  of 
business  the  transaction  of  which  by  do- 
mestic corporations  is  not  permitted.  Acts 
1894,  ch.  381.  Manufacturing  corpora- 
tions which  have  complied  with  Acts  1884, 
ch.  330,  may  purchase  and  hold  such  real 
estate  as  may  be  necessary  for  conducting 
their  business.  Acts  1888,  ch.  321.  Min- 
nesota :  P"oreign  corporations  created  for 
the  jiurpose  of  buyiui;-  and  selling  lands 
cannot  hold  more  than  one  thousand  acres, 
and  must  sell  the  same  within  twenty-one 
years,  excejjt  that  lands  acquired  under 
mortgage  foreclosure  must  be  disposed  of 
within  fifteen  years.  G.  S.  1894,  §  3420. 
Nebraska :  Foreign  corporations  become 
domestic  corporations  upon  filing  the 
pr()j)er  certificate.  Com  p.  Stats,  ch.  16, 
§  21.5.  New  Hampshire:  Foreign  man- 
ufacturing companies  may  acquire,  hold, 
and  convey  real  and  per-sonal  property. 
P.  S.  1891,  ch.  148,  §  21.  New  Jersey: 
May  acquire,  hold,  mortgage,  and  convey 
real  estate  necessary  for  its  business,  or 
acqinred  by  way  of  mortL'age  or  in  pay- 
ment of  debts.  R.  S.  1877,  Corj).  Acts, 
§  99  ;  Laws  1887,  p.  157.  New  Mexico  T. : 
Shall  not  hold  real  estate  except  as  pro- 
vided in  relation  to  domestic  eor])orations. 
Corp.  Laws  1884,  §  218.  New  York:  Any 
forei;;n  corporation  doing  business  in  this 
State   mav  acquire   such  real    projierty  as 

168 


may  be  necessary  for  its  corporate  pur- 
poses, and  may  convey  the  .>-ame  in  the 
same  manner  as  a  domestic  corporation. 
Such  corporation  may  purchase,  at  a  sale 
upon  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  held  by  it 
or  upon  a  judgment,  any  real  property, 
and  may  hold  the  same  for  not  exceeding 
five  years.  Laws  1892,  ch.  687,  §§  17,  18. 
North  Dakota,  Oklahoma,  and  South  Da- 
kota :  (,'aiinot  acquire,  hold,  or  dispose  of 
real  or  personal  property  until  it  has  tiled 
a  copy  of  its  charter.  G.  S.  1893,  §1167; 
Comp.  Laws  Dak.  1887,  §3190.  Pennsyl- 
vania :  Foreign  corporations  may  become 
corporations  of  the  State  under  the  pro 
visions  regulating  corporations  of  the  same 
class.  Brightly's  Purdou's  Dig.  1894,  p. 
937.  Tennessee :  May  hold  real  estate 
necessary  or  suitable  for  carrying  on  the 
business  specified  in  tlie  charter.  Code 
1884,  §  1995.  Washington:  Have  full 
power  to  acquire,  hold,  mortgage,  and  con- 
vey all  real  estate  necessary  or  convenient 
to  carry  into  effect  the  purposes  of  the 
corporation.  G.  S.  1891,  §  1524.  West 
Virginia  :  Have  the  same  powers  and  priv- 
ileges, and  are  subject  to  the  same  restric- 
tions, as  domestic  corporations.  Code 
1891,  ch.  .54,  §  30. 

1  Tarpey  v.  Deseret  Salt  Co.  5  Utali, 
494,  17  Pac.  Re]).  631  ;  White  v.  Howard, 
38  Conn.  342  ;  Thompson  /'.  Waters,  25 
Mich.  214,  12  Am  Rep  243;  Nicholson 
V.  Leavitt,  4  Sandf.  272,  276  ;  Slierwood  v. 
American  Bible  Soc.  4  Abb.  App.  Dec. 
227. 

2  Bank  of  Augusta  i;.  Earle,  13  Pet. 
519,  588. 


RESTRICTIONS   UPON    FOREIGN   CORPORATIONS.  [§  189. 

business  in  all  places  where  its  charter  allows  and  the  local  laws 
do  not  forbid.^  But  wherever  it  goes  lor  business  it  carries  its 
charter,  as  that  is  the  law  of  its  existence, ^  and  the  charter  is  the 
same  abroad  that  it  is  at  home."  ^ 

If  a  foreign  corporation  is  limited  by  its  charter  as  to  its  power 
to  acquire  and  hold  land,  the  courts  of  another  State  where  it  ac- 
quires land  may  undoubtedly  enforce  this  limitation,  though  it 
would  seem  tliat  the  legislature  of  the  latter  State  might  empower 
.  sucii  corporation  to  acquire  and  hold  land  without  limit  in  tiiat 
State.*  In  the  latter  case  the  title  to  the  laud  acquired  would 
pass  to  the  Corporation,  and  it  would  be  for  the  State  under  whose 
laws  it  was  organized  to  enforce  the  restrictions  imposed  by  its 
laws.  But  it  is  for  the  courts  of  the  State  in  which  the  land  is 
situated  to  determine  not  only  its  capacity  under  the  laws  of  that 
State  to  acquire  and  hold  real  estate,  but  also  its  capacity  to  do 
so  under  its  charter.  An  adjudication  upon  the  question  of  its 
corporate  capacity  by  a  court  of  another  State  has  no  further 
effect  or  authority  than  the  reasoning  upon  which  it  may  have 
been  fininded  gives  it.^ 

Where  a  foreign  corporation  is  by  its  charter  competent  to  take 
land,  the  statute  of  wills  of  the  State  in  which  it  was  created,  pro- 
hibiting devises  of  the  lands  to  corporations,  does  not  prohibit  it 
from  taking  and  holding  land  in  another  State  by  devise  of  one 
of  its  own  citizens.  Such  a  statute  defines  the  capacity  of  testa- 
tors and  not  of  corporations.^  Where  the  charter  of  a  foreign 
corporation  is  sufficiently  broad  to  confer  upon  it  the  capacity  to 
take  and  hold  real  estate  by  devise,  though  not  expressly  so 
authorized,  the  statute  of  wills  of  the  State  where  the  corporation 
was  created,  providing  that  "  no  devise  of  real  estate  to  a  corpora- 
tion shall  be  valid  unless  such  corpoi'ation  be  ex[)ressly  author- 
ized by  its  cliai-ter  or  by  statute  to  take  by  devise,"  is  operative 
only  in  that  State,  and  does  not  affect  the  capacity  of  the  corpora- 
tion t(j  take  by  devise  in  another  State." 

1  Railroad  ''.  Koontz,  104  U.  S.  5,  12.  *■'  Thompson  v.  Rwoope,  24  Pa.  St.  474. 

2  Relfei\  Rundcl,  103  U.  S.  222,  22().  And  see  Ilollis  v.  Drew  Theoloj,ncal  Sem- 
^  Canada  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Gebhard,     inary,  95  N.  Y.  Kifi. 

109   U.   S.   .527,   .537,  3    S.  Ct.  Rep.  363,  '  American    Bible  Soc.  v.  Marshall,  15 

per  Waite,  C.  J.  Ohio  St.  .'j.'?7. 

*  Whitman    Mining    Co.    v.   Baker,   3  There   are   a   few   cases,    however,    in 

Nev.  38f).  which  it  has  been  said  that  a  devise  to  a 

^  Boyce  v.  St.  Louis,  29  Barb.  650.  forei<;n  corporation,  void  by  the  laws  of 

169 


§  llH).]  C.VrACITY   OF   CORPORATIONS  AS   PURCHASERS. 

190.  The  question  whether  a  foreign  corporation  can  ac- 
quire and  hold  land  is  a  question  "which  can  be  determined 
only  by  the  State  in  a  proceeding  instituted  for  that  purpose. ^ 
The  rule  is  the  sume  us  that  which  prevails  as  to  domestic  cor- 
porations, when  the  question  is  raised  whether  they  have  exceeded 
their  corporate  powers.'-^  Even  in  case  a  foreign  corporation  is 
piohibited  from  acquiring  and  holding  real  estate,  the  State  alone 
can  object  to  the  legal  capacity  of  the  corporation  to  take  and 
hold  real  estate.^  Whether  the  right  of  a  foreign  corporation  to 
hold  lands  arises  under  the  terms  of  its  charter,  or  of  the  laws  of 
the  State  under  which  it  is  organized,  or  whether  it  arises  with* 
reference  to  its  authority  under  the  laws  of  the  State  in  which 
the  lands  are  situated,  the  right  can  be  questioned  only  by  the 
State  itself  in  which  the  land  is  situated.* 

By  the  Constitution  of  the  State  of  Nebraska,  no  foreign  rail- 
road corporation  has  power  to  acquire  land  for  any  purpose  until 
it  has  become  a  body  corporate  under  the  laws  of  that  State ;  but 
a  conveyance  of  land  to  the  Union  Pacific  Railway  Company, 
which  had  not  complied  with  this  provision,  and  was  therefore  in- 
competent to  take  title,  was  held  to  be  voidable  only  and  not  void. 
The  title  of  the  company,  it  was  declared,  was  valid  against  every 
one  but  the  State,  and  could  not  be  questioned  by  any  one  in  a 
suit  in  ejectment  brought  against  the  company.^ 

the  State  where  it  was  organized,  is  void  Barnes  v.  Suddard,  117  111.  237,  7  N.  E. 

in  another  State  in  which  the  testator  re-  Rep.  477  ;  Alexander  v.  Tolletson  Club, 

sided  and  was  a  citizen  ;  that  such  statute  110  111.  65;  Silver  Lake  Bank  i-.  North, 

affects  the   power  to  take  as  well  as  the  4  .Johns.  Ch.  370,  per  Chancellor  Kent; 

power  to  devise.     Kerr  y.  Dougherty,  79  American  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Tcnnille,  87  Ga. 

N.  Y.  327  ;  Boyce  v.  St.  Louis,  '29    Barb.  28,  13   S.  E.  Rep.  158;  O'Brien   v.  Weth- 

650;    Starkweather    v.   American    Bible  erell,    14    Kans.   616;  Leasure  v.   Union 

Sue.   72  111.  50,  22  Am.   Rep.  133.     The  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  91    Pa.  St.  491  ;  Grant 

latter  case  was  overruled  in  Santa  Claia  r.   Henry  Clay  Coal   Co.  80  Pa.  St.  208; 

Female  Academy  v.  Sullivan,  116  111.  375,  Leazure  v.  Hellegas,  7  S.  &  R.  313. 

6   N.  E.  Rep.  183,  56   Am.  Rep.  776,  and  -  §  175. 

the  New  York  cases  are  not  regarded  now  ^  Hickory  Farm  Oil  Co.  v.  Boston,  N. 

a.^  good  law.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.   32  Fed.  Rep.  22  ;  Carlow 

1  Cowell    V.    Springs    Co.    100    U.    S.  v.  Aultman,  28  Neb.  672,  44  N.  W.  Rep. 

55 ;    Seymour    v.    Slide    &    Spur    Gold  873. 

Mines,   153  U.  S.  523,   14  Su]).  Ct.  Rep.  ■*  American    Mortg.  Co.  u.  Tennille,  87 

847;    Fritts   v.    Palmer,  132    U.  S.  282;  Ga.  28,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  158. 

Runyan  v.  Coster,  14  Per.  122  ;  Reorgan-  ^  Myers  )•.  McGavock,  39  Neb.  843,  58 

ized  Church  u.  Church  of  Christ,  60  Fed.  N.  W.  Rep.  522.     The  court  say :  "  The 

Rep.  937  ;   Hickory  Farm  Oil  Co.  >•.  Buf-  Union   Pacific  Railway  Company,  liccmise 

falo,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.  32   Fed.  Rep.  22  ;  it  took  title  to  this  property  in  vii)!ati<m  of 

170 


RESTRICTIONS   UPON   FOREIGN   CORPORATIONS.  [§  191. 

191.  If  there  are  legal  purposes  for  which  a  foreign  corpo- 
ration may  hold  land,  but  it  is  unlawful  for  it  to  deal  in  real  es- 
tate, its  capacity  to  hold  any  particular  piece  of  land  cannot  be 
attacked  by  any  private  litigant,  but  only  by  the  State.  Thus, 
where  a  foreign  corporation  authorized  by  its  charter  to  deal  in 
leal  estate  was  admitted  to  dp  business  in  Texas,  by  whose  laws 
neither  a  foreign  nor  a  domestic  corporation  could  lawfully  prose- 
cute this  business,  though  they  expressly  provided  that  any  cor- 
poration miglit  acquire  such  real  estate  as  the  purposes  of  the 
corporation  might  require,  it  was  held  that  the  capacity  of  the 
corporation 'to  hold  land  in  any  particular  instance  could  not  be 
questioned  collaterally  in  an  action  of  trespass  brought  by  the 
corporation  to  try  title.i  The  Court  of  Appeals  said  :  "  For  the 
purposes  of  this  case  it  may  be  conceded  that  the  business,  as 
such,  which  is  thus  provided  for,  could  not  be  lawfully  prosecuted 
in  Texas,  either  by  a  foreign  or  domestic  corporation.  It  is  yet 
apparent  that  several  of  the  purposes  for  which  this  company  was 
chartered  were  provided  for  by  our  statute  as  objects  for  the  pro- 
motion of  which  corporations  could  be  formed.  If  it  be  conceded 
that  the  charter  contained  a  provision  not  authorized  by  the  law, 
it  would  not  follow  that  the  formation  of  the  corporation  was  for 
that  reason  illegal  and  void,  but  it  would  be  good  for  the  purposes 
which  were  authorized  by  law,  but  without  power  to  pursue  those 
which  were  not.  .  .  .  The  pursuit  of  other  purposes  mentioned 
m  the  articles  than  the  one  quoted  above  would  evidently  ne- 
cessitate the  purchase  of  land ;  and  it  follows  that  the  company 
had  the  capacity  to  take  title  to  that  in  controversy,  whether,  as 
a,sainst  the  State,  it  could  hold  such  title  or  not.  The  question, 
whether  or  not  the  land  conveyed  to  it  was  such  as  the  company 
could  hold  under  its  charter,  cannot  be  raised  collaterally  and  liti- 

the  Constitution,  did  not  thereby  become  railroad  company.  It  would  be  a  mon- 
iin  outlaw  ;  nor  docs  the  fact  of  iis  incom-  strous  construction  of  this  Constitution 
))etency  to  be  a  grantee  of  such  property  to  say  if  A  should,  for  a  valuable  con- 
authorize  any  one  to  appropriate  the  sideration,  convey  his  real  estate  to  B, 
property  who  may  see  fit  to  brine  a  suit  that  because  B  was  incompetent  under 
for  that  jjurpose.  The  citizen  has  no  the  law  to  take  such  conveyance,  there- 
vitrht,  title,  or  claim,  as  such,  to  property  fore  the  title  should  revert  to  A." 
attempted  to  be  acquired  in  contravention  i  Galveston  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  y.  Per- 
<>f  law,  whether  the  person  attempting  kins  (Texas  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep. 
<nch  acquisition  be  an  Eri'.'lish  I'-rd,  a  250,  258. 
Turkish    pasha,  or   an    ordinary    foreign 

171 


^  ll'J.  j  CAPACITY   OF  COUrOKAlluNS   Ab   riia'iiA:?i;i:.->. 

s^ati'il  ill  this  notion.  Sucli  laiul  \v;is  conveyed  to  it  by  u  person 
witli  wlioiu  the  defendants  had  no  connection,  and  under  whom 
they  asserted  no  rights.  As  the  plaintiff  was  a  corporation  com- 
petent to  hoUl  hmd,  the  conveyance  to  it  of  that  in  controversy 
passed  the  title.  It  had  capacity  to  take  the  title,  and  to  hold 
the  land  against  any  person  but  the  State,  Whether  it  can  hold 
against  the  sovereign  is  a  question  which  can  be  decided  only  in  a 
proper  proceeding  instituted  for  that  purpose," 

192.  The  question  -whether  a  foreign  corporation  is  violat- 
ing a  local  statute  in  acquiring  real  estate  is  one  whicli  belongs 
to  the  State  alone,  which  may  dispute  or  prevent  such  usurpation 
of  power  or  may  acquiesce  in  it,  A  provision  of  the  Constitution 
of  Missouri  that  "  no  religious  corporation  can  be  established  in 
this  State,  except  such  as  may  be  created  under  a  general  law» 
for  the  purpose  only  of  holding  title  to  such  real  estate  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  law  for  church  edifices,  j)arsonages,  and  cemeteries," 
does  not  prohibit  the  existence  of  such  corporations,  nor  deny  their 
rigiit  to  hold  real  estate.  It  limits  their  creation  to  a  general  law. 
The  fact  that  the  legislature  of  the  State  has  not  prescribed  the 
quantity  of  real  estate  to  be  held  by  such  corporations  affords 
no  ground  for  claiming  that  the  State  has  I'efused  to  recognize 
the  right  of  foreign  religious  corporations  to  hold  land  in  the 
State.  The  court  will  not  undertake,  in  a  collateral  proceeding, 
to  determine  whether  the  land  acquired  by  such  a  corporation 
was  necessary  for  the  purpose  declared  by  the  Constitution.^ 

The  acts  of  a  foreign  corporation  duly  organized,  which  under- 
takes to  transact  business  in  a  State  without  having  com  |  lied 
with  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  that  State  in  relation  to  trans- 
acting business  and  owning  and  disposing  of  property,  are  not 
void,  and  cannot  be  questioned  or  determined  collaterally.  It 
rests  with  the  State  in  a  direct  proceeding  to  prevent  the  corpo- 
ration from  exercising  its  franchises  within  the  State  until  it  has 
fully  complied  with  its  Constitution  and  laws.^ 

Thus  an  individual  dealing  with  a  foreign  corporation,  whicli 
is  authorized  to  acquire  such  real  property  as  may  be  necessary 
for  its  corporate  purposes,  cannot  object  to  its  title  to  land  on  the 
ground  that  it  has  exceeded  its  authority  by  engaging  in  the  busi- 

1  Reorganized  Church  v.  Church  of  W.  Kep.  706,  aud  on  rchearinjj,  55  N.  W. 
Christ,  60  Fed.  Rep.  937.  Rep.  O-'U. 

2  \Vri;;ht  v.  Lee,   2   S.   D.   596,   51   N. 

172 


RESTRICTIONS   UPON    FOREIGN   CORPORATIONS.  [§  192. 

ness  of  buying  and  selling  real  property,  when  the  laws  of  the 
State  under  which  it  was  organized  conferred  some  authority  to 
engage  in  such  business,  or  to  acquire  and  convey  land.  It  is  for 
tlie  State  under  whose  laws  the  corporation  was  created  to  inquire 
into  any  excessive  use  of  its  corporate  powers.  It  is  for  the  State 
where  the  foreign  corporation  is  transacting  business  to  inquire 
whether  it  is  violating  the  laws  of  that  State  in  engaging  in 
the  business  of  buying  and  selling  land.  "  It  is  not  for  the  party 
contracting  for  the  conveyance  of  its  land  to  i-aise  the  question  of 
how  far  his  grantor  ma}^  have  exceeded  the  authority  given  by 
the  statutes  of  the  State,  any  more  than  he  might  with  respect  to 
an  alleged  abuse  of  the  powers  conferred  by  its  home  charter. 
Those  are  questions  between  the  corporation  and  the  govern- 
ment." 1 

^  Lancaster  v.  Amsterdam  Imp.  Co.  140     reversing    72    Hun,  18,  25   N.  Y.   Supp. 
N.  Y.  576,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  964,  9  Am.  R.     309. 
R.  &  Corp,  Rep.  155,  161,  per  Gray,  J., 

173 


BOOK  11. 

ESTATES  m   FEE   AND   THEIR  TRANSFER   BY   DEED. 


CHAPTER 

XIII.  DEEDS   OF   CONVEYANCE   AND   THETR   FORMS. 

XIV.  PARTIES   TO   DEEDS   AND   THEIR   DESCRIPTION. 
XV.   RECITALS   IN   DEEDS. 

XVI.  CONSIDERATION. 

XVII.  OPERATIVE   WORDS. 

XVIII.  DESCRIPTION    AND   BOUNDARIES. 

XIX.  EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 

XX.  HABENDUM,   OR  THE   ESTATES  CREATED. 

XXI.  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

XXII.  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO   THE    USE    OF   LAND. 

XXIII.  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

XXIV.  SIGNING. 
XXV.  SEALING. 

XXVI.   ATTESTATION. 
XXVII.   ACKNOWLEDGMENT. 
XXVIIL   DELIVERY. 
XXIX.   DELIVERY   IN   ESCROW. 
XXX.   FILLING  BLANKS  AND  MAKING  ALTERATIONS  AFTER 

EXECUTION. 
XXXI.   RECORDING. 
XXXIL   NOTICE. 


BOOK   II. 

ESTATES  JN  FEE  AND   THEIR  TRANSFER  BY  DEED. 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

DEEDS  OF  CONVEYANCE  AND  THEIR  FORMS. 

193.  It  is  probable  that  transfers  of  land  were  originally 
made  by  means  of  the  delivery  upon  the  land  of  something 
pertaining  to  it,  such  as  a  piece  of  turf,  or  a  bough  from  a  tree, 
accompanied  by  words  signifying  an  intention  to  transfer  the 
land.  In  the  times  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  in  England,  before  the 
Norman  Conquest,  grants  of  public  land  were  made  by  the  king 
as  the  chief  of  the  community,  with  the  assent  of  his  witan,  by 
means  usually  of  a  "book"  or  charter.  The  land  thus  granted 
was  called  bocland  or  bookland.  Whether  the  land  was  actually 
considered  as  transferred  by  the  book,  as  in  modern  conveyances, 
is  uncertain,  but  the  analogy  of  the  practice  of  other  nations 
would  seem  to  show  that  something  in  the  nature  of  a  symbolical 
delivery  would  be  considered  essential.^ 

194.  When  land  in  England,  after  the  Norman  Conquest, 
came  to  be  held  by  feudal  tenure,  it  was  transferred  by  livery 
of  seisin  without  a  deed,  a  custom  in  imitation  of  the  ancient 
feudal  investiture.  The  two  essential  elements  of  a  conveyance 
of  a  freehold  interest  in  it  were,  first,  a  formal  delivery  of  pos- 
session, called  livery  of  seisin  ;  and,  second,  words  accompanying 
such  delivery  indicating  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  grantee's 
interest   and   the  service  to  be  rendered   for  it.^     Tiiis  mode   of 

1  Digby's  Hist,   of  the   Law   of    Real  If    the    rightful    freeholder   was    ousted 

ProjKTty,  4th  ed.  13  and  note.  and  in  fact  lost  his  possession,  he  was  dis- 

■^  Digby's  Hist,  of  the  Law  of  Real  seised,  or  put  out  of  seisin,  and  the  wrong- 
Property,  4th  ed.  49.  Seisin  means  pos-  doer  or  disseisor  was  seised  in  his  place, 
session,  as  of  freehold,  that  is,  the  posses-  liolding  by  wrong  the  estate  from  which 
sion  which  a  freeholder  coiiM  assert  and  he  had  ousted  the  rightful  possessor." 
maintain  by  apjjcal  to  law.  "There  was  a  Digby's  Hist,  of  the  Law  of  Real  Prop- 
seisin  as  of  right,  and  a  sei-.iii  a-^'if  wrotig.  erty,  4th  ed.  108. 

VOL.  I.  177 


§  11)5.]  DEEDS   OF   CONVEYANCE   AND    THEIR   FORMS. 

conveviiii;'  land  was  tortued  a  feoil'mcnt.  'I'lie  grantor  was  the 
ft'olTor,  the  grantee  the  feoffee.  Livery  of  seisin  was  made  either 
by  the  feoffor  or  by  his  deputy.  The  delivery  of  something  on 
the  hind  was  not  an  essential  part  of  the  ceremony  ;  but  it  was 
essential  to  an  actual  delivery  of  j)Ossessi()n,  or  livery  in  deed, 
that  the  parties  should  be  actually  present  on  the  land,  and  that 
possession  should  be  delivered  either  by  act  or  word.  A  livery 
in  law  took  place  when  the  transaction  was  made  in  sight  of  the 
land  but  not  upon  it,  and  was  followed  by  an  entry  of  the  feoffee 
during  the  lifetime  of  the  feoffor.^ 

Notoriety  was  given  to  the  transaction  by  making  delivery  upon 
the  land,  and  much  importance  was  attached  to  this.  "  That  all 
the  neighbors  might  know  that  A  was  tenant  to  B  from  the  fact 
that  open  livery  of  seisin  had  been  made  to  him,  was  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  B,  in  order  to  protect  him  and  enable  him 
to  assert  his  rights  as  lord."  ^ 

195.  Sometimes  livery  of  seisin  "was  accompanied  by  the 
delivery  of  a  deed,  which  served  to  define  more  accurately  the 
nature  and  terms  of  the  transfer,  but  no  deed  was  necessary ;  and 
wiien  it  was  used  the  lands  were  supposed  to  be  transferred,  not 
by  the  deed,  but  by  the  livery .^  The  apt  words  of  conveyance 
in  a  deed  of  feoffment  were  "give  and  grant."  The  conveyance 
was  primarily  a  gift,  the  only  consideration  being  the  feudal  ser- 
vice which  the  feoffee  was  expected  to  render  to  the  feoffor.* 

While  it  was  not  essential  that  the  words  of  gift  or  transfer 
should  be  embodied  in  a  deed,  it  was  usual  to  execute  a  charter 
of  feoffment,  in  order  to  preserve  the  evidence  of  the  grant. 
Bracton  gives  a  specimen  of  such  a  charter.^ 

1  Co.  Litt.  48  6;  Digby's  Hist,  of  the  a  township,  to  have  and  to  hold  to  C  D  and 

Law  of  Real  Property,  4th  ed.  146.  his  heirs   (either  generally  or  with  some 

-  Digby's   Hist,   of  the   Law   of    Real  limitation  of  heirs)  or  assigns,  freely  and 

l^roperty,  4th  ed.  146.  peaceably,  rendering  for  the  same  so  much 

3  iMcCabe  v.  Hunter,  7  Mo.  .35.5.  by  the  year  at  such  and  such  fixed  terms, 

*  Poe  V.   Domec,  48  Mo.  441,443,  per  and  performing  fur  the  same  such  services 

Bliss,  J.  and  such  customs    in    lieu  of  all  service 

^  Bracton,  lib.  ii.  ch.  16,  fol.  346.     It  is  custom,   secular  exaction,   and  demand," 

in  the  following  words :  "  Know  all  per-  by   which  general  expression   it   apjtears 

sons,  now  and  hereafter,  that  1,  A  B,  have  that  all  other  articles,  customs,  and  seen- 

given    and   granted,  and   by  this  present  lar   demands   which    belong   to  the   lord 

charter  of  mine  have  confirmed  to  C  D,  from  the  tenement  are  exjjressly  released, 

in  return  for  his  homage   and  service,  so  although   no  express   words  to  this  effect 

much  laud,  with  its  appurtenances,  in  such  are  contained  in  the  charter. 

178 


DEEDS    OF    CONVEYANCE    AND    THEIR    FORMS.       [§§  196,  197. 

196.  But  a  deed  alone  was  ineffectual  to  transfer  the  title. 
"  A  gift  is  not  valid,"  said  Bracton,  writing  in  the  time  of  Henry 
III.,^  "'unless  it  be  followed  by  delivery  of  possession,  because 
the  subject  of  the  gift  is  not  transferred  by  homage,  or  by  the 
execution  of  deeds  or  instruments,  although  they  may  have  been 
read  in  public."  The  following  from  a  recent  judgment  by  Lord 
Justice  Fry  illustrates  the  importance  formerly  attached  to  the 
delivery  of  possession,  or  the  livery  of  seisin:  "In  Bracton's  day, 
seisin  was  a  most  important  element  of  the  law  of  property  in 
general;  and,  however  strange  it  may  sound  to  jurists  of  our  day 
and  countr}^  the  lawyers  of  that  day  applied  the  term  as  freely 
to  a  pig's  ham  as  to  a  manor  or  a  field.  At  that  time  the  distinc- 
tion between  real  and  personal  property  had  not  yet  grown  up  : 
the  distinction  then  recognized  was  between  things  corporeal  and 
things  incoi-poreal ;  no  action  could  then  be  maintained  on  a  con- 
tract for  the  sale  of  goods,  even  for  valuable  consideration,  unless 
under  seal ;  the  distinction  so  familiar  to  us  now  between  con- 
tracts and  gifts  had  not  fully  developed  itself.  The  law  recog- 
nized seisin  as  the  common  incident  of  all  property  in  corporeal 
things,  and  tradition,  or  the  delivery  of  that  seisin  from  one  man 
to  another,  as  essential  to  the  transfer  of  the  property  in  that 
thing,  whether  it  were  land  or  a  horse,  and  whether  by  way  of 
sale  or  of  gift,  and  whether  by  word  of  mouth  or  by  deed  under 
seal.  This  necessity  for  delivery  of  seisin  has  disappeared  from 
a  large  part  of  the  transactions  known  to  our  law,  but  it  has 
survived  in  the  case  of  feoffments."  ^ 

197.  After  a  time  a  writing  or  deed  in  connection  with,  a 
feoffment  became  more  and  more  important,  and  served  to 
declare  uses  and  trusts,  and  to  record  the  limitations  of  the  estates 
transferred.  Finally,  by  the  statute  of  frauds,^  a  feoffment  made 
by  livery  of  seisin  onl}^  and  not  accompanied  b}'  an  instru- 
ment in  writing  signed  by  the  feoffor,  or  his  agent  lawfully  au- 
thorized in  writing,  had  the  effect  of  creating  an  estate  at  will 
only.^ 

An  incorporeal  right  or  easement  could  be  created  and  conveyed 
only  by  deed.     In  the  language  of  the  common  law  an  incorpo- 

1  Bracton,  lib.  ii.  ch.  18,  fol.  39.  ■*  Bytliewood    &    Jarman's    Conveyan- 

^  Cochrane  v.  Moore,  25  Q.  B.  Div.  57,  cing,  4tli  ed.  vol.  v.  p.  3.    So  by  statute  in 

65,  per  Fry,  Lord  Justice.  many  American  States. 
8  29  Charles  II.  ch.  3. 

179 


§§  108,  100.]       DKKDS   OF   CONVEYANCK   AND    THEIB   FORMS. 

real    horoditanient   was   saiil    to  lie   in   grant,  ant!   could   not   be 
created  or  ti'ansferred,  as  lands  couKl  be,  by  livery  of  seisin. 

198.  The  Statute  of  Uses.  —  In  equity  the  jicrfoiinance  of 
any  use  declared  upon  the  feoll'nient  could  be  enforced,  and  ad- 
vantage was  taken  of  this  means  by  the  monasteries  and  other 
religious  corporations  to  evade  the  mortmain  laws,  and  to  keep 
secret  the  actual  benelicial  ownership  of  land.  The  pi-eamble  of 
the  Statute  of  Uses  ^  recites  at  length  the  evils  of  this  practice, 
declaring  that  "divers  and  sundry  imaginations,  subtle  inven- 
tions, and  practices  have  been  used,  whereby  the  hereditaments  of 
this  realm  have  been  conveyed  from  one  to  another  by  fraudulent 
feoffments,  fines,  recoveries,  and  other  assurances  craftily  made 
to  secret  uses,  intents,  and  trusts."  The  statute  transferred  the 
estate,  title,  right,  and  possession,  that  was  in  the  person  legally 
seised  of  the  land  to  the  use  of  another  person,  directly  to  such 
other  person.     It  made  the  beneficial  owner  the  legal  owner. 

The  purpose  of  the  statute  was  to  compel  all  conveyances  to  be 
made  directly  to  the  beneficial  owner,  in  order  that  the  king  and 
lords  might  not  be  deprived  of  the  profits  and  advantages  to  which 
they  were  entitled  under  the  feudal  system.  It  failed  in  the  pur- 
pose, because  the  courts  of  equity  decided  that  the  statute,  having 
operated  once  in  executing  the  use  and  turning  it  into  a  legal  seisin, 
was  ihenceiovih  functus  officio.  It  therefore  became  possible,  by 
the  addition  of  a  further  use,  to  create  trust  estates  with  the  same 
facility  as  before.  The  courts  favored  less  restricted  dealings 
with  land,  and  in  this  instance,  as  in  others,  found  means  to  nul- 
lify feudal  legislation.^ 

The  consequences  of  the  Statute  of  Uses  have  been  great  and 
far-reaching.  "  They  continue  to  the  present  day.  What  may 
be  called  the  modern  law  of  real  property,  and  the  highly  tech- 
nical and  intricate  system  of  conveyancing  which  still  prevails, 
dates  from  the  legislation  of  Henry  VIII."'' 

199.  The  deed  of  lease  and  release  had  its  origin  in  the 
Statute  of  Uses.  It  was  a  contrivance  to  avoid  livery  of  seisin 
and  the  restrictions  of  the  statute.  A  lessee  for  years  having 
entered  into  possession  of  the  land,  though  he  was  not  considered 
as  having  feudal  seisin,  had  the  actual  possession,  so  that  there 

1  27  Henry  VIII.  ch.  10.  ^  Digby's   Hist,   of    the   Law  of   Keal 

2  5  Bythewood's    Precedeuts,    4th    ed.     Property,  4th  ed.  345. 
4-7 ;  Croxall  v.  Sheran],  5  Wall.  268. 

180 


DKKDS  OF  CONVEYANCE  AND  THEIR  FORMS.      [§  200. 

was  no  occasion  for  any  livery  of  seisin,  nor  would  such  livery 
be  possible  unless  he  surrendered  his  lease.  He  was  therefore  in 
a  position  to  acquire  his  landlord's  interest,  without  any  livery  of 
seisin,  by  a  deed  of  release.  Leases  for  years  were  accordingly 
made  for  the  express  purpose  of  afterwards  conveying  the  land- 
lord's interest  to  the  lessee,  and  thus  avoiding  the  publicity  of  a 
livery  of  the  seisin.^  This  form  of  conveyance  became  the  usual 
form  in  England,  and  continued  so  to  be  till  the  year  1841,  when 
by  act  of  Parliament  ^  a  release  was  declared  to  be  as  effectual 
for  the  conveyancee  of  freehold  estates  as  a  lease  and  release. 

2C0.  The  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  was  another  form  of 
conveyance  devised  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  the  publicity  of 
conveyance  by  livery  of  seisin.  A  deed  of  release  could  only  be 
made  in  case  the  lessee  had  actually  entered  under  his  lease.  The 
necessity  of  such  an  entry  was  avoided  by  a  bargain  and  sale. 
"A  bargain  was  made  for  the  sale  of  an  estate;  the  purchase- 
money  was  paid  ;  but  there  was  either  no  conveyance  at  all  of  the 
legal  interest,  or  a  conveyance  defective  at  law  by  reason  of  the 
omission  of  livery  of  seisin,  or  attornment:  the  court  of  chancery 
properly  thought  that  the  estate  ought  in  conscience  to  belong- 
to  the  person  who  paid  the  mone}',  and  therefore  considered  the 
bargainor  as  a  trustee  for  him.  But  the  centui  que  trust  had  only 
an  equitable  interest."  ^  By  the  Statute  of  Uses,  where  a  person 
is  seised  of  land  to  the  use  of  another,  by  reason  of  any  bargain, 
sale,  or  feoffment,  the  person  who  has  such  use  shall  be  deemed 
ill  lawful  seisin,  estate,  and  possession  of  the  land,  to  all  intents 
and  purposes,  in  such  like  estate  as  he  has  in  the  use.  This 
statute,  as  applied  to  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale,  passes  the  legal 
estate,  v/hich  for  want  of  feoffment  remained  in  the  bargainor, 
to  the  purchaser,  who  by  payment  of  the  purchase-money  was 
entitled  to  the  equitable  interest.  Without  the  statute  the  bar- 
gainor was  deemed  to  be  seised  of  the  land  to  the  use  of  the 
bargainee  ;  but  the  statute  united  the  possession  to  the  use,  so 
that,  the  very  instant  the  use  is  raised,  the  j)Ossession  is  joined  to 
it,  and  the  bargainee  becomes  seised  of  the  land.^     "  The  Statute 

'  5  Bythewood  &  Jarman's  Precedents  In's  Ilisi.  of  the  Law  of   Real  Prop.  4th 

in  ConvcyancinfT,  4th  eil.  7.  ed.  328  ;  5  Bythewood   &  Jarman's  Pre- 

-  Act  4  «&.  5  Vict.  ch.  21.  cedents   in  Conveyancing,  4th  ed.  8;  Sli- 

8  French  v.   French,  3  N.  II.  2.34,  260,  fcr  v.  Beates,  9  S.  &  H.  166,  177,  per  Dun- 

per  Richardson,  C.  J.  can,  J. 

*  French  v.  French,  3  N.  II.  234  ;  Dig-  181 


5;;^  -JOl,  -02.]   DEKDS  OF  CONVEYANCE  AND  THEIR  FORMS. 

of  Uses   iieeordingly  defeated  its  own  ends,   and  enabled  secret 
conveyances  to  be  made  with  greater  facility  than  before." 

201.  Statute  of  Enrolments.  —  The  Statute  of  Uses  having 
failed  in  its  purpose,  a  second  act  was  passed  tlie  same  year  to 
prevent  the  mischief  of  secret  bargains  and  sales.  Tliis  was  the 
Statute  of  Enrohiients,  which  re(piired  all  bargains  and  sales  of 
inheritance  or  freehold,  which  previously  might  be  made  by  parol, 
to  be  made  by  deed  indented,  and  that  they  should  be  enrolled 
in  a  court  of  record. ^  The  intention  was  to  secure  publicity; 
but  the  statute  failed  of  its  purpose,  because  it  applied  only  to 
estates  of  inheritance  or  freehold,  and  not  to  estates  for  years  ; 
and  consequently,  upon  a  bargain  and  sale  for  years,  the  use  raised 
upon  the  consideration  was  immediately  executed  by  the  Statute 
of  Uses,  so  that  the  purchaser  having  legal  possession  could 
receive  the  seisin  by  a  mei'e  release.^  "  Thus  if  A,  tenant  in  fee 
simple,  bai'gained  and  sold  the  manor  of  Dale  to  B  for  a  year, 
and  the  day  after  executed  a  release  of  the  reversion  in  fee  to  B 
and  his  heirs,  he  would  by  the  bargain  and  sale  have  immediately 
vested  in  him  an  estate  for  a  year  in  possession.  He  would  there- 
upon become  capable  of  taking  a  release,  and,  so  soon  as  the  release 
was  executed,  the  smaller  estate  and  the  larger  would  coalesce, 
and  the  term  be  '  merged  '  or  sunk  in  the  larger  estate,  whereupon 
B  would  become  tenant  in  fee  simple  in  possession.  So  popular 
did  this  conveyance  become  that  in  ordinary  cases  it  entirely 
superseded  the  feoffment,  and  bargain  and  sale  enrolled,  and 
became  the  general  mode  of  conveying  freeholds  mter  vivos  till 
the  year  1841."-^ 

202.  The  form  of  conveyance  known  as  a  covenant  to 
stand  seised  is  also  founded  upon  the  Statute  of  Uses.  The 
consideration  is  the  distinctive  and  essential  feature  of  this  spe- 
cies of  deed ;  the  covenant  can  rest  only  in  consideration  of 
blood  or  marriage.  It  need  not  be  expressed  in  any  particular 
words,  but  this  consideration  must  in  some  way  appear  as  the 
actual  consideration.  Thus  the  deed  need  not  in  terms  declare 
that  it  is  made  in  consideration  of  natural  love  or  affection  for  a 
wife,  son,  or  cousin  ;  but  if  there  is  a  covenant  to  stand  seised  to 

1  27  Henry  VIII.  ch.  16.  3  Digby's    Hist,  of   the    Law   of    Heal 

2  .5  Bythewood's  Precedents  in  Convey-  Property,  4th  ed.  365.  The  En<rlish  Stat- 
anciDjr,  4th  ed.  8;  Digby's  Hist,  of  the  iite  4  &  5  Vict.  eh.  21  (1841)  niiidc  a  re- 
Law  of  Real  Property,  4th  ed.  355,  364.  lease  an  effectual  couveyaiice. 

182 


DEEDS    OF   CONVEYANCE    AND   THEIR   FORMS.       [§§  203,  204. 

the  use  of  the  wife,  son,   or  cousin,  the  covenant  raises  the  use 
and  the  statute  executes  it.^ 

203.  Our  ancestors  brought  with  them,  upon  the  first  set- 
tlement of  this  country,  the  modes  of  conveying  real  estate 
then  in  use  in  England.  Thus,  a  statute  of  the  colony  of  ]Mas- 
sachusetts,  passed  in  1652,^  provided  that  "no  sale  or  alienation  of 
houses  and  lands,  within  this  jurisdiction,  shall  be  holden  good  in 
law,  except  the  same  be  done  by  deed  in  writing,  under  hand  and 
seal,  and  delivered,  and  possession  given  upon  part  in  the  name 
of  the  whole  by  the  seller,  or  his  attorney  so  authorized,  under 
hand  and  seal,  unless  the  said  deed  be  acknowledged  and  recorded 
according  to  law."  Here  a  feoffment  is  recognized  as  a  valid 
mode  of  conveyance. 

Deeds  of  bargain  and  sale  were  distinctly  recognized  in  the 
laws  of  the  same  colony  passed  in  1641  and  in  1697.'^ 

In  South  Carolina,  previous  to  the  year  1795,  a  deed  of  lease 
and  release  was  the  usual  form  of  conveyance.  In  that  year  an 
act  was  passed  reciting  that,  whereas  the  mode  of  conveying  land 
by  lease  and  release  is  expensive  and  inconvenient,  a  form  of 
release  which  is  given  shall  be  effectual  to  convey  the  fee  simple 
of  any  real  estate.  The  operative  words  in  this  form  were  "  bar- 
gain, sell,  and  release,"  which  combines  the  operative  words  of 
a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  and  of  a  deed  of  release.* 

The  principles  of  the  Statute  of  Uses  were  a  part  of  the  com- 
mon law  adopted  by  the  colonies.^  The  forms  of  convej^ances 
then  used,  and  in  substance  used  down  to  the  present  time,  have 
their  foundation  in  this  statute. 

204.  Conveyances  of  estates  of  inheritance  or  freehold  in 
land,  or  of  any  interest  in  it  more  than  for  a  short  term  of 
years,  must  be  by  deed  in  writing  ;  and  this  is  expressly  de- 
clared by  statute  in  many  of  the  American  States,*^  and  is  implied 

'  French  i-.  French,  3  N.  H.  234  ;  Cook  «  Alabama:  Code  1886,  §   1789.     Ari- 

V.  Brown,  34  N.  H.  460.  zona  :  K-  S.  1887,  IT  214.   California:  Civ. 

2  Col.  Laws,  ed.  1672,  p.  32.  Code,  §   1091.     Connecticut :  G.   S.  1888, 

8  Col.  Laws,  ed.    1672,  p.  32  ;  1  Prov.  §29.54.      Florida:    K.    S.    1892,   §   1950. 

Laws,  298.     The  latter  was  reenacted  in  Georgia:  Code  1882,  §  2690.     Idaho:  R. 

New    Hampshire,    13    Wm.    IIL    ch.    12  S.  1887,  §  2920.     Illinois :  R.  S.  1S89,  ch 

(Prov.  Laws,  19);  French    ;;.    French,   3  39,  §   1.     Indiana:    2  R.  S.  1894,  s^  .33.3.5. 

N.  H.  234.  Kansas:  G.  S.  1889,  §  1112.     Kentucky: 

*  Craig  V.  Pinson,  Chevcs  (S.  C),  272.  R.  8.  1894,  §§  490,  2.341.     Maine :  R.  S. 

6  Bryan  v.  Bradlev,  16  Conn.  474.  1883,  ch.  73,  §  10.     Maryland  :  Pub.  G.  L. 

183 


§§  205-207.]       DEKDS    OF    CONVKYANCK    AND    TIIKIU    FORMS. 

by  the  statutory  provisions  of  other  States,  especially  the  provi 
sions  for  the  recortUiii^  of  deeds. 

205.  Livery  of  seisin  is  not  in  any  of  the  States  necessary 
in  any  conveyance  of  land,  and  in  most  of  tiit^  States  it  is  de- 
chired  by  statute  either  that  livery  of  seisin  is  not  necessary  ;  or 
that  conveyances  of  any  interest  in  hind  may  be  made  by  deed 
Avithout  any  other  act  or  ceremony  ;  or  tliat  all  deeds  shall  be 
held  to  vest  the  possession  of  the  grantor  in  the  grantee  to  th(^ 
extent  of  the  estate  intended  to  be  conveyed.^ 

206.  In  modern  conveyancing  the  deed  of  bargain  and 
sale  is  in  fact  the  instrument  of  transfer  almost  exclusively 
in  use,  though  the  technical  words  originally  used  in  other  forms 
of  conveyances  are  often  joined  with  the  appropriate  words  of  a 
deed  of  bargain  and  sale.  In  fact,  almost  every  deed  made  upon 
a  pecuniary  consideration  is  regarded  as  a  deed  of  bargain  and 
sale.  Whatever  may  be  the  words  used,  if  they  import  a  present 
sale  for  a  pecuniary  consideration,  and  the  deed  cannot  oper.ite  as 
a  lease  and  release  b}'  reason  that  the  grantee  is  not  in  possession, 
nor  as  a  contract  to  stand  seised  to  uses,  because  there  is  no  con- 
sideration of  blood  or  marriage,  effect  will  be  given  to  it  as  a 
bargain  and  sale.^ 

207.  The  words  "  bargain  and  sell  "  are  not  essential  to  a 
deed  of  bargain  and  sale.  No  technical  words  are  required  to 
raise  a  use.     If  the  words  used  and  the  consideration  paid  create 

1888,  art.  21,  §  1.    Massachusetts:  P.  S.  G.  S.  1889,  ^  1112.      Kentucky:   E.  S. 

1882,  ch.  120,  §§  1,  3.     Michigan  :  2  An-  1894,  §491.     Maryland :  Pub.  G.  L.  1888, 

not.    Stats.    1882,   §   5652.     Mississippi:  art.  21,  §  23.    Massachusetts:  P.  S.  1882, 

Annot.    Code     1892,   §    2433.     Missouri:  cli.  120,  §§  1,3.     Michigan :  Annot.  Stats. 

R.  S.   1889,   §  2395.     Nebraska:    Conip.  1882,   §   5G52.     Minnesota:    G.  S.    1894, 

Stats.  1893,  ch.  73,  §§  1,  46.     North  Da-  §  4160.     Mississippi:    Annot.  Code  1892, 

kota:  Comp.  Laws    1877,  §  3245.     Okia-  §  2433.      Missouri:    U.   S.  1889,  §  2395. 

homa:  n.  S.  1893,  §  1608.    Pennsylvania:  Montana:    Com]).    Stats.    1887,   p.    656, 

Bri<;htly's    Piirdon's    Dig.   1894,    p.    942,  §235.    Nevada :  G.  S.  1885,  §  2569.    New 

§  2.     South  Dakota:  Comp.  Laws  1887,  Hampshire  :  P.  S.  1891,  ch.  137,  §  1.    New 

§  3245.     Texas:  R.  Civ.  Stats.  1889,  art.  York:  2  R.  S.  1889,  p.  2451.     North  Caro- 

54S.     Vermont:  R.  S.  1880,  §§  1922,  1932.  lina:  Code  1883,  §  1245.    Oregon:  Annot. 

Virginia:  Code  1887,  §  2413.     Washing-  Laws  1892,  §3002.     Rhode  Island:  P.  S. 

ton:  G.  S.  1891,  §  1422.  1882,  p.  443.     South  Carolina:  G.  S.  1882, 

1  Alabama:  Code  1886,  §  1841.   Arkan-  §   1780.     Tennessee:    Code  1884,  §  2811, 

sas:  Dig.  of  Stats.  1884,  §  639.   Colorado:  Wisconsin:    Annot.   Stat.s.    1889,  §   2203. 

Annot.    Stats.    1891,   §   428.     Delaware:  Wyoming:  R.  S.  1887,  §  1. 

R.  Code  1893,  ch.  8.3,  §1.   Florida:  H.  S.  ^  Lynch   v.   Livin.-.'^ton,  8    Barb.   463; 

1892,  §  1954.     Illinois  :  R.  S.  1889,  cb.  30,  Chiles  v.  Conley,  2  Dana,  21. 
§1.     Iowa:    R.  S.   1888,3099.    Kansas: 
184 


DEEDS    OF    CONVEYANCE    AND    THEIR    FORMS.       [§§  208,  209. 

a  contract  of  sale,  or  bargain,  a  trust  is  instantly  raised  upon 
which  the  Statute  of  Uses  operates.  The  statute  performs  the 
task  of  the  ancient  livery  of  seisin.  Thus,  the  words  "•  remise, 
release,  and  quitclaim  "  are  sufficient  to  raise  a  trust  or  use  for 
the  benefit  of  the  bargainee,-  which  the  statute  transfers  into 
possession.^  The  words  "  release  and  assign "  have  the  same 
effect  ;  and  so  the  words  "  make  over  and  confirm,"  ^  or  the  words 
"  make  over  and  grant."  ^ 

208.  The  courts  endeavor  to  give  eflfect  to  the  intent  of 
the  parties  to  a  deed  in  some  -way.  If  it  cannot  operate  as  a 
bargain  and  sale  for  the  reason  that  there  was  no  pecuniary  con- 
sider.ition  expressed  or  paid,  but  there  was  a  consideration  of  love, 
marriage,  or  natural  love  and  affection,  the  deed  will  be  given 
effect  as  a  covenant  to  stand  seised."^  jNIoreover,  a  deed  will  be 
construed  as  a  feoffment,  with  livery  of  seisin,  or  as  a  deed  under 
the  Statute  of  Uses,  as  will  best  accomplish  the  intention  of  the 
parties.''^ 

209.  A  quitclaim  deed,  or  in  other  "words  a  deed  of  release, 
under  the  principles  of  the  common  la-w,  never  operated  as  a 
conveyance  in  a  technical  sense,  but  merely  as  an  enlargement 
of  the  estate  of  the  releasee  if  he  was  at  the  time  in  possession  of 
the  land,  or  had  some  estate  to  be  enlarged,  such  as  an  estate  for 
years.^  In  England  it  was  not  till  1841  that  an  act  was  passed 
"for  rendering  a  release  as  effectual  for  the  conveyance  of  free- 
hold estates  as  a  lease  and  release  by  the  same  parties." ' 

By  statute  in  many  States,^  and  by  usage  in  others,  a  quitclaim 
deed,  or  deed  of  release,  operates  to  pass  all   the  estate  the  re- 

1  Doe  V.  Salkeld,  Willes.  675  ;  Good-  ^  niinois  :  R.  S.  1889,  ch.  30,  §  10  ;  Mc- 
rigbt  V.  Moss,  Cowp.  593;  Jackson  v.  Coiinel  u.  Reed,  5  111.  1 17.  Indiana:  R.  S. 
Fisk,  10  Johns.  456;  Lynch  c.  Livingston,  1894,  §  3343.  Kansas:  G.  S.  1889,111111. 
8  Barb.  463.  Kentucky :  G.   S.    1894,    §   49-2.     Maine: 

2  Jackson  v.  Root,  18  Johns.  60,  79.  R.  S.  1883,  ch.  73,  §  14.  Massachusetts  : 
8  Jackson  i;.  Alexander,  3  Johns.  484.  P.  S.  1882,  ch.  120^  §  2.  Michigan:  2 
*  Eckman  v.  Eckman,  68  Pa.  St.  460;     Annot.   Stats.  1882,  §  5652,     Minnesota: 

Bryan   v.  Bradley,  16  Conn.  474  ;  Cheney  G.  S.  1894,  §  4163  ;   Everest  v.  Ferris,   16 

V.  Watkins,  1  Har.  c&  J.  527,  2  Am.  Dec.  Minn.  26.    Mississippi:  Annot.  Code  1892, 

.530.  §  2438  ;  Kerr  v.  Freeman,  33  Miss.  292  ; 

'^  Eckman  v.  Eckman,  68  Pa.  St.  460.  Chapman  v.  Sims,  53  Miss.  154.     Oregon: 

6  Porter  7;.  Perkin.s,  5  Mass.  233,  4  Am.  G.  L.  1892,  §  3004.    Virginia:  Code  1887, 

Dec.  52;  McConnel  v.   Reed,  5  111.  117;  §   2427.     West  Virginia :  Code    1891,  ch. 

Kerr  v.  Freeman,  33  Miss.  292.  72,  S;  3.     Wisconsin:  Annot.  Stats.  1889, 

■^  4  &  5  Vict.  ch.  11.  §  2207.     Wyoming  :  R.  S.  1887,  §  3. 

185 


§§  210,  'Jll.J       DEEDS    OF   CONVEYANCE   AND   THEIR   FORMS. 

leasor  could   convey  by  a  deed   of  bargain   and   sale,  or   by  any 
otlun-  form  of  deed. 

210.  There  has  long  been  a  tendency  towards  brevity  and 
simplicity  in  the  forms  of  deeds.  In  tlieory  at  least,  a  good 
deed  might  be  made  in  a  very  few  words  so  long  ago  as  the  time 
of  Sir  Edward  Coke  ;  ^  for,"  he  said,  "  if  a  man  by  deed  give 
land  to  another  and  to  his  heirs  without  more  saying,  this  is  good, 
if  he  put  his  seal  to  the  deed,  deliver  it,  and  make  livery  accord- 
ingly." Not  merely  in  theory,  but  in  practice,  the  American 
States  are  returning  to  the  simplicity  of  the  Anglo-Saxons,  who, 
"  in  their  deeds,  observed  no  set  form,  but  used  honest  and  per- 
spicuous words  to  express  the  things  intended  with  all  brevity, 
yet  not  wanting  the  essential  parts  of  tlie  deed,  as  the  names  of 
the  donor  and  donee ;  the  consideration  ;  the  certainty  of  the 
thing  given  ;  the  limitation  of  the  estate;  the  reservation:  and 
the  names  of  the  witnesses."  ^  Some  of  the  statutory  forms  of 
deeds  now  in  use  would  have  satisfied  the  Anglo-Saxons  as  re- 
gards brevity. 2  It  is  probable  that  statutory  forms  of  deeds  will 
come  into  general  use. 

Aside  from  statutory  enactments,  however  concise  and  informal 
an  instrument  may  be,  it  will  operate  as  a  deed  if  it  has  the  sub- 
stantial requisites  of  a  deed,  —  that  it  identifies  the  parties  and 
the  property,  contains  words  of  grant  or  transfer,  and  is  executed 
as  a  deed  is  required  to  be.^ 

211.  A  deed  by  indenture  is  one  executed  by  two  or  more  par- 
ties. This  is  the  more  usual  form  of  deed  both  in  England  and 
in  this  country.  It  commences  with  the  words,  "  This  indenture," 
and  then  follow  a  statement  of  the  date,  the  names  and  descrip- 

1  Sir    Henry    Spellinan's    Works,    by  1882,  §§  5729,  rsTSO.     Mississippi:  Annot. 

Bishop  Gibson,  p.  234.  Code  1892,  §  2479.     Missouri :  R.  S.  1889, 

-  Tliere  are  statutory  forms  of  deeds  in  p.  22.51.     New  York  :  Laws  1890,  ch.  475. 

the  following  States,  many  of  them  in  very  Oklahoma  T. :  Com  p.  Stats.  1893,  §§  1609, 

brief  terms :  —  C094.     South  Carolina  :  G.  S.  1892,  §  1775. 

Arizona  T. :  R.  S.  1887,  §  218.     Arkan-  South  Dakota:  Comj).  Laws  1887,  §§  3247, 

sas:    Dig.  of  Stats.   1884,  p.  1288.     Cali-  3249.      Tennessee:    Code    1884,    §  2820. 

fornia :  Civ.  Code,  §  1 092.   Colorado :  Laws  Texas:  R.  S.  1879,  art.  552  ;  R.  Civ.  Stats. 

1887,  p.226.     Florida:  Laws  1891,  §4038.  1889,  §   552.     Utah:  Laws   1890,   ch.  57. 

niinois  :  R.  S.  1889,  ch.  ,30,  §§  9-11.     In-  Virginia :  Code  1887,  ch.  108,  §§  2437-2452. 

diana:  R.  S.  1894,  §  3346-3349.     Iowa:  Washington:  G.  S.   1891,  §  1424.     West 

R.  S.  1888,  §  3145.     Kansas:  G.  S.  1889,  Virginia  :  Code  1891,  ch.  72,  §  1.     Wiscon- 

§§1110,1111.     Maryland:    Pub.    G.    L.  sin :  Annot.  Stats.  1889,  §  2208. 

1883,  :irt  21,  §§  51-59.     Michigan:  G.  S.  =>  chiles  v.  Conley,  2  Dana  (Ky.),  21. 
186 


DEEDS  OF  CONVEYANCE  AND  THEIR  FORMS.      [§  212. 

tion  of  the  parties,  the  recitals,  the  consideration,  the  operative 
words,  the  parcels,  the  habendiini,  the  covenants,  and  at  the  close 
the  testimonium  clause,  which  refers  to  the  date  of  the  instru- 
ment stated  at  the  beginning.^ 

A  deed  by  indenture  is  thedeed  not  only  of  the  grantor,  who 
alone  executes  it,  but  also  of  the  grantee,  to  whom  the  conveyance 
is  made,  although  it  be  not  sealed  and  delivered  by  him.^ 

212.  A  deed  poll  is  a  deed  made  by  one  party  only.  If  it 
contains  no  recitals,  the  introductory  words  are,  "  Know  all  men 
by  these  presents,"  etc.  If  there  are  recitals,  the  introductory 
words  should  be,  "  To  all  to  whom  these  presents  shall  come  " 
the  grantor  "  sends  greeting,"  followed  by  the  recitals,  which  are 
introduced  by  "  whereas."^ 

1  "  Indenture  "  means  an  indented  deed,  though  formerly  this  appears  to  have  been 

It  was  the  custom  to  make  two  copies  of  considered    necessary.      The   authorities, 

the  deed   upon  the  same  roll   of    parch-  however,  did  not  sustain  the  opinion  that 

ment,  which  was  then  cut  in  a  waving  or  actual  indenture  was  necessary, 

"indented"  line  ;  and  sometimes  the  cut  In  a  deed  poll  there  was  no  occasion  for 

was  made  through  a  word  written  across  more  than  one  copy,  and  the  parchment 

the   parcliment.     The  two   parts   of    the  was  cut  straight,  or  "  polled." 

parchment  could  be  identified  by  putting  ^  Woodruff  n.  Woodruff  (N.  J.),  16Atl. 

the  cut  edges  together  and  seeing  whether  Rep.  4. 

they  conformed.     In  recent  times  the  in-  ^  Bythewood's  Precedents,   4th  ed.  p. 

strument  need  not  be  actually  indented,  24. 

187 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

PARTIES   TO   DEEDS   AND   THEIR   DESCRIPTION. 


I.  Names  and  descriptions  of  the  grant- 

ors, 213-221. 

II.  Names  and  descriptions  of  the  grant- 

ees, 222-234. 


III.  Corporations    and    associations    as 

grantees,  235-243. 

IV.  Partnerships  as  grantees,  244,  245. 


Names  and  Descriptions  of  the  Grantors. 

213.  The  deed  should  describe  with  sufficient  clearness 
who  is  the  grantor  and  who  is  the  grantee,  giving  their  names, 
places  of  residence,  occupation  or  profession,  and  such  other  de- 
scriptions as  are  usually  stated  in  deeds.  "  And  regularly  it  is 
requisite,"  says  Coke,  "  that  the  purchaser  be  named  by  the  name 
of  baptism  and  his  surname,  and  that  special  heed  be  taken  to  the 
name  of  baptism  ;  for  that  a  man  cannot  have  two  names  of  bap- 
tism as  he  may  have  divers  surnames."  ^  A  formal  stateuient  of 
the  names,  residences,  and  other  description  of  the  parties  is  not 
essential  to  the  validity  of  a  deed.  But  it  has  been  sanctioned  by 
usage  for  so  long  a  period,  and  is  so  desirable,  that  great  suspicion 
attends  a  deed  vs'hich  does  not  conform  to  usage  in  this  particular. 
The  ofEce  of  a  name  is  to  identify  a  person  ;  but  identification 
may  be  made  by  any  other  description  which  points  him  out  and 
distinguishes  him  from  others.  "•  Know,"  says  Perkins,  "  that  the 
name  of  the  grantor  is  not  put  in  the  deed  to  any  other  intent 
but  to  make  certainty  of  the  grantor."  ^ 

A  description  of  a  party  to  a  deed  by  name,  residence,  and 
occupation  only  furnishes  the  means  of  identification.  That  is 
all  that  any  description  can  do.  It  doe_s  not  in  itself  identify  the 
party.     It  affords  a  presumption,  which  is  ordinarily  all   that  is 

^  Co.   Litt.  3a.,-    Jackson    v.   Ilart,   12  law  is  not  precise  in  the  case  of  surnames, 

Johns.  77,  87,  7  Am.  Dec.  280, per  Thomp-  but   for   the   Christian   name   this  ought 

son,  C.  J.    The  importancu  formerly  at-  aljvays  to  be  perfect."   Britton  v.  Wright- 

tached  to  the  Christian  name,  as  compared  man,  I'oph.  56. 

with  the  surname,  is  .shown   by  the   state-  ^  Profitable  Book,  §  36. 
nicnt  of  Chief  Justice  PoplKim   that  "the 

188 


NAMES    AND   DESCRIPTIONS   OF    THE   GRANTORS.  [§  214. 

required. 1  If  a  conveyance  is  made  to  one  by  a  certain  name,  and 
afterwai'ds  there  is  a  conveyance  by  one  under  the  same  name  of 
the  same  land,  there  is  a  presumption  of  identity  which  is  not 
overcome  by  the  statement  of  a  different  place  of  residence  in 
the  two  deeds.  Thus  land  was  conveyed  to  "Ashbel  Green,  of 
New  York,"  and  subsequently  it  was  conveyed  by  Ashbel  Green, 
of  the  township  of  Palisades,  in  the  county  of  Bergen  and  State 
of  New  Jerse}' ; "  and  it  was  held  that,  notwithstanding  the  vari- 
ance, such  grantee  and  grantor  would  be  presumed  to  be  the  same 
person. 2  The  proximity  or  remoteness  of  the  places  of  residence 
might  have  a  bearing  upon  the  presumption  of  identity. 

214.  Similarity  of  name  is  ordinarily  sufficient  evidence  of 
identity  of  a  purchaser  in  a  chain  of  title,  in  absence  of  evidence 
casting  doubt  upon  his  identity. ^  TIius,  where  a  grant  was  made 
to  "  Asahel  Savery,"  who  conveyed  the  land  by  an  instrument 
reciting  that  it  is  made  b}^  "  A.  Savary,"  but  signed  it  "  A.  Sa- 
vary,"'  and  this  instrument  is  shown  to  have  come  from  the  proper 
custody,  the  evidence  of  identity  is  sufficient  to  support  a  finding 
that  the  conveyance  was  executed  by  the  original  grantee.'*  And 
so  where  a  patent  was  issued  to  "  James  Enimonds  "  and  a  deed 
of  the  land  was  made  in  which  the  grantor's  name  was  so  given, 
but  it  was  signed  "  James  Emmens,"  it  was  lield  that  there  was 
no  such  variance  as  to  destroy  the  presumption  that  it  was  the 
deed  of  the  patentee.^ 

Though  the  name  written  in  a  deed  is  not  the  same  as  the  name 
signed  to  it,  the  variance  in  orthography  or  in  sound  may  be  so 
slight  as  not  to  destroy  the  presumption  that  they  are  intended  for 
the  same  person.^  A  deed  describing  the  grantor  by  his  first 
given  name  written  in  full,  with  an  initial  for  his  middle  name, 
but  signed  by  an  initial  for  the  first  name  with  the  middle  name 
written  in  full,  sufficiently  identifies  the  grantor,  where  the  certifi- 

1  Tinder  v.  Tinder,  131  Ind.  381,  30  v.  Cody,  9  Cow.  140 ;  Lyon  y.  Kain,  36  HI. 
N.  K.  Rep.  1077,  per  Elliott,  C.J. ;  Rupert  362  ;  O'lVIeara  v.  North  American  M.  Co. 
V.  Tenner,  35  Neb.   .587,  53  N.  W.  Rep.     2  Nev.  112,  121. 

598;  Eames  v.   McGre<;or,  43   Mich.  313,  *  Smith  v.  Gillum,  80  Tex.   120,  15  S. 

5  N.  E.  Rep.  408 ;  Goodell  v.  Ilihbard,  32  W.  Rep.  794. 

Mich.  47.  ^  Lyon  v.  Kain,  36  111.  362. 

2  Tillotson  V.  Webber,  96  Mich.  144,  55  «  Lyon  v.  Kain,  36  111.  362;  Dodd  v. 
N.  W.  Rep.  837.  Bartholomew,  44  Ohio  St.  171  ;  Galveston 

3  Chamblee  v.  Tarbox,  27  Tex.  139, 144,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stealey,  66  Tex.  468,  1  S. 
84  Am.  Dec.  614;  Robertson  v.  Du  Bo.se,  W.  Rep.  186. 

76  Tex.  1,  6,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  300;  Jackson 

189 


§  215.]  rARllKS    TO    DEEDS    AND    THEIR    DESCRIPTION. 

cate  of  aokuowledgment  states  that  the  officer  knows  the  person 
sii^niiKi-  the  deed  to  be  the  same  described  in  it,  and  who  exe- 
cuted it.^ 

Where  an  error  occurs  in  the  name  or  residence  of  a  party  to  a 
written  instrument  apparent  upon  its  face,  and  from  its  contents 
suscejitible  of  correction  so  as  to  itUmtify  the  party  with  certainty, 
such  error  does  not  affect  the  vaHdity  of  the  instrument.^  Thus 
where  a  deed  was  signed  and  acknowledged  by  "  Samuel  S.  Jen- 
kins," the  fact  that  in  one  part  of  the  deed  the  grantor's  name 
was  written  "  Samuel  S.  Jones  "  is  a  manifest  error  which  does 
not  affect  the  validity  of  the  deed.^ 

215.  If  the  name  under  which  one  has  purchased  land  is  not 
the  correct  name,  nor  idem  sonans,  and  he  conveys  by  his  cor- 
rect name,  his  identity  as  purchaser  may  be  proved  ;  but  until  such 
proof  is  made,  and  the  deed  to  him  is  reformed,  his  deed  is  not  a 
sufficient  compliance  with  an  agreement  to  give  a  ''  good  and  per- 
fect title."  Thus  it  appeared  in  a  chain  of  title  that  a  convey- 
ance was  made  to  "  K.  F.  Redmond,"  and  that  thereafter  one 
"K.  F.  Redman  "  conveyed  the  land  ;  and  after  this  said  Redman 
executed  another  deed  to  tlie  same  grantee,  in  which  he  recited 
that  he  derived  title  to  the  land  under  the  name  of  "K.  F. 
Redmond,"  that  his  name  was  erroneously  written  "  Redmond," 
and  that  he  was  the  identical  person  to  whom  such  conveyance 
was  in  fact  made  under  such  erroneous  name.  It  was  held  that 
these  deeds  were  not  sufficient  to  make  a  good  and  perfect  title 
under  an  agreement  to  convey.  The  court  said  :  "  The  second 
deed  from  Redman,  in  which  he  recites  that  he  is  the  identical 
person  named  as  '  Redmond '  in  the  prior  conveyances,  does  not 
help  the  matter.  These  recitals  may  be  true  in  point  of  fact, 
and  upon  being  established  by  proof  in  a  proper  action,  the  de- 
fendant could  doubtless  be  able  to  obtain  a  judgment  reforming 
the  deeds  under  which  his  grantor  Redman  claimed,  and  which 
judgment  would  in  effect  give  him  a  '  good  and  perfect  title '  to 
the  land,  within  the  meaning  of  the  law  and  the  agreement  which 
he  made  with  the  plaintiff.  But  a  good  and  perfect  title  is  one 
which  is  not  only  good  in  point  of  fact,  but  it  must  also  be  appar- 

1  Lyon  V.  Kain,  36  111.  362.  ^  Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  148  Pa.  St.  216, 

'-i  .Tones  on  Mort.  §  63  ;  Dodd  v.   Bar-     23  Atl.  Rep.  985. 
tholomew,  44   Ohio   St.  171  ;  Stewart   v. 
Sutherland,  93  Cal.  270,  28  Pac.  Rep.  947. 
190 


NAMES    AND    DESCRIl'TIONS    OF    THE    GRANTORS.       [§§  216,  217, 

eiitly  perfect  when  exhibited,  that  is,  free  from  nuy  reasonable 
objection.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  it  can  be  sliown  to  be  good  as 
tiie  I'esult  of  an  action  institnted  for  the  purpose  of  reforming 
defects  existing  in  'dnj  deed  which  is  necessary  to  make  tlie  chain 
of  title  complete."  ^ 

216.  For  the  purposes  of  identification,  recitals  in  deeds 
as  to  facts  of  birth,  marriage,  and  death  are  admissible  as 
original  evidence.^  A  deed  of  a  land  certiticate  wliich  had 
been  the  community  property  of  one  August  Auerbacli  and  his 
wife  Louisa,  who  after  the  death  of  her  husband  married  one 
'' Antone  Hammer,"  was  signed  by  "  A.  Hammer"  and  Louisa 
Hammer.  The  deed  gave  the  grantors'  names  as  "  Andreas  Ham- 
mer and  Louisa  Hammer,"  bnt  recited  that  the  certificate  conveyed 
was  "  the  headright  of  August  Auerbach,  first  husband  of  Louisa 
Hammer."  It  was  held  that  the  deed  was  admissible  in  evidence 
in  an  action  to  try  the  title,  and  it  was  for  the  jury  to  say  whether 
the  Louisa  Hammer  who  executed  it  as  the  wife  of  Andreas  Ham- 
mer was  the  same  person  as  the  Louisa  Auerbach  who  married 
Antone  Hammer.  The  identity  is  indicated  by  the  recital  in  the 
deed.'? 

217.  A  grantor  may  be  identified  by  the  certificate  of  ac- 
knowledgment.^ Thus  where  in  the  body  of  a  deed  the  grantor 
was  described  as  "  Robert  P.  McClintock,"  and  the  deed  was 
signed  "  R.  Parker  McClintock,"  and  the  certificate  of  acknow- 
ledgment shows  that  Robert  P.  McClintock  acknowledged  the 
deed,  it  was  held  that  the  grantor  was  sufficiently  identified.^ 
Where  the  grantor's  true  name  was  recited  in  the  body  of  the 
deed,  and  he  acknowledged  by  his  true  name,  the  fact  that   he 

1  Peckham  v.  Stewart,  97  Cal.  147,153,.        »  Auerbach  v.  Wylie,  84  Tex.  615,  19 

31  Pac.  Rep.  928.     A   perfect  title  is  one  S.  W.  Rep.  856. 

that  is  free  from  ajipaient  defects  and  is         *  Lj'on  r.  Kain,  36  111.  362;  Boothroyd 

fairly  deducible  from   the  records.     It  is  v.  Engles,  23  Mich.  19;  Houx  v.  Batteen, 

one   that   does   not   require   litigation   to  68  Mo.  84  ;  Fenton  i-.  Perkins,  3  Mo.  144 ; 

establish  it.     Richmond  v.  Gray,  3  Allen,  Ballard  v.  Carmichael,    83  Tex.  355,   18 

25;  Turner  v.  McDonald,  76  Cal.  177,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  734,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  393. 
Pac.  Rep.  262;  Sheehy  u.  Miles,  93   Cal.         '^  Grand   Tower   Co.    v.    Gill,    111   111. 

288,  28  Pac.  Rep.  1046  ;  Tillotson  v.  Ges-  541  ;  Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  148  Pa.  St.  216, 

ner,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  313,  327.  23    Atl.    Rep.   985.     The  affidavit  of  the 

-  1  Greenlcaf's  Ev.  §  104;  Auerbach  v.  subscribing  witness  has  the  same  effect. 

Wylie,   84  Tex.   615,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  856;  Bennett  i;.  Green,  74  Cal.  425,   16  Pac. 

Russell  y.  Oliver,  78  Tex.  11,16,  14  S.W.  Rep.  231. 
Rep.  264  ;  Ciiamblee  v.  Tarbox,  27  Tex. 
139,  145,  84  Am.  Dec.  614. 

191 


§    218.]  l'ARIli:S    TO    DEEDS    AND    THEIR    DKSCHIPTION. 

sigiu'd  l>v  the  Christaii  name  of  "  Ediiiuiul  "  when  his  true  name 
was  "  EJwaril  "'  was  htdd  not  to  invalidate  the  conveyance.  It  is 
to  be  presumed  from  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  in  the 
absence  of  the  deed  itself,  that  the  deed  was  in  fact  executed  by 
*' Edward."  ^ 

In  tlie  body  of  a  deed  and  in  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment 
the  grantor  was  correctly  described  as  "  Archibald  T.  Finn."  The 
deed  was  signed  by  "  Arch.  T,  Finn."  The  officer  taking  the 
acknowledgment  certified  that  "  personally  came  Archibald  T. 
Finn,  personally  to  me  known  to  be  the  identical  person  whose 
name  is  affixed  to  the  above  deed  as  grantor,  and  acknowledged 
the  instrument  to  be  his  voluntary  act  and  deed."  This  was 
sufficient  to  show  that  the  grantor  described  in  the  deed  and 
the  person  wiio  signed  and  acknowledged  the  instrument  were 
one  and  the  same  person.'-^ 

The  name  of  the  grantor  in  the  body  of  the  deed  and  in  the 
acknowledgment  may  be  so  unlike  that  signed  to  the  deed  that 
the  certificate  of  acknowledgment  will  not  be  held  to  sufficiently 
identify  the  grantor.  If  the  name  signed  to  a  deed  and  the  name 
by  which  it  was  acknowledged  are  not  similar,  proof  should  be 
made  that  the  person  who  signed  the  deed  also  acknowledged  it. 
Thus  a  deed  purporting  to  be  signed  by  "  Harmon  Sherman," 
and  acknowledged  by  "  Hiram  Sherman,"  cannot  in  the  absence 
of  such  proof  be  received  in  evidence  as  the  deed  of  Hiram  Sher- 
man, the  original  deed  not  being  shown.  In  the  absence  of  proof, 
such  a  deed  is  signed  and  acknowledged  by  different  persons.^ 
And  so  where  a  deed  and  the  acknowledgment  described  the 
grantor  as  "  R.  P.  O'Neil,"  and  the  signature  was  the  same,  it  was 
held  that  the  deed  was  not  admissible  in  evidence  to  show  a 
convej'ance  from  "Patrick  O'Neil"  without  evidence  of  identity; 
and  without  such  proof  it  would  not  be  presumed  that  "  R.  P. 
O'Neil  "  stood  for  "  Rev.  Patrick  O'Neil."  * 

218.  The  o-wner  of  land  may  convey  it  by  any  name  which 
he  niay  use  as  a  signature,  and  the  title  will  pass  to  his  grantee, 
though  he  received  the  title  under  a  different  name.^     "  If  a  man 

1  Middletoii  v.  Findla,  25  Cal.  76;  3  Boothroyd  v.  Engles,  23  Mich.  19. 
Nixon  V.  Cohleigh,  52  111.  387 ;  Lyon  v.  See  O'Mcara  u.  North  iVmerican  M.  Co. 
Kain,  36  111.  362.  2Nev.  112,  121. 

2  Rupert  V.  Pe^iner,  35  Neb.  587,  53  N.  *  Burford  v.  McCue,  53  Pa.  St.  427. 
W.  Rep.  598.  5  Addis  v.   Power,  7   Bing.   455  ;    Wil- 

192 


NAMES   AND   DESCRIPTIONS    OF    THE   GRANTORS.  [§  219. 

be  baptized  by  one  name  and  known  by  another,  a  grant  by  the 
name  by  which  he  is  known  shall  be  good."  ^  Whether  one  pur- 
posely uses  an  assumed  name,  or  the  scrivener  has  made  a  mis- 
take in  writing  his  name,  the  deed  of  the  true  owner  of  the  bind 
is  etTectual  to  pass  tlie  title.  "  If  the  true  owner  conveys  bv  aiiv 
name,  the  conveyance  as  between  the  grantor  and  grantee  \\\]\ 
transfer  title,  and  in  all  cases  evidence  aliunde  the  instrument  is 
admissible  to  identify  the  actual  grantor.  The  admission  of  such 
evidence  does  not  change  the  written  instrument,  or  add  new 
terms  to  it,  but  merely  fixes  and  applies  the  terms  already  con- 
tained in  it."  2  Though  the  name  used  by  the  grantor  throughout 
the  deed  and  in  his  signature  is  wholly  fictitious,  he  is  bound  by 
the  deed,  and  the  title  passes  to  the  grantee.'^ 

Though  the  grantor's  name  be  incorrectly  given  throughout  a 
deed,  and  it  be  executed  by  his  signing  his  correct  name,  the  deed 
is  good.^  He  is  estopped  from  denying  that  he  is  bound  hy  the 
deed.'^  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  grantor  signs  a  deed  by  his 
Christian  name  only,  his  name  in  full  appearing  in  the  body  of  the 
deed,  the  signing  is  sufficient  and  binding.^  A  description  of  the 
grantor  as  the  wife  of  a  person  named  is  sufficient,  though  it  is 
afterwards  shown  that  the  marriage  ceremony  was  invalid." 

219.  The  middle  name  or  initial  of  a  person  is  not  a  part 
of  his  legal  name,  which  consists  of  one  given  name   and   one 

liams  I'.  Bryant,  5  Mees.  &  W.  447,  454  ;  dence  was   admissible   to  show  that  John 

Shaw  V.    Hunt,  8  Taunt.  64.5  ;  Elliot  i'.  O.  Brunius  was  the  party  who  sijined  the 

Davi-i,  2  Bos.   &  Pul.   338;  Garwood  v.  deed,  and  that  if  this  was  proved  his  title 

Hastings,  38  Cal.  216  ;  Fallon   v.  Kehoe,  passed. 

38  Cal.    44,   99    Am.    Dec.  347,   where  a  ^  Lord  Chief   Baron  Comyns  in  his  Di- 

deed   made   to  "  Darby  O'Fallon,"  which  gest.  Fait,  E.  3. 

was  the  name  under  wliich  JtTemiah  Fal-  -  Wakefield  xk   Brown,  38  Minn.  361, 

Ion  .sometimes   passed,  was   held   to   be  a  37  N.  W.  Rej).  788. 

good  deed,  and  a  conveyance  by  him  under  ^  David   r.  Willianisburgh   Ins.  Co.  83 

tlic  name    of   "Darby   O'Fallon"   trans-  N.  Y.  265,  38   Am.    Rep.  418;  Andrews 

ferred  the  title.     A  somewhat  similar  rul-  v.  Dyer,  81    Me.   104,  16  Atl.  Rep.  405  ; 

inj;  was  made  in  Middleton  v.  Findla,  25  Hommel    v.    Devinney,    39    Mich.    522  ; 

Cal.    76,    and    in   Nixon   v.   Cobleigh,  52  Nixon  v.  Cobleigh,  52  III.  387. 

111.387;  Wilson  v.  AVIiite,  84  Cal.  239,  *  Jones  v.  Whitbread,    11    C.  B.   400, 

24  Pac.  Rep.   114;  Wakefield  v.  Brown,  413. 

38  Minn.  361,  37   N.  W.  Rep.  788,  where  &  Boothroyd  v.  Engles,  23  Mich.  19. 

a  deed  was    made   out   in    the   name   of  ^  Zann  i;.  Haller,  71  Ind.  136. 

"James  O.  Brunius,"  and   signed  "J.  0.  "^  Boughton   v.    Sandilands,   3    Taunt. 

Brunius."      It  was  held    that   parol  evi-  342. 

VOL.  I.  193 


§  219.]  PARTIES    TO   DEEDS   AND   THEIR   DESCRIPTION. 

su  111:1  me. '  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  omission  of  such  mid- 
ilh'  naiiK'  or  initiiil,  or  the  insertion  of  a  wrong  middle  name  or 
initial,  in  a  deed  does  not  affect  its  legal  validity,  whatever  confu- 
sion or  uncertainty  may  be  thereby  occasioned.'-^  It  is  competent 
to  show  that  the  grantor  or  grantee  is  as  well  known  without  a 
niidille  name  as  with  one.'^  The  deeds  themselves  may  sufficiently 
iileiitify  the  party  though  the  middle  name  or  initial  be  omitted 
in  one  instance.  Thus,  where  a  deed  was  made  to  "  Harriet  N. 
Andrews,"  and  the  next  deed  in  the  chain  of  titUi  was  executed 
by  "•  Harriet  Andrews  "  and  her  husband,  but  in  the  body  of  the 
deed  she  was  described  by  the  same  name  as  in  the  deed  to  her, 
and  as  residing  in  the  same  town,  the  identity  was  regarded  as 
sufficiently  established.** 

If  the  deed  does  not  sufficiently  show  the  identity  of  the  party, 
this  may  be  proved  by  testimony  that  he  executed  the  deed,  or 
was  the  grantee  to  whom  the  deed  was  delivered.  Thus,  where 
in  a  chain  of  title  it  appeared  that  a  conveyance  was  made  to 
"  E.  J.  Courtright,"  and  that  subsequently  Courtright  conveyed 
by  a  deed  in  the  body  of  which  his  name  was  given  as  "  Erastus  J. 
Courtright,"  but  it  was  signed  "Erastus  I.  Courtright,"  it  was 
held  to  be  competent  to  identify  the  grantor  by  his  testimony  and 
that  of  the  grantee  that  the  Courtright  who  executed  the  deed 
was  tiie  same  person  to  whom  the  deed  was  made  under  the  name 
of  -  E.  J.  Courtright."  '> 

One  David  A.  Brown  purchased  a  lot,  taking  a  deed  in  the 
name  of  David  C.  Brown.  He  executed  a  bond  and  mortgage  in 
the  name  of  David  C.  Brown  to  secure  the  purchase-money,  and 
the  notary  certified  that  the  mortgage  was  acknowledged  by 
David  C.  Brown.  He  had  at  the  time  an  infant  son  named  David 
C.  Brown.  It  was  held  that  the  deed  and  mortgage  must  be  con- 
strued   together,   and  it   was  the  evident    understanding  of  the 

1  Games  v.  Stiles,  14  Pet.  322;  Dunn  ^  Gillespie  v.  Kogers,  146  Mass.  610, 16 
V.  Games,  1  McLean,  .321  ;  Franklin  v.  N.  E.  Rep.  711  ;  Games  v.  Stiles,  14  Pet. 
Talmadge,  5  Johns.  84;  Erskinc  r.  Davis,  322,327  ;  Hall  r  Leonard,  1  Pick.  27,  30; 
2.5  111.  251  ;  Roosevelt  v.  Gardinier,  2  Scanlan  v.  Wright,  13  Pick.  523,  25  Am. 
Cow.  463;  McDonald  ?;.  .Morgan,  27  Tex.  Dec.  344  ;  Peabody  v.  Brown,  10  Gray, 
503  ;  Banks  v.  Lee,  73  Ga.  25.  45. 

2  Coke  r.  Brummell,  2  Moo.  495 ;  Sclio-  *  Clow  v.  Plummer,  85  Mich.  550,  48 
field  V.  Jennings,  68  Ind.  232  ;  Nicoderaus  N.  W.  Bep.  795. 

1;.  Young   (Iowa),   57  N.   W.  Rep.  906;         *  Nicodemus  i;.  Young   (Iowa),  57  N. 
Erskine  v.  Davis,  25  III.  251 ;  Peabody  v.     W.  Hep.  906. 
Brown,  10  Grav,  45. 

194 


NAMES    AND   DESCRIPTIONS    OF   THE    GRANTEES.       [§§  220-222. 

grantor  that  the  grantee  and  mortgagor  were  one  and  the  same 
person,  and  the  title  did  not  pass  to  his  son  by  the  deed.^ 

220.  But  in  recent  years  the  middle  name,  or  its  initial,  is 
apt  to  be  regarded  as  a  material  part  of  a  name.  The  use  of  such 
initials,  in  addition  to  a  fully  written  Christian  name,  is  the  most 
common  means  by  which,  in  all  the  affairs  of  life,  persons  bear- 
ing names  otherwise  the  same  are  distinguished ;  and  if  it  appear 
merely  that  land  had  been  conveyed  to  "  William  H.  Brown," 
and  that  a  subsequent  conveyance  of  the  same  land  had  been 
executed  by  "  William  B.  Brown,"  it  will  not  be  presumed  that 
the  grantee  in  the  one  deed  and  the  grantor  in  the  other  were  the 
same  person.^ 

The  rule  that  the  middle  name  or  initial  is  not  a  material  part 
of  a  person's  name  does  not  apply  when  the  first  name  is  not 
given,  but  only  its  initial.^ 

221.  The  designation  of  "junior"  or  "second"  is  no  part 
of  a  man's  name,  and,  although  convenient  and  desirable  for  the 
purpose  of  distinguishing  the  party  from  another  person  of  the 
same  name,  it  is  not  essential,  and  the  person  intended  may  be 
shown  in  some  other  way.  "  Neither  of  the  terms  constitutes  any 
part  of  the  name,  but  they  are  used  to  describe  and  designate 
the  person,  as  his  residence  is  sometimes  used  for  the  same  pur- 
pose." * 

II.  Names  and  Descriptions  of  the  Grantees. 

222.  In  every  grant  there  must  be  a  grantee.  If  no  grantee 
is  named  or  described  in  the  deed  no  title  passes  by  it  to  any  one. 
Parol  testimony  that  one  of  the  persons  named  in  the  deed  as  a 
grantor  was  the  intended  grantee  is  inadmissible  when  there  is 
nothing  in  the  deed  to  indicate  that  such  grantor  was  not  just 
what  he  was  stated  to  be,  save  the  bare  fact  that  he  did  not  join 
in  its  execution,  and  that  a  grantee  was  not  named  therein.  That 
the  name  of  the  intended  grantee  is  indorsed  upon  the  deed  is  of 
no  consequence.     The  grantee  must  be  determined  from  the  con- 

1  McDuffie  V.  Clark,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  *  Cobb  v.  Lucas,  15  Pick.  7,  per  Mor- 
826.  ton,  J.;  Kincaid  v.  Howe,  10  Mass.  203; 

2  Ambs  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  Minn.  &  Padgett  v.  Lawrence,  10  Paige,  170,  40 
Omaha  Ry  Co.  44  Minn.  266,  46  N.  W.  Am.  Dec.  232  ;  Fleet  v.  Youngs,  11  Wend. 
Kep.  321.  .')22.     See  Sawyer  v.  Northan,   112  N.  C. 

^  State  V.  Higgins  (Minn.),  61  N.  W.     261,  16  S.  PI  Kep.  1023. 
Rep.  816. 

195 


§  223.]  PAKTIKS    TO   DEEDS   AND   THEIR   DESCRIPTION. 

tents  of  the  iiistniincnt,  not  fioin  its  label.  Parol  evidence  is 
inadmissible  that  another  person  named  as  grantor  was  the  sole 
owner  of  the  property  described ;  that  he  bargained  it  to  the 
other  person  named  as  grantor;  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the 
owner  to  convey  to  such  other  person  ;  and  that  a  mistake  was 
made  by  the  person  wiio  drew  the  deed.  Title  to  real  property 
cannot  be  established  by  parol, ^ 

The  fact  that  one  is  named  in  the  consideration  clause  does 
not  make  him  a  grantee.  Thus,  where  a  deed  acknowledged  the 
receipt  of  consideration  from  two  persons,  and  the  granting  clause 
and  habendum  contained  the  name  of  one  of  them  only,  with  a 
blank  api)arently  left  for  the  insertion  of  another  name,  it  was 
held  that  the  deed  conveyed  no  interest  to  the  person  whose  name 
appeared  onl}'  in  the  consideration  clause.^ 

223.  The  grantee  must  be  in  existence  and  capable  of  tak- 
ing at  the  tinae  of  the  grant.-^  This  was  essential  at  common 
law,  because  otherwise  there  could  be  no  livery  of  seisin.  A 
grantee  is  as  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a  grant  as  that  there 
should  be  a  grantor  or  a  thing  granted.*  Thus  a  conveyance  to 
such  children  as  may  afterwards  be  born  to  persons  named  is 
inoperative,  and  vests  no  title  in  after-born  children  of  such 
persons.^ 

A  deed  to  a  person  not  living  at  the  time  of  its  execution  and 
his  heirs  is  void,  there  being  no  person  to  take  under  it,  as  the 
word  "heirs  "  is  a  word  of  limitation  and  not  of  purchase.^  But 
a  deed  to  a  person  named  or  his  heirs  is  not  void,  for  it  is  a 
conveyance  to  such  person  if  living,  and,  if  he  is  not  living, 
to  his  heirs.  It  is  a  deed  in  the  alternative.''  A  deed  to  the  heirs 
of  a  person  deceased  is  valid,  because  the  persons  entitled  to 
take  can  be  ascertained  by  parol  evidence.^ 

There  must  be  parties  capable  of  contracting  with  each  other. 

1  Allen    D.Allen,  48  Minn.  462,  51  N.     W.  Rep.  47.3 ;  Whitaker  v.  Miller,  83  III. 
W.  Rep.  473.  381;  Gannett  v.  Garnett,  7   T.  B.    Mon. 

2  Hardin  v.   Hardin,  32   S.  C.  599,  11      545. 

S.  E.  Rep.  102.  6  shep.  Touch.  235  ;  Lillard  v.  Ruck- 

»  Douthitt    V.    Stinson,   63    Mo.   268  ;  ers,  9  Yerg.  64. 

Chase  o.  Palmer,  29  111.  306;  Simms  v.  «  Hunter  v.  Watson,  12  Cal.  363,  73 

Hervey,  19  Iowa,  273  ;  Kelley  v.  Bourne,  Am.  Dec.  543. 

15  Oieg.  476,  16  Pac.  Rep.  40 ;   Sloane  v.  ^  Ready  v.  Kearsley,  14  Mich.  215. 

McConahy,  4  Ohio,  157,  169.  ^  Boone  v.   Moore,  14  Mo.  420;  Shaw 

*  Allen  V.  Allen,  48  Minn.  462,  51   N.  v.  Loud,  12  Mass.  447. 

396 


NAMES   AND    DESCRIPTIONS   OF   THE    GRANTEES.  [§  224. 

A  orantor  cannot  make  a  conveyance  to  himself,  though  he  claims 
to  act  in  a  representative  capacity  in  taking  it.  Thus,  where 
an  administrator  with  will  annexed,  having  appropriated  funds 
belonging  to  the  estate,  made  a  mortgage  to  himself  as  adminis- 
trator to  secure  his  indebtedness,  the  mortgage  was  declared  inop- 
erative. Though  the  mortgage  was  made  to  himself,  with  the 
addition  of  the  words  "executor  of  the  estate"  named,  the  legal 
effect  of  the  mortgage  was  a  grant  to  himself  in  his  individual 
capacity. 1 

The  word  "  administrator,"  "  executor,"  or  "  trustee  "  after  the 
name  of  a  grantee  in  a  deed  is  merely  a  description  of  the  per- 
son, and  a  conveyance  to  a  person  so  described  vests  in  him  in  his 
individual  capacity.^ 

224.  It  is  not  essential  that  the  grantee  should  be  formally 
named  in  the  granting  part  of  a  deed.  It  is  only  necessary 
that,  taking  the  whole  instrument  together,  there  is  no  uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  grantee.^  "  The  whole  writing  is  always  to  be 
considered,  and  the  intent  will  not  be  defeated  by  false  English 
or  irregular  arrangement,  unless  the  defect  is  so  serious  as  abso- 
lutely to  preclude  the  ascertainment  of  the  meaning  of  the  par- 
ties through  the  means  furnished  by  the  whole  document,  and 
such  intrinsic  aids  as  the  law  permits.  It  is  not  indispensable 
that  the  name  of  the  grantee,  if  given,  should  be  inserted  in  the 
premises.  If  the  instrument  shows  who  he  is,  if  it  designates 
him,  and  so  identifies  him  that  there  is  no  reasonable  doubt  re- 
specting the  party  constituted  grantee,  it  is  not  of  vital  conse- 
quence that  the  matter  which  establishes  his  identity  is  not  in 
the  common  or  best  form,  or  in  the  usual  or  most  appropriate  posi- 
tion in  the  instrument."* 

But  a  mere  recital,  in  a  deed  of  indenture,  of  the  name  of  a  per- 
son as  one  of  the  parties  of  the  second  part,  who  is  not  afterwards 
named  in  the  deed,  is  not  sufficient  to  make  such  person  one  of 
the  grantees.  Thus,  where  it  appeared  that  John  Hartman  and 
Susan,  his  wife,  were  named  as  parties  of  tl)e  second   part  in  a 

1  Gorham  v.  Meacham,  63  Vt,  231,  22  »  American  Emifrrant  Co.  v.  Clark,  62 
Atl.  T^ep.  .572.  Iowa.   182,  17   N.   W.   Rep.  483  ;  Bay  v. 

2  Jack.son   n.  Roberts  (Ky.),  2.")   S.   W.     Toaner  (Md.),  20  Atl.  Rep.  1084. 

Rep.  879;  Towar  v.  Hale,  46  Barb.  361  ;         *  Newton  v.  McKay,  29  Mich.   1,  per 
Austin  V.  Shaw,  10  Allen,  552  ;  Brown  v.      Graves,  C.  J. 
Combs,  29  N.  J.  L.  36. 

197 


§§  -I'ln,  226.]       rAHTIKS    TO    DKKDS    AND    TIIKIU    DKSCRIPTION. 

di'eil  of  iiulontuie,  but  in  all  the  gnuiting  and  operative  clauses 
of  the  di'od  the  fonveyanct;  was  to  John  Hartinaii,  his  heirs  and 
assigns,  alone,  imd  thi'  covenants  were  with  him  alone,  and  the 
iiiinie  of  Susan  llartnian  did  not  otherwise  aj)[)ear  in  the  deed,  it 
was  lield  tliat  the  lonveyance  was  to  the  liusband  alone,  and  not 
to  the  luisband  and  wife  jointly.  It  was  claimed  that  the  inten- 
tion was  to  make  a  conveyance  to  them  jointly,  that  by  a  mistake 
of  the  scrivener  the  name  of  the  wife  was  omitted  from  the 
granting  and  operative  clauses  of  the  deed,  and  that  the  deed 
should  be  veformed  so  as  to  make  it  conform  to  such  intention. 
Testimony  was  introduced  that  all  the  parties  intended  that  the 
conveyance  should  be  to  the  husband  and  wife  jointly.  It  was 
held  that  the  evidence  was  not  sufficient  to  establish  such  inten- 
tion beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. ^ 

225.  It  is  not  absolutely  necessary  that  the  grantee  be 
named  at  all,  provided  he  is  so  described  that  he  can  be  clearly 
ascertained.^  Thus  a  deed  made  to  the  eldest  or  other  designated 
son  of  a  person  named,  or  to  all  the  sons  of  such  person,  is  good ;  ^ 
or  to  all  the  creditors  of  the  grantor ;  *  or  to  the  heirs  of  a  named 
deceased  person;^  or  to  the  children  of  a  person  named  ;^  or  to 
the  wife  of  a  person  named  ; '  or  to  the  son,  though  a  bastard,  of 
his  reputed  father,  when  he  has  acquired  the  reputation  of  being 
his  son.^ 

226.  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  identify  the  grantee. 
When  a  person  produces  a  deed  having  the  name  of  the  grantee 
identical  with  his  own,  there  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  de- 
livery of  the  deed  to  him  as  grantee.^  But  if  the  name  of  the 
grantee  in  the  deed  and  the  name  of  the  person  producing  it  and 
claiming  to  be  the  grantee  are  unlike,  evidence  of  identification 
of  the  grantee  and  of  delivery  of  the  deed  to  him  is  necessary. 
This  identification   may   be   made  by   parol  evidence.     Thus    it 

1  National  Bank  v.  Hartiniin  (Pa.  St.),  Laren  v.  Baxter,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  559; 
30  W.  N.  C.  42,  23  Atl.  Rep.  842.  Isaacs  v.  Green,  L.  R.  2  Exch.  352. 

2  Shep.  Touch.  232,  236;  Reeves  v.  ^  Shaw  v.  Loud,  12  Mass.  447  ;  Jones 
Watts,  7  Best  &  S.  523;  Maujiham  v.  y.  Morris,  61  Ala.  518  ;  Payne  i>.  Mathis, 
Sharpe,  17  C.  B.  N.  S.  443  ;  Gillespie  92  Ala.  585,  9  So.  Rep.  605 ;  McKee  v. 
V.  Rogers,  146  Mass.  610,  16  N.  E.  Rep.  Spiro,  107  Mo.  452,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1013; 
711 ;  Shaw  v.  Loud,  12  Mass.  447;  Webb  Boone  v.  Moore,  14  Mo.  420. 

V.  Den,  17  IIow.  576.  «  Hogg  v.  Odom,  Dudley  (Ga.),  185. 

3  Co.  Litt.  3  h.  7  Dr.  Ayray's  Case,  11  Coke,  21  a. 
*  Reeves  v.  Watts,  L.  R.  1   Q.  B.  412  ;         «  Finch's  Case,  6  Coke,  63  a. 

Gresiy  v.  Gibson,  L.  R.  1   Ex.   112  ;  Mc-         ^  Dunlap  v.  Green,  60  Fed.  Rep.  242. 

108 


NAMES   AND   DESCRIPTIONS    OF   THE    GRANTEES.  [§  227. 

may  be  shown  that  the  name  written  in  the  deed  was  errone- 
ous by  mistake,  but  was  intended  for  the  person  to  whom  it  was 
delivered.' 

227.  Parol  evidence  is  not  admissible,  however,  to  show 
that  the  deed  was  made  and  delivered  by  mistake  to  the 
wrong  person,  and  tliat  the  grantor  intended  another  person  as 
grantee.-  Such  evidence  is  admissible  only  to  show  that  the  per- 
son named  in  the  deed  was  the  person  intended  to  be  the  grantee.^ 

If  a  deed  is  made  to  one  by  his  surname  onl}-,  his  Christian 
name  being  left  blank,  there  is  an  ambiguity  as  to  tlie  grantee 
which  may  be  remedied  by  proof  aliunde  showing  to  whom  the 
deed  was  delivered,  or  intended  to  be  delivered.  Where  the 
grantee  in  such  a  deed,  for  the  purpose  of  defrauding  his  cred- 
itors, without  the  knowledge  of  his  wife  filled  the  blank  with  her 
Christian  name,  it  was  h(dd  that  the  title  vested  in  the  husband, 
and  was  not  divested  by  his  filling  the  blank  with  the  name  of  his 
wife.* 

The  ground  for  the  admission  of  parol  evidence,  to  determine 
who  is  the  grantee  to  whom  a  deed  is  made,  is  well  stated  by  Chief 
Justice  Royce  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Vermont.^  "  There  is," 
he  says,  "  an  important  difference  between  a  description  which  is 
inherently  uncertain  and  indeterminate,  and  one  which  is  merely 
imperfect,  and  capable,  on  that  account,  of  different  applications. 
To  correct  the  one  is,  in  effect,  to  add  new  terms  to  the  instru- 

1  Andrews  v.  Dyer,  81  Me.  104,  16  Atl.  Jackson  f.  Hart,  12  Johns.  77,  where  the 

Sep.  405,  78  Me.  427,   6   Atl.   Rep.  833.  mistake  was  in  the  surname. 

The  deed  in  this  case  was  made  to"  Mercy  -  Crawford  v.  Spencer,   8  Cush.  418; 

A.Andrews,"  instead  of  "  Melissa  A.  An-  Whitmore  v.  Learned,  70  Me.  276.     See 

drews,"  to  whom  it  was  deliveied  and  for  Diener  v.  Diener,  5  Wis.  483. 

whom  it  was  intended.    Jacobs  v.  Benson,  ^  Andrews   v.   Dyer,    81    Me.    104,   16 

39  Me.   132,  63   Am.  Dec.  609;  Hall  v.  Atl.    Hep.  40.5;  Jackson   v.    Stanley,    10 

Leonard,  1  Pick.   (Mass.)   27;   Scanlan  r.  Johns.  133. 

Wright,  13  Pick.  523,  25  Am.  Dec.  344  ;  •*  Fletcher  v.  Mansur,  5  lud.  267.     A 

Skinker  v.  Haagsma,  99   Mo.  208.  12  S.  different  conclusion  was  reached  in  Jei\- 

W.  Rep.  659  ;  Staak  v.  Sigclkow,  12  Wis.  nings  v.  Jennings.   24   Oreg.  447,  34  Pac. 

234;  Nicodemus  v.  Young  (Iowa).  57  N.  Rep.  21,  where,  a  deed   having  been  exe- 

W.  Re)).  906  ;  Peabody  y.  Brown,  10  Gray,  cutcd  and   delivered   to  one  who  was  eii- 

45,  where   a   deed   to   '*  Hiram    Gowing,  titled   to  receive  it,  he  filled   the   blank 

cordwainer,"  was  .shown  to  have  been  in-  with  the  name  of  bis  daughter,  and  deliv- 

tendf'd  for  "  Hiram  G.  Gowing,"  and  not  ered  the  deed  to  her,  and  it  was  held  that 

for    "  Hiram    Gowing,"  his  young  son  ;  this  was  sufficient  to  convey  the  title  to 

Jackson  v.  Stanley,  10  Johns.  133,  where  her  as  against  him  and  his  heirs. 

the  mistake  was  in  the  Chri-tian  name  ;  ^  Morse  v.  Carpenter,  19  Vt.  613,  616. 

199 


§^^  2-28,  2211]       PARTIES    TO    DEKDS    AND    THKIU    DKSCKirTION. 

uu'iit ;  wliiU'  to  coiuplete  the  other  is  t)iily  to  iiseertaiii  aiul  iix  the 
apulieatioii  of  terms  ahe;uly  cuutained  in  it.  Iinleed,  tiie  most 
usual  and  approved  description  of  the  (grantee  —  that  whicli  gives 
his  Christian  and  surname  and  tlie  town  in  wliich  he  lives  —  may- 
prove  to  be  imperfect,  as  others  hearing-  both  those  names  may  be 
living  in  the  same  town.  ^\nd  if  the  Christian  name  or  place  of 
residence  be  omitted,  the  description  is  only  rendered  the  more 
imperfect;  it  is  less  certain  than  it  might  be,  and  usually  is,  made. 
But  a  grantee  is  still  designated,  though  imperfectly,  and,  for 
aught  that  the  deed  discloses,  the  party  accepting  the  conveyance 
may  be  the  only  person  answering  the  description  given.  In  all 
these  cases  a  resort  to  extraneous  facts  and  circumstances  may 
become  necessary  in  order  to  ascertain  the  individual  to  whom 
the  description  was  intended  to  apply  ;  but  it  is  not  perceived 
that  the  greater  or  less  probability  of  this  should  in  either  case 
afTcct  the  validity  of  the  deed." 

228.  A  deed  to  a  married  woman  by  the  name  she  bore 
before  her  marriage  may  be  shown  by  parol  evidence  to  have 
been  made  to  the  person  to  whom  the  grant  was  intended  to  be 
made;  that  her  marriage  was  unknown  to  the  grantor;  and  that 
there  was  no  other  person  claiming  to  bear  the  name  used  in  the 
deed,  or  claiming  title  under  the  deed.^ 

229.  A  deed  to  a  person  by  a  fictitious  name  passes  the 
title.  If  there  be  a  person  in  existence  to  whom  delivery  of  the 
deed  is  made,  the  deed  is  not  a  nullity,  but  transfers  the  title  to 
the  person  to  whom  it  is  delivered.^  It  makes  no  difference  in 
the  legal  effect  of  a  deed  delivered  to  the  actual  purchaser  that 
he  is  called  by  some  other  name  than  his  own.  He  may  assume 
a  name  for  the  occasion,  and  a  conveyance  to  and  by  him  under 
such  name  will  pass  the  title.  In  a  New  York  case  so  deciding, 
Mr.  Justice  Earl  said  :  '^  '"  In  executing  any  instruments,  I  can  find 
no  authorities  which  hold  that  one  is  not  bound  by  the  name 
he  adopts  or  uses.  Pro  hae  vice,  it  is  his  name."  If  one  accepts 
and  places  on  record  a  conveyance  of  land  to  himself,  wherein  his 
name  as  grantee  is  erroneously  written,  he  is  presumed  to  know 

1  Scanlan  v.  Wri<iht,  13  Pick.  .523,  25  Ion  v.  Kelioe,  38  Cal.  44,  99  Am.  Dec.  347  ; 
Am.  Dec.  344;  Wilkerson  v.  Schoon-  Garwood  i'.  H;istings,  38  Cal.  216.  See 
maker.  77  Tex.  61 5,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  223.  Barr  v    Schroeder,  32  Cal.  609  ;  Thomas 

2  AVilson  V.  White,  84  Cal.  2.39,  24  Pac.  v.  Wyatr,  31  Mo.  188,  77  Am.  Dec.  640. 
Rep.   114;    David   r.  William.sl)urt.'h  Ins.  3  David  r.  Williamsbursh  Ins.  Co.  83 
Co.  83  N.  Y.  265,  38  Am.  Rep.  418  ;   Fal-  N.  Y.  265,  38  Am.  Rep.  418. 

200 


NAMES    AND    DESCRIPTIONS    OF    THE    GRANTEES.       [§§  230,  231. 

tht-  misnomer,  and  to  have  adopted  such  name  for  the  purpose  of 
acquiring  and  holding  such  land  ;  and  he  has  no  cause  to  complain 
if.  in  judicial  proceedings  against  him  with  respect  to  the  title,  he 
is  designated  by  that  name.^ 

230.  A  deed  to  the  heirs  of  a  living  person,  without  naming 
th'-m,  is  void  for  uncertainty.-  Mr.  Justice  Wilde,  delivering  the 
opinion,  said  :  "  The  tlifficult}'  is  to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the 
giaiitor.  Supposing  we  may  understand  that  children  were  in- 
tendi-d,  are  at'ter-born  children  to  be  included,  or  those  only  who 
were  in  esse  at  the  time  of  the  grant  ?  Was  it  meant  that  the 
grant  should  take  effect  immediateh%  or  at  the  death  of  the 
father?  Suppose  there  were  no  children  then  surviving,  would 
the  brothers  and  sisters  take  ?  We  have  no  certain  means  of 
ascertaining  the  grantor's  intention  in  these  particulars  :  it  is  all 
uncertain,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  deed  to  clear  away  the 
unci'rtainty." 

Tliis  rule  does  not  apply  in  Pennsylvania,  where  registry  stands 
for  livery  of  seisin,  except  in  case  the  grant  is  of  incorporeal 
interests  which  are  not  susceptible  of  livery.^ 

231.  This  rule  does  not  apply  where  there  is  anything  in 
the  deed  from  which  it  raay  be  inferred  that  the  word  •'  heirs  " 
was  not  used  in  its  technical  sense,  but  as  meaning  children. 
There  is  a  strong  tendency  to  restrict  if  not  to  discard  this  techni- 
c;d  rule,  on  the  ground  that  it  often  defeats  the  clear  intention  of 
the  grantor,  and  seldom  gives  effect  to  his  intention.  Therefore 
the  intention  of  the  grantor  in  using  the  term  "heirs  "  is  sought 
for,  and,  if  discovered,  is  carried  into  effect.  If  the  deed  uses 
the  word  "  heirs  "  to  designate  a  class  of  persons,  as,  for  instance, 

1  Blinn  v.  Chesseman,  49  Minn.    140,  tier  y.  Tinder,  131  Ind.  381,  30  N.  E.Rep. 

51  N.  W.  Rep.  666.  1077,  and  later  still    in   Booker  v.  Tar- 

^  Perkins,    §    52  ;  Hall    v.    Leonard,    1  water  (Ind),  37  N.  E.  Rep.  979. 
Pick.  27,  31,  upon  wliich  ca.se  tlie  whole         ^  Huss   v.    Stephens,   51    Pa.   St.    282. 

series  of  American  decisions  to  the  same  Woodward,  C.  J.,  referring  to  the  case  of 

effect  seems  to  rest.     Morris  i-.  Stephens,  Hall  v.  Leonard,  1  Pick.  27,  said    "If  the 

46  Pa.  St.. 200;  Winslow  v.  Winslow,   52  learned  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 

Ind.  8.     See   Lyles   /.•.  Leschcr,    108   ind.  Massachusetts  had  noticed  that  this  rule 

3S2,  9  N.  W.  Rep.  365.     Elliott,  J.,  speak-  from  Perkins  was  predicated  of  incorno- 

ing  for  the  court,  seriously  doubted   the  real  interests,  which  lie  in  grant  and  arc 

correctness  of  the  decision  in  Winslow  y.  not   suscei>til)le  of  livery,   he  would  not 

Winslow,  supra.     But  that  case  was  di-  have  misled  us  into  applying  it  to  a  con- 

rectly  affirmed  in  Oiitland   r.  Bowen,  115  veyancc   of  land   here  in    Pennsylvania, 

Ind.  150,  17  N.  E.  Rep.  281,  and  in  Tin-  where  registry  stands  instead  of  livery." 

201 


§  232.]  PARTIES   TO   DEEDS    AND   THEIR   DESCRIPTION. 

the  chiKlveii  of  a  person  living,  and  not  his  posslbh;  descendants, 
or  an  indefinite  line  of  descendants,  then  the  word  "heirs"  will 
be  taken  to  mean  the  living  children  of  the  person  named,  and 
effect  will  be  given  to  the  deed  as  a  conveyance  to  snch  children. 
Accordingly,  where  a  deed  was  to  a  married  woman  and  the  heirs 
of  herself  and  her  husband  named,  it  was  held  that  tlie  estate 
conveyed  vested  immediately  in  liim  and  the  chihli'en  then  living 
of  herself  and  her  husband.  Hie  word  "  heirs  "  as  used  in  this 
deed  was  considered  as  descriptive  of  a  class,  and  as  meaning  the 
children  of  the  persons  named ;  ^  and  so,  where  the  words  of  a  deed 
were  "  to  have  and  to  hold  the  same  to  the  said  Nancy  West  and 
her  present  heirs  forever,"  it  was  held  that  Nancy  West  and  her 
apparent  heirs  took  the  estate  in  common.^ 

If  there  are  words  restricting  the  meaning  of  the  word  "  heirs  " 
to  grandchildren,  the  latter  will  take  title  under  the  deed.  Thus, 
where  one  made  a  deed  to  the  heirs  of  his  son  "  for  the  natural 
love  and  affection  he  hath  for  his  grandchildren,"  it  was  held 
that  the  grandchildren  were  sufficiently  described  to  take  under 
the  deed.-^ 

232.  If  there  are  no  words  in  a  deed  to  indicate  that  the 
grantor  used  the  word  "•  heirs  "  in  otherwise  than  its  strict  le- 
gal sense,  then  it  must  be  taken  in  that  sense.  "  He  may  have 
meant  '  children,'  and  he  may  have  meant  '  heirs.'  This  makes 
it  wholly  uncertain  as  to  who  the  grantees  were.  If  he  had  used 
words  in  addition  indicating  that  he  meant  children  by  the  word 
'  heirs,'  that  would  have  been  certain  enough,  but  he  might  have 
meant  '  heirs  '  in  the  legal  signification  of  tlie  word.  If  he  did, 
then,  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  a  man  cannot  have   lieirs  while 

1  Tinder  '•.  Tinder,  131  lud.  381,  30  either  upon  reason  or  authority,  that  we 
N.  E.  Rep.  1077.  To  like  effect,  Tucker  ought  to  construe  'heirs'  a  word  of  pur- 
V.  Tucker,  78  Ky.  503  ;  Brann  v.  Elze}',  chase,  meaning  the  grandchildren,  and 
83  Ky.  440.  thus  serve  the  intent  ?     It  is  an  instance 

2  Franklin  Co.  C.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Beckle-  where  the  context  of  the  instrument  proves 
heimer,  102  Ind.  76,  1  N.  E.  Rep.  202.  that  the  word  'heirs'  is    to  be  taken    in 

^  IIuss   V.    Stephens,   .51    Pa.    St.  282.  its   ])opular  and  not  its  technical  sense. 

Woodward,   C.   J.,    Siiid  :     "  Now,    when  Acknowledging  the  consideration  of  the 

in  this  deed  the  grant  is  to  the  heirs  of  instrument  to  be  love  and  affection  for  his 

a  son  and  to  their  heirs  and  assigns  for-  grandchildren,  he  intended,  by  that  sure 

ever,  and  the  other  word  '  grandchildren'  token,  that   they   should    take   an   estate 

comes  in  as  a  rh-xir/nnlio  prrsonarum,  —  as  from  him.     Had  he  named  them  he  could 

the  grantor's  definition  of  what  he  means  scarcely  have  been  better  understood." 
by  '  heirs,' —  where  is  the  room  to  doubt, 
202 


NAMES   AND   DESCRIPTIONS   OF   THE   GRANTEES.  [§  233. 

he  lives,  it  would  always  remain  a  matter  of  great  uncertainty  who 
the  man's  heirs  would  be  until  he  dies ;  so  that,  if  he  meant 
'  heirs,'  in  the  legal  signification  of  the  word,  it  is  void  for 
uncertainty,  and  because  he  could  have  no  heirs  while  he  lives. 
But  as  we  do  not  know  whether  he  meant  '  heirs '  in  the  legal 
signification  of  the  word,  or  '  children,'  the  deed  is  equally  void 
for  uncertainty  in  the  grantee."^ 

But  even  where  there  are  no  words  restricting  the  meaning  of 
the  word  "heirs,"  it  has  been  held  that  a  deed  to  the  heirs  of  a 
living  person  vests  the  title  in  his  children.^  The  word  "heirs" 
in  such  case  is  not  used  in  its  technical  sense,  but  as  meaning  the 
apparent  heirs  of  the  living  person  at  the  time  of  the  execution 
of  the  deed.  Tlie  same  rule  applies  in  the  case  of  a  will.  As 
declared  in  an  earlier  case  in  New  York,  "  where  the  will  recog- 
nizes the  ancestor  as  living,  and  makes  a  devise  to  the  heir  eo  no- 
mine,  this  shows  that  the  term  was  not  used  in  its  strictest  sense, 
hut  as  meaning  the  heir  apparent  of  the  ancestor  named."  ^ 

233.  A  deed  to  a  person  named  "  and  her  children  "  is  not 
void  as  to  the  mother  or  her  children  living  at  the  time  the 
deed  was  made.  Such  children  can  be  identified  by  parol  evi- 
dence, and  they  and  their  mother  take  the  title  as  tenants  in  com- 
mon,* but  children  subsequently  born  take  no  title.^  If  in  such 
case  the  grantee  named  has  no  children  at  the  time  of  the  execu- 
tion of  the  deed,  such  grantee  takes  the  entire  property  to  the 
exclusion  of  children  born  subsequently  to  the  execution  of  the 
deed.'^ 

If  a  deed  be  made  to  one  and  his  heirs,  designating  as  such  his 
children  by  name,  the  conveyance  is  in  effect  to  the  grantee  and 
the  children  named  as  tenants  in  common.  The  word  "heirs" 
was  used  in  the  sense  of  "  children."' 

1  Booker  v.  Tarwater  (Ind.),  37  N.  E.  334.  The  habendum  was  to  them  and 
Rep.  979,  982,  per  McCabe,  J.  their  heirs  and    assigns  forever.     Arthur 

2  Heath  V.   Hewitt,  127  N.   Y.  166,  27     v.  Weston,  22  Mo.  378. 

N.  E.  Rep.  9,i9.     To  like  effect,  Tharp  v.  ^  Glass  v.  Glass,  71  Ind.  392. 

Yarbroiigh,  79  Ga.  382,  4  S.  E.  Rep.  91.5.  •^  Baird   v.  Brookin,  86  Ga.  709,  12  S. 

3  Heard  v.  Ilorton,  1  Dciiio,  105,  43  E.  Rep.  981;  Lofton  v.  Murchison,  80 
Am.  Dec.  659.  Ga.  391,7   S.  E.  Rep.  322,  a  case  of  a 

*  Moore  r.  Lee  (Ala.),  17  So.  Rep.  15;  will  ;  Loyless  v.  Blackshear,  43  Ga.  327; 
Vanziint  v.  Morris,  25  Ala.  285 ;  Var-  Estill  v.  Beers,  82  Ga.  608,  9  S.  E.  Rep. 
ner   v.    Younj;,   56    Aln.  260;    Mason    c.     .596. 

Pate,  34  Ala.  379;  Williams  r.  McConico,  '   Brassinglon   v.   Hanson,   149   Pa.  St. 

36  Ala.  22  ;   Hamilton   v.   Pitcher,  53  Mo.      289,  24  Atl.  Rep.  344. 

203 


§§  i!o4,  23,').]     PAiniKS  to  dkeds  and   iiikik  i»kscriimion. 

But  a  conveyance  made  to  a  woman  and  her  children  living  at 
the  time  or  after-born  vests  a  life  estate  only  in  the  mother,  with 
remainder  to  her  children.' 

234.  Certainty  as  to  the  grantee  is  essential.  If  the  deed 
does  not  itself  make  it  certain  who  is  the  grantee,  it  must  afford  the 
means  of  ascertaining  with  certainty  who  he  is  through  evidence 
aliunde.  A  deed  "  to  the  estate"  of  a  person  deceased  is  a  nul- 
lity.^ The  executor  or  administratoi"  is  the  legal  representative 
of  the  deceased,  and  the  estate  is  something  tluit  cannot  be  recog- 
nized at  all  as  a  party  to  a  contract.  The  fact  that  the  grantors 
were  executors  of  the  will  of  the  deceased,  and  were  authorized 
by  the  will  and  an  order  of  court  to  distribute  his  estate,  is  not 
sufficient  to  identify  the  grantees  intended. 

A  deed  "  to  the  legatees  and  devisees  "  of  a  deceased  person 
named  sufficiently  describes  the  grantees,  for  they  may  be  ascer- 
tained by  reference  to  the  will.^ 

A  deed  granting  a  right  of  way  to  the  "  owner  oi-  owners  of  the 
brick  house,  and  curtilage  "  described  in  the  deed  is  insufiicient  to 
enable  any  one  to  claim  the  right  of  way.'* 

A  deed  which  for  the  want  of  a  grantee  passes  no  legal  estate 
may  be  sufficient  to  create  a  trust  which  a  court  of  equity  will 
protect  by  appointing  a  trustee  to  receive  the  legal  title  from 
the  grantor  or  his  heirs;  as  where  a  deed  was  made  naming  no 
grantee,  "  for  the  use  of  a  school-house,  if  the  neighboring  inhab- 
itants see  cause  to  build  a  school-house  thereon."  ^ 

III.    Corporations  and  Associations  as  Grrantees. 

235.  A  corporation,  when  made  a  grantee,  should  be  de- 
scribed by  its  oflacial  name.  A  grant  to  a  corporation  is  good, 
however,  if  it  clearly  appears  from  the  deed  itself  what  coi-pora- 
tion  was  intended,  though  an  omission  or  mistake  may  have  been 
made  in  the  corporate  name.^ 

1  Kinuey  r.  Mathews,  69  Mo.  520 ;  Carr  ^  Schaidt  v.  Blaul,  66  Md.  141,  6  Atl. 

V.  Estill,  16   B.  Mon.  309.     And  see  Jef-  Rej).  669. 

fery  u.  De  Vitre,  24  Beav.  296;  Froggatt  5  Bailey  v.    Kilbiirn,    10  Met.  176,  43 

V.  Warden,  3  De  G.  &  S.  685.  Am.  Dec.  423. 

-  Mclnerney  r.  Beck  (Wash.),  39  Pac.  «  Lyniie   Regis  Case,  10  Coke,  122  h.; 

Rep.  130,  per  Dunhar,  C.  J. ;  Simmons  v.  Dr.  Ayray's  Case,  11  Coke,  IS  b. ;  Pits  u. 

Spratt,  20  Fla.  495,  1  So.  Rep.  860.  James,  Ilob.  121  h. ;    Dutch  West  India 

^  Webb  V.  Den,  17  IIow.  576.  Co.  r.  Van  Moses,  1  Strange,  612;  Croy- 


204 


don  Hospital  v.  Farley,  6  Taunt.  467. 


CORPORATIONS   AND   ASSOCIATIONS   AS   GRANTEKS.       [§§  230,    237. 

The  fact  that  the  grantor  at  the  time  of  tlie  execution  of  the 
deed  was  ignorant  that  the  grantee  was  a  body  corporate  does 
not  change  the  rule  that  such  grantee  must  be  named  or  described 
with  certainty.^ 

A  deed  to  an  imaginary  corporation  passes  no  title.^ 

A  de  facto  corporation  is  capable  of  taking  title  as  grantee.^ 

236.  The  corporation  must  have  a  legal  existence  and  be 
capable  of  taking  a  conveyance.  Thus  a  deed  purporting  to  con- 
vey land  to  a  corporation,  before  such  corporation  was  organized, 
is  a  nullity  :  it  passes  no  title  to  any  one.*  A  qualification  of 
this  rule  is  to  be  noted  as  regards  corporations  which  have  a  de 
facto  existence,  either  from  long  recognition  as  such,  or  from  recog- 
nition after  an  imperfect  organization,  though  they  cannot  pro- 
duce any  charters  which  show  their  incorporation.^  A  voluntary 
association  of  persons  not  incorporated  has  no  legal  capacity  to 
take  a  conve3^ance  of  land,  and  a  deed  to  such  an  association  by 
name  passes  no  title.^ 

But  a  conveyance  to  an  unincorporated  comp;iny  which  is  shortly 
afterwards  duly  organized  as  a  corporation,  and  goes  into  posses- 
sion under  the  deed,  passes  a  title  to  such  corporation  as  against 
one  not  holding  by  a  superior  title,  but  under  a  subsequent  tax 
sale.'^ 

237.  A  deed  to  the  trustees  or  officers  by  name  of  an  unin- 
corporated association  is  good,  for  in  such  case  the  title  vests 
in  such  trustees  or  officers  as  individuals.  The  words  naming 
the  association  are  regarded  merely  as  words  descriptive  of  the 
persons.^  A  deed  to  one  described  as  administrator  is  a  grant  to 
him  individually ;  therefore,  where  an  administrator  became  in- 
debted to  the  estate,  and  for  the  purpose  of  securing  such  indebt- 

1  Asheville  Division  v.  Aston,  92  N.  C.  <*  German  Land  Asso.  r.  Scholler,  10 
578.  Minn.  331,  338. 

2  Russell  V.  Topping,  5  McLean,  194,  "  Clifton  Heights  Land  Co.  v.  Kandell, 
202;    Harriman    v.    Soutliani,     16    lud.  82  Iowa,  89,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  905. 

190.  ^  Austin  v.  Shaw,  10  Allen,  .552  ;  Towar 
8  Smith  r.  Sheeley,  12  Wall.  358  ;  My-  v.  Hale,  46  Barb.  361;    Bundy  v.  Bird- 
ers V.  Croft,  13  Wall.  291.  sail,  29  Barb.  31  ;   Brown  v.  Combs,  29 
*  Douthitt   V.    Stinson,    63    Mo.    268  ;  N.  J.  L.  36  ;  Den  v.  Hay,  21  N.  J.  L.  174  ; 
Harriman  v.  Southam,  16  Ind.  190;  Rus-  Hart  v.  Seymour,  147   111.  .'■)r)8,  35  N.  E. 
sell  y.  Tojjping,  5  McLean,  19.5.  Rep.   246  ;  Douthitt   v.    Stinson,  63  Mo. 
^  Mercers  of  Shrewsbury  v.  Hart,  1  Car.  268  ;  Bayley  v.  Onondaga  Ins.  Co.  6  Hill, 
&  P.  113  ;  Smith  v.  Slieeley,  12  Wall.  358  ;  476,  41   Am.  Dec.  759;  Vansant  v.  Rob- 
Myers  V.  Croft,  13  Wall.  291.  erts,  3  Md.  119. 

205 


§  288.]         rAiMii:s  to  dkeds  and   riiiaii  dksckh'Tion. 

(.'iliK'ss  executed  a  niorty:i!j;e  to  hiinsell'  as  administrator  to  secure 
the  same,  the  mortgage  was  held  invalid  lor  want  of  contracting 
parties.' 

A  deed  to  persons  named,  for  the  use  of  a  clinrch  dcscTibed 
not  then  incorporated,  vests  the  title  in  such  persons,  who  stand 
seised  to  the  use  of  the  church  ;  and  when  the  church  afterwards 
acquires  a  legal  capacity  to  take  and  hold  title,  the  statute  exe- 
cutes the  possession  to  the  use,  and  the  estate  vests  in  the  incor- 
porated church.- 

When  a  deed  is  made  to  trustees  named,  and  the  beneficiaries 
can  be  determined  with  certainty,  the  conveyance  is  not  void.  If 
a  deed  be  made  to  the  trustees  of  a  building  association,  there  is 
no  uncertainty  which  will  avoid  the  conveyance  if  the  members 
of  the  association  can  be  ascertained.  In  such  a  case  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Illinois  said  :  "  The  association,  not  being  incorporated, 
was,  in  contemplation  of  law,  a  mere  copartnership,  composed  of 
the  several  associates,  who  executed  and  thereby  became  parties 
to  the  trust  agreement,  and  the  name  adopted  by  the  agreement 
may  be  regarded  as  their  firm  or  copartnership  name.  The  co- 
partners were  all  natural  persons,  whose  identity  was  fixed  and 
ascertained  by  the  agreement  itself.  The  grantees  in  the  deeds, 
therefore,  if  they  took  the  land  in  trust,  took  it  in  trust  for  their 
firm,  composed  of  ascertained  partners,  all  capable  of  becoming 
beneficiaries  of  the  trust.  The  case,  then,  is  not  one  where  deeds 
creating  trusts  may  be  held  to  be  void  by  reason  of  the  inca- 
pacity of  the  beneficiaries  to  take  and  hold  the  title."  ^ 

238.  A  deed  to  persons  named,  "trustees"  of  an  incorpo- 
rated society,  "their  successors  in  office  and  assigns,"  vests  the 
title  in  such  persons  and  not  in  the  society.  A  statute  which 
provides  that,  where  one  holds  land  under  a  deed  to  the  "  use, 
confidence,  or  trust"  of  another,  the  title  shall  be  deemed  to  be 
in  the  latter,  does  not  have  the  effect  to  vest  the  title  in  the  cor- 
poration, because  the  deed  does  not  create  an  express  trust,  but 
only  an  implied  or  constructive  trust.* 

But  a  deed  "  to  the  trustees  "  of  a  corporation,  without  naming 

^  Gorham  v.  Mcacham,   63  Vt.  231,  22  3  jjart  v.  Seymour,  147  111.   598,  35  N. 

Atl.  Rep.  572.  E.  Rep.  246. 

2  Reformed  Dutch  Church  v.  Veeder,  4  *   United  Bretliren  Church  r. First  Meth- 

Wend.  494.  odist  Church,  138  111.  608,  28  N.  E.  Rep. 


829. 


206 


CORPORATIONS    AND    ASSOCIATIONS    AS    GRANTEES.         [§  239. 

them,  vests  the  legal  title  in  the  oorjooration  ;  ^  and  a  deed  ''to  the 
trustees"  of  an  unincorporated  society,  which  by  statute  is  en- 
titled to  receive  grants  of  land,  is  a  grant  to  the  association."'  If 
a  deed  be  made  to  a  voluntary  unincorporated  association  which 
is  not  authorized  to  take  and  hold  real  estate,  and  all  the  members 
of  it  may  be  ascertained,  it  may  be  construed  as  a  grant  to  those 
who  are  properly  described  under  the  name  of  the  association. 
They  would  hold  the  land  as  tenants  in  common.^ 

239.  The  misnomer  of  a  corporation  intended  to  be  tlie 
grantee  does  not  invalidate  the  deed  when  the  true  name  of  the 
corporation  appears  in  the  covenant  of  warranty  or  other  part  of 
the  deed,*  or  when  it  appears  in  any  way  from  the  deed  itself 
what  corporation  was  intended.^  A  misnomer  of  a  corporation 
has  the  same  legal  effect  as  the  misnomer  of  an  individual ;  ^  it  is 
only  necessary  in  either  case  that  it  should  clearly  appear  from 
the  deed  by  name  or  description  that  a  particular  grantee  capa- 
ble of  identification  was  intended.  The  corporation  intended 
may  be  shown  upon  proper  averments  and  proof.''  An  abbrevia- 
tion of  the  name  of  a  corporation  made  a  grantee  in  a  deed  does 
not  invalidate  it  if  the  abbreviation  may  be  explained  and  made 
definite  by  extrinsic  evidence.^ 

Where  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  a  mortgage  to  a  corpo- 

1  Keith  &  Perry  Coal  Co.  v.  Bingham,  393,  a  deed  recited  that  it  was  made  by 
97  Mo.  196,  10  S.  W.  Kep.  32.  the  Ranger  Cattle  Company,  of  "  Shackel- 

2  Lawrence  v.  Fletcher,  8  Met.  153.  ford  "  County,  while  the  execution  thereof 

3  Byam   v.  Bickford,   140   Mass.  31,  2  was  by  the  Ranger   Cattle   Company,  of 
N.  E.  Rep.  687.  "  .Throckmorton  "  County,  which  was  its 

*  Centenary  M.  E.  Church  v.  Parker,  correct  name.     The  vice-president  of  the 

43  N.  J.  Eq.  307,   12  Atl.   Rep.    142;  St.  company  executed   the  deed  and  affixed 

Louis  Hospital  v.  Williams,  19   Mo.  609;  its  cor])orate  seal,  and  it  purported  to  be 

Douglas  V.  Branch  Bank,   19  Ala.  659;  the  act  of  the  corporation.     It  was  held 

Berks,  &c.  Road  v.  Myers,  6  S.  &  R.  12,  tliat  the  recital  was  a  misnomer,  and  was 

9  Am.  Dec.  402 ;  Pierce  v.  Somersworth,  cured  by  the  execution  and  acknowledg- 

10  N.  H.  369.  ment. 

^  Asheville  Division  v.  Aston,  92  N.  C.  '  Kentucky  Seminary  v.  Wallace,  15  B. 

578,  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  94.  Mon.  35;  Inhabitants  v.   String,  10  N.  J. 

6  Case  of  Lynne  Regis,  10  Coke,  122  b. ;  L.  323  ;  New  York  Annual  Conference  v. 
Carlisle  v.  Blamire,  8  East,  487  ;  Ryan  v.  Clarkson,  8  N.  J.  Eq.  541  ;  Medway  Cot- 
Martin,  91  N.  C.  464,  per  Merriman,  J. ;  ton  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Adams,  10  Mass.  360 ; 
Den  V.  Hay,  21  N.  J.  L.  174;  Inhabitants  Bower  v.  Bank,  5  Ark.  234;  AVoolwich 
V.  String,  10  N.  J.  L.  323;  Culpepper,  &c.  v.  Forrest,  2  N.  J.  L.  84  ;  Bruce  v.  Cro- 
Soc.  V.  Diggcs,  6  Rand,  165,  18  Am.  Dec.  mar,  22  Uj).  Can.  Q.  B.  321. 
708.  In  Ballard  t;.  Carmichael,  83  Tex.  »  Aultman  &  T.  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Rich- 
355,    18  S.  W.  Rep.  734,   17  S.  W.  Rep.  ardson,  7  Neb.  1. 

207 


j  1:40.  j  I'AUTIKS    TO    DKKDS    AND    THEIR    DESCRIPTION. 

ration  its  name  had  recently  been  ehaiiged,  the  ni  >rti;a^e  made 
to  it  by  its  former  mime  is  valid;  and  in  a  I'oit clDsnic  suit 
bv  the  corporation  the  mortgagor  cannot  contend  that  at  the 
date  of  the  mortgage  no  snch  corporation  existed,  though  the 
<;orporation  in  its  comphiint  should  aver  tiiat  the  nmrtgage 
was  executed  to  the  corporation  under  the  name  stated  in  the 
mortgage.^ 

240.  If  there  are  two  corporations  of  the  same  nanae,  and 
a  conveyance  is  made  to  one  of  them,  the  grantee  may  be 
identified  by  evidence  aliunde,  as,  for  instance,  by  evidence  as 
to  which  cor[)oration  jiaid  the  purchase-money  and  received  deliv- 
ery of  the  deed.  The  Virginia  Iron  Company  of  Dulutli  at- 
tempted to  amend  its  articles  of  associa,tion  by  clianging  its  name 
to  the  Kentucky  Iron  Company,  but  the  attempt  failed,  because 
the  secretar}^  of  state  returned  the  certified  amendment  stating 
that  there  was  another  corporation  of  the  same  name  having  its 
place  of  business  at  Duluth.  Before  this  fact  was  known,  the 
Virginia  Iron  Company  purchased  from  one  Milligan  land  which 
he  cimveyed  to  it  under  its  new  name  of  Kentucky  Iron  Com- 
pan3\  To  cure  this  error  the  Virginia  Iron  Company  obtained  a 
reconveyance  to  Milligan  from  the  original  Kentucky  Iron  Com- 
pany, which  was  executed  by  the  president  and  secretary  of  the 
company  without  express  authority  from  the  directors  or  stock- 
holders of  the  company,  and  Milligan  conveyed  to  the  Vii"ginia 
Iron  Company.  A  third  person,  seeing  upon  recoixl  the  conve}'- 
ance  to  the  Kentucky  lion  Company,  made  a  sale  of  property  to 
the  oi'iginal  company,  taking  in  pajMuent  shares  of  its  coi'poi'ate 
stock.  This  person  claimed  that  the  title  to  the  land  conveyed 
by  i\Iilligan  to  the  Kentucky  Iron  Company  passed  to  the  i-eal 
company  of  that  name,  and  he  asked  to  have  the  deed  of  that 
company  to  Milligan  and  his  deed  to  the  Virginia  Iron  Com|)any 
cancelled.  It  was  held  that  the  title  did  not  pass  to  the  Ken- 
tucky Iron  Company,  because  it  did  not  purchase  the  land  and 
was  not  the  intended  grantee.  The  deed  was  not  delivered  to  it, 
nor  to  any  one  for  it.  The  land  was  purchased  by  the  Virginia 
Iron  Company  and  the  deed  delivered  to  it,  and  the  title  passed 
to  it  under  another  name.^ 


1  City  Bank  j;.  McClellan,  21  Wis.  112.     Rep.    9.5.5.     Gilfillan,  C.  J.,  sairl  :    "The 

2  riarkp  ?•,  Milligan  (Minn.),  59  N.  W.     only  question,  then,  is,  were  Milligan  and 

208 


CORPORA  I  IONS    AND    ASSOCIATIONS   AS    GRANTEES.       [§§   241,  242. 


241.  A  deed  to  the  inhabitants  of  a  town  or  county  not  in- 
corporated passes  no  title. ^  A  deed  to  the  ''  board  of  diree'tors" 
of  ii  town  not  incorporated  is  also  a  nullity.^  A  deed  "  to  the 
members"  of  a  cbiiruh  is  void  for  the  want  of  certainty  as  to  the 
grantees.^ 

A  crant  to  the  inhabitants  of  a  certain  neiirhborhood  not  incur- 
porated  is  void  if  tlie  neii^diborhoud  is  not  defined  with  certainty, 
or  its  exact  limits  cannot  be  ascertained.  It  is  a  conveyance  only 
to  the  persons  who  were  inhabitants  at  the  time  of  the  grant,  and 
these  cannot  be  ascertained  if  the  territory  of  the  neighborhood  is 
not  defined."^  A  grant  to  an  unincorporated  association  may  be 
construed  as  a  grant  to  the  individual  members  of  the  association, 
if  these  can  be  ascertained  to  a  certainty.^ 

If  a  mortgage  be  made  to  persons  described  as  trustees  of  an 
association  which  is  not  incorporated,  the  legal  title  vests  in  such 
persons.  Inasmuch  as  they  are  trustees  they  take  as  joint  ten- 
ants, and  all  must  join  in  an  assignment  of  the  mortgage  or  otiier 
conveyance  of  their  title.  An  assignment  of  the  mortgage  by  the 
association  is  invalid,  as  that  has  no  title.^ 

242.  An  unincorporated  society  or  association  has  no  legal 
capacity  to  take  or  hold  real  property.'  If  the  jiersons  belong- 
ing to  the  society  or  association  can  be  di^termined  with  certainty, 
they  may  perhaps  take  title  as  individuals.  So  a  grant  to  the 
inhabitants  of  a  certain  territory  clearly  defined  may  be  a  valid 
grant  to  such   persons   as  were   inhabitants   at  the  time  of  the 


the  Virginia  Iron  .Company,  or  was  either 
of  them,  estopped  to  deny  that  the  deed 
passed  tlie  title  to  the  Kentucky  Iron 
Company  by  reason  of  the  facts  that  it 
was  ])lace(l  on  record  ;  that  plaintiffs  saw 
it  there,  and  were  thereby  induced  to  be- 
lieve that  company  to  be  the  owner  of  the 
land,  and  in  consequence  to  exchange 
their  leases  for  its  stock  1  The  parties 
having  acted  in  good  faith,  and  in  iirno- 
rance  of  the  fact  that  there  was  already 
existing,  at  the  time  of  the  attempted 
change  of  name,  a  corporation  styled  the 
Kentucky  Iron  Company,  there  could  be 
no  estoppel,  except  on  the  jiroposition 
that  it  was  culpable  negligence  not  to 
know  of  the  existence  of  such  other  cor- 
poration,  and   not  to   know  that  the  at- 

VOL.    I. 


tempted  change  of  name  had  failed.  We 
do  not  think  it  was  culpable  negligence, 
such  as  will  form  the  basis  of  estoppel." 

1  Jackson  v.  Corey,  8  Johns.  385  ;  Han- 
beck  V.  Westbrook,  9  Johns.  73  ;  Greene 
V.  Dennis,  6  Conn.  293,  16  Am.  Dec.  .58; 
Sloane  v.  McConahy,  4  Ohio,  157,  169. 

2  Douthitt  V.  Stinson,  63  Mo.  268. 

3  Morris  v.  State,  84  Ala.  457,  4  So. 
Rep.  628. 

4  Thomas  v.  Mar^bfield,  10  Pick.  364. 

^  By  am  v.  Bickford,  140  Mass.  31,  2 
N.  E.  Hep.  687  ;  Kclley  v.  Bourne,  15  Ore. 
476,  16  Pac.  Rep.  40. 

^  Austin  V.  Shaw,  10  Allen,  552. 

''  (ierman  Land  Asso.  v.  Scholler,  10 
Minn.  331  ;  Douthitt  v.  Stinson,  63  Mo. 
268. 

209 


§^;^  243,  244.]     parties  to  dekds  and  thkir  DKSCRirnoN. 

grant.      Hut  a  grant  to   the   inluibitiints   of  a   neighborhood  not 
defineil  is  void  for  iiiiciMlaiiity.' 

It  may  be,  however,  that  such  a  deed  is  void  because  of  the 
uncertainty  as  to  tlie  persons  who  are  beneficially  interested  under 
the  (rust,  as  where  the  trust  was  for  a  voluntary  association  for 
the  purpose  of  acquiring  homesteads  for  the  members  in  the  pub- 
lic lauds.- 

243.  A  deed  to  persons  named,  and  their  associates,  is  void 
for  uncertainty.  But  a  deed  to  persons  named,  for  themselves 
and  their  associates,  being  a  settlement  of  friends  on  the  west 
side  of  Seneca  Lake,  vests  the  legal  estate  in  such  persons  as  trus- 
tees for  the  association.  The  grant  is  free  from  uncertainty, 
because  it  is  evident  that  the  associates  had  only  an  equitable 
interest.''^  A  grant  to  several  persons  by  name  for  and  in  behalf 
of  themselves  and  their  associates,  the  inhabitants  of  a  town 
named,  is  a  valid  grant,  inasmuch  as  the  persons  named  would 
take  title  as  trustees."^ 

IV.    Partnerships  as  G-rantees. 

244.  A  deed  to  persons  named,  described  as  constituting  a 
firm,  conveys  a  legal  title  to  such  persons  as  tenants  in  common, 
though  such  title  may  be  subject  to  partnership  equities.^ 

A  mortgage  to  the  "  City  Investment  and  Advance  Com- 
pany "'  is  a  mortgage  to  the  individuals  composing  the  firm  using 
this  name  and  style  ;  and  when  it  is  ascertained  who  the  persons 
are  who  carry  on  the  business  under  that  name,  the  deed  operates 
to  convey  the  property  to  them.^  A  mortgage  to  the  "Chicago 
Lumber   Company,"  under   which   name    two  persons   conducted 

1  Thomas  v.  Marshfield,  10  Pick.  364.        405 ;  Murray  v.  Blackledge,  71  N.  C.  492  ; 

2  German  Land  Asso.  v.  Scholler,  10  Printup  v.  Turner,  6.5  Ga.  71  ;  Hunter  v. 
Minn.  331.  Martin,  2  Rich.  541  ;  Orr  v.  How,  55   Mo. 

3  Jackson  v.  Sisson,  2  Johns.  Gas.  321.      328 ;  Baldwin  v.  Richardson,  33  Tex.  16  ; 
*  North    Hempstead    v.    Hempstead,   2     Wilson  v.  Hunter,   14  Wis.  683;  Sherry 

Wend.  109;  Natchez  v.   Minor,  9   Sm.  &  v.  Gilmore,  58  Wis.  324,   17  N.  W.  Rep. 

M.  544,  48  Am.  Dec.  727.  252 ;   Jones  v.  Neale,  2  Pat.  &  H.  339, 

5  Morse  u.  Carpenter,  19  Vt.  613  ;  Mc-  350;    Hoffman  v.  Porter,  2  Brock.   156; 

Cauley  v.  Fulton,  44  Gal.  355  ;  Planchard  Newton  v.  McKay,   29    Mich.  1  ;    Kelley 

V.    Floyd,    93    Ala.   53,  9    So.  Rep.   418;  ?;.  Bourne,  15  Greg.  476,  16  Pac.  Rep.  40. 
Jones  V.  Morris,  61   Ala.  518;  Lindsay  i;.         ®  Maugham  v.  Sharpe,  17  C  B.  N.  S. 

Hoke,  21  Ala.  542  ;  Slaughter  v.  Doe,  67  443. 
Ala.   494;  Caldwell   v.  Parmer,  56   Ala. 

210 


PARTNERSHIPS  AS  GF.ANTEES.  [§  244. 

their  business,  maybe  foreclosed  by  them  under  proper  allegations 
that  they  conducted  business  under  that  name.^ 

If  the  partnership  name  contains  the  surname  or  surnames  of 
one  or  more  of  the  partners,  the  instrument  will  have  legal  effect 
as  a  conveyance  or  mortgage  to  the  partner  or  partners  thus 
named.2  Under  this  rule  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  full  names 
of  such  partners  be  given.  Thus  a  deed  to  "•  Farnham  &  Love- 
joy,"  of  a  town  named,  is  a  sufficient  conveyance  to  Sumner  W. 
Farnham  and  James  A.  Lovejoy,  who  are  shown  to  constitute  the 
firm  doing  business  under  such  partnership  name  ;  ^  for  resort  may 
always  be  had  to  facts  beyond  the  instrument  for  the  purpose  of 
applying  the  description  or  designation  of  the  persons  named  to 
the  persons  so  described.* 

Where  the  grantees  described  in  a  deed  are  A,  B  &  Co.,  the 
firm  consisting  of  A  and  B,  and  other  persons  described  only 
under  the  general  term  "company,"  A  and  B  take  the  title  for 
themselves  and  in  trust  for  those  associated  with  them.'^  It  is 
proper,  however,  for  all  the  members  of  such  firm,  though  their 
names  do  not  appear  in  the  firm  name  and  style,  to  join  in  a  con- 
veyance of  land  acquired  under  a  conveyance  to  the  partnership  ; 
and  it  is  not  necessary,  though  desirable,  that  the  deed  should 
recite  that  these  persons  constituted  the  partnership.^ 

A  deed  to  A  &  Co.  vests  the  legal  title  in  A  alone.'^ 

If  land  be  sold  to  a  partnership,  and  a  deed  be  made  to  it  in 
the  firm  name  of  Blanchard  &  Burrus,  but  one  of  the  partners 
dies  before  the  deed  is  delivered,  it  conveys  to  the  surviving  part- 
ner an  undivided  half  interest  in  the  land.     The   heirs  at  law  of 

1  Chicago  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ashworth,  26  W.  Rep.  788;  Morse  v.  Carpenter,  19  Vt. 
Kans.  212.  613. 

2  Dunlap  V.  Green,  60  Fed.  Rep.  242  ;  ^  Beaman  v.  Whitney,  20  Me.  413  ;  Ly- 
Morse  v.  Carpenter,  19  Vt.  613  ;  Beaman  man  v.  Gedney,  114  111.  388,  29  N.  E.  Rep. 
V.  Whitney,  20  Me.  413  ;  Sherry  v.   Gil-  282,  5.5  Am.  Rep.  871. 

more,  58   Wis.  324,   17  N.  W.  Rep.  252;  ^  Lyman  v.  Gedney,  114  111.  388,  29  N. 

Jones  V.  Neale,  2  Pat.  &  II.  3.39 ;  Menage  E.  Rep.  282,  55  Am.  Rep.  871. 

V.  Burke,  43  Minn.  211,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  "  Ketchum  v.   Barber   (Cal.),  12   Pac. 

155;  Gille  v.  Hunt,  35  Minn.  357,  29    N.  Rep.  251  ;  Winter  v.  Stock,  29  Cal.  407, 

W.  Rep.  2  ;  Foster  r.  Johnson,  39   Minn.  89   Am.   Dec.  57;  Arthur  t>.  Weston,  22 

378,   40   N.   W.   Rep.   255;    McMurry  v.  Mo.  378;  Percifull    y.  Piatt,  36  Ark.  456, 

Fletcher,  28  Kans.  337.  464;   Chavcner  v.  Wood,   2    Oreg.    182; 

3  Menage  I'.  Burke,  43  Minn.  211,  45  Lindsay  v.  Jaffray,  55  Tex.  626,  641; 
N.  W.  Rep.  155.  Moreau   v.   Saffarans,  3    Sneed,   595,  67 

*  Dunlaj)  I'.  Green,  60  Fed.  Rep.  242;     Am.  Dec.  582. 
Wakefield  v.  Brown,  38  Minn.  361,  37  N. 

211 


§  245.]  PARTIES    TO    DEEDS    AND    THEIR    DESCRIPTION. 

tlio  ilecenscd  partner  would  sii .eiHHl  to  his  iqiiitable  interest,  the 
purcliasi'-moiioy  Jiaving  been  paid,  and  the  grantor  would  be  com- 
pelled to  (VMivey  such  interest  to  them.' 

245.  Some  courts  have  taken  the  distinction  that  a  deed  to 
a  partnership  by  the  partnership  name  alone  does  not  pass 
the  legal  title  to  the  land,  but  only  an  equitable  title. ^  A  part- 
nership is  not  recognized  in  law  as  a  person,  and  the  legal  title 
to  real  property  can  only  be  held  by  a  person,  or  by  a  corporation, 
which  is  deemed  such  at  law.  A  deed  to  a  partnership  may  be 
given  effect  as  a  contract  to  convey.^  The  individual  members 
of  the  firm,  in  whom  the  legal  title  should  vest,  may  be  identi- 
fied by  extrinsic  evidence.  By  implication  the  deed  vests  in  the 
members  of  the  firm  the  power  to  convey.*  But  even  where  this 
distinction  is  taken  between  the  legal  and  equitable  title,  it  is 
declared  that  where  a  partnership  as  a  grantee  in  a  deed  contains 
the  name  or  names  of  one  or  more  of  the  partners,  the  legal  title 
vests  in  the  partner  or  partners  so  named.^ 

1  Blancliiird  v.  Floyd,  93  Ala.  53,  9  So.  melsberg  v.  Mitchell,  29  Ohio  St.  22,  52 ; 

Kep.  418.  Frost  v.  Wolf,  77  Tex.  455, 14  S.  W.  Rep. 

-  Percifull  v.  Piatt,  36  Ark.  456  ;  Land  440  ;  Baldwin  v.  Richardson,  33  Tex.  16  ; 

Asso.  V.  Scholler,  10  Minn.  331  ;  Morrison  Lowery  v.  Drew,  18  Tex.  786. 
«;.    MenJenhall,    18    Minn.  232;  Tidd   v.         3  Dunlap  r.  Green,  60  Fed.  Rep.  242 ; 

Rines,  26  Minn.  201,  2  N.  W.  Rep.  497  ;  Kyle  v.  Roberts,  6  Leigh,  495. 
Gille  V.  Hunt,  35  Minn.  357,  29  N.  W.         *  Dunlap  v.  Green,  60  Fed.  Rep.  242. 
Rep.  2  ;  Foster  v.  Johnson,  39  Minn.  378,         ^  Gille  v.  Hunt,  35  Minn.  357,  29  N.  W. 

40  N.  W.  Rep.  255  ;  Townshend  v.  Good-  Rep.  2  ;  Foster  v.  Johnson,  39  Minn.  378, 

fellow,  40  Minn.  312,41  N.  W.  Rep.  1056;  40  N.  W.  Rep.  255. 
Dunlap  V.  Green,  60  Fed.  Rep.  242  ;  Ram- 

212 


CHAPTER  XV. 

RECITALS    IN    DEEDS. 

I.  Use  and  effect  of  recitals,  246-250.     I  III.  Estoppel  by  recitals,  256-262. 
II.  Recitals  as  evidence,  251-255.  I 

I.     Use  and  Effect  of  Recitals. 

246.  In  the  ordinary  forms  of  deeds  in  general  use  in  this 
country  there  are  no  formal  narrative  or  introductory  recitals, 
and  there  is  no  need  of  them  in  conveyances  in  fee  simple  by  ab- 
solute owners,  though  they  are  useful  in  more  elaborate  convey- 
ances, and  especially  in  deeds  of  settlement  and  deeds  creating 
partial  interests  or  subordinate  estates.  This  part  of  a  deed  for- 
merly had  a  recognized  place  and  was  seldom  omitted,  though  it 
never  was  a  necessary  part  of  a  deed  either  in  law  or  equity;  and 
the  tendency  has  long  been  in  the  direction  of  dispensing  with 
such  recitals.  In  modern  conveyancing  brevity  is  deemed  a  vir- 
tue, and  recitals  are  usually  confined  to  a  brief  statement  of  the 
source  of  the  grantor's  title,  of  the  capacity  in  which  he  executes 
the  deed,  or  of  its  intended  operation  and  effect.^  Such  recitals 
are  a  key  to  the  operative  part  of  the  deed.  These  recitals  in 
deeds  of  indenture  immediately  follow  the  description  of  the  par- 
ties, though  at  the  present  time,  in  deeds  jioll,  such  recitals  as  are 
used  are  often  placed  nt  the  end  of  the  description  of  the  prop- 
erty, and  recitals  may  be  inserted  in  connection  with  the  words 
of  conveyance,  or  in  tlie  in  testimonium  clause. 

The  office  of  nn native  recitals  is  to  state  the  facts  and  instru- 
ments through  which  the  grantor's  title  is  deduced  ;  and  the  office 
of  introductory  recitals  is  to  explain  the  motive  of  the  grantor  in 
making  the  conveyance.  It  is  quite  important  that  the  immedi- 
ate source  of  the  title  should  be  stated  somewhere  in  the  deed. 
In  this  country,  at  the  present  day,  the  accountof  the  title  is  quite 
informal,  and  consists  merely  of  a  reference  to  the  deeds  under 
1  Moore  v.  Magrath,  1  Cowp.  9,  per  Mansfield,  J. 

213 


§§  :24T--249.]  kkcitals  in  dkkds. 

which  the  gvantur  deiivos  liis  title.  This  is  usually  inserted  after 
the  di'scripiioii  ot"  thi>  property.  Where  this  is  done  witli  care  in 
sncci'ssive  deeds  of  the  same  land,  t'ach  recital  carries  back  the 
title  one  step,  and  together  the  lecitals  make  a  connected  history 
of  the  title.  Careful  conveyancers  at  the  present  time  seldom  fail 
to  make  accurate  reference  to  the  grantor's  source  of  title. 

247.  Recitals  should  be  confined  to  statements  of  facts,  and 
should  not  contain  inferences  of  law.  Thus,  for  instance,  if  the 
title  has  come  to  the  grantor  by  descent,  the  recital  should  state 
what  is  necessary  to  prove  his  heirship,  and  not  merely  that  he  took 
it  as  heir  of  a  person  named  ;  or,  if  the  title  came  to  him  by  devise, 
recitals  should  be  made  of  the  death  of  the  testator  seised  of  the 
land,  of  the  probate  of  his  will,  and  of  the  devise  of  the  land  to 
the  grantor,  and  not  merely  that  the  grantor  is  a  devisee  of  the 
land.i 

Recitals  of  facts  in  a  patent  for  a  land  grant  bind  both  the 
officers  of  government  and  the  grantee,  as  well  as  those  in  privity 
with  him.  But  recitals  of  an  opinion  of  the  executive  officers  as 
to  matters  of  law  are  not  conclusive.^ 

248.  Recitals  should  not  contain  negative  statements  ;  as, 
for  instance,  that  the  testator  died  without  altering  or  revoking 
his  will.  They  should  not  contain  matters  not  relevant  to  the 
subject-matter  and  intended  operation  of  the  deed;  as,  for  in- 
stance, executors  having,  in  general,  no  powers  over  real  estate 
passing  by  a  will,  there  should  be  no  recital  of  the  appointment  of 
executors.  It  is  not  strictly  necessary  to  state  the  date  and  place 
of  probate  of  a  will,  though  such  a  statement  is  a  convenient  one 
and  may  properly  be  added.  In  reciting  powers  under  a  will  or 
settlement,  only  so  much  should  be  stated  as  is  sufficient  to  show 
the  necessary'  authority  for  executing  the  conveyance. ^ 

249.  When  the  recitals  agree  with  the  operative  part  of  a 
deed  they  have  no  legal  effect ;  and,  if  the  operative  part  of  a 
deed  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  recitals  at  variance  with  it  are  of 
no  effect.  The  operative  clause,  when  clear,  always  controls  the 
recitals.'*      An  operative    clause   in   definite  terms  controls    reci- 

1  5  Bythewood's  Free.  4th  ed.  p.  139.  *  Bailey  v.  Lloyd,    5    Russ.   330,  344; 

2  McGarrahan  v.  New  Idiia  M.  Co.  49  Ilolliday  v.  Overton,  14  Beav.  467  ;  Dawes 
Cal.  331.  V.  Tredwcll,   18   Ch.  D.  354,  358,  per  Jes- 

3  5  Bythewood's  Prec.  4th  ed.  pp.  140,  scl,  M.  R. ;  Leggott  v.  Barrett,  15  Ch.  D. 
141.  306,  311,  per  Brett,   L.  J.;  Alexander  v. 

214 


USE    AND    EFFECT    OF    RECITALS. 


[§  250. 


tills  In  general  terms.i  On  the  other  hand,  general  words  in  the 
operative  clause  may  be  restrained  by  a  particular  recital.^  The 
operative  part  of  a  power  of  attorney  appointed  attorneys  with- 
out in  terms  limiting  the  duration  of  their  powers;  but  it  was 
preceded  by  a  recital  that-  the  principal  was  going  abroad,  and 
was  desirous  of  apjDointing  attorneys  to  act  for  him  during  his 
absence.  It  was  held  that  the  recital  controlled  the  generality 
of  the  operative  part  of  the  instrument,  and  limited  the  exercise 
of  the  powers  of  the  attorney  to  the  period  of  the  principal's 
absence  from  this  country .^ 

250.  Where  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  the  recitals 
and  the  operative  part  of  the  deed,  the  latter,  if  certain  in  its 
terms,  controls.*  Thus,  where  the  grantor  in  a  preamble  to  a  deed 
recited  that  he  had  given  a  certain  parcel  of  land  to  the  county 
to  be  used  as  a  site  for  a  court-house,  but  the  operative  part  of  the 
deed  did  not  specify  the  purpose  for  wliich  the  land  was  given,  but 
conveyed  it  for  the  use  of  the  county,  it  was  properly  held  that 
the  preamble  merely  expressed  the  motive  which  induced  the 
grantor  to  make  the  conveyance,  and  did  not  create  a  condition 
that  the  land  should  be  used  for  a  court-house.^ 

The  description  of  the  property  in  the  operative  clause,  when 
made  in  language  that  admits  of  no  uncertainty,  is  never  con- 
trolled by  mere  lecitals.^ 


Crosbie,  L.  &  G.  145,  per  Lord  St.  Leon- 
ards; Jenner  v.  Jenner,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  361  ; 
Walsh  V.  Trevanion,  15  Q.  B.  733,751, 
per  Patteson,  J. ;  Rooke  v.  Kensington, 
2  K.  &  J.  7.53,  769;  Ingleby  v.  Swift, 
10  Bing.  84;  Yoimg  i-.  Smith,  L.  R.  1 
Eq.  180,  183,  35  Beav.  90.  In  this  case, 
Romilly,  M.  R.,  said  :  "  It  is  of  the  great- 
est consequence  to  keep  distinct  the  dif- 
ferent parts  of  deeds,  and  to  give  to  reci- 
tals and  to  the  operative  part  their  proper 
iffccts." 

'  Dawes  V.  Tredwell,  18  Ch.  D.  354, 
358,  iier  Jcssell,  M.  R. 

-  Knight  V.  Cole,  1  Show.  150,  per  Lord 
Holt;  Jenner  v.  Jenner,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  361  ; 
Cln'ldeis  V.  Eardley,  28  Beav.  648  ;  Ex 
jiuiir.  Dawes,  17  Q.  B.  D.  275  ;  Walsh  v. 
Trevanion,  15  Q.  B.  733;  Gray?;.  Lim- 
erick, 2  De  G.  &  Sm.  370. 

3  Danby  v.  Coutts,  29  Ch.  D.  500. 


*  Hammond  v.  Hammond,  19  Beav.  29 ; 
Young  V.  Smith,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  180,  183. 

5  Miller  v.  Tunica  Co.  67  Miss.  651. 

^  Howard  v.  Shrewsbury,  L.  R.  17  Eq, 
378,  per  Je.'^sel,  M.  R. ;  Ex  parte  Young, 
4  Deac.  185;  Huntington  v.  Havens,  5 
Johns.  Ch.  23,  27,  per  Chancellor  Kent. 
In  Barratt  v.  Wyatt,  30  Beav.  442,  Ro- 
milly, M.  R.,  said  :  "As  to  the  construc- 
tion of  the  settlement,  I  do  not  dispute  the 
proposition  which  was  argued,  that,  if  you 
find  in  a  settlement  recitals  indicating 
various  parcels  enumerated,  from  whence 
it  is  to  be  inferred,  from  reading  the  re- 
cital alone,  that  these  parcels  and  these 
alone  are  to  be  included  in  and  made  .sub- 
ject to  the  provisions  of  the  deed,  but  yet 
you  find  that  in  the  operative  part  of  the 
deed  one  or  two  of  these  ])arccls  are 
omitted,  the  court  may  be  of  opinion,  upon 
the  construction  of  the  deed,  that  the  par- 

215 


$  ±'A.]  kechals  in  dkhds. 

Wliore,  howt'ver,  the  oiHuutive  part  of  a  deed  contains  an  am- 
bii;iiitv,  a  clear  recital  of  the  same  matter  will  be  <^iven  control- 
liiii>-  otYect.  Resort  may  always  be  had  to  a  recital  to  explain 
such  ambiguity. 1  "  We  may  consider  it  settled  by  authority  that 
where  the  Avords  of  a  covenant  are  ambiguous  and  difficult  to 
deal  with,  we  may  resoit  to  the  recitals  to  see  whether  they 
throw  any  light  on  its  meaning."  ^ 

II.    Recitals  as  Evide7ice. 

251.  A  recital  is  not  evidence  in  favor  of  the  grantor  except 
as  to  his  acts  in  an  official  capacity.  A  recital  that  the  grantor 
is  the  heir  at  law  of  a  person  deceased,  who  was  the  former  owner 
of  the  land,  is  no  evidence  as  against  a  stranger  of  either  the 
heirship  or  the  death  of  such  former  owner.  The  recital  is,  of 
course,  no  evidence  in  favor  of  the  grantor,  and  it  is  no  better 
evidence  in  favor  of  any  one  claiming  under  the  grantor.  It  is 
no  more  competent  as  evidence,  as  against  a  stranger  to  the  deed, 
of  the  facts  stated,  than  it  would  bo  if  embodied  in  a  letter  or 
any  other  paper.^     Such  a  recital  is  merely  a  claim  of  heirship.'* 

Recitals  in  an  executor's  deed  are  not  competent  to  establish 
the  testator's  will,  the  probate  thereof,  and  the  proceeding  ending 
in  the  execution  of  the  deed,  as  against  persons  not  in  privity 
with  the  grantor.  The  execution  and  probate  of  the  will,  the 
appointment  and  qualification  of  the  executor,  the  provisions  of 
the  will,  and  the  probate  proceedings,  must  be  proved  by  compe- 
tent evidence  without  the  aid  of  any  recitals  in  the  deed.^ 

A  recital,  in  a  deed,  of  a  former  deed  between  the  same  par- 
ties, proves  as  between  the  parties  so  much  of  the  former  deed 
as  is  recited,  but  no  more.^ 

eels  which  are  omitted  in  the  operative  Michell's  Trusts,  9  Ch.  D.  5  ;  In  re  Neal's 

piirt  are  omitted  hy  mistake,  and  are  not  Trusts,  4  Jur.  N.   S.  6  ;  Gwyn  v.  Nenth 

included  in   the    provisions   of   the    deed.  Canal  Co.  L.  TJ.  .3    Kx.    209,  219  ;  Walsh 

And  tlie  converse  of  that  proposition  is  v.  Trevanion,  1.5    Q.    B.    73.3;  Yonnj,'  r. 

al.so  true:  parcels  may  be  included  in  the  Smith,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  180,  3.5  Beav.  90. 

operative  part  of  the  deed  which  the  re-  '^  In  re  Michell's  Trusts,  9  Ch.    D.   5, 

citals  and  the  rest  of  the  deed  show  to  9,  per  Jessell,  M.  R. 

have    been    inserted    there    by    mistake.  3  Costello  r.  Burke,  63  Towa,  361. 

There  are  several  cases  to  that  effect,  and  *  Potter  v.   Washburn,   13  Vt.  558,  37 

amongst  them  the  well-known  case,  before  Am.  Dec.  615. 

Lor.i  Mansfield,  of  Moore  ;;.  Magrath,  1  ^  Miller  v.  Miller,  63  Iowa,  387. 

C(,«p.  9."  «  Gillett  V.  Abbott,  7  Ad.  &  E.  783. 
1   B.iilev  V.  Llovd,  5   Hnss.   344  ;  In  re 

216 


RECITALS    AS    EVIDEXCI':.  [§§  252-254. 

252.  Recitals  in  ancient  deeds  are  competent  evidence  for 
some  purposes,  as,  for  example,  to  show  pedigree,^  or  to  show 
the  position  of  a  natural  boundary.'-^  But  such  recitals  are  not 
aduiissible  to  enlarge  the  estate  granted  in  a  prior  deed  of  the 
same  grantor,  to  the  impairment  of  an  intervening  title.^ 

Where  a  conveyance  would  be  competent  evidence  as  an  ancient 
deed  without  proof  of  its  execution,  the  power  under  which  it 
purports  to  have  been  executed  will  be  presumed  ;  and  a  recital 
of  such  power  will  be  held  to  be  sufficient  evidence  of  the  exist- 
ence of  such  power  and  of  its  execution  ;  ^  and  a  recital  of  facts 
equivalent  to  a  power  of  attorney  will  have  a  like  effect.^ 

253.  Recitals  in  an  administrator's  deed  of  the  acts  re- 
quired by  statute  in  making  a  sale  are  prima  facie  evidence 
of  their  performance.  The  administrator  is  an  officer  of  the 
law,  acting  under  the  obligations  of  his  oath  of  office,  and  it  is 
presumed  that  he  does  his  duty,  and  fulfils  the  requirements  of 
the  statute,  until  the  contrary  is  proved.^  This  is  particularly 
the  case  after  a  lapse  of  time  which  makes  the  instrument  an 
ancient  deed."  After  twenty  years'  acquiescence  by  the  heirs  of 
an  intestate  in  the  possession  of  land  under  a  sale  by  the  admin- 
istrator, recitals  in  his  deed  may  be  regarded  in  aid  of  the  pre- 
sumption that  the  administrator  had  taken  the  oath  of  office,  and 
had  posted  notifications  according  to  law.^ 

A  deed  by  an  executor,  administrator,  guardian,  or  other  person 
acting  in  like  capacity,  should  contain  recitals  of  the  power  under 
which  the  grantor  acts  in  making  the  conveyance.  If  a  person 
in  such  representative  capacity  executes  a  deed  without  such 
recitals,  and  signs  it  with  the  addition  merely  of  the  words  indi- 
cating the  capacity  in  which  he  intends  to  act,  as,  for  instance, 
"administrator,"  etc.,  the  deed  is  strictly  his  own  personal  deed.^ 

254.  A  sheriff's  deed  should  contain   recitals  sufficient  to 

1  1  Grcenl.  Ev.  §  104.  6  Williams  v.  llardie  (Te.\.  Civ.  App.), 

-  Drury  v.  Midland   11.  Co.  127  Mass.  21  S.  W.  Kep.  267;  Veramendi  v.  Iliitch- 

.'571.  in.s,  48  Tex.  .531,' .5.53. 

3  Whitney   v.    Wheeler    Cotton    Mills,  «  Doe  y.  Henderson,  4  Ga.  148,  48  Am. 

151  Mass.  396.  Dec.    216;   Worthy    v.    Johnson,   8   Ga. 

<  Doe  V.   I'help.s,  9   Johns.  160;    Wil-  230. 

Hams  I'.  Hard ie   (Tex.  Civ.  App  ),  21    S.  '  Stevenson    v.    McKeary,    12    Sm.    &. 

W.  Kep.  267  ;  Johnson  v.  Timmons,  50  M.  9. 

Tex.    521,   534;  Watrous   v.  McGrew,  16  ^  Gray  v.  Gardner,  3  Mass.  399. 

Tex.   .506,  513  ;  Harrison  v.  MeMurray,  '•*  IJohb  i'.  Barnum,  59  Mo.  394. 
71  Tex.  122,  128,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  612. 

217 


§  255.]  RECITALS   IN   DEEDS. 

show  the  authority  under  which  he  acted  in  making  the  sale. 
Tlu'V  should  show  the  authority  to  sell,  and  a  sale  made  substan- 
tially according  to  law.^  All  the  facts  which  constitute  tiie  foun- 
dation of  title,  and  without  which  the  sale  would  be  void,  must 
be  recited.^ 

But  recitals  other  than  tliose  which  show  the  sheriff's  author- 
ity, and  his  acts  in  executing  it,  are  not  necessary,  and  may  be 
omitted  even  when  required  by  statute.  Thus  a  statutory  pro- 
vision, that  the  sheriff's  deed  shall  recite  all  the  executions  issued 
upon  a  judgment,  is  regarded  as  directory  merely,  in  so  far  as 
it  relates  to  other  executions  than  that  under  which  the  sheriff 
acts.^ 

The  deed  need  not  recite  the  amount  of  the  judgment  and  the 
names  of  the  parties,  if  the  execution  is  valid.* 

A  misrecital  of  facts  authorizing  a  sale  by  the  sheriff  does  not 
avoid  his  deed,  if  the  necessary  facts  actually  exist.^ 

In  the  case  of  a  sale  by  a  tax-collector  the  deed  must  show  by 
its  recitals  that  the  statute  has  been  strictly  complied  with.^ 

255.  Recitals  in  a  deed  made  by  a  mortgagee  under  a 
power  of  sale,  of  the  giving  of  due  notice  of  the  sale,  in  con- 
formity with  the  requirements  of  the  statute  and  in*  pursuance  of 
the  provisions  of  such  mortgage,  giving  the  particulars  of  the 
notice,  are  prima  facie  evidence  of  such  notice."  The  mortgagee's 
recitals  in  such  a  deed  bind  not  only  the  mortgagee  but  as  well 
the  mortgagor,  equally  as  if  the  deed  were  executed  by  him  in 
person,  for  the  mortgagee  is  his  attorney  in  fact.^ 

1  Tanner  v.  Siine,  18  Mo.  580,  59  Am.  Dec.  370;  Huggins  v.  Ketchum,  4  Dev.  & 
Dec.  320  ;  Lackey  v.  Lubke,  36  Mo.  115  ;  B.  414.  If  the  statute  requires  a  recital 
Martin  u.  Bonsack,  61  Mo.  556  ;  Buchanan  of  the  judgment,  a  deed  without  such 
V.  Tracy,  45  Mo.  437;  Stewart  u.  Sever-  recital  is  void.  Dufour  w.  Camfranc,  11 
ance,  4.'}  Mo.  322;  Strain  v.  Murphy,  49  Martin  (I.a.),  607,  13  Am.  Dec.  360. 
Mo.  337.  *  Perkins   v.    Dibble,    10   Ohio,  433,  36 

2  Armstrong  v.  McCoy,  8  Ohio,  128.  Am.  Dec.  97  ;  McGuire  v.  Kouns,  7  T.  B. 

3  Jixck.son  V.  Pratt,  10  Johns.  381 ;  Jack-  Mon.  386,  18  Am.  Dec.  187. 

son  V.  Davis,  18  Johns.  7;  Armstrong  v.  ^  Martin  v.  Wilbourne,  2   Hill,  395,  27 

McCoy,   8  Ohio,  128,  31    Am.  Dec.  435 ;  Am.  Dec.  393;  Harrison   v.  Maxwell,  2 

Perkins  v.  Dibble,  10  Ohio,  433,   36  Am.  Nott.  &  Mc.  347,  10  Am.  Dee.  611. 

Dec.  97  ;  Buchanan  v.  Tracy,  45  Mo.  437  ;  ^  Brnok.s  v.  Rooney,  1 1  Ga.  423,  56  Am. 

Ogden   V.  Walters,  12    Ivans.  282  ;  Bet-  Dec.  4.30,  per  Lumpkin,  J. 

tison  V.  Budd,    17  Ark.    .546  ;   Humphry  '  Tartt  v.  Clayton,  109  111.  579. 

V.  Beeson,  I  Greene  (Iowa),  199,  48  Am.  ^  Simsou  v.  Eckstein,  22  Cal.  580. 

218 


ESTOPPEL   BY   RECITALS. 


[§§  256,  257. 


III.  Estoirpel  by  Recitals. 

256.  An  estoppel  by  recital  binds  the  grantor  and  all  who 
take  his  estate,  privies  in  blood,  privies  in  estate,  and  privies  in 
law.i  The  recital  does  not  bind  persons  who  are  not  privies  of 
the  grantor,  such  as  claimants  by  adverse  or  prior  title,  or  the 
grantor's  creditors.^ 

A  party  to  a  deed  must  be,  sui  juris,  competent  to  make  an 
effectual  contract,  to  be  estopped  b}'  a  recital.'^ 

In  a  deed  by  a  corporation,  a  recital  by  the  person  who  executes 
it  in  behalf  of  the  corporation,  that  he  was  duly  authorized  to  exe- 
cute it,  estops  him  to  deny  that  he  was  so  authorized."* 

But,  even  as  between  the  parties,  a  recital  is  not  binding  when 
the  proceeding  is  really  collateral  to  the  deed  and  the  title  thereby 
conveyed.     In  such  case  the  facts  recited  may  be  disputed.-^ 

A  conveyance  is  not  affected  by  a  false  recital  made  by  the 
same  grantor  on  the  same  day  in  conveying  an  adjoining  lot  to  a 
different  gi'antee.^ 

257.  A  recital,  to  have  the  effect  of  an  estoppel,  must  be  a 
distinct  recital  of  particular  facts,  and  not  a  recital  in  general 
terms.  Where  a  distinct  statement  of  a  particular  fact  is  made 
in  a  recital,  and  the  parties  act  with  reference  to  that  recital,  it  is 
not,  as  between  them,  competent  for  the  party  bound  to  deny  the 
recital.'  "  It  is  said  that  the  recitals  of  a  deed  cannot  operate  by 
way  of  estoppel.      But   the  distinction   which    has    always  been 


1  Strouirhill  v.  Buck,  14  Q.  B.  781 ; 
Doe  V.  Errington,  6  Bing.  N.  C.  79 ;  Bank 
of  U.  S.  V.  Benning,  4  Cr.  C.  C.  81  ;  Car- 
ver V.  Jackson,  4  Pet.  I,  83;  West  v. 
Pine,  4  Wash.  691  ;  Doe  r.  Porter,  3  Ark. 
18,  36  Am.  Dec.  448  ;  Jackson  v.  Park- 
hurst,  9  Wend.  209  ;  Chautauqua  Co. 
Bank  v.  Risley,  4  Den.  480 ;  Usina  i'. 
Wilder,  58  Ga.  178;  Rangely  v.  Spring, 
28  Me.  127,  142  ;  Stoutimorc  v.  Clark,  70 
Mo.  471  ;  Hasenritter  v.  Kirclihoffer,  79 
Mo.  239  ;  Sim.'^on  v.  Eckstein,  22  CfiL 
.580;  Byrne  v.  Morehouse,  22  111.  C03 ; 
Pinckard  v.  Milinino,  76  III.  4.53  ;  Kinsman 
V.  Loomis,  1 1  Ohio,  47.5,  478 ;  Doe  v. 
Howell,  1  Honst.  178. 

2  Battersbee  v.  Farrington,  1  Swans. 
106;   West    V.    Pine,    4    Wash.    691;   Dc 


Farges  v.  Ryland,  87  Va.  404  ;  Allen  v. 
Allen,  45  Pa.  St.  468. 

■^  Bank  of  America  v.  Banks,  101  U.  S. 
240;  Jackson  r.  Vanderheyden,  17  Johns. 
167,  8  Am.  Dec.  378. 

■*  Stow  V.  Wyse,  7  Conn.  214,  18  Am. 
Dec.  99. 

5  Carpenter  v.  Bullcr,  8  Mees.  &  W.  209, 
213  ;  Bank  of  America  v.  Banks,  101  U. 
S.  240  ;  Carter  v.  Carter,  3  K.  &.  J.  617, 
per  Wood,  V.  C.  ;  Ex  parte  Morgan,  2 
Ch.  D.  72. 

6  Bay  V.  Posner  (Md.),  29  Atl.  Rep. 
11. 

^  Carpenter  v.    Buller,  8  Mees.  &  W. 
209 ;  Bowman   v.   Taylor,  4   Nev.  &   M. 
262  ;   Heath  v.  Crcalock,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  22  ; 
Crofts  I'.  Middleton,  2  K.  &  J.  194. 
219 


^§  258,  259.]  RECITALS    IN    DKEDS. 

taken  is  this,  —  that  a  general  recital  will  not  operate  as  an  estop- 
pel, but  the  recital  of  a  particular  fact  will  have  that  elTect."  ^ 
The  recital  must  also  be  of  a  material  fact  and  of  the  essence  of 
the  contract.'-^  As  between  the  immediate  parties  to  a  deed,  a 
recital  not  necessary  to  the  conveyance  does  not  amount  to  an 
estoppel.^ 

A  party  to  a  deed  is  not  estopped  by  recitals  contained  in  other 
deeds,  through  which  the  title  is  derived,  to  which  he  was  not 
a  party.  Lord  Denman  said:*  "  Is  it  true  as  a  genei-al  proposi- 
tion that  a  party  so  claiming  adopts  the  statement  of  facts  in  an 
anterior  deed  which  goes  to  make  up  his  title?  We  are  aware 
of  no  authority  for  such  a  doctrine." 

258.  A  recital,  to  operate  as  an  estoppel,  must  be  clear  and 
without  ambiguity.^  "  It  is  a  rule,"  says  Lord  Tenterden,  "  that 
an  estoppel  should  be  certain  to  every  intent,  and  therefore,  if  the 
thing  be  not  precisely  and  directly  alleged,  or  be  mere  matter  of 
supjaosal,  it  shall  not  be  an  estoppel ;  nor  shall  a  man  be  estopped 
where  the  truth  appears  by  the  sauie  instrument,  or  that  the 
grantor  had  nothing  to  grant,  or  only  a  possibility."  ^ 

259.  Only  the  parties  to  a  deed  and  their  privies  can  take 
advantage  of  recitals  wiiicli  operate  as  estoppels."  ^  Privies  in 
blood,  as  the  heir  ;  privies  in  estate,  as  the  feoffee,  lessee,  etc.  ; 
privies  in  law,  as  the  lords  byescluat;  tenant  by  the  curtesie, 
tenant  in  dower ;  the  incumbent  of  a  benefice  ;  and  others  that 
come  under  by  an  act  in  law,  or  in  the  post,  —  shall  be  bound  and 
take  advantage  of  estoppels."^  ^V  stranger  to  the  deed  and  title 
cannot  take  advantage  of  an  estoppel  created  by  it.^  "Every 
estoppel  ought  to  be  reciprocal,"  says  Lord  Coke,  "  that  is,  to  bind 
both  parties  ;  and  this  is  the  reason  that  regularly  a  stranger  shall 

J  Bensley  c.  Bunion,  8  L.  J.  Vh.  85,  87,  '•  Shelton    v.    Shelton,  4  N.  &  M.   857, 

per  Lord   Lyiidliiirst.     The   law  was  so  867,  3  Ad.  &  El.  265,  283.      See,  however, 

laid  down  by  Lord  Chief  Justice  Holt,  in  Doe  v.  Stone,  3  C.  B.  176. 

the   case   of  Salter   v.    Kidley,    Shower's  ^  Palmer  i-.  Ekin.s  2  Ld.  Raym.  1550, 

Rep.  59  ;  by  Chancellor  Kenf,  in  Hunting-  1553  ;  Heath  i\  Crealock,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  22  ; 

ton  V.  Havens,  5  Johns.  Ch  23,  26.  Hays  v.  Askew,  5  Jones  L.  63. 

2  Carpenter  v.  Buller,  8  :M.  &  W.  209,  ^  i^jght  v,  Biickiiell,  2  B.  &  Ail.  278, 

213;  Fort  v.  Allen,  110  N.  C.  183,  14  S.  281. 

E.  Rep.  685  ;  Brinegar  v.  Cliaffin,  3  Dcv.  •  Strvenaon  v.  McReary,  12  Srn.  &  M. 

108.  9.  51  An).  Dec.  102. 

8  Osborne  v.  Endicott,  6   Cal    149,  65  «  Co.  Litt.  352  a 

Am.   Dec.    498;  Siinson  v.    Eckstein,  22  ^  Doe  r.   Errington,  8   Scott,  210;  Al- 

Cal.  580.  len   v.  Allen,  45  Pa.    St.   468. 
220 


ESTOPPEL    BY    RECITALS.  [§  260. 

neither  take  advantage  nor  be  bound  by  the  estoppel."  ^  Thus 
the  owner  of  land  conveyed  it  to  several  tenants,  some  of  \\  hom 
afterwards  joined  with  him  in  executing  a  mortgage  to  a  strnng.r, 
containing  a  recital  that  he  was  the  owner  of  a  certain  undivided 
part  of  the  land.  A  creditor  of  such  owner,  after  the  execution 
of  the  mortgage  and  before  it  was  recorded,  attaclied  the  land, 
sold  it  on  execution,  bought  it  at  the  sheriff's  sale,  and  then 
brought  ejectment  against  the  tenants  in  possession,  who  alleged 
that  the  judgment  debtor  had  no  title  when  the  attachment  was 
made.  To  this  the  creditor  set  up  tlio  recital  in  the  mortgnge  as 
an  estoppel.  It  was  held  that  the  creditor  could  not  take  advan- 
tage of  this  recital,  as  it  was  not  made  to  him  or  to  any  one 
under  whom  he  claimed  title.  Mr.  Justice  Strong  said :  "  Nor 
was  the  recital  an  admission  or  declaration  made  to  the  plaintiff 
at  the  time  of  the  sale,  or  at  an}'  previous  time.  He  was  not  a 
party  to  the  mortgage.  It  w;is  altogether  res  inter  alios  acta.  If 
he  saw  it,  and  did  not  know  it  was  a  mistake  or  a  falsehood,  still 
he  was  not  warranted  in  relying  upon  it.  I  agree  that,  if  the 
plaintiff  had  been  induced  to  purchase  by  anything  said  by  these 
mortgagors  at  the  sale,  or  by  representations  made  by  them  to  him 
previously,  they  would  have  been  bound  by  their  declarations,  and 
pi-ecluded  from  averring  the  contrary  to  the  prejudice  of  his  title. 
But  it  is  an  unprecedented  extension  of  the  doctrine  of  equitable 
estoppel  to  hold  that  a  man  is  bound  to  the  world  to  make  good 
what  he  has  said  to  any  one,  if  others  choose  to  rely  upon  it.  If 
every  man  may  be  held  liable  not  only  to  parties  and  privies  to  his 
deed  but  to  all  mankind,  to  make  good  every  introductory  recital 
which  the  deed  contains,  it  behooves  him  to  avoid  all  recitals, 
and  be  careful  what  scrivener  he  employs.  Such  is  not  the  law, 
and  there  are  no  authorities  which  assert  it.  The  plaintiff,  then, 
being  a  stranger  to  tliis  mortgage,  neither  a  party  nor  a  privy, 
cannot  use  it  as  the  basis  of  an  equitable  estoppel."  ^ 

A  recital  by  one  tenant  in  common  in  a  deed  to  a  stranger  can- 
not affect  any  right  of  the  otlier  tenant  in  common.'^ 

260.  "Whether  a  recital  estops  one  party  or  all  the  parties 
to  the  deed  depends  upon  the  intention  to  be  gathered  from 
the  whole  instrument.     "  Where  a  recital  is   intended  to  be  a 

^  Co.  Litt.  352  a.  ^  Thomason   v.    Dayton,   40   Ohio    St. 

2  Sunderlin  v.  Struthers,  47  Pa.  St.  411 ,     6.3. 
423. 

221 


§  260.] 


RECITALS    IN    DKKDS, 


slatonuMit  wiru'li  all  the  parties  to  a  deed  have  imitually  agreed 
to  aihnit  as  true,  it  is  an  estoppel  upon  all.  "  It  seems  elear  that, 
where  it  can  be  collected  rrom  the  deed  that  the  parties  to  it  have 
ac;reed  upon  a  certain  admitted  state  of  facts  as  the  basis  on 
-whirh  they  contract,  the  statement  of  those  facts,  though  but  in 
the  way  of  recital,  shall  estop  the  parties  to  aver  the  contrary.' 
But  when  it  is  intended  to  be  the  statement  of  one  party  only, 
the  estoppel  is  confined  to  that  party."  ^ 

Thus  a  recital,  in  an  instrument  executed  by  a  husband  and. 
wife  of  one  part  and  a  trustee  of  the  other,  that  it  had  been 
agreed  between  them  before  their  marriage  that  a  certain  sum  of 
money  belonging  to  the  intended  wife  should  be  secured  to  her 
separate  use,  does  not  purport  to  be  of  any  fact  within  the  know- 
ledge of  the  trustee,  and  he  does  not  affirm  the  truth  of  it,  but 
he  is  at  liberty  to  assert  that  there  was  no  valid  agreement  for  a 
marriage  settlement ;  that  the  agreement  being  by  parol  and  the 
settlement  being  actually  made  after  marriage,  it  was  invalid  as 
against  creditors.  The  trustee  afterwards  having  been  made  an 
assignee  of  the  husband  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  he  was 
held  to  be  bound  to  apply  the  property  as  the  law  would  apply  it, 
and  not  in  accordance  with  the  invalid  settlement.^ 

Where  the  recitals  refer  to  what  the  grantors  have  done,  or 
intend  to  do,  among  themselves,  and  in  which  the  grantees  have 
no  part  or  interest,  and  include  a  reference  to  a  previous  deed  of 
marriage  settlement  between  the  grantors,  and  there  is  no  evi- 
dence that  the  grantees  knew  anything  of  the  recited  deed  except 
from  the  recitals,  the  wording  of  which  indicates  that  the  scrive- 
ner did  not  have  the  recited  deed  before  him,  these  recitals  will 
be  regarded  as  the  statement  of  the  grantors  only.     The  grantees 

1  Young  V.  Raincock,  7  C.  B.  310,  338,  sides,  an  estoppel,  as  a  general  rule,  does 

per  Coltman,  J.  not  grow  out  of  a  recital ;  to  give  it  that 

■-  Sirougliill  V.  Buck,  14  Q.  B.  781  ;   Doe  effect,  it  must  show  that  the  object  of  the 

r.  Brooks,  3  Ad.  &  E.  513.     To  like  effect  parties  was  to  make  tlie  matter  recited  a 

in  Bower  v.  IMi  Cormick,  23   Gratt.  310,  ,/?.ref//«c<  as  the  basis  of  their  action." 

328,  Christian.  J.,  said  :  "A  mere  recital  »  Borst  ?;.  Corey,  16  Barb.    136;  Wil- 

does  not  conclude   all  the  parties :  there  lard,  P.  J.,  said :  "  A  mere  recital  never 

must  be  a  direct  affirmation,  so  intended  concludes  a  party.   There  must  be  a  direct 

by  all  the  parties,  in  order  to  bind  all;  affirmation.    And  a  recital  by  A  and  B 

and  this  intention  may  be  gathered  from  can  never  furnish  evidence  against  C.     It 

the  whole  instrument."  In  Hays  r.  Askew,  is  never  evidence  against  strangers." 
5  Jones  L.  63,  65,  Pearson,  J.,  said :  "  Be- 
222 


ESTOPPEL    BY    RECITALS.  [§§  261,  262. 

may  show  a  mistake  in  such   recitals  by  introducing  in  evidence 
the  deed  referred  to  in  the  recitals.^ 

Recitals  will  estop  the  grantee  only  under  circumstances  which 
would  make  the  declarations  of  the  grantor,  made  at  the  time  of 
the  execution  of  tlie  deed,  evidence  against  the  grantee.^ 

261.  A  recital  that  the  property  granted  is  subject  to  a 
mortgage  described  estops  the  grantee,  and  every  one  claiming 
under  him,  from  denying  the  validity  of  the  mortgage,  if  such  mort- 
gage was  in  fact  deducted  from  the  amount  of  the  consideration 
of  the  purchase.^  In  such  case  the  mortgagor  provides  for  the 
payment  of  the  mortgage  out  of  the  purchase-money.  A  pur- 
chaser of  land  upon  execution,  "  subject  to  whatever  sum  might 
be  due  upon  the  property  by  virtue  of  a  certain  mortgage,"  can- 
not dispute  the  fact  of  the  mortgage  or  its  validity.* 

Failure  or  want  of  consideration  as  between  the  parties  to  a 
mortgage  cannot  be  set  up  as  a  defence  by  a  purchaser  of  the 
land  ''  subject  to  the  mortgage."  which  is  in  fact  a  part  of  the  con- 
sideration, whether  he  has  expressly  assumed  the  mortgage  as  a 
part  of  the  purchase-money  or  not.^ 

A  deed  which  recites  that  the  property  conveyed  is  subject  to 
a  mortgage  in  favor  of  a  corporation  estops  a  person  claiming 
title  through  such  deed  from  disputing  the  corporate  existence  of 
the  mortgagee. '5 

262.  A  recital  may  operate  as  a  covenant  where  such  opera- 
tion appears  to  have  been  intended  by  the  parties,''^  and  there  is 
no  express  covenant  in  the  deed  relating  to  the  same  subject- 
matter.^  But  "  it  is  plain  that  the  court  ought  to  be  cautious 
in  spelling  a  covenant  out  of  a  recital  of  a  deed  ;  "  because  that 

1  Bower  v.  McCormick,  2.3  Gratt.  310.       E.  Eep.  299,  11  N.  E.  Rep.  792;  Schee  v. 

2  Joeckel  v.  Easton,  11  Mo.  118.  McQuilken,  59  Ind.  269;  Studabaker  v. 

3  Jones  on   Mortgage,s,  §§  744,  1491  ;     Marquardt,  55  Ind.  341. 

Pratt  I'.  Ni.xon,  91   Ala.  192;  Freeman  w.  "  Ilaseuretier  v.   Kirclihoffer.   79   Mo. 

Auld,  44   N.  Y.  50,  37  Barb.   587  ;  liar-  239. 

din  V.   Hjde,   40  Barb.  435  ;  Johnson  v.  "  Young  v.  Sniitli,  35  Beav.  87 ;  Lay  v. 

Thompson,  129  Mass.  398.  Mottrani,  19  C.  B.  N.  S.  479  ;  Mouypenny 

*  Conkling  v.   Secor  Sewing  Machine  v.  Monypcnny,  4  K.  &  J.  174,  3De  G.  &  J. 

Co.  55  How.  Pr.  269.  572,  9  H.  L.  C.  1 14  ;   Sampson  v.  Ea.sterby, 

5  Hoiton  V.  Davis,  26  N.  Y.  495  ;  Pratt  9    B.  &  C.  505,  6  Biug.  644  ;    IloUis    v. 

V.  Nixon,  91  Ala.   192,  8  So.   Hep.  751  ;  Carr,  Freem.  Ch.  3,  2  Mod.  86. 

Price  V.  Pollock,  47  Ind.  362;    West  ?•.  «  Dawes    v.  Tredwell,   18  Ch.  D.  354, 

Miller,  125  Ind.   70,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  143;  per  Jess.ll,  M.  R. ;  Whitehill  v.  Gotwalt, 

Bennett  v.  Mattingly,  110  Ind.  197,  10  N.  3  P.  &  W.  (Pa.)  313. 

223 


§  262.]  RECITALS    IN    DKKDS. 

is  not  the  part  of  a  deed  in  which  covenants  are  nsually  ex- 
pressed.' 

Where  it  distinctly  appears  from  the  wliole  deed  tliat  it  was 
iiit(Muled  to  express  by  the  recital  the  whole  arrangement  and 
transaction,  the  recital  amonnts  to  a  covenant.  Thus,  where  it 
was  recited  that  a  debtor  against  whom  an  action  had  been  com-^ 
nienced  had  agreed  to  convey  to  the  creditor  certain  land  to 
ss'cure  the  debt,  and  that  it  had  been  agreed  that  the  debtor  "  shall 
be  at  liberty  to  sign  judgment  in  said  action,  but  tliat  no  execution 
shall  issue  thereon  until  this  pi'esent  security  be  realized,"  it  was 
held  that  tlie  recital  amounted  to  a  covenant  by  the  creditor  not 
to  issue  execution  until  the  realization  of  the  security.  If  the 
recital  liad  been  that  "it  has  been  agreed  that  no  execution  shall 
issue,"  this  would  clearly  have  been  a  covenant  to  that  effect,  and 
the  intention  sufiiLiently  appears  from  the  words  used.^ 

Where,  after  the  description  of  the  property,  there  was  the 
further  statement  that  it  wns  late  the  property  of  the  grantor's 
father  then  deceased,  it  was  held  that  the  words  did  not  amount 
to  a  covenant  by  the  grantor  that  his  father  was  seised  of  an 
indefeasible  estate  in  fee  simple,  and  that  it  vested  in  the  grantor. 
The  words  used  amounted  to  no  more  than  a  recital  and  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  description  of  the  land  intended  to  be  conveyed, 
especially  as  the  grantor's  deed  contained  a  covenant  of  general 
warranty.^ 

1  Farrall  v.  Hilditch,  5  C.  B.  N.  S.  840.         3  Whitehill  v.  Gotwalt,  3  P.  &  W.  (Pa.) 
^  Farrall  v.  Hilditch,  5  C.  B.  N.  S.  840,     313. 
854. 

224 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

CONSIDERATION. 
L  Consideration  in   deeds  of  bargain    I       V.  Antecedent  debt  as  a  valuable  con- 


and  sale,  263-267. 
II.  Consideration  for  covenant  to  stand 
seised,  268,  269. 
III.  What  is  a  valuable  consideration, 


sideration,  285-287. 
VI.   Voluntary  conveyances,  288-294. 
VII.  Parol  evid  nee  of  the   true  consid- 
eration, 295-302. 


270-279.  I  VIII.  Recital   of  payment   of   considera- 

IV.  Marriage  is  a  valuable  considera-  tion,  303-310. 

tiou,  280-284. 

I.    Consideratioyi  in  Deeds  of  Bargain  and  Sale. 

263.  At  common  law  a  feoffment  was  valid  without  any 
consideration,  in  consequence  of  the  fealty  or  homage  which  was 
incident  to  every  such  conveyance.  The  law  raised  a  considera- 
tion out  of  the  tenure  itself.  The  notion  of  a  consideration,  it  is 
j)robable,  first  came  from  the  court  of  equity,  where  it  was  held 
necessary  to  raise  a  use  ;  and  when  conveyances  to  uses  were  intro- 
duced, the  courts  of  law  adopted  the  same  idea,  and  held  that  a 
consideration  was  requisite  in  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale.^  The 
principle  that  a  consideration  was  requisite  in  a  deed  of  bargain 
and  sale  was  opposed  by  Plowden,^  and  by  Lord  Bacon  in  his 
Reading  on  the  Statute  of  Uses.'^  "But  notwithstanding  this 
strenuous  opposition,"  said  Chief  .Justice  Kent,*  "  the  rule  from 
chancery  prevailed,  and  it  has  been  long  settled  that  a  considera- 
tion, exyjressed  or  proved,  was  necessary  to  give  effect  to  a  deed 
of  bargain  and  sale.  I  am  not  going  to  attempt  to  surmount  the 
series  of  cases  on  this  subject,  though  I  confess  myself  a  convert 
to  the  argument  of  Plowden."  If  the  consideration  be  expressed, 
it  need  not  be  pi'oved  that  it  was  actually  paid."'     "An  averment 

1  Jackson  v.  Alexander,  3  Johns.  484,         '  Bacon's  Works. 

492,  3   Am.  Dec.  517,  per   Kent,  C.  J. ;  *  Jackson  v.  Alexander,  3  Johns.  484, 

Spring's  v.  Hanks,  5  Ired.  30.  492,  3  Am.  Dec.  517. 

2  Sharington  i-.  Strotton,  1  Plowd.  298,  ■'  Winans   v.   Peebles,   31     Barh.   371  ; 
308.  Wood  V.  Chapin,  13  N.  Y.  509. 

VOL.  I.  225 


K  2()4.]  CONSIDERATION. 

shall  not  be  allowotl  and  taken  at;'ainst,  a  deed,  that  there  was  no 
cons'uh'i'atiiiii  j^'iven,  wIkmi  there  is  an  express  consideration  upon 
the  ileed."  ^  If  the  consideration  expressed  be  a  mere  nominal 
one,  tlu>  deed  need  not  be  snp[)oi-ted  as  against  the  grantoi-  or 
those  claiming  nnder  him.  or  as  against  a  stranger,  by  showing 
what  consitleration,  or  what  other  reason  in  addition  to  the  will 
of  the  grantor,  led  to  its  execution.^ 

264.  The  doctrine  that  a  pecuniary  consideration  expressed 
in  the  deed  is  essential  to  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  was 
adopted  by  some  of  the  courts  in  this  country  in  the  early  cases. ^ 
It  was  a  mere  form,  though  an  essential  form.  Chief  Justice 
Kent,  in  the  case  from  which  we  have  ah-eady  quoted,  expressing 
his  dissent  from  the  genei-al  rule,  says  :  "  The  rnle  requiring  a 
consideration  to  raise  a  use  has  become  merely  nominal  and  a 
matter  of  form :  for  if  a  sum  of  money  be  mentioned,  it  is  never 
an  inquiry  whether  it  was  actually  paid,  and  the  smallest  sum 
possible  is  sufficient ;  nay,  it  has  been  solemnly  adjudged  that  a 
peppercorn  was  sufficient  to  raise  a  use.  Since,  then,  the  efficacy 
of  the  rule  is  so  completely  g(me,  we  ought,  in  support  of  deeds, 
to  t'onstrue  the  cases  which  have  modified  the  rule  with  the 
utmost  liberality."* 

Under  this  rule  a  deed  "  for  a  competent  sum  of  money  "  suffi- 
ciently expressed  a  consideration.'^  So  does  a  deed  "for  a  certain 
sum  ot"  money  in  hand  paid,"  without  mentioning  any  sum  ;  ^  or 
a  tleed  '•  for  value  received  ;  "  '  or  a  deed  for  " dollars."  ^ 

A  general  consideration  was  not  sufficient  to  raise  a  use,  as 
where  one,  for  "  divers  good  considerations,"  bargains  and  sells  his 
land.^     There  is  too  much  generality  in  the  statement. 

1  Shep.  Touch.  510.  ^  Jackson    v.    Schoonmaker,    2   Johns. 

2  Jackson  v.  Root,  18  Johns.  60;  Rock-  230;  VVortman  v.  Ayles,  1  Hannay,  N.  B. 
well  I'.  Brown,  .54  N.  Y.  210.  63. 

'^  Jackson  v.  Florence,   16  Johns.  47  ;  ''  Jackson  v.  Alexander,  3  Johns.  484, 

Jackson  v.  Sahrlwr,   16  Johns.   515,  528,  492,3  Am.  Dec.  517. 

8  Am.  Dec.  357  ;  Jackson  i\   Cadwell,  1  »  Wood  v.  Beach,  7  Vt.   522  ;   Murray 

Cow.  622 ;  Jackson   v.   Dclancy,  4  Cow.  v.  Khnzing,    64  Conn.  78,   29  Atl.   Rep. 

427  ;  Jack-on  v.  Alexander,  3  Johns.  484,  244. 

3   Am.   Dec.    517;  Jackson  v.    Root,    18  ^  Mildmay's  Case,  1  Coke,  176  a. ;  Be- 

Johns.  60  ;  Okison   v.  Patterson,  1  Watts  dell's  Case,  7  Coke,  40  a. ;  Ward  v.  Lam- 

&  S.  395.  hert,   Cro.   Eliz.    394;    Fisher   v.    Smith, 

*  Jackson  v.  Alexander,  3  Johns.  484,  Moore,  569  ;  Ro<,^ers  v.  Hillhouse,  3  Conn. 

492,  3  Am.  Dec.  517.  398  ;  Jackson  v.  Scbriug,  16  Johns.  515,  8 

5  Fisher   v.   Smith,    Moore,   569,    case  Am.  Dec.  357. 
777. 

226 


CONSIDERATION   IN   DEEDS   OF   BARGAIN   AND    SALE.       [§§  265,  266. 

Wliere  the  only  consideration  expressed  was  that  the  grantee 
should  support  the  grantor,  the  deed  was  held  void ;  for,  it  not 
being  executed  by  the  grantee,  there  was  no  binding  agreement 
on  his  part,  but  be  was  given  an  option  to  furnish  the  support,  or 
to  let  the  deed  become  void. by  withholding  support.^ 

A  deed  made  in  pursuance  of  a  sale  under  a  decree  of  court 
need  not  express  any  consideration.^ 

265.  Following  this  doctrine  -was  the  doctrine  that  any 
valuable  consideration  paid  in  fact  is  sufficient  to  constitute  a 
valid  conveyance  by  way  of  bargain  and  sale.-5  "  It  was  not  neces- 
sary in  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  at  common  law  to  express  a 
consideration  ;  but  it  was  necessary  that  there  should  in  fact  be  a 
consideration,  and  that  the  consideration  should  be  a  valuable  as 
contradistinguished  from  a  good  one.  Without  a  valuable  con- 
sideration, the  deed  of  bargain  aiiJ  sale  would  not  raise  a  use  ; 
and  if  there  were  none  in  fact,  and  none  expressed  in  the  deed, 
and  no  use  was  declared,  there  was  at  common  law  a  resulting 
trust  in  favor  of  the  grantor,  and  the  operation  of  the  deed  would 
be  defeated."  * 

266.  As  between  the  parties  to  a  deed  at  the  present  day, 
no  consideration,  expressed  or  unexpressed,  is  necessary.^ 
This  is  the  case  in  all  States  where  there  are  statutes  to  the  effect 
that  all  conveyances  of  land  signed  and  sealed  by  the  grantor, 
having  good  authority  to  convey,  shall  be  valid  to  pass  the  same, 
without  any  other  act  or  ceremony  whatever.     A  deed  of  convey- 

1  -Jnckson  v.  Florence,  16  .Johns.  47.  *  Peck  v.  Vandenberg,  30  Cal.  11,  25, 

2  Porter  v.  Robinson,  3  A.  K.  Marsh,     per  Sawyer,  J. 

253,  13  Am.  Dec.  153.  ^  Traftou  v.  Hawcs,  102  Mass.  533,  541, 

3  Wood  V.  Chapin,  13  N.  Y.  509,  67  3  Am  Rep.  494,  per  Wells,  J. ;  Beal  v. 
Am.  Dec.  62  ;  Covwin  v.  Corwin,  6  N.  Y.  Warren,  2  Gray,  447  ;  Laberee  v.  Carlton, 
342,  57  Am.  Dec.  453;  Willis  c  Albert-  53  Me.  211;  Green  v.  Thomas,  11  Me. 
son,  20  Abb.  N.  C  263  ;  Jackson  v.  Pike,  318  ;  Hatch  v.  Bates,  54  Me.  136  ;  Ham- 
9  Cow.  69;  Winans  r.  Peebles,  31  Barb,  mond  v.  Woodman,  41  Me.  177,56  Am. 
371  ;  Maccubbin  >:  Crni.iwell,  7  Gill  &  J.  Dec.  219  ;  Randall  v.  Ghent,  19  Ind.  271  ; 
157;  Cheney  v.  Watkins,  1  Har.  &  J.  Thompson  ?-.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323,  68 
527,  2  Am.  Dec.  .530;  Schmitt  v.  Giova-  Am.  Dec.  638:  M'Neely  v.  Rucker,  6 
nari,  43  Cal.  617  ;  Merle  v.  Mathews,  26  Blackf.  391  ;  Doe  v.  Hurd,  7  Blackf.  510; 
Cal.  455;  Havens  v.  Dale,  18  Cal.  359;  Rogers  v.  Ilillhouse,  3  Conn.  398 ;  Hous- 
Perry  v.  Price,  1  Mo.  553 ;  Springs  v.  ton  v.  Blackman,  66  Ala.  559,  41  Am. 
Hanks,  5  Ired.  30;  Okison  v.  Patterson,  1  Rep.  756  ;  -Tackson  v.  Cleveland,  15  Mich. 
W.  &  S.  395  ;  Boardman  v.  Dean,  34  Pa.  94,  90  Am.  Dec.  266. 

St.  252  ;  Pennsylvania  Salt  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Neel,  54  Pa.  St.  9. 

227 


§§  -2117,  -208.] 


CONSIDKHATION, 


ance  tlu>ii"li  it  be  wliolly  voluntury,  operates  to  pass  the  title,  as 
between  tlie  parties,  ;is  effectually  as  if  it  had  been  matle  for  an 
aileiinntc  v;ilii:il)K'  consideration.^ 

267.  A  deed  of  conveyance  under  seal  imports  a  considera- 
tion, and  no  considiMation  need  in  the  first  instance  be  pleaxU'd  or 
proved.-  A  stranger  to  the  land  cainiot  question  the  considera- 
tion of  a  deed  executed  under  seal.'^ 

II.    Consideration  for  Covenant  to  stand  Seised. 

268.  A  covenant  to  stand  seised  must  be  supported  by  a 
consideration  of  blood-relationship  or  marriage.*  Such  a  con- 
sideration may,  however,  be  shown,  th(jugh  the  only  consideration 
expressed  in  the  deed  is  a  valuable  one.'^  A  voluntary  deed  made 
to  the  donor's  brothers  and  sisters,  though  expressing  a  nominal 
consideration,  and  though  not  to  take  effect  in  possession  until 
his  death,  is  good  as  a  covenant  to  stand  seised  to  their  use.'' 

But  affinity  by  marriage  is  not  a  consideration  on  which  a  cov- 
enant to  stand  seised  can  be  sustained,  and  accordingly  a  covenant 


1  Comstock  I'.  Son,  1.54  Mass.  .389,  28 
N.  E.  Rep.  296;  Mather  v.  Corliss,  103 
Mass.  568,  571  ;  Rogers  v.  Hilllionse,  3 
Conn.  398.  Here  the  consideration  ex- 
pressed was  "  for  divers  good  causes  and 
considerations."  Washband  v.  Washband, 
27  Conn.  424  ;  Perry  v.  Price,  1  Mo.  553, 
14  Ara.  Dec.  316;  Den  v.  Hanks,  5  Ired. 
30;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323, 
68  Am.  Dec.  638;  Doe  v.  Hurd,  7  Blackf. 
510. 

•i  Trafton  v.  Hawes,  102  Mass.  533,  541, 
3  Am.  Rep.  494,  per  Wells,  J. ;  Boynton 
V.  Rees,  8  Pick.  329,  332,  19  Am.  Dec. 
326  ;  Marshall  ;;.  Fisk,  6  Mass.  24  ;  Ruth 
V.  Ford,  9  Kans.  17  ;  Green  v.  Thomas,  11 
Me.  318;  Doe  v.  Hurd,  7  Blackf.  510; 
Brockway  v.  Harrin^'ton,  82  Iowa,  23,  47 
N.  W.  Rep.  1013;  Perry  v.  Price,  1  Mo. 
553;  Saunders  v.  Blythe,  112  Mo.  1,20 
S.  W.  Rep.  319;  Baker  v.  Westcott,  73 
Tex.  129,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  157. 

3  Jones  on  Mortgages,  §  613;  West 
Portland  Homestead  Asso.  v.  Lawnsdale, 
19  Fell.  Rep.  291. 

•*  New  York:  Jackson  v.  Sebring,  16 
Johns.    515,  8  Am.  Dec.  357,  per  Kent, 

228 


Chancellor;  Rogers  v.  Eagle  F.  Co.  9 
Wend.  611  ;  Jackson  v.  Cadwell,  1  Cow. 
622  ;  Jackson  v.  Delancy,  4  Cow.  427.  Mas- 
sachusetts: Wallis  V.  Wallis,  4  Mass.  135, 
3  Am.  Dee.  210;  Welsh  v.  Foster,  1 2  Mass. 
93;  Parker  !'.  Nichols,  7  Pick.  Ill  ;  Gale 
V.  Coburn,  18  Pick.  397;  Miller  v.  Good- 
win, 8  Gray,  542.  Maine  :  Gault  v.  Hall, 
26  Me.  561  ;  Mardeu  v.  Chase,  32  Me. 
329 ;  Emery  v.  Chase,  5  Me.  232.  Mary- 
land :  Cheney  v.  Watkins,  1  Har.  &  J. 
527,  532,  2  Am.  Dec.  530,  per  Chase,  C.  J. 
New  Hampshire  :  French  v.  French,  3  N. 
H.  2.'U;  Rollins  v.  Riley,  44  N.  H.  9; 
Underwood  v.  Campbell,  14  N.  H.  393; 
Bell  V.  Scammon,  15  N.  H.  381,41  Am. 
Dec.  706.  Ohio :  Thompson  v.  Thompson, 
17  Ohio  St.  649.  South  Carolina  :  Single- 
ton V.  Bremar,  4  McCord,  12,  17  Am.  Dec. 
699. 

=  WaUis  V.  Wallis,  4  Mass.  135,  3  Am. 
Dec.  210  ;  Parker  v.  Nichols,  7  Pick.  Ill  ; 
Gale  V.  Coburn,  18  Pick.  397  ;  Brewer  v. 
Hardy,  22  Pick.  376,  33  Am.  Dec.  747 ; 
Miller  v.  Goodwin,  8  Gray,  542. 

6  Wall  V.  Wall,  30  Miss.  91. 


CONSIDERATION    FOR    COVENANT    TO    STAND    SEISED.       [§  269. 

to  stand  seised  by  a  father  to  his  daughter's  husband  is  ineffec- 
tual.^ 

259.  An  exceptional  rule  prevails  in  Massachusetts  to  the 
effect  tliat  a  vahuible  consideration  is  sufficient  to  support  a  cove- 
nant to  stand  seised.  The  requirement  of  a  consideration  of 
blood  or  marriage  to  support  a  covenant  to  stand  seised  is  declared 
to  be  artificial,  and  wholly  without  reason  for  its  existence  in  this 
country- ;  and  it  is  said  there  is  no  reason  why  such  a  deed  should 
not  rest  upon  the  same  consideration,  or  the  same  presumption  of 
consideration,  that  will  support  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale.  In- 
asmuch as  in  this  country  all  deeds  of  land,  whatever  their  form, 
are  required  to  be  recorded,  there  is  no  reason  for  the  distinction 
between  deeds  of  bargain  and  sale  and  deeds  in  the  form  of  cov- 
enants to  convey,  so  far  as  this  distinction  is  founded  upon  the 
English  Statute  of  Enrolments.  "  A  deed  of  itself  imports  a 
consideration.  The  recital  of  a  consideration  is  conclusive  for 
the  purpose  of  supporting  the  deed  against  the  grantor  and  his 
heirs.  A  vokmtary  conveyance  or  gift  to  a  stranger  is  good 
against  the  grantor  and  his  heirs.  It  is  also  good  against  a  sub- 
sequent purchaser  for  value,  in  the  absence  of  actual  fraud.^  The 
reason  for  distinguishing  between  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  and 
a  covenant  to  stand  seised,  on  the  ground  of  the  nature  of  the 
consideration,  does  not  exist  here.  Between  the  grantor  and  his 
heirs  and  the  grantee,  in  a  controversy  respecting  the  title,  there 
is  no  question  open  in  relation  to  the  nature  or  existence  of  the 
consideration,  unless  it  be  in  conection  with  a  charge  of  fraud  in 
procuring  the  execution  of  the  deed.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  seek  by  construction  to  maintain  rather  than  defeat  the  opera- 
tion of  the  deed.  In  case  of  a  deed  to  take  effect  at  the  decease 
of  the  grantor,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court,  in  accordance  wath  the 
foregoing  principles  of  construction,  to  give  to  the  deed  its  in- 
tended operation,  by  construing  it  as  a  covenant  to  stand  seised 
to  tlie  use  of  the  grantee,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  use 
granted."  ^ 

1  Corwin  v.  Corwin,  6  N.  Y.  342,  57  an  error  to  correct  an  error.  The  first 
Am.  Dec.  45.T.  error  consi^tell  in   holdiiij,'  that  a  future 

2  Heal  V.  Warren,  2  Gray,  447.  estatejn  land  could   uut  be  created  by  a 
■5  Trafton  v.  Hawes.  102  Mass.  .5.33, 540,     deed  of  hurpain  and  sale.     Welsh  v.  Fos- 

3  Am.  Rep.  494,  per  Wells,  J.  Professor  ter,  12  Ma-s.  93,  96  ;  Parker  v.  Nichols,  7 
Gray,  in  his  Rule  against  I'erjietuiiie.s,  I'ici<.  Ill;  Hunt  v.  Hunt,  14  Pick.  374, 
§  57,  declares  the  Massachusetts  rule  to  be     380  ;  Rrewcr  v.  Hardy,  22  Pick.  376.     The 

229 


§§  '210,  271.]  CONSIDEKATION. 

III.    What  w  a  Valuable  Consideration. 

270.  A  valuable  consideration  is  a  money  or  property  con- 
sideration, as  distiiignislied  from  a,  good  consideration  founded 
on  natural  atfcrtion.  Deeds  made  merely  upon  a  good  considera- 
tion are  considered  as  volunlarv,  and  may  frequently  be  set  aside 
in  favor  of  the  gr;intor\s  creditors  and  purchasers  from  liim  in 
i^'ood  faith. 1  A  valuable  consideration  may  consist  of  anything 
which  the  parties  to  the  deed  esteem  of  value  ;2  anything  that  is 
a  benefit  to  the  grantor  or  a  damage  to  the  grantee.  It  may  con- 
sist of  the  surrender  of  a  valuable  I'ight  by  the  grantee  to  the 
gi-antor,  or  to  another  at  the  grantor's  request.-^  The  surrender  to 
the  grantor  of  the  promissory  note  of  a  third  person  constitutes  a 
valuable  consideration.'* 

271.  An  agreement  by  the  grantee  to  do  something  for  the 
grantor  is  a  valuable  consideration,  though  as  a  matter  of  fact 
the  grantee  never  performs  the  agreement.  The  agreement  itself 
is  a  sufficient  consideration.^  An  agreement  of  the  grantee  to 
pay  a  debt  for  the  grantor  is  a  valuable  consideration.*^  So  is  the 
signing  of  a  note  as  surety  for  the  grantor.^  So  is  the  execution 
of  a  mortgage  by  the  grantee  upon  the  land  granted,  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  grantor,  to  secure  a  debt  due  by  him  to  a  third 
person.^ 

The  release  by  a  w^ife  of  her  inchoate  dower  interest  in  his 
lands  is  a  valid  consideration  for  his  agreement  to  convey  lands 
to  her,  and  for  his  deed  made  in  fulfilment  of  such  agreement.^ 

inconvenience  of  this  rule  was  done  away  ^  Lake  v.  Gray,  35  Iowa,  459  ;  Gray  v. 

with   by  the  other  erroneous  doctrine  that  Lake,  48  Iowa,  505  ;  Mobile  Sav.   Bk.  v. 

a  covenant  to  stand  seised   may  be  sup-  McDonnell,  89  Ala.  434,  8  So.  Rep.  137; 

ported  by  a  pecuniary  consideration  ;   the  Twomey  v.  Crowley,  137  Mass.  184. 

court  holding  that  a  deed  made  upon  a  '^  Buffum    v.  Green,  5   N.    H.    71,   20 

pecuniary  consideration,  when  void  as  a  Am.  Dec.  562  ;  Vanmeter  v.  Vanmeter, 

deed  of  bargain  and  sale  because  the  es-  3  Gratt.   148 ;  McWhortcr  v.  Wright,  5 

tate  was  to  commence  i'n/H^in-o,  might  be  Ga.  555;   Carty  y.  Connolly,  91  Cal.  15, 

regarded  as  a  covenant  to  stand  seised.  27   Pac.  Rep.  599  ;  Gladwin   v.   Garrison, 

1  Clark  V.  Troy,  20  Cal.  219  ;  Rockhill  13  Cal.  330  ;  Saunderson  v.  Broadwell,  82 
V.  Spraggs,  9  Ind.  30.  Cal.  133,  23  Pac.  Rep.  36. 

2  Charleston,  C.&C.R.R.  Co.  D.  Leech,  '  Grigsby  w.  Schwarz,  82  Cal.  278,  22 
.33  S.  C.  175, 11  S.  E.  Rep.  631.  Pac.  Rep.  1041 ;  Willis  v.   Albertson,  20 

3  Smith  V.  Wcstall,   76   Tex.    509,    13  Abb.  N.  C.  263. 

S.  W.  Rep.  540.  s  Doran  v.  McConlogue,  150  Pa.  St.  98, 

4  Swenson  v.  Searle  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),     30  W.  N.  C.  296,  24  Atl.  Rep.  357. 

28  S.  W.  Rep.  143.  '■*  Brown    v.    Rawlings,    72    Ind.    505  ; 

230 


WHAT    IS    A    VALUABLE    CONSIDERATION.       [§§   272,  273. 

Where  a  deed  was  executed  to  a  car-manufacturing  company 
in  consideration  of  a  promise  by  such  company  to  locate  car 
works  thereon,  parol  evidence  is  inadmissible  to  show,  in  an 
action  to  cancel  the  deed,  that  the  shops  were  never  built,  when 
no  ground  for  equitable  relief  is  shown  in  the  circumstances  sur- 
rounding the  execution  of  the  deed.  The  promise  to  build  the 
works  upon  the  land  was  a  valid  consideration  ;  and  though  fail- 
ure to  comply  with  such  promise  would  be  a  good  ground  for 
rescinding  an  executory  agreement  to  convcj^  it  is  no  ground  for 
attacking  the  validity  of  an  executed  conveyance.^ 

Services  rendered,  or  to  be  rendered,  to  the  grantor  by  the 
grantee  are  a  valuable  consideration,'-^  though  there  was  in  the 
beginning  no  contract  to  compensate  for  the  services ;  ^  and 
though  the  deed  very  imperfectly  expresses  the  consideration, 
it  will  pass  the  title.^  If  the  grantee  wholly  fails  to  perform 
his  agreement  to  render  services,  it  has  been  held,  contrary  to 
the  lule  above  stated,  that  the  conveyance  may  be  set  aside  at 
the  instance  of  the  grantor.^ 

In  a  conditional  sale,  the  execution  of  the  agreement  to  recon- 
vey  is  a  sufficient  consideration  for  the  conveyance.^ 

272.  A  deed  to  indemnify  an  indorser  or  guarantor,  who 
became  such  at  the  request  of  the  grantor,  is  founded  upon  a 
valuable  consideration,  and  vests  the  property  in  the  grantee, 
until  the  grantor  relieves  the  grantee  from  the  liability  assumed 
by  liimJ 

273.  A  deed  made  in  satisfaction  of  a  debt  due  from  the 
grantor  to  the  grantee  is  based  upon  a  valuable  consideration.^  A 
conveyance  in  satisfaction  of  illegal  claims  paid  by  the  grantee  at 
the  grantor's  request  —  such,  for  instance,  as  claims  void  on  account 
of  usury  —  is  founded  upon  a  va\id  and  sufficient  consideration.^ 

Goff  V.  Rogers,   71   lud.  459;   Bullard  v.  '  United  States  v.  Hooe,  3  Crancli,  73; 

Briggs,  7  Pick.  533,  19  Am.  Dec.  292.  Hendricks  v.  Robiuson,  2  Johns.  Ch.  283; 

1  Beaumont  Car  Works  v.   Beaumont  Stevens  v.  Bell,  6  Mass.  339  ;  Buffiun  (;. 

Imp.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  23  S.  W.  Rep.  Green,  5  N.   H.   71,  20  Am.  Dec.  562; 

274.  Griffith  V.  Frederick  Co.  Bank,  6  Gill  &  J. 

-  Young  V.  Riiigo,  1  T.  B.  Mon.  30.  424;  Wilson  v.   Russell,    13  Md.  494,  71 

3  Doran  v.  McCoiilogue,  150  Pa.  St.  98,  Am.  Dee.  645;  Vanmeter  v.  Vanmetcr,  3 

30  W.  N.  C.  296,  24  Atl.  R(p.  357.  GriUt.   148;  Simpson  v.  Robert,   35    Ga. 

*  Howe  V.  Warnaek,  4  Bibb,  234.  180. 

5  Pironi  v.  Corrigan,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  135,  8  Steinriede  v.  Tcgge  (Ky.),  14  S.  W. 

20  Atl.  Rep.  218.  Rep.  357. 

'''  Wil.son  V.  F'airchild,  45  :\Iiiiii.  203,  47  '•'  Butler  r.  Myer,  17  Ind.  77. 

N.  W.  Rep.  642.  "     .)0-j^ 


§§  :274,  27.").]  considkhaiion. 

274.  A  covenant  in  a  deed  to  support  the  grantor,  or  an- 
other, is  a  valuable  consideration,  and  it  is  iinniatL'iial  that  the 
«Tantee  does  not  e.\ecute  it,  for  he  is  bound  by  tlie  covenant  by 
accepting  the  deed.^  lie  takes  tlie  land  subject  to  the  support 
stipulated  as  a  charge  thereon.  A  parol  contract  to  suppoit  one 
during  life  is  a  sufficient  consideration  for  a  deed  of  real  estate. 
Such  a  contract  is  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds,  for  the  person 
to  be  supported  may  die  within  the  year.^ 

But  a  conveyance  for  the  support  of  the  grantor  is  not  good 
as  against  the  grantor's  creditors,  unless  he  has  other  property 
sufficient  to  satisfy  his  existing  debts.^ 

A  grantee,  by  accepting  a  deed  of  conveyance  for  a  considera- 
tion to  be  performed,  such  for  instance  as  to  support  the  grantor,, 
becomes  bound  to  perform  his  obligation,  just  as  he  would  be  had 
he  become  a  party  to  an  indenture  in  which  he  expressly  cove- 
nanted to  perform  such  obligation.'* 

275.  A  consideration  may  be  valuable  though  it  is  not  ade- 
quate. Questions  in  regard  to  the  adequacy  of  the  consideration 
may  arise  between  the  grantor  and  tlie  grantee,  or  between  the 
latter  and  the  grantor's  creditors.  To  enable  the  grantor,  or 
any  one  claiming  under  him,  to  set  aside  a  conveyance  on  the 
o-round  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  consideration,  he  must  make  out 
a  very  strong  case  of  imposition  or  undue  influence;^  but  in  a 
suit  by  the  grantor's  creditors,  a  lesser  degree  of  inadequacy  may 
be  evidence  of  a  secret  trust  between  the  parties  to  the  convey- 
ance. Great  inadequacy  of  price  may  be  prima  facie  evidence  of 
the  fraudulent  character  of  the  conveyance.^ 

1  Eastman  v.  Batchelder,  36  N.  H.  141,  154;  Green  u.  Thomas,  11  Me.  318  ;  Vail 
72   Am.  Dec.  295.     Wisconsin:    Scott  y.     y.  McMillan,  17  Ohio  St.  617. 

Scott  (Wis.),  61  N.W.  Rep.  286  ;   Shontz  ^  Woodward   y.  Wyman,   53    Vt.   645; 

V.  Brown,   27  Pa.   St.  123;   Hender.'?on   v.  Stanley   v.  Bobbins,  36  Vt.  422;    Bri^rys 

Hunton,  26  Gratt.  926;  Spaldinj-:  v.  Hal-  v.  Beach,   18  Vt.  115;  Crane  v.   Stiikles, 

lenbeck,  .30  Barb.  292,  distinguisliinfr  Jack-  15  Vt.  252. 

son  V.  Florence,  16  Johns.  47.     West  Vir-  •*  Caraway  v.  Caraway,  7  Cold.  (Tenu.) 

ginia:   Keener  v.  Keener,  34  W.  Va.  421,  245. 

12  S.  E.  Rep.  729;  McClure  y.  Cook  (W.  ^  Brockway    v,    Ilarrinjrton,    82    Iowa, 

Va.),  20  S.  E.  Rep.  612.  23,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  1013. 

Otherwise  in  California:  Grimmer  c  6  Kuykendall  r.  McDonald,  15  Mo.  416, 
Carlton,  93  Cal.  189,  28  Pac.  Rep.  1043,  57  Am.  Dec.  212;  Friedman  v.  Hirsch,  18 
27  Am.  St.  Rep.  171,  on  the  ground  that  N  Y.  Supp.  85.  In  this  ca.se,  the  proof 
such  a  contract  cannot  be  specifically  en-  of  iiriual  fraud  not  beiny;  clear  and  satis- 
forced,  factory,  the  deed  was  allowed  to  stand  as 

2  Hutchinson    v.    Hutchinson,    46    Me.  sicurity  for  the  sum  paid   by  the  grantee. 


WHAT    IS    A    VALUABLE    CONSIDKRATION.        [§§  276,    277. 

Mere  inadequacy  of  consideration,  when  there  is  no  fraud, 
affords  no  ground  for  avoiding  a  deed.  It  is  enough  that  there  is 
an  actual  consideration  which  is  legal  and  of  some  value. ^ 

276.  A  consideration  may  be  meritorious  though  not  valu- 
able. A  uioral  duty  to  do- anything  is  a  meritorious  consideia- 
tion.  It  is  a  nullity  in  law,  and  is  an  imperfect  consideration  in 
equity,  though  recognized  by  it  as  effective  within  very  narrow 
limits.  '•  While  this  species  of  consideiation  does  not  render  an 
agreement  enforcible  against  the  promisor  himself,  nor  against 
any  one  in  whose  favor  he  has  altered  his  original  intention,  yet 
if  an  intended  gift  based  upon  such  meritorious  consideration  has 
been  partially  and  imperfectly  executed  or  carried  into  effect 
by  the  donor,  and  if  his  original  intention  remains  unaltered  at 
his  death,  then  equity  will,  within  certain  narrow  limits,  enforce 
the  promise  thus  imperfectly  performed,  as  against  a  third  person, 
claiming  merely  by  operation  of  law,  who  has  no  equally  meri- 
torious foundation  for  his  claim.  The  equity,  thus  described 
as  based  upon  a  meritorious  consideration,  only  extends  to  cases 
involving  the  duties  either  of  charity,  of  paying  creditors,  or  of 
maintaining  a  wife  and  children."  ^ 

The  benefits  received  in  the  way  of  religious  instruction  and 
consolation,  by  one  who  attends  regularly  upon  the  ministrations 
of  a  religious  society,  form  a  meritorious  consideration  for  a  con- 
veyance of  land  by  such  attendant  to  the  society  which  will 
induce  a  court  of  equity  to  cure  a  defect  in  the  conveyance. ^ 

277.  A  good  consideration  is  usually  applied  to  a  considera- 
tion that  is  not  a  valuable  one,  and  imports  a  consideration 
founded  on  blood-relationship  or  natural  affection.  A  deed  for 
such  a  consideration  is  a  voluntary  one,  while  a  deed  for  a  valu- 
able consideration  is  termed  compensatory.  The  term  "good 
consideration  "  is  sometimes  loosely  used  to  denote  any  considera- 
tion valid  in  law,  whether  valuable  or  meritorious;^  but  techni- 
cally it  should  always  denote  a  meritorious  consideration. 

On  this  point  see,  also,  Dunn  v.  Chambers,  see  Attorney-General  v.  Tancrcd,  1  Eden, 

4   Barb.  37G  ;  Buyd  v.  Dunlap,   1   Johns.  10,  1  Anib.  351,  and  1  Wm.  B1.90;  Innis 

Ch.  478  ;    Washband    v.    Washband,    27  v.  Saver,  7  Ilarc,  377,  3  Macn.  &  G.  606. 
Conu.  424.  ■'  Methodist  E.  Cliurch  v.  Town,  47  N. 

1  Goodspced  v.  Fuller,  46  Mo.  141.  J.  Eq.  400,  20  Atl.  Kep.  488. 

-  2  Pomeroy  Eq.  Jur.  §  588.    For  cases         *  As  in  the  statutes  of  27  Eliz.  ch.  4,  rc- 

where  equity  has  lent  its  aid   to  cure  de-  latinji;  to  fraudulent  conveyances.    Coj/is 

fects  in  conveyances  to  charitable  uses,  jj.  iNIiddlcton,  2  Madd.  410;  Doe  i-.  Bout- 

233 


§§  278,  279.]  CONSIDERATION. 

A  good  as  distinguislied  from  a  valuable  consideration  is  not 
sufficient  to  support  the  covenants  of  a  deed.^ 

A  deed  by  a  father  for  the  benefit  of  his  iUegitimate  child  is 
upon  a  good  consideration  which  will  su}iport  the  conveyance.^ 

278.  A  deed  in  consideration  of  past  or  future  illicit  inter- 
course passes  the  legal  title,  and,  the  grantee  being  in  posses- 
sion, neiilier  the  grantor  nor  liis  heirs  can  recover  in  ejectment."^ 
But  such  a  conveyance  is  not  founded  upon  either  a  valuable  or 
good  consideration,  and  is,  as  against  the  grantor's  creditors,  a  vol- 
untary conveyance.*  A  conveyance,  however,  not  looking  to  past 
or  future  cohabitation  as  a  consideration,  but  founded  upon  a 
legal  and  moral  obligation  to  support  his  cliildren  born  of  the 
grantee,  may  be  held  valid  as  against  the  gi'antor's  creditors.  It 
was  so  liehl  in  a  case  where  the  grantee  had  been  deceived  into  a 
marriage  with  the  grantor  ^  when  he  already  had  a  wife  living 
and  had  had  children  by  him  ;  and  also  in  a  case  wliere  a  wo- 
man had  been  the  grantor's  mistress  and  had  had  children  by 
him.^  In  such  cases  there  is  either  a  legal  or  moral  obligation 
upon  the  grantor  to  indemnify  the  woman  for  the  support  of  his 
ohildi-en." 

279.  Love  and  affection  for  a  blood  relation  is  not  a  valu- 
able consideration.^  A  deed  for  such  a  consideration  is  purely 
a  voluntary  one.  Such  a  considei-ation  is  called  meritorious  ;  but 
while  it  makes  the  conveyance  good  between  the  parties,  it  is  void 
as  against  the  grantor's  creditors  under  the  same  circumstances 
that  would  render  any  voluntary  conveyance  void  as  against  them. 
An  executory  covenant,  such  as  a  covenant  by  a  grantee  to  pay 
an  existing  mortgage  upon  the  property,  contained  in  a  deed  by 

ledge,  2  Cowp.  705  ;  Hodgson  v.  Butts,  3  *  Potter  v.  Gracie,  38  Ala.  303,  29  Am. 

Cninch,  140;  Roberts  v.  Coleman,  37  W.  Rep.  748;  Jackson  v.  Miner,  101  111.  5.50. 

Va.  143,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  482.  s  Fellows  v.  Emperor,  13  Barb.  92,  97. 

1  Wilbur  V.  Warren,  104  N.  Y.  192,  10  ^  "Wait  v.   D.iy,  4  Den.   439.      Contra, 

N.  E.  Rep.  263.      Contra,  Hanson  v.  Buck-  Potter  v.  Gracie,  58  Ala.  303,  29  Am.  Rep. 

uer,  4  Dana,  251,  29  Am.  Dec.  401.  748. 

-  Marchioness  of  Annandale  v.  Harris,  "  Wait  v.  Day,  4  Den.  439. 

2    P.  Wms.    432;  Jennings   v.  Brown,  9  ^  ]\l;ithews  v.  Feaver,  1  Cox's  V.q.  Cas. 

M.  &  W.  490  ;  Conley  v.  Nailor,  118  U.  S.  278  ;  Hinde  v.  Longworth,  1 1  Wheat.  199  ; 

127,  6  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1001  ;  Gay  v.  Parpart,  Borum   v.  King,  37  Ala.  606  ;  Kinncbrew 

100  U.  S.  679,  1  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  450  ;  Hook  v.  Kinnebrew,  35  Ala.  628  ;  Danville  Snn 

V.  Pratt,  78  N.  Y.  371  ;  Bunn  v.  W^intlirop,  inary  v.  Mott,  136  111.  289,  28   N.  E.  Rep. 

1  .John.s.  Ch.  .329.  .54  ;  Beith  v.  Beith,  76  Iowa,  GOl,  41  N.  W. 

''  Hill  V.  Freeman,  73  Ala.  200,  49  Am.  Rep.  371  ;  Burton  v.  Le  Roy,  5   Sawyer, 

Rep.  48.  510,  where  the  deed  was  to  a  son-in-law. 

234 


MARRIAGE   IS   A    VALUABLE   CONSIDERATION-       [§§  280,    281. 

a  father  to  his  daughter,  not  supported  b}'  any  valuable  or  pecu- 
niary consideration,  cannot  be  supported  either  in  law  or  equity. ^ 

IV.  Marriage  is  a  Valuable  Consideration. 

280.  Marriage  is  deemed  in  law  a  valuable  consider ation.^ 
A  conveyance  for  such  a  consideration  stands  upon  a  different  foot- 
ing from  a  voUmtary  conveyance.  A  man  may  convey  a  portion 
of  his  property  to  his  intended  wife,  if  this  is  no  more  than  a  suita- 
ble provision  for  her,  and,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  on  the  part  of 
the  parties  to  the  settlement,  it  will  be  upheld  against  existing  as 
well  as  subsequent  creditors.^  "  In  determining  whether  or  not 
the  settlement  was  made  in  good  faith,  the  value  of  the  property 
conveyed,  the  amount  of  the  settler's  debts,  and  the  value  of  his 
remaining  property  as  compared  therewith,  would  of  course  be 
important  considerations.  A  presumption  of  fraud,  more  or  less 
conclusive,  would  arise  in  proportion  as  the  projjerty  conveyed 
was,  or  was  not,  in  excess  of  a  reasonable  provision,  and  as  the 
settler's  remaining  property  was  sufficient,  or  insufficient,  for  the 
payment  of  his  debts." ^  The  pi-esumption,  until  some  evidence 
of  fraud  is  shown,  is  that  the  conveyance  is  valid,  and  not  a  fraud 
upon  the  rights  of  any  one.^ 

Marriage  may  be  given  in  evidence  as  the  consideration  of  a 
deed  exjiressed  to  be  for  a  money  consideration  only.^ 

281.  A  settlement  in  contemplation  of  marriage  will  not  be 
set  aside  except  upon  clear  proof  of  fraud  participated  in   by 

1  Wilbur  V.  Warren,  104  N.  Y.  192,  10  13  K.  I.  91,  96,  43  Am.  Rep.  132,  per  Mat- 

N.  E.  Rep.  263  ;  Whitaker  v.   Whitaker,  teson,  J. 
52  N.  y.  368.  5  Frazer  v.  Western,  1   Barb.  Ch.  220; 

-  Nairn    v.   Provvse,   6   Ves.    Jr.    752  ;  Dygert  v.  Kemersclmider,  32  N.  Y.  629 ; 

Smith  V.  Allen,  5  Allen,  454,  81  Am.  Dec.  Bonser  v.  Miller,  5  Oreg.  110. 
758;    Bonser    v.    Miller,    5    Oreg.    110;         '^  Tolman  w.  Ward   (Me.),  29  Atl.  Rep. 

Cains   V.  Jones,   5  Yerg.    249;    Betts   v.  1081.     A  decision  to  the  contrary  is  Betts 

Union  Bank,   1   liar.  &  G.  175,  18  Am.  !'.  Union   Bank,  1  liar.  &  G.  175.     But  it 

Dec.  283  ;  Gibson  v.  Bennett,  79  Me.  302,  was  remarked   by  Walton;  J.,  in  Tolman 

9  All.  Rep.  727;  Tolman  v.  Ward  (Me.),  v.  Ward,  supra,  that  "the   decision    does 

29  Atl.  Rup.  1081.  not  rest  on  the  consideration  of  marriage 

^  Camjiion  v.  Cotton,  17  Ves.  Jr.  264,  alone.     It  applies  to  all  considerations  in 

271  ;  National  E.xchange  Bank  v.  Wat-  conflict   with   the  one  expressed   in   the 

son,  13  R.I.  91,  43  Am.  Rep.  132;  Smith  deed.     And  there  are  other  decisions  in 

V.  Allen,  5  Allen,  454,  81   Am.  Dec.  758;  which  the  doctrine  is  maintained  that  the 

Marshall  v.  Morris,  16  Ga.  368 ;  Corwin  expressed  consideration  in  a  deed  cannot 

V.  Corwin,  6  N.  Y.  342,  57  Am.  Doc.  453,  be  varied  or  contradicted  by  oral  evidence, 

per  Johnson,  J.  But   in    this  State,  and    in   most    of    the 

*  National   Exch  nigo  Uank  r.  Watson,  States,  the  law  is  oiherwisc." 

235 


§  281.] 


CONSIDEKATION. 


both  parties.  The  wife  is  a  purchaser  of  the  property  settled 
upon  her  in  anticipation  of  marriage,  and  she  is  entitled  to  hold 
it  as  against  all  persons  claiuiin<;"  under  the  grantor.^  Even  if 
the  trnintor  made  the  ante-nui)tial  settlement  with  the  intent  to 
defraud  his  creditors,  it  will  be  sustained,  in  absence  of  proof  that 
the  grantee  participated  in  the  fraud."-^  "I  never  knew  an  in- 
stance," said  the  Lord  Chancellor  in  Barroio  v.  Barro'W^  "  wliere 
a  settlement  in  consideration  of  marriage  liath  been  set  asitle, 
and  I  will  not  make  a  precedent  for  it."  There  are  more  recent 
cases  in  which  marriage  settlements  have  been  declared  void  as 
to  creditors."* 

Where  the  grantee  was  not  aware,  at  the  time  of  the  execution 
of  a  deed  to  her  in  consideration  of  her  marriage  to  the  grantor, 
of  any  intent  on  his  part  to  defraud  his  creditors,  the  fact  that 
she  became  aware  of  such  fraudulent  intent  before  the  marriage 
took  place  is  not  sufficient  to  avoid  the  deed,  as  the  considera- 
tion for  the  deed  is  the  agreement  to  marry,  and  not  its  actual 
consummation.' 

Marriage  is  a  consideration  of  the  highest  value,  and  a  deed  or 


1  Ex  parte  McBurnie,  1  De  G.,  M.  &  G. 
440  ;  Sterry  v.  Arden,  1  Johns.  Ch.  261  ; 
Verplank  v.  Sterry,  12  Johns.  536,  7 
Am.  Dec.  348  ;  Herring  v.  Wickham,  29 
Gratt.  628,  26  Am.  Rep.  405  ;  Jones's 
App.  62  Pa.  St.  324  ;  Bunnel  v.  Witherow, 
29  Ind.  128. 

In  Magniac  v.  Thompson,  7  Pet.  348, 
Mr.  Justice  Story,  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  whole  court,  said :  "  Nothing  can 
be  clearer,  both  upon  principle  and  au- 
thority, than  the  doctrine  that,  to  make  an 
ante-nuptial  settlement  void  as  a  fraud 
upon  creditors,  it  is  necessary  that  both 
parties  should  concur  in,  or  hnve  cogni- 
zance of,  the  intended  fraud.  If  the  settler 
alone  intend  a  fraud,  and  the  other  party 
have  no  notice  of  it,  hut  is  innocent  of  it, 
she  is  not  and  cannot  be  affected  by  it." 

-  Prewit  V.  Wilson,  103  U.  S.  22  ;  Mag- 
niac  V.  Thompson,  7  Pet.  .348,  393  ;  Frank's 
A|.poal,  59  Pa.  St.  190  ;  Wri-ht  v.  Wright, 
5'J  Barb.  505,  affirmed  54  N.  Y.  437  ;  Bon- 
>er  c.  Miller,  5  Oreg.  110;  Andrews  v. 
Joiies  10  Ala.  400;  Tolman  v.  WaM 
(Me.),  29  Atl.  Rep.  1081;  Prignon  c. 
236 


Danssat,  4  Wash.  St.  199,  29  Pac.  Rep. 
1046. 

3  2  Dickens,  504,  506  (1774).  To  like 
effect  Sir  Samuel  Romilly  and  Mr.  Bell, 
counsel  for  defendants  in  Campi<jn  r. 
Cotton,  17  Ves.  Jr.  264,  267  (1810),  de- 
clared :  "  There  is  no  decision  to  be  found 
in  wliich  a  settlement  previous  to,  and  in 
contemplation  of,  marriage  has  been  con- 
sidered as  fraudulent  against  creditors. 
That  a  case  strong  enough  for  timt  pur- 
pose might  exist  cannot  be  denieil,  as  if 
the  wife  was  clearly  a  party  and  tin;  mar- 
riage a  more  secure  mode  of  deframiing 
the  creditors,  but  no  such  decision  has 
been  yet  made.  The  wife  must  he  clearly 
proved  to  have  had  knowledge  that  a 
fraud  upon  creditors  was  intended." 

•i  Fr.iser  v.  Thompson,  4  De  G.  &  J. 
659.  In  this  case,  before  the  execution  of 
the  settlement,  the  grantor  had,  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  intended  wife,  com- 
mitted acts  of  bankruptcy. 

'"  Prignon  v.  Daussat,  4  WasJi.  St.  109, 
29  Pac.  Rep.  1046. 


MARRIAGE    IS   A    VALUABLE   CONSIDERATION.       [§§  282,  283. 

settlement  on  this  consideration  is  upheld  with  a  steady  resolu- 
tion from  motives  of  the  soundest  policy.^  One  reason  why  the 
courts  are  averse  to  annulling  an  ante-nuptial  settlement  is,  that 
there  can  be  no  dissolution  of  the  marriage  which  was  the  con- 
sideration for  it. 2  The  parties  cannot  be  placed  in  the  condition 
they  were  in  before  the  marriage,  or  even  before  the  execution  of 
the  deed  prior  to  the  marriage.^ 

282.  A  legal  contract  or  promise  of  marriage  is  a  valuable 
consideration,  and  justifies  the  grantee  in  holding  the  property 
conveyed  against  subsequent  purchasers,  or  creditors  of  the 
grantor,  although  the  marriage  is  prevented  by  the  death  of  the 
grantor.^  If  a  deed  to  an  intended  wife  be  expressed  to  be  "in 
consideration  of  the  promise  of  the  said  party  of  the  second  part 
to  marry"  the  grantor,  an  objection  that  the  promise  was  not  in 
writing  is  without  force,  since  the  grantee  is  bound  by  the  recitals 
in  the  deed.^ 

283.  The  subsequent  marriage  of  a  grantee  may  change 
a  voluntary  conveyance  to  a  conveyance  on  a  valuable  consid- 
eration. Thus  where  a  father  makes  a  settlement  upon  his 
daughter,  and  she  subsequently  marries  a  man  who  has  knowledge 
of  the  settlement,  the  character  of  the  settlement  is  changed  by 
the  marriage,  and  the  grantee  becomes  a  purchaser  for  a  valuable 

1  Prewit  y.  Wilson,  103  U.  S.  22,  per  performance  by  affording  an  effectual 
Field,  J.;  Magniac  i;.  Thompson,  7  Pet.  remedy  against  the  party  who  shall  with- 
348,  393,  per  Story,  J.  ;  Prignon  v.  Daus-  out  legal  excuse  fail  to  fulfil  it.  But  a 
sat,  4  Wash.  St.  199,  29  Pac.  Kep.  1046.  contract  of  this  kind  is  not  to  be  regarded 

2  Jones'  App.  62  Pa.  St.  324 ;  Smith  v.  as  a  valuable  consideration,  merely  be- 
Allen,  5  Allen,  4.54,  81  Am.  Dec.  758.  cause  damages  commensurate  with  the  in- 

3  Prignon  v.  Daussat,  4  Wash.  St.  199,  jury  may  be  recovered  of  the  party  who 
29  Pac.  Rep.  104G.  inexcusably  refuses  to  fulfil  it.     It  is  pe- 

*  Smith  V.  Allen,  5  Allen,  454,  81  Am.  culiarin  its  character,  and  has  other  effects 

Dec.  758.     "  In  reference  to  the  question  and  consequences  attending  it.     It  cssen- 

of  the  sufficiency  and  value  of   the  consid-  tially  changes  the  rights,  duties,  and  priv- 

eration,  and  consequently  of   the  validity  ilcges  of  the  i)artic8."    See  Conner  r.  Stan- 

of  the  title  acquired   by  the  conveyance,  ley,  65  Cal.  183,  where  it  was  held  that  a 

there  docs  not  appear  to  be  any  real  and  written  contrnct  in  view  of  marriage,  pro- 

sul)stantial  distinction  between  a  marriage  viding  for  a  transfer  of  certain  corporate 

formally   solemnized  and   a   binding  and  bonds    to    intended    wife,    could   not    be 

obligatory    agreement,    which    has    i)een  avoided  by  the  man's  refusal  to  fulfil  his 

fairly  and  truly  and  wbove  all  suspicion  of  agreement  of  marriage.     Also,  Tolman  v. 

collusion  made,  to  form  such  connection  Ward  (Mc),  29  Atl.  Rep.  1081. 

and  enter  into  that  relation.     All  the  con-  ^  Prignon  v.  Daussat,  4  Wash.  St.  199, 

sequences  of  a  legal  obligation  accompany  29  Pac.  Rep.  1046. 
such  an  agreement.     The  law  enforces  its 

237 


§  284.]  CONSIDERATION. 

consideration.  It  does  not  matter  tliat  no  particular  marriage 
■was  in  contcmiilalion  at  the  time  of  the  voluntary  conveyance. 
When  the  subsequent  marriage  occurred,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that 
the  settlement  was  one  probable  inducement  to  the  marriage.^  It 
may  not  even  be  material  to  prove  that  the  marriage  was  made 
with  notice  of  the  settlement,  as  knowledge  of  the  circumstances 
of  the  party  is  to  be  presumed.'-^ 

A  marriage  solemnized  subsequently  to  a  conveyance  to  a  wo- 
man, which  is  otherwise  merely  voluntary,  makes  the  conveyance 
indefeasible,  though  nothing  was  said  by  the  parties  concerning 
the  consideration  for  the  conveyance,  either  at  the  time  of  the 
solemnization  of  the  marriage,  or  in  the  negotiation  which  preceded 
it.  The  law  presumes  that  the  property  conveyed  constituted 
some  part  of  the  consideration  which  induced  the  grantee  to 
marrv.'^  Parol  evidence  may  be  given  that  a  conveyance  was 
made  in  consideration  of  a  marriage  contract,  although  the  deed 
does  not  mention  it.* 

284.  A  conveyance  through  a  third  person  by  a  husband  to 
his  wife,  in  pursuance  of  an  oral  agreement  made  before  mar- 
riage, is  upon  a  valuable  consideration.''^  Even  in  the  absence  of 
snch  an  agreement,  a  conveyance  by  a  husband  to  his  wife,  in  pay- 
ment of  an  equitable  indebtedness  from  him  to  her,  is  not  volun- 
tary. Such  a  conveyance,  made  by  way  of  a  settlement  upon 
the  wife  after  marriage  without  a  previous  agreement  therefor,  is 
a  valid  voluntary  conveyance,  if  the  husband  was  free  from  debt, 
or  had  other  property  sufficient  to  pay  all  his  debts  at  the  time  of 
such  conveyance.^  But  such  a  conveyance  is  invalid  as  against 
existing  creditors ; '''  and  it  is  equally  invalid  although  made  in 
pursuance  of  an  agreement  between  the  husband  and  wife  after 
marriage,  whereby  he  was  to  compensate  her  for  services  in  the 
care  of  his  invalid  mother.^ 

1  Prodgers   r.  Langham,    1    Sid.    133;  176  ;  Bentley  r.  Harris,  2  Gratt.  357  ;  Her- 

Stcrry  r.  Ardeu,   1    Johns.  Ch.  261  ;  Ver-  ring  v.  Wickham,  29   Gratt.  628,  637,  26 

plank  V.  Sterry,   12    Johns.   .536,    7    Am.  Am.  Rep.  405,  per  Staples,  J. 

Dec.  348.  *  Eppes  v.  Randolph,  2  Call,  103. 

-  Brown  v.  Carter,  5  Ves.  862,  877,  per  °  Dygert  v.  Remersehnider,  32  N.  Y. 

Lord  Alvanly.  629  ;    Babcock  i'.  Eckler,  24  N.  Y.  623. 

8  Sterry  v.   Arden,   1  Johns.  Ch.  261 ;  o  Barker  v.  Koneman,  13  Cal.  9. 

Dygert  v.  Remer.schnider,  32  N.  Y.  629;  "  Beeoher  v.  Clark,  12  Blatchf.  256. 

Smith  t).  Allen,  5  Allen,  454.  81  Am.  Dec.  «  Coleman  r.   Bnrr,   93    N.  Y.    17,    45 

758;  Huston  v.  Cantril,  11   Leigh,    136,  Am.  Rep.  160. 

238 


ANTECtDENT    DEBT    AS    A    VALUABLE    CONSIDERATION.       [§  285. 


V.  Ayitecedent  Debt  as  a  Valuable  Consideration. 
285.  Whether  an  antecedent  debt  is  a  valuable  considera- 
tion is  a  qut-stion  upon  which  the  courts  of  the  different  States 
lire  not  in  accord. ^  A  distinction  has  sometimes  been  taken  be- 
tween a  conveyance  in  complete  satisfaction  and  discharge  of  an 
antecedent  debt,  and  a  conveyance  or  mortgage  as  security  for  an 
antecedent  debt ;  the  antecedent  debt  being  regarded  as  a  vahia- 
ble  consideration  for  a  conveyance  in  extinction  of  the  debt,  but 
not  for  a  conveyance   in   security  of  it;^  for   in    the   latter  case 


1  A  preexisting  debt  a  valuable  consid- 
eration for  an  absolute  conveyance  or 
mortgage  :  Lawrence;  v.  Tucker,  23  How. 
14 ;  Conrad  v.  Atl.  Ins.  Co.  I  Pet.  386, 
448 ;  Shirras  v.  Caig,  7  Crancli,  34.  Califor- 
nia:  Frey  v.  Clifford,  44  Cal.  335;  Pajue 
r.  Beiisley,  8  Cal.  260,  68  Am.  Dec.  318  ; 
Robinson  v.  Smitb,  14  Cal.  94;  Naglee  v. 
Lyman,  14  Cal.  450.  Illinois :  Partridfre 
V.  Sniiih,  2  Biss.  183  ;  Doolittle  v.  Cook, 
75  111.  3.54  ;  Manning  v.  McCliire,  36  111. 
490.  Indiana:  Work  i-.  Brayton,  5  Ind. 
396  ;  Wright  v.  Bundy,  1 1  Ind.  398  ;  Aiken 
V.  Bruen,  21  Ind.  137  ;  Babcock  v.  Jor- 
dan, 24  Ind.  14;  McMahan  v.  Morrison, 
16  Ind.  172,79  Am.  Dec.  418  ;  Wert  v. 
Naylor,  93  Ind.  431.  Otherwiise  in  case 
of  a  mortgage  to  secure  a  preexisting 
debt.  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Conn.  Mut.  L. 
Ins.  Co.  129  Ind.  241,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  695. 
Kansas  :  Ruth  v.  Ford,  9  Kans.  17  ;  Jack- 
."on  V.  Reid,  30  Kans.  10,  1  Pac.  Rep. 
308;  Haynes  v.  Eberhardt,  37  Kans.  308, 
25  Pac.  Rep.  168.  Maryland:  Biisey  v. 
Reese,  38  Md.  264;  Cecil  Bank  r.  Ilcald, 
25  Md.  562.  Mississippi :  Love  v.  Tay- 
lor, 26  Miss.  567  ;  Soule  v.  Shotwell,  52 
Miss.  236.  See  Boon  v.  Barnes,  23  Miss. 
136.  Missouri:  Knox  r.  Hunt,  18  Mo. 
174.  Pe:insylvania  :  Ciunmings  r.  Boyd, 
83  Pa.  St.  372  ;  Royer  v.  Keystone  Nat. 
Bank,  83  Pa.  St.  248.  Wisconsin  :  Heath 
i:  Silverthoni,  &c.  Co.  39  Wis.  146. 

Preexisting  debt  not  a  valuable  consid- 
eration for  a  conveyance  or  mortgage : 
Alabama  :  Jones  ?'.  Robinson,  77  Ala.  499  ; 
Wells  V.  Morrow,  38  Ala.  125;  Thurman 
V.  Stoddard,  63  Ala.  336  ;  Short  v.  Battle, 


52  Ala.  456;  Alexander  v.  Caldwell,  55 
Ala.  517;  Craft  v.  Russell,  67  Ala.  9; 
Sweeney  v.  Bixler,  69  Ala.  539.  Delaware : 
Lockwood  V.  Bate.s,  1  Del.  Ch. 435.  Iowa: 
Koon  V.  Tramel,  71  Iowa,  132,  32  N.  W. 
Rep.  243;  Phelps  v.  Foekler,  61  Iowa, 
340,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  729,  16  N.  W.  Rep. 
210.  Michigan  :  Boxheimer  v.  Gunn,  24 
Mich.  372;  Edwards  v.  McKernan,  55 
Mich.  520,  523,  22  N.  W.  Rep.  20.  New 
Jersey :  Mingus  v.  Condit,  23  N.  J.  Eq. 
313  ;  Pancoast  v.  Duval,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  445  ; 
Wheeler  v.  Kirtland,  24  N.  J.  Eq  552. 
New  York :  Dickerson  c.  Tillinghast,  4 
Paige,  215,  25  Am.  Dec.  528;  Padget  v. 
Lawrence,  10  Paige,  170,  40  Am.  Dec. 
232  ;  Wood  v.  Robinson.  22  N.  Y.  564  ; 
Weaver  v.  Barden,  49  N.  Y.  286 ;  Cary 
V.  White,  52  N.  Y.  138 ;  De  Laucey  v. 
Stearns,  66  N.  Y.  157;  Moore  v.  Ryder, 
65  N.  Y.  438.  See,  however,  Seymour  r. 
Wilson,  19  N.  Y.  417.  Pennsylvania  :  Ash- 
ton's  App.  73  Pa.  St.  1 5:3.  South  Carolina : 
Zorn  V.  Railroad  Co.  5  S.  C.  90.  Ten- 
nessee :  Lane  v.  Logue,  12  Lea,  681,  684. 
Texas:  Spurlock  v.  Sullivan, 36  Tex.  511  ; 
Steffian  v.  Bank,  69  Tex.  513,  6  S.  W. 
Rep.  823  ;  Overstreet  v.  Planning,  67  Tex. 
657,  660,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  248;  Golson  i-. 
Fielder  (Tex.  Civ.'  App.),  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
173;  Swenson  v.  Seale  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
28  S.  W.  Rep.  143. 

-  2  Pomeroy's  Eq.  Juris.  §§  748,  749  ; 
Morse  v.  Godfrey,  3  Story,  364,  390,  per 
Story,  J.  ;  Wert  r.  Naylor,  93  Ind.  431, 
434.  Mr.  Pomeroy,  ujion  a  review  of  the 
cases,  is  of  opinion  that  the  weiglit  of  au- 
thority is  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  that  the 

239 


§§  280,  287.]  CONSIDKRAIION. 

somctliiiij^  is  given  up,  but  ouc  who  merely  takes  a  conveyance 
or  mortgage  as  security  for  a  debt  gives  up  uotliing'.  A  mort- 
gage to  secure  an  antecedent  debt  is  of  course  v. did  between  the 
parties,  and  can  be  tlisputi'd  only  by  pureliasers  from  the  grantor 
.lud  his  creditors.^  An  extension  of  the  times  of  })ayment  of  a 
preexisting  debt  is  a  valuable  consideration,  and  makes  a  mort- 
gagee a  }>ona  fide  purchaser  for  value.^  The  surrender  of  any 
right  or  security  at  the  time  of  taking  a  mortgage  for  a  preexist- 
ing debt  makes  the  mortgagee  a  purchaser  for  value.-^ 

286.  The  rule  that  a  preexisting  debt  does  not  constitute 
one  a  bona  fide  purchaser  is  by  some  courts  never  applied  where 
the  property  is  purchased  in  good  faith  from  the  real  and  exclusive 
owner,  but  only  where  the  property  is  purchased  from  some  per- 
son who  is  apparently  the  owner,  but  who  is  not  in  fact,  or  not  in 
law  or  equity,  the  real  owner.'* 

Under  this  rule  a  conveyance  to  a  surety  in  consideration  that 
he  had  a  few  days  before  become  a  surety  for  a  person  other  than 
the  grantor  is  a  conveyance  for  a  consideration  that  had  passed 
before  the  execution  of  the  deed,  and  does  not  constitute  the 
grantee  a  bona  fide  purchaser.^ 

287.  As  between  the  immediate  parties,  the  payment  of  a 
preexisting  debt  due  from  one  to  the  other  is  as  valuable  a  con- 
sideration to  support  a  contract  as  though  the  amount  was  then 
for  t!ie  first  time   advanced.^     And    so  a  mortgage  to  secure  an 

surrender  of  a   precedent  deht,  in  consid-  ^  Alstin  v.  Cnudiff,  52  Tex.  453.     Ttiis 

eration  of  a  conveyance,  makes  the  grantee  was  a  case  where  the  holder  of  an  uure- 

a  bona  Jifle    purchaser   even    as    ag;ainst  corded    instrument   soufjht,  after  a   long 

prior  equities;  but  that  the  weight  of  au-  lapse  of  time,  to  prevail  over  a  purchaser 

thority  supports  the  doctrine  that  a  mort-  for  the  consideration  of  an  antecedent  in- 

gage  to  secure  a  preexisting  debt  does  not  debledness.     The  court  say  :  "There  was 

make  the  mortgagee  a  iona_yir/e  purchaser  no  offer  to  refund  this  indebtedness,  and 

for  a  valuable  consideration.  on  evidence  tliat,  in  respect  to  their  col- 

'  Steiner  v.  McCall,  61  Ala.  406  ;  Tur-  lection,  the  creditors,  from  want  of  the 

ner  v.  McFee,  61  Ala.  468.  bar  of  limitations,  insolvency  of  the  debt- 

2  Cary  I'.  White,  52   N.  Y.   1.^8;   Koon  ors,  or  other  good  cause,  particularly  after 

I).  Tramel,  71   Iowa,  1.32,  .32  N.  W.  Uep.  so  long  a  lapse  of  time,  could  be  placed 

243  ;  Jones  v.  Robinson,  77  Ala.  499  ;  Sul-  in  as  good  condition  as  before  the  execu- 

livan  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Young,  55  Iowa,  1.32,  tion  of  the  deeds.  .  .  .  Under  these  cir- 

7  X.  W.  Rep.  480.     See  Jones  on   Mort-  cumstances  it  woidd  seem  but  reasonable 

gages,  §  459.  and  equitable  that,  before  she  (the  one  re- 

'^  Lane  ?;.  Logue,  12  Lea,  681.  b'ing   upon    the   unrecorded  instrument) 

*  Ruth  »'.  Ford,  9  Kans.  17.  should  prevail,  it  should  be  shown  that  if 

6  Willis  V.  Alborison,  20   Abb.  N.    C.  the  deed  were  set  aside  because   the  con- 

263.  sideration  was  a  preexisting  debt,  Alstin 

240 


VOLUNTARY  CONVEYANCES.       [§§  288,  289. 

antecedent  debt  is  perfectly  valid  as  between  the  parties,  what- 
ever may  be  its  effect  as  to  purchasers  or  incumbrancers.^ 

VI.    Voluntary  Conveyances. 

288.  A  voluntary  conveyance  is  one  wholly  without  a  valua- 
ble consideration,-  or  for  a  valuable  consideration  which  is  merely 
A  nominal  one.^ 

A  deed  which  expresses  a  mere  nominal  consideration,  but  is 
founded  upon  an  agreement  for  a  subsequent  valuable  considera- 
tion, such  as  an  agreement  to  pay  a  debt  of  the  gi-antor,  whie-h  is 
subsequently  performed  in  good  faith,  is  not  a  voluntary  convey- 
ance, and  will  be  upheld  as  against  the  grantor's  heirs.^ 

A  voluntary  conveyance  confers  a  title  good  against  the  grantor 
and  his  heirs,  and  as  against  subsequent  creditors  of  the  grantor 
and  purchasers  from  him,  provided  tlie  grantor  made  the  con- 
veyance without  intent  to  defraud.^  A  mortgage  may  be  made 
by  way  of  a  gift  when  the  rights  of  creditors  are  not  interfered 
with.*^ 

It  is  only  as  against  the  rights  of  existing  creditors  of  the 
grantor  that  his  voluntary  conveyance  is  invalid.' 

289.  A  voluntary  conveyance  is  presumptively  fraudulent 
as  to  existing  creditors.^  Tiie  want  of  a  valuable  consideration 
throws  upon  the  grantee,  in  defence  of  his  title,  the  burden  of  dis- 
|. roving  any  fraudulent  intent  in  the  grantor  to  defraud  his  cred- 
itors. If  the  conveyance  was  made  with  a  fraudulent  intent  on 
che  part  of  the  grantor,  it  is  void  both  as  to  prior  and  subsequent 
creditors,  whether  the  grantee  participated  in  the  fraud  or  not.^ 

(the  cmlitor)  woul.l  not  be  prejudiced  in         ^  Jones  on  Mortgages,  614. 
the  colk-ction  otherwise  of  this  indebted-  '  Jones  v.  Clifton,  101  U.  S.  225. 

ness."     This  was  ai.proved  in  Dunlap  v.         ^  Lloyd  v.  Fulton,  91  U.  S.  479,   48.5; 

Green,  60  Fed.  Kep.  242.  Beecher  v.  Clark,  12  Blatchf.  256 ;  Laugh- 

1  Steiner  v.  McCall,  61  Ala.  406;  Tur-  ton  v.  Harden,  68  Me.  208,  213;  Carter 
ner  v.  McFee,  61  Ala.  468.  v.  Grimshaw,  49  N.    H.    100;  Hitchcock 

2  Seward  v.  Jackson,  8  Cow.  406,  430;  v.  Kiely,  41  Conn.  611 ;  Mohawk  Bank  c. 
Washband  v.  Washband,  27  Conn.  424.  Atwater,  2  Paige,  54 ;  Houston  v.  Bhick- 

3  Houston  V.  Blackman,  66  Ala.  559,  41  man,  66  Ala.  559, 41  Am.  Kep.  756. 

Am.  Rep.  756.  ^  Beecher  v.   Clark,    12    Blaichf.    256; 

■•  Young  I'.  Young,  27  S.  C.  201,  3   S.  Hitchcock  v.  Kiely,  41  Conn.  611  ;  Carter 

E.  Rep.  202.  "•  Grimshaw,  49  N.  H.  100;  Coolidge  v. 

'>  Gale  V.  Gould,  40  Mich.  515  ;  Keeler  Melvin,  42  N.  H.  510,  534;  Mohawk  Bank 

V.  Ullrich,  32  Mich.  88  ;  Page  v.  Kendrick,  v.  Atwater,  2   Paige,  54  ;  Savage  v.  Mur- 

10   Mich.  300;   Stafford    i-.    Stafford,    41  phy,  34  N.   Y.   508,   90   Am.    Dec.    733; 


Tex.  111. 
VOL.  I. 


241 


§  290.]  CONSIDKUATION. 

^  \\'luMt>  [ho  purpose  of  tin'  gruntor  is  shown  to  liave  been  actu- 
;illv  finiuliilt  lit  as  to  creditors,  it  is  sufficient  to  prove  that  the 
Ljranti'e  takes  without  consideration,  without  proving  otherwise 
his  participation  in  the  fraudulent  intent."  ^ 

111  New  York  a  conveyance  is  not  necessarily  or  even  presump- 
tively fraudulent  because  it  is  voluntary.'-^  The  mere  fact  that  the 
o-rantor  was  indebted  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  does  not  render 
a  voluntary  conveyance  absolutely  fraudulent  and  void  in  law. 
If  there  was  no  intention  on  the  part  of  the  grantor  to  delay  or 
defraud  his  creditors,  and  he  has,  aside  from  the  property  conveyed, 
property  sullieient  to  pay  all  his  debts,  though  it  afterwards  hap- 
pens that  he  does  not  in  fact  pay  his  debts  existing  at  the  time  of 
sucli  conveyance,  the  voluntary  conveyance  will  be  sustained. 

290.  Generally  subsequent  creditors  of  the  grantor  cannot 
question  a  voluntary  conveyance,  or  one  made  upon  an  inade- 
quate consideration.^  Subsequent  creditors  deal  with  the  grantor 
and  give  him  credit,  relying  only  upon  the  property  he  has  at  the 
time  of  their  transactions  with  him.  It  is  only  upon  proof  that 
the  grantor  disposed  of  his  property  with  intent  to  defraud  those 
to  whom  he  might  soon  afterwards  become  indebted  that  his 
subsequent  creditors  can  question  his  voluntary  conveyance.  But 
if  the  conveyance  was  made  by  the  grantor  with  the  intent  to 
defraud  his  subsequent  creditors,  it  is  void,  although  the  grantee 
did  not  participate  in  or  know  of  such  intent.'*  In  the  absence 
of  proof  of  such  intent,  subsequent  creditors  have  no  better  right 
than  subsequent  purchasers  to  question  the  debtor's  voluntary 
conveyance.'' 

Lassiter  v.  Davis,  64  N.  C.  498 ;  Foley  v.  J. ;  Hatch  v.  Bates,  54  Me.  136  ;  Pomeroy 

Bitter,  34  Md.  646.  v.  Bailey,  43  N.  H.  118. 

1  Clark  V.  Chamberlain,  13  Allen,  257,  *  Sexton  v.  Wheaton,   8   Wheat.  229  ; 

260,  per  Hoar,  J.  Mattingly  v.  Nye,  8  Wall.  370;  Panil  r. 

-  Van  Wyc'k  v.  Seward,  6  Paige,   62;  Murphree,  13  How.  92;   Beecher  u.  Clark, 

Jackson  v.  Post,   15  Wend.  588;   Phillips  12  Blatchf.  256;   Laughton  r.  Harden,  68 

r.  Woostcr,  36  N.  Y.  412;  Fox  v.  Moyer,  Me.  208;  Savage    v.   Murphy,   34  N.   Y 

54    N.  Y.   125  ;  Dunlap   v.    Hawkins,    59  508,  8  Bosw.  75,  90  Am.  Dec.  733. 

N.  Y.   342;    Ilolden   v.  Burnham,  63    N.  ^  French  y.  Shotwell,  5  Johns.  Ch.  555, 

Y.  74  ;  Babcock  v.  Eckler,  24  N.  Y.  623  ;  20   Johns.    668.     Such    creditors    cannot 

Dygcrt  V.  Remerschnider,  32  N.  Y.  629.  avoid   the  conveyance  even  if  the  debtor 

It   was  so   determined    in    New    York  assigns   to   them    his   supposed   right  of 

before  the   statute.     Seward   v.  Jackson,  avoidance.     Prosser  >;.  Edmomis,    1  Y.  & 

8  Cow.  406.  C.  481 ;  Crocker  v.  Belangee,  6  Wis.  645, 

3  Graham  v.  Railroad  Co.  102  U.  S.  148  ;  70  Am.  Dec  489  ;   Milwaukee  &  M.  R.  R. 

Shaw  V.  Tracy,  83  Mo.  224,  229,  per  Ray,  Co.  v.  Milwaukee  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  20  Wis. 
242 


VOLUNTARY  CONVEYANCES.        [§§  291,  292. 

291.  Fraudulent  intent  on  the  part  of  the  grantor  may  be 
inferred  -where  he  continues  in  possession  tifter  a  vokintav}^ 
conveyance,  aiul  he  pays  existing  debts  b}^  contracting  new  debts. 
The  fraud  consists  in  a  design  to  obtain  credit  by  means  of  the 
possession  and  apparent  ownership  of  the  property  conveyed.  If 
the  existing  indebtedness  is  merely  transferred,  not  paid,  the  fraud 
is  as  palpable  as  it  would  be  if  the  debts  contracted  after  ohe 
conveyance  were  owing  to  the  same  creditors  who  held  them  at 
the  time  of  the  conveyance.^ 

A  purchaser  from  one  who  holds  under  a  voluntary  conveyance 
is  not  bound  to  inquire  whether  such  conveyance  was  fraudulent, 
although  he  has  notice  that  it  was  not  founded  upon  a  pecuniary 
consideration.  He  has  a  right  to  act  upon  the  legal  presumption 
that  the  voluntary  conveyance  was  honestly  made,  unless  some 
other  fact  is  brought  to  his  knowledge  to  raise  a  suspicion  in  his 
mind  that  the  conveyance  was  intended  to  defraud  some  one.^ 

But  if  the  grantee  paid  a  valuable  consideration,  the  conveyance 
is  good  notwithstanding  the  intent  of  the  grantor  to  defraud, 
unless  the  grantee  also  participated  in  the  fraudulent  intent.^ 

292.  A  conveyance  is  not  voluntary  -where  a  money  con- 
sideration, ho-wever  small,  is  actually  paid."*  Thus  a  convey- 
ance by  a  father  to  his  daughter,  in  consideration  of  one  dollar 
actually  paid,  and  natural  love  and  affection,  is  not  a  voluntary 
conveyance.'^  Inadequacy  of  consideration  may  be  shown  in  evi- 
dence as  affecting  the  question  of  fraud,  but  it  does  not  render 
the  conveyance  a  voluntai'y  one.^ 

174,  88   Am.    Dec.    740.     But    they  may  ^  Ferguson's  App.  (Pa.)   11  Atl.    Rep. 

convey  the  same  property  to  another  for  88.5  ;  Scott  v.  Scott,  1  Mass.  527.    In  Hat- 

the  purpose  of  his  disputing  the  validity  tcrsley  v.  Bissett  (N.  J.  Eq.),  25  Atl.  Rep. 

of  the  prior  conveyance,  and  give  him  the  3.32,  it  is  said  that  the  presumption  is  that 

right  to  sue.     Dickinson  ^^  Burrell,  L.  R.  an  advancement  was  intended;   but  such 

1    Eq.  3.37  ;  McMahcm  v.  Allen,  35  N.  Y.  presumption   may  he   overcome  by   parol 

403;  Graham  v.  Railroad  Co.  102  U.  S.  testimony  sliowing  the  intention  to  be  to 

148,  158,  per  Bradley,  J.  make  a  gift.     And  see  Murrel  v.  Murrel, 

1  Savage  v.  Murphy,  34   N.  Y.   508,  8  2  Strob.  Eq.  148. 

Bosw.  75,  90  Am.  Dec.  7.33.  "  Washband   v.   Washband,  27    Conn. 

2  Frazcr  v.  Western,  1  Barb.  Cli.  220.  424;  Brockvvay  v.  Harrington,   82  Iowa, 

3  Prewit  V.  Wilson,  103  U.  S.  22;  Las-  23,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  1013;  Rankin  v.  Wal- 
siter  V.  Davis,  64  N.  C.  498;   Devries  v.  lace  (Ky.),  14  S.  W.  Rep.  79. 

Phillips,  63  N.  C.  .53  ;  Brown  v.  Rawlings,         See,  contra,  Kinnebrew  v.  Kinnebrew, 
72  Ind.  505.  35  Ala.  628. 

*  Washband    v.   Washband,   27    Conn. 
424. 

243 


§  20;').]  CONSIDERATION. 

'J'o  show  that  a  ileed  was  volmitaiy  and  fraudulont,  evidence 
is  admissible  that  the  consideration  named  in  tlie  deed  was  not 
ill  fact  i);rKU'  or  that  the  consideration  paid  was  inadequate.''^ 

293.  A  voluntary  conveyance  is  good  against  subsequent 
purchasers  from  the  grantor  for  a  valuable  consideration  Tvith- 
out  notice  of  such  prior  conveyance.-^  The  English  rule,  how- 
ever, is  that  a  voluntary  conveyance  is  void  as  against  subsequent 
bona  fide  purchasers  for  a  valuable  consideration,  even  with  notice 
of  such  conveyance.'^  The  English  cases  go  upon  the  ground  that 
such  subsequent  conveyance  of  itself  shows  tlie  fraudulent  intent 
in  making  the  voluntary  conve3ance.  This  presumption  of  fraud 
cannot  be  contradicted.  The  question  arises  upon  the  construc- 
tion of  the  statute  of  27  Eliz.  ch.  4,  §  2,  which  proves  that  every 
conveyance,  "  for  the  intent  of  and  purpose  to  defraud  and  de- 
ceive "  such  person  or  persons  as  shall  afterwards  purchase  in  fee 
simple  the  same  lands,  shall  be  deemed  and  taken  as  against  such 
person  or  persons  and  all  others  claiming  under  them  to  be  utterly 
void  and  of  no  effect.  This  statute  is  in  affirmance  of  the  com- 
nn)n  law.  Though  this  statute  is  in  force  in  Massachusetts  and 
other  of  the  older  States  as  a  part  of  the  common  law,  there  was 
no  settled  construction  of  it  at  the  time  of  the  separation  of  the 
colonies  from  the  mother  country,  nor  indeed  before  the  famous 
decision  of  Lord  Ellenboiough  in  1807,*  and  our  courts  were 
therefore  free  to  make  their  own  construction  of  the  statute. 

1  Kerr  v.  Birnie,  25   Ark.  225.  (1812),  said  :   "I  have  great  difficulty  to 

2  Motiile  Sav.  Bank  v.  McDonnell,  89  persuade  myself  that  the  words  of  the 
Ala.  4.34,8  So.  Rep.  1.37.  statute  warranted,  or  that  the  purpose  of 

3  Beal  V.  Warren,  2  Gray,  447  ;  Trafton  it  required,  such  a  construction.  .  .  .  But 
V.  Hawes,  102  Mass.  533,  540.  it  is  essential  to  the  security  of  property 

*  Doe  V.  Manning,  9  East,  59  (1807);  that  the  rule  should  be  adhered  to  when 

Doe  V.  Rusham,  17  Q.  B.  723,  per  Lord  .settled."     See,  also,  expres.sions  of  regret 

Campbell,  C.  J.;    Evelyn  v.  Templar,   2  as  to  the  rule  by  Lord  p:idon  in  Pulver- 

Bro.  C.  C.  148(1787).  toft  v.  Pulvertoft,   18   Ves.  84;  by  Lord 

Some  of  the  English  judges  have  not  Campbell  in  Doe  v.  Rusham,  17  Q.  B. 
liked  the  English  rule,  and  have  supported  723  ;  by  Je.ssel,  M.  R.,  in  Ex  parte  Hill- 
it  only  because  it  had  become  well  settled,  man,  10  Ch.  D.  622.  In  this  country  the 
Thus  Lord  Thurlow,  in  Evelyn  v.  Tern-  English  rule  was  in  some  early  cases  sup- 
plar,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  148  (1787),  said:  "  Al-  posed  to  have  been  a  settled  rule  before 
though  it  would  have  been  as  well  at  first  the  American  Revolution,  and  to  have  been 
if  the  voluntary  covenatit  had  not  been  adopted  here  as  part  of  the  common  law. 
thought  so  little  of,  yet  the  rule  was  such,  Sterry  v.  Arden,  1  Johns.  Ch.  261,  12 
and  so  many  estates  stand  upon  it,  ihat  it  Johns.  .536  ;  Den  v.  Underwood,  4  Wash, 
cannot  be  shaken."  And  Sir  William  129  ;  Clapp  v.  Leatherbee,  18  Pick.  131. 
Grant,  in  Buckle  v.  Mitchell,  18  Ves.  100 

244 


VOLUNTARY    CONVEYANCES.  [§  293. 

As  late  ;is  1777  Lord  ALinsfield  said  :  ^  "  There  is  no  part  of  the 
Act  of  Parliament  wliicli  affects  voluntary  settlements  eo  nomine^ 
unless  they  are  fraudulent."  The  objections  to  the  present  Eng- 
lish rule  are  forcibly  and  ably  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Thomas  in 
delivering  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts 
in  Beal  v.  Warren^^  already  cited.  "  The  first  is,  that  it  conclu- 
sively determines  as  a  question  of  law,  what  is  a  mixed  question  of 
law  and  fact.  A  man  has  a  I'ight  to  give  away  his  estate.  Such 
gift  is  good  as  against  him  and  his  heirs  or  devisees.  It  is  void  only 
as  against  creditors,  c)r,  under  that  statute,  as  against  subsequent 
purchasers  for  a  valuable  consideration.  It  is  void  against  them» 
only  when  it  was  made  with  intent  and  purpose  to  deceive  and 
defraud  them.  .  .  .  Again :  it  not  only  makes  the  inference  or 
presumption  of  fraud  from  the  simple  act  of  subsequent  sale,  but 
it  makes  that  presumption  retrospective,  and  con(;lusive  of  the 
character  of  a  previous  act,  however  long  the  interval  of  time 
between  the  two,  or  however  changed  the  condition,  relations,  and 
motives  of  the  actors.  It  saj^s,  because  the  grantor  has  now  sold 
for  a  valuable  consideration,  the  intent  and  purpose  to  sell  for  a 
valuable  consideration  must  have  existed  in  his  mind  some  fifteen 
or  twenty  3'^ears  ago,  it  may  be  when  he  made  the  voluntary  gift. 
The  statute  draws  no  such  conclusion.  The  common  law,  in 
whose  light  it  is  to  be  construed,  draws  no  such  conclusion.  Such 
conclusion  is  not  based  upon  any  law  of  the  human  mind,  or  any 
experience  of  the  modes  of  its  operation.  The  most  that  can 
justly  be  said  is,  that  the  second  conveyance  has  created  a  party 
capable  of  avoiding  the  first,  if  it  was  fraudulent ;  and  that  by 
reflection  it  has  some  tendency  to  show  the  purpose  and  intent  of 
the  first,  greater  or  less,  as  the  transactions  are  near  or  distant  in 
point  of  time,  or  are  connected  in  fact  by  the  other  evidence  in  the 
case.  Another  objection  to  this  view  of  the  statute  is,  that  it 
leaves  uncertain  the  tenure  of  pi-operty.  The  owner  of  real  estate 
has  the  legal  right  to  make  a  voluntary  gift  of  it ;  and,  if  the  gift 
be  made  in  good  faith,  it  will  conclude  liim  and  his  heirs,  and 
ought  to  conclude  all  other  persons.  The  question  whether  it  was 
made  in  good  faith  depends  upon  the  situation  of  his  affairs  when 
it  was  made,  and  the  motives  and  purposes  which  led  to  the  act." 

M")oe  V.   IJontledso,  Cowp.   705.     For     citeii  in  Beal  r.  Wsirren,  2  Gray,  447,  452, 
other  cases  supporting  this  view,  see  eases     per  Thomas,  J. 

^  2  Gray,  447,  453. 

245 


i>§  -JiU,  iJOo.]  CONSIDERATION. 

294.  By  the  English  law,  moreover,  a  consideration  of  blood 
or  marriage  has  always  been  necessary  to  sustain  a  voluntary 
conveyance.  Where  there  is  no  siu-h  relation,  a  vohintary  coii- 
Ycyance  is  void,  not  only  against  creditors,  but  also  against  subse- 
(jiient  pui-chaseis  for  value,  even  if  they  have  notice  of  the  volun- 
tary conveyance.^  While  this  rule  as  to  a  voluntary  conveyance 
does  not  prevail  in  this  country,  a  voluntary  conveyance  upon  a 
good  consideration  will  be  sustained  against  creditors,  if  it  does 
not  (lej)rive  tlu'ni  of  existing  rights. 

A  gift  of  land  by  a  husband  to  his  wife  is  sustained  by  some 
courts  if  it  is  only  a  reasonable  provision  for  her,  although  he  has 
not  property  remaining  sufficient  to  pay  his  creditors.'-^ 

A  conveyance  to  the  use  of  the  grantor's  wife  is  supported 
by  evidence  that  the  grantor  had  received  and  used  the  separate 
property  of  the  wife  foi-  liis  own  purposes,  in  the  absence  of  any 
evidence  of  an  intention  to  defraud  creditors.'^ 

In  equity  a  deed  may  be  made  directly  from  a  husband  to  his 
wife;^  and  it  will  be  sustained  if  the  consideration  is  valuable 
or  meritorious,  or,  under  some  circumstances,  as  a  voluntary  gift 
without  any  consideration  by  way  of  a  reasonable  settlement.^ 

VII.    Parol  Evidence  of  the  True  Consideration. 

295.  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the  true  consid- 
eration of  a  deed,  provided  the  consideration  offered  to  be  shown 
is  not  inconsistent  with  that  which  is  expressed,  and  does  not 
alter  the  effect   of   the  instrument.*^      Though  the    consideration 

1  Trafton   v.   Hawes,  102   Mass.  5.33,  3  4.34,  8  So.  Rep.  137, 18  Am.  St.  Rep.  137  ; 

Am.  Rup.  494.  Hubbard  v.  Allen,  59  Ala.  283,  297  ;  Man- 

^  Wood  I'.  Broadley,  76  Mo.  23;   Hullo-  ning  v.  Pippen,  86  Ala.  357,  5   So.  Rep. 

cher  V.  Hollocher,  62  Mo.  267.  572.     In  this  case  it  was  held  that  parol 

^  Hill  V.  West,  8  Ohio,  222, 31  Am.  Dec.  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  a  deed 

442;   Hannan  v.  O.xley,  23  Wis.  519.  expres.sed  to   be  made  for  a  money  con- 

*  Hannan  v.  Oxley,  23  Wis.  519  ;  sideration  was  really  made  in  considera- 
Pennsylvauia  Salt  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Neel,  .54  tion  of  the  promise  of  the  grantee  to  exe- 
Pa.  St.  9.  cute  a  will  in  favor  of  the  grantor.     In 

*  Hunt  V.  Johnson,  44  N.  Y.  27  ;  Town-  this  State,  however,  a  deed  impeached  by 
abend  r.  Townshend,  1  Abb.  N.  C.  81.  creditors  cannot  be  supported  by  evidence 

«  Clifford   t'.   TurrcU,  1  Y.  &  C  C.   C.  of  a  consideration  different  in  kind  from 

138,  per  Knight-Bruce,  V.-C,  9  Jur.  63.3,  that  expressed.     Potter  v.  Cracie,  58  Ala 

per  Lor  1  Lyndhur.st.     Alabama:    Kinne-  303,  29  Am.  Rep.  748  ;  Houston  y.  Black- 

lirew  V.   Kiiinebrew,  35  Ala.  628;  Olimer  tiiaii,  C6   .Ma.  559,  562,  41   Am.  Rep.  756 

V.  Boyer,   89   Ala.   273,   7  So.  Rej).   003;  Arkansas  :  Gulbreath  y.  Cook,  .30  Ark.  417 

MoMle  Sav.  Bank  v.  McDonnell,  89  Ala.  California:  Coles  v.  Soulsby,  21   Cal.  47; 

246 


PAROL    EVIDENCE   OF    THE    TRUE   CONSIDERATION. 


[§  295. 


expressed  is  money  paid,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  real  considera- 
tion was  goods  or  property  valued  at  the  sum  named ;  ^  or  that  the 
actual  consideration  included  an  agreement  by  the  grantee  to  pay 
an  existing  incumbrance  on  the  property  ;  ^  or  that  the  conveyance 


Tarty  v.  Connolly,  91  Cal.  15,  27  Pac. 
Hep.  599;  Rhine  v.  Ellen,  36  Cal.  362; 
Htndrick  i'.  Crowley,  31  Cal.  471;  Peck 
V.  Vandenberg,  30  Cal.  11.  Connecticut: 
Belden  i'.  Seymour,  8  Conn.  304,  21  Am. 
Dec.  661  ;  Meeker  i-.  Meeker,  16  Conn. 
383.  Florida  :  Sullivan  v.  Lear,  23  Fla. 
463,  2  So.  Kep.  846.  Illinois  :  Hutbsch  v. 
Scheel,  81  111.  281  ;  Monis  v.  Tillson,  81 
111.  607  ;  Booth  v.  Hynes.  54  111.  363. 
Indiana :  Welz  v.  Rhodius,  87  lud.  1  ; 
Mather  v.  Scoles,  35  Ind.  1 ;  Rockhill  v. 
Spraggs,  9  lud.  30,  68  Aui.  Dec.  607; 
Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323,  68 
Am.  Dec.  638.  Iowa :  Harper  v.  Perry, 
28  Iowa,  57 ;  Lawton  y.  Buckingham,  15 
Iowa,  22 ;  Swafford  v.  Whipple,  3  Greene, 
261,  54  Am.  Dec.  498.  Kentucky:  Ran- 
kin V.  Wallace  (Ky.)  14  S.  W.  Rep.  79. 
Maine:  Bassett  v.  Bassett,  55  Me.  127; 
Tyler  v.  Carlton,  17  Me.  175;  Emery  v. 
Chase,  5  Me.  232;  Goodspecd  f.  Fuller, 
46  Me.  141,71  Am.  Dee.  572  ;  Tolman  v. 
Ward  (Me.),  29  Atl.  Rep.  1081  ;  Nicker- 
son  V.  Saunders,  36  Me.  413.  Massachu- 
setts:  Miller  v.  Goodwin,  8  Gray,  542; 
Paiire  r.  Sherman,  6  Gray,  511  ;  Preble  r. 
BaMwin,  6  Cii-h.  549  ;  Clapp  v.  Tirrell, 
20  Pick.  247  ;  Gale  v.  Coburu,  18  Pick. 
397  ;  Bullard  v.  Briggs,  7  Pick.  533  ;  Wil- 
kinson V.  Scott,  17  Mass.  249,  257  ;  Drury 
V.  Tremont  Imp.  Co.  13  Allen,  168;  Cow- 
ard V.  Waters,  98  Mass.  596 ;  Twomey  v. 
Crowley,  137  Mass.  184.  Michigan  :  Stro- 
hauer  v.  Voltz,  42  Mich.  444,  4  N.  W. 
Rep.  161  ;  Blair  r.  Carpenter,  75  Mich. 
167.  Minnesota:  Jordan  v.  White,  20 
Minn.  91  ;  Keith  r.  Brigirs,  32  Minn.  185, 
20  N.  W.  Rep.  91.  Mississippi:  Davidson 
V.  Ji.nes,  26  Miss.  56  ;  Parker  v.  Foy,  43 
Miss.  260.  Missouri:  Ilollocher  v.  Hol- 
locher,  62  Mo.  267  ;  Altringer  v.  Cape- 
beart,  68  Mo.  441  ;  Miller  v.  McCoy,  50 
Mo.  214;  Rabsuhl  v.  Lack,  35  Mo.  316; 
Bobb  y.  Bobb,  7   Mo.    App.   501,  89  Mo. 


411,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  511  ;  Wood  v.  Broad- 
ley,  76  Mo.  23,33  ;  Fontaine  i-.  Boatman's 
Sav.  Inst.  57  Mo.  552.  Nebraska  :  Fall  v. 
Glover,  34  Neb.  522,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  168. 
New  Hampshire  :  Morse  v.  Shattuck,  4  N. 
H.  229,  17  Am.  Dec.  419.  New  Jersey  : 
Morris  Canal  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Ryer^ou, 
27  N.  J.  L.  457.  New  York :  McCrea  v. 
Purmort,  16  Wend.  460,  30  Am.  Dec.  103, 
a  leading  case ;  Frink  v.  Green,  5  Barb. 
455 ;  Meriam  v.  Harsen,  2  Barb.  Ch. 
232;  Murray  v.  Smith,  1  Duer,  412; 
Bingham  v.  Weiderwax,  1  N.  Y.  509 ; 
Truscott  V.  King,  6  N.  Y.  147  ;  McKiu- 
ster  V.  Babcock,  26  N.  Y.  378 ;  Halliday 
V.  Hart,  30  N.  Y.  474;  Baker  v.  Union 
Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  43  N.  Y.  283 ;  Arnot  v. 
Erie  Ry.  Co.  67  N.  Y.  315.  North  Caro- 
lina:  Barbee  v.  Barbee,  108  N.  C.  581,  13 
S.  E.  Rep.  215  ;  Michael  v.  Foil,  100  N. 
C.  178.  Ohio:  Vail  v.  McMillan,  17  Ohio 
St.  617;  Steele  v.  Worthington,  2  Ohio, 
182.  Pennsylvania:  Hartley  v.  M'An- 
ulty,  4  Yeate«,  95,  2  Am.  Dec.  396. 
Rhode  Island:  Wood  v.  Moriarty,  15  R.I. 
518,  9  Atl.  Rep.  427  ;  National  Exchange 
Bank  v.  Watson,  13  R.  I.  91.  South  Car- 
olina :  Calvert  v.  Nickles,  26  S.  C.  304,  2 
S.  E.  Rep.  116.  Vermont :  Pierce  v.  Brew, 
43  Vt.  292.  Virginia  :  Harvey  v.  Alexan- 
der, 1  Rand.  219,  10  Am.  Dec.  519.  Wis- 
consin: Hannan  v.  Oxley,  23  Wis.  519; 
Ildrner  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  38 
Wis.  165;  Kicklaud  v.  Mennsha  Wooden 
Ware  Co.  68  Wis.  34,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  471, 
60  Am.  Rep  831. 

1  McCrea  v.  Purmort,  16  Wend.  460,  30 
Am.  Dec.  103;  Miller  v.  McCoy,  50  Mo. 
214. 

~  Hays  V.  Peck,  107  Ind.  389,  8  N.  E. 
Rep.  274;  McDill  v.  Gunn,  43  Ind.  315; 
Pitman  v.  Conner,  27  Ind.  337 ;  Allen  v. 
Lee,  1  Ind.  58  ;  Carver  v.  Louthain,  38 
Ind.  .530 ;  Robl)iniufl  v.  Lister,  30  Ind.  142  ; 
Murray  v.  Smith,  I  Duer,  412. 

247 


^  20().]  CONSIDKUATION. 

was  iiKuU'  as  an  advaneemeiil  by  a  iatlicr  to  his  son,  and  not  upon 
a  inoui'V  consideration  as  expressed  in  the  deed.^ 

Thouc^h  the  consideration  expressed  be  h)ve  and  alTection,  it 
ni.iv  be  sliown  that  tliere  was  a  vahiable  consideration  also,  such 
as  a  ti-ansfer  of  property  by  the  grantee  to  the  giantor,^  or  an 
ao-reenient  for  maintenance  ;'^   or  a  release  of  dower.* 

On  the  other  hand,  where  a  deed  expresses  only  a  valuable 
consideration,  it  may  bt>  shown  that  the  grantee  is  a  blood  re- 
lation to  the  grantor,  whereupon  the  law  will  presume  a  con- 
sideration of  natural  affection  in  addition  to  the  consideration 
expressed.^ 

Though  the  consideration  expressed  be  the  past  services  of  the 
grantee,  a,  woman,  it  may  be  shown  that  an  additional  considera- 
tion was  a  contemplated  marriage  between  the  parties.'^ 

296.  A  recital  of  a  consideration  paid  is  not  inconsistent 
with  a  consideration  executory  in  character  which  is  the  real 
consideration,'  or  with  such  a  consideration  in  addition  to  that 
recited  in  the  deed.^  Though  the  expressed  consideration  of  a 
deed  to  a  railroad  company  is  "■  benefit  to  be  derived  from  the 
building  of  the  road  and  one  dollar  paid,"  the  grantor  may  show 
that  the  real  consideration  was  the  company's  promise  to  build  a 
depot  on  the  land.^  In  addition  to  the  consideration  named  in  a 
deed, it  maybe  shown  that  the  real  consideration  consisted  largely 
of  the  grantee's  agreement  to  erect  a  sawmill  on  the  land.i'^ 

A  deed  made  for  the  expressed  consideration  of  one  dollar, 
when  attacked  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  voluntary  gift,  may  be 
shown  to  have  been  made  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  the  legal 

1  Rockhill   V.  Spraggs,  9    Ind.    30,    68  Kenney  y.  Phillipy,  91  Intl.  511  ;  Pomeroy 

Am.  Dec.  607.  v.  Biiilcy,  43  N.  H.  118. 

■•^  Banks  v.  Brown,  2  Hill  Ch.  558,  30  6  ]\]iller  ,..  Goodwin,  8  Gray,  542. 

Am.  Dec.  380  ;  Ilannan  v.  Oxley,  23  Wis.  ■?  Tolman   v.  Ward  (Me.),  29  Atl.  Rep. 

519.  1081  ;  Snllivan  v.  Lear,  23  Fla.  463,  2  So. 

3  Gale  V.  Williamson,   8   Mees.   &  W.  Rep.  846 ;  Rankin   v.  Wallace   (Ky.),  14 

405.  S.  W.  Rep.  79. 

*  Harvey  v.   Alexander,  1    Rand,  219,  «  Kickland  v.  Mcnasha  Wooden  Ware 

10  Am    Dec.  519.  Co.  68  Wis  34,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  471. 

5  Gale  «.  Coburn,  18  Pick.  397;  Wallis  »  Loni.sville,    St.  L.    &  T.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

i:  Wallis,  4   Mass.  135,  3    Am.  Dec.  210;  Neafus,  93  Ky.  53,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  10.30. 

Parker  v.  Nichols,  7  Pick.    Ill  ;  Meeker  lo  Fraley  i\  Beutley,  1   Dak.  25,  46  N. 

V.    Moeker,    16    Conn.    383;    Rockhill    v.  W.  Rep.  506. 
Spraggs,  9   Ind.   30,   68  Am.  Dec.  607; 
248 


PAROL    EVIDENCE    OF    THE    TRUE   CONSIDERATION.       [^§  297,  298. 

title  to  the  real  owner  who  had  paid  for  the  land,  and  had  con- 
veyed it  to  the  grantor  to  hold  for  him.^ 

it  may  be  sliown  that  in  addition  to  the  consideration  named 
in  the  deed,  the  grantor  was  to  have  the  rents  and  profits  of  the 
1,1  ml  fxi-  the  current  year  of  the  sale.^ 

it  may  be  shown  that  the  consideration  paid  was  not  paid  by 
til  -grantee  bnt  by  a  third  person,  in  whose  favor  a  resulting 
ti  u.-.t  thereby  arose,  as  where  land  is  purchased  with  the  money 
if  ;i  married  woman,  and  the  deed  is  taken  in  the  name  of  her 
hu>band.'^ 

L97.  Ordinarily  a  deed  does  not  profess  to  set  out  specifi- 
cally the  terms  of  the  trade  and  the  consideration  which  in- 
duced the  making  of  it.  An  ordinary  deed  is  regarded  as  an 
ins  rument  of  conveyance  by  the  grantor,  and  not  an  instrument 
binding  the  grantee  and  setting  out  the  undertaking  on  his  part 
which  constitutes  the  consideration  upon  which  the  grantor  has 
eX'M  uted  the  deed.* 

Although  no  consideration  is  expressed,  a  valuable  considera- 
ti'iii  niay  be  proved  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  deed.^  If  only 
a  nominal  consideration  be  expressed,  a  valuable  consideration 
may  be  proved.^ 

TIk^  consideration  stated  in  the  deed  is  presumed  to  be  the 
actual  consideration,  until  the  contrary  is  shown.''  Though  the 
monev  consideration  was  actually  paid  in  property,  there  is  a  pre- 
sumption that  this  is  of  the  value  expressed  in  the  deed.^ 

298.  More  or  less  than  is  expressed  in  a  deed  may  be 
proved  by  parol  evidence  as  the  consideration,  and  even  a 
different  consideration  if  valuable  may  be  proved.^  If  the  deed 
is    assailed    by   the   creditors   of    the  grantor  as  fraudulent,   the 

1  Livingston  v.  Livingston,  29  Neb.  167,  Jackson  r.  Fish,  10  Jolins.  456  ;  Jackson 

45  N.  W.  Rep.  233.  "•   I'ike,  9   Cow.  69 ;  Willson  v.  Betts,  4 

-  Bourne  i:  P.onine,  92  K\'.  211.  Denio,  201. 

3  Connor!;.  Foliansbce,  59  N.  II.  124.  ^  Chapman    v.  Emery,   1    Cowp.    278; 

■»   Pierce  v.  Brew,  43  Vr.  292.  Leifehild's  Case,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  231. 

5  Peacock  r.   Monk,    1    Ves.   Sen.    128;  "  Behlen    r.   Seymour,  8  Conn.  304,  21 

Townend  v.  Toker,  L.  R.   1    Ch.  446.  per  Am.  Dec.  661  ;  Clements   v.  Landnim,  26 

Tnrnor,  L.  J. ;  Eerrars  r.  Cherry,  2  Vern.  Oa.  401  ;  Spear  v.   Ward,   20  Cal.  659; 

383  ;  Llawelly  By.  Co.  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Gaui^h  v.  Henderson,  2  Head,  628  ;  Bay- 

Ry.  Co.  L.   R.  8  Ch.  942;  Davenport  r.  Hss  r.  Williams,  6  Coldw.  440. 

Ma'Jon,   15  Mass.   85;    White    r.    Weeks,  "  ("lements  i'.  Landrum,  26  Ga.  401. 

1    Pa.  486;  Wood    v.   Beach,   7  Vt.  522;  ^  Bullard  f.  Briggs,  7  Pick.  533,  19  Am. 

Stevens  v.  Griffith,  3  Vt.  448.  New  York  :  Dec.  292. 

249 


s^  -299.]  CONSIDERATION. 

grantoe  may  support  it  by  proving  any  valuable  consitleiation, 
tliougli  ilitVerent  from  that  expressed.^  Thus  the  grantee  may 
show  that  the  actual  eonsitleration  was  a  contemplated  marriage 
between  the  grantor  and  grantee  instead  of  the  sum  of  money 
expressed  in  the  dee.l.'-^  The  recital  of  a  consideration  is  not 
evidence  as  auainst  creditors  of  the  jj^rantor  who  were  such  at 
the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  deed  ;  but  as  against  them  the 
hurden  is  upon  the  grantee  to  prove  a  consideration  such  as 
will  support  the  deed.  The  effect  of  a  consideration  expressed 
is  merely  to  estop  the  grantee  from  alleging  that  the  deed  was 
executed  without  consideration.  For  every  other  purpose  it  is 
open  to  explanation,  and  may  be  varied  by  parol  proof.'^ 

A  deed  from  a  mother  to  her  married  daughter,  which  expresses 
a  valuable  consideration  in  money  as  well  as  a  consideration  of 
love  and  affection,  may  be  shown  to  have  been  made  upon  the 
latter  consideration  only,  no  money  having  been  paid,  where  the 
purpose  of  such  evidence  is,  not  to  defeat  the  deed,  but  to  show 
that  the  deed  was  made  by  way  of  a  gift,  and  that  in  consequence 
the  laud  conveyed  became  the  separate  property  of  the  daughter, 
and  not  the  couimon  property  of  the  daughter  and  her  husband.* 

299.  There  are,  however,  decisions  to  the  effect  that  an 
expressed  consideration  cannot  be  varied  by  proof  of  a  differ- 
ent or  further  consideration,  unless  the  instrument  itself  indicates 
that  the  entire  contract  is  not  disclosed,  and  that  there  was  a 
consideration  other  than  that  expressed,  the  nature  of  which  is  in- 
dicated. Thus,  where  one  conveyed  land  to  a  railroad  company 
in  consideration  of  one  dollar  and  the  further  consideration  that 
the  company  would  locate  its  road  over  the  grantor's  land,  the 
grantor  cannot  show  a  parol  undertaking  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
pany to  establish  a  depot  on  the  grantor's  land,  made  contempora- 
neously with  the  deed  and  not  expressed  therein,  because  this 
would  ingraft  upon  the  deed  conditions  not  expressed  therein.^ 

1  National  Exchange  Bank  v.  Watson,  McCrea  v.   Purmort,   16   Wend.  460,  30 

13  R.  I.  91,  43    Am.    Rep.  132;   Miller  i'.  Am.    Rep.    103;    Greenvault    v.   Davis,  4 

Goodwill,  8   Gray,  542;  Tolman   v.  Ward  Hill,  643;  Coles  v.   Soulsby,  21   Cal.  47; 

(Me.),   29   Ati.  Rep.  1081.      Contra,  Belts  Hollocher  v.  Hollocher,  62  Mo.  267. 

V.  Union   Bank,  1    Ilar.  &  G.  17.t,   on  the  *  Peck  v.  Vandenberg,  30   Cal.  11.     In 

ground  that  the  expressed  consideration  this   case   the   Louisiana   and  Texas  de- 

cannoi  be  varied  by  parol.  ci.'-ions  bearing  upon  the  question  are  con- 

-  Houston  V.  Blackman,   66  Ala.   .559,  sidered  at  length. 

41  Am.  Rep.  756.  5  K^st  Line,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Garrett,  52 

8  Stackpole   v.  RoVjbins,  47   Barli.  212  ;  Tex.  133. 

250 


PAROL   EVIDENCE    OF   THE   TRUE   CONSIDERATION.       [§§  300,  301. 

But  where  one  conveyed  land  for  a  money  consideration  to  a 
railroad  company,  and  another  insti'uuient,  executed  by  the  grantor 
to  the  railroad  compauy  at  the  same  time,  recited  that  he  would 
do  certain  acts  in  consideration  of  the  purchase  of  the  land  by  the 
company  for  the  location  of  a  depot  thereon,  it  was  held  that 
the  instruments  did  not  evidence  the  entire  contract,  and  that 
the  grantor  could  show  by  parol  that  the  consideration  of  the 
deed  was  that  the  company  should  locate  a  depot  on  the  land 
conveyed.^ 

300.  If  there  is  a  consideration  in  addition  to  a  valuable 
consideration  expressed,  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  such 
other  consideration.  A  deed  which  expresses  a  valuable  consid- 
eration, though  this  be  merely  a  nominal  one,  need  not,  as  against 
the  grantor  and  those  claiming  under  him,  or  as  against  a 
stranger,  be  supported  by  showing  what  other  reason,  in  addition 
to  the  will  of  the  grantor,  led  to  its  execution.  Thus  where  a 
deed  made  in  consideration  of  one  dollar  also  recited  it  was  exe- 
cuted under  and  by  virtue  of  the  statute  concerning  voluntary 
assignments  made  pursuant  to  the  application  of  an  insolvent  and 
liis  creditors,  and  in  pursuance  of  an  order  made  by  a  county 
judge,  it  was  held  that  the  deed  might  be  given  in  evidence  with- 
out proving  the  insolvency  of  the  grantor.^  And  so,  if  a  deed 
purporting  to  be  made  in  pursuance  of  a  decree  of  court  also  re- 
cites a  valuable  consideration,  the  latter  consideration  is  suffi- 
cient to  support  the  deed  without  proving  the  existence  of  the 
decree.^ 

301.  The  only  eflfect  of  the  consideration  clause  in  a  deed 
is  to  estop  the  grantor  from  alleging  that  it  was  executed 
without  consideration,  and  to  prevent  a  resulting  trust  in  the 
grantor.  For  every  other  purpose  the  consideration  may  be  va- 
ried or  explained  by  parol  proof.*  As  between  the  parties,  "  one 
dollar  viewed  as  a  consideration  is  as  much  a  valuable  consider- 
ation as  a  million  dollars."^ 

A  valuable  consideration  is  essential  at  common  law  to  raise  a 

1  Gulf,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  I'.  Jones,  82  Tex.  Purmort,  16  Wend.  460  ;  Gordon  v.  Gor- 
156,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  534.  don,    1   Met.  (Ky.)   285;    Belden  v.  Sey- 

2  Rockwell  I!.  Brown,  54  N.  Y.  210.  mour,   8    Conn.  304,   21   Am.  Dec.  661; 

3  Toncra  v.  Henderson,  .3  Litt.  235,  Meeker  v.  Meeker,  16  Conn.  383  ;  Morrall 
*  Goodspeed  r.  Fuller,  46  Me.  141,  per     v.  Waterson,  7  Kans.  199. 

Appleion,  J. ;  Tolman  v.  Ward  (Me.),  29         ^  Harvey  v.  Alexander,  1  Rand.  219,  10 
Atl.  Rep.  lOSl.per  Walton,  J. ;  McCrea  v.      Am.  Dec.  519,  per  Cabell,  J. 

251 


§  i^O-l.]  CONSIDKKATION. 

use.  If  tlu'ic  is  lu)  considevjitiou  expressed,  ;iiul  none  in  fact,  and 
no  use  is  declareil,  a  trust  results  in  favor  of  the  grantor  and  the 
operatii)n  of  tlie  deed  is  defeated.  "  If,  then,  the  grantor  of  a 
deed  of  bargain  and  sale,  which  expressed  a  money  consideration, 
slmuKl  be  permitted  to  prove  by  parol  testimony  that  no  money 
was  in  fact  paid,  he  would  be  permitted  to  show,  in  opposition  to 
the  deed  itself,  that  he  had  made  no  conveyance  of  a  beneficial  in- 
terest at  all,  and  thereby  prevent  any  beneficial  estate  from  pass- 
ing from  him  by  the  deed.  This  the  policy  of  the  law  would 
not  permit  him  to  do,  and  he  was  held  estopped  by  his  deed  from 
showing  the  fact  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  his  deed  from 
operating  to  pass  an  estate."  ^ 

302.  The  consideration  stated  in  the  deed  cannot  be  dis- 
proved for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  conveyance,  but  for 
all  other  purposes  it  is  subject  to  be  modified  or  varied  by  parol 
proof.2 

For  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  effective  operation  of  a  deed, 
the  grantor's  administrator  is  estopped,  just  as  the  grantor  him- 
self would  be,  from  denying  that  there  was  a  consideration  for 
such  deed.^ 

The  grantor  is  not  allowed  to  impeach  his  conveyance  by 
showing  that  the  consideration  was  an  illegal  one,  as  that  it  was 
made  in  pursuance  of  a  lottery  scheme  in  which  he  participated. 
He  is  not  allowed  to  defeat  his  deed  by  showing  his  own  unlawful 
act.4 


1  Peck  V.  Vandenberg,  30  Cal.  11,  25, 
per  Sawyer,  J. 

•i  McCalla  v.  Bane,  45  Fed.  Rep.  828. 
Alabama:  Vincent  v.  Walker,  93  Ala. 
105,  9  So.  Rep.  382  ;  Ohmer  v.  Boyer,  89 
Ala.  273,  7  So.  Rej).  663.  California  :  Ir- 
vine V.  McKeon,  23  Cal.  472.  Connecti- 
cut: Belden  v.  Seymour,  8  Conn.  304,  21 
Am.  Dec.  661.  Illinois:  Kimball  r. 
Walker,  .30  111.  482  ;  Richardson  r.  Clow, 
8  Bradw.  91.  Indiana:  Bever  v.  North, 
107  Ind.  544,  8  N,  E.  Rep.  576.  Maine: 
Hammond  v.  Woodman,  41  IMe.  177,  66 
Am.  Dec.  219;  Abbott  r.  Maish^ill,  48 
Me.  44.  Massachusetts:  Wilkin.son  v. 
Scott,  17  Mas.s.  249, 257.  Missouri:  Bobb 
V.  Bobb,  89  Mo.  411,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  511 ; 
252 


Ilonilcrson  r.  Henderson,  13  Mo.  151. 
New  Hampshire :  Morse  v.  Shattuck,  4 
N.  H.  229,  17  Am.  Dec.  419;  Connor  v. 
Follansbee,  59  N.  H.  124  ;  Horn  v.  Tliomp- 
son,  31  N.  H.  562;  Farrington  v.  Barr, 
36  N.  H.  86;  Burleigh  v.  Coffin,  22  N.  H. 
118,  53  Am.  Dec.  236.  Ohio  :  Vail  v.  Mc- 
Millan, 17  Ohio  St.  617.  Rhode  Island: 
National  Exchange  Bank  v.  Watson,  13 
R.  I.  91,  43  Am.  Rep.  132.  Wisconsin: 
Hannan  v.  Oxley,  23  Wis.  519. 

3  Campbell  v.  Carruth  (Fla.),  13  So. 
Rep.  432. 

*  Allebach  v.  Hunsicker,  132  Pa.  St. 
349.  19  Atl.  Rep.  139;  Winton  v.  Free- 
man, 102  Pa.  St.  366. 


RECITAL   OF   PAYMENT    OF   THE    CONSIDERATION.         [§  303. 

VIII.  Recital  of  Payment  of  the  Consideration. 
303.  The  acknowledgment  of  consideration  contained  in  a 
deed  is  only  presumptive  evidence  of  payment,  and  does 
not  estop  the  grantor  from  maintaining  an  action  against  the 
grantee  for  the  consideration  remaining  unpaid.  It  \s  prima  facie 
evidence  of  a  valuable  considei'ation  paid  and  of  the  amount  paid.^ 


1  Mills  V.  Dow,  13.3  U.  S.  423,  431,  10 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  413,  per  Blatcliford,  J.; 
Taggart  v.  Stanberry,  2  ^IcLean,  543. 
Alabama  :  Hubbard  v.  Allen,  59  Ala.  283. 
California:  Authony  v.  Chapniau,  65  Gal. 
73,  2  Pac.  Rep.  889 ;  Irvine  v.  McKeon, 
23  Cal.  472 ;  Rhine  v.  Ellen,  36  Cal.  362. 
Connecticut:  Beldeu  v.  Seymour,  8  Conn. 
304,21  Am.  Dec.  661  ;  Sparrow  v.  Smith, 
5  Conn.  113;  Meeker  v.  Meeker,  16  Conn. 
383  ;  Collins  r.  Tillou,  26  Conn.  368,  68 
Am.  Dec.  398.  Delaware :  Callaway  v. 
Hearn,  1  Houst.  607.  Georgia :  Bonner 
V.  Metcalf,  58  Ga.  236.  Illinois:  Rich- 
ardson V.  Clow,  8  Bradw.  91  ;  Ayers  v. 
McConnel,  15  111.  230;  Kimball  v. 
Walker,  30  111.  482  ;  Morris  i;.  Tillson,  81 
111.  607.  Indiana:  McCouuell  v.  Citizens' 
State  Bank,  130  Ind.  127,  27  N.  E.  Rep. 
616.  Kentucky:  Gully  ;•.  Grubbs,  1  J.  J. 
Marsh.  387,  3S9  ;  Hutchison  v.  Sinclair, 
7  Hon.  291  ;  Bryant  v.  Hunter,  6  Bush, 
75 ;  Engleman  v.  Craig,  2  Bush,  424 ; 
Gordon  y.  Gordon,  1  Met.  285.  Maine: 
Barter  v.  Greenleaf,  65  Me.  405 ;  Bassett 
V.  Bassett,  55  Me.  127  ;  Long  v.  Wood- 
man, 65  Me.  56,  overruling  Steele  v.  Ad- 
ams, 1  Me.  1  ;  Goodsi)eed  v.  Fuller,  46 
Me.  141,  71  Am.  Dec.  572;  Dearborn  v. 
Parks,  5  Me.  81,  17  Am.  Dec.  206  ;  Schil- 
lingcr  V.  McCann,  6  Me.  364  ;  Burbauk  v. 
Gould,  15  Me.  118;  Nickerson  r.  Snun- 
der.s,  36  Me.  413.  Maryland:  Wolfe  v. 
Hauver,  1  Gill,  84,  overruling  earlier 
cases  in  that  State  ;  Morgan  v.  Bitzen- 
berger,  3  Gill,  350.  Massachusetts:  Paige 
V.  Sherman,  6  (Jray,  511  ;  Miller  v.  Gnod- 
win,  8  Gray,  542;  Drury  v.  Trcindnt  Im- 
provement Co.  13  Allen,  168;  Wilkinson 
r.  Scott,  17  Mass.  249  ;  Clapp  v.  Tirreil, 
20    Piek.  247  ;  Carr  v.  Drolrv,  119    Mass. 


294.  Minnesota:  Kumler  i-.  Ferguson,  7 
Minn.  442.  Mississippi :  Parker  v.  Foy, 
43  Miss.  260,  55  Am.  Kep.  484.  Missouri : 
Hogel  V.  Lindell,  10  Mo.  483  ;  Henderson 
V.  Henderson,  13  Mo.  151 ;  HoUocher  v. 
Hollocher,  62  Mo.  267  ;  Fontaine  v.  Boat- 
man's Sav.  Inst.  57  Mo.  552.  Nebraska : 
Patrick  v.  Leach,  2  Fed.  Rep.  120.  New 
Hampshire :  Morse  v.  Shattuck,  4  N.  H. 
229,  17  Am.  Dec.  419;  Pritchard  v. 
Brown,  4  N.  H.  397,  17  Am.  Dec.  431  ; 
Kimball  v.  Fenner.  12  N.  H.  248  ;  Nut- 
ting V.  Herbert,  37  N.  H.  346.  New  York  : 
Shephard  v.  Little,  14  Johns.  210  ;  Bowen 
V.  Bell,  20  .Johns.  338,  11  Am.  Dec.  286; 
M'Crea  v.  Purmort,  16  Wend.  460,  30 
Am.  Dec.  103 ;  Grout  v.  Townsend,  2 
Hill,  554,  2  Denio,  336 ;  Barnuni  v. 
Child,<,  1  Sandf.  58 ;  Sanford  v.  Sanford, 
61  Barb.  293;  Witbeck  v.  Waine,  16 
N.  Y.  532 ;  Diefendorf  ?•.  Diefendorf,  8 
N.  Y.  Supp.  617;  Murdock  v.  Gilchrist, 
52  N.  Y.  242  ;  Reubens  v.  Joel,  13  N.  Y. 
t88.  North  Carolina  :  Barbee  v.  Barbee, 
108  N.  C.  581,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  215  ;  Shaw 
V.  Williams,  100  N.  C.  272;  Medley  v. 
Mask,  4  Ired.  Eq.  339.  Con/ra,  Brocket  v. 
-  oscuc,  1  Hawks,  64  ;  Mendenhall  v.  Par- 
ish, 8  .Jones  L.  105,  78  Am.  Dec.  269. 
Pennsylvania:  Hamilton  v.  McGuire,  3  S. 
&  U.  355;  Weigley  v.  Weir,  7  S.  &  R. 
309 ;  Byers  j;.  Mullen,  9  Watts,  266 ; 
Watson  V.  Blaine,  12  S.  &  R.  131,  14  Am. 
Dec.  669;  Diitton  v.  Tilden,  13  Pa,  St. 
46  ;  Cox  V.  Henry,  32  Pa.  St.  18  ;  Batdorf 
V.  Albert,  59  Pa.  St.  61.  Tennessee  :  Bay- 
lies V.  Williams,  0  Coldw.  440.  Vermont : 
Beach  v.  Packard,  10  Vt.  96,  33  Am.  Dec. 
185;  Lazell  v.  Lazell,  12  Vt.  443,  30  Am. 
Dec.  352.  Virginia  ;  Harvey  r.  Alexan- 
der, 1  Rand.  219,   10  Am.  Dec.  519;  Du- 

2;j3 


§§  304,  305.]  CONSIDKRATION. 

The  statement  of  the  consideration  in  a  deed  is  in  hirge  part  for 
the  purpose  of  giving  full  effect  to  the  instrument,  and  not  to 
disclose  in  full  the  contract  between  the  parties.^  A  recital  of 
the  payment  of  a  particular  consideiation  does  not  exclude  proof 
of  other  and  consistent  consideration.^ 

This  rule  does  not  apply  when  the  recitals  as  to  the  considera- 
tion are  ambiguous,  as  where  the  amount  was  stated  quite  differ- 
ently in  different  places  in  the  deed.^ 

304.  A  sale  of  land  is  a  good  consideration  for  an  oral 
promise  to  pay  the  price  of  it,  and  such  price  may  be  recov- 
ered after  the  conveyance  by  an  action  of  assumpsit.*  If,  how- 
ever, the  promise  is  not  to  pay  money,  but  to  convey  real  estate 
in  exchange,  such  promise  is  void  by  the  statute  of  frauds.^  If 
one  party  to  such  agreement  refuses  to  fulfil  his  agreement  to 
convey  after  he  has  received  the  deed  of  the  other  party,  the 
latter  may  recover  upon  the  implied  promise  of  the  former  to 
pay  the  price  for  the  land  when  this  has  been  estimated  by  the 
parties  at  a  fixed  sum ;  but  the  cause  of  action  is  not  properly 
described  by  a  count  for  money  had  and  received,  but  by  a  count 
for  the  price  or  value  of  the  land  sold  and  conveyed.  The  action 
is  not  for  money  agreed  to  be  paid,  but  for  the  price  or  value  of 
the  land.^ 

In  the  absence  of  fraud,  when  the  grantor  is  content  with  a 
quitclaim  deed,  the  rule  caveat  emptor  applies,  and  he  must  pay 
the  consideration  for  the  deed  whether  he  receives  any  title  or 
not." 

305.  It  may  be  shown  that  the  grantee,  at  the  time  of  the 
sale,  agreed  to  pay  a  sum  additional  to  that  expressed  in  the 
deed,  and  the  agreement  may  be  enforced  although  it  was  parol 

val  V.  Bibb,  4  Heu.  &  M.  113,4  Am.  Dec.  v.  Boll,  20  Johns.  338,  11    Am.  Dec.  286; 

.506;    Wilson   v-   Shelton,    9    Leigh,    342.  Whitbeck  v.    Whitbeck,   9   Cow.   266,   18 

Wisconsin:   Kickhmd ?;.  Menasha  Wooden  Am,    Dec.    503;    Basford  v.   Pearson,   9 

Ware  Co.  68  Wis.  34,31  N.  W.  Rep.  471,  Allen,  387,  85  Am.  ])ec.  764. 

831,  60  Am.  Rep.  831.  "  Griswold  v.  Messenger,  6  Pick.  516. 

1  Collins  V.  Tilloii,  26  Conn.  368,  68  6  Basford  v.  Pearson,  9  Allen,  387,  85 
Am.  Dec.  398 ;  Clarke  v.  Tappin,  32  Conn.  Am.  Dec.  764. 

56,69.  7  Hulett  v.  Hamilton   (Minn.),  61    N. 

2  Engleman  v.  Craig,  2  Bush,  424;  Gor-  W.  Rep.  672  ;  Washington  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
don  V.  Gordon,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  285.  Marshall   (Minn.),  57  N.   W.   Rep.  658; 

3  Hall  V.  Loveman  (Ala.),  3  So.  Rep.  Mitchell  v.  Chisholm  (Minn.),  58  N.  W. 
767.  Rep.  873. 

*  Nelson  v.  Swan,  13  .Johns.  483  ;  Bowen 

254 


RKCITAL    OF    PAYMENT    OF    THE    CONSIDERATION.       [§§  306,   307. 

merely.^  It  may  be  shown  by  such  evidence  that  the  grantee 
agreed  to  assume  and  pay  a  mortgage  upon  the  land  as  a  part  ot" 
the  consideration  for  the  conveyance  stated  in  the  deed.- 

If  in  an  exchange  of  lands  it  be  agreed  that  the  taxes  upon  the 
lands  shall  be  offset  and  shall  be  paid  by  the  grantors,  such  pay- 
ment of  the  taxes  becomes  a  part  of  the  consideration  of  the 
conveyance.  Parol  proof  of  such  agreement  is  admissible,  and  a 
suit  may  be  maintained  for  money  paid  by  one  of  the  grantees 
for  the  amount  paid  by  him  in  removing  the  incumbrance  of  the 
taxes.'^ 

306.  The  actual  payment  of  the  nominal  consideration  ex- 
pressed in  a  deed  is  not  essential  to  its  validity.  It  is  suffi- 
cient if  it  is  expressed  to  have  been  paid.  The  admission  of  its 
payment  is  generally  onU^  a  formality.  This  admission  is  not 
essential  to  the  conveyance.  It  is  immaterial  whether  it  was  ac- 
tually paid  or  not,  even  if  the  ackuDwledgment  of  the  payment 
be  inserted  for  the  purpose  of  attesting  the  fact.  Such  acknow- 
ledgment is  no  better  evidence  than  a  sealed  receipt  on  a  separate 
paper  would  be.* 

307.  As  between  the  parties,  the  ackno-wledgment  of  pay- 
ment, like  any  other  receipt,  changes  the  burden  of  proof, 
and  requires  the  grantor,  not  only  to  prove  the  sale  of  the  land, 
but  to  prove  that  it  remains  unpaid  for.-^    Such  acknowledgment  is 

1  Nickersoii  v.  Saunders,  36  Me.  413;  *  Meriam  v.  Harsen,  2  Barb.  Ch.  232; 
Tyler  v.  Carlton,  7  Me.  175.  Winans  v.  Peebles,  31  Barb.  371;  M'Crea 

2  Jones  on  Mortgages,  §  750;  Burnham  v.  Purmort,  16  Wend.  460,  474,  30  Am. 
V.  Dorr,  72  Me.  198;  Tuttle  v.  Armstead,  Dec.  103.  "A  release  cannot  be  coiitra- 
53  Conn.  175,  22  Atl.  Rep.  677  ;  Bensit'ck  dieted  or  explained  by  parol,  because  it 
V.  Cook,  110  Mo.  173,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  642;  extinguishes  a  preexisting  right;  but  no 
Lamb  v.  Tucker,  42  Iowa,  118;  Bolles  v.  receipt  can  have  the  effect  of  destroying. 
Beach,  22  N.  J.  L.  680,  53  Am.  Dec.  263  ;  per  se,  any  subsisting  right ;  it  is  only  evi- 
Wilson  V.King,  23  N.J.  Eq.  150;  Wright  dence  of  a  fact.  The  payment  of  the 
V.  Briggs,  99  Ind.  563 ;  Buckley's  App.  money  discharges  or  extinguishes  the 
48  Pa.  St.  491,  88  Am.  Dec.  468;  Mer-  debt.  A  receipt  for  the  payment  does  not 
riman  v.  Moore,  90  Pa.  St.  78  ;  I'utney  v.  pay  the  debt :  it  is  only  evidence  that  ic 
Farnham,  27  Wis.  187  ;  Society  of  Friends  has  been  paid,  ^ot  so  of  a  written  re- 
V.  Haines,  47  Ohio  St.  423,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  lease  :  it  is  not  only  evidence  of  the  ex- 
119;  Groce  v.  -Jenkins,  28  S.  C.  172,  5  S.  tin'.'ui.-jhment,  but  is  the  extinguishment 
E.  Rep.  352.     Contra,  Lewis  v.  Day.  53  itself."     Per  Cowan,  J. 

Iowa,  577,  5  N.  W.  Rep.  753.  &  Mills  v.   Dow,  133  U.  S.  423,  431,  10 

■"'  Hobinius  v.   Lister,  30   Ind.   142,    95  Sup.    Ct.   Rep.  413,    per   Blatchford,   J.; 

Am.  Dec.  674  ;  Brackett  y.  Evans,  1  Cu>li.  Lawrence    v.  McCalmont,    2    How.  426; 

79,  82;  Preble  v.  Baldwin,  6  Cusli.  .549;  Beach  v.  Packard,  10  Vt.  96,  33  Am.  Doc. 

Carr  v.  Dooley,  119  Mass.  294.  185;  Jackson  v.  McChesney,  7  Cow.  360, 

255 


§§  308,  309.]  coNsinF.KAiioN. 

alsi)  prima  facie  evidence  as  against  persons  who  have  subse- 
(lUfiillv  dt'iived  title  from  the  grantor.  But  as  against  a  sti-ani^or 
llie  acknowledgint'nt  of  payment  is  no  evidence  whatever;  it  is 
t.n\\y  iin  ex  parte  deehiration,  not  under  oath. ^  Wliere  a  deed  is 
impeached  on  the  ground  that  it  was  made  to  defraud  crciHtors, 
the  acknowh'dgment  of  the  consideration  is  the  hnvest  species  of 
prima  facie  evidence,  inasmuch  as  the  same  motives  which  would 
uidnce  the  ])arties  to  execute  a  frauchdent  conveyance  would  in- 
duce them  to  insert,  in  the  strongest  terms,  an  acknowledgment 
of  the  receipt  of  the  consideration.^ 

The  recital  of  payment  of  the  consideration  in  a  deed  is  not 
evidence  as  against  third  persons.^ 

308.  The  presumption  is  that  the  person  to  whom  a  deed 
is  made  paid  his  own  money  for  it.  Wliere  a  deed  is  made  to 
a  married  woman  which  expresses  on  its  face  that  the  consider- 
ation was  paid  by  her,  there  is  a  presumption  that  the  considera- 
tion was  her  own  raoney\*  But  where  the  consideration  is  called 
in  question,  and  evidence  is  given  from  which  the  jury  may  draw 
the  conclusion  that  the  consideration  money  paid  was  not  that 
of  the  grantee,  but  of  some  other  person,  whose  laud  it  is  alleged 
by  the  party  disputing  the  fact  of  payment  by  the  grantee  to  be, 
the  duty  is  cast  upon  such  grantee,  or  pei'son  asserting  the  pay- 
ment by  the  grantee,  to  prove  the  fact  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
jury  ;  otherwise  the  presumption  is  to  be  taken  to  be  overthr(}wn.5 

309.  But  evidence  that  the  consideration  recited  was  not 
in  fact  paid  cannot  be  used  to  avoid  the  deed,  or  to  affect  its 
legal  import  as  between  the  parties.  The  grantor  is  estopped,  by 
a  recital  of  a  consideration  paid,  to  claim  a  resulting  trust  in  his 
favor,  or  to  deny  that  the  deed  was  executed  for  the  uses  expressed 
in  it.'^ 

17   Am.  Dec.   .521  ;   Boiling  v.  Munchus,  Redfield,  &c.  Co.  v.  Dysart,  62  Pa.  St.  62; 

65  Ala.  .558  ;   Grimball  v.  Mastin,  77  Ala.  Pennsylvania  Salt  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Neel,  54 

553.  Pa.  St.  9. 

1  Lloyd  V.   Lynch,  28  Pa.  St.  419,  70         *  StalU\  Fulton,  30  N.  J  L.  430  ;  Jones 
Am.    Dec.    137;    Hubbard   v.    Allen,  59  v.  Cannon,  8  Houst.  1,  31  Atl.  Rep.  521. 
Ala.  283  ;  Galland  v.  Jackmau,  20  Cal.  79,         *  Jones  v.  Cannon,  supra. 

85  Am.  Dec.  172.  «  AVilkin.son   v.    Scott,    17    Mass.  249; 

2  Clapp  V.  Tirrell,  20  Pick.  247,  per  Bassett  y.  Bas^ett,  55  .Me.  127;  Belden  y. 
Shaw,  C.  J.  Seymour,  8  Conn.  304,  21  Am.  Dec.  661  ; 

3  Bolton  V.  Johns,  5  Pa.  St.  145,  47  Sparrow  c.  Smith,  5  Conn.  113;  Kimball 
Am.  Dec.  404;  Search's  Appeal,  13  Pa.  y.  Walker,  30  111.  4S2 ;  Pennsylvania  Salt 
St.  108  ;  Lloyd  v.  Lynch,   28  Pa.  St.  419  ;  Manuf.  Co.  r.  Ned,  54  Pa.  St.  9  ;  Graves  v. 

256 


RECITAL    OF    PAYMENT    OF    THE    CONSIDERATION.  [§  310. 

This  rule  was  held  not  to  apply  as  against  a  married  woman  seek- 
ing relief  from  a  conveyance  of  her  statutory  estate.  Her  recital 
of  a  consideration  did  not  estop  her,  under  the  former  statutes  of 
Alabama,  from  showing  that  no  consideration  was  in  fact  paid. 
Only  such  a  deed  as  the  statute  authorized  her  to  execute  could 
raise  an  estoppel  against  her.^  The  statute  only  authorized  her 
to  sell  her  separate  estate,  and  not  to  give  it  away. 

310.  As  against  creditors  of  the  grantor,  his  deed  is  re- 
garded as  voluntary  untiLthe  payment  of  a  valuable  considera- 
tion is  shown.  Where  there  is  proof,  however  slight,  of  fraud 
in  a  sale,  tlie  burden  of  proving  payment  of  the  consideration  is 
on  the  giantee.  The  acknowledgment  of  the  receipt  of  the  con- 
sideration, wbicli  is  in  the  first  instance  priina  facie  evidence  of 
its  payment,  is  rebutted  by  the  evidence  of  fiaud,  and  the  burden 
of  proof  is  no  longer  upon  the  party  attacking  the  deed,  but 
upon  the  party  claiming  under  it.^  The,  prima  facie  evidence  of 
the  payment  of  a  consideration  arising  from  the  admission  of  it 
in  the  deed  is  sufficiently  rebutted  by  showing  that  the  party 
claiming  the  invalidity  of  the  conveyance  was  a  creditor  of  the 
grantor  when  the  deed  was  made.  The  acknowledgment  of  a  con- 
sideration received  is  not  evidence  of  that  fact  against  an  existing 
creditor,  and  a  deed  is  presumed  to  be  fraudulent  against  such 
creditors  until  proof  of  an  actual  consideration  paid  is  given.^ 
The  proof  of  the  execution  of  the  deed,  when  this  acknowledges 

Graves,  29  N.  H.  129  ;  ]N[oore  v.  Shattuck,  Rep.  983  ;  Jackson  v.  McChesney,  7  Cow. 
4  N.  H.  229  ;  Farrinjrton  t-.  Barr,  36  N.  H.  360,  17  Am.  Dec.  521. 
86  ;  Heuiier.son  I'.  Henderson,  13  Mo.  151  ;  3  Prescott  v.  Hayes,  43  N.  H.  593; 
Hollocher  t'.  Hollocher,  62  Mo.  267;  Me-  Kimball  v.  Fenner,  12  N.  H.  248;  Bel- 
Connell  v.  Brayner,  63  Mo.  461  ;  Bobb  v.  knap  v.  Wendell,  21  N.  H.  175  ;  Ferguson 
Bobb,  7  Mo.  App.  501,  89  Mo.  411,48.  v.  Clifford,  37  N.  H.  86  ;  Mobile  Sav.  Bank 
\V.  Rep  511  ;  Vincent  v.  Walker,  93  Ala.  v.  McDonnell,  89  Ala.  434;  Roswald  v. 
165,  9  So.  Rep.  382  ;  Mobile  Sav.  Bank  v.  Hobbie,  85  Ala.  73,  4  So.  Rep.  177  ;  Mil- 
McDonnell,  89  Ala.  434,  8  So.  Rep.  137;  burn  v.  Phillips  (lud.),  34  N.  E.  Rep. 
Jkacb  V.  Packard,  10  Vt.  96,  33  Am.  Dec.  983 ;  Wells  v.  Watson  (Ala.),  14  So.  Rep. 
185  ;  Grout  v.  Townsend,  2  Hill,  554,  2  361  ;  Hubbard  v.  Allen,  59  Ala.  283  ;  Tut- 
Denio,  336  ;  Meriani  v.  Ilassen,  2  Barb,  wiler  f.  Munford,  68  Ala.  124;  Ellis  v. 
Ch.  232  ;  Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Housman,  6  Allen,  80  Ala.  515,  2  So.  Rep,  676;  Lips- 
Paige,  526.  comb  V.  McClellan,  72  Ala.  151  ;  Calhoun 

•  Code  1876,  §§  2707,  2709  ;  Vincent  v.  v.  Ilannan,  87  Ala.  277,  6   So.  Rep.  291  ; 

Walker,    93    Ala.    165,   9  So.    Rep.  382;  Thorington  v.  City  Council,  88  Ala.  548, 

Shulman  v.  Fitzpatrick,  62  Ala.  571.  7   So.  Rej).  363;  DoUins  v.  Pollock,  89 

'  Redtield  &  Rice  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Dysart,  Ala.  351,  7  So.  Rep.  904  ;  Allen  v.  Cowan, 

62  Pa.  St.  62;   Kerr  v.  Biriiie,  25  Ark.  28   Barb.  99;  Peck  v.  Mallams,  10  N.  Y. 

225  ;  Milburn  i-.  Phillips  (Ind.),  .34  N.  E.  509,  528. 

VOL.  I.  257 


§  310.]  CONSIDERATION. 

payment  of  the  consideration,  carries  witli  it  proof  that  the  con- 
sideration was  paid,  so  far  as  the  grantor  is  concerned ;  but  his 
admission  of  payment,  when  used  against  his  creditors,  is  no  evi- 
dence against  them.  As  against  them,  a  deed  is  regarded  as 
merely  vohmtary  until  evidence  is  offered  that  it  was  founded  on 
a  valuable  consideration,  and  that  this  was  actually  paid.  These 
decisions  tend  to  the  suppression  of  fraud. ^ 

1  Kimball  v.  Feuner,  12  N.  H.  248,  per  Parker,  C.  J. 

258 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

OPERATIVE   WORDS. 

311.  The  operative  words  of  a  deed  are  the  words  by 
which  the  estate  passes  from  the  grantor  to  the  grantee. 
"  Originally  the  operative  words  which  were  used  all  had  their 
distinctive  meanings  and  appropriate  uses.  These  words  are: 
'  enfeoff,'  proper  to  be  used  in  a  feoffment ;  '  grant,'  applicable  to 
the  conveyance  of  freehold  hereditaments  of  every  kind  not  lying 
in  livery  ;  '  release,'  appropriate  to  the  conveyance  to  the  person 
in  possession  of  the  remainder  expectant  on  his  estate;  '  alien  and 
assure,'  the  most  general  words  of  conveyance;  'bargain  and 
sale,'  which  operated  either  under  the  Statute  of  Uses,  to  vest 
the  legal  estate  in  the  bargainee,  or  at  the  common  law,  in  exer- 
cise of  a  common-law  power  of  sale ;  and  '  confirm,'  which,  tliough 
properly  suitable  only  to  cases  of  actual  confirmation  of  a  previous 
conveyance,  was  generally  used  without  distinct  reference  to  its 
proper  meaning.  .  ,  .  Where  a  deed  operates  in  exercise  of  a 
power,  the  proper  oj)erative  word  is  '  appoint.'  "^ 

While  words  of  conveyance  should  be  j^laced  in  the  appropri- 
ate part  of  the  deed,  it  is  sufficient  if  they  are  found  in  any  part 
of  it,  and  are  so  used  as  to  express  an  intention  to  convey.^ 

312.  Any  words  which  denote  an  intention  to  transfer  the 
title  to  land  are  sufficient  to  make  an  effectual  deed.^  The 
words  "  make  over  and  grant "  are  effectual  to  convey  land  by 
way  of  a  use  in  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale."*  But  where  the 
only  words  used  were  "  sign  over,"  it  was  held  that  they  could  not 
be  considered  operative  words  showing  an  intention  to  convey 

1  5  Bythewood's  I'icc.  162,  163.  8  Gambril   v.   Rose,   8   Blackf.   140,  44 

2  Bridge  ;•.  Wellington,   1  Mass.  219;  Am.  Dec.  760.     The  word.s  were   "  mort- 
Kenworthy  v.  Tulli.s,  3   Iiid.   96 ;  Hum-  gage,  assign  over,  and   transfer."     Cobb 
inelman  v.  Mounts,  87   Ind.  178,  per  El-  v.  Hines,  Biiabee,  343,  .59  Am.  Dec.  559. 
liott,  J.;  P.ranson   v.   Studcbaker  (Ind.),         *  Jack.son  ?;.  Alexander,  3  Johns.  484. 
33  N.  E.  Rep.  98,  105,  per  Elliott,  J. 

259 


§  31;). J  OPERATIVE   WORDS. 

an  estate  in   laiid.^     The  word   '' convey  "  passes  the  title  as  ef- 
fectually as  a  grant  at   eoninioii  law.- 

The  word  "grant  "  is  of  veiy  gi'neral  use  as  a  word  of  convey- 
ance. It  has  lost  its  restricted  meaning  at  common  law,  and  is 
at  the  present  day  eifectual  to  convey  an  estate  in  a  corporeal 
hereilitanient.''^ 

Where  the  words  ''  give  and  grant,"  and  the  words  "-  bargain  and 
sell,"  as  well,  are  used,  the  operative  words  of  both  these  forms 
of  conveyance  are  united,  and  the  deed  is  a  deed  of  feoffment  as 
well  as  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale,*  and  requires  no  pecuniary 
consideration  to  support  it. 

Words  of  conveyance  in  the  past  tense  only  are  sufficient,  as, 
for  instance,  "  have  given,  granted,  and  confirmed."  ^ 

313.  The  courts  will  construe  the  words  used  by  the  par- 
ties so  as  to  give  effect  to  the  deed,  if  possible.  "The  judges 
have  been  aatuti  to  carry  the  intent  of  the  parties  into  execution, 
and  to  give  the  most  liberal  and  benign  construction  to  deeds,  ut 
res  magis  valeaty  ^  Upon  this  principle  a  feoffment,  or  a  bargain 
and  sale  from  a  parent  to  a  child,  to  take  effect  after  the  death  of 
the  parent,  may  be  held  to  be  a  covenant  to  stand  seised  to  the 
use  of  the  parent  for  life,  because  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale 
would  be  void." 

A  release  to  one  not  in  possession,  if  made  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration, will  be  construed  to  be  a  bargain  and  sale,  or  a  cove- 
nant to  stand  seised,  by  which  the  estate  might  pass.^  And  so  a 
deed  of  lease  and  release  has  been  held  to  be  a  covenant  to  stand 
seised  to  uses  where  the  consideration  was  a  good  one.^  A  deed 
which  cannot  take  effect  as  a  bargain  and  sale,  for  want  of  a 

1  McKinney  v.  Settles,  31  Mo.  541.  C.  101, 106  ;  llussell  v.  Coffin,  8  Pick.  143  ; 

2  Patterson  v.  Carneal,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  Bryan  v.  Bradley,  16  Conn.  474;  Emery 
618,  13  Am.  Dec.  208.  v.  Chase,  .5  Maine,  232 ;  Jackson  v.  Beach, 

3  San  Francisco  &   0.   R.   Co.  v.  Oak-  1  Johns.  Cas.  399,  402. 

land,  43  Cal.  502.  '   Wailis  v.  Wallis,  4  Mass.  135  ;  Brewer 
*  Poe  V.  Dotnee,  48  Mo.  441  ;  Perry  v.  v.  Hardy,  22  Pick.  376.     And  sec  Barrett 
Price,  1   Mo.  553 ;  Belden   v.  Seymour,  8  v.  French,  1  Coun.  354  ;  Rowietts  v.  Dan- 
Conn.  304,  318,  21  Am.  Dec.  661,  per  Hos-  iel,  4  Munf.  473. 

mer,  C.  J. ;  Cheney  v.    Watkins,  1  Ilarr.  »  Pray  v.  Pierce,  7  Mass.  381  ;  Lynch 

&J.  527;  Spring's  y.  Hanks,  5  Ired.  .30.  i).  Livingston,   8  Barh.  463.     Such   prior 

°  Pierson  v.  Armstrong,  1  Iowa,  282.  possession  is  not  now  necessary  under  the 

8  Roe  V.  Tranmer,  2  Wils.  75,  per  Willes,  common  form  of  conveyance  hy  quitchiim 

C.J.     See.  also.  Shove  y.  Pincke,  5  T.  R.  and  release.     Russellr.  Coffin,  8  Pick.  143. 

124;  Haggerston  v.  Hauhurv,  5  Barn.  &  ^  Doe  v.  Tranmer,  2  Wils.  75. 

260 


OPERATIVE    WORDS.  [§§  314,  315. 

pecuniary  consideration,  may  be  given  effect  as  a  covenant  to  stand 
seised  if  there  is  a  consideration  of  blood.i  In  Massachusetts, 
where  a  valuable  consideration  is  sufficient  to  support  a  covenant 
to  stand  seised,  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  may  operate  as  a 
covenant  to  stand  seised  when  it  is  necessary  that  it  should 
have  that  effect  in  order  to  carry  out  the  manifest  intention  of 
the  parties.^ 

314.  A  deed  without  words  of  conveyance  passes  no  title.^ 
In  some  States  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  any  instrument  in 
writing  signed  by  the  grantor  is  effectual  to  transfer  the  legal 
title,  if  such  was  the  intention  of  the  grantor,  to  be  collected  from 
the  entire  instrument.  But,  even  under  such  statutes,  some  words 
of  conveyance  are  necessary."^  The  statute  does  not  wholly  dis- 
pense with  the  use  of  words  operative  to  convey,  but  simply  im- 
poses upon  the  courts  the  duty  of  construing  liberally  the  words 
employed  as  words  of  transfer.^ 

An  assignment  of  a  deed,  indorsed  thereon,  does  not  convey 
any  interest  in  the  lands  therein  described.  In  equity  it  might 
entitle  the  assignee  to  a  decree  for  a  specific  performance,  but  it 
cannot  operate  as  a  transfer  of  the  legal  title.*^ 

315.  If  an  instrument  has  no  words  of  conveyance,  the 
courts  have  no  right  to  put  them  in  by  interpretation. 
"  Courts  cannot  make  contracts  for  parties.  It  is  not  their  prov- 
ince to  write  in  an  instrument  words  which  will  make  it  operative 
as  a  deed,  where  none  of  that  character  have  been  written  by  the 
parties  themselves.     The  rule  that  courts  will  so  construe  an  in- 

1  Eckman  r.  Eckman,  68  Pa.  St.  460.  *  Bell  v.  McDuffie,  71  Ga.  264. 

2  Trafton  v.  Ilawes,  102  Mass.  .-iS-S,  541,  ^  Webb  v.  Mullins,  78  Ala.  Ill ;  Brew- 
3  Am.  Kep.  494;  Hall  v.  Bliss,  118  Mass.  tou  v.  Watsou,  67  Ala.  121.  The  instru- 
5.54,  560,  19  Am.  Kep.  476,  jier  Gray,  C.  ment  in  this  case  was  styled  articles  of 
•T.;  Prav  y.  Pierce,  7  Mass.  381,  384,  5  agreement,  and  the  only  words  referring 
Am.  Dec.  59;  Russell  v.  Coffin,  8  Pick,  to  the  passing  of  the  title  were,  "and  the 
J43   J51  said  Watson,  upon    the  faithful  perfurm- 

3  Davis  1-.  Davis,  43  Ind.  561,  where  the  ance  on  her  part  of  this  contract,  shall 
deed,  after  naming  the  grantors,  was  "  for  have  and  be  entitled  to,  at  and  after  the 
the  sum  of  si.x  thousand  dollars,  the  fol-  death  of  said  Rrowning,  all  the  property, 
lowing  real  estate,"  describing  it.  Hum-  both  hmiI  and  personal,  now  owned  by  the 
mdman  v.  Mounts,  87  Ind.  178,  where  said  Browning."  It  was  held  that  these 
the  writing  was  "I.,  J.  S.,  warrant  and  were  words  of  covenant  or  contract,  and 
defend  unto  C.   S.,  her  heirs  and  a.ssigns  not  of  conveyance. 

forever,  the  receipt  whereof  is  hereby  «  Bentley  y.  Deforest,  2  Ohio,  221,  15 
acknowledged,  the  following  real  estate,"  Am.  Dec.  546.  There  are  decisions  to  the 
ile^cril)ed  contrary.     See  §  589. 

261 


§§  BIG,  317.] 


OrKliAllVK    WORDS. 


stniinent  as  to  make  it  effective  does  not  mean  that  courts  shall 
iiiji'ot  into  it  new  aiul  distinct  provisions.''  ^ 

316.  A  deed  does  not  bind  a  person  signing  it  unless  it  con- 
tains words  expressive  of  an  intention  to  convey  some  estate, 
title,  or  interest.^  "  It  has  been  said  that  the  signing  of  a  cU'ed 
manifests  the  intention  of  the  signer  to  be  bound  by  it,  and  that 
tlie  courts  shoukl  construe  every  instrument  so  as  to  give  effect  to 
the  intention  of  the  parties  to  it.  But  tlie  intention  of  the  parties 
to  a  wiitten  contract  must  be  derived  from  tlie  hmguage  of  the 
contract  itself;  and,  where  there  is  nothing  in  the  deed  to  show 
an  undertaking  on  the  part  of  one  of  the  signers  to  convey,  we 
do  not  see  very  clearly  that  his  signature  manifests  a  purpose  to 
make  a  conveyance.  Where  the  tith^  is  in  one  person,  and  the 
consent  of  another  is  essential,  under  the  law,  to  convey  such  title, 
and  such  other  signs  the  deed,  his  name  not  appearing  thereon  as 
a  grantor,  the  signature,  it  would  seem,  would  merely  manifest  his 
consent  to  the  conveyance."  ^ 

Merely  signing,  sealing,  and  acknowledging  an  instrument  in 
which  another  person  is  grantor  is  not  sufficient.* 

317.  If  from  the  whole  deed  the  grantor  appears  to  be 
named  as  such,  and  his  intention  to  convey  is  manifest,  the 
deed  is  not  void,  though  his  name  does  not  appear  in  its  proper 
place  in  the  granting  clause.  Thus,  where  a  conveyance  is  in  the 
form  of  an  indenture  between  the  person  who  signs  it  as  grantor, 


^  Hummelman  v.  Mounts,  87  Ind.  178, 
per  Elliott,  J. 

2  Catlin  V.  Ware,  9  Mass  218,  6  Am. 
Dec.  56  ;  I'eabody  v.  Hewett,  52  Me.  33 ; 
McKinney  v.  Settles,  31  Mo.  541. 

3  Stone  V.  Sledjre  (Tex  ),  26S.  W.Rep. 
1068.  per  Gaines,  J. 

*  Batchelor  v.  Brereton,  112  U.  S.  396  ; 
Af,'ric:nltnral  Bank  v.  Rice,  4  How,  225, 
per  Tauey,  C.  J. ;  Lane  v.  Dolick,  6  Mc- 
Lean, 200,  203 ;  Powell  v.  Monson,  &c. 
Manuf.  Co.  3  Mason,  347  ;  Hall  v.  Savage, 
4  Mason,  273 ;  Cox  v.  Wells,  7  Blackf. 
410;  Catlin  v.  Ware,  9  Mass.  218,6  Am. 
Dee  56;  Lufkin  v.  Curtis,  13  Mass.  223; 
Hubbard  ;■.  Knous,  3  Gray,  567  ;  Bruce 
V.  Wood,  1  Met.  542;  Leavitt  v.  Lam- 
prey, 13  Pick.  382,  23  Am.  Dec.  685; 
Greenough    v.   Turner,    11     Gray,    332; 

262 


Wildes  V.  Vanvoorhis,  15  Gray,  139; 
Pealiody  v.  Hewett,  52  Me.  33  ;  Payne  v. 
Parker,  10  Me.  178,  25  Am.  Dec.  221 ; 
Lothrop  V.  Foster,  51  Me.  367 ;  Stevens  v. 
Owen,  25  Me.  94  ;  Harrison  v.  Simons,  55 
Ala.  510;  Adams  v.  Medsker,  25  W.  Va. 
127  ;  Hatchings  v.  Ta]I)ot,  3  Har.  &  J. 
378;  Purcell  v.  Goshorn,  17  Ohio,  105. 
Texas:  Stone  v.  Sledge  (Tex.),  26  S.  W. 
Kep.  1068,  affirming  (Tex  )  24  S.  W.  Rep. 
697. 

Contrary  to  the  general  rule,  see  In- 
goldsby  V.  Juan,  12  Cal.  564;  Dentzel  v. 
Waldie,  30  Cal.  138;  Stone  v.  Montgom- 
ery, 35  Miss.  83;  Armstrong  v.  Stovall,26 
Miss.  275  ;  Woodward  v.  Seaver,  38  N.  H. 
29;  Burge  v.  Smitli,  27  N.  H..332;  Elliot 
v.  Sleejjer,  2  N.  H.  525, 


OPERATIVE   WORDS.  [§  318. 

of  one  part,  and  a  person  named  as  grantee,  of  the  other  part, 
the  omission  of  the  grantor's  name  in  the  granting  clause,  when 
it  appears  in  the  covenant  of  warranty  as  well  as  in  the  in  testi- 
monium clause,  is  not  a  fatal  defect. ^ 

The  receipt  of  the  consideration  by  a  person  who  signed  a  deed 
but  did  not  join  in  it  as  a  grantor  does  not  operate  to  give  effect 
to  the  deed  as  his  conveyance.^ 

318.  A  deed  by  a  husband  in  his  own  name  only,  conveying 
his  wife's  land  in  fee,  in  which  she  does  not  join,  though  she 
affixes  her  signature  and  seal,  is  not  a  conveyance  of  her  estate 
in  fee.3  Her  signature,  "in  token  of  her  relinquishment  of  all 
her  right  in  the  bargained  premises,"  or  "  in  token  of  her  release 
of  dower/'  does  not  convey  her  title  in  fee,  nor  bar  her  from  assert- 
ing her  title.*  That  it  was  her  intention  to  convey  her  estate  in 
fee  is  not  sufficient  unless  this  intention  is  expressed  in  the  deed. 
Such  intention  will  not  enable  a  court  of  chanceiy  to  correct  the 
mistake  and  decree  the  execution  of  a  perfect  deed.^ 

The  signing  of  the  deed  by  the  wife  at  most  merely  signifies  her 
consent  to  the  conveyance  ;  it  does  not  convey  any  interest  or 
estate  she  has  in  the  granted  land.  Under  statutes  which  provide 
that  a  conveyance  b}^  a  married  woman  may  be  made  with  the 
written  consent  of  her  husband,  it  is  held  that  this  consent  is  suf- 
ficiently manifested  by  his  signing  a  deed  by  which  his  wife  con- 
veys her  separate  property,  though  he  is  not  named  as  a  party  to 
the  deed.^  The  husband  has  nothing  to  convey,  and  his  assent 
to  the  conveyance  by  his  wife  is  all  that  is  required.  The  case  is 
very  different  when  the  legal  interest  or  estate  is  in  the  wife,  and 
she  does  not  join  in  the  deed,  or  use  any  words  manifesting  an 
intention  to  convej'  such  interest  or  estate,  but  merely  signs  ;i 
deed  which  purports  to  be  a  conveyance  by  the  husband  alone.' 

1  Mardes  v.  Meyers   (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  25  Am.  Dec.  221  ;  Purcell  v.  Goshorn,  17 

28  ^.  W.    Rep.   693.     The    court  distin-  Ohio,  10.5. 

{.'uish  tlie  case  from  Stone  v.  Sledj,'e  (Tex.  ■•  Wales  v.  Coffin,  13  Allen,  213. 

Slip),  26  S.  \V.   Rep.  1068,  where  it  no-  ^  Purcell  y.  Goshorn,  17  Ohio,  105.     In 

when-  appeared  from  the  deed  that  Mrs.  New   Hampshire,  by  custom,  the   wife   i.s 

Stone  was  to  join  her  husband  in  its  exe-  hound  by  si<:ning,  without  more.     Wood- 

cuiion.  ward  v.  Seaver,  38   N.    II.  29;  Elliot  v. 

-  A{;ricultural  Bank  v.   Rice,  4   How.  Sleeper,  2  N.  H.  525. 

225.  e  §  38,  and  Ochoa  v.  Miller,  59    Tex. 

^  A<:ricultural    Bank  v.  Rice,  4   How.  460. 

225;  Bruce  v.  Wood,  1   Met.  542,  35  Am.  '^  Stone  v.  Sledge  (Tex.),  26  S.  W.  Rep. 

Dec.  380;  Payne  v.  Parker,  10  Mc.  178,  1068. 

263 


R  319.]  OPEKATIVK    WORDS. 

319.  A  wife  cannot  bar  her  right  of  dower  by  signing  and 
sealing  her  husband's  deed  without  any  words  of  conveyance 
or  of  release  by  her  of  dower.' 

By  usage,  however,  in  New  Humpsliire  a  wife  may  bar  her 
dower  by  signing  her  husband's  deed  without  any  words  of  con- 
veyance or  release.^ 

The  words,  "in  token  of  lier  free  consent,"  used  at  the  conchi- 
sion  of  a  deed,  do  not  sufficiently  express  her  intention  to  bar 
her  right  of  dower,^  nor  do  the  words,  "  I  agree  in  tlie  above  con- 
veyance. "  ^ 

If  a  wife  having  an  estate  in  fee  executes  a  deed  of  it  with  her 
liu.sb;tnd,  both  joining  in  the  granting  part  of  the  deed,  the  fact 
tliat  the  wife  also  releases  dower  and  homestead  in  the  granted 
pi'emises  does  not  restrict  her  conveyance  to  these  interests,  but 
the  deed  passes  the  title  of  the  wife  in  fee.^ 

1  Hall  V.  Savage,  4  Mason,  273  ;  Green-  lawyers,  or  were  materially  aided  by  an 

ongh  V.  Turner,  11  Gray,  332  ;  Learned  v.  educated  bar;  and  it  is  probably  owing  to 

Cutler,  18  Pick.  9;  Leavitt  v.  Lamprey,  this  circumstance  that  the  custom  became 

13  Pick.  382,  23  Am.  Dec.  685  ;  Lufkin  established   here,   that   the  wife  may  re- 

V  Curtis,  13  Mass.  223  ;  Catlin  v.  Ware,  lease  her  dower  by  her  signature  and  seal 

9  Mass.  218  ;  Stevens  v.  Owen,  2.5  Me.  94  ;  at   the  foot  of  her  husband's  deed,  with- 

Lothrop  I'.  Foster,   51    Me.   367  ;  Cox  v.  out  her  name  being    in    any   other   way 

Wells    7  Blackf.  410,  43  Am.   Dec.  98 ;  mentioned   or   alluded    to   in    the   instru- 

Davis  V.  Bartholomew,  3  Ind.  485.  ment.     Such  is  found,  by  an  examination 

■^  Buro-e   V.  Smith,  27   N.  H.  332,  337.  of  the  records  of  deeds,  to  beaverycom- 

In    explanation  of  this   usage.   Bell,  J.,  mon  mode  of  conveyance  among  the  un- 

after  speaking    of    the   different    rule   in  professional  magistrates,  by  whom  a  large 

Massachusetts  and  Maine,  and  of  the  fact  part  of  the  conveyances  are  made  in  this 

that  pretty  early  in  provincial  times  their  State." 

courts  consisted,  in  part  at  least,  of  men  3  Stevens  v.  Owen,  23  Me.  94. 

educated    as    lawyers,    said:    "In    New  *  Hall  y.  Savage,  4  Mason,  273. 

Hampshire  it  was  much  later  before  the  ^  Sinith  v.   Carmody,  137   Mass.  126 ; 

courts  were  either  composed  of  educated  Stone  v.  Montgomery,  35  Miss.  83. 

264 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


DESCRIPTION  AND  BOUNDARIES. 


I.  Certainty,  320-334. 
II.  Parol  evidence,  335-353. 

III.  Boundary  lines  by  agreement,  354- 

380. 

IV.  General  rules  of  construction,  381- 

409. 


V.  General  and  particular  descriptions, 

410-423. 
VI.  References   to  maps  and  surveys, 

424-447. 
VII.  Boundary  by  highway,  448-469. 
VIII.  Boundary  by  the  sea,  rivers,  and 
lakes,  470-501. 


I.  Certainty. 

320.  In  General.  The  description  of  the  parcels  follows  im- 
mediately after  the  operative  words,  and  should  contain  all  the 
particulars  necessary  to  clearly  and  accui'ately  identify  the  prop- 
erty, such  as  its  situation  in  a  town  and  county  named,  its  bonn- 
(hiries,  their  measurements,  and  the  total  area.  A  house  in  a  town 
is  usually  described  as  situate  in  a  pai'ticular  street  or  road,  and 
the  dimensions  of  the  lot  of  land  are  usually  given  in  linear  feet. 
The  street  number  of  the  house  is  a  useful  particular.  Land  in 
the  country  is  usually  described  by  reference  togovei'nment  surveys, 
or  to  private  surveys  of  the  particular  property.  A  plan  should  be 
annexed  or  referred  to  when  practicable.  The  boundaries  are 
often  fixed  by  reference  to  the  land  of  adjoining  owners.  Boun- 
daries are  sometimes  determined  by  reference  to  fixed  monuments, 
or  by  their  distance  fi-om  streets  or  natural  or  permanent  objects. 
A  reference  to  the  occupancy  of  the  property  by  a  former  owner, 
or  by  a  tenant,  is  often  a  useful  means  cf  identification. 

Resort  may  be  had  to  other  parts  of  a  deed  to  aid  in  determin- 
ing what  property  the  deed  was  intended  to  convey.  Thus,  a 
recital  in  a  settlement  of  an  intention  to  settle  property  in  a  par- 
ticular county  was  allowed  to  limit  words  in  the  description 
which  included  all  the  settler's  property.^ 

Deeds  purporting  to  convey  lands,  wliich  do  not  describe  or 
designate  the  lands,  are  invalid  for  uncertainty.^ 

1  Jenner  v.  Jenner,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  361.  -  WiNon   v.  Johnson   (Ind.),  38  N.  E. 

2(35 


§  321.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


321.  The  situation  of  the  land,  :is  regards  tlie  State,  oounty, 
town,  or  loL';ility  in  wliich  the  land  is  located,  must  be  mentioned 
in  the  deed,  or  indicated  sidliciently  to  enable  one  to  determine 
the  location  of  the  land;  but  if,  (aking  all  the  facts  which  appear 
npon  the  face  of  the  deed,  and  the  legal  presumptions  which  nat- 
urally flow  from  these  facts,  the  true  locality  may  be  determined  by 
I  he  aid  of  proper  averments  and  extrinsic  proof,  the  deed  will  not 
be  void  for  uncertainty.^  Thus,  where  a  deed  commenced  with 
the  words,  "  State  of  Tennessee,  Lawrence  County,"  and  the  land 
was  described  as  lying  on  a  certain  creek  in  Lawrence  County,  and 
the  deed  was  acknowledged  before  the  clerk  of  the  county  court  of 
Lawrence  County,  it  was  held  that  it  sufficiently  appeared  by  the 
deed,  coupled  with  the  grantee's  averment  that  the  land  intended 
to  be  conveyed  was  situated  in  Lawrence  County,  in  the  State  of 
Tennessee,  to  entitle  him  to  show  the  facts  by  extrinsic  proof.^ 
There  is  a  presumption,  in  the  absence  of  anything  in  the  instru- 
ment to  the  contrary,  that  the  land  is  in  the  State  in  which  the 
parties  reside  and  in  which  they  execute  the  deed.^  This  pre- 
sumption is  one  of  fact  and  may  be  rebutted  by  oral  evidence.* 

If  there  is  a  mistake  in  the  deed  as  to  the  general  location  of 
the  land,  though  the  description  is  perfect,  parol  evidence  is  ad- 


Rep.  38;  Buchanan  v.  Whitman,  36  Ind. 
257  ;  Shoemaker  v.  McMonigle,  86  Ind. 
421. 

1  Bryan  v.  Wisner,  44  La.  Ann.  832, 
11  So.  Rep.  290;  Calton  v.  Lewis,  119 
Ind.  181,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  47.5;  Dutch  v. 
Boyd,  81  Ind.  146  ;  Noland  v.  Wassou, 
ll.T  Ind.  .529,  18  N.  E.  Rep.  26;  Banks  v. 
Amnion,  27  Pa.  St.  172;  Wilt  v.  Cutler, 
38  Mich.  189;  Black  i:  Pratt  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  85  Ala.  504,  5  So.  Rep.  8'J  ; 
Walker  v.  Moses,  113  N.  C.  527,  18  S.  E. 
PiCp.  339. 

Thus,  in  a  conveyance  by  an  adminis- 
trator which  leaves  the  location  of  the 
land  in  doubt,  tills  may  be  determined  by 
reference  to  maj)S,  to  land  certificates 
{giving  the  location  and  description  of  sur- 
veys, district  immbers,  patents,  and  the 
like,  and  by  reference,  also,  to  proceedin;.'s 
bad  in  the  administration  and  ijartition  of 
the  estate  ;  Kerlicks  r.  Keystone  Land  Co. 
(Tex.)  21  S.  W.  Rep.  623. 

•266 


2  Calton!'  Lewis,  119  Ind.  181,21  N.  E. 
Rep. 475,  476,  per  Mitchell,  J. :  "If,  there- 
fore, the  name  of  the  State  was  omitted 
through  the  negligence  or  inadvertence  of 
the  parties,  or  of  the  scrivener  who  pre- 
pared the  deed,  or  if  it  was  supposed  that 
the  State  in  which  the  land  was  situate 
was  sufficiently  identified  by  the  caption 
to  the  deed,  it  does  not  constitute  a  mis- 
take of  law  of  which  the  grantor  can  avail 
himself  when  asked  to  respond  for  a 
breach  of  the  covenants  contained  In  the 
deed.  In  a  case  like  the  present  It  is  not 
es.sentlal  to  the  grantee's  right  to  recover 
damages  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of 
seisin  that  there  should  first  be  a  reforma- 
tion of  the  deed.  Tlie  deed  not  being 
void,  it  is  only  necessary  that,  under 
proper  averments,  the  identity  of  the  land 
described  in  the  deed  be  proved." 

8  Dutch  V.  Boyd,  81  Ind  146  ;  Homan 
V.  Stewart  (Ala.),  16  So.  Rep.  35. 

4  Mead  v.  Parker,  115  Mass.  413. 


CERTAINTY.  [§  322. 

missible  to  identify  the  land,  and  the  erroneous  general  location 
may  be  rejected  as  surj^lusage.^ 

When  land  is  described  according  to  the  system  of  the  public 
land  surveys  of  the  United  States,  the  description  is  sufficient 
though  the  county  and  State  or  Territory  in  which  the  land  is  situ- 
ated be  not  given,  for  judicial  notice  is  taken  of  such  surveys.^ 
If  the  county  or  school  district  in  which  the  land  is  situated  be 
given,  with  a  particular  description  by  metes  and  bounds,  tliough 
the  section  and  township  be  omitted,  the  location  can  be  identified.'^ 
But  if  there  is  nothing  in  the  deed  to  indicate  the  township, 
range,  or  county  in  which  the  land  is  situated,  and  this  is  described 
only  by  the  number  and  subdivisions  of  a  section,  the  description 
is  void  on  its  face.* 

322.  A  misnomer  of  the  city,  to'wn,  or  county  in  \^hich  the 
land  is  situate  does  not  invalidate  the  deed  if  the  description 
is  suflacient  to  identify  the  land.^  Thus,  where  land  is  described 
as  being  in  a  certain  city,  but  by  a  prior  change  of  the  city  limits 
is  in  fact  in  another  town,  and  the  grantor  is  seised  thereof  when 
the  conveyance  is  made,  and  the  land  can  be  identified  by  the  de- 
scription in  the  deed,  the  deed  is  valid.^  It  was  contended  in 
this  case  that  the  name  of  a  town  is  such  an  essential  and  ma- 
terial part  of  the  description  in  a  deed  that  it  cannot  be  con- 
trolled by  the  language  of  the  rest  of  the  description.  But  this  is 
too  broad  a  contention.  The  general  rule  on  this  subject  is  thus 
stated  by  Chief  Justice  Parsons  : "    "It  seems  to  be  a  general  rule 

1  Myers  i'.  Ladd,  26  111.  415;   Lochte  '  Worthington  i;.  Hylycr,  4  Mass.  196, 

V.  Austin,  69  Miss.  271,  13  So.  Rep.  838  ;  205.     These  remarks,  says  Lathrop,  J.,  in 

Armstrong  v.  Colby,  47  Vt.  359.  Perry  v.  Clark,  supra,  were  undoubtedly 

-  Carson  v.  Kaijsback,  3  Wash.  T.  168,  founded   on  Doddington's  Case,  2  Coke, 

13  Pac.  Rep.  618;  Beal  r.  Blair,  33  Iowa,  32,  where  the  distinction  was  drawn  be- 

318:  Mee  r.  Benedict,  98  Mich.  260,  57  N.  tween   general   and   particular   words  of 

W.  Rep.  175.  grant,  and  it  was  said  :  "And   therefore, 

■'  Fuller  V.  Fellows,  .30  Ark.  657  ;  Gor-  when  the  general  words  of  patent  do  not 

don  V.  Goodman,  98  Ind.  269.  comprehend     content,     number,    nature, 

•»  Dorr  V.  School  District,  40  Ark.  237  ;  quality,  certain  name,  nor  any  convenient 

Hau-,'hton   v.  Sartor  (Miss.),  15   So.  Rep.  certainty  of  the  land,  but  the  town  is  the 

71,  overruling  Foute  v.  Fairman,  48  Miss,  principal  thing  which  restrains  the  gen- 

536.  erality  of  the  grant,  and  reduces  it  to  a 

5  Perry  v.  Clark,  157  Mass.  330,  32  N.  certainty,  it  would  be  dangerous  to  extend 

E.  Rep.  226;   Stringer  r.  Young,  3  Pet.  the  same  out  of  the  town  comprised  in  the 

320  ;  Lamb  r.  Reaston,  1  Marsh.  C.  P.  23.  grant.  .  .  .  But  it  is  otherwise  when  any 

"  Perry  v.  Clark,  s>i/ini  :  and  see  Pres-  grant   doth   comprehend   any   convenient 

ton  r.  Robin-soii    24  Vt.  583.  ccrtaintv,  as  of  a  manor,  farm,  land  known 

267 


S  'Cy2'^.]  DESCRIl'TION    AND    BOUNDAIilES. 

thai,  when  thi;  description  of  the  estate  iutemled  to  be  conveyed 
inchidod  several  particuLu'S,  all  of  which  are  necessary  to  ascer- 
tain the  estate  to  be  conveyed,  no  estate  will  pass  except  snch  as 
will  a<Tee  to  every  paiticuiar  of  the  description.  Thus,  if  a  man 
o-rant  all  his  estate  in  his  own  occupation  in  the  town  of  W.,  no 
estate  can  pass  except  wdiat  is  in  his  own  occupation,  and  is  also 
situate  in  that  town.  But  if  the  description  be  sufficient  to  ascer- 
tain the  estate  intended  to  be  conveyed,  although  the  estate  will 
not  acree  to  some  of  the  particulars  in  the  description,  yet  it  shall 
pass  by  the  conveyance,  that  the  intent  of  the  parties  may  be 
effected."' 

323.  The  first  requisite  of  an  adequate  description  is  that 
the  land  shall  be  identified  with  reasonable  certainty,  but  the 
degree  of  certainty  required  is  always  qualified  by  the  aj)plication 
of  the  rule  that  that  is  certain  which  can  be  made  certain.^  A 
deed  will  not  be  declared  void  for  uncertainty  if  it  is  possible,  by 
any  reasonable  rules  of  construction,  to  ascertain  from  the  descrip- 
tion, aided  by  extrinsic,  evidence,  what  property  it  was  intended  to 
convey.^     The  office  of  a  description  is  not  to  identify  the  land, 


by  a  certain  name,  or  containing  so  many 
acres,"  etc.,  "  so  as  there  may  appear  in  the 
letters  patent  some  convenient  certaitity 
of  the  thing  which  the  king  intended  to 
pass."  The  casis  of  King  v.  Little,  1 
(Jush.  436,  and  Cook  r.  Babcock,  7  Cush. 
526,  are  clearly  distinguishalilefrom  Perry 
V.  Clark,  sn/ira.  "  In  King  v.  Little  the 
grantor  was  possessed  of  real  estate  in 
two  towns,  and  gave  a  deed  of  quitclaim 
of  land  in  one,  describing  it  as  being  the 
same  bequeathed  by  his  father  to  the  cliil- 
dren  of  the  releasor.  The  will  devised 
lands  in  both  towns,  and  it  was  held  that 
the  description  was  to  be  confined  to  land 
in  the  town  mentioned.  In  Cook  ik  Bab- 
cock the  question  was  one  of  boundary. 
The  land  was  described  as  being  in  the 
town  of  Blandford,  and  as  bounded  'north 
on  the  line  of  said  Blandford.'  The  deed 
was  given  after  the  line  of  Blandford  had 
been  established  by  an  act  of  the  legisla- 
ture. It  was  held  tliat  the  line  so  estab- 
lished was  the  northern  boundary  of  the 
land    conveyed,  and  that  parol  evidence 

268 


was  inadmissible  to  show  that,  before  the 
act  of  the  legislature,  the  line  of  Bland- 
ford was  understood  and  reputed  to  be 
farther  north  than  the  line  so  established, 
and  was  defined  by  a  line  cif  marked  trees, 
and  that  the  parties  to  the  deed  under- 
stood that  it  was  intended  to  convey  the 
land  to  this  line."     Per  Lathrop,  J. 

1  United  States  v.  King,  .3  How.  773, 
787  ;  Thompson  v.  Motor  Koad  Co.  82 
Cal.  497,  23  Pac.  Rep.  l.'BO;  Austin  v. 
Dolbee  (Mich.),  .59  N.  W.  Rep.  608 ;  Kyle 
V.  Rhodes,  71  Miss.  487,  1.5  So.  Rep.  40  ; 
Smith  i;.  Greaves,  15  Lea,  459  ;  Steinbeck 
V.  Stone,  53  Tex.  382 ;  Norris  v.  Hunt,  51 
Tex.  609  ;  Knowles  v.  Torbitt,  53  Tex. 
557  ;  Bowles  v.  Brice,  66  Tex.  724,  2  S. 
W.  Rep.  729  ;  Cantagrel  v.  Von  Lupin,  58 
Tex.  570  ;  Peart  v.  Brice,  152  Pa.  St.  277, 
25  Atl.  Rep.  537  ;  Winnipisiogee  Paper 
Co.  ?•.  N.  H.  Lead  Co.  59  Fed.  Rep.  .542. 

■-  Calton  V.  Lewis,  119  Tnd  181,  21  N. 
E.  Rep.  475;  Works  v.  State,  120  Ind. 
119,  22  N  E.  Rep.  127;  Bowen  v.  Gallo- 
wav,  98  111.  41. 


CERTAINTY. 


[§  324. 


but  to  furnish  the  means  of  identification.^  The  description  will 
be  liberally  construed  to  afford  the  basis  of  a  valid  grant.^  It  is 
only  when  it  remains  a  matter-  of  conjecture  what  property  was 
intended  to  be  conveyed,  after  resorting  to  such  extrinsic  evidence 
as  is  admissible,  that  the  deed  will  be  held  void  for  uncertaint}^ 
in  the  description  of  parcels.'^ 

If  the  description  is  sufficient  to  allow  of  identification  by  an 
actual  survey,  it  will  be  upheld,  however  indefinite  it  may  seem 
to  be.^  But  if  the  description  is  so  vague  that  the  parcel  cannot 
be  located  under  it,  it  is  void  for  uncertainty.  If  the  starting- 
point  of  a  boundary  line  cannot  be  identified,  the  deed  is  necessa- 
rily void.^  A  description  which  omits  one  or  more  of  the  boun- 
daries, and  leaves  the  quantity  of  laud  undetermined,  is  insufficient.^ 

A  description  in  a  deed  which  consists  only  of  the  words,  "  a 
piece  or  parcel  of  land  near  Bacon  Quarter  Branch,''  is  too  vague 
and  indefinite  to  create  a  right  of  property  in  any  particular 
parcel  of  land."^ 

324.  It  is  a  rule  that,  if  possible,  a  deed  shall  be  so  con- 


1  Works  V.  State,  120  Ind.  119,  22  N. 
E.  Rep.  127,  per  Elliott,  C.  J.  ;  Kucker  v. 
Steelman,  73  Ind.  396  ;  Burrow  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  107  Ind.  432,  8  N.  E.  Rep.  167  ; 
Collins  V.  Dressier,  133  Ind.  290.  32  N. 
E.  Rep.  883;  Thorn  v.  Pliares,  35  W.  Va. 
771.  14  S.  E.  Rep.  399. 

~  Hannon  v.  Hilliard,  101  Ind.  310, 
316  ;  Calion  v.  Lewis,  119  Ind.  181.  21  N. 
E.  Rep.  475. 

3  Roehl  V.  Haiimesser.  114  Ind.  311, 
314,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  345  ;  Calton  v.  Lewis, 
119  Ind.  181,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  475;  Tryon 
V.  Huntoon,  67  Cal.  325,  7  Pac.  Rep.  741  ; 
People  V.  Klumpke,  41  Cal.  263;  Wil- 
liams V.  Western  Union  Ry.  Co.  50  Wis. 
71,  5  N.  W.  Rep.  482  ;  Jackson  v.  Ruse- 
velt,  13  Johns.  97  ;  Harkne.ss  r.  Dcvine, 
73  Tex.  628,  1 1  S.  W.  Rej).  872. 

To  {;ive  a  deed  any  sensible  operation, 
it  must  describe  the  subject-matter  of  the 
conveyance  so  as  to  denote  upon  the  in- 
strument what  it  is  in  particular,  or  by  a 
reference  to  something  el.se  which  will 
render  it  certain.  The  want  of  such  a 
description  or  reference  in  a  deed  is  a  de- 


fect which  renders  it  totally  inoperative. 
Kea  t'.  Robeson.  5  Ired.  Eq.  373. 

*  Oxford  r.  White,  95  X.  C.  525 ;  Smi- 
ley V.  Fries,  104  111.  416;  Fowler  v. 
People,  93  111.  116;  Pennington  v.  Flock, 
93  Ind.  378;  Meikel  v.  Greene,  94  Ind. 
344  ;  Guy  v.  Barnes,  29  Ind.  103 ;  Reid  v. 
Mitchell,  95  Ind.  397  ;  Brown  v.  Ander- 
son, 90  Ind.  93  ;  Campbell  v.  Carruth,  32 
Fla.  264,  13  So.  Rep.  432;  Goodbar  v. 
Dunn,  61  Miss.  618;  Throckmorton  v. 
Moon,  10  Ohio,  42  ;  Thompson  v.  So.  Cal. 
M.  R.  Co.  82  Cal.  497,  23  Pac.  Rep.  130. 

5  Le  France  v.  Richmond,  5  Sawyer, 
601;  Archibald  v.  Davis,  5  Jones,  322; 
Pry  V.  Pry,  1 09  111.  466 ;  Deaver  v.  Jones, 
114  N.  C.  649,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  637. 

•5  Island  Coal  Co.  v.  Streitlemier  (Ind.), 
37  N.  E.  Rep.  340. 

■  George  v.  Bates,  90  Va.  839,  20  S.  E. 
Rep.  828.  See,  also,  Capps  v.  Holt,  5  Jones 
Eq.  1.53  ;  Westfall  v.  Cottrills,  24  W.  Va. 
763;  Clark  (.-.  Chambcrlin,  112  Mass.  19; 
Lumbard  v.  Aldrich,  8  N.  H.  31  ;  Mun- 
niuk  V.  Jung,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  395,  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  293  ;  Peart  v.  Brice,  1 1  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  606,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  713, 152  Pa.  St.  277, 
269 


§  o24.] 


DESCKU'lIdN    AND    I'.i  »L'M)A1IIKS. 


strued  that  no  part  shall  be  rejected.'  Etfect  shall  be  given  to 
the  inti'ut  of  the  parties  as  indicated  by  the  whole  instrument.^ 
This  rule  is  of  course  subordinate  to  the  general  rule  that  nothing 
will  pass  by  a  deed  except  what  is  described  in  it,  whatever  the 
intention  of  the  parties  may  have  been.^  The  description  as  it 
stands  in  the  deed  is  presumed  to  be  as  the  parties  intended  it, 
until  it  is  clearly  made  to  appear  that  a  mistake  exists.  Every 
■word  is  to  have  effect,  and  to  be  harmonized  with  the  rest  of  the 
description,  if  this  is  possible. 

The  punctuation  of  a  deed  is  not  to  be  regarded  in  its  con- 
struction.^ 

Where  there  is  doubt  or  uncertainty  arising  from  the  terms  of 
the  description  in  a  deed,  or  in  the  application  thereof  to  the  sub- 
ject-matter, the  court  may  place  itself  in  the  position  of  the 
grantee,  and  read  it  in  the  light  of  the  circumstances  under  which 
it  was  executed,  and  may  consider  the  condition  of  the  property, 
state  of  the  title,  boundaries,  or  other  material  matters  in  aid  of 
its  interpretation.^ 

A  description  that  may  be  rendered  certain  by  averment  is  not 
void  for  uncertainty.^ 

1  Jones  V.  Tashby,  62  Mich.  614,  29  N. 
W.  Rep.  374  ;  Moran  v.  Lezotte,  54  Mich. 
83,  19  N.  W.  Rep.  757;  Thatcher  v.  St. 
Andrews  Church,  37  Mich.  264;  Whar- 
ton V.  Briclc,  49  N.  J.  L.  289,  8  Atl.  Rep. 
529  ;  Wolfe  v.  D}er,  95  Mo.  545,  8  S.  W. 
Rep.  551  ;  Cleveland  v.  Sims,  69  Tex.  153, 
6  S.  W.  Rep.  634  ;  Miller  v.  Kryan,  86  N. 
C.  167  ;  Shultz  V.  Young,  3  Ired.  L.  385, 
40  Am.  Dec.  413;  Shaffer  v.  Halin,  111 
N.  C.  1,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  1033;  Osborne  y. 
Anderson,  89  N.  C.  261  ;  Alton  v.  Illinois 
Transp.  Co.  12  111.  38,  52  Am.  Dec.  479  ; 
More  V.  Massini,  37  Cal.  432 ;  Moore  v. 
Griffin,  22  Me.  350;  Herrick  v.  Hopkins, 
23  Me.  217  ;  Cilley  v.  Childs,  73  Me.  130  ; 
Simpson  v.  Blaisdell,  85  Me.  199,  27  Atl. 
Rep.  101  ;  Richardson  v.  Palmer,  38  N. 
H.  212  ;  Lane  v.  Thompson,  43  N.  H. 
320;  Johnson  v.  Simpson,  36  N.  H.  91, 
94 ;  Harris  v.  Hull,  70  Ga.  831 ;  Parkin- 
sou  V.  McQuaid,  54  Wis.  473,  11  N.  W. 
Rep.  682 ;  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stigcler,  61  N.  Y.  348;  Law  v.  Hemp- 
stead, 10  Conn.  23. 

270 


-  Cannon  v.  Emmans,  44  Minn.  294,  46 
N.  W.  Rep.  356. 

3  Thayer  v.  Fintou,  108  N.  Y.  394,  15 
N.  E.  Rep.  615  ;  Coleman  v.  Manhattan 
Beach  Co.  94  N.  Y.  229. 

*  Thatcher  r.  St.  Andrew's  Church, 37 
Mich.  264. 

6  Cannon  v.  Emmans,  44  Minn.  294,  46 
N.  W.  Rep.  356  ;  Witt  v.  Railwny  Co.  38 
Minn.  127,  35  N.  W.  Rep.  862  ;  Austrian 
V.  Davidson,  21  Minn.  117  ;  Everett  v. 
Insurance  Co.  21  Minn.  76;  Driscoll  v. 
Green,  59  N.  H.  101,  104;  Crafts  v.  Hib- 
bard,  4  Met.  438  ;  Jackson  ;;.  Marsh,  6 
Cow.  281  ;  W^alsh  v.  Hill,  38  Cal.  481  ; 
Thompson  v.  Railway  Co.  82  Cal.  497,  23 
Pac.  Rep.  130;  Haynes  ;;.  Heller,  12  Kan. 
381 ;  Seaton  v.  Hixon,  35  Kan.  663, 12  Pac. 
Rep.  22  ;  Denver,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lockwood 
(Kans.),  38  Pac.  Rep.  794. 

6  Pence  v.  Armstrong,  95  Ind.  191; 
Mettart  v.  Allen  (Ind.),  39  N.  E.  Rep. 
239. 


CERTAINTY.  [§§  325,  326. 

325.  Nothing  passes  by  a  deed  except  what  is  described  in 
it,  whatever  the  intention  of  the  parties  may  have  been.^  Though 
parol  evidence  is  often  admissible  to  ascertain  what  lands  are  em- 
braced in  the  description,  such  evidence  cannot  make  the  deed 
operate  upon  land  not  embraced  in  the  descriptive  words.^  A 
deed  described  the  land  conveyed  as  beginning  at  a  certain  rock, 
and  running  thence  one  mile  east,  one  mile  north,  one  mile  west, 
and  one  mile  south,  to  the  place  of  beginning,  and  also  stated  that 
it  was  the  land  set  off  to  a  certain  Indian  under  a  treaty  with  the 
government.  The  Indian  had  previously  selected  his  land  as  "  a 
tract  one  mile  square,  the  exact  boundaries  of  which  may  be  de- 
fined when  the  surveys  are  made."  After  the  deed  was  given, 
the  Indian's  land  was  located  and  patented  so  as  to  include  a  sec- 
tion not  in  the  form  of  a  square,  no  part  of  wdiich  lay  within  the 
boundaries  named  in  said  deed.  It  was  held  that  the  deed,  being 
for  a  specific  tract  of  land,  could  not  be  construed  to  convey  the 
grantor's  interest  in  the  land  actually  patented  to  the  Indian.^ 

That  one  parcel  or  some  portion  of  the  lands  is  not  described 
with  sufficient  certainty  does  not  invalidate  the  deed  as  to  other 
parcels  that  are  sufficiently  described."^ 

326.  An  erroneous  description  •will  not  vitiate  a  deed  ■which 
also  contains  an  adequate  and  sufficiently  certain  description. 
Thus,  a  needless  and  erroneous  mention  of  an  incident  in  the 
history  of  the  title  has  no  effect  as  against  an  adequate  descrip- 
tion of  the  property  by  metes  and  bounds.  The  erroneous  state- 
ment may  be  rejected,  and  the  deed  will  have  effect  according  to 
the  remaining  description.^    In  Sheppard's  Touchstone^  it  is  said: 

1  Thayer  v.  Finton,  108  N.  Y.  394,  15  age  Co.  58  Fed.  Rep.  437  ;  Prentice  v. 
N.  E.  Rep.  615  ;  Coleman  v.  Manhattan  Stearns,  20  Fed.  Rep.  819,  113  U.  S.  435, 
Beach  Co.  94  N.  Y.  229  ;  Jone.s  v.  Smith,     5  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  547. 

73  N.   Y.    205;   Andreu  v.   "Watkins,  26         •*  Tatum  v.  Tatiim,  81   Ala.  388,  1  So. 

Fla.  390,  7  So.  Rep.  876  ;  Minor  v.  Powers  Rep.  195. 

(Tex.),  26  S.  W.   Rep.  1071,  reversing  24         ^  Miller  v.   Travers,  8   Ring.  244;  Lie 

S.  W.  Rep.  710.  wellyn  r.  Karl  of  Jersey,  11  M.  &  W.  183 

2  Doe  V.  Holtom,  4  Ad.  &  El.  76  ;  Cole-  Land  Co.  v.  Saunders,  103  U.  S.316,  322 
man  v.  Manhattan  Beach  Co.  94  N.  Y.  Prentice  v.  Stearns,  1 13  U.  S.  435,5  S.  Ct 
229;  Minor  v.  Powers  (Tex.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  547 ;  Hamm  »;.  San  Francisco,  17  Fed 
Rep.  1071.  Rep.  119;  Lodge  v.  Lee,  6  Cranch,  237 

*  Prentice  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  43  .Jackson  v.  Sprague,  1  Paine,  494.  Ala 
Fed.  Rep.  270;  Prentice  v.  Duluth  Stor-     bama :  (-'hadwick  v.  Carson,  78  Ala.  116; 

8  Shep.  Touch,  marg.  p.  247.     And  see  Wilco.xson  v.  Sprague,  51  Cal.  640. 

271 


§  o2u.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


''If  one  L;-i-ant  all  his  lauds  whieli  lie  liatli  in  1)  in  lliis  maimer, 
'all  my  lands  in  1)  which  I  had  of  the  ^-rant  of  I  S,' this  is  a 
o-ooil   i;Tant  of  all  his  huuls  in   I),   alheil  he  had  them  not  of  the 


ClcTiieiit.s  V.   rearce,  G3   Ala.  284.     Cali- 
fornia :  Irviiij^    c.    Cunuiiigliam,  66    Cal. 
1.") ;  Wade  v.  Deray,  50  Cal.  376  ;  Reamer 
r.  Nesmith,  34  Cal.  624  ;   Heed  v.  Si)icer, 
27    Cal.  .")7  ;    WilcoxM)ii    c.    Sprague,    51 
Cal.  640.     Colorado  :  Miirjay   v.  Hohsoti, 
10  Colo.  66,  13  I'ac.  Hep.  921.     Connecti- 
cut: Slieiwood  i\  Whiiinsr,  54  Conn.  .•i.'iO, 
8  At).  Hep.  80.     Illinois:  Myers  v.  Ladd, 
26  111.  415;  Kruse  r.  Wilson,  79  111.  2.'53  ; 
Stevens  r.  Wait,   112  111.  544;  Boweu  v. 
Allen,  113  111.  53;  Ilolston  v.  Needles,  115 
111.  461,  5  N.  E.  Hep.  .530;  White  v.  Her- 
mann, 51  111.  243,  99  Am.  Dec.  543  ;  Indi- 
ana :     Kinsey    v.    Satterthwaite,   88    Ind. 
342.    Louisiana:  Bryan  y.  Wisner,  44  La. 
Ann.  832, 1 1  So.  Rep.  290.     Maine  :  Vose 
V.  Handy,  2  Me.  322,  11   Am.   Dec.  101. 
Cate  V.  Thayer,  3  Me.  71  ;  Keith  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 3  Me.  393 ;  Andrews  i\  Pearson, 
68  Me.    19;  GetehcU   v.    Whittemore,   72 
Me.  393 ;  Chandler  v.  Green,  69  Me.  350  ; 
Jones    V.    Buck,  54  Me.   301  ;  Abbott  v. 
Abbott,  53  :\Ie.  356  ;  Maker  v.  Lazell,  83 
Me.  562,  22  Atl.  Rep.  474  ;  Hobbs  v.  Pay- 
son,  85  Me.  498,  27  Atl.  Hep.  519.    Mary- 
land:  Bay  V.   Posner  (Md.),  29  Atl.  Hep. 
11.    Massachusetts:  Ha>tings  v.  Hastings, 
110  Mass.  2S0;   Klii.t  y.  Thatcher,  2   Met. 
44  ;  Bond  v.  Fay,  12  Allen,  86  ;  Bosworth 
V.  Sturtevant,  2  Cnsh.  392  ;  Parks  v.  Loo- 
mis,  6  Gray,  467  ;  Worthington  v.  Hylyer, 
4  Ma.ss.  196;    Waterman    v.  Johnson,  13 
Pick.  261  ;  IMelvin  v.  Proprietors  of  Locks 
and  Canals,  5  Met.  15,  38  Am.  Dec.  384  ; 
Morse  V.  Rogers,  118  Mass.  572,  578;  Au- 
burn Cong.  Church  v.  Walker,  124  Mass. 
69;  Lovejoy  v.  Lovett,  124    Mass.    270; 
Cassidy  v.  Charlestown    Savings    Biink, 
149  Mass.  325,  327,  21   N.   E.   Rep.  372. 
Micliigan :  Wiley  v.  Lovely,  46  Mich.  83, 

8  N.  W.  Hep.  716;  Wilt  v.  Cutler,  38 
Mich.  189.  Mississippi:  Lochte  v.  Aus- 
tin, 69  Miss.  271,  13  So.  He|>.  838.  Mis- 
souri: Union  Ry.  &   T.  Co.   v.   Skinner, 

9  Mo.  A  pp.  189;  West  v  Brf  telle,  115 
Mo.  653,   22    S.  W.   Rep.  705 ;  Evans    v. 

979 


Greene,  21  Mo.  170;  Shewalier  v.  Pir- 
ner,  55  xMo.  218;  Gibson  v.  Bogy,  28 
Mo.  478  ;  Jamison  v.  Fopiano,  4S  Mo. 
194;  Rutherford  v.  Tracy,  48  Mo.  325, 
8  Am.  Rep.  104;  Bray  v.  Adams,  114 
Mo.  486,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  853.  New  Hamp- 
shire :  Benton  v.  Mclnlyre,  64  N.  H.  598, 
15  Atl.  Uep.  413;  Harvey  v.  Mitchell,  31 
N.  H.  575  ;  Johnson  v.  Simpson,  36  N.  H. 
91  ;  Tliompson  v.  Ela,  60  N.  H.  562; 
White  V.  Gay,  9  N.  H.  126,  31  Am.  Dec. 
224;  DriscoU  v.  Green,  59  N.  H.  101; 
Eastman  v.  Knight,  35  N.  H.  551  ;  Win- 
nipisiogce  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  H.  Land  Co. 
59  Fed.  Hep.  542,  547,  per  Aidrich,  J. 
New  York:  Case  v.  Dexter,  106  N.  Y. 
548,  13  N.  E.  Hep.  449  ;  Jackson  v.  Bar- 
ringer,  15  Johns.  471  ;  Jackson  v.  Clark,  7 

Johns.  217  ;  Looniis  v.  Jackson,  19  Johns. 

449;  Robinson   v.   Kime,  70   N.  Y.    147; 
Baldwin  v.   Brown,  16   N.  Y.   359;  Dan- 

ziger  V.  Boyd,  21  J.  &  S.  398  ;   Si  hoene- 
wald  V.  Rosenstein,  25  N.  Y.  St.  Ref).  964, 

5   N.  Y.  Supp.  766  ;   Muldoon  v.  Dtliiie, 
135    N.    Y.    150,   31    N.    E.   Rep.    1091. 

North  Carolina:   Proctor  y.  Pool,  4   Dev. 

370;  Simpson    v.  King,   1    lied.    Ecj.  II  ; 

Shaffer  v.  Halin,   111  N.  C.   1,   15  S.  E. 

Rep.    1033;   British  &   Am.  Murt.  Co.  v. 

Long,  113  N.  C.  123,   18   S.   E.   Hep.  165. 

Ohio :  Merrick  v.   Merrick,   37    Ohio  St. 

126,  41  Am.  Hep.  493.   Oregon:  Hayinond 

V.   Coffey,   5    Oreg.   132.     Pennsylvania : 

Duncan    v.   Madara,    106    Pa.    St.    562. 

Texas :  Coffey  v.  Hendricks,  66  Tex.  676  ; 

Barnard  v.  Good,  44  Tex.  638 ;  Kingston 

V.  Pickins,  46  Tex.  99  ;  Smith  v.  Chatham, 

14  Tex.  322 ;   Oliver  v.  Malioney,  61  Tex. 

610  ;  Robinson  v.  Doss,  53  Tex.  496  ;  Pe- 
terson  V.  Ward    (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  23   S. 

W.    Hep.  637;  Arambula  r.  Sullivan,  80 

Tex.   615,  16  S.  W.  Hep.   436;  Minor  v. 

Powers  (Tex.),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  710  ;  Birds. 

eye   v.    Rogers   (Tex.    Civ.  App),  26  S. 

W.  Rep.  841.     Wisconsin  :    Green  Bay  v. 

Hewitt,  55  Wis.  96,  12  N.  W.  Rep.  382; 

Thompson  v.  Jones,  4  Wis.  106. 


CERTAINTY.  [§§  327,  328. 

grant  of  I  S,  but  of  the  grant  of  another.  But  if  the  words  be, 
'  all  my  lands  which  I  had  by  the  grant  of  I  S  in  D,'  in  this  case 
the  grant  is  not  good  to  carry  any  other  lands  in  D  but  such  as  he 
had  of  the  grant  of  I  S.  So,  if  one  grants  in  this  manner,  '  all  my 
manor  of  sale  in  Dale,  wliicli  I  had  by  descent,'  and  in  ti'uth  he 
had  it  not  by  descent  but  by  pui-chase,  this  is  a  good  grant  of 
the  manor."  In  case  there  are  two  inconsistent  descriptions 
equally  explicit,  that  will  control  which  best  expresses  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  as  manifested  by  the  whole  instrument.^ 

327.  A  court  of  law  can  correct  a  description  only  by  way 
of  a  construction  of  the  language  used,  and  with  a  view  to 
carry  out  the  manifest  intention  of  the  grantor.  One  part  of  a 
description  cannot  be  rejected  merely  because  it  is  inconsistent 
with  another  part.  If  the  ambiguity  is  patent,  the  deed  is  V(dd. 
But  it'  from  the  whole  deid  it  appears  that  the  intention  of  the 
grantor  can  evidently  be  carried  out  by  the  rejection  of  a  repugnant 
clause  or  word,  this  can  be  done  by  construction  in  a  court  of 
law  ;  otherwise  the  parties  must  seek  a  court  of  equity,  wiiere 
alone  a  deed  can  be  reformed.^ 

A  mistake  in  naming  the  owner  of  lands,  when  the  real  owner 
conveys  it,  is  immaterial.  Thus  a  deed  by  a  married  woman, 
properly  describing  land  which  she  had  inherited  from  her  father, 
is  not  invalidated  by  her  describing  it  as  land  which  her  husband 
had  inherited  from  her  father.^ 

328.  The  maxim,  falsa  demonstratio  non  nocet,  is  not  ap- 
plicable unless  the  descriptive  phrase  to  be  suppressed  is  cleai-ly 
repugnant  to  other  and  more  important  parts  of  the  description. 
To  justify  the  suppression  of  a  part  of  a  description,  this  must 
not  only  be  out  of  harmony  with  other  parts  of  the  description, 
but  it  must  be  undeniably  so,  in  some  important  respect,  after 

1  Driscoll  V.  Green,  59  N.  II.  101;  Rep.  394;  West  c.  Rretelle,  115  Mo.  653, 
White  V.  Gay,  9  N.  II.  126,  31  Am.  Dec.  22  S.  W.  Kep.  705  ;  Gil.soii  c.  Bo^y,  28  Mo. 
224  ;  Lane  v.  Thompson,  43  N.  H.  320 ;  478 ;  Kutherford  n.  Tracy,  48  Mo.  325, 
Allen  V.  Ilolton,  20  Pick.  458,  463,  per  8  Am.  Kep.  104;  Jenninfrs  r.  Bii/.eadiiie, 
Wilde,  J.;  Wade  v.  Deray,  50  Cal.  376;  44  Mo.  332;  Kin-,'  v.  Fink,  51  Mo.  209; 
More  I".  Massini,  37  Cal.  432;  Benedict  Cam|)l)ell  v.  Johnson,  44  Mo.  247  ;  Evaus 
r.  Gaylord,  11  Conn.  332,  29  Am.  Dec.  ;-.  Greene,  21  Mo.  170,208;  Shewalter  y. 
299;  Raymond  v.  Coffey,    5   Oreg.    132;  Pirner,  55  Mo.  218. 

Bond  V.  Vay,  8  Allen,  212,  12  Allen,  86.  ^  Grant  v.  Armstrong  (Ky.),  16  S.  W. 

2  Boardman  ;;.  Ricd,  6  Pet.  328;  Foid     Rej).  531. 
V.  Unity  Church,  120  Mo.  498,  25  S.   \V. 

VOL.  I.  278 


§  329.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


putting  a  reasonable  construction  upon  the  rest  of  the  descrip- 
tion. Words  of  general  description  will  not  always  prevail  over 
an  oiuuneration  of  particulars;  for,  in  cas(^s  where  tliere  is  an 
eiuuneration  of  {)articulars,  which  on  their  face  purport  to  be 
designed  as  (pialiiications  or  restrictions  of  a  preceding  general 
description,  the;  general  description  must  yield  to  the  particular 
descri[>ti  in.^ 

329.  After  an  accurate  description,  an  inaccurate  descrip- 
tion following  which  is  merely  accumulative  will  be  rejected.'- 
If  land  be  described  by  a  name  which  is  applicable  to  the  whole 
of  it,  a  subsequent  description,  which  appears  to  be  merely  a 
second  description,  and  in  fact  covers  only  a  part  of  the  land  first 
described,  does  not  affect  the  general  description,  but  will  be 
rejected.^  But  if  the  further  descriptive  phrase  restricts  or  qual- 
ifies the  general  terms  of  the  description,  effect  must  be  given  to 
the  words  of  restriction  or  qualification. 


1  Evens  v.  Griscom,  40  N.  J.  L.  402, 
42  N.  J.  L.  579.  In  this  case  the  words 
were  :  "  All  that  my  farm  and  plantation 
near  Cropwell  conveyed  to  me  by  the 
heirs  of  my  deceased  wife,  and  where  my 
son  Thomas  now  resides,  containing  about 
eifihty-five  acres,  more  or  less."  The 
tt's:ator's  farm  near  Cropwell,  whereon 
his  son  Thomas  resided,  embraced  in 
fact  fourteen  acres,  which  had  not  been 
conveyed  to  him  by  tlie  heirs  of  his  wife, 
but  had  come  to  him  from  an  entirely 
ilifFerent  source.  Consequently  the  words 
"  conveyed  to  me  by  the  heirs  of  my  de- 
ceased wife  "  stood  in  direct  incompatibility 
wiih  two  other  descriptions  of  the  lands 
intended  to  be  devised,  namely,  "  all  that 
iny  farm  near  Cropwell,"  and  "  where  "  or 
wherever  "  my  son  Thomas  now  resides  ;  " 
M)  that  a  case  was  presented  which  com- 
jx-lkd  the  court  to  decide  whether  the 
words  "  conveyed  to  me  by  the  lieirs  of  my 
deceased  wife  "  were  a  mere  false  descrip- 
tion, or  were  used  to  restrict  the  generality 
of  the  language  of  both  a  previous  and 
subsequent  description.  It  was  held  that 
these  words  restricted  the  general  descrip- 
tion, and  were  not  to  be  suppressed.  This 
case  is  commented  upon  and  approved  in 
Kanouse  r.  Slockbower,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  42, 

274 


21  Atl.  Rep.  197,  where  Van  Fleet,  V.-C, 
states  it  to  this  effect :  "  Whenever  the 
testator's  intention  to  give  the  whole  us 
an  entirety  clearly  appears  from  the  lan- 
guage of  the  will,  whether  such  intention 
is  expressed  by  a  designation,  by  a  name, 
or  by  abuttals,  or  other  descriptive  words, 
additional  words  of  description  which 
prove  to  be  only  partially  true  will  be  re- 
jected as  a  misdescription.  But  it  is  not 
true  that  words  of  general  description 
will  always  ])revail  over  an  enumeration 
of  particulars  ;  for,  in  cases  where  there 
is  an  enumeration  of  particulars,  which 
on  their  face  purport  to  be  designed  as 
qualifications  or  restrictions  of  a  preced- 
ing general  description,  there  the  general 
description  must  yield  to  the  particular 
description.  This  rule  has  its  root  in  that 
great  principle  which  declares  that  in  con- 
struing wills  the  court  must,  if  possible, 
give  effect  to  every  word  of  the  will." 

'•^  Cassidy  v.  Charlestown  Savings  Bank, 
149  Mass.  325,  327,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  372. 

•^  Chamberlaine  v.  Turner,  Cro.  Car. 
129  ;  Down  v.  Down,  7  Taunt.  343  ;  Ela 
V.  Card,  2  N.  H.  175;  Drew  v.  Drew,  28 
N.  H.  489 ;  Crosby  v.  Bradbury,  20  Me. 
61  ;  Gri.scom  v.  Evens,  40  N.  J.  L.  402,  29 
Am.  Rep.  251,  42  N.  J.  L.  579. 


CKRTAINTY.  [§§  330,  331. 

330.  A  manifest  omission  in  a  description  may  be  supplied 
by  construction  when  the  deed  famishes  sufficient  data  for  tliis 
purpose.^  In  like  manner  a  manifest  error,  such  as  an  error  in 
the  number  of  a  lot  or  block  of  land,  may  be  corrected  by  the 
data  supplied  by  the  deed.^  "  The  omission  of  one  of  the  boun- 
dary lines,  or  of  a  call  in  a  survey,  does  not  necessarily  render  the 
description  void  ;  for  the  remaining  line  may  be  determined  by 
the  lines  given,  and,  if  need  be,  the  description  may  be  aided  by 
extrinsic  evidence.^ 

331.  A  reference  for  description  to  other  deeds  or  title 
papers  is  equivalent  to  incorporating  the  full  descriptions  set 
forth  in  such  papers,  and  competent  evidence  is  admissible  to 
locate  the  land  so  described.'^  Of  course  the  reference  to  such 
deeds  or  title  papers  must  be  specific.  A  reference  in  general  terms 
to  the  records  of  the  county  for  a  description  is  without  effect.^ 
If  a  deed  referred  to  be  fully  identified,  it  is  immaterial  that  it 
has  not  been  recorded  in  the  county  in  which  it  is  recited  in  the 
reference  as  having  been  recorded.*^  A  deed  of  a  parcel  of  land 
secured  to  the  grantor  by  letters  patent  of  a  certain  quantity  of 
land  situated  in  a  named  land-district  of  Texas,  "  on  the  waters 
of  the  Brazos  River,  and  fully  described  in  the  foot-notes  of  said 
patent,"  contains  a  description  sufficient  to  convey  the  land  de- 
scribed in  the  patent,  though  the  latter  was  not  in  fact  issued  to 

1  Deal  V.  Cooper,  94  Mo.  62;   Hoffman  Mo.  83,  6  S.  W.  Rep.  651  ;  Glamorgan  v^ 

r.  Riehl,  27  Mo.  .5.54  ;  Burnett  u.  McCluey,  Badger  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  72  Mo.   139 

78  Mo.  676;  Edwards  v.  Bowden,  99  N.  Dolde  v.  Yodicka,  49   Mo.  98;  Nelson  v 

C.  80;  Moss  v.  .Shear,  30  Cal.  467  ;  Camp-  Brodhack,  44  Mo.  .596  ;  Hays  r.  Perkins 

bell  V.   Carruth,  32  Fla.  264,  13  So.  Rep.  109   Mo.    102,  18   S.  W.  Rep.  1127;   Cat 

432.  lett   V.   Starr,  70  Tex.  485,  7    S.  W.  Rep 

-  Murray  i\    Hobson.  10  Colo.   66,  13  844;  Bowles  r.  Beal,  60  Tex.  322 ;  Stein 

Pac.  Rep.  921.  beck  v.  Stone,  53  Tex.  382;  Cleveland  v 

3  Montgomery  !'.  Carlton,  56  Tex.  431  ;  Sims,  69  Tex.    153,  6   S.  W.   Rep.  634 

John.son  v.  Williams,  67  Hun,  652,  22  N.  Bratton    v.   Adams    (Tex.  Civ.  A])p.),  26 

Y.  Supp.  247.  S.  W.  Rep.  1108;   Henry  r.  Whitaker,  82 

*  Robinson  v.  Brennan,  115  Mass.  582;  Tex.   5,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  509;  Gresham  v. 

Waterman  y.  Andrews,  14  R.  I.  589;  Mil-  Chambers,  80  Tex.  544,  16  S.   W.  Rep. 

ler  V.  Topeka  Land  Co.  44  Kans.  354,  24  326;  Kyle   v.  Rhodes,  71    Miss.  487,  15 

I'ac.  Rep.  420 ;  Davidson  v.  Arledge,  88  So.    Rep.    40 ;    Hoffman    v.  Port  Huron 

N.  C.  326;  Euliss  >:  McAdams,  108  N.  C.  (Mich.),  60  N.  W.  Rep.  831  ;  Rupert  v. 

507, 13  S.  E.  Rep.  162  ;  Everitt  v.  Thomas,  Penner,  35  Neb.  587,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  .598  ; 

1    Ired.   252;    Walker  v.   Moses,   113   N.  Newman  r.  Tymeson,  13  Wis.  172. 

C.    527,  :8  S.    E.    Rep.   339;    Powers  v.  ^  Brown  y.  Chambers,  63  Tex.  131. 

Jiickson,  50  Cal.  429  ;  Caldwell  v.  Center,  ^  Saunders  v.  Sehmaelzle,  49  Cal.  59. 
30  Cal.  539  ;  Glamorgan   v.   Hornsby,  94 

275 


g  3:32.]  DKsciai'Tiox  and  boundaries. 

the  oiaiitoi-  till  the  Uipsc  of  several  months  after  the  execution  of 
the  deed.^ 

A  deed  which  describes  hind  only  by  the  number  of  acres  in 
the  parcel,  and  as  lying  on  the  north  and  east  side  of  a  speeilied 
lot,  but  subjeet  to  the  dower  of  a  widow  named,  "  which  has 
been  laid  oft"  and  assigned  to  her  for  life  in  said  lot  of  land,"  is 
not  void  for  uncertainty  ;  for  there  is  a  plain  reference  to  the 
proceeilings  by  which  dower  was  assigned  to  the  widow,  and 
the  import  of  the  deed  is  to  convey  the  reversion  to  the  identical 
parcel  embraced  in  the  assignment  of  dower.^ 

A  deed  referring  accurately  to  another  deed  made  to  the 
grantor,  and  conveying  all  the  parcels  of  land  therein  described 
not  already  disposed  of,  sufficiently  describes  such  land.^  A  de- 
scription of  land  in  a  certain  town  or  county,  or  on  a  certain 
river,  and  simply  by  the  name  under  which  the  property  is  known, 
is  a  sufficiently  certain  and  definite  description,  when  supple- 
mented by  proper  parol  identification.* 

A  deed  describing  land  as  "  all  that  certain  interest  in  the  landed 
estates  of  H,  deceased,  to  which  we  are  or  may  be  entitled  by 
gift,  devise,  or  descent,  or  otherwise,"  describes  the  property  con- 
veyed with  sufficient  certainty.^  But  a  deed  of  land  described  as 
"  inherited "  from  a  certain  person  is  not  sufficient  to  embrace 
land  which  the  grantor  received  by  devise  under  the  will  of  such 
person.^ 

»  332.  A  reference  to  another  deed  for  a  description  may 
control  a  description  by  metes  and  bounds,  when  the  latter  is 
inaccurate  according  to  the  manifest  intention  of  the  parties  to 
the  deed.     Thus,  where  one  purchased  a  dwelling-house  and  lot  by 

1  Norton  v.  Conner  (Tex.),    14   S.  W.  f.  Stone,  53  Tex.  382  ;  Bitner  v.  N.  Y.  & 

Rep.  193.     And  see  Bitner  v.  New  York  Tex.  Land  Co.  67  Tex.  341,  8  S.  W.  Rep. 

&  Tex.   Land  Co.  67  Tex.  341,  3  S.  W.  301  ;  Gresham  v.  Chambers,  80  Tex.  .544, 

Rep.  301.     A  description  of  land  by  refer-  16  S.  W.  Rep.  326. 

ence  to  "  the  title  of  possession  as  given  ■*  Began   v.  Hamilton,  90  Ala.  4.54,  8 

by   George   A.   Nixon,  especial   commis-  So.  Rep.  186;  O'Neal  v.  Seixas,  85  Ahi. 

aioner  for  Joseph    Veheliu's    colony,   of  80,  4  So.  Rep.  745  ;  Liles  v.  Ratehford,  88 

whi'h  the  said  Mardes  was  a  colonist,"  Ala. 397,  6  So.  Rep.  914. 

is  suniiient.     Mardes  y.  Meyers  (Tex.  Civ.  ^  Harris  v.  Broiles  (Tex.   Civ.  App.), 

App.),  28  S.  \V.  Rep.  693.  22  S.  W.  Rep.  421.     And  see  Austin  v. 

■^  Rarler  v.  Johnson,  81  Ga.  254,  7  S.  E.  Bolbce  (Mich.),  59  N.  W.  Rej..  608. 

Rep.  317.  •>  Kmeric  v.  Alvarado,  90  Cal.  444,  27 

3  Falls   Land,   &c.  Co  v.  Chisholm,  71  Pac.  Rep.  356. 
Tex.  523,  9   S.  W.   Rep.  479  ;  Steinbeck 

276 


CERTAINTY. 


[§  333. 


a  deed  correctly  describing  the  land,  and  afterwards  gave  a  niort- 
gaoe  ill  which  the  description  by  metes  and  bounds  did  not  cover 
a  strip  two  feet  wide  along  one  side  of  the  premises,  but  stated 
that  they  were  the  same  premises  conveyed  to  the  mortgagor  by 
duly  recorded  deed  of  a  certain  date,  being  the  purchase-deed 
referred  to,  it  was  held  that  the  purchaser  at  foreclosure  of  such 
mortgage  obtained  title  to  the  entire  premises  described  in  the 
deed  to  the  mortgagor;  though  the  complaint,  the  decree,  and 
the  deed  to  such  purchaser  at  the  foreclosure  sale  omitted  that 
part  of  the  description  in  the  mortgage  which  referred  to  the 
mortgagor's  purchase-deed. ^ 

333.  An  immaterial  recital  does  not  estop  the  parties  from 
denying  its  truth.  Thus,  in  the  description  of  lands  excepted 
from  a  conveyance,  a  recital  that  such  lands  had  been  conveyed 
to  another  does  not  estop  the  grantor,  nor  any  one  to  whom  he 
may  convey  the  excepted  lands,  from  alleging  that  no  such  con- 
veyance had  in  fact  been  made.^ 

1  Bernstein  c.  Nealis  (N.  Y.),  39  N.  E.  the  same  premises,'  etc.  As  to  the  mort- 
Eep.  328,  reversing  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  739.  gagor,  however,  and  his  grantees  i-ubse- 
Peckham,  J.,  said :  "  In  this  case  the  spe-  qi  ent  to  the  mortgage,  the  particular 
citic  description  is  slightly  inaccurate,  and  description  was  sufficient  to  convey  the 
in  fact  it  cuts  off  two  feet  from  a  house  premises  as  they  actually  existed.  .  .  . 
and  lot,  the  whole  of  which,  beyond  all  Wlien  the  mortgagee  comes  to  foreclose 
possible  controversy,  was  intended  to  be  the  mortgage,  therefore,  he  may  take  the 
conveyed.  By  reason  of  this  inaccuracy  mortgagor  at  his  word,  and  may  rely  upon 
in  the  desd-iption  by  metes  and  bounds,  it,  and  assume  that  the  particular  <lescrip- 
if  unaided  by  the  added  statement,  the  tion  does  convey  the  same  premises  con- 
clear  intention  of  the  mortgagor  to  mort-  veyed  to  the  mortgagor  by  tiie  Floyd  deed  ; 
gage  the  whole  might  fail.  But  when  and  the  added  statement  in  the  mortgage 
such  added  statement  is  referred  to,  all  need  not  be  inserted  in  the  comijlaint  or 
doubt  is  removed,  and  by  combining  the  in  the  decree,  or  in  the  deed  of  the  rcf- 
two,  the  special  and  particular  description  crte,  in  order  to  convey,  as  against  the 
with  the  statement  as  to  what  it  actually  mortgagor,  tiie  same  premises  that  were 
conveys,  all  the  land  described  in  the  conveyed  to  the  mortgagor  by  ihe  Floyd 
Floyd  deed  must  be  held  to  pass  under  deed." 

the    description    in   the  mortgage.     The  -  South  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Warton,  6   Hurl, 

statement,  in  the  light  of  the  character  of  &  N.  519  ;  Carpenter  v.  BuUer,  8  M.  &  W. 

the  property,  means  all  the  premises  con-  209  ;  Reed   v.   McCourt,   41    N.  Y.  435  ; 

tained  in  the  Floyd  deed,  and  not  a  jiart  Ambs  v.   Chicago,  St.  Paul,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 

only.     The  doubt  in  this  case  arises  from  Co.  44   Minn.  2C6,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  321  ; 

the  fact  that  in  proceeding  to  foreclo.se  tlie  Great    Falls   Co.    v.  Worster,   15  N.    li. 

mortga;;e  the  compl.iint,  decree,  and  lef-  412;  Osborne  v.  Endicott,  6  Cat  149,65 

eree's  deed  described  the  premises  by  the  Am.  Dec.  498;  IngersoU  v.  Truebody,  40 

particular    description    contained   in   the  Cal.  003 ;  Baldwin  r.  Thompson,  15  Iowa, 

mortgage,  and  did  not  refer  to  the  stale-  5U4. 
ment  in  the  mortgage  beginning,  '  being 

277 


§  334.]  DK.^CRUTION    AXl)    UOUNDARIES. 

334.  A  description  which  in  itself  does  not  identify  the  land 
may  be  cured  by  the  acts  of  the  parties.^  Tims  wlicio  one 
conveyoil  three  Imiidfed  acres  out  of  a  nuu'li  larger  tract,  diroct- 
iiii^  that  it  be  laid  off  in  a  convenient  form,  and  the  grantee 
entered  into  possession  of  that  quantity  of  land  out  of  the  larger 
tract,  and  continued  in  possession  for  many  years,  and  then  con- 
veyed the  land  so  occupied  by  metes  and  bounds,  the  last 
grantee  cannot  object  that  the  deed  to  his  grantor  was  void 
because  it  did  not  sufficiently  identify  the  land.^  A  conveyance 
of  a  certain  number  of  acres  of  land  to  be  selected  out  of  a  larger 
tract  by  the  grantee  is  not  void  for  uncertainty ,3  but  no  title  to 
any  specific  land  passes  until  the  selection  is  made;  and,  if  the 
selection  be  not  made  within  twenty  years,  the  grantee's  right  is 
barred.-^  If  the  })arties  to  a  deed  which  does  not  describe  the 
property  with  certainty,  either  before  or  after  the  date  of  the 
same,  maik  out  or  identify  and  appropriate  certain  land  as  the 
exact  and  identical  parcel  conveyed,  or  to  be  conveyed,  by  such 
deed,  it  will  be  held  to  be  effective  to  convey  such  land.  Their 
declarations  and  acts  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  maybe  proved 
to  determine  the  intent  of  the  parties.^  Thus,  where  a  grantor 
conveys  a  wharf  property  by  clear  and  definite  description,  and 
then  adds  to  the  description  the  following  words,  "Also  one  half 
of  an  acre  of  land  near  the  wharf,  or  at  the  wharf,"  the  deed 
will  be  regarded  as  effective  to  convey  a  particular  half  acre  near 
the  whai-f  which  the  parties  to  the  deed,  near  the  time  ot  its  exe- 
cution, surveyed  or  otherwise  marked  out  and  appropriated.^ 

1  Vejar  v.  Mound  City  Asso.  97  Cal.  E.  Rep.  530;  Donahue  v.  Case,  61  N.  Y. 
659,  32  Pac.  Rep.  713;  Mulford  v.  Le  631;  Clark  ?;.  Wethey,  19  Wend.  320. 
Franc,  26  Cal.  88  ;  McNamara  v.  Seaton,  «  Simpson  v.  Blaisdell,  85  Me.  199,  27 
82  111.  493;  Mettart  v.  Allen  (Ind.),  39  Atl.  Rep.  101  ;  Farrar  v.  Cooper,  34  Me. 
N.  E.  Rep.  239  ;  Wolfe  v.  Dyer,  95  Mo.  394.  In  the  first-named  case,  Chief  Jus- 
545,8  S.  W.  Rep.  551  ;  Richards  v.  Snider,  tice  Peters,  delivering  the  decision  upon 
11  Ore"-.  197,  3  Pac.  Rep.  117.  the  point  whether  the  land  had  been  de- 

2  Sndth  V.  Bradley  (Ky.),  11  S.  W.  fined,  said:  "It  can  be  defined  by  the 
Rep.  370.  parties  going  down  with  the  surveyor  and 

3  Pond  V.  Minnesota  Iron  Co.  58  Fed.  surveying  it  off  and  putting  down  marks. 
Rep.  448;  Dohoney  v.  Womack  (Tex.),  It  can  be  defined  in  other  ways,  perhaps. 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  883;  Nye  v.  Moody,  70  It  need  not  be  done  necessarily  by  both 
Tex.  434,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  606  ;  Waters?;,  parties  being  upon  the  ground  at  the  time. 
Bew  (N.  J.),  29  Atl.  Rep.  590.  If  George   Hinman  went  upon  the  land 

*  Dull  V.   Blum,  68  Tex.  299,  4  S.  W.  him.self,  and  began  to  use  a  half  acre, — 

Rep.  489.  a  well-defined  half  acre,  —  marked  it  out 

5  Harris  v.  Oakley,  130  N.  Y.  1,  28  N.  by  piling  paving  all  over  a  well-defined 
278 


PAROL    EVIDENCE. 


[§  335. 


What  is  the  practical  construction  given  to  a  doubtful  desciiji- 
tion  by  the  subsequent  acts  of  the  parties  may  be  proved  by  parol 
evidence.!  But  a  description  which  is  clear  and  unambiguous 
cannot  be  set  aside  and  a  different  one  substituted  in  its  place  by 
parol  proof  of  tlie  acts  of  the  pai-ties,  either  before  or  after  the 
execution  of  the  deed.^ 

On  the  other  hand,  if  it  appears  that  certain  land  was  not 
claimed  by  the  grantee  as  being  embraced  in  the  grant;  that  he 
conveyed  all  the  land  definitely  granted,  but  did  not  attempt  to 
convey  the  land  in  question  ;  and  that  the  grantor,  the  Common- 
wealth of  Massachusetts,  did  subsequently  authorize  a  location 
on  such  land,  — these  contemporaneous  and  subsequent  acts  of  the 
parties  are  sufhcient  evidence  that  such  land  was  not  included  in 
the  grant.^ 

ir.    Parol  Evidence. 

335.  Where  the  description  is  clear  and  intelligible,  parol 
evidence  is  not  admissible  to  control  the  legal  effect  of  it,  but  a 
construction  must  be  put  upon  the  terms  used.'*     In  that  case  the 


half  arre,  or  in  any  other  way  ;  if  he.  heean 
to  use  it  in  that  way,  so  as  to  make  it 
clear  and  distinct  that  he  was  appropriat- 
ing a  certain  sjecific  hnlf  acre  under  his 
deed,  and  the  frrantor  knew  it  and  saw  it, 
and  acquiesced  therein  for  a  number  of 
years, —  that  would  be  evidence  from 
which  the  jury  might  infer  that  it  had 
been  in  that  way  marked  out  and  appro- 
priated, but  it  would  not  be  conclusive." 

1  Lovejoy  v.  Lovett,  124  Mass.  270; 
Stone  V.  Clark,  1  Met.  .378,  35  Am.  Dec. 
370. 

2  Ames  V.  Hilton,  70  Me.  36. 

*  Eoherts  v  Richards,  84  Me.  1,  24 
Atl.  Hep.  42.5. 

^  Alabama :  Guilmaitin  v.  Wood,  76 
Ala.  204.  California:  Hogins  v.  Boggs, 
(f\il.),  34  Pac.  Eep.  653.  Connecticut: 
Benedict  v.  Gaylord,  11  Conn.  332,  336, 
29  Am.  Dec.  299.  Florida  :  Andrcu  v. 
Watkins  26  Fla.  390,  7  So.  Rep.  876. 
Illinois  :  Brndish  v.  Yocum,  130  III.  386, 
23  N.  E.  Rep.  114.  Maine-  A  mo  v. 
Hilton,  70  Me.  36.  Massachusetts  :  Miles 
V.  Barrows,  122  Ma'^s.  579;  Waterman 
V.  Jr)lin«oD,  13  Rick.  261,  204,  per  Sliaw, 
C.  J. ;  Bond  v.  Fay,  12  Allen,  86.    Minne- 


sota:  Beardsley  v.  Crane,  52  Minn.  537, 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  740.  Missouri:  Jennings 
V.  Brizeadine,  44  Mo.  332.  New  Hamp- 
sMre  :  Coburn  ?;.  Coxeter,  51  N.  H.  158; 
Hall  V.  Davis,  36  N.  H.  569  ;  Sanborn  v. 
Clough,  40  N.  H.  316;  Prescott  v.  Haw- 
kins, 12  N.  H.  19.  New  York:  Harris  v. 
Oakley,  130  N.  Y.  1,  28  N.  E.  Rep  .530, 
per  Haight,  J. ;  Brookman  v.  Kiirzman, 
94  N.  Y.  272,  276  ;  Lawrence  v.  Palmer, 
71  N.  Y.  607;  Green  v.  Collins,  86  N.  Y. 
246,  254,  40  Am.  Rep.  531  ;  Drew  v.  Swift, 
46  N.  Y  204  ;  Partridge  r.  Russell,  18  N. 
Y.  St.  Rep.  685,  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  529.  Ore- 
gon :  Meier  r.  Kelly,  20  Oreg.  86,  25  Pac. 
Rep.  73;  Holcomb  v.  Mooney,  13  Ortg. 
503,  11  Pac.  Rep.  274.  Texas  :  Farley  i-. 
Weslande,  69  Tex.  458,  6  S.  W.  Rep. 
786;  Anderson  v.  Stamps,  19  Tex.  460  ; 
Williams  v.  Winslow,  84  Tex.  371,  !9 
S.  W.  Rep.  513;  Hartz  r.  Owen  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W.  Rep.  42.  Rhode 
Island:  Segar  v.  Babcock,  18  R.  I.  188, 
26  Atl.  Rep.  257.  Virginia:  Norfolk 
Trust  Co.  V.  Foster,  78  Va.  413.  Wis- 
consin :  Kirch  v.  Davics,  55  Wis.  287.  1 1 
N.  W.  Rep.  689. 

279 


§  336.] 


DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDARIKS. 


description  cannot  be  changed  or  varied  by  construction,  although 
it  is  phiin  that  this  description  is  not  the  descri[)tion  that  was 
intended  to  be  used.  The  construction  must  be  confitied  to  the 
intention  of  the  parties  as  gathered  from  the  d^ed.^  'J'hus,  where 
a  description  was  clear  and  exact,  giving  metes  and  bounds,  but, 
as  applied  to  the  land,  conveyed  a  lot  adjoining  the  land  of  the 
grantor,  it  was  held  that  parol  evidence  could  not  be  introduced 
to  show  that  the  grantor  intended  to  convey  his  own  lot,  though 
his  deed  referred  to  the  deed  by  which  he  acquired  title,  whicli 
deed  correctly  described  the  land  intended  to  be  conveyed  ;  for 
there  was  no  ambiguity  in  the  description  by  metes  and  bounds, 
and  the  clause  referring  to  the  prior  deed  did  not  create  ;iny  am- 
biguity in  the  prior  description,  but  was  repugnant  to  it.^ 

If,  on  inspection  of  the  deed,  the  identity  of  the  land  is  alto- 
gether uncertain,  the  court  should  pronounce  the  deed  void/'' 

336.  Proof  of  the  intention  of  the  grantor  is  inadmissible 
to  explain  a  deed  which  is  on  its  face  void  for  uncertainty,''^ 
or  to  enlarge  or  change  the  meaning  or  import  of  the  words  used 
in  the  deed.^  When  the  parties  have  reduced  their  contrnct  to 
wiiting  in  the  form  of  a  deed,  this  is  taken  to  be  the  final  expres- 
sion of  their  intention,  and  extrinsic  evidence  cannot  be  employed 
to  show  that  their  intention  was  different  from  what  is  expressi  d 
on  the  face  of  the  deed.^     If  the  land  intended  to  be  conveyed 


1  Cunningham  v.  Thornton,  28  111.  App. 
58;  Johnson  Co.  v.  Wood,  84  Mo.  489 ; 
Armstrong  v.  Du  Bois,  90  N.  Y.  9.5  ;  Clark 
V.  Baird,  9  N.  Y.  18.3;  Meier  v.  Kelly,  20 
Oreg.  86,  2.i  Pac.  Rep.  73;  Holston  Salt 
Co.  V.  Campbell  (Va.),  16  S.  E.  Hep.  274; 
Rugg  V.  War.l,  64  Vt.  402,  23  Atl.  Rep. 
726.  Ross,  C.  J  ,  said  :  "  If  the  applica- 
tion of  the  description  to  the  subject-mat- 
ter manifests  that  all  its  terms  cannot  ex- 
actly be  fulfilled,  and  that  by  rejection  of 
nearly  equal  portions  of  the  description, 
by  varying  the  courses  or  shortening  or 
lengthening  the  distances  in  two  or  more 
ways,  the  description  becomes  applicable, 
and  it  is  uncertain  which  is  the  one  in- 
tended by  the  parties,  oral  testimony  may 
be  received  to  remove  the  uncertainty." 

-  Cassidy  v.  Charlestown  Sav.  Bank,  149 
Mass.  32.5,  21  N.  E  Rep.  372. 

8  Cox  V.  Hart,  145  IJ.  S.  376,  12  Sup. 
280 


Ct.  Rep.  962;  Kingston  v.  Pickins,  46 
Tex.  99,  101  ;  Wilson  v.  Smith,  50  Tex. 
365,  369. 

*  Bond  V.  Fay,  12  Allen,  86,  affirming 
8  Allen,  212;  Gaston  v.  Weir,  84  Ala. 
193,  4  So.  Rep.  258;  Meyer  v.  Mitchell, 
75  Ala.  475  ;  Driggers  v.  Cassady,  71  Ala. 
529;  Chambers  v.  RingstafT,  69  Ala.  140; 
Clements  r.  Pearce,  63  Ala.  284 ;  Jen- 
nings V.  Brizeadine,  44  Mo.  332  ;  Wells 
V.  Jackson  Iron  Co.  47  N.  H.  235;  Mu! 
doon  V.  Deline,  135  N.  Y.  1.50,  31  N.  E. 
i.'ep.  1091. 

5  Green  v.  Collins,  86  N.  Y.  246,  40  Am. 
Rep.  531  ;  Mar.><hall  v.  Gridley,  46  111. 
247;  Segar?>.  Babcock,  18  R.  I.  188,  26 
Atl.  Rep.  257. 

«  Bond  V.  Fay,  12  Allen,  86;  Benedict 
V.  Gaylord,  11  Conn.  332,  29  Am.  Dec. 
299;  Payne  r.  Atterbury,  Har.  Ch.  414; 
May  V.  Tillman,  1    Mich.  262  ;    White  v. 


PAROL    EVIDHNCE. 


[§  337. 


can  be  ascertained  from  the  deed  itself  by  rejecting  a  part  (f  tlie 
description  manifestly  false,  resort  should  not  be  had  to  extrane- 
ous evidence.^  A  grantor  is  not  allowed  to  contradict  his  deed  or 
to  vary  the  description  of  the  land  thereby  conveyed. ^ 

337.  An  ambiguity  which  is  patent  on  the  face  of  the  deed 
renders  the  instrument  void.  Pai-ol  evidence  is  not  in  that  case 
admissible  to  aid  the  description.'^  Tims,  if  a  deed  conveys  a 
part  of  a  lai-ger  tract,  without  affording  any  means  of  determin- 
ing what  part  of  such  tract  is  intended,  as  for  instance  forty  acres 
out  of  a  quarter  section  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres,*  there  is 
a  patent  ambiguity  which  parol  evidence  cannot  aid.  For  the 
same  reason,  a  deed  of  a  tract  of  land  in  a  county  named  adjoin- 
ing the  lands  of  two  j)ersons  named  is  void,  if  the  land  is  part 
of  a  larger  tract  belonging  to  the  grantor;  but  if  the  land  so 
described  be  not  a  part  of  a  larger  tract,  and  the  quantity  be 
given,  the  ambiguity  is  not  patent  and  the  land  may  be  located 
by  parol  evidence.^ 


Smith,  37  Mich.  291  ;  Shotwell  v.  Harri- 
son, 22  Mich.  410;  Case  v.  Greeu,  53 
Mich.  61.5,  19  X.  W.  Rep.  554;  Thomp- 
son V.  Smith,  96  Mich.  258,  55  N.  W.  Rep. 
886  ;  Gordon  v.  Trimmier,  91  Ga.  472,  18 
S.  11.  Rep.  404;  Holston  Salt  Co.  v. 
Camphell,  89  Va.  396,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  274. 

1  Schoenewalfl  v.  Rossenstein,  25  N.  Y. 
St.  Rep.  964,  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  766 ;  Brookman 
V.  Kurtzman,  94  N.  Y.  272  ;  Masten  v.  01- 
cott,  101  N.  Y.  152,  4  N.  E.  Rep.  274; 
Case  I'.  Dexter,  106  N.  Y.  548,  13  N.  E. 
Rep.  449  ;  Coffey  v.  Hendricks,  66  Tex. 
676,  2  S.  W.  Rep.  47;  Bond  v.  Fay,  12 
Allen,  86,  8  Allen,  212  ;  Benedict  v.  Gay- 
lord,  11   Conn.  33->,  29  Am.  Dec.  299. 

2  Harding  v.  Wrii,'ht,  119  Mo.  1,  24  S. 
W.  Rep.  211  ;  Jennings  ;,'.  Brizeadine,  44 
Mo.  332  ;  Jones  v.  Shepley,  90  Mo.  307,  2 
S.  W.  Rep.  400. 

3  Cox  V.  Hart,  145  U.  S.  376,  12  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  962  ;  Boardnian  v.  Reed,  6  Pet. 
328.  Alabama :  Chamher.s  v.  Ringstaff, 
69  Ala.  140.  Arkansas  :  Fuller  v.  Fel- 
lows, 30  Ark.  657.  California:  Mesick  v. 
Sunderland,  6  Cal.  297  ;  Brandon  v.  Lcd- 
dy,  67  Cal.  43.  7  Pac.  Rep.  33.  Illinois: 
Fi.sher  v.  Quackenbush,  83  111.310;  Pry 
V.  Pry,  109  111.  466.     Mississippi :  Brown 


V.  Guice,  46  Miss.  299.  Missouri :  Camp- 
bell V.  Johnson,  44  Mo.  247  ;  Hardy  v. 
Matthews,  38  Mo.  121  ;  Jennings  v.  Brize- 
adine, 44  Mo.  332;  King  ?•.  Fink,  51 
Mo.  209.  North  Carolina :  Dickens  v. 
Barnes,  79  N.  C.  490  ,  Hinchcy  v.  Nichols, 
72  N.  C.  66.  Texas:  Wilson  v.  Smith,  50 
Tex.  365  ;  Kingston  v.  Pickins,  46  Tex. 
99 ;  Norris  v.  Hunt,  51  Tex.  609  ;  Stein- 
beck V.  Stone,  53  Tex.  382 ;  Ragsdale  v. 
Robinson,  48  Tex.  379,  395 ;  Kuowles  v. 
Torhitt,  53  Tex.  557  ;  Giddings  v.  Day, 
84  Te.\.  605,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  682 ;  Curdy 
V.  Stafford  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W. 
Rep.  823  ;  Wooters  v.  Arledge,  54  Tex. 
395 ;  Mitchell  r.  Ireland,  54  Tex.  301  ; 
Allday  v.  Wl.itaker,  66  Tex.  671,  1  S. 
W.  Rep.  794  ;  Linney  v.  Wood,  66  Tex. 
22, 17  S.  W.  Rep.  244.  Wisconsin  :  John- 
son  V.  Ashland  Lumber  Co.  52  Wis.  458, 
9  N.  W.  Re]).  464. 

<  Campbell  i\  Johnson,  44  Mo.  247. 
Also  Allen  v.  Chambers,  4  Ired.  Eq.  125, 
the  words  "to  be  laid  off"  in  this  case 
indicating  that  the  land  was  part  of  a 
larger  tract.  Gricr  v.  ];h\ne,  69  N.  C. 
346. 

■■'  Perry  v.  Scott,  109  N.  C.  374,  14  S. 
E.  Rip.  294;   Hinton  r.  Roach,  95  N.  C. 

281 


§  338.] 


DESCRirriON   AND    BOUNDAKIES. 


Ami  60  II  deed  of  kind  "except  such  portion  us  has  been  laid 
out  in  town  lots,  and  sold  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  mortgage,  ' 
which  does  not  show  which  lots  had  been  sold,  is  void  for  uncer- 
tainty, and  cannot  be  aided  by  extrinsic  lividence.^ 

A  deed  of  "one  tract  of  laml  lying  and  being  in  the  county 
aforesaid,  adjoining  the  lands  of  A  and  B,  containing  twenty 
acres,  more  or  less,"  is  suiHcient  to  pass  the  title  to  any  land,  and 
the  description  cannot  be  aided  by  parol  proof."'^ 

338.  Extrinsic  evidence  is  always  admissible  to  explain 
any  uncertainty  or  latent  ambiguity  there  may  be  in  the  de- 
scription in  the  deed,  so  as  to  make  it  apply  to  the  parcel  intended 
to   be   conveyed,  and  give  effect    to   the   deed.^     Thus,  where  a 


106;  AVhaiton  v.  Eborn,  88  N.  C.  344; 
Edwards  v.  Bowden,  99  N.  C.  80,  5  S.  E. 
Rep.  283 ;  McGlawhorn  v.  Worthington, 
98  N.  C.  199,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  633. 

Ill  Dickens  c.  Barnes,  79  N.  C.  490,  the 
descript'on,  "one  tract  of  land  lyinn^  and 
biiu}^  in  the  county  aforesaid,  adjoining 
thj  lands  of  John  J.  Phelps  and  Norfleet 
I'eiuler,  containing  twenty  acres,  more  or 
less,"  was  held  to  be  insufficient  to  admit 
the  aid  of  parol  evidence.  But  it  has 
been  intimated  that  this  decision  is  over- 
ruled by  Farmer  v.  Bates,  83  N.  C.  387. 
In  Blow  V.  Vaughan,  105  N.  C.  198,  10 
S.  E.  Rep.  891,  a  deed  of  "fifty  acres  of 
land  lying  in  the  county  of  Hertford,  and 
bounded  as  follows,"  by  the  lands  of  three 
persons  named,  left  open  for  explanation 
by  ]^arol  proof  only  tlie  question  whether 
there  was  a  tract  so  bounded  as  to  sepa- 
rate it  from  other  tracts,  and  indicate  its 
limits  with  reasonable  certainty.  In  this 
case  and  in  the  case  of  Wilson  v.  John- 
son, 105  N.  C.  211,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  895,  a 
dist,iuction  is  taken  between  the  words 
"bounded"  and  "adjoining,"  which  is 
repudiate<l  in  Perry  v.  Scott,  109  N.  C. 
374,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  294. 

1  Bowen  V.  Wicker>hatn,  124  Ind.  404, 
24  N.  E.  Rep.  983. 

■^  Dickens  v.  Barnes,  79  N.  C.  490. 

^Alabama:  Guilinartin  v.  Wood,  76 
Ala.  204.  Arkansas:  Dorr  v.  School  Dis- 
trict, 40  Ark.  237.  California:  Thomp- 
son V.  Motor  Road   Co.  82    Cul.  4'.)7,  23 

282 


Pac.  Rep.  130;  Reamer  v.  Nesmith,  34 
Cal.  624 ;  Vejar  v.  Mound  City  Asso.  97 
Cal.  659,  32  Pac.  Rep.  713.  Colorado: 
Murray  v.  Hobson,  10  Colo.  66,  13  Pac. 
Rep.  921 ;  Blair  v.  Bruns,  8  Colo.  397,  8 
Pac.  Rep.  569.  Connecticut :  Benedict  v. 
Gaylord,  11  Conn.  332,  29  Am.  Dec.  299. 
Georgia:  Shore  v.  Miller,  80  Ga.  93,  4  S. 
E.  Rep.  561.  Illinois:  Mason  r.  Merrill, 
129  111.  .503,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  799  ;  Chicago 
Dock  Co.  V.  Kinzie,  93  111.  415;  Bradish 
y.  Yocum,  130  111.386,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  114; 
Sharp  V.  Thompson,  100  111.  447,  39  Am. 
Rep.  61  ;  Fisher  v.  Quackenbush,  83  111. 
310;  Colcord  U.Alexander,  67  111.  581; 
Billings  V.  Kankakee  Coal  Co.  67  111.  489  ; 
Bybee  v.  Ilageman,  66  111.  519  ;  Marshall 
V.  Gridley,  46  111.  247  ;  Stevens  v.  Wair, 
112  111.  544;  Smith  v.  Crawford,  81  III. 
296.  Indiana:  Trentman  v.  Neff,  124 
Ind.  503,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  895.  Kentucky: 
Shelby  V.  Tevis  (Ky.),  14  S.  W.  Rep.  .501. 
Maine:  Tyler  v.  Fickctt,  73  Me.  410. 
Massachusetts  :  Reynolds  v.  Boston  Rub- 
ber Co.  160  Mass.  240,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  677  ; 
Macdonald  v.  Morrill,  154  Mass.  270,  28 
N.  E.  Rep.  259;  Crafts  v.  Kibbard,4  Met. 
438  ;  Stone  v.  Clark,  1  Met.  378,  35  Am. 
Dec.  370;  Waterman  v.  Johnson,  13  Pick. 
261  ;  Kellogg  v.  Smith,  7  Cash.  375,  382  ; 
Dodd  V.  Witt,  139  Mass.  63,  66,  29  N.  E. 
Rep.  475,52  Arn.  Rep.  700;  Lovejoy  v. 
Lov(tt,  124  Mass.  270;  Miles  v.  Barrows, 
122  ]\Iass.  579,  581  ;  Hootrn  r.  Comciford, 
152  Mass.  591,  26   N.  E.  Rep.  407,  23  Am. 


PAROL   EVIDENCE. 


[§  338. 


right  of  way  over  certain  lots  of  land  was  described  as  laid  out 
bj"^  a  civil  engineer  named,  in  accordance  with  a  map  attached  to 
tlie  deed,  and  the  map  did  not  identify  the  location  apart  from 
the  survey  on  the  ground,  explanatory  evidence  was  admitted  to 
prove  that  the  map  was  made  from  an  actual  survey,  and  to  show 
the  location  of  the  way  as  surveyed  upon  the  ground.^  Where  a 
description  applies  to  two  or  more  parcels  equally  well,  there  is  a 
latent  ambiguity  which  may  be  explained  by  parol.^ 

A  latent  ambiguity  occurs  when  the  deed  or  other  instrument 
appears  sufficiently  certain,  free  from  ambiguity,  but  the  ambi- 
guity is  produced  by  something  extrinsic,  or  some  collateral  matter 
out  of  the  instrument.  Where  a  description  is  apparently  clear 
and  complete,  yet  when  it  is  applied  to  the  land  it  appears  that 
the  words  are  applicable  to  different  things,  and  tliere  is  nothing 
in  the  deed  to  show  which  is  meant,  extrinsic  evidence  is  admis- 
sible to  show  the  true  meaning  of  the  words  used.^     "  The  iden- 


St.  Eep.  861.  Michigan:  Heffelman  v. 
Otsego  Water  Power  Co.  78  Mich.  121, 
4.3  X.  W.  Rep.  1096,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  1151. 
Mississippi:  Price  f.  Fer^'uson,  66  Miss. 
404  ;  Brown  r.  Guice,  46  Miss.  299.  Mis- 
souri :  Wolfe  V.  Dyer,  95  Mo.  545,  8  S.  W. 
Rep.  551  ;  Charles  r.  Patch,  87  Mo.  450. 
Nebraska:  Hanlon  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
40  Neb.  52,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  590.  New  Jer- 
sey :  Scott  V.  Yard,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  79,  18  Atl. 
Rep.  359;  Dunn  v.  En-^lish,  23  N.  J. 
L.  126;  Smith  v.  Negbauer,  42  N.  J.  L. 
305  ;  Opdyke  v.  Stepheus,  28  N.  J.  L.  83. 
New  Mexico  :  Gentile  v.  Crossan  (N.  M.), 
38  Pac.  Rep.  247.  New  York :  Thayer  v. 
Finton,  108  N.  Y.  394,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  615  ; 
Weeks  v.  Martin,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  656  ; 
Clark  V.  Wethey,  19  Wend.  320;  Vos- 
burfrh  r.  Teator,  32  N.  Y.  561  ;  Wood  v. 
Lafayette,  46  N.  Y.  484  ;  Stout  v.  Wood- 
ward, 5  Hun,  340,  affirmed  71  N.  Y.  590; 
Douahiic  V.  Case,  61  N.  Y.  631  ;  Case  v. 
Dexter,  106  N.  Y.  548,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  449  ; 
Harris  v.  Oakley,  130  N.  Y.  1,  28  N.  E. 
Rep.  530,  reversing  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  232. 
North  Carolina  Allen  v.  Sallinger,  108 
N.  C.  159,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  896;  Radford 
V.  Edwards,  88  N.  C.  347.  Oregon  :  Hick- 
lin  V.  McClear,  19  Oreg.  508,  22  Pac.  Rep. 
10.57;  Kanne  v.   Otty,  25   Oreg.  531,  36 


Pac.  Rep.  5'57.  Pennsylvania  :  Hughes  v. 
Westmoreland  Coal  Co.  104  Pa.  St.  207; 
Palmer  v.  Farrell,  129  Pa.  St.  162,  18 
Atl.  Rep.  761.  Texas  :  Kingston  v.  Pick- 
ens, 46  Tex.  99;  Coffey  v.  Hendricks, 
66  Tex.  676,  2  S.  W.  Rej).  47  ;  Norris 
V.  Hunt,  51  Tex.  609  ;  Clark  v.  Gregory 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  244  ;  Liu- 
ney  v.  Wood,  66  Tex.  22,  17  So.  Rep.  244  ; 
Dwyre  ;•.  Speer  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S. 
W.  Rep.  585.  Vermont :  Patch  v.  Keeler, 
28  Vt.  332;  Hull  v.  Fuller,  7  Vt.  100; 
Clary  v.  McGlynn,  46  Vt.  347  ;  Pingry  v. 
Watkins,  17  Vt.  379;  Rugg  v.  Ward,  64 
Vt.  402,  23  Atl.  Rep.  726.  Wisconsin: 
Lego  V.  Medley,  79  Wis.  211,  48  N.  W. 
Rep.  375 ;  Lyman  i\  Babcock,  40  Wis. 
503.  See,  also,  Ganson  v.  Madigan,  15 
Wi.s.  144,  82  Am.  Dec.  659;  Prentiss  v. 
Brewer,  1 7  Wis.  635  ;  Rockwell  v.  Insur- 
ance Co.  21  Wis.  548  ;  and  Sawyer  r.  In- 
surance Co.  37  Wis.  503.  Washington  : 
Squire  r.  Greer,  2  Wash.  209,  20  Pac. 
Rep.  222. 

1  Thompson  v.  Motor  Road  Co.  82  Cal. 
497,  23  Pac.  Rep.  130. 

2  Clark  V.  Powers,  45  HI.  283. 

"  '^  Ambiguitas  patens,"  say i^  Lord  Ba- 
con, "  is  that  which  appears  to  be  am- 
biguous  upon   the   deed  or  instrument] 

fl8?. 


§  ooS.]  DESCRIPTION    AND    HOUNDAKIKS. 


tical  niominiont  or  boundary  referred  to  in  a  deed  is  always  a 
subjoot  of  parol  evidence,  and,  when  disputed,  it  is  always  left  to 
tlh'  jury  to  say  what  was  the  actual  monument  intended.  Thus 
there  may  be  two  trees  of  a  similar  species  and  with  similar 
marks ;  two  similar  stakes  not  far  distant  from  each  other ;  or  two 
rivers  of  the  same  name  ;  and  whicli  was  intended  by  the  deed 
would  be  settled  by  parol  evidence,  on  the  ground  Ihat  it  is  a 
latent  ambiguity."  ^  A  boundaiy  line  was  described  as  drawn 
from  a  house  named,  and  reference  was  made  to  a  map  for  a  more 
particular  description.  On  the  map  referred  to  the  line  appeared 
to  be  drawn  from  tlui  northeast  corner  of  the  house.  It  appeared 
in  evidence  that  the  position  of  the  house  was  incorrectly  repre- 
sented upon  tlie  map.  It  was  held,  however,  that  the  trial  judge 
was  bound  to  look  to  the  map  as  forming  part  of  the  deed,  and 
to  tell  the  jur}^  that  the  line  was  to  be  drawn  as  marked  on  the 
map.^ 


Intens  is  that  which  seemeth  certain  and 
without  ambiguity,  for  iiuythinj^  that  ap- 
peareth  upon  the  deed  or  instrument ;  hut 
there  is  some  collateral  matter  out  of  the 
deed  that  breedeth  the  ambiguity."  Ba- 
con's Tracts;  Patch  v.  White,  117  U.  S. 
210,  6  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  617,  710  ;  Holcomb 
V.  Mooney,  13  Oreg.  503,  507,  11  Pac.  Rep. 
274;  Fisher  i\  Quackenbush,  83  111.310; 
Kingston  v.  Pickins,  46  Tex.  99  ;  Master- 
son  V.  Todd,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  131,  24  S. 
W.  Rep.  682  ;  Brooks  v.  Britt,  4  Dev.  L. 
481  ;  Thornell  v.  Brockton,  141  Maj^s. 
151,  6  N.  E.  Rep.  74. 

In  Minor  v.  Powers  (Tex.),  24  S.  W. 
Rep.  710,  Fisher,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  The  in- 
strument itself  may, not  disclose  any  uu- 
CL-rtainty  or  doubt,  and  may  upon  its  face 
give  a  perfect  description  ;  but  in  an  at- 
tempt to  apply  it,  when  it  is  found  that 
the  descri[;tion  will  apply  to  two  or  more 
objects  or  subjects,  or  is  a  misdei^cription 
of  the  ol)ject  or  subject  intended  by  the 
conveyance,  a  latent  ambiguity  results, 
and  evidence  is  admissible  to  explain  and 
remove  it." 

In  Gentile  r,  Crossan  (N.  M.),  38  Pac. 
Rep.  247,  a  deed  described  a  boundary  as 
follows  :  "  Y  del  camino  a  las  lomas ;  " 
meaning,   "  And   from   the  road   to  [las 

?84 


lomas]  the  hills."  There  was  strong  evi- 
dence that  "  las  lomas  "  signified,  in  that 
viciuity,  a  certain  kind  <>f  hills.  It  was 
held  that  the  use  of  the  term  constituted 
a  latent  ambiguity  which  could  be  ex- 
pkiined  by  parol  evidence. 

1  Claremont  v.  Carlton,  2  N.  H.  369,  9 
Am.  Dec.  88,  per  Woodbury,  J.  To  like 
effect,  see  Coe  v.  Rittcr,  86  Mo.  277 ; 
Thacker  v.  Howeil  (Ky.),  26  S.  W.  Rep. 
719  ;  Dorr  v.  School  Di.strict,  40  Ark.  237  ; 
Greeley  v.  Weaver  (Me.),  13  Atl.  Rep. 
575;  Hoar  v.  Goulding,  116  Mass.  132. 

■^  Lyle  V.  Richards,  1  L.  R.  H.  L.  222, 
241.  Lord  Westbury  dissented,  on  the 
ground  that,  it  being  ascertained  that  the 
house  itself  was  incorrectly  laid  down  on 
the  map,  it  was  im])ossible  to  know  by 
an  examination  of  the  deeds,  or  by  their 
coiistvuction  alone,  from  what  corner  of 
the  house  the  boundary  line  was  to  be 
drawn  ;  that  consequently  4here  was  a 
latent  ambiguity,  which  Was  to  be  deter- 
mined Ity  evidence,  and  was  not  dei)endcnt 
on  construction.  He  said  :  "  But  the  ques- 
tion here  is  not  of  the  interpretation  of 
the  deed  itself,  nor  even  of  the  construc- 
tion of  the  description  of  the  parcels,  but 
of  ihe  inference  to  be  derived  from  a  map 
as  to  the  relative  position  of  two  objects 


PAROL    EVIDENCE. 


[§  339. 


Wliere  there  is  a  reservation  or  exception  of  one  acre  of  land, 
from  the  southwest  corner  of  the  hmd  described,  "together  with 
the  buildings  thereon,"  and  the  grantor  remained  in  possession  of 
all  the  buildings,  he  could  show  that  one  square  acre  in  the  south- 
east corner  of  the  land  would  not  include  all  the  buildings  re- 
served by  him,  and  that  it  was  intended  to  reserve  an  acre  of  such 
shape  as  would  include  them.^ 

339.  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  apply  the  description 
to  the  parcel  intended  to  be  conveyed,  when  the  terms  used  in 
the  deed  leave  it  uncertain  what  property  was  intended  to  be 
embraced  in  it.'^  Such  evidence  cannot  be  used  to  enlarge  the 
scope  of  the  descriptive  words,  but  only  to  fit  them  to  the  land 
intended  to  be  described.^  But  the  deed  must  itself  point  to  the 
source  from  which  evidence  aliunde  to  make  the  description  com- 

laid  down  as  adjoin iug  each  other,  where 
one  is  proved  to  be  erroneously  laid  down. 
As  soon  as  that  proof  was  admitted,  it 
became  obvious  that  the  true  position  in 
nature  of  the  tiling  erroneously  laid  down, 
and  the  true  relative  position  of  the  ad- 
joining objects,  must  both  be  ascertained 
by  external  evidence."  The  dissenting 
opinion  seems  to  be  the  better  opinion. 

1  Lego  V.  Medley,  79  Wis.  211,  48  N. 
W.  Rep.  375. 


2  Cox  V.  Hart,  145  U.  S.  376,  12  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  962  ;  Brown  v.  Cranberry  Iron 
Co.  59  Fed.  Rep.  434,  437.  California  : 
Reamer  v.  Nesmith,  34  Cal.  624  ;  Thomp- 
son V.  Southern  Cal.  M.  R.  Co.  82  Cal. 
497,  23  Pac.  Rep.  130.  Colorado:  Mur- 
ray V.  Hobson,  10  Colo.  66,  13  Pac.  Rep. 
921.  Florida:  Andreu  v.  Watkins,  26 
Fla.  390,  7  So.  Rep.  876.  Georgia :  Gross 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Coody  (Ga.),  21  S.  E.  Rep. 
217.     Illinois:  Cunningham  c.  Thornton, 

28  111.  App.  58;  Mason  v.  Merrill,  129 
111.  .503,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  799  ;  :\Iycrs  v. 
Ladd,  26  111.  415;  Smith  v.  Crawford, 
81  111.  296.  Iowa  :  Judd  v.  Anderson,  51 
Iowa,  346,  1  N.  W.  Rep.  677.  Massachu- 
setts :  AVatcriiiau  v.  Johnson,  13  Pick. 
261.     Minnesota:  Tiirnbull  ?;.  Schroeder, 

29  Minn.  49,  11  N.  W.  Rep.  147.  Missis- 
sippi: Lochle  V.  Austin,  69  Miss.  271,  1." 
So.  Rep.  838.  Missouri:  Charles  r.  Patch, 
-87    Mo.   450;   Bray    v.   Adams,    114    .Mo. 


486,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  853  ;  Skinker  v.  Haags- 
ma,  99  Mo.  208.  North  Carolina :  Rob- 
bins  V.  Harris,  96  N.  C.  557,  2  So.  Rep. 
70;  Wellons  v.  Jordan,  83  N.  C.  371; 
Walker  v.  Moses,  113  N.  C.  527,  18  S. 
E.  Rep._  339.  Oregon  :  Meier  v.  Kelly,  20 
Oreg.  86,  25  Pac.  Rep.  73 ;  Raymond  v. 
Coffey,  5  Oreg.  132.  Pennsylvania :  Brown 
V.  Willey,  42  Pa.  St.  205  ;  Peart  r.  Brice, 
152  Pa.  St.  277,  25  All.  Rep.  537  ;  Fergu- 
son V.  Staver,  33  Pa.  St.  411  ;  Smith's  Ap- 
peal, 69  Pa.  St.  474.  Texas  :  McWhirter 
V.  Allen,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  649,  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  1007  ;  Cox  v.  Rust  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
29  S.  W.  Rep.  807  ;  Giddings  v.  Day,  84 
Tex.  605,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  682;  Kingston 
V.  Pickins,  46  Tex.  99  ;  Wilson  v.  Smith, 
50  Tex.  365;  Brown  v.  Chambers,  63 
Tex.  131  ;  Koepsel  v.  Allen,  68  Tex.  446, 
4  S.  W.  Rep.  856  ;  Ovcrand  v.  Menczer, 
83  Tex.  122,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  301  ;  Watson 
V.  Baker,  71  Tex.  739,  9  S.  W.  Rep.  867  ; 
Cook  V.  Oliver,  83  Tex.  559, 19  S.  W.  Rej). 
161  ;  Gresham  v.  Cliambers,  80  Tex.  544, 
16  S.  W.  Rep.  326  ;  Flanagan  v.  Bogtrc-s, 
46  Tex.  330.  Vermont :  Wead  v.  St.  Johns- 
bury,  &c.  R.  Co.  64  Vt.  52,  24  All.  Rej). 
361.  Virginia:  Hunter  y.  Hume,  88  Va. 
24,  13  S.  IC.  Rep.  305. 

3  Harrison  v.  Halm,  95  N.  C.  28 ;  Blow 
V.  Vaughan,  105  N.  C.  198,  10  S.  E.  Rep. 
891  ;  Stiles  V.  Estabrooks,  66  Vt.  535,  29 
All.  Rep.  961. 

285 


§  340.] 


DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDARIES. 


plete  is  to  be  sought.'  Tliis  may  sometimes  be  done  by  the  use 
of  a  single  word,  as  for  instance  where  the  hinguage  used  is  iny 
farm,  or  )nij  homestead.- 

The  question  of  the  appHcation  of  a  description  to  its  proper 
subject-matter  is  for  the  jury,  wlio  may  have  tlic  aid  of  all  com- 
petent extrinsic  evitlence.-^  The  question  of  the  identity  of  the 
loi-ation  is  always  one  of  fact  for  the  jury.* 

The  construction  of  the  terms  used  in  a  deed,  siside  from  extra- 
neous evidence,  is  for  the  eourt.^  It  is,  however,  the  province  of 
the  jury  to  determine  the  boundaries  in  controversy  from  all  the 
evidence,  including  the  description  in  the  deed.*^ 

340.  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the  position  of 
monuments  and  boundary  marks  mentioned  in  a  deed,"  or  fixed  by 
the  parties  at  the  time  or  soon  afterwards.  Where  land  has  been 
actually  surveyed,  and  stakes  set  at  the  corners,  it  is  competent 
to   })i'0V(»   bv   parol  their   location,   and,  if  lost   or  destroyed,  the 


1  Blow  V.  Vaughiui,  105  N.  C.  198,  10 
S.  E.  Rep.  891 ;  Massey  v.  Belisle,  2  Ired. 
170;  Coker  v.  Roberts,  71  Tex.  597,  9  S. 
W.  Rep.  665 ;  Black  v.  Pratt  Coal  &  C. 
Co.  85  Ala.  504,  5  So.  Rep.  89 ;  Gaston 
V.  Weir,  84  Ala.  19-3,  4  So.  Rep.  258; 
Norris  v.  Hunt,  51  Tex.  609  ;  Cleveland 
V.  Sims,  69  Tex.  153,  6  S.  W.  Rep.  634  ; 
Bitner  v.  Land  Co.  67  Tex.  341,  3  S.  W. 
Rep.  301. 

^  Blow  V.  Vaughan,  105  N.  C.  198,  10 
S.  E.  Rep.  891  ;  Murdock  v.  Anderson,  4 
Jones  Eq.  77  ;  Carson  v.  Ray,  7  Jones, 
609,  78  Am.  Dec.  267  ;  Brown  v.  Coble, 
76  N.  C.  391. 

But  in  Perry  v.  Scott,  109  N.  C.  374, 
14  S.  E.  Rep.  294,  it  is  declared  that  the 
necessity  for  the  presence  of  the  word 
"  my  "  or  "  my  lands  "  in  such  descrip- 
tion in  conveyances  by  the  owner,  as  in- 
•licated  in  several  of  the  older  cases,  seems 
to  b«  no  longer  recf)gnized,  and  their  im- 
materiality is  distinctly  declared  in  Far- 
mer V.  Batts,  83  N.  C.  387,  where  Smith, 
C.  J.,  says  that  "  the  assertion  of  title 
in  the  vendor  is  not  less  unequivocally 
involved  in  the  very  act  of  disposing 
of  it  as  his  pioi)erty."  It  would,  indeed, 
seem  but  charitable  to  a^^sume  that  he 
who    undertakes   to  convey   property  in- 

286 


tends  to  dispose  of  what  he  claims  to  be 
his  own. 

3  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  1461  ;  Stei- 
gleder  t;.  Marshall,  159  Pa.  St  77,  28  Atl. 
Rep.  240;  King'-ton  ;;.  Pickens,  46  Tex. 
99  ;  Curtis  r.  Aarouson,  49  N.  J.  L.  68,  7 
Atl.  Rep.  886. 

4  Steigledcr  v.  Marshall,  159  Pa.  St.  77, 
28  Atl.  Rep.  240  ;  Keizer  r.  Berm -r  (Pa.), 
1.3  Atl.  Rep.  909;  Oliver  v.  Brown,  80 
Me.  542,  15  Atl.  Rep.  599. 

5  Cox  V.  Hart,  145  U.  S.  376,  12  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  962;  Curtis  v.  Aaronson,  49  N. 
J.  L.  68,  7  Atl.  Rep.  88fi  ;  Robinson  v. 
Jones,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  316,  22  S  \V.  Rep. 
15  ;   Wilson  v.  Smith,  50  Tex.  365,  369. 

c  Cochran  v.  Smith,  73  Ilun,  597,  26  N. 
Y.  Supp.  103. 

"  Xoonan  v.  Lee,  2  Black,  499  ;  Bagley 
I'.  Morrill,  46  Vt.  94 ;  Robin.son  v.  Kime, 
70  N.  Y.  147  ;  Tyler  v.  Fickett,  73  Me. 
410;  Linscott  c.  Fcrnald,  5  Me.  496; 
Strickland  v.  Draughan,  88  N.  C.  315; 
Claremont  v.  Carlton,  2  N.  H.  369,  9  Am. 
Dec.  88;  Benton  v.  ilorsley,  71  Ga.  619; 
Borer  v.  Lange,  44  Minn.  281,  46  N.  "W. 
Rep.  358 ;  Anderson  v.  Richardson,  92 
Cal.  623,  28  Pac.  Rep.  679  ;  Minor  v. 
Kii  klaud  (Tex.  Civ.  Ai)]).),  20  S.  W.  Rep. 
9.32. 


PAROL    EVIDENCE,  [§  340. 

places  where  they  were  set.^  But  if  such  corners  and  monuments 
can  be  determined  by  the  field-notes  of  the  govern  a:  ent  survey  of 
the  land,  tl)ey  are  not  so  unknown  or  uncertain  as  to  allow  the 
admi.ssion  of  parol  evidence  to  locate  them.'-^  It'  the  means  are  at 
hand  to  establish  the  line,  and  a  competent  surveyor  could  locate 
it,  it  is  not  uncertain  in  a  legal  sense. ^  Resoi-t  must  often  be  had 
to  the  existing  circumstances,  and  to  the  construction  put  upon 
the  description  by  the  |)arties  interested,  to  ascertain  where  on 
the  face  of  the  earth  the  moiuinients  and  lines  described  really 
are.^  "It  is  every  day's  experience  in  land  trials,  to  establish  by 
evidence  the  identity  of  both  natural  and  artificial  monuments 
called  for  in  surveys.  If  the  beginning  point  be  at  the  mouth  of 
a.  brook  or  creek,  where  it  empties  into  a  river,  evidence  may  be 
given,  nay,  must  generally  be  given,  to  establish  the  identity  of 
the  brook;  and,  when  once  established  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
jury,  it  has  all  the  effect  of  any  natural  or  artificial  object  called 
for  in  the  survey,  and  will  control  courses  and  distances."^  The 
lines  and  courses  in  a  deed  may  be  established  upon  the  land  by 
showing  the  survey  actually  made  at  the  instance  of  the  parties 
to  the  deed  with  a  view  to  its  execution.^ 

When  the  description  is  by  a  surve}^  however  full  and  precise 
it  may  be,  resort  must  be  had  to  extrinsic  evidence  to  identify  it 
on  the  ground.  If  by  such  evidence  the  land  described  can  be 
found  and  identified  with  reasonable  certainty,  the  description  is 
sufficient.'^ 

Where  the  boundaries  are  may  be  proved  by  any  kind  of  evi- 
dence which  is  admissible  to  prove  any  fact.  As  evidence  which 
may  tend  to  establish  this  fart,  th(^  jury  may  consider,  among 
other  things,  actual  occupation,  ancient  reputation,  the  admission 
of  a  party  against  his  interest,  and  the  agreement  of  the  parties 

1  Borer  v.  Lange,  44  Minn.  281,46  N.  Wing  v.  Bnrgis,  13  Me.  Ill  ;  Wnlsh  v. 
W.  Kep.  358 ;  Turnbull  r.  Schroeder,  29  Hill,  38  Cal.  481;  Wills  j;.  Levcrich,  20 
Minn.  49,   11    N.   W.   Kep.    147;  Hoolen      Oreg.  168,  25  Pac.  Kep.  398. 

V.  Comerford,  152    Mass.    591,  26   N.  K.         •'''  Ayers  ?;.  Watson,  113  U.  S.  594,  605, 

Kep.  407.  5  S.  Ct.  Kep.  641,  per  Bradley,  J. 

2  Pickett  i;.  Nelson,  79  Wis.  9,  47  N.  '■  Euliss  v.  MeAdams,  108  N.  C.  .507,13 
W.  Kej).  436.  S.  E.  Rep.  162  ;  Koberts  v.  Preston,  100 

^  Ilartung  v.  Witte,    59   Wis.   285,   18  N.  C.  243,   6  S.  K.  Kep.  574;  Kronenber- 

N.  W.  l{cp.  175.  ger  r.  Iloffner,  44  Mo.  185. 

*  Stone   );.  Clark,  1    Met.  378,   35   Ain.  '   Doutliit  ??.  Kobin.son,  55  Tex.  69. 
Dec.  370;  Tyler  v.   Fickett,  73  Me.  410; 

287 


^  3U.]  DKSCUirilOX    AND    BOUXl)Ai;li:S. 

as  to  the  actual  location  of  tlu'  houiularv.'  Kel'cieiice  may  also 
be  hail  to  prior  tie.  ds  conveyini;'  the  same  hiiuL- 

341.  What  are  boundaries  is  a  question  of  law  for  the 
court,  but  where  tlu'  boundaries  are  u|)oii  the  ground  is  a  ques- 
tion of  laet  to  be  determined  by  the  evidence.'^  It  is  for  the  jury 
to  lit  the  boundaries  describetl  to  the  land.  Where  the  terms 
used  in  the  deseription  of  a  deed  are  unambiguous,  its  interpre- 
tation is  for  the  C(jurt ;  but  wliere  the  terms  themsi'lves  are  am- 
biguous, or  their  presumptive  meaning  is  rebutted  by  eompetent 
proof  aliunde,  the  question  of  the  meaning  of  the  deed  is  for  the 
jury.^ 

Wliere  a  government  corner  between  adjoining  landowners 
has  been  obliterated,  the  exact  location  of  the  corner  may  be  de- 
termined by  the  jury  from  the  evidence.^ 

Where  tlie  monuments  called  for  by  a  survey  have  disappeared, 
but  there  is  evidence  of  their  existence  and  location  at  a  former 
time,  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  the  line  was  indicated 
by  monuments.*^ 

Where  the  true  location  of  a  government  corner  is  in  doubt, 
evidence  is  admissible  to  show  where  the  original  marks  of  such 
corner  were  years  before,  when  they  were  very  plain  and  distinct, 
and  were  generally  regarded  and  recognized  as  indicating  the 
original  government  corner ;  and  to  that  end  it  may  be  shown 
that  permanent  improvements,  as  lines  of  trees,  roads,  Imildings 
public  and  {)rivate,  were,  when  such  indications  were  plain  and 
visible,  located  with  reference  thereto  as  the  true  government 
corner,  by  persons  who  had  no  other  interest  than  to  locate  them 
correetlyj 

1  Joues  V.  Pashby,  62  Mich.  614,  29  N.  Carter,  106  N.  C.  .')34,  11  S.  E.  Rep.  262; 
W.  Rep.  374;  Mulford  v.  Le  Franc,  26  Jones  v.  Bunker,  83  N.  C.  324;  Maisliall 
Cal.  88.  '•.  Fisher,  1   Jones,  111  ;   Andreii  v.  Wat- 

2  Beaumont  v.  Field,  I    B.  &  ALL  247  ;  kins,  26  Fla.  390,  7  So.  Rep.  876. 
McAfee  v.  Arline,  83   Ga.  045,    10  S.  E.  •»  Meeks  v.  Willard   (N.  J.  L.),  29  Atl. 
Rep.  441;  Daily   v.  Litchfield,    10   Mich.  Rep.  318. 

29  ;  Cronin  v.  Gore,  38  Mich.  .'581  ;  Fahey  ^  McKey  v.   Hyde  Park,  134  U.  S.  84, 

V.  Marsh,  40  Mich.  236;   Weeks   i\  Mar-  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  .512;    Kittell  w.  Jenssen, 

tin,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  6.56  ;  Cannon  i'.  Em-  37  Neb.  685,  5(i   N.  \V.  Rep.  487  ;  Bushey 

mans,  44  Minu.  294,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  356.  v.  South  Mountain  M.  &  I.  Co.  136  Pa. 

»  Lyle  V.  IJichards,  L.  R.  H.  L.  222;  St.  541,  20  Atl.  Rep.  549. 

Scull  V.  Priiden,  92  N.  C.  168  ;   Abbott  v.  "  Seneca  Nation  v.  Hujiaboom,  9  N.  Y. 

Abbott,  51    Me.  575,  581  ;  Farley  v.  Des-  Supp.  699.  affirmed   132  N.  Y.  492,  30  N. 

londe,  5S  Tex.  588;  Scott  v.  Yard,  46  N.  E.  Rep.  983. 

J,  Eq.  79,  18  Atl.  Rep.  359  ;  Bonaparte  f.  "  Arneson  v.  Spawu  (S.  T>.),  49  N.  \V. 
288 


PAROL   EVIDENCE.  [§§  342,  343. 

342.  The  office  of  extrinsic  evidence  as  applied  to  the  de- 
scription of  a  parcel  is  to  explain  a  latent  ambiguity,  or  to  point 
ont  the  property  described  on  tlie  ground.  Such  evidence  must 
not  contradict  the  deed,  or  make  a  description  of  otlier  land  than 
that  described  in  tlie  deed.^  .  It  cannot  be  used  to  make  the  deed 
convey  Lmd  not  embraced  in  the  words  used  to  describe  the  sub- 
ject-niattcr  of  the  deed,  but  only  to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the 
parties  as  expressed  by  such  words.^  The  test  of  the  admi.-siiility 
of  such  evidence  is  involved  in  the  inquiry  whether  it  tends  to 
explain  some  descriptive  word  or  expression  of  doubtful  import 
contained  in  the  deed,  so  that  the  description,  aided  by  such  ex- 
planation, identifies  the  land  conveyed.'^ 

343.  There  must  be  something  in  the  deed  to  suggest  the 
possibility  of  locating  the  land  by  the  use  of  competent  ex- 
planatory evidence,^  and  there  are  cases  which  seem  to  go  to  the 
extreme  limit  in  this  direction.  Thus  a  reference  to  the  land  as 
being  "  the  interest  in  two  shares,  adjoining  the  lands  "  of  persons 
named,  belonging  to  tlie  vendor,  was  held  sufficient  to  suppoit 
explanator}'  evidence  tliat  there  was  a  tract  of  land  which  fi;ted 
tlie  rest  of  the  description,  in  which  it  was  known  that  the  ven- 
dor claimed  two  shares  ;  and,  moreover,  that  the  land  had  been 
more  partieulai-ly  described  in  a  partition  proceeding." 

Evidence  aliunde  is  pointed  to  by  a  reference  to  another  deed 
for  the  description,  or  some  part  of  the  desciiption  ;^  or  by  a 
description  of  the  land  as  being  the  same  inherited  by  the  grantor 
from  his  father,  or  devised  to  him  by  some  other  person  ;  or  as 

Rep.  1066  ;  Baker  v.  McArthur,  .54  Mich.  16;  Keamer  v.  Nesmith,  34  Cal.  624  ;  Mi- 

139,  19  N.  W.  Rep.   923  ;   Coy   r.   Millei-,  nor  v.  Powers  (Tex.),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  710; 

31  Neb.  348,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  1046  ;  Jacobs  Kingston  v.  Pickins,  46  Tex.  99. 

V.  Moseley,  91  Mo.  457,4  S.  W.  Rep.  135 ;  *  Farmer  v.  Baits,  83  N.  C.  387  ;  Dca- 

Major  V.  Watson,  73  Mo.   661;  Liberty  ver  v.  Jones  (N.  C),  19  S.  E.   Rep.  6.S7; 

V.   Burns,   114  Mo.  426,  19    S.  W.  Rep.  Kea  v.  Robeson,  5  Ired.   Eq.  373  ;  Mms- 

1107.  terson   v.  Todd,  6    Tex.  Civ.  App.  131,  24 

1  Ilannon    v.    Hilliard,    101    Ind.  310;  S.  W.  Rep.  682. 

Jennings  r.  Biizeadine,  44  Mo.  332  ;  Fratt  ^  Farmers.  Batts,  83  N.  C.  387.     For 

V.Woodward,  32  Cul.  219,  91    Am.  Dec.  other  extrinsic  cases,  see  Edwards  y.  Bow- 

573 ;  Fisher  v.  Quackenbush,  83  111.  310.  den,  99  N.  C.  80 ;  McGhiwhorn  v.  Worlh- 

2  Coleman  v.  Manhattan  Beach  Co.  94  inyton,  98  N.  C.  199. 

N.  Y.  229.  6  Wharton  v.   Eborn,   88   N.   C.   344 ; 

8  Blow  V.  Vaughan,  105  N.  C.  198,  10  Cleveland  v.  Sims,  69  Tex.  153,  6  S.  W. 

S.  E   Hep.  891  ;  Massey  v.  Belisle,  2  Ired.  Rep.  634;  Gilder  v.  Brenham,   67    Tex. 

170;  McCormick  v.  Monroe,  1   Jones,  13,  345,  3  S.  W.  Hep.  309. 

VOL.  I.  289 


^^     44-346.]  DESCRIPTION    AND   BOUNDAKIES. 

liaviiij;  t'oruu'rly  been  in  the  possession  of  ii  person  named ;  ^  or 
as  (.'allt'J  by  a  distinct  name,  or  described  as  known  by  that  name.^ 

341.  There  must  be  a  sufficient  description  in  the  deed  to 
afford  a  basis  for  admitting  parol  evidence  to  identity  the  hind. 
A  description  cannot  be  made  by  parol  evidence.^  Thus  a  de- 
sciiplion  of  hmd  as  consisting  of  fifty  acres  situate  on  the  head- 
waters of  a  creek  named  cannot  be  aided  by  parol,  because  there 
is  nothing  in  the  deed  by  which  tlie  location  on  the  creek  can  be 
determined.^  For  the  same  reason,  a  deed  of  a  hundred  and  fifty 
acres  of  land  "  lying  on  Watery  Branch,"  in  a  county  named,  is 
void.^ 

A  description  of  land  as  "  all  my  interest  in  a  piece  of  land 
adjoining  the  lands  of  A  and  B  and  others,"  is  too  vague  to  admit 
of  extrinsic  evidence  to  fit  the  description  to  the  land.^  Whether 
such  a  description  is  too  vague  to  admit  of  extrinsic  evidence, 
when  aided  by  a  reference  to  the  number  of  acres  in  the  parcel, 
seems  a  little  uncertain.' 

345.  The  particular  terms  used  to  describe  the  property 
may  be  defined  by  parol  evidence.  The  term  "  messuage " 
properly  includes  a  dwelling-house  and  the  land  usually  held  with 
it.  Therefore,  where  land  is  described  as  a  "messuage"  in  the 
occupation  of  a  person  named,  oral  evidence  is  admissible  to 
show  that  a  garden  adjoining  had  always  been  occupied  with  the 
messuage  and  passed  by  the  deed.^ 

A  "farm"  may  be  defined  b}'  parol  evidence  showing  what 
lands,  house,  and  buildings  have  been  used  and  known  as  consti- 
tuting the  farm. 

346.  Land  described  as  "  my  residence,"  "  my  homestead," 
"  my  place,"  "  my  lot,"  may  be  identified  by  pai*ol  evidence  if 
necessary.^     Land  is  sufficiently  described  as  situated  in  a  county 

i  Rrowa  v.  Coble,  76  N.  C.  391.  ^  Dickens  v.  Barnes,  79  N.  C.  490 ;  Far- 

-  Ciise  V.  Dexter,  106  N.  Y.  548.  mer  v.  Batts,  83  N.  C.  387.    The  decisions 

^  Dickens   v.   Barnes,    79   N.    C.  490;  in  these  cases  do  not  seem  to  be  quite  in 

Walker  v.  Moses,  113  N.  C.  527,  18  S.  E.  harmony. 

Rep.  339  ;  Farmer  v.  Batts,  83  N.  C.  387  ;  «  poe  v.  Webster,  12  A.  &  E.  442. 

Blow  V.  Vaughan,  105  N.  C.  198,  10  S.  E.  ^  Hodf,'es  v.  Rowing,   58  Conn.  12,  18 

Rep    891  ;  Bowers  v.  Andrews?,  52  Miss.  Atl.  Rep.  979 ;  Andrews  v.  Pearson,  68 

596.     See  §  323.  Me.  19  ;  Euliss  v.  McAdams,  108  N.  C. 

*  Radford  v.  Edwards,  88  N.  C.  347.  .507,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  162  ;  Carbon   v.  Ray, 

*  Capps  V.  Holt,  5  .Jones  Eq.  153.  See,  7  Jones,  609;  Miudock  v.  Anderson,  4 
also,  Hinchey  v.  Nichols,  72  N.  C.  66.  Jones  Eq.   77  ;  Lente  v.  Clark,   22   Fla. 

6  Harrell  i;.  Butler,  92  N.  C  20.  515,  1   So.  Rep.  149;  Lick  v.  O'Donnell, 

290 


PAROL    EVIDENCE.  [§  347. 

named,  containing  a  certain  number  of  acres,  and  being  the  land 
on  which  I  now  reside.^  Or  all  my  land  in  a  certain  town,  county, 
or  State:  2  or  all  my  lands  wherever  situated.^  If  the  land  be 
described  as  the  land  inherited  by  tlie  grantor  from  his  parents 
or  others  named,  evidence  to  identify  the  land  so  inherited  is  ad- 
missible.* Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  identify  land  described 
by  a  name  applied  by  the  parties  to  the  property,  though  not  so 
known  by  the  entire  neighborhood.'^ 

347.  If  the  property  be  described  as  a  house  and  lot  in  a 
street  named,  evidence  is  admissible  that  the  vendor  or  grantor 
had  only  one  hnuse  and  lot  on  that  street,  and  that  the  parties 
had  been  in  treaty  for  the  purchase  and  sale  of  such  house  and 
lot.  Such  evidence  identifies  the  property,  and  applies  the  de- 
scription to  the  property  intended.*^  "  In  a  deed  the  words  of 
description  are,  of  course,  intended  to  relate  to  an  estate  owned 
by  the  grantor.  And,  in  our  opinion,  this  is  also  the  presump- 
tion in  construing  a  contract  for  a  future  conveyance.  If  the 
party  who  enters  into  the  agreement  in  fact  owns  a  parcel  answer- 
ing to  the  description,  and  only  one  such,  that  must  be  regarded 
as  the  one  to  which  the  description  refers.  With  the  aid  of  this 
presumption,  the  words  '  a  house  and  lot,'  on  a  street  where  the 
party  who  uses  the  language  owns  only  one  estate,  are  as  definite 
and  precise  as  the  words  ••  my  house  and  lot '  would  be,  —  a  descrip- 
tion the  sufficiency  of  which  has  been  placed  beyond  all  doubt  by 
very  numerous  authorities."'' 

A  description  of  a  town  lot  by  its  length  and  breadth,  and  also 
by  the  improvements  upon  it,  is  sufficient  when  it  is  shown  that 
no  other  lot  in  the  town  has  improvements  of  a  like  character. § 

3  C.il.  .59,  58  Am.  Dec.  383;  McAfee  v.  ^  Dougherty  r.  Cliesnutt,  86  Tenu.  1, 
Arline,  83  Ga  64.'),  10  S.  E.  Eep.  441  ;  5  S.  W.  Rep.  444 ;  Euliss  v.  McAdams, 
Tethcrow  v.  Anderson,  63  Mo.  96;  Jack-  108  N.  C.  507,  13  S.  E.  Kep.  162;  lien- 
son  r.  DeLancey,  4  Cow.  427,  11  Johns.  Icy  v.  Wilson,  81  N.  C.  405;  Smith  v. 
365,   13  Johns.   537;  Pond  v.  Bergh,  10  Low,  2  Led.  457. 

Paige,  140,  156;  Campbell  v.  Morgan,  68  ^  Hurley  i'.  Brown,  98  Mass.  545,  96 

Hun,  490,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  1001.  Am.  Dec.  671  ;  Mead  v.  Pari<er,  115  Mass. 

1  Swiney  ;;.  Swiney,  14  Lea,  316.  413,  20  Am.  Rep.  110. 

2  Frey  v.  Clifford,  44  Cal.  335;  Brown  '^  McAfie  v.  Arline,  83  Ga.  645,  10  S. 
V.  Warren,  16  Nev.  228  ;  Starling  r.  Blair,  E.  Rep.  441  ;  Hurley  r.  Brown,  98  Mass. 

4  Bibb,  289;  Blair  y.  Burns,  8  Colo.  397,  545,  547,  96  Am.  Dec.  671,  per  Fos- 
8  Pac.  Rep.  569.  ter,  J. 

3  Petti-n.'w  V.  Dobbelaar,  63  Cal.  396.  »   Ilarkcy  v.  Cain,  69  Tex.  146,  6  S.  W. 
*  vSmith  V.   Westuil,   76   Tex.   509,  13     Rep.  637. 

S.   W.  Rep.  540. 

291 


§§  348-351.]  DHSciarriON  and  boundakip:s. 

348.  A  conveyance  in  general  terms  of  all  the  lands  of  the 
grantor  wherever  situated,  without  iuctlicr  (.Inscription,  may  be 
rendered  oeitain  as  to  the  lands  conveyed  by  provintj  wiiat  lands 
the  i;rantor  owned  at  tlie  time  such  conveyance  was  executed.' 
B}' a  convevance  of  all  tlie  grantor's  real  estate  without  deseri[)- 
tion,  only  that  of  which  he  holds  the  legal  title  passes.^ 

349.  A  parcel  of  land  described  as  adjoining  the  lands  of 
persons  named,  and  as  containing  a  specitied  number  of  acres, 
is  sufficiently  described  to  atlniit  parol  evidence  as  to  the  land 
intended  to  be  conveyed.^  If  the  quantity  of  land  be  given,  and 
it  he  described  as  situate  in  a  certain  county  adjoining  the  lands 
of  three  persons  named,  the  question  left  open  for  explanation  by 
proof  aliunde  is  whether  the  grantor  had  a  tract  of  land  in  the 
county  containing  the  quantity  named,  and  so  bounded  by  the 
lands  of  the  three  persons  named  as  to  separate  it  from  other 
tracts,  and  to  indicate  its  boundaries  with  reasonable  certainty."* 

350.  A  deed  conveying  all  of  a  designated  tract  of  land 
not  included  in  a  previous  conveyance  by  the  grantor  to  a  third 
person  is  insufficient  of  itself  to  show  title  to  any  of  such  lands 
in  the  grantee,  though  the  deed  may  be  made  effectual  by  show- 
ing what  part  of  the  ti'act  had  not  been  conveyed  to  such  third 
person.^  The  deed  will  convey  title  to  such  land  as  the  grantor 
actually  owns  within  the  limits  of  the  whole  tract  described.^  If 
land  be  described  as  a  part  of  a  larger  tract,  and  as  being  the 
remainder  of  such  tract  not  already  sold  by  the  grantor,  there  is 
sufficient  data,  for  determining  the  land  intended  to  be  conveyed.'^ 

351.  A  description  of  a  tract  of  land  by  name  only  points 
to  evidence  aliunde  showing  the  existence  of  a  body  of  land  gen- 
erally known  by  the  name  designated,  and  such  evidence  is  admis- 
sible to  iipply  the  name  to  the   land  intended.^     A  grant  of  the 

1  Clifton  Heights  Land  Co.  v.  Randell,  E.  Rep.  294 ;  McGlawhorn  v.  Worthing- 
82  Iowa,  89,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  90.5  ;  Harvey  ton,  98  N.  C.  199,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  633;  Ed- 
V.  Edens,  69  Tex.  420,  6  S  W.  Rep.  306;  wards  v.  Bowden,  99  N.  C.  80,  5  S.  E. 
Falls  Land,  &c.  Co.  v.  Chisholm,  71  Tex.  Rep.  283. 

523,  9  S.  W.  Rep.  479;   Witt  v.  Harlan,  *  Blow  i-.  Vaughan,  105  N.  C.  198,  10 

66   Tex.  660,  2   S.  W.   Rep.  41  ;  Smith  S.  E.  Rep.  891. 

V.  Westall,  76  Tex.  509,  13   S.  AY.   Rep.  *  Maier  v.  Joslin,  46  Minn.  228,  48  N. 

540.  W.  Rep.  909. 

2  Jamaica  Pond  A(iucduct  Co.  v.  ^  Baker  v.  Clay,  101  Mo.  553,  14  S.  W. 
Chandler,  9   Allen,   159,   169,   per   Bige-  Rep.  734. 

low,  J.  "  Duncan  v.  Madara,  106  Pa.  St.  562. 

8  Perry  v.  Scott,   109  N.  C.  374,  14  S.         ^  Andrews  v.  Pearson,  68  Me.  19;  Eu- 

292 


PAROL    EVIDENCE. 


[§  352. 


land  by  such  name  passes  the  title  to  tjie  entire  tract  known  by 
that  name.^  Where  a  mortgage  conveyed  "  the  following  de- 
sci'ibed  tract  or  parcel  of  land,  to  wit,  the  property  known  as  '  K's 
Grist  and  Saw  Mill  and  Gin,'  together  with  all  the  privileges  and 
appurtenances  belonging  ther-eto,"  parol  evidence  was  admitted 
to  show  that  two  acres  of  land  on  which  the  mill  and  sin  were 
situated  had  always  been  nsed  in  connection  therewith,  and  were 
necessary  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  same.- 

352,  A  deed  should  be  construed  ^^rith  reference  to  the 
actual  state  of  the  land  at  the  time  of  its  execution.  The  court 
should  as  nearly  as  possible  assume  the  position  of  the  parties  to 
the  deed,  and  consider  the  circumstances  of  the  transaction  be- 
tween them,  and  then  read  and  interpret  the  words  used  in  the 
liffht  of  these  circumstances.^  A  deed  will  not  be  held  void  for 
uncertainty  so  long  as  by  reasonable  intendment  it  can  be  ascer- 
tained what  both  parties  understood  to  be  embraced  in  the  de- 
scription. "  Descriptions  do  not  identify  of  themselves  ;  they  only 
furnish  the  means  of  identification.  They  give  us  certain  marks 
or  characteristics,  —  perhaps  historical  data  or  incidents,  —  by 
the  aid  of  which  we  may  single  out  the  thing  intended  from 
all  others  :  not  by  the  description  alone,  but  by  that  explained 
and  applied.  Even  lands  are  not  identified  by  description  until 
we  place  ourselves  in   the  position   of  the  parties   by  whom  the 


liss  V.  McAdams,  108  N.  C.  507,  13  S.  E. 
Rep.  1 62  ;  Henley  v.  Wilson,  81  N.  C. 
405 ;  Smith  v.  Low,  2  Ired.  457  ;  Scnll  v. 
Pruden,  92  N.  C.  168;  McGlawhorn  v. 
WorthinL-ton,  98  N.  C.  199,  3  S.  E.  Kep. 
633  ;  McAfee  r.  Arline,  83  Ga.  645,  10  S. 
E.  Kep.  441  ;  Coleman  v.  iMaiihattan  Bank 
Co.  94  N.  Y.  229;  Marvin  v.  Elliot,  99 
Mo.  616,  12  S.  W.  Hep.  899;  Trentman 
I'.  Ncff,  124  Ind.  503,  24  N.  E.  Kep. 
895. 

1  Triiptt  r.  Adnm.s,  66  Cal.  218;  Haley 
i\  Ame't()y,44  Cal.  132;  Stanley  )•.  Green, 
12  Cal.  148;  Ilnddleson  v.  Reynolds,  8 
Gill,  332. 

2  Kimbrell  i'.  Rogers,  90  Ala.  339,  7 
So.  Rep.  241.  "While,  ordinarily,  land 
cannot  he  .';!ii(l  to  jiiiss  as  appnrtenant  to 
land,  if  ihct  land  expressly  granted  does 
not  admit  of  reasonable  enjoyment  with- 


out certain  adjacent  land,  which  has  been 
constantly  used  with  the  land  j;ranted,  it 
will  also  pass."  Woodman  r.  Smith,  53 
Me.  79;  Riddle  v.  Littiefield,  53  N.  H. 
503,  16  Am.  Rep.  388  ;  Voorhecs  v.  Bur- 
chard,  55  N.  Y.  98  ;  Esty  i.  Currier,  98 
Mass.  500;  Allen  v.  Scott,  21  Pick.  25,32 
Am.  Dec.  238. 

3  Jones  V.  Pashby,  62  Mich.  614,  29  N, 
W.  Rep.  374;  Thompson  v.  Motor  Road 
Co.  82  Cal.  497,  23  Pac.  Rep.  130;  Truett 
V.  Adams,  66  Cal.  218,  5  Pac.  Rep.  96  : 
Thoinji.son  v.  So.  Cal.' M.  R.  Co.  82  Cal 
497,  23  Pac.  Rep.  130;  Me.sser  v.  Oes 
treich,  52  Wis.  684,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  6 
Whitney  v.  Robinson,  53  Wis  309,  10  N 
W.  Rep.  512;  Cilley  v.  Childs,  73  Me 
130;  Elliott  (.'.  Gilchrist,  64  N.  H.  260,  9 
Atl.  Rep  382  ;  Wolfe  v.  Dyer,  95  Mo. 
545,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  551. 

293 


§§  353,  :lo4.]  dkscrii'tion  and  boundaries. 

desci-ip'.ion  luis  been  prepared,  :iiul  read  it  with  the  knowledge  of 
the  su'.iji  C't-m;itter  which  they  had  at  the  time."  ^ 

A  bcnid  or  agreement  to  convey  may  assist  in  exphiining  an 
aml)i^;uity  in  the  deed  made  in  pursuance  of  such  bond  or  agree- 
ment: f^r,  though  the  negotiations  of  the  parties  which  led  to 
tlic  making  of  the  dt-ed  are  merged  in  the  deed  and  cannot  be 
aUow.d  to  eontrol  the  deed,  they  may  serve  to  explain  any 
auibii;iiity  in  it,  or  to  point  out  what  is  errcmeous.^ 

353.  A  grant  will  be  held  void  for  uncertainty  when,  after 
resort  to  oral  proof,  the  parcel  is  still  uncertain,  and  it  remains 
a  matter  nf  mere  conjecture  what  was  intended  by  the  instru- 
ment.-^ It  the  description  is  not  sufficient,  with  the  aid  of  extrin- 
sic testimony,  to  identify  the  land  and  all  its  boundaries,  the  deed 
will  not  pass  any  title  to  the  grantee.* 

A  deed  describing  land  merely  as  lying  on  Flat  River,  includ- 
ing a  house  and  lot  named,  adjoining  the  lands  of  persons  named, 
is  void  for  uncertainty,  because  no  quantity  of  land  is  given,  nor 
any  means  pointed  out  by  which  the  land  about  the  house  and  lot 
named  could  be  laid  otf.^ 

III.  Boundary  Lines  hy  Agreement. 

354.  An  oral  agreement  fixing  a  dividing  line  between 
adjoining  owners  is  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds,  if  such 
line  had  been  in  doubt  or  dispute  ;  and  the  agreement  may  be 
enforced  in  equity,  and  at  law  as  well.*^     Such  agreement  is  not 

1  Willey  V.  Snyder,  34  Mich.  60.     And  Blow  v.  Vaushan,  105  N.  C.  198,  10  S.  E. 

see  Hoffman  v.  Port  Huron  (Mich.),  60  Rep.  891.     See  §§  323,  344. 

N.  W.  Rep.  831.  ^  California  :    White    v.    Spreckels,  7.5 

■2  Moran  y.  Lezotte,  .54  Mich.  8.3,  19  N.  Cal.    610,    17    Pac.    Rep.    715.     Illinois: 

W.  Rep.  757.  Sheets  v.  Sweeney,  136  III.  336,  26  N.  E. 

3  Mason  v.  Merrill,  129  111.  503,  21  N.  Rep.  648;  Cutler  v.  Callison,  72  111.  113; 

E.  Rep.  799  ;  Bernstein  y.  Humes,  71  Ala.  Kerr   v.   Hitt,  75  111.   51;  McNaniara  v. 

260;  Tounsend   v.   Downer,  23  Vt.  225;  Seaton,  82   111.  498;  People  v.  Stahl,  101 

Bates  V.  Bank  of  Missouri,  15  Mo.  309, 55  111.  346  ;  Fisher  v.  Bennehoff,  121  111.  426, 

Am.  Dec    145;  Le  Franc  v.  Richmond,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  1.50;  Schoon maker  r.  Doo- 

5  Sawyer,  601.  little,    118  111.    60.5,    8   N.  E.    Rep.    839 

*  Blow  V.  Vauffhan,    105   N.  C.  198,  10  Kentucky:  Jamison  v.  Petit,  6  Bush,  669 

S.  E.  Rej).  891  ;  McCormick  v.  Monroe,  1  Grigsby  v.  Combs  (Ky.),  21   S.  W.  Rep 

Jones,  13,  16.  •'i7 ;  Ferguson  v.  Crick  (Ky.).  23  S.  W, 

5  Allen  V.   Chambers,  4  Ired.  Eq.  125.  Rep.  668.     Massachusetts:  Bo.«ton  &  W 

For  other   descriptions   held  void  for  in-  R.  Co.  v.  Sparhawk,  5    Met.  469  ;  Wake 

defiuit'-ness,  see  Harrell  v.  Butler,  92  N.  field  i.  Ross,  5  Mason,  16.     Mississippi 

C.  20  ;  Iliiichey  v.  Nichols,  72  N.  C.  66  ;  Archer  v.  Helm,  69  Miss.  730,  11  So.  Rep. 

294 


BOUNDARY    LINES   BY   AGREEMENT. 


[§  355. 


reo-arded  as  passing  the  title  to  any  real  estate,  but  merely  as 
detining  the  line  between  such  owners, ^  "  because  that  can  only 
be  done  by  deed  properly  executed  ;  but  such  settlement  deter- 
mines the  location  of  the  existing  estate  of  each,  and,  when  fol- 
lowed by  possession  and  occupancy,  binds  them,  not  by  way  of 
passing  title,  but  as  determining  the  true  location  of  the  boun- 
dary line  between  their  lands."  ^ 

355.  If  the  divisional  line  is  well  defined  and  known  to 
the  parties,  a  parol  agreement  fixing  upon  a  new  and  different 
line  is  not  binding,  because  it  would  annunt  to  a  parol  convey- 
ance of  land,  contrary  to  the  statute  of  frauds.^     Such  agreement 


3  ;  Natchez  v.  Vandervelde,  31  Miss.  706, 
66  Am.  Dec.  581.  Missouri:  Krider  v. 
Milner,  99  Mo.  145,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  461,  17 
Am.  St.  Rep.  549  ;  Atchison  v.  Pease,  96 
Mo.  566 ;  Schad  v.  Sharp,  95  Mo.  573,  8 
S.  W.  Rep.  549;  Jacobs  u.  Moseley,  91 
Mo.  457,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  135  ;  Acton  v.  Doo- 
ley,  74  Mo.  63  ;  Turner  v.  Baker,  64  Mo. 


305.  West  Virginia :  Gwynn  v.  Schwartz, 
32  W.  Va.  487,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  880. 

^  Bevghoefer  r.  Frazier,  150  111.  577,  37 
N.  E.  Rep.  914. 

3  Schraeder  Min.  Co.  v.  Packer,  129  U. 
S.  688.  Alabama:  Alexander  i-.  Wheeler, 
69  Ala.  332.  Florida :  Watroiis  i'.  Mor- 
rison, 33  Fla.  261,  14  So.  Rep.  805.     Mas- 


218,  27  Am.  Rep.  226  ;  Blair  v.  Smith,  16  sachusetts:  Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Spar- 
hawk,  5  Met.  469.  Michigan:  White  i;. 
Hapeman,  43  Mich.  267,  5  N.  W.  Rep. 
313,  38  Am.  Rep.  178;  Hayes  v.  Living- 
ston, 34  Mich.  384,  22  Am.  Rep.  533. 
Nebraska  :  Trussel  v.  Lewis,  13  Neb.  415, 
42  Am.  Kep.  767.  New  Hampshire  :  Bart- 
lett  V.  Young,  63  N.  H.  265  ;  Dudley  v. 
Elkins,  39  N.  H.  78;  Sawyer  ?;.  Fellows, 
6  N.  H.  107,  25  Am.  Dec.  452.  New  York: 
Vofburgh  V.  Teator,  32  N.  Y^.  561  ;  Terry 
V.  Chandler,  16  N.  Y.  354,  69  Am.  Dec. 
707;  Ambkr  v.  Cox,  13  Hun,  295;  San- 
ford  V.  McDonald,  53  Hun,  263,  6  N.  Y. 
Supp.  613.  North  Carolina  :  Buckner  v. 
Anderson,  111  N.  C.  572,  16  S.  E.  Rep. 
424  ;  Shaffer  v.  Hahn,  1 1 1  N.  C.  1 ,  1 5  S.  E. 
Rep.  1033  ;  Caraway  v.  Chancy,  6  Jones, 
361.  Ohio:  Bobo  v.  Richmond,  25  Ohio 
St.  115.  Pennsylvania:  Fleming  v.  Ram- 
say, 46  Pa.  St.  252.  Texas  :  George  v. 
Thomas,  16  Tex.  74, 89,  67  Am.  Dec.  612  ; 
Coleman  v.  Smith,  55  Tex.  254  ;  Brown- 
ing V.  Atkinson,  46  Tex.  605,  609;  De- 
menti'. Williams,  44  Tex.  158.  Cough- 
ran  V.  Alderetc  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S. 
AV.  Rep.  109.  Wisconsin:  Pickett  v.  Nel- 
son, 71  Wis.  542,  37  N.  W.  Rep.  836; 
Ilartung  v.  Witte,  59  Wis.  285. 
295 


Mo.  273;  Tavlor  v.  Zepp,  14  Mo.  482; 
Smith  V.  McCorkle,  105  Mo.  13.5,  16  S. 
W.  Rep.  602.  New  York :  Voshurgh  v. 
Teator,  32  N.  Y.  561  ;  Davis  v.  Town- 
send,  10  Baib.  333. 

1  Bo.vd  v.  Graves,  4  Wheat.  513.  Dela- 
ware :  Lindsay  i\  Springer,  4  Harr.  (Del.) 
547,  550.  Florida  :  Watrous  v.  Morrison, 
33  Fla.  261,14  So.  Rep.  805.  Illinois: 
Berghoefer  v  Frazier  (111.),  37  K  E.  Rep. 
914  ;  Croweil  ;;.  Manglis,  7  111.  419  ;  Yates 
V.  Shaw,  24  111.367.  Michigan  :  Smith  v. 
Hamilton,  20  Mich.  433,  438,  4  Am.  Rep. 
398;  Burns  v.  Martin,  45  Mich.  22,  24, 
7  N.  W.  Rep.  219.  Missouri:  Blair  v. 
Smith,  16  Mo.  273,  281  ;  Turner  v.  Baker, 
64  Mo.  218,  239,  240,  27  Am.  Rep.  226  ; 
Acton  V.  Dooley,  74  Mo.  63.  New  York  : 
Terry  v.  Chandler,  16  N.  Y.  354,  356,  69 
Am.  Dec.  707  ;  Jackson  r.  Pierce,  2  Johns. 
221  ;  Kip  r.  Norton,  12  Wend.  127  ;  Vos- 
hurgh V.  Teator,  32  N.  Y.  561  ;  Wood  v. 
Lafayette,  46  N.  Y.  484,  68  N.  Y.  181  ; 
Siout  /'.  Woodward,  5  Hun.  340,  affirmed 
71  N.  Y.  590  ;  Siiernian  »,-.  Kane,  86  N.  Y. 
57.  Pennsylvania :  I.'.iuey  r.  Detwciler, 
35  Pa.  St.  409,  412.  Ehode  Island  :  O'Don- 
nell  V.  Penney,  17   K.  1.  164,  20  Atl.  Kep. 


§  356.]  DKSCRirriox  and  boundaries. 

is  bimliiig  only  in  ciist^  the  boundary  line  has  been  the  subject  of 
dispute  and  contention,  and  the  parties,  with  tiie  view  to  settle 
tlie  dispute,  agree  upon  and  settle  a  line  between  their  lands  ;  ^ 
though  a  line  may  be  established  by  acquiescence,  for  a  period 
equal  to  that  fixed  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  where  there  is  no 
dispute  about  it.'-^ 

356.  There  is  a  marked  distinction  between  an  undertaking- 
to  settle  a  disputed  boundary  and  the  mere  consent  of  the 
parties  to  adopt  a  dividing  line,  in  regard  to  which  no  doubt  or 
dis|iute  lias  arisen,  and  in  regard  to  which  both  are  mistaken  as 
to  the  true  line.  The  acquiescence  or  admission  of  the  owner 
of  land,  made  under  a  mistake  as  to  his  rights,  should  neither 
estop  nor  prejudiee  him  from  subsequently  enlarging  his  posses- 
sion to  the  limits  of  his  true  title,  provided  no  actual  adversary 
p^.ssession  has  intervened  to  defeat  his  title.  This  has  long  been 
the  settled  rule.  Thus,  in  an  early  case  in  Pennsylvania,  Mr. 
Justice  Gibson  said :  "  If  the  parties,  from  misapprehension, 
adjust  their  fences,  and  exercise  acts  of  ownership,  in  conformity 
with  a  line  which  turns  out  not  to  be  the  true  boundary,  or  per- 
mission be  ignorantly  given  to  place  a  fence  on  the  land  of  the 
party,  this  will  not  amount  to  an  agreement,  or  be  binding  as  an 
assent  of  the  parties  ;  and  I  agree  it  is  a  principle  of  equity  that 
the  parties  to  an  agreement  must  be  acquainted  with  the  extent 
of  their  rights,  and  the  nature  of  the  information  thev  can  call 
for  respecting  them,  else  they  will  not  be  bound.  The  reason  is, 
that  they-  proceed  under  an  idea  that  the  fact  which  is  the  induce- 
ment to  the  agreement  is  in  a  particular  way,  and  give  their 
assent,  not  absolutely,  but  on  conditions  that  are  falsified  by  the 
event." -^  Mr.  Justice  Lamar,  in  a  case  before  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  after  quoting  from  and  approving  this  Penn- 
sylvania case,  said:  "The  decisions  in  the  other  States  generally 
support  the  rule  that  owners  of  adjacent  tracts  of  land  are  not 
bound  by  consent  to  a  boundary  whicli  has  been  defined   under  a 

1  Adams   ;;.   l^ockwell,    IG  Wend.  285;  -  H.'lm  v.  Wilson,  76  Cal.  476,  18  Pac. 

PiUtet)  V.  Stitt,  6  Kobt.  431  ;  Vosburgh  r.  Kep.  604. 

Teaior,  .32   N.  Y.  561  ;  Hass  v.  I'lautz,  56  3  Perkins  v.  Gay,  3  S.  &  K.  327,  331,  8 

Wi-.  105,  14  N.  W.  Hep   65,  43  Am.  Rep.  Am.   Dec.   653,   citinr^  Turner  i-.  Turner, 

699  ;    Miller   v.   McGlaun,    63    Ga.   435  ;  2  Hep.  Ch.  81  ;  Bin^diam  v.  Biui;ham,  1 

Beard.-k'.v  V.  Crane,  52   Mirm.  537,  54  N.  Ves.  Sr.  126  ;  Gee  v.  Spencer,  1  Vern.32; 

W.  Rep.  740;  Pickett  v.  Nelson,  79  Wis.  Pusey  v.  Deshouvrie,  3  P.  Wms.  316. 
9,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  936. 
296 


BOUNDARY    LINES   BY   AGKEEMEXT.  [§§  357,  358. 

mistaken  apjDreliension  that  it  is  the  true  line,  each  claiming  only 
the  true  line,  wherever  it  may  be  fuund,  and  that  in  such  case 
neither  party  is  precluded  or  estopped  from  claiming  his  own 
rights  under  the  true  one  when  it  is  discovered."  ^ 

357.  Whether  there  is  a  dispute  or  uncertainty  in  regard  to 
the  boundary  line  is  a  matter  sometimes  requiring  considera- 
tion. Tiiat  there  is  a  question  between  adjoining  owners  in 
regard  to  the  boundary  line  is  not  enough  to  serve  as  the  foun- 
dation of  a  valid  and  conclusive  agreement  as  to  such  line.  Thus, 
where  a  question  arose  as  to  the  boundary  line,  and  one  of  the 
parties  caused  a  survey  to  be  made,  and  both  parties  expressed 
themselves  as  satisfied  with  the  line  of  such  survey,  and  a  parti- 
tion wall  was  placed  upon  such  line,  it  was  found  as  a  fact  that 
the  line  was  not  drawn  and  fixed  as  a  compiomise  of  any  dispute 
between  the  parties,  and  that  the  true  line  was  susceptible  of 
demonstration  by  a  survey  correctly  made.  The  agreed  line  was 
not  therefore  binding  upon  either  party.  The  only  effect  of 
the  agreement  was,  that  the  parties  ^vere  to  accept  and  abide 
by  the  line  established  by  the  surve}^  if  it  was  the  true  line, 
and  not  otherwise.  When  it  was  shown  that  this  was  not  the 
true  line,  either  party  was  at  liberty  to  repudiate  the  erroneous 
line.2 

There  need  be  no  actual  dispute  between  the  parties  as  a  basis 
for  an  agreed  line,  if  the  true  boundary  lines  are  in  fact  uncertain, 
and  can  be  determined  only  by  judicial  inquir^^■^ 

358.  If  the  parties  have  carried  the  agreement  into  execu- 
tion, and  entered  into  possession  in  accordance  with  it,  the 
courts  will  not  disturb  it,  though  both  parties  were  mistaken 
as  to  the  true  location   of  the  line."^     "  Having  agreed  upon  the 

1  Schraedcr   IMin.  Co.   (.-.  P;icker,    129  v.   Atkinson,   46    Tex.    605;     George   v. 

U.  S.  688,  9  Sup.  Ct.  Rep  38.5.     And  see  Thomas,  16  Tex.  74,  89,  67  Am.  Dec.  612. 

Jenkins   v.    Tra<;er,    40    Fed.   Rep.    726  ;  2  Siinford  v.  ^McDonald,   .5.3    Ilun,  26.3. 

White  r.   Ward,  35  W.  Va.  418,  14  S.   E.  And  see  Ilubhcll  r.  McCiilloch.   47  Barb. 

Ri'p.  22  ;  Hatfield  v.  Workman,  35  W.  Va.  287. 

578,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  153;  Smith  r.  Davis.  4  3  Silvarer   v.  Hansen,   77  Cal.     79,  20 

Grau  50;  Iliibbfll  v.  ISIcCulloch,  47  Barb.  Pac.  Rep.  136. 

287;  Bnchanan  v.  Ashdown,  71  Hun,  327,  *  California:  Cavanaugh  i;.  Jackson,  9 1 

24  X.  Y.  Supp.  1122;  Hass  ;;.  IMautz,  56  Cal.  580,  27   Pac    Rep.  931  ;  Silvarer  v. 

Wis.  105,  14  N.  W   Rep.  65,  43  Am.  Rep.  Hansen,  77    Cal.  579,  20  Pac.  Rep.  136; 

609  ;   Harn  i\  Smith,  79  Tex.  310,  15  S.  White  v.  Spreckels,  75  Cal.  610,   17  Pac. 

W.  Kep.  240,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  340;  Cole-  Rep.  715;  Helm  v.  Wilson,  76  Cal.  476, 

man  r.   Smith,   55    Tex.   254;   Browniiif;  18   Pac.   Rep.    604;  Snecd   v.  Osborn,  25 

297 


§  358.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND   BOUNDARIES. 


line,  t)r  agreed  upon  a  mode  by  wliich  it  shall  be  determined,  and 
having  accepted  and  acquiesced  in  it  by  the  mieqnivocal  act  of 
taking  j)t>sscssion  according  to  the  line,  they  and  their  privies 
arc  cst(>p[)ed  from  afterwards  disputing  it.  The  estoppel  arises 
from  the  act  of  the  })artics  in  taking  possessicm,  and  occupying 
their  respective  tracts  to  the  line  thus  agreed  upon  and  deter- 
mined." ^  The  courts,  on  the  contrary,  encourage  such  settlements 
as  a  means  of  suppressing  litigation.^  To  make  the  agreement 
effective,  however,  by  way  of  estoppel,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
line  established  by  agreement  should  be  followed  by  possession 
according  to  that  line.^ 

Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the  location  of  a  boun- 
dary line  established  by  agreement  between  the  adjoining  land- 
owners.* 

In  case  one  of  the  parties  at  once  repudiated  the  line  as  fixed, 
and  retained  possession  of  the  land  in  controversy,  and  there  has 
been  no  possession  acquired  or  taken  by  the  other  according  to 
the  line  claimed  to  have  been  established  by  the  agreement  of 
Cal.    619,    626.     Delaware:    Liudsay    v.     sylvania:  Perkins  v.  Gay,  .S   Serg.  &  R. 


Springer,  4  Harr.  547,  549,  550.  Idaho  : 
Idaho  Land  Co.  v.  Parsons,  2  Ida.  1191, 
.31  Pac.  Kep.  791.  Illinois:  Mnllaney  j^. 
Duffy,  145  111.  .559,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  750; 
Quick  V.  Nitsoholm,  139  111.  251,  28  N.  E. 
Rep.  926;  Fisher  v.  Benuehoff,  121  111. 
426,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  1,50;  Bloomington  v. 
Cemetery,  126  111.  221, 18  N.  E.  Rep.  298; 
Crowell  V.  Maughs,  7  111.  419.  Indiana: 
Main  v.  Killinger,  90  Ind.  165  ;  Kiiisey  v. 
Satterthwaite,  88  Ind.  342.  Kentucky: 
Young  V.  Wooletr.  (Ivy.),  29  S.  W.  Rep. 
879.  Maine  :  Pritchiird  v.  Young,  74  Me. 
419.  Massachusetts  :  Kellogg  v.  Smith, 
7  Cush.  375,  379.  New  Hampshire  :  Saw- 
very.  Fellows,  6  N.  II.  107,  25  Am.  Dec. 
452 ;  Eaton  v.  Rice,  8  N.  H.  378 ;  Gray  v. 
Barry,  9  N.  H.  473 ;  Prescott  v.  Haw- 
kins, 12  N.  II.  19;  Orr  r.  Hadley,  36  N. 
II.  575;  Dudley  v.  Elkins,  39  N.  H.  78; 
Bartktt  v.  Young,  63  N.  H.  265.  New 
York:  Jackson  v.  Dysling,  2  Caines,  198, 
201  ;  Jackson  v.  Ogden,  7  Johns.  238, 
245;  Kip  v.  Norton,  12  Wend.  127,  130, 
27  Am.  Dec.  120;  Laverty  v.  Moore,  32 
Barb.  347.  Ohio:  Hills  v.  Ltidwig,  46 
Ohio  St.  373,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  596.     Penn- 

298 


327,  .331,  7  Am.  Dec.  653.  Texas:  Levy 
V.  Maddux,  81  Tex.  210,  16  S.  W.  Rep. 
877;  Eddie  v.  Tinuin  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
26  S.  W.  Rep.  732;  Harn  i;.  Smith,  79 
Tex.  310,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  240;  Harrell  v. 
Houston,  66  Tex.  278  ;  Coleman  v.  Smith, 
55  Tex.  254;  Houston  v.  Sneed,  15  Tex. 
307.  West  Virginia  :  Gwynn  v.  Schwartz, 
32  W.  Va.  487,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  880,  885  ; 
Teass  v.  St.  Albans,  38  W.  Va.  1,  17  S. 
E.  Rep.  400. 

1  Berghoefer  v.  Frazier,  150  111.  577,  37 
N.  E.  Rep.  914. 

2  McArthur  v.  Henry,  35  Tex.  801 ; 
Houston  V.  Matthews,  1  Yerg.  116  ;  Fisher 
V.  Bennehoff,  121  111.  426,  13  N.  E.  Rep. 
150. 

3  Berghoefer  ;•.  Frazier,  150111.  577,  37 
N.  E.  Rep.  914;  Yates  (,•.  Shaw,  24  111. 
367  ;  Bauer  v.  Gottmanhausen,  65  III.  490  ; 
Kerr  v.  Hitt,  75  111.  51  ;  Cutler  v.  Ciilli- 
son,  72  111.  113;  Fisher  v.  Bennelioff,  121 
111.  426,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  1.50;  Bloomington 
r.  Cemetery,  126  111.  221,  18  N.  E.  Rep. 
298. 

■*  Sheetz  i-.  Sweeney,  136  III.  336,  26  N. 
E.  Rep.  648. 


BOUNDARY   LINES   BY    AGREEMENT. 


[§  B59. 


the  parties,  it  is  clear  that  there  has  been  no  practical  location  of 
the  line  by  which  tlie  parties  are  estopjied.^ 

359.  An  agreement  settling  a  disputed  boundary  is  a  final- 
ity, and  cannot  be  disturbed,  though  the  pai'ties  afterwards  learn 
that  the  true  line  could  have  been  found,  or  the  parties  were 
mistaken  as  to  the  true  line.^  After  a  disputed  boundai'y  has 
been  established  by  agreement,  a  subsequent  conveyance  by  the 
parties  to  the  agreement  and  their  privies,  by  the  same  description 
as  that  under  which  the  title  was  acquired  and  possession  held 
prior  to  the  agreement,  will  pass  the  title  according  to  the  agreed 
boundary.'^  If  the  agreed  line  is  marked  by  monuments,  subse- 
quent purchasers  would  be  bound  to  take  notice  of  them  for  this 
reason  ;  *  but  if  the  agreement  is  susceptible  of  clear  proof,  it  is 


1  Berghoefer  v.  Frazier,  150  111.  577,  37 
N.  E.  Rep.  914. 

-  California :  Tructt  v.  Adams,  66  Cal. 
218;  Sneed  r.  Osborn,  25  Cal.  619;  Sil- 
varer  v.  Hansen,  77  Cal.  579,  20  Pac.  Rep. 
136;  Cavanaugh  y.  Jackson,  91  Cal.  580, 
27  Pac.  Rep.  931 ;  White  v.  Spreckels,  75 
Cal.  610,  17  Pac.  Rep.  715.  Idaho:  Idaho 
Land  Co.  v.  Parsons,  2  Ida.  1191,  31  Pac. 
Rep.  791.  Illinois  :  Yates  v.  Shaw,  24  111. 
367  ;  Fisher  v.  Bennehoft",  121  111.  426,  13 
N.  E.  Rep.  150  ;  Bauer  v.  Gottmanhau- 
sen,  65  111.  499  ;  McNamara  v.  Seaton,  82 
111  498;  Cutler  v.  Callison,  72  111.  113. 
Indiana:  Horton  v.  Brown,  130  Ind.  113, 
29  N.  E.  Rep.  414;  Cleveland  i-.  Oben- 
chain,  107  Ind.  591  ;  Pitcher  v.  Dove,  99 
Ind.  175.  Kentucky:  Grigsby  y.  Combs 
(Ky.),  21  S.  \V.  Rep.  37.  Maine  :  Esty 
V.  Baker,  50  Me.  325,  79  Am.  Dec.  616. 
Michigan:  Siniih  n.  Hamilton,  20  Mich. 
433,  4  Am.  Rep.  398  ;  .Tones  v.  Pashby, 
67  Mich.  459,  35  N.  W.  Rep.  1.52.  Mis- 
souri :  Major  v.  Rice,  57  Mo.  384  ;  Atchi- 
son V.  Pease,  96  Mu.  566,  10  S.  W.  Rep. 
159  ;  Schad  v.  Sharp,  95  Mo.  573,  8  S.  W. 
Rep.  849.  New  Hampshire :  Thompson 
V.  Major,  58  N.  H.  242.  Tiie  case  of  Saw- 
yer V.  Fellows,  6  N.  H.  107,  is  in  its  terms 
niiliriiited  in  iis  application  to  agreements 
fixing  the  boundary  line  between  adjacent 
owners  ;  but  it  should  he  limited  to  cases 
of  dispiiteii  or  uncertain  boundaries.  It 
was  doubtless   intended    to   be  so  iimiied 


because  the  cases  cited  by  the  court  in 
support  of  the  doctrine  announced  are  so 
limited.  See  Bartlctt  r.  Young,  63  N. 
11.265.  New  York:  Vosburgh  s,-.  Yeaton, 
32  N.  Y.  561  ;  McCormick  v.  Barnum, 
10  Wend.  104.  Ohio:  Avery  v.  Baum, 
Wright,  576  ;  Walker  v.  Devlin,  2  Ohio 
St.  593;  Bobo  v.  Richmond,  25  Ohio  St. 
115  ;  Hills  V.  Ludwig,  46  Ohio  St.  373,  24 
N.  E.  Rep.  596.  In  this  case  Bradley,  J., 
said :  "  This  view  is  entirely  consistent 
with  the  principle  that  where  adjoining 
proprietors,  in  attempting  to  find  the  true 
line  between  them,  by  mistake  fix  upon  an 
incorrect  one,  they  may  repudiate  the  spu- 
I'ious  line  ...  at  any  time  before  the  stat- 
ute of  limitation  has  run."  Texas  :  Cooper 
V.  Austin,  58  Tex.  494  ;  Coleman  v.  Smith, 
55  Tex.  254;  Levy  r.  Maddux,  81  Tex. 
210,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  877  ;  Houston  v. 
Sneed,  15  Tex.  307  ;  Harrell  v.  Houston, 
66  Tex.  278,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  731  ;  Liuney 
V.  Wood,  66  Tex.  22,  17  S.  W.  Rej).  244. 
Virginia  :  Voiglit  v.  Raby  ( Va.),  20  S.  E. 
Rep.  8124.  West  Virginia :  Gwynn  v. 
Schwartz,  32  W.  Va.  487,  9  S.  E.  Rep. 
880. 

«  Smith  V.  Catlin  Land  Co.  117  Mo. 
438,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  1083 ;  Smith  v.  Mc- 
Conkle,  105  Mo.  135,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  602 ; 
Sawyer  v.  Fellows,  6  N.  H.  107,  25  Am. 
Dec.  452  ;  Dudley  v.  Elkins,  39  N.  II.  78. 

*  Makepeace  v.  Bancroft,  12  Mass.  4(;9  ; 
Davis  V.  Kainsford,  17  Mass.  207  ;  Sawyer 

299 


^§  oOO,  olil.J  DKSCKirTION    AND    HOUNDARIKS. 

undoubtedly  binding  u[)on   subsoquont  j)ureliasers,   though  there 
are  no  visible  nioiiuments  of  the  agreed  line.^ 

360.  A  division  line  between  adjoining  owners  established 
by  the  award  of  referees,  under  a  written  agreement  entered 
into  by  them  for  the  jmrpose,  is  binding  u{)on  them  where  pos- 
session of  the  land  is  taken  and  held  by  them  respectively  under 
the  award.'-^ 

An  award  on  an  oral  submission  as  to  the  division  line  between 
adjoining  proprietors  is  not  conclusive  between  them  unless  fol- 
lowed by  an  acquiescence  for  a  time  sufficient  to  give  title  by  pre- 
scription.-'^ 

Fence-viewers  having  no  official  authority  to  establish  a  dis- 
puted boundary  line,  their  establishment  of  one  is  merely  an 
award  on  an  oral  submission,  or  a  parol  contract  between  the 
parties.'^ 

A  boundary  line  fixed  by  a  surveyor  employed  by  various  prop- 
erty owners  is  not  binding  upon  an  owner  who  was  not  a  party 
to  the  surveying,  and  who  never  acquiesced  in  the  line  fixed  by 
the  surveyor.'' 

361.  The  parties  to  an  eflfectual  agreement  establishing  a 
boundary  line  must  be  owners  in  fee  of  the  lands  adjoining  upon 
the  disputed  or  uncei-tain  boundary.  "  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that 
a  parol  agreement  to  establish  a  boundary,  where  one  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  is  an  owner  and  the  other  has  neither  the  title 
nor  the  possession,  can  be  of  any  avail.  It  is  difficult  to  compre- 
hend how  such  an  agreement  could  have  any  operation  at  all."  '^ 

But  the  fact  that  a  purchaser  of  land  has  not  yet  paid  the  con- 
sideration therefor  does   not  invalidate  a  parol  agreement  made 

V.  Fellows,  6  N.  II.  107,  25  Am.  Dec.  452;  than   twenty  years,  made  an   oral  agree- 

Boyd  )•.  Graves  4  Wheat.  51.3.  mcnt  with  B,  who  claimed   title  to  nine 

1  Dudley  v.  Elkins,  39  N.  H.  78.  acres  on  the  north  side  of  the  ditch,  that 

2  Veasey  v.  Williams,  6  Houst.  56.3.  the  ditch   .should   constitute   the   division 

3  Smith  V.  Bullock,  16  Vt.  502;  Wa-  line  between  them ;  and  B  thereupon  en- 
trous  y.  :\Iorrison,  33  Fla.  261,  14  So.  Tvcp.  tered  into  and  for  five  years  kept  pos- 
805.  ses-ion  of  the   nine  acres.     It   was   held 

*  Camp  V.   Camp,  59  Vt.  667,   10  Atl.  that  the  agreement  did  not  affect  the  title, 

Rep.  748.  or  prevent  A  from  recovering  pos,session, 

5  Kampmann  v.  Heiutz  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  See,  also,  Vosburgh  v.  Teator,  32  N.  Y. 

24  S.  W.  Rep.  329.  561  ;  Snecd  y.  Osborn,  25  Cal.  619;  An- 

•■■  Terry  v.  Chandler,  16  N.  Y.  3.54.     In  derson  (;.  Jackson,  69  Tex.  346,  6  S.  W. 

this  case  A,  who  had  been  in  posse.ssioii  Rep.  575. 
of  lands  on  both  side.s  of  a  ditch  for  more 

300 


BOUNDARY    LINES    BY    AGRKEMENT.  [§§  362,  363. 

bj'  him  with  the  adjoining  owners  fixing  the  boundary  line  be- 
tween their  lands. ^ 

An  agreement  between  a  grantor  and  bis  grantee's  husband 
fixing  the  division  line  between  the  land  conveyed  and  that  re- 
tained by  the  grantor  at  a  line  different  from  the  one  stated  in 
the  deed,  in  consequence  of  which  the  grantor  extended  improve- 
ments up  to  the  new  line,  is  not  binding  upon  the  grantee  when 
it  and  the  improvements  were  made  without  her  knowledge.^ 

The  agreement  or  acquiescence  of  one  heir  does  not  bind  the 
other  heirs,  all  the  heirs  being  tenants  in  common  of  the  prop- 
erty.3 

362.  A  mere  intruder  is  not  allowed  to  question  the  boun- 
daries defined  in  a  deed,  and  assert  the  title  to  a  portion  of  the 
land  to  be  in  an  adjoining  owner,  especially  when  it  appears  that 
the  grantee  by  the  deed  has  liad  long-continued  possession  of  the 
land  in  accordance  with  the  boundaries  described  in  his  deed.* 

363.  A  division  line  established  by  the  admission  of  one  of 
the  parties,  and  acted  upon  by  the  other,  may  estop  the  former 
from  denying  that  it  is  the  true  line  though  in  fact  it  is  not. 
Tims  where  one  of  two  adjoining  proprietors,  for  the  purpose  of 
enabling  the  other  to  locate  a  division  fence,  pointed  out  a  line  as 
the  true  dividing  line  between  them,  and  the  latter,  relying  upon 
this  information,  built  the  fence  and  cultivated  the  land  and  made 
improvements  up  to  this  line,  it  was  held  that,  as  against  him, 
tlie  other  propi-ietor  and  his  grantees  were  estopped  to  claim  that 
a  mistake  had  been  made,  and  the  line  established  was  not  the 
the  true  line.'^  And  so  where  a  landowner  surveys  a  boundary  line 
for  his  land,  which  is  publicly  mai'ked,  and  sells  land  with  refer- 
ence thereto,  he  is  estopped  from  denying  the  correctness  of  its 
location  as  against  one  purchasing  with  reference  thereto.^ 

When  parties  agree  upon  a  line,  neither  of  them  knowing  the 

1  Cavanaugh  v.  Jackson,  91  Cal.  580,  27  Idaho  Land  Co.  v.  Parsons,  2  Idaho,  1191, 
Pac.  Ke|).  931.  31  Pac.  Hep.  791';  Sherman   v.  Hastings, 

2  Mitchell   r.  Brawley  (Ind.),  39  N.  E.  81  Iowa,  372,46  N.  W.  Kip.  1084;  Cough- 
Rep.  497.  ran  v.  Alderete   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26   S. 

3  Lagow  I'.  Glover,  77  Tex.  448,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  109. 

W.  Rep.  141.  «  New  York,  &c.  Land   Co.  v.  Gardner 

^  Stemhridge  v.  Britschur  (Ky.),  20  S.     (Tex.),  25    S.   W.    Rep.  737  ;    Bri.scoe  v. 

W.  Rep.  278;   Fowke  v.  Darnall,   5  Litt.     Puckeit  (Tex.),   12  S.  W.  Rep.  978;  An- 

(Ky.)  316,  321.  der^oii   v.  Jackson,  69  Tex.  346,6  S.  W. 

6  Lemmon    v.    Hartsook,   80   Mo.    13;     Rep.  575,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  30. 

301 


§  ;U!4.j  DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 

true  lino,  but  each  intending  to  fix  upon  it,  and  each  acting  on 
the  best  ii)t''>iMu;ition  bo  can  get,  and  not  relying  wholly  upon  the 
other,  nuikos  a  mistake  in  locating  the  line,  neither  of  them  is 
estopped  from  asserting  chiim  to  tlie  true  hne  when  this  is  after- 
wards ascertained.^ 

The  owner  of  a  city  lot,  upon  part  of  which  his  neighbor  has 
erected  a  building,  is  not  estopped  from  asserting  title  to  such 
part  by  the  fact  that  he  allowed  the  building  to  be  erected  with- 
out objection,  where  it  appears  that  he  honestly  believed  that  his 
neighbor  knew  the  correct  location  of  the  boundary  between  their 
lots.2 

Though  one  of  two  adjoining  owners  has  been  led  to  establish, 
or  acquiesce  in  the  establishment  of,  a  line  as  the  true  boundary 
between  the  estates  by  the  misrepresentation  of  the  other,  still 
the  line  is  binding  on  him  as  to  purchasers  from  the  other  who 
make  improvements  relying  upon  the  supposed  boundary.  No- 
tice to  such  purchasers  that  he  does  not  recognize  the  line  as  the 
true  boundary  is  sufficient,  liow^ever,  to  save  his  rights,  and  he 
need  not  actually  take  steps  to  prevent  their  trespass.'^ 

364.  Long  acquiescence  by  the  owners  of  adjoining  lands 
in  the  location  of  the  dividing  line  between  their  lands  may  have 
the  effect  of  an  agreement  in  establishing  such  line,  if  the  acqui- 
escence be  for  a  period  of  time  equal  to  that  fixed  by  the  statute 
of  limitations.'*     It  has  been  said  that  a  supposed  boundary  line, 

1  Burnell  v.  Maloney,  39  Vt.  579  ;  Lem-  ^^  Hefner  v.  Downing,  57  Tex,  576. 
m'Jii  V.  Hartsook,  80  Mo.  1.3 ;  Cheeney  v.  *  Alabama  :  Hoffman  v.  White,  90  Ala. 
Nebra>*ka,  &c.  Stone  Co.  41    Fed.   Kep.  354,7   So.  Rep.  816.     California:  White 
740;   Golterman  u.  Schiermeier  (Mo.),  28  v.  Spreckels,  75  Cal.   610,   17  Pac.  Rep. 
S.  W.  Rep.  616.  715;   Columbet  r.    Pacheco,  48   Cal.  395, 

2  Mullaney  r.  Duffy,  145  111  559,565,  397;  Cooper  v.  Vierra,  59  Cal.  282; 
33N.  E.Rep.  750,  perShope,  J. :  "Where  Sneed  v.  Osborn,  25  Cal.  619;  Helm  v. 
the  estoppel  is  .sought  to  be  established  Wil.^on,  7G  Cal.  476,  18  Pac.  Rep.  604; 
from  the  silence  of  a  party  who  in  equity  Burris  v.  Fitch,  76  Cal.  395,  18  Pac.  Rep. 
and  good  conscience  should  have  spoken,  8fi4.  Connecticut:  Rathljnn  v.  Genr,  64 
as  it  is  here,  if  there  be  any  ground  of  Conn.  421,  30  All.  Rcj).  60.  District  of 
e8tf>ppel,  it  is  essential  that  the  party  Columbia:  Neale  i\  Lee,  19  D.  C.  5. 
should  have  had  knowledge  of  the  facts,  Florida:  Liddon  r.  llartwell,  22  Fla.  442. 
and  the  other  party  have  been  ignorant  Illinois:  Fisher  r.  Beunehoff,  121  111.426, 
of  the  truth,  and  have  been  misled  into  13  N.  E.  Rep.  150;  Darst  v.  Enlow,  116 
doing  that  which  he  would  not  have  done  111.  475.  Iowa:  Doolittle  v.  Bailey,  85 
but  for  such  silence."  Smith  v.  Newton,  Iowa,  398,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  337  ;  Wilson 
38  111.  2.30;  Noble  ;;.  Chrisman,  88  111.  v.  Gunning,  80  Iowa,  331,  45  N.  W.  Rep. 
186;  Commercial  Ins.  Co.  ??.  Ives,  56  111.  920.  Kansas:  Sheldon  v.  Atkinson,  38 
402;  Hill  r.  Blackwelder,  113  111.283.  Kans.  14,  16  Pac.  Hep.   68.     Kentucky: 

302 


BOUNDARY    LINES    BY   AGREEMENT. 


[§  364. 


long  acquiesced  in,  is  better  evidence  of  the  true  location  of  tiie 
line  than  any  survey  made  after  the  original  monuments  Lave  dis- 
appeared.^ "  The  acquiescence  in  such  cases  affords  ground  not 
merely  for  an  inference  of  fact,  to  go  to  the  jury  as  evidence  of 
an  original  parol  agreement,  .but  for  a  direct  legal  inference  as  to 
the  true  boundary  line.  It  is  held  to  be  proof  of  so  conclusive  a 
nature  that  the  party  is  precluded  from  offering  any  evidence  to 
the  contrary.  Unless  the  acquiescence  has  continued  for  a  suffi- 
cient length  of  time  to  become  thus  conclusive,  it  is  of  no  impor- 
tance. The  rule  seems  to  have  been  adopted  as  a  i  ule  of  repose, 
with  a  view  to  the  quieting-  of  titles,  and  rests  upon  the  same 
reason  as  our  statute  prohibiting  the  disturbance  of  an  adverse 
possession  which  has  continued  for  twenty  years.  In  all  cases 
in  which  practical  locations  have  been  confirmed  upon  evidence 


Belknap  i;.  Loui'^ville,  93  Ivy.  444,  20  S. 
W.  Rep.  309;  Critchlow  v.  Beaity  (Ky.), 
23  S.  W.  Rep.  960;  Hammond  v.  Wil- 
liams (Ky.),  9  S.  W.  Rep.  711  ;  Scheible 
V.  Hart  (Ky.),  12  S  W.  Rep.  628.  Maine  : 
Walker  v.  Simpson,  80  Me.  143,  13  Atl. 
Re)..  580;  Faiiglit  r.  Holway,  50  Me.  24. 
Massachusetts:  Kellogg  v.  Smith,  7  Cnsh. 
375.  In  this  case  there  was  evidence  of 
the  understanding  and  occupation  of  va- 
rious and  successive  owners  for  more  than 
one  hundred  years.  Owen  v.  Bartholo- 
mew, 9  rick.  519.  Michigan:  Flynn  v. 
Glenny,  51  Mich.  580,  17  N.  W.  Rep.  65; 
Dupont  V.  Starring,  42  Mich.  492  ;  Lc- 
compte  V.  Lueders,  90  Mich.  495,  51  N. 
W.  Rpp.  542.  Minnesota  :  Beardsley  v. 
Crane,  52  Minn.  537,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  740. 
Missouri:  Jacohs  v.  Moseley,  91  Mo.  457, 
4  S.  W.  Rep.  135  ;  Battner  v.  Baker,  108 
Mo.  311,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  911  ;  Turner  v. 
Baker,  64  Mo.  218,  243,  27  Am.  Rep.  2l^6. 
Nebraska:  Benson  v.  Daly,  38  Neb.  155, 
50  N.  W.  Rep.  788;  Trussel  v.  Lewis,  13 
Neb.  415,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  155,42  Am.  Rep. 
767  ;  Levy  v.  Yerga,  25  Neb.  764,  41  N. 
W.  Rep.  773;  Obernalte  v.  Ed;,'ar,  28 
Neb.  70,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  82.  New  Hamp- 
shire:  Dudley  v.  Elkins,  30  N,  H.  78; 
Richardson  v.  Chickering,  41  N.  H.  380, 
77  Am.  Dec.  769.  New  York:  Avery  ;;. 
Empire  Woolen  Co.  82  N.  Y.  582  ;  Clark 
V.  Davis,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  191,  28  Abb.  N. 


C.  135  ;  Baldwin  v.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  359  ; 
Adams  v.  Rockwell,  16  Wend.  285;  Dib- 
ble r.  Rogers,  13  Wend.  536;  Pangburn 
V.  Miles.  10  Abb.  N.  C.  42  ;  Smith  v.  Mc- 
Allister, 14  Barb.  434,  436-438  ;  Rockwell 
V.  Adams,  7  Cow.  761,  762  ;  Kip  v.  Nor- 
ton, 12  Wend.  127,  27  Am.  Dec.  120; 
Ausable  Co.  v,  Hargraves,  1  N.  Y.  Supp. 
42  ;  Hill  V.  Edie,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  480  ;  Dale 
V.  Jackson,  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  715.  North 
Carolina :  Norcum  v.  Leary,  3  Ircd.  49. 
Oregon  :  Richards  i'.  Snider,  11  Oreg.  197, 
3  Pac.  Rep.  177.  Pennsylvania:  Kuhns 
V.  Fennell  (Pa.),  15  Atl.  Rep.  920;  Cul- 
bertson  r.  Duncan  (Pa.),  13  Atl.  Rep. 
966  ;  West  Chester  &  P.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal 
(Pa.),  13  Atl.  Rep.  214.  Rhode  Island  : 
O'Donnell  v.  Penney,  17  R.  L  164,  20  Atl. 
Rej).  305.  Tennessee  :  Galbraith  v.  Luns- 
ford,  3  Pick.  89,  9  S.  W.  Rep.  365  ;  Gil- 
christ v.  McGec,  9  Yerg.  455.  Texas : 
King  V.  Mitchell,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  701, 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  50;  Davis  v.  Mitchell,  65 
Tex.  623;  Davis  v.  Smith,  61  Tex.  18. 
West  Virginia :  Teass  v.  St.  Albans,  38 
W.  Va.  1,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  400;  Gwynn  v. 
Schwartz,  32  W.  Va.  487,  9  S.  E.  Rep. 
880.  Wisconsin :  Pickett  v.  Nelson,  71 
Wis  542 ;  37  N.  W.  Rep.  836  ;  Eiden  v. 
Eiden,  76  Wis.  435.  45  N.  W.  Rep.  322. 

1  Tarpenning  v.  Cannon,  28  Kans.  665, 
quoting  Judge  Cooley. 

803 


§  80o.] 


DESCKiniON    AND    liOUXDAUIK.s. 


vi  this  kiihl,  the  iienuii'scence  lias  coiiliiiui'tl  for  a  long  period, 
rarely  less  than  twenty  years/"  ' 

When  the  statement  of  the  boiindaiirs  is  indeliuile,  much 
weight  is  to  be  given  to  the  construction  put  upon  the  deed  by 
the  parties  themselves  by  their  acts  and  admissions.'-^ 

The  rule  of  acquiescence  appears  to  have  been  adopted  as  a 
I'ule  of  repose,  for  the  purpose  of  quieting  titles,  and  preventing 
the  uncertainty  and  confusion,  and  consequent  litigation,  which 
would  be  likely  to  risult  from  the  disturbance  of  boundary  lines 
so  long  established.'' 

Where  a  corner,  or  a  line,  supposed  to  have  been  established 
by  the  government  in  the  surveys  of  public  lands,  has  been  acqui- 
esced in  by  adjoining  owners  of  such  lands  for  many  years,  and 
improvements  made,  and  the  land  broken  up  to  the  line  thus 
established,  there  is  a  presumption  in  favor  of  such  corner  being 
the  true  one,  which  can  onl}^  be  overcome  by  clear  proof  that  it 
was  not  established  by  the  government.* 

365.  Acquiescence  is  a  question  of  fact,  and  each  case  must 
furnish  its  own  rule,  to  be  deduced  from  its  own  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances.^ 


1  Baldwin  v.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  359,  363, 
per  Selden,  J. ;  Reed  v.  McCourt,  41  N. 
Y.  435  ;  Reed  v.  Farr,  35  N.  Y.  113  ;  Hub- 
bell  V.  McCullocli,  47  Barb.  287  ;  Jones  v. 
Smith,  64  N.  Y.  180;  Stewart  v.  I'atrick, 
68  N.  Y.  450.  The  earlier  cases  in  this 
Sta:e  were  decided  upon  the  ground  that 
acquiescence  was  evidence  of  an  agree- 
ment between  the  parties.  Jackson  v. 
Dyfeling,  2  Caines,  198;  Jackson  v.  Ved- 
der,  3  John?.  8  ;  Jackson  v.  Dieffcndorf, 
3  Johns.  269  ;  l^ockwell  v.  Adams,  7  Cow. 
761  ;  Clark  v.  Wethey,  19  Wend.  320. 

2  Deery  v.  Cray,  10  Wall.  263  ;  Hamm 
V.  San  Francisco,  17  Fed.  Re|i.  119  ;  Truett 
V.  Adams,  66  Cal.  218,  5  Pac.  Rep.  96; 
Hastings  v.  Stark,  36  Cal.  122;  Blancy  ),-. 
Rice,  20  Pick.  62,  32  Am.  Dec.  204 ;  Stone 
V.  Clark,  1  Met.  378,  35  Am.  Dec.  370 ; 
Lovejoy  D.  Lovett,  124  Mass.  270;  Rich- 
ardson V.  Chickering,  41  N.  H.  380,  77 
Am.  Dec.  769  ;  Fnller  v.  Cair,  33  N.  J.  L. 
157  ;  Jackson  v  Periinc,  35  N.  J.  L.  137  ; 
Lodge  ;;.  Barnett,  46  Pa.  St.  477. 

8  O'Donmll  i'.  Pennev,  17  R.  I.  164,  20 

304' 


Atl.  Rep.  305,  per  Matteson,  J.,  citing 
Baldwin  r.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  359,  363,  364  ; 
MeCormick  v.  Barnuni,  10  Wend.  103, 109  ; 
Smith  V.  McAllister,  14  Barb.  434,  437; 
Jackson  y.  Van  Corlaer,  II  Johns.  123, 
127;  Kellotrg  v.  Smith,  7  Cnsh.  375,  381. 

In  Baldwin  v.  Brown,  sn/ira,  the  court 
denies  tiie  sonndness  of  the  theory  that  a 
parol  agreement,  either  actual  or  sup- 
posed, lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  rule, 
and  holds  that  the  siipijositiou  of  such  an 
agreement,  in  cases  of  long  acquiescence, 
is  entirely  superfluous. 

*  Coy  V.  Miller,  31  Neb.  348,  47  N.  W. 
Rep.  1046;  Carpenter  v.  Monks,  81  Mich. 
103,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  477  ;  Diehl  v.  Zanger, 
39  Mich.  601  ;  Beaubien  v.  Kellogg,  69 
Mich.  333,  37  N.  W.  Rep.  691,  696  ;  Hoff- 
man V.  Port  Huron  (Mich.),  60  N.  W. 
Rep.  831. 

5  Koenigheim  v.  Sherwood,  79  Tex. 
508,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  23;  Floyd  v.  Rice,  28 
Tex.  341  ;  Beecher  v.  Galvin,  71  Mich. 
391,  39  N.  W.  Rep.  469;  Jackson  v.  Vaa 
Corlaer,  11  Johns.  127. 


BOUNDARY   LINES   BY   AGREKMENT. 


[§  36u. 


Where  there  was  a  dispute  as  to  the  division  line,  and  one  of 
the  adjoining  owners  occupied  the  disputed  hind,  and  the  other, 
because  misled  by  the  adverse  claim  and  by  advice  received  in 
reference  to  it,  acquiesced  for  less  than  twenty  ye;irs  in  such  occu- 
pation, he  was  not  estopped  from  asserting  his  tille.^ 

366.  The  distinction  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  acquies- 
cence in  a  boundary  line  without  any  agreement  is  not  conclu- 
sive unless  it  is  continued  under  circumstances  of  adverse  occu- 
pation long  enough  to  give  title  by  prescii()tion ;  while  acquiescence 
in  a  boundary  line  wiiich,  by  reason  of  uncertainty  or  dispute, 
the  parties  have  established  by  agreement,  need  not  be  continued 
for  any  definite  time.^  The  acquiescence  is,  then,  of  importance 
only  as  sl]owing  the  agreement.  "  Where  tlu-re  can  be  no  real 
doubt  as  to  how  the  premises  should  be  located  according  to  cer- 


1  Hinkley  v.  Grouse,  125  N.  Y.  730,  26 
N.  W.  Kep.  452;  Biildwiu  v.  Brown,  16 
N.  Y.  359;  Reed  v.  Farr,  35  N.  Y.  113; 
Reed  v.  McCourt,  41  N.  Y.  435 ;  Duffy  v. 
Mastci>on,  44  N.  Y.  557 ;  Townsend  v. 
Hayt,  51  N.  Y.  656. 

2  Arkansas  :  Jordan  v.  Deaton,  23  Ark. 
704.  California  :  Silvarer  v.  Hansen,  77 
Cal.  5S('.,  20  Pac.  Rep.  136  ;  Cavanaugh 
V.  Jack-on,  91  Cal.  580,  27  Pac.  Rep.  931  ; 
Johnson  v.  Brown,  63  Cal.  391  ;  Biggins 
V.  Chainplin,  59  Cal.  113;  Cooper  v. 
Vierra,  59  Cal.  282.  Illinois  :  Blooming- 
ton  V.  Cemetery,  126  111.  221, 18  S.  E.  Rep. 
298  ;  Quick  v.  Nitschelm,  139  111.  251,  28 
N.  E.  Rep.  926  ;  Sheets  /•.  Sweeney,  136  III. 
336, 26  N.  E.  Rep.  648  ;  Bauer  v.  Gottman- 
hansen.  65  111.  499;  Schneiders.  Botsch, 
90  111.577;  Sutherland  v.  Goodnow,  108 
III.  528,  48  Am.  Rep.  560.  Kentucky: 
Beyer.sdorfer  v.  Schultz  (Ky.),  2  S.  W. 
Rep.  492  ;  Sebastian  v.  Keeton  (Ky.),  29 
S.  W.  Rep.  23.  Michigan ;  Maui.^tee 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Cogswell  (Mich.),  61  N. 
W.  Rep.  884;  Stewart  v.  Carleton,  31 
Mich.  270  ;  Dui)ont  v.  Starring,  42  Mich. 
492,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  190;  Smith  v.  Ham- 
ilton, 20  Mich.  433,  4  Am.  Rep.  398; 
Joyce  V.  Williams,  26  Mich.  332  ;  Cronin 
V.  Gore,  38  Mich.  381  ;  Bird  v.  Stark,  66 
Mich.  654,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  754;  Junes  v. 
Pashby,  67  Mich.  459,  35  N.  W.  Rep   152, 

VOL.  I. 


11  Am.  St.  Rep.  589.  As  was  ."^aid  in 
Bird  V.  Stark:  "It  is  undoubtedly  true, 
under  our  decisions,  that,  to  make  an  ar- 
raugement  less  than  fifteen  years  old  liind- 
ing,  it  must  have  been  made  with  the 
understanding  that  it  should  l)e  so  re- 
garded." Missouri  :  Turner  v.  Baker,  64 
Mo.  218,  27  Am.  Rej).  226.  Nev/  Hamp- 
shire :  Orr  v.  Hadley,  36  N.  H.  575.  New 
York:  Clark  v.  Wethey,  19  Wend.  320; 
Clark  V.  Baird,  9  N.  Y.  183;  Terry  v. 
Chandler,  16  N.  Y.  354,  69  Am.  Dec.  707 ; 
Baldwin  y.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  359;  Hub- 
bell  r.  McCidloch,  47  Barb.  287  ;  Patten 
V.  Stitt,  6  Rol'.  431.  Tennessee:  Chad- 
well  V.  Chadwell,  93  Tenn.  201,  23  S.  W. 
Rep. 973.  Texas:  Alliance  Milling  Co.  v. 
Eaton,  86  Tex.  401,  23  8.  W.  Rep.  455; 
Cooper  V.  Austin,  58  Tex.  494 ;  Levy  v. 
Maddox,  81  Tex.  210,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  877; 
Lecomte  v.  Toudouze,  82  Tex.  212,21.3, 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  1047 ;  Adams  v.  IlalfF 
(Tex.),  24  8.  W.  Rep.  334  ;  Ilarn  v.  Smith, 
79  Tex.  310,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  240;  Blas^in- 
game  v.  Davis,  68  Tex.  595,  5  S.  W.  Rep. 
402;  Coleman  v.  Smith,  55  Tex.  254; 
Bailey  v.  B;.kcr,  4  Tex.  Civ.  Aj.p.  395, 
23  S.  W.  Rep.  454.  Utah:  Switzgable 
V.  Wor.seldine,  5  Utah,  315,  recognizing 
general  jirinciple,  which  was  held  not  ap- 
]ilicable  to  the  case. 

305 


§  367.] 


DESCRIPTIOX    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


tain  und  known  boinuhirios  describtHl  in  tlu>  deed,  to  establish  a 
jtrjictical  location  different  tluMet'i'oni  .  .  .  there  must  be  either  a 
location  which  has  been  ;ic(niiesceil  in  for  a  siiHicient  length  of 
time  to  bar  a  right  of  entry  under  the  statute  in  I'clation  to  real 
(>st;ite,  or  the  erroneous  line  must  have  been  agreed  upon  between 
the  parties  claiming  the  land  on  botli  sides  thereof  ;  or  the  party 
whose  right  is  to  be  thus  barred  must  have  silently  looked  on  and 
seen  the  other  party  doing  acts,  or  subjecting  himself  to  expenses 
in  relation  to  the  land  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  line  which  would 
be  an  injury  to  him,  and  wliich  lie  would  not  have  done  if  the 
line  had  not  been  so  located,  in  which  case,  perhaps,  a  grant 
might  be  presumed  within  the  twenty  years."  ^ 

367.  An  agreement  or  acquiescence  in  a  wrong  boundary 
when  the  true  boundary  is  known,  or  can  be  ascertained  from  the 
deed,  is  treated  both  in  law  and  equity  as  a  mistake,  and  neither 
party  is  estopped  from  claiming  the  true  line.^  Accordingly, 
where  adjoining  landowners  employ  a  surveyor  to  run  the  boun- 
dary line  between  the  lands,  not  because  they  have  a  dispute 
about  it,  but  merely  because  they  are  ignorant  of  its  exact  loca- 
tion, the  line  so  run,  if  incorrectly  located,  is  not  conclusive  on 
the  parties,  even  though  they  acquiesce  in  it  believing  it  to  be 
correct.^ 


1  Adams  v.  Rockwell,  16  Wend.  285, 
302,  per  Walworth,  Ch. 

■^  See,  as  Ijenringupon  the  principle,  Ric- 
ard  V.  Williams,  7  Wheat.  59,  106;  Brad- 
street  V.  Huntington,  5  Pet.  402 ;  Shrae- 
dor  M.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Packer,  129  U.  S.  688, 
9  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  385  ;  .Jenkins  v.  Trager, 
40  Fed.  Rep.  726.  Kentucky :  Scheible  v. 
Hart  (Ky.),  12  S.  W.  Rep.  62S.  Massachu- 
setts: Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Sparhawk, 
.')  Met.  469  ;  Wliitney  v.  Holmes,  15  Mass. 
152;  Cleavelan<l  v.  Fiagg,  4  Cush.  76; 
Jyiverpool  Wharf  v.  Prescott,  7  Allen, 
494;  Putnam  v.  Putnam  Machine  Co.  137 
Mass.  159.  Missouri  :  Knowlton  v.  Smith, 
36  Mo.  507,  88  Am.  Dec.  152 ;  Golterman 
V.  Schiermcrer  (Mo.),  28  S.  W.  Rep.  616. 
New  York  :  Adams  v.  Rockwell,  16  Wend. 
2S5  ;  Sanford  v.  McDonald,  53  Hun,  263. 
North  Carolina:  Shaffer  v.  Hahn,  111  N. 
C.  1,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  1033.  Pennsylvania  : 
Perkins  v.  Gay,  3  Sprg.  &  R.  327,  8  Am. 
306 


Dec.  653.  Texas  :  Bohny  v.  Petty,  81  Tex. 
524,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  80.  Vermont:  Russell 
t;.  Malouey,  39  Vt.  579.  West  Virginia: 
Hatfield  v.  Workman,  35  W.  Va.  578,  14 
S.  E.  Rep.  153.  Wisconsin:  Hartung  v. 
Witte,  59  Wis.  286,  18  N.  W.  Rep.  175. 

3  Pickett  V.  Nelson,  79  Wis.  9,  47  N. 
W.  Rep.  936.  In  Hartung  v.  Witte,  59 
Wis.  286,  298,  Orton,  J  ,  said  :  "  There 
must  be  an  uncertainty  as  to  the  true  line, 
and  some  question,  dispute,  or  contro- 
versy about  it  which  can  be  settled  hy 
such  an  agrLcment  or  acquiescence.  In 
other  words,  that  is  certain  which  can  be 
made  certain;  and  if  the  true  line  cannot 
be  made  certain  by  the  deed  and  a  survey, 
or  by  the  calls  and  monuments  mentioned 
in  the  deed,  then  only  it  may  be  made 
certain  by  an  agreement  or  acquiescence 
of  the  parties.  There  must  be  such  un- 
certainty as  to  cause  a  dispute  or  contro- 
versy of  the  parties  before  resort  can  be 


BOUNDARY    LINES    BY    AGREEMENT.  [§§  368,  369. 


Where  the  owner  of  land,  desiring  to  break  it,  calls  upon  the 
owner  of  adjoining  land  to  point  out  the  boundary  between  tliem, 
and  the  latter  indicates  what  he  supposes  to  be  the  line,  no  estop- 
pel is  created  against  such  adjoining  owner  to  claim  tlie  true  line 
if  different  from  the  one  pointed  out ;  though  there  might  be 
such  an  estoppel  in  case  the  first-named  owner  had  erected  valu- 
able buildings  on  the  faith  of  the  boundary  so  pointed  out.^ 

368.  If  adjoining  o-wners  hold  to  a  division  fence  or  line 
under  the  mistaken  belief  that  it  is  the  true  line,  such  occupa- 
tion, though  continuous  and  uninterrupted,  is  not  adverse.  Such 
occupation  without  the  intention  of  claiming  beyond  the  true  line 
is  no  evidence  of  an  agreement  between  such  owners  establishing 
the  line  of  occupation  as  the  division  line  between  them.  Pos- 
session in  accordance  with  a  division  fence,  built  for  convenience 
and  not  to  establish  a  line,  is  no  bar  to  a  claim  of  title  according 
to  the  true  line.^ 

369.  That  a  fence  has  been  maintained  between  adjoining 
owners  for  convenience  only,  without  any  intention  of  fixing  the 
limits  of  ownership  between  them,  is  not  evidence  of  adverse  pos- 
session.^    Thus  a  brush   fence  maintained  near  the  line  between 


had  to  such  evidence.  In  this  deed  there 
is  no  uncertainty  as  to  the  true  west  line 
of  the  premises,  and  there  is  no  evidence 
of  any  question  or  dispute  of  the  parties 
concerning  it,  and  both  parties  know  or 
can  ascertain  where  the  true  Hue  is.  .  .  . 
When  the  true  line  can  he  ascertained  by 
a  correct  survey,  it  is  considered  certain." 
Citint?  Coats  v.  Taft,  12  Wis.  388  ;  Colcord 
V.  Alexander,  67  111.  581  ;  Canal  Co.  v. 
Kinzie,  93  111.  415  ;  Fowler  v.  The  People, 
93  111.  lir. ;  Smiley  ».  Fries,  104  111.  416. 
1  Heinz  i\  Cramer,  84  Iowa,  497,  51  N. 
W.  Rep.  173;  Boston  &  W.  K.  Co.  v. 
Sparhawk,  5  Met.  469  ;  Adams  v.  Rock- 
well, 16  Wend.  285;  Hefner  v.  Down- 
ing, 57  Tex.  576. 

'^  Golterman  v.  Schiermeier  (Mo.),  28  S. 
W.  Rep.  616;  Skinker  v.  Haapsma,  99 
Mo.  208,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  659;  Kridcr  r. 
Milner,  99  Mo.  145,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  461  ; 
Schad  i:  Sharp,  95  Mo.  573,  8  S.  W.  Rep. 
549;  Jacolis  v.  Moseley,  91  Mo.  457,  4  S. 
W.  Rep.  135;  Atchison  v.  Pease,  96  Mo. 
566,  10  S.  W.  Rep.  159  ;  Finch  r.  Ullman, 


105  Mo.  255,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  863  ;  Kincaid 
V.  Dormey,  47  Mo.  337  ;  Walbrunn  v. 
Ballen,  68  Mo.  164;  Tamm  v.  Kellogg, 
49  Mo.  1 1 8  ;  Thomas  v.  Babb,  45  Mo.  384  ; 
Hoiix  V.  Batteen,  68  Mo.  84;  St.  Louis 
University  r.  McCune,  28  Mo.  481  ;  Acton 
V.  Dooley,  74  Mo.  63 ;  Goldsborough  v. 
Pidduck,  87  Iowa,  599,  54  N.  W.  Rep. 
431;  King  v.  Bri^ham  (Oreg.),  31  Pac. 
Rep.  601  ;  McAfferty  v.  Connover,  7  Ohio 
St.  99,  70  Am.  Dec.  57  ;  Bobo  v.  Rich- 
mond, 25  Ohio  St.  115;  Mills  v.  Penny, 
74  Iowa,  172,37  N.  W.  Rep.  135  ;  Skinner 
V.  Crawford,  54  Iowa,  119,  6  N.  W.  Rep. 
144;  Grube  v.  Wells,  34  Iowa,  148  ;  Maple 
V.  Stevenson,  122  Ind.-368,  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
854  ;  Silver  Creek  Cement  Co.  v.  Union 
Lime  Co.  (Ind.)  35  N.  E.  Rep.  125. 

3  Smith  V.  Hosmer,  7  N.  H.  436,  28 
Am.  Dec.  354;  Clough  v.  Bowman,  15  N. 
H.  504  ;  Knight  v.  Coleman,  19  N.  H.  118  ; 
Jacobs  V.  Moseley,  91  Mo.  457,  4  S.  W. 
Rep.  135  ;  Burrell  v.  Biirrell,  1 1  Mass.  294; 
Kridcr  v.  Milner,  99  Mo.  145,  12  S.  W. 
Rep.  461,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  549;  Walbrunn 
307 


^;^  oTO,  371.]  DESCRII'TION    AND    HUUNDARIES. 

ailjoiniiig  owners,  and  cuntiuuetl  for  fori}'  years,  but  not  at  all 
times  in  tli<>  s;une  place,  does  not  bind  either  party  to  tlie  line 
nsuidly  occupied  by  such  fence. ^  Neither  are  the  parties  in  such 
case  bound  for  the  reason  that  they  have  cut  wood,  or  pastured 
their  cattle,  or  mowed  the  grass,  up  to  such  fence,  each  on  his  own 
side  and  never  on  the  other  side."-^ 

A  fence  between  adjoining  owners,  placed  by  mistake  on  a  line 
dilferent  from  the  true  boundary  line,  does  not  estop  the  owner 
ui'on  whose  land  the  fence  stands  from  claiming  up  to  the  true 
line  ;  and  his  grantee,  under  a  deed  conveying  the  land  "  bounded 
by  lands  of"  his  adjoining  owner,  may  claim  title  according  to 
the  true  boundary  line,  and  is  not  restricted  to  the  line  of  the 
grantor's  occupation  as  shown  by  the  fence. ^ 

A  fence  erected  by  an  adjoining  owner  nearly  on  the  true  line 
is  not  notice  to  the  other  that  any  portion  of  his  land  is  inclosed. 
He  is  justified  in  assuming  that  his  neighbor  is  inclosing  only  his 
own  land,  and  is  not  estopped  to  claim  to  the  true  line.* 

370.  A  permanent  fence  built  by  adjoining  owners,  on  what 
they  supposed  to  be  the  true  line  between  them,  is  evidence  of  an 
asieement  to  establish  the  line  in  accordance  vi'itli  the  line  of  the 
fence. ^  But  a  permanent  fence  built  upon  a  portion  of  the  line 
between  such  owners  does  not  entitle  either  of  them  to  hold  by 
adverse  possession  upon  another  part  of  the  same  line,  when  a 
temporary  fence  has  been  kept  up  varying  from  the  line  of  the 
pei-manent  fence.*^ 

371.  The  position  of  old  fences  may  be  considered  in  ascer- 
taining disputed  boundaries  ;  '  and  the  conduct  of  the  parties 
with  reference  to  such  fences  may  be  such  as  to  authorize  the 
conclusion  that  the  fences  were  established  by  agreement  of  the 
partie.s,  or  have  been  recognized  by  them  for  such  a  length  of  time 
as  to  determine  the  line  of  ownership  between  the  parties. 

V.  Ballen,  68Mo.  165  ;  Kincaid  v.  Dormey,  3  Cleaveland  r.  Fla?g,  4  Cush.  76. 

47    Mo.  337  ;  Jackson  v.  SchoonmMker,  2  ^  Hockinoih  c  Des  Grands  Champs,  71 

Johns.  230,  per  Kent,  C.  J.;  Jackson  v.  Mich.  520,  39  N.  W.  Rep.  737. 

Warford,  7   Wend.  62;  Brown  v.   Cock-  5  Smith   v.    Hosmer,   7  N.   H.  436,  28 

erell,  33  Ala.  38;  Alexander  v.  Wheeler,  Am.  Dec.  354. 

78  Ala.  107;  Hass  y.  Plantz,  56  Wis.  105,  «  Smith    v.  Hosmer,   7    N.   II.  4.36,   28 

14  N.  W.  Rep.  65.  Am.  Dec.  354. 

1  Smith  V.  Hosmer,  7  N.  H.  436.  ''  Hoffman  v.  Port  Huron  (Mich.),  60 

■^  Smith  V.  Hosmer,  7  N.  H.  436  ;  Doo-  N.  W.  Rep.  831. 
little  i;.  Tice,  41  Barb.  181. 
308 


BOUNDARY    LIXES   BY   AGREEMENT.        [§§  372,    373. 

Fences  built  by  adjoining  lot-owners  on  the  line  of  the  street, 
accoiding  to  stakes  set  by  the  surveyors  soon  after  the  original 
survey  was  made,  and  maintained  for  forty-five  years,  are  better 
evidence  of  the  location  of  such  line  than  a  new  survey,  made 
forty  years  after  the  original  survey,  which  changes  such  Hne.^ 
Evidence  that  there  was  a  very  ancient  fence  between  the  lots  of 
adjoining  owners,  and  that  the  fence  has  been  maintained  as  it 
now  stands  for  about  forty  years,  and  that  during  such  time  the 
owners  have  openly  and  continuously  held  possession  under  a 
claim  of  right  up  to  the  line  of  such  fence,  warrants  a  finding  that 
the  fence  was  erected  by  agreement  of  the  parties  ;  and  a  slight 
variation  from  the  position  of  the  boundary  line  as  described  in  a 
deed  made  sixty  years  ago,  when  the  land  was  of  little  value,  does 
not  affect  the  conclusiveness  of  the  evidence.^ 

372.  If  a  mistake  has  been  made  by  the  parties  in  locating 
a  division  line  or  fence,  this  may  be  corrected,  if  it  has  not 
been  acted  upon  for  too  long  a  time  and  no  injustice  will  be 
done.^  The  mistake  must,  however,  be  a  material  one ;  *  and  it 
must  be  corrected  before  rights  have  been  acquired  by  presump- 
tion.^ Thus,  whei-e  a  division  fence  between  lands  of  adjoining 
owners  had  been  standing  more  than  twenty-one  years,  it  consti- 
tutes the  boundary  line  between  them,  although  it  is  crooked  and 
the  deeds  of  both  parties  call  for  a  straight  line  between  acknow- 
ledged landmarks.^ 

Where  the  grantee  under  a  defective  description  takes  posses- 
sion of  the  land  actually  intended  to  be  conveyed,  a  court  of 
equity  may,  as  against  the  grantor,  correct  the  description.'^ 

373.  A  court  of  equity  has  no  jurisdiction  to  fix  bounda- 
ries merely  because  they  are  disputed  or  uncertain.  To  give 
such  jurisdiction  there  must  be  son]e  equity  superinduced  by  the 
act  to  the  parties  or  their  situation  or  relation.^     "Among  the 

I  Racine  /•.  Emerson  (Wis.),  .5.5  N.  W.  ^  Dyeri-.  Eldrid^rc  (Intl.),  .36  N.  E.  Kep. 

Rep.  177.  .522;   Hoffman    v.  White,  90  Ala.   3.54,  7 

-  Beekman  v.  Davidson,  162  Mass.  .147,  So.  Rep.  816. 

39   N.  E.   Rep.  38.     See  cases  cited    by  <=  :\i(.Coy  v.  Ilance,  28  Pa.  St.  149. 

Knowlton,  J.  ^  I)\vi;;bt  v.  Tyler,  49  Mich.  614,  14  N. 

^  Menkens  r.  Blumenthal,  27  Mo.  198  ;  W.  Rep.  567. 

Leinmon    v.  Ilart-ook,   80  Mo.  13;   Cun-  «  1   Story  Eq.  Jtir.  §   615,3  Pom.   Eq. 

ningham  v.  Roherson,  1  Swan,  138 ;  Scliad  .Tiir.  §  1384  ;  Noiris's  App.  64  Pa.  St.  27.5  ; 

V.  Sharp,  9.5  Mo.  573,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  549.  Wilson  v.   Hart,   98    Mo.  618,    12   S.  W. 

■*  Cunningham   v.   Roberson,    1  Swan,  Rep.  249,  250. 
138. 

30!) 


s§  ;'.T4,  o75.]  DKSCKIPIION    AND   BOUNDARIES. 

grouiKls  of  oquituble  interference  niiiy  be  nicntionctl  multiplicity 
of  suits,  irreparable  mischief  not  easily  measured  by  damages, 
fraud  or  mistake."  ^ 

Even  in  case  tiiere  lias  been  a  mistake  as  to  the  boundary  line, 
and  one  owner  lias  placed  a  building  a  little  over  the  line  upon 
land  of  the  adjoining  owner,  a  court  of  equity  will  not  order  the 
removal  of  the  building,  but  will  leave  the  party  to  his  remedy  at 
law.  The  court  may,  however,  enter  a  decree  that,  if  the  plaintiff 
will  release  the  strip  of  land  so  built  upon  within  a  certain  time, 
judgment  shall  be  entered  for  the  value  of  the  land  as  found  by  a 
referee  and  costs.  The  court  will  not  aid  the  plaintiff  in  obtain- 
ing an  exorbitant  price  for  land  which  is  comparatively  valueless 
except  for  purposes  of  litigation.'-^ 

374.  In  some  States  there  are  statutes  providing  for  estab- 
lishing disputed  boundaries  by  an  official  survey.  To  make 
such  a  survey  final  and  binding  upon  the  parties,  notices  must 
be  given,  and  all  proceedings  had  in  substantial  conformity  with 
the  statute.'^  The  fact  that  notice  was  given  to  the  parties  to  be 
affected  should  appear  on  the  face  of  the  proceedings.^ 

Authority  under  an  equitable  proceeding  to  ascertain  the  true 
boundary  lines  between  adjacent  lands  cannot  be  extended  to  the 
determination  of  the  title.  Title  must  be  determined  by  a  suit 
at  law  to  recover  the  land.  It  is  true  that  the  determination  of 
the  boundary  may  involve  the  title  to  some  portion  of  the  land. 
"  The  distinction  is  between  cases  which  are  prosecuted  with  the 
ostensible  object  of  determining  the  true  boundary  line  between 
the  parties  and  those  brought  to  recover  lands  claimed  by  the 
defendant  to  be  embraced  within  this  boundary  line  as  against 
the  line  claimed  by  the  plaintiff."  '"^ 

375.  The  declarations  of  deceased  persons  made  -while  in 
possession  of  land,  and  in  the  act  of  pointing  out  their  boun- 
daries, are  admissible  in   evidence   as  to  such  boundaries  when 

1  Sedg.  &  Waitii,  Tr.  Title  Land,  §  865.  ■*  Davis  v.  Howell,  47  N.  J.  L.  280. 

2  Hunter  v.  Carrol,  64  N.  H.  572,  15  ^  King  v.  Brigham,  23  Oreg.  262,  31 
Atl.  Rt-p.  17  ;  Clark  v.  Society,  46  N.  H.  Pae.  Rep.  601 ;  Love  v.  Morrill,  19  Greg. 
272.  545,   24  Pac.   Rep.  916;  Norris'  App.  64 

•MIolliday  V.  Maddox,  39  Kans.  359, 18     Pa.    St.    275,   279;    West   Hartford   Soc. 
Pac.  Rep.  299  ;  Schwab  v.  Stoneback,  49     r.  First  Baptist  Church,  35   Conn.   117, 
Kans.  607,  31   Pac.   Rep.  142;  Marsh  v.     120. 
Chestnut,    14   111.   223 ;  Neary   v.   Jones 
(Iowa),  56  N.  W.  Rep.  675. 

310 


BOUNDARY    LINES   BY    AGREEMENT. 


[§  376. 


nothing  appears  to  show  an  interest  to  deceive  or  misrepresent.^ 
It  need  not  appear  affirmatively  that  the  dechirations  were  against 
the  interest  of  the  person  making  them,^  but  they  must  be  so  in 
fact,^  or  it  must  at  least  appear  that  such  person  had  no  interest 
to  make  false  representations  ;  *  and  it  must  appear  that  they  were 
made  by  a  former  owner  in  possession  of  the  land  at  the  time,^  in 
tlie  act  of  pointing  out  the  boundaries,^  The  declarations  must 
be  those  of  a  person  who  has  since  deceased."  The  declarations 
derive  their  force  from  the  fact  that  they  accompany  the  act  of 
pointing  out  the  boundaries,  and  are  thus  a  part  of  the  act.^ 

376.  In  some  States  the  declarations  of  a  surveyor  or  other 
disinterested  person  since  deceased  are  admissible  in  a  con- 
troversy about  such  line,  though  not  a  former  owner,  if  he  was 
in  a  position  to  know  a  boundary  line,  corner,  or  monument,  and 
the  declarations  were  made  before  the  controversy  commenced,^ 


1  Hunnicutt  v.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  333; 
Ellicott  V.  Pearl,  10  Pet.  412.  Califor- 
nia: Sharp  V.  Blankenship,  79  Cal.  411, 
21  Pac.  Rep.  842.  Georgia:  McLeod  v. 
S\v;>iu,  87  Ga.  150,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  315; 
Towner  v.  Thompson,  82  Ga.  740,  9  S.  E. 
Rt')).  672.  Kentucky :  Scott  v.  Means 
Iron  Co.  (Ky.)  18  S.  W.  Rep.  1012. 
Maine  :  Simpson  v.  Blai^dell,  85  Me.  199, 
27  Atl.  Rep.  101  ;  Royal  r.  Chandler,  83 
Me.  150,  21  Atl.  Rep.  842.  Massachu- 
setts: Chapman  v.  Edmands,  3  Allen,  512; 
LoDj,'  V.  Colton,  lie  Mass.  414;  Bartlett 
V.  Emerson,  7  Gray,  174  ;  Ware  v.  Brook- 
house,  7  Gray,  454  ;  Wood  v.  Foster,  8 
Allen,  24,  85  Am.  Dec.  681 ;  Flags  '••  Ma- 
son, 8  Gray,  556  ;  Da{:<;ett  v.  Shaw,  5  Met. 
223.  New  Hampshire  :  Smith  v.  Forre.^t, 
49  \.  11.  230  ;  South  Hampton  v.  Fowler, 
54  N.  II.  197  ;  Great  Falls  Co.  v.  Wor.ster, 
15  N.  H.  412,  437;  Wood  v.  Fi.ske,  62 
N.  H.  173  ;  Pike  v.  Hayes,  14  N.  II.  19,40 
Am.  Dec.  171  ;  Lawrence  v.  Tennant,  64 
N.  II.  .532,  15  All.  Rep.  .54.3.  New  York: 
Partridge  v.  Russell,  2  N.  Y.  Sti])p.  529. 
North  Carolina:  Roberts  u.  Preston,  100 
^■.  ('.  243,  6  S.  E.  Rep.  574.  Peimsyl- 
vania:  Bender  v.  Piizer,  27  Pa.  St.  3.33. 
Texas:  Kvans  v.  Hurt,  34  Tex.  Ill  ;  Hurt 
r.  Evans.  49  Tex.  311  ;  Windus  /-.  James 
(Tex),  !9  S.  W.  Rep.  873;   Whitman   v. 


Haywood.  77  Tex.  557,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
166.  Vermont :  Wood  v.  Willard,  36  Vt. 
82,  84  Am.  Dec.  659. 

-  Daggett  I'.  Shaw,  5  Met.  223 ;  Wood 
V.  Foster,  8  Allen,  24,85  Am.  Dec.  681, 

3  Corbleys  v.  Ripley,  22  W.  Va.  154,46 
Am.  Rep.  502  ;  Wood  v.  Willard,  36  Vt, 
82,  84  Am.  Dec.  659. 

4  Corbleys  v.  Ripley,  22  W.  Va.  154, 
46  Am.  Rep.  502;  Long  v.  Colton,  116 
Mass.  414. 

5  Whitney  v.  Bacon,  9  Gray,  206  ;  Chap- 
man V.  Twitchell,  37  Me.  39,  58  Am.  Dec. 
773 ;  Partridge  v.  Russell,  2  N.  Y.  Supp. 
529  ;  Taylor  v.  Glenn,  29  S.  C,  292,  7  S. 
E.  Rep.  483. 

«  Hunnicutt  v.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  333, 
363  ;  Lemmon  v.  Ilartsook,  80  Mo.  13 ; 
Long  V.  Colton,  116  Mass.  414;  Bartlett 
V.  Emerson,  7  Gray,  174  ;  Curtis  v.  Aaron- 
son,  49  N.  J.  L.  68,  7  Atl.  Rep.  886. 

■^  Flagg  V.  Mason,  8  Gray,  556 ;  Bart- 
lett V.  Emerson,  7  Gray,  174;  Davis  v. 
Fuller,  12  Vt.  178,  36  Am.  Dec.  334. 

8  Hunnicutt  v.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  333, 
363,  per  Strong,  J. ;  Bender  ;•.  I'itzer,  27 
Pa.  St.  333. 

'■>  Boardman  v.  Reed,  6  Pet.  328;  Hun- 
nicutt V.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  333,  365; 
Tucker  v.  Smith,  08  Tex.  473,  3  S.  W. 
Rep.   671;    McCausland   v.   Fleming,  63 

311 


;;  377.1  DESCRIl'TION    AND    BOUNDAniES. 

provideJ  tlu'  tlerliiiatioiis  weix'  iiiiidc  while  tlu'  declarant  was 
poiiitiiig-  out  or  marking  the  boundaries,  or  discharging  some  duty 
relating  thereto.^ 

More  generally,  however,  and  upon  sound  principles,  the  rule  is 
restricted  to  the  admission  of  declarations  only  when  made  by 
persons  owning  the  land  anil  being  at  the  time  in  possession  of 
it  •  ^  and  evt-n  then  the  dcclaiations  must  be  either  a  part  of  the 
7-es  geatcv^^  or  be  made  against  the  interest  of  the  owner.  Thns 
the  declarations  of  the  owner,  while  staaiding  on  his  land,  in  his 
own  favor,  are  not  competent  evidence  in  favor  of  one  claiming 
under  him,  to  prove  a  right  of  way  over  adjacent  land  of  another 
person."* 

377.  The  declarations  of  a  surveyor  made  while  he  was 
engaged  in  making  the  survey  are  held  admissible  as  a  part 
of  the  res  gestae,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  his  subsequent 
d.-ath.-^ 

Survevs  by  the  same  surveyor  made  at  about  the  same  time  as 
a  survey  in  dispute,  and  locating  the  same  lines,  are  admissible  as 
declarations  of  the  surveyor,  who  is  dead.^  But  declarations  of  a 
deceased  surveyor,  who  was  not  present  at  or  C(mnected  with  the 
original  survey,  are  inadmissible  though  he  took  part  in  a  sub- 
division of  the  survey.'' 

Pa.  St.  36;  Kianier  v.  Goodlander,  98  i  Ellicott  v.  Pearl,  10  Pt-t.  412;  Hun- 
Pa.  St.  366  ;  Harrimau  r.  Brown,  8  Leigh,  nicutt  v.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  333;  Clay 
697;  Hill  v.  i'roctor,  10  VV.  Va.  59,  84;  County  Land  Co.  v.  Montague  County 
Bender  v.  i'ltzer,  27  Pa.  St.  333  ;  George  (Tex.  Civ.  Ai)p.),  28  S.  W.  Rep.  704. 
V.  Thomas,  16  Tex.  74,  67  Am.  Dec.  612  ;  "-  Hunnicntt  v.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  333; 
Siroudw.  Springfield,  28  Tex.  649;  Welder  Hall  v.  Mayo,  97  Mass.  416  ;  Bartlett  v. 
r.  CMrroll,  '29  Tex.  317  ;  Smith  o.  Kussell,  Emerson,  7  Gray,  174;  Long  v.  Colton, 
37  Tex.  247  ;  Tucker  v.  Smith,  68  Tex.  116  Mass.  414;  Curtis  v.  Aaronson,  49 
473,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  671  ;  Smith  v.  Forrest,  N.  J.  L.  68,  7  All.  Rep.  886,  60  Am.  Rep. 
49  N.  H.  230 ;  Lawrence  v.  Tennant,  64  .584 ;  Horner  v.  Stillwell,  35  N.  J.  L. 
K.  H.  532,  15  Atl.  Rep.  543;  Great  Falls  307;  Chiii'man  v.  Twitchell,  37  Me.  59, 
Co.  /•.  Worster,  15  N.   H.  412;  Wdod   r.  58  Am.  Dee.  773;  Hurt  v.  Evans,  49  Tex. 

Willard,  37   Vt.   377,   386,  86  Am.  Dec.  311. 

716;  Bethea  v.  Byrd,  95  N.  C.  309,  59  '^  Deming  v.   Carrington,   12   Conn.  1, 

Am.  Rep.  240  ;  Whitehurst  v.  Pettipher,  30  Am.  Dec.  591. 

87  N   C.  179,  42  Am.  Rep.  520;  Smith  v.  *  Ware  v.  Broolshouse,  7  Cray,  4.54. 

Heidrick,  93  N.  C.  210;  Fry  tJ.  Ciirrie,  91  5  George  v.  Tlioina.s,   16    Tex.    74,    67 

N.  C.  436  ;  Williams  v.  Kivett,  82  N.  C.  Am.  Dec.  612. 

110;  Sasser  v.  Herring,  3   Dev.  L.  340;  <^  Cottingham    v.    Seward    (Tex.    Civ. 

Martin  v.   Atkinson,  7   Ga.   228,  50   Am.  App.),  25  S.  W.  Rep.  797. 

D.'C.  403;  Whalen   r.  Ni^bet  (Ky.),  26  S.  "  §376.     Angle  v.    Young  (Tex.    Civ. 

W.  Rep.  188.  Apj).),  25  S.  W.  Rep.  798. 

312 


HuLWDARY    LINES    BY    AGREEMENT.  [§§  378-380. 


378.  The  declarations  of  a  deceased  surveyor  made  on  the 
spot  while  running  or  pointing  out  a  line  are  admissible  to 
identify  the  monuments  of  a  survey.^  Thus  the  dechu'ations  of 
a  deceased  surve3or,  while  making  a  survey,  have  been  admitted 
to  identify  a  monuuieut  pointed  out  by  him  as  a  corner  of  the 
same  survey,  estabhshed  in  making  the  original  survey  many 
years  before,  in  which  he  had  participated. 

The  decisions  in  South  Carolina  and  Texas  have  gone  the 
length  of  admitting  not  only  evidence  of  the  declarations  of  a 
deceased  surveyor  made  while  surveying  the  land,  but  also  those 
of  a  deceased  chain-bearer  who  had  pointed  out  to  the  witness 
the  place  of  a  corner. - 

379.  The  opinion  of  a  witness  as  to  the  location  of  a  dis- 
puted division  line  is  incompetent  testimony,  though  he  had 
long  been  intimately  acquainted  with  the  premises.^ 

The  opinion  of  surveyors  to  the  effect  that,  when  the  land  was 
originally  surveyed,  only  one  line  of  tlie  survey  was  actually  run, 
is  inadmissible.  It  is  the  province  of  the  jury  to  conclude  from 
tlie  facts  pi'oved  whether  or  not  the  lines  were  actually  run,  or 
the  survey  was  merely  an  office  survey.* 

380.  In  some  States,  ancient  boundaries  in  dispute,  whether 
public  or  private,  may  be  proved  by  the  common  reputation 
and  understanding  of  the  neighborhood  where  the  land  lies.  Such 
reputation  or  understanding,  to  be  admissible,  must  be  shown  to 
be  general  and  concurrent,  and  it  must  have  been  in  existence 
before  the   controversy  commenced  in  which   it  is   used   as   evi- 


1  Aycrs  v.  Watson,  l."?;  U.  S.  584,  11 
Sup.  Ct.  Hep.  201 ,  per  Bradley,  J. ;  Huuiii- 
ciitt  V.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  333  ;  Georjje  v. 
Thomas,  16  Tex.  74,  67  Am.  Dec.  612; 
P.lythe  V.  Suthorliuui,  3  McCortl,  258; 
Stroud  V.  Sprinofield,  28  Tex.  649  ;  Wdder 
V.  Carroll,  29  Ttx.  317  ;  Caufman  v.  Pres- 
byieriau  Cong.  6  Binn.  .'i9  ;  Bender  v.  Pit- 
zer,  29  Pa.  St.  333,  ,335;  Kennedy  v.  LuLold, 
88  Pa.  St.  246 ;  MeCausland  v.  Fleming, 
63  Pa.  St.  36  ;  Kramer  v.  Goodlander,  98 
Pa.  St.  366;  Bellas  v.  Cleaver,  40  Pa.  St. 
260  ;  Tyrone  Co.  v.  Cross,  25  \\.  N.  C.  97, 
18  Atl.  Rep.  519;  Sweigart  v.  Richards, 
8  Pa.  St.  436  ;  Conn  v.  Penn,  1  P.t.  C.  C. 
496  ;  Board  man  v.  Reed,  6  Pet.  328  ;  Cuin- 
iiion«eaUli  v.  Frew,  3   Pa.  Co.  Ct.   Rep. 


492;  Cherry  v.  Boyd,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  7; 
Donohue  i-.  Whitney,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  622 ; 
Partridge  v.  Russell,  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  529. 
The  Eiigli.sh  cases  admit  hearsay  to  deter- 
mine a  private  houndary  when  it  is  iden- 
tical with  a  public  boundary,  as  of  a 
hamlet,  ))aiish,  or  manor.  Thomas  v. 
Jenkins,  6  Ad.  &  E..525. 

■-  Specry.  Coate,3McCurd,  227;  Blythe 
r.  Sutherland,  3  McCord,  258;  Smith  r. 
Russell,  37  Tex.  247. 

•■'  Beccher  v.  Galvin,  71  Mich.  391,  39 
N.  W.  Rep.  469. 

•»  Randall  v.  Gill,  77  Tex.  351,  14  S. 
W.  Rep.  134;  Reast  v.  Donald,  84  Tex. 
648,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  795. 

313 


K  GSl.]  DESCRirTION    AND   BOUNDARIES. 

deiR'o.'     SiK'li  proof  must  also  show  the  bouiuUuy  with  i-east)ua- 
ble  ri'rtainty.- 

W'hoie  the  location  of  a  private  boundary  depends  upon  show- 
ing the  original  section  line,  this  may  be  shown  by  proof  of 
general  reputation  .^ 

IV.    Greiteral  Rules  of  Construction. 

381.  It  is  a  rule  thit  monuments  prevail,  in  cases  of  dis- 
crepancies, over  courses  and  distances.^     The  ground   of  the 


1  Stroiul  V.  Springfield,  28  Tex.  649  ; 
Sexton  V.  Hollis,  26  S.  C.  231  ;  Jones  v. 
Dean  (Kv.),  5  S.  W.  Rep.  470;  Nixon  v. 
Porter,  34  Miss.  697,  69  Am.  Dec.  408  ; 
Stetson  V.  Freeman,  35  Kans.  523, 11  Pac. 
Rep.  431,  as  to  boundary  of  a  city;  Kin- 
ney w.  Farnsworth,  17  Conn.  355;  Woos- 
ter  V.  Butler,  13  Conn.  309 ;  Goddard  v. 
Parker,  10  Oreg.  102;  Nys  v.  Biemeret.  44 
Wis.  104  ;  Aid  rich  v.  Griffith,  66  Vt.  390, 
29  Atl.  Rep.  376  ;  Thoen  v.  Roche  (Minn.), 
58  N.  W.  Rep.  686. 

-  Nixou  V.  Porter,  34  Miss.  697,  69 
Am.  Dec.  408. 

3  Mullaney  v.  Duffy,  145  111.  559,  .33 
N.  E.  Rep.  750. 

*  Avers  V.  Watson,  113  U.  S.  594,5 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  641 ;  Land  Co.  v.  SMunders, 
103  U.  S.  316,  322;  Morrow  v.  Whitney, 
95  U.  S.  551 ;  United  States  v.  Murray,  41 
Fed.  Rep.  862;  Brown  v.  Hnger,  21  How. 
305 ;  Barclay  v.  Howell,  6  Pet.  498 ; 
Cleaveland  v.  Smith,  2  Story,  278  ;  M'lver 
V.  Walker,  9  Cranch,  173;  4  Wheat. 
444;  Nelsun  j).  Hall,  1  McLean,  518. 
Alabama  :  Guilmartin  v.  Woo.d,  76  Ala. 
204.  California :  Walsh  v.  Hill,  38  Cal. 
481  ;  Pii-rcy  v.  Crandall,  34  Cal.  334;  Col- 
ton  V.  Seavey,  22  Cal.  496;  Penry  ;;. 
Richards,  52  Cal.  496;  Adair  i;.  Whiie, 
85  Cal.  313,  24  Pac.  Rep.  663;  StoU  y. 
Beccher,  94  Cal.  1,  29  Pac.  Rep.  327; 
Anderson  v.  Richardson,  92  Cal.  623,  28 
I'ac.  Rep.  679;  Beaudry  v.  Doyle,  68  Cal. 
105;  Tognazzini  o.  Morganti,  84  Cal. 
1 59,  23  Pac.  Rep.  1 035.  Colorado :  Hol- 
leubeck  r.  Syke.s,  17  Colo.  317,  29  Pac. 
Rep.  3S0.  Connecticut:  Nichols  v.  Tur- 
ney,  15  Conn.   101  ;  Beldcn   v.   Seymour, 

314 


8  Conn.  19.  Florida  :  Ho{;;ans  v.  Carruth, 
19Fla.  84;  Andreu  v.  Watkins,  26  Fla. 
390,  7  So.  Rep.  876;  Daggett  v.  Wilky, 
6  Fla.  482.  Georgia:  Harris  u.  Hull,  70 
Ga.  831  ;  Benton  u.  HorsJey,  71  Ga.  619; 
Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamilton,  59  Ga. 
171.  Illinois:  Coltingham  v.  Parr,  93 
ill.  2.33;  Miller  v.  Bceler,  25  111.  163;  Lin- 
coln V.  McLaughlin,  74  111.  11  ;  England 
V.  Vandermark,  147  111.  76,  35  N.  E.  Rep. 
465;  McClintock  v.  Rogers,  11  HI.  279; 
Fisher  v.  Bennehoff,  121  111.  426,  13  N.  E. 
Rep.  150.  Indiana:  Caspar  (J.Jamison,  120 
Ind.  58,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  743;  Simonton  v. 
Thompson,  55  Ind.  87  ;  Shepherd  u.  Nave, 
125  Ind.  226,25  N.  E.  Rep.  220.  Iowa: 
Bolton  I'.  Eggleston,  61  Iowa,  163,  16  N. 
W.  Rep.  62  ;  Yocum  v.  Hasldns.  81  Iowa, 
436,46  N.  W.  Rep.  1065;  Moreland  v. 
Page,  2  Iowa,  139;  Walrod  v.  Flanigan, 
75  Iowa,  365,  39  N.  W.  Hep.  645.  Ken- 
tucky:  Bailey  v.  McConnell  (Ky.),  14  S. 
W.  Rep.  337;  Baxter  v.  Evett,  7  Mon. 
329.  Louisiana  :  Gnghlielhmi  v.  Gei.smar, 
46  La.  Ann.  280,  1 4  So.  Rep.  501 .  Maine : 
Bryant  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.  79  Me.  31 2, 
9  Atl.  Rep.  736  ;  Carville  v.  Hutehins,  73 
Me.  227;  Tyler  r.  Fickett,  73  Me.  410; 
Cilley  V.  Childs,  73  Me.  130;  Melcher 
r.  Merryman,  41  Me.  601  ;  Haynes  v. 
Young,  36  Me.  557.  Maryland :  Friend 
r.  Friend,  64  Md.  321,  1  Atl.  Rep.  865; 
Thomas  v.  Godfrey,  3  Gill  &  J.  142; 
Heck  V.  Remka,  47  Md.  68 ;  Wil.'^nn  v. 
Inloes,  6  Gill,  121.  Massachu-setts  :  Dodd 
V.  Witt,  130  Mass.  63,  •J9  \.  K.  Rep.  475, 
52  Am.  Rep.  700;  Woodward  v.  Nims, 
130  Mass.  70;  Foley  v.  IMcCarrhy,  157 
Mass.  474,  32  N.  E.   Rep.  669 ;  Howe  v. 


GENERAL  .RULES   OF   CONSTRUCIIUX. 


[^  SSI. 


rule  is,  tbut  mistakes  are  deemed  more  likely  to  occur  with  respect 
to  courses  and  distances  than  in  regard  to  objects  which  are  visi- 


Bass,  2  Mass.  380,  3  Am.  Dec.  59  ;  Frost 
v.  Augier,  127  Mass.  212  ;  Morse  v.  Kog- 
ers,  lis  Mass.  572;  Sauboru  i'.  Rice,"  129 
Mass.  387  ;  Frost  v.  Spauldiug,  19  Pick. 
445,  31  Am.  Dec.  150;  Pernam  v.  Wend, 
6  Mass.  131  ;  Davis  v.  Kainsford,  17  Mass. 
207.  Michigan:  Twogoud  v.  Hoyt,  42 
Mich.  C09,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  445;  Biowu  v. 
Morrill,  91  Midi.  29,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  700. 
Minnesota :  Nicolin  v.  Schneiderhan,  37 
Minn.  63,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  33  ;  TurnbuU  v. 
Schroeder,  29  Miim.  49,11  N.  W.  Rep. 
147  ;  Coles  v.  Yorks,  36  Minn.  388,  31  N. 
W.  Rep.  353  ;  Yanish  v.  Tarbox,  49  Minn. 
268,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  1051.  Mississippi: 
O'Hei-rin  v.  Brooks,  67  Mi-.s.  266,  6  So. 
Rep.  844 ;  Potts  v.  Canton  Warehouse 
Co.  70  Miss.  462,  12  So.  Rep.  147.  Mis- 
sonri:  Harding  v.  Wright,  119  Mo.  1,  24 
S.  W.  Rep.  211;  Whittlesey  i-.  Kellogg, 
28  Mo.  404  ;  Climer  v.  Wallace,  28  ]\Io. 
556:  Campbell  v.  Johnson,  44  Mo.  250; 
Smith  ?j.  Catlin  Laud  Co.  117  Mo.  438, 
22  S.  W.  Rep.  1083  ;  Kroneubergerr.  Hoff- 
ner,  44  Mo.  185  ;  Rutherford  v.  Tracy,  48 
Mo.  326  ;  Kellogg  v.  Mullen,  45  Mo.  571  ; 
Jamison  i'.  Fopiano,  48  Mo.  194;  Cooley 
V.  Warren,  53  Mo.  166;  West  i:  Bretclle, 
115  Mo.  653,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  705;  She- 
waiter  V.  Pirner,  55  Mo.  218  ,  Blumcnthal 
Real  Estate  Co.  v.  Broch  (Mo.),  29  S. 
W.  Rep.  836.  Nebraska :  Thompson  c. 
IlHrris,  40  Neb.  230,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  712  ; 
Johtison  V.  Preston,  9  Neb.  474.  New 
Hampshire:  Cunningham  v.  Curtis,  57 
N.  n.  157;  Coburu  v.  Coxeter,  51  N.  H. 
158;  Smith  v.  Dodge,  2  N.  H.  303;  Grif- 
fin V.  Bixby,  12  N.  H.  454,  37  Am.  Dec. 
225.     New  Jersey:    Smith    r.   Negbauer, 

42  N.  J.  L.  305  ;  Andrews  v.  Rue,  34  N. 
J.  L.  402  ;  Opdyke  r.  Stephens,  28  N.  J. 
L.  83  ;  M(;CulIough  v.  Absecon  Imp.  Co. 
48  N.  J.  Eq.  170,  21  Atl.  Rep.  481  ;  Cur- 
tis V.  AarOD'^on,  49  N.  J.  L.  68,  7  Atl. 
Rep.  886;  K.ill)fleisch  w.  Standard  Oil  Co. 

43  N.  J.  L  259.  New  York :  Case  »;.  Dex- 
ter, 106  N.  Y.  548,  13  N.  E.  Rep  449; 
Thayer  v.  Pinion,  108  N.  Y.  394,  15  N.  E. 


Rep.  615;  Arden  v.  Thompson,  5  Cow. 
371  ;  Casey  v.  Dunn,  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  305; 
Baldwin  v.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  359  ;  Drew  v. 
Swift,  46  N.  Y.  204  ;  Wendell  v.  People,  8 
Wend.  183,  22  Am.  Dec.  635  ;  Seneca  Na- 
tion V.  Hugaboom,  132  N.  Y.  492,  30  N. 
E.  Rep.  983;  Lovejoy  v.  Tietjeu,  47  Ilun, 
321  ;  Muhlker  v.  Ruppeit,  124  N.  Y.  627, 
26  N.  E.  Rep.  313.  North  Carolina  :  West 
V.  Shaw,  67  N.  C.  439  ;  Credle  v.  Hays,  88 
N.  C.  321  ;  Buckner  i;.  Anderson,  111  N.  C. 
572,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  424;  Proctor  v.  Pool, 
4  Dev.  370;  Shaffer  v.  Hahn,  111  N.  C. 
1,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  1033;  Bonaparte  v.  Car- 
ter, 106  N.  C.  534,11  S.  E.  Rep.  262; 
Cowles  V.  Reavis,  109  N.  C.  417,  13  S.  E. 
Rep.  930 ;  Cox  i\  McGowan  (N.  C),  21 
S.  E.  Rep.  108.  Ohio:  Wyckoff  i-.  Ste- 
phenson, 14  Ohio,  13;  Alseire  r.  Hulse,  5 
Ohio,  534.  Oregon:  Lewis  v.  Lewis,  4 
Oreg.  177;  Anderson  v.  McCormick,  18 
Oreg.  301,  22  Pac.  Rep.  1062;  King  v. 
Brigham,  19  Oreg.  560,  25  Pac.  Rep.  150. 
Pennsylvania:  Breneiserr.  Davis,  134  Pa. 
St.  1  ;  Watson  v.  Jones,  85  Pa.  St.  117; 
Morse  v.  Rollins,  121  Pa.  St.  537,  15  Atl. 
Rep.  645  ;  Bnrkholder  v.  Markley,  98  Pa. 
St.  37 ;  Lodge  v.  Barnett,  46  Pa.  St.  477. 
South  Carolina:  Sturgeon  v.  Floyd,  3 
Rich.  L.  80;  FuUwood  ;,'.  Graham,  1  Rich. 
491.  Tennessee:  Lewis  v.  Oakley,  10 
Heisk.  483 ;  Disney  v.  Coal  Creek  Min. 
Co.  11  Lea,  607  ;  Bleidorn  v.  Pilot  Mt. 
Coal  Co.  89  Tenn.  166,  204,  15  S.  W. 
Rep.  737.  Texas:  St;ifford  v.  King,  30 
Tex.  257,  94  Am.  Dec.  304;  Booth  v. 
Strippleman,  26  Tex.  436;  Welder  v. 
Hunt,  34  Tex.  44;  Titteiingion  v.  Trees, 
78  Tex.  567,  US  W.  Rep.  692;  Mitch- 
ell r.  Bnrdett,  22  Tex.  633  ;  Davis  i;.  Bay- 
lor (Tex.),  19  S.  W.  Rej).  523;  Liiiuey  v. 
Wood  (Tex.),  17  S.  W.  Rc]).  244;  Ran- 
dall V.  Gill,  77  Tex.  351,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
134  ;  Roberts  v.  Helms  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
20  S.  AV.  Rep.  1004  ;  Wyatt  v.  Foster,  79 
Tex.  413,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  679;  Luckctt  i'. 
Scruggs,  73  Tex.  519,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  .529  ; 
Bland   v.  Smith  (Tex.   Civ.  Ai)p.),  26  S. 

315 


§  ^^81.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


blo  ami  luM-iiiiui'Mit.'  A  description  by  coiirst^  aiul  distance  is 
rt't>-;ir(lt>il  as  tlu'  most  uncertain  kind  of  dest-ription,  because  niis- 
takes  are  liable  to  occur  in  the  making  of  the  survey,  in  entering 
the  minutes  of  it,  and  in  copying  the  same  from  ti>e  field-book."'' 
"Consequently,  if  marked  trees  and  marked  corners  be  found 
conformably  to  the  calls  of  tlie  patent,  or  if  watercourses  be 
called  for  in  the  patent,  or  mountains  or  other  natural  objects, 
distances  must  be  lengthened  or  shortened  and  courses  varied  so 
as  to  conform  to  those  objects."  ^  In  locating  lands,  the  follow- 
ing calls  are  resorted  to,  and  generally  in  the  order  stated :  (1) 
Natural  boundaries ;  (2)  artificial  marks ;  (3)  adjacent  bounda- 
ries; (4)  course  and  distance,  —  course  controlling  distance,  or 
distance  course,  according  to  circumstances  ;*  but  it  has  never  been 
said  that  each  of  these  occupies  an  inflexible  position. 


W.  Rep.  773.  Vermont :  Baslny  v.  Mor- 
rell,  46  Vt.  94;  Church  v.  Stiles,  59  Vt. 
642  ;  Keenan  v.  Cavanauj^h,  44  Vt.  268  ; 
Park  V.  Park,  38  Vt.  545,  552.  Virginia  : 
Norfolk  Tru.st  Co.  v.  Foster,  78  Va.  413  ; 
DoKan  v.  Seekright,  4  Hen.  &  M.  125; 
Clements  y.  Kyles,  13  Gratt.  468,  480; 
Coles  V.  Woodinz,  2  Tat.  &  H.  189  ;  Smith 
V.  Davis,  4  Gratt.  50.  West  Virginia: 
Adams  v.  Alkire,  20  W.  Va.  480;  Teass 
V.  St.  Albaus,  38  W.  Va.  1,  17  S  E.  Rep. 
400  ;  Gwynn  v.  Schwartz,  32  W.  Va.  487, 
19  S.  E.  Rep.  880.  Wisconsin  :  Marsh  v. 
Mitchell,  25  Wis.  706;  Fleischfresser  v. 
Schmidt,  41  Wis.  223;  Miner  v.  Brader, 
65  Wis.  537,  27  N.  W.  Rep.  313  ;  Borker- 
hagen  v.  Viandeu,  82  Wis.  206,  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  260. 

1  Morrow  v.  Whitney,  95  U.  S.  551, 
555;  M'lver  v.  Walker,  9  Cranch,  173, 
178;  Clements  v.  Pearce,  63  Ala.  284, 
292;  Baldwin  v.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  .T59  ; 
Baxter  v.  Wilson,  95  N.  C  137  ;  Strick- 
land V.  Drauq;han,  88  N.  C  315  ;  Keenan 
V.  Cavanaiijh,  44  Vt.  268,  276;  Ferris  v. 
Coover,  10  Cal.  589  ;  Stafford  v.  King,  30 
Tex.  257,  271,  94  Am.  Dec.  304.  In  this 
case  Smith,  J.,  said  :  "The  general  rules 
are,  that  the  location  should  be  governed, 
first,  by  natural  ohjects  or  boundaries, 
su'-h  as  rivpis,  hikes,  creeks,  etc.  ;  second, 
artificial    marks,    such    as    marked    trees, 

Q1  /? 


lines,  stakes,  etc. ;  and,  third,  course  and 
distance.  The  true  and  correct  location 
of  the  land  is  ascertained  by  the  applica- 
tion of  all  or  any  of  these  rules  to  the 
particular  case ;  and  when  they  lead  to 
contrary  results  or  confusion,  that  rule 
must  be  adopted  which  is  most  consistent 
with  the  intention  apparent  upon  the  face 
of  the  i>atent  read  in  the  light  of  the  sur- 
rounding facts  and  circumstances.  Of  all 
these  indicia  of  the  locality  of  the  true 
line  as  run  by  the  surveyor,  course  and 
distance  are  regarded  as  the  most  unre- 
liable, and  gemr.iUy  distance  more  than 
course,  for  the  reason  that  chain-carriers 
may  miscount  and  report  distances  inac- 
curately, by  mistake  or  design.  At  any 
rate,  they  are  more  liable  to  err  than  the 
compass." 

2  Credle  v.  Hays,  88  N.  C  321  ;  Houser 
V.  Belton,  10  Ired.  358  ;  Herbert  v.  Wise, 
3  Call,  2.39. 

3  Mclver  V.  Walker,  9  Cranch,  173,  177, 
jicr  Marshall,  C  J.  And  see  Biirkholder 
V.  Marskley,  98  Pa.  St.  37;  Dogan  v. 
Seekright,  4  Hen.  &  M.  125;  Randall  i;. 
Gill,  77  Tex.  351,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  134. 

i  Vanish  V.  Tarbox,  49  Minn.  268,51 
N.  W.  Rep.  1051  ;  Fisher  v.  Bennehoff, 
121  in.  426,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  150;  Teass  v 
St.  Albans  38  W.  Va.  1,17  S.  E.  Rep. 
400,  ])cr   Holt,  .T.  ;   Fulwood  v.  Graham, 


GENERAL   RULES   OF   CONSTRUCTION.        [§§  382,  383. 


382.  This  rule  applies  where  the  monuments  or  boundaries 
described  in  the  deed  are  certain,  or  capable  of  being  made 
certain.^  It  does  nut  apply  where  the  monuments  or  bounjiiries 
cannot  be  found,  where  they  contravene  all  the  other  terms  of  the 
description,  or  where  an  adherence  to  them  would  defeat  the  evident 
intent  of  the  jjarties.-  Though  the  monument  referred  to  does 
not  actually  exist  at  the  time,  but  is  afterwards  erected  by  the 
parties  with  the  intention  that  it  shall  conform  to  the  deed,  it 
will  eontrul.-^ 

383.  But  a  call  for  a  monument  in  a  deed  does  not  control 
absolutely,  so  as  to  preclude  the  consideration  of  other  evidence 
as  to  the  true  locality  of  the  land.*  Courses  and  distances  will 
prevail  over  monuments,  if  the  former  best  comport  with  the 
circumstances  oi  the  case  and  the  manifest  intention  of  the  par- 
ties.^ When  it  is  manifest  there  is  a  mistake  as  to  the  monument, 
or  the  monuments  are  uncertain,  inferior  evidence  of  location 
may  control  the  higher.^  Where  the  boundary  is  not  fixed  and 
known,  and  the  location  of  monuments  is  in  dispute,  lost,  or  left 
in  doubt  by  the  evidence,  courses  and  distances  will  be  considered 


1  Rich.  491  ;  Gordon  v.  Booker,  97  Cal. 
586,  32  Pac.  Rep.  593;  Rand  v.  Cart- 
wright,  82  Tex.  399,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  794. 

1  Morse  v.  Rogers,  118  Mass.  572,  578; 
George  v.  Wood,  7  Allen,  14;  Wharton 
V.  Garvin,  34  Pa.  St.  340 ;  Coughran  v. 
Alderete  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep. 
109;  Gerald  v.  Freeman,  68  Tex  201,4 
S.  W.  Rep.  256. 

2  White  V.  Luning,  93  U.  S.  514  ;  Mur- 
dock  ?;.  Chapman,  9  Gray,  156;  Parks  v. 
Loomis,  6  Gray,  467  ;  Davis  v.  Raiusford, 
17  Mass.  207;  Mizell  v.  Simmons,  79  N. 
C.  182;  Hanson  v.  Red  Rock  (S.  T).),  57 
N  W.  Rep.  11;  Davidson  v.  Killcn,  68 
Tex.  406,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  561. 

■^  Makepeace  v.  Bancroft,  12  Mass.  469  ; 
Owen  V.  Bartholomew,  9  Pick.  520 ;  Ken- 
nebec Purchase  v.  Tiffany,  1  Me.  219,  10 
Am.  Dec.  60. 

•*  Jones  V.  Burgett,  46  Tex.  284 ;  Big- 
hnm  V.  McDowell,  69  Tex.  100,  7  S.  W. 
Rep.  315;  Linney  v.  Wood,  66  Tex.  22, 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  244;  Jones  v.  Andrews, 


72  Tex.  5,  9  S.  W.  Rep.  170;  Cannon  v. 
Enmians,  44  Minn.  294,  46  N.  W.  Rep. 
356  ;  Biiekner  i".  Hendrick  (Ky.),  1  S. 
W.  Rep.  646. 

5  Hale  V.  Cottle,  21  Oreg.  580,  28  Pac. 
Rep.  901  ;  Teass  c.  St.  Albans,  38  W.  Va. 
I,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  400;  Ruffner  v.  Hill,  31 
W.  Va.  428,  7  S.  E.  Rep.  13  ;  Titterington 
V.  Trees,  78  Tex.  567,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  692 ; 
Scott  r.  Weisbnrg,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  46, 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  769  ;  Davis  v.  Rainsford, 
17  Mass.  207;  Parks  v.  Loomis,  6  Gray, 
467  ;  Murdock  v.  Chapman,  9  Gray,  156  ; 
Flagg  V.  Thurston,  13  Pick.  145;  Cobiirn 
V.  Coxeter,  51  N.  H.  158;  White  v.  Gay, 
9  N.  H.  126;  Hamilton  v.  Foster,  45  Me. 
32 ;  Evans  r.  Weeks,  6  Rich.  83. 

•"'  Fuhvood  V.  Graham,  1  Rich.  491  ; 
Hollenbeck  v.  Sykes,  17  Colo.  317,  29  Pac. 
liep.  380;  Cannon  v.  Emmans,  44  Minn. 
294,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  356;  Blackburn  v. 
Nelson,  100  Cal.  336,  34  Pac.  Rep.  775; 
Vanish  v.  Tarbox,  49  Minn.  268,  51  N. 
W.  Rep.  1051. 

317 


§  384.] 


DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 


ill  fixing  boundaries.^  Where  no  monuments  are  referred  to  in 
the  description,  and  none  are  intended  to  be  erected,  the  distance 
stateil  tlierein  must  control  the  location.'^ 

384.  A  monument  inadvertently  referred  to,  or  inconsistent 
with  the  rest  of  the  description,  may  be  rejected.'^  And  so,  if 
the  monuments  described  in  a  deed  cannot  be  found,  nor  their 
location  proven,  resort  must  be  had  to  other  parts  of  the  descrij)- 
tion  to  identify  the  land;  and  courses  and  distances,  if  they  are 
given  and  appear  to  be  correct,  may  be  relied  upon.*  "  Tlie 
courses  and  distances,"  says  Cliief  Justice  Marshall,  "are  less 
certain  and  less  permanent  guides  to  the  land  which  was  actually 
surveyed  and  granted  than  natural  and  fixed  objects  on  the  ground  ; 
but  they  are  guides  to  some  extent,  and,  in  the  absence  of  all 
others,  must  govern  us.  If  a  grant  be  made  which  describes  the 
land  granted  by  course  and  distance  only,  or  by  natural  objects 
not  distinguishable  from  others  of  the  same  kind,  course  and  dis- 
tance, though  not  safe  guides,  are  the  only  guides  given  us,  and 
must  be  used."  ^ 

When  it  is  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  deed  that  the  intention 
was  to  convey  a  specific  quantity  of  land,  if  the  courses  and  dis- 
tances given  would  include  that  precise  quantity,  but  the  descrip- 
tion by  fixed  monuments  would  embrace  more  or  less,  it  is  clear 
tliat  the  former  siiould  be  followed.  To  do  otherwise  would  be 
to  defeat  the  plain  intent  of  the  parties.^ 


1  Hanson  v.  Red  Rock  (S.  D.),  57  N. 
TV.  Rep.  II  ;  Yocum  v.  Haskins,  81  Iowa, 
43G,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  1065. 

^  Chinoweth  v.  Haskell,  3  Pet.  92,  96, 
per  Marshall,  C.  J. ;  Nej^bauer  v.  Smith, 
44  N.  J.  L.  672  ;  Breneiser  v.  Davis,  134 
Pa.  St.  1,  19  Atl.  Rep.  433;  Daler.  Trav- 
ellers' Ins.  Co.  89  Ind.  473. 

3  White  V.  Lunin^',  93  U.  S.  514; 
Parks  V.  Loomis,  6  Gray,  467  ;  Eosworth 
r.  Sturtevant,  2  Cush.  393 ;  Thatcher  v. 
Ilowland,  2  Met.  41  ;  Fitzgerahl  r.  Bren- 
nan,  57  Conn.  511,  18  Atl.  Rrp.  743; 
Davis  );.  Rainsford,  17  Mass.  207  ;  Talbot 
V.  Copeland,  32  Me.  251  ;  Chandler  v. 
Green,  69  Me.  3.50;  Benton  v.  Mclniire, 
64  N.  H.  .598,  15  Atl.  Rep.  413;  Buffalo, 
N.  Y.  &  Eric  R.  Co.  v.  Stifreler,  61  N. 
Y.  .348  ;  Negbauer  v.  Smith,  44  N.  J.  L. 
672;  Redmond  v.   Stepp,  100  N.  C.  212, 

318 


6  S.  E.  Rep.  727  ;  Browning  v.  Atkinson, 
37  Tra.  6.33 ;  W  oods  t'.  Robinson,  58  Tex. 
655 ;  Gordon  v.  Booker,  97  €.nl.  586,  32 
Pac.  Rep.  593;  Hale  v.  Cottle,  21  Oreg. 
580,  28  Pac.  Rep.  901 ;  Robinson  v.  Doss, 
.53  Tex.  496. 

*  Wil.snn  V.  Hildreth,  118  Ma.ss.  578; 
Lincoln  v.  Edgecotnb,  28  Me.  275  ;  Den 
V.  Graham,  1  Dev.  &  B.  76,  27  Am.  Dec. 
226  ;  Boydston  v.  Siimpter,  78  Tex.  402, 
14  S.  W.  Rep.  906;  Gerald  i\  Freeman, 
68  Tex.  201,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  256  ;  Pagan  v. 
Stoner,  67  Tex.  286,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  44  ; 
Booth  V.  Strippleman,  26  Tex.  436  ;  Rand 
V.  Cartwri-ht,  82  Tex.  399,  18  S.  W.  Rep. 
794;  Talkin  v.  Anderson  (Tex.),  19  S. 
W.  Rep.  350  ;  Gregg  r.  Hill,  82  Tex.  405, 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  838. 

'"  Cliinoweth  v.  Haskell,  3  Pet.  92,  96. 

6  Damziger  v.  Boyd,  21    J.  &  S.  398, 


GENERAL   RULES    OF   CONSTRUCTION.  [§  385. 

Where  tlie  stai'ting-point  in  a  desci'iption  is  known,  or  ascer- 
tained by  a  survey,  but  at  the  time  of  making  the  deed  the  ]y,\v- 
ties  placed  a  monument  in  anotlier  place  as  the  staiting-point, 
this  must  yield  to  the  siiivey  and  the  requirements  of  the  descrip- 
tion given. ^ 

The  metes  and  bounds  in  a  description  prevail  in  a  conveyance 
of  tlie  land  "  with  the  buildings  thereon,"  though  one  of  the 
buildings  extends  five  feet  over  upon  other  land  of  the  grantor; 
the  deed  does  not  convey  the  strip  of  land  covered  by  the  build- 
ing, or  any  easement  therein.^ 

But  all  the  calls  for  monuments  must  be  satisfied  if  this  is 
reasonably  possible.'^ 

385.  When  a  monument  is  named  as  the  point  of  begin- 
ning, words  descriptive  of  the  locality  do  not  control,  except  as 
indicating  the  general  locality  of  the  monument.*  Thus  in  a 
grant  "  beginning  on  the  side  of  Gallon  Creek,  at  a  small  oak, 
John  Edward's  corner,"  the  side  of  the  creek  is  merely  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  locality.  The  true  point  of  beginning  is  the  small 
oak.'^ 

The  starting  call  of  a  description,  being  more  important 
than  any  other  call,  usually  controls  any  other  call  with  which 
it  is  in  conflict,  for  it  is  supposed  that  a  mistake  in  regard  to 
that  is  less  likely  to  occur. '^  But  when  the  succeeding  calls 
are  as  readily  ascertained,  and  are  as  little  liable  to  mistake,  they 
are  of  equal  dignity  with  the  first ;  and  when  all  the  subsequent 
calls  conflict  with  the  first,  and  agree  with  each  other,  their  united 
testimony  controls  the  point  of  beginning.' 

409;  Baldwin    v.   Brown,  16  N.    Y.  359;  *  Cleaveland   v.   Smith,   2   Story,   278; 

Higinbotham   v.    Stoddard,  72  N.   Y.  94;  Murray  v.  Spencer,  88  N.  C.  357. 

Townsend  v.  Hayt,   51    N.   Y.  656;   Buf-  ^  Bonaparte  v.  Carter,  106   N.   C.   534, 

falo,  N.  Y.  &Erie  R.  Co.?-.  Stigcler,  61  N.  11  S.   E.   Hep.  262;  Wilson  v.   Inloes,  6 

Y.  348  ;  Booth  v.  Upshur,  26  Tex.  64,  71  ;  Cill,  121. 

Booth  V.  Strippleman.  26  Tex.  436,  441  ;  '■  Hord  v.  Olivari  (Tex.),  5  S.  W.  Rep. 

Doe  V.  Vallejo,  29  Cal.  385.  57. 

'  I'arkinson   v.  McQuaid,  54  Wis.  473,  '   Stevenson  v.  Erskine,  99  Mass.  367 ; 

11  .\.  W.  Rep.  682.  Walsh   v.    Hill,  38   Cal.   481  ;   Hughes  v. 
2  Griffiths  r.  Morrison,  106  N.   Y.   165,  Cawthom,  35   Fed.   Rep.  248;    Harry  ;•. 

12  N.  E.  Rep.  580.  See,  also.  Old  South  Graham,  1  Dcv.  &  B.  76,  79,  47  Am  Rep. 
Soc.  ?^.  Wainwright,  141  Mass.  443,5  N.  226;  Norwood  v.  Crawford,  114  N.  C. 
E.  Rep.  843.  513,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  349  ;  Cowles  v.  Reavis 

8  Miller  c.  Bryan,  86  N.  C.  167  ;  Budd  109  N.  C.  417,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  930;  Scotr 
V.  Brooke,  3  Gill,  198,  43  Am.  Dec.  321.        v.  Pettigrew,  72  Tex.  321,  12  S.  W.  Rop. 

319 


§   38«>.]  DKSCHIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 

386.  Natural  and  artificial  monuments.  —  Some  of  tlie  natu- 
i;il  obieots  rrferrocl  to  in  deeds  as  iiioinmuMits  ai'e  streams,  rivers, 
poiuls,  lakes,  shores,  beaches,  rocks,  higliways,  streets,  trees,  and 
hills. ^  Such  natural  objects  serve  the  same  purpose  as  artificial 
iiioiiuinciits,  and  are  better  because  more  permanent  and  more 
readily  ascertained.  A  call  for  "  the  hills"  might  in  many  cases 
be  too  inilefinite  a  nionninent  ;  but  if  there  is  a  studied  repe- 
tition of  this  call  in  several  deeds,  eti'ect  must  be  given  to  it,  and 
it  will  prevail  over  a  call  for  distance.^ 

Artilicial  monuments  are  more  readily  disregarded  than  natu- 
ral monuments  in  favor  of  other  modes  of  description.-'^  Thus, 
when  it  is  apparent  from  the  designation  of  quantity  or  other 
elements  of  description  that  the  courses  and  distances  given  are 
correct,  an  artificial  monument  is  readily  discarded  in  favor  of 
the  description  by  courses  and  distances.'* 

The  general  rule  applies,  however,  to  artificial  monuments, 
though  these  are  less  certain  than  natural  monuments.^  A  deed 
of  a  house  and  lot  in  a  row  or  block  of  houses  described  the  side 
lines  as  being  "  eighty  feet,  or  a  fraction  more  or  less."  The 
grantor  owned  the  land  only  to  the  depth  of  about  sixty-five  feet 
from  the  front;  and  extrinsic  evidence  showed  that  at  the  time 
of  the  conveyance  a  fence  ran  along  the  rear  of  the  block  of 
houses  at  that  depth  from  the  fi-ont.  It  was  held  that  the  fence 
formed  a  visible  boundary  and  controlled  the  distance  as  ex- 
pressed in  the  deed,  and  consequently  there  was  no  breach  of  the 
covenant  of  ownership.^ 

ir.l  ;   Lancaster  v.  Ayers  (Tex.),  12  S.  W.  <  Baldwin  v.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  359. 

Kep.  163.                     "  '"  Avers  v.  Watson,  113  U.  S.  .594,  .5  S. 

1  Travellers'   In.surance  Co.  v.  Yount,  Ct.  Kep.  641. 

98  Ind.  454  ;  Myers  v.  St.  Louis,  82  Mo.  «  Smith  v.  Negbauer,  42  N.  J.  L.  305, 

367;  Bellows   r.   Jewell,  60  N.   H.   420;  307.     "The  expression  '  house   and  lot,' 

Winthrop  v.  Curtis,  3   Me.    110,  14  Am.  used  in  reference  to  pri-mises  in  a  titv,  or- 

Dec.  216.  dinarily  imports  a  house  with  a  curiilai::e, 

-  Clamorgan   v.  Baden   &   St.   L.    Ry.  shut  (if   from   the    ueiirhboring  {rroumls 

Co.  72  Mo.  139;  Clamorgan  v.   Hornshy,  by  some  physical  objects.     Thus  the  deed 

94  Mo.  83,  6  S.  W.  Rep.  651,  13  Mo.  A]ip.  bears  upon   ii.s   face   iutimation   that   the 

5.iO.  land  to  be  conveyed  by  it  is  inclosed  with- 

-*  Ayers  r.  Watson,  113  U.  S.  594,  5  S.  in   visible  boundaries,  and,  although   the 

Ct.  Rep.  641  ;   IJiginbotham  v.  Stoddard,  character  of  these  boundaries  be  not  in- 

72    N.  Y.  94;    Fisher  r.  Benneboff,    121  dicated    in    the   instrument,    nevertheless 

111.426,   13  N.  E.  Rep.   1.50;  Wyckoff  y.  the  law  permits  extrinsic  evidence  of  the 

Stephenson,    14    Ohio,    13;    Fulwood    v.  actual  condition   of   things  for  the  pup 

Graham,  1   Rich.  491  ;  Reed  v.  Shenck,  3  pose  of  ascertaining  the  situation  of  th« 

Dev.  65.  land."     Per  Dixon,  J. 

320 


GENERAL    KULES    OF    CUNS 1 RUC IION. 


[§  387. 


jMoiuiments' erected  by  the  p;irties  immediately  after  a  convey- 
ance have  the  same  effect  as  if  they  had  been  in  existence  at  the 
time  of  the  conveyance.^  If  the  monuments  themselves  have 
disappeared,  the  positions  where  they  were  placed  may  be  shown, 
and,  when  established  with  reasonable  certainty  by  evidence,  they 
-overn,  just  as  the  monuments  themselves,  had  they  been  found, 
vouki  govern. - 

A  boundary  upon  a  river  is  a  monument  which  controls  coui-ses 
and  distances,  as  well  as  the  corners  and  meander  lines  of  a  sur- 
vey.3  A  ditch  is  spoken  of  as  a,  natural  monument.'*  Highwavs, 
fences,  and  walls  are  regarded  as  artificial  monuments  when  re- 
ferred to  in  deeds,  and  the  land  conveyed  abuts  upon  them.^ 

If  a  fence  or  wall  on  or  near  a  boundary  line  is  not  called  for 
or  mentioned  in  a  deed,  there  is  no  pr^-sumption  that  it  was  or 
was  not  intended  for  a  line.  Any  inference  from  the  fact  is  for 
the  jury.^ 

387.  When  dififerent  and  conflicting  monuments  are  given, 
tliat  which  is  the  most  substantial,  the  most  clearly  identified, 
and  most  certain  to  be  that  with  reference  to  which  the  });irties 
contracted,  must  be  regarded  as  controlling.^  The  owner  of  a 
large  tract  of  land,  divided  into  lots  for  houses,  sold  a  lot  with  a 
house  built  upon  it,  bounding  it,  begiuning  at  a  fence  two  hun- 
dred and  thirty  feet  distant,  and  thence  by  a  line  running  around 
the  lot,  the  courses  and  distances  of  which  were  given.     One  of 


J  Blaney  v.  Rice,  20  Pick.  62,  32  Am. 
Dec.  204;  Davis  v.  Rainsford,  17  Muss. 
207,  212;  Waterman  v.  Johnson,  1.3  Pick. 
261,  267  ;  Kennebec  Purcha.se  a.  Tiffany,  1 
Me.  219,  10  Am.  Dec.  60;  Fleisclifresser 
V.  Schmidt,  41  Wis.  22.3. 

2  Tnriibnll  v.  SchroedcM-,  29  Minn.  49, 
11  N.  W.  Rep.  147;  Yanish  v.  Tarhox, 
49  Minn.  268,  51  N.  W.  Rej..  10.51  ;  Ben- 
ton V.  Hor.sley,  71  Ga.  619  ;  West  v.  Shaw, 
67  N.  C.  483  ;  Buford  v.  Gray,  51  Tex. 
331. 

•i  Il.irt.shorn  v.  Wright,  1  Pet.C.C.  64; 
D.ivis  V.  Rainsford,  17  Ma.s.s.  207  ;  Sphimt,' 
V.  Moore,  120  Ind.  352,  22  \.  K.  Rep.  319; 
Shelton  V.  Manpin,  16  Mo.  124;  Galves- 
ton County  V.  Taiikeisley,  39  Tex.  651. 

♦  Greenieaf  v.  Brooklyn,  &c.  Rv.  Co.  3 
N.  Y.  Supp.  222,  8  N.  Y.  Siipp.  30. 
VOL.  I. 


6  Hender.^on  v.  Hatterman,  146  111.  555, 
34  N.  E.  Rep.  1041  ;  Canal  Trustees  v. 
Haven,  11  111.  554;  Morgan  v.  Givens 
(Ky.),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  582. 

«  Blackington  v.  Sumner,  69  Me.  136. 

■^  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387  ;  Hub- 
bard V.  Dusy,  80  Cal.  281,  22  Pac.  Rep. 
214;  Robertson  v.  Mooney,  1  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  379,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  143;  New  York 
Land  Co.  r.  Votaw,  ISO  U.  S.  24,  14  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  1;  Zeibold  v.  Foster,  118  Mo. 
349,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  155.  In  cases  where 
the  known  and  fixed  monuments  do  not 
agree  wiih  each  other,  the  court  must 
of  necessity  decide  them.  Fitzgerald  v. 
Biennan,  57  Conn.  511,  18  Atl.  Kep.  743  ; 
Harrell  r.  Morris  (Tex.),  5  S.  W.  Hep. 
625;  Roberts  i-.  Helm,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
100,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1004. 

321 


ass.] 


DESCRirnON    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


the  comlitions  of  tlie  coiiveytmoe  was  tliat  the  house  should 
oceni)}'  the  entire  width  of  the  lot,  and  it  was  recited  that  the 
house  tlien  upon  the  hit  was  in  coni{)liance  with  the  conditions 
named.  Afterwards  the  owner  sohl  the  adjoining  lionse  and  lot 
by  a  deed  containing  a  siniihir  description.  It  was  lield  that  the 
centre  of  the  partition  wall  between  the  two  houses  was  the  true 
boundary,  although  the  effect  of  measuring  from  the  fence  re- 
fen-ed  to  would  be  to  place  the  whole  of  the  partition  wall  on  the 
lot  last  sohl.  The  house  itself  was  the  controlling  monument 
rather  than  the  distant  fence. ^  Where  there  are  two  conflicting 
monuments,  one  of  which  corresponds  with  the  courses  and  dis- 
tances, that  one  should  be  taken,  and  the  other  rejected  as  sur- 
plusage.- 

When  there  is  conflicting  evidence  as  to  natural  objects  named 
in  running  the  lines,  this  is  not  to  be  put  wholly  out  of  view  ;  but 
if  the  jury,  after  considering  such  evidence,  are  left  in  doubt,  they 
will  be  justified  in  locating  the  land  by  referring  to  such  natural 
objects  mentioned  as  are  certain.^ 

388.  A  description  by  -well-ascertained  monuments  prevails 
over  a  description  by  reference  to  the  limits  of  the  lands  of 
adjacent  owners.^  If  a  boundary  be  by  the  line  of  a  railroad, 
the  line  of  the  railroad  becomes  a  monument  and  controls  the 
bouiidarv,  instead  of  a  line  running  "  to  a  stake  and  stones;"^ 
if  the  railroad  is  then  located,  but  not  built,  a  subsequent  change 
of  location  does  not  affect  the  boundary.*^ 

If  there  are  no  monuments  or  marks  upon  the  ground,  a  call 
for  the  adjoining  lands  prevails  in  case  there  is  any  discrepancy 
between    such  call  and   the   courses   and   distances   given.''     The 

1  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387.  lily  be  by  the  right  of  way  of  the  road; 

-  Zfihold    V.    Foster,    118  Mo.  349,   24  but  a  boundary  by  the  "railroad   track," 

S.  W.  Rep.  155  ;  Jamison   v.  Fopiano,  48  before  any  definite  right  of  way  had  been 

Mo.  194.  secured,  is  a  boundary  by  the  tracli.    Rciii 

3  New  York  Land  Co.   v.  Votaw,  150  v.  Klein  (Ind.),  37  N.  E.  Rep.  967.     And 

U.  S.  24,  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1.  see  Williams  v.  Savannah,  &c.  Ry.  Co 

*  Benedict  v.  Gaylord,  11  Conn.  332,  29  (Ga.)  20  S.  E.  Rep.  487. 

Am.  Dec.  299  ;  Clement  v.  Bank  of  Rut-  «  King  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  (Va.) 

land,  61  Vt.  298,  17  Atl.  Rep.  717  ;  Smith  17  S.  E.  Rep.  868. 

V.   Ileadrick,   93    N.    C.   210;  Thoma.s   ;;.  ~'   Glamorgan   v.   Horn.sby,  94  Mo.  83,  6 

Godfrey,  3  Gill  &  J.   142,  147;  Spreckles  S.   W.   Rep.  651;    Stroup    v.    McClo.'ikey 

V.  Ord,  72  Cal.  86.  (Pa.),  10   Atl.   Rep.   421,  481 ;  Hogans  v. 

5  Church   )•.   Stiles,  59  Vt.  642,  la  Atl.  (^arruth,  19  Fla.  84  ;  Roane  Co.  y.  Ander- 

Rep.   674;  Miller  v.  Becler,  25  Til.   163.  .'ion  Co.  89  Tenn.  259,  14  S.  W.  Rep  1079; 

A  boundary   by  a  railroad  would  ordina-  Cunningham  v.  Curtis,  57  N.  H.  157. 

'•'22 


GENERAL  RULES  OF  CONSTRUCTION. 


[§  388. 


adjoining  land  in  that  case  becomes  a  monument  which  controls 
courses  and  distances.^  The  length,  of  the  boundary  line  upon 
adjoining  land  is  that  named  in  the  deed,  if  the  distance  is 
gfiven.^ 

When  a  boundary  is  "  bj'  land  of  "  another,  the  phrase  means 
land  belonging  to  him,  and  does  not  include  land  in  wliicli  he  has 
simply  an  easement,^  such  as  a  right  of  way,  and  does  not  in- 
clude land  occupied  by  him  without  having  the  title.'*  The  true 
line  of  the  ownership  of  the  adjoining  land  is  the  monument, 
rather  than  the  line  marked  by  possession,'^  or  that  which  the 
parties  supposed  was  the  line  at  the  time  the  deed  was  executed ;  ^ 
or  that  which  the  adjoining  owner  had  contracted  to  pui'chase, 
and  had  paid  the  price  for,  and  was  occupying  as  his  own,  but 
had  received  no  conveyance  of."     If  the  line   of  the  land  of  the 


1  Land  Co.  v.  Saunders,  103  U.  S.316; 
Bryant  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.  79  Me.  312, 
9  AtL  Rep.  736  ;  Church  v.  Stiles,  59  Vt. 
642,  10  Atl.  Rep.  674;  Graybeal  v.  Pow- 
ers, 76  N.  C.  66 ;  Howell  v.  Merrill,  30 
Mich.  282 ;  Smith  v.  Headrick,  93  N.  C. 
210;  Buckner  v.  Anderson,  111  N.  C. 
572,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  424;  Smith  v.  Catlin 
Land  Co.  117  Mo.  438,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  1083; 
Whittlesey  v.  Kdlojrg,  28  Mo.  404;  Win- 
nipisioofpe  Paper  Co.  i\  N.  H.  Land  Co.  59 
Fed.  Rep.  542.  In  the  last  case,  a  line  was 
described  as  running  south  to  the  "  north- 
west corner  of  Burton ;  thence  westerly 
along  the  northern  line  of  Watervillc," 
both  parties  :i.ssnminir  that  the  north- 
east corner  of  Waterville  is  at  the  north- 
west corner  of  Burton,  but  it  afterwards 
turns  out  that  the  Waterville  corner  and 
north  line  are  a  substantial  distance  far- 
ther south:  the  grant  only  goes  to  the 
Burton  comer,  and  the  southern  boun- 
dary must  he  run  westerly  therefrom,  and 
parallel  with  the  north  line  of  Waterville, 
thus  excluding  the  intervening  territory. 
Land  Co.  v.  Saunders,  103  U.  S.  316,  dis- 
tinguished ;  Cox  V.  McGowan  (N.  C),  21 
S.  E.  Rep.  108. 

2  Thomasson  ;•.  Ilanna  (Ky.),  18  S.  W. 
Rep.  227. 

3  Segar  c  Babcock,  18  R.  I.  188,  26 
Atl.  Rep.  257. 


*  Crosby  i-.  Parker,  4  Mass.  110;  Cor- 
nell V.  Jackson,  9  Mete.  150;  Cleaveland 
V.  Flagg,  4  Cush.  76  ;  Sparhawk  v.  Bagg, 
16  Gray,  583.  In  Cleaveland  v.  Elagg  a 
fence  had  been  erected  on  what  was  sup- 
posed to  be  a  dividing  line.  But  Shaw, 
C.  J.,  said  :  "  Here  no  fence  was  alluded 
to  in  the  deed  as  a  monument.  The  fence 
was  not  set  up  with  a  view  to  make  it  a 
monument,  and  there  was  no  uncertainty 
respecting  the  true  line.  It  appears  quite 
certain  that  H  [the  grantor]  owned  up  to 
B's  true  line,  notwithstanding  the  fence, 
and,  if  he  did,  we  think  it  is  beyond  doubt 
that  he  intended  to  convey  it;  indeed, 
such  is  the  direct  effect  of  the  words  in 
his  deed."  In  Jewett  r.  Ilussey,  70  Me. 
433,  the  same  rule  is  followed,  upon  the 
ground  that  it  is  safer  to  adhere  to  the 
line  marked  by  ownershij)  than  to  the  line 
marked  by  possession,  which  is  an  indefi- 
nite guide.  See,  also,  Powers  v.  Jackson, 
50  Cal.  429. 

5  Cornell  i'.  Jackson,  9  Met.  150;  Jew- 
ett V.  Hussey,  70  Me.  433 ;  Howell  v. 
Merrill,  .30  Mich.  282;  Umbarger  r.  Cha- 
boya,  49  Cal.  525  ;  Kellogg  v.  Mullen,  45 
Mo.  571.  See  Matlack  v.  Hogue,  13  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  214. 

"  Umbarger  v.  Chaboya,  49  Cal.  256. 

T  Crosby  V.  Parker,  4  Mass.  110;  Cor- 
nell i\  Jackson,  9  Met.  150. 

823 


§  389.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNiiAKIKS. 


iuljoiiiing  owner,  or  a  corner  of  his  luiul  rcl'errcd  to,  litis  not  been 
cleterniineil,  the  line  or  corner  is  wlierevtM-  it  may  be  finally 
locatt'd.'  ir  a  mistake  be  made  in  the  nanu>  ol"  an  owner  of  ad- 
joining' land,  as  where  the  name  given  is  that  of  the  owner's 
agent  insleail  of  the  owner  himself,  this  fact  may  be  shown,  and 
the  h'lundaiy  is  sufHeienliy  identified.^ 

389.  Lines  actually  run  and  marked  upon  the  ground  con- 
trol calls  for  naturid  or  other  fixed  Ixamdaries,  and  calls  for  adjoin- 
ing: boundaries  and  for  courses  and  distances.^  If  the  stakes  and 
monuments  sot  at  the  corners  of  the  parcel  in  making  the  survey 
have  disappeared,  it  is  competent  to  show  their  location  by  parol 
evidence.'*  It  is  presumed  that  a  line  in  a  call  frt)m  one  monu- 
ment to  another  is  a  straight  line;^  but  this  is  rebutted  when 
the  laniiuaue  of  the   deed  shows   that  a  different  line   was   in- 


1  Eiison  V.  Knox,  8  Wash.  642,  36  Pac. 
Kep.  698;  Bailey  i-.  White,  41  N.  H. 
337. 

2  McKeon  r.  Milhird,  47  Cal.  581. 

3  Burkholder  v.  Markley,  98  Pa.  St.  37  ; 
Craft  V.  Yeatiey,  66  Pa.  St.  210;  Clary  v. 
McGlyrm,  46  Vt.  347;  Baxter  v.  Wilson, 
95  N.  C.  137;  Adams  ;;.  Alkire,  20  W 
Va.  480  ;  Browning  v.  Atkinson,  37  Tex. 
633;  Fitch  v.  Boyer,  51  Tex.  336;  Riley 
V.  Griffin,  16  Ga.  141  ;  Moore  v.  Whit- 
comb  (Tex.),  4  S.  W.  Rep.  373  ;  Duffy. 
Moore,  68  Tex.  270,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  530 ; 
Titterington  v.  Trees,  78  Tex.  567,  14  S. 
W.  Rep.  692;  Fisher  v.  Bennehoff,  121 
111.426,13  N.  E.  Rep.  150;  Watrous  y. 
Morrison,  33  Fhi.  261,  14  So.  Rep.  805; 
King  V.  Brigham,  19  Oreg.  560,  25  Pac. 
Re;).  150;  Raymond  v.  Coffey,  5  Oreg. 
132;  Goodman  v.  Myrick,  5  Oreg.  65; 
Lewis  V.  Lewis,  4  Oreg.  209;  Hanson  v. 
Red  Rock  (S.  1).),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  11; 
Pruncr  v.  Bisbin,  98  Pa.  St.  202 ;  Yonnkin 
V.  Cowan,  34  Pa.  St.  198;  Darrah  v.  Bry- 
ant, 56  Pa.  St.  69;  Wharton  v.  Gavin,  34 
Pa.  St.  340;  Watson  v.  Jones,  85  Pa.  St. 
117.  Even  an  unmarked  line  of  one  survey, 
but  which  can  he  otherwise  identifieii  and 
its  true  locality  established,  when  called 
for  as  one  of  the  intended  boundaries  of 
another  survey,  will  prevail  over  the  call 
for  di -ranee  when  there  is  a  conflict  in  the 

324 


two  calls.  Maddox  v.  Fenner,  79  Tex. 
279,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  237;  Fordtran  v. 
Ellis,  58  Tex.  245 ;  Moore  v.  Reiley,  68 
Tex.  668,  5  S.  W.  Rep.  618;  Blaisdell  v. 
Bissell,  6  Pa.  St.  258,  259.  In  this  case 
Gibson,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  The  calls  of  a  sur- 
vey, and  not  its  courses  and  distances,  are 
to  govern;  and  where  there  are  actual 
lines  of  demarcation,  the  compass  and 
chain  are  no  more  than  instruments  to 
point  them  out.  Where  they  are  not  to 
be  found,  the  results  obtained  by  actual 
survey  are  the  next  best  evidence  of  tiieir 
location.  The  mischiefs  of  a  system 
adopted  in  an  adjoining  State,  where 
courses  and  distances  are  everything  and 
landmarks  nothing,  have  induced  us  to 
cling  to  our  own  in  all  cases.  Careless- 
ness of  chain-carriers,  roughness  of  sur- 
face, variation  of  the  compass,  imi)erfec- 
tion  of  the  instrument,  unskilfulncss  in 
the  use  of  it,  and  other  causes  not  to  be 
enumerated,  inevitably  produce,  in  every 
instance,  more  or  less  uncertainty  of  re- 
sult ;  and,  if  we  suffered  ourselves  to  be 
governed  by  the  compass  and  by  measure- 
ment, collisions  would  be  incessant." 

4  Turnbiill  v.  Schroeder,  29  Minn.  49, 
11  N.  W.  Rep.  147. 

5  McCoy  V.  Galloway,  3  Ohio,  282,  17 
Am.  Dec.  591  ;  Smith  v.  Davi.s,  4  Gratt. 
50. 


GENERAL  RULES  OF  CONSTRUCTION.    [§§  390,  391. 

tended.^  When  a  line  was  actually  run  and  uiarked  and  corners 
made,  and  the  maiks  and  corners  can  be  found,  the  line  will  con- 
trol, although  the  deed  calls  for  a  natural  object  not  reached  by 
such  line.2  It  is  only  when  the  marked  lines  can  be  identified  on 
the  ground  that  they  will  control  a  call  for  course  and  distance.-^ 
A  call  for  course  and  distance  will  control  a  call  for  an  unmarked 
line  which  cannot  itself  be  ascertained  except  by  running  the 
boundaries  of  another  survey  according  to  course  and  distance.* 

390.  Corners  marked  by  stakes  control  courses  and  dis- 
tances. Although  stakes  are  monuments  liable  to  be  displaced 
or  removed,  they  control  so  long  as  it  is  certain  that  they  mark 
the  corners  of  the  original  survey.^ 

If  a  line  in  the  description  of  land  in  a  deed  is  given  as  run- 
ning a  certain  distance  to  a  stake  and  stones,  and  no  such  monu- 
ment exists,  the  end  of  the  line,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  show- 
ing a  contrary  intent,  is  to  be  determined  by  the  measurement.*^ 

In  case  there  is  no  error  or  inconsistency  in  the  boundaries 
described  in  a  deed  until  the  last  line  is  reached,  which  is  declared 
to  run  a  given  course  and  distance  "  to  the  place  of  beginning," 
but  the  given  course  and  distance  would  not  bring  it  to  that 
point,  nor  complete  the  inclosure  of  any  land,  the  course  and  dis- 
tance of  the  last  line  should  be  rejected  as  erroneous,  and  effect 
be  given  to  the  more  certain  designation,  "  thence  to  the  place  of 
beginning." '' 

391.  A  course    or   line    given    in  a  deed   is  presumably  a 

1  Pratt  V.  Woodward,  32  Cal.  219,  91  *  Johnson  v.  Arcliibald,  78  Tex.  96,  14 
Am.  Dec.  573 ;  Thornberry  v.  (Miui-chill,  S.  W.  Rep.  266  ;  Robertson  v.  Mooney 
4  T.  B.  Mon.  29,  16  Am.  Dec.  12.5.  (Tex.   Civ.   App.),  21   S.  W.   Rep.  143; 

2  Baxter  v.  Wilson,  95  N.  C.  137  ;  McAninch  v.  Freeman,  69  Tex.  445,  4  S. 
Hedge  i-.  Sims,  29  Ind.  574 ;  Maguire  v.  W.  Rep.  369 ;  Baker  r.  Light,  80  Tex. 
Rturtevant,  140  Mass.  258,  5  N.  E.  Rep.  627,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  330;  Gerald  v.  Free- 
644.  man,  68  Tex.  201,  4   S.   W.  Rep.   2.56; 

^  Darrah    v.    liryant,    .^    Pa.    St.   69  ;  Duff  v.  Moore,  68  Tex.  270,  4  S.  W.  Uep. 

Mathers  y.  Ilegarty,  37  Pa.  St.  64  ;  Qiiinn  530;  Davidson  u.  Killen,  68   'I'ex.  406,4 

i;.  Heart,  43  Pa.  St.  337  ;  Fagan  v.  Stoner,  S.  W.  Rep.  561. 

67  Tex.  286,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  44  ;  Browning  ^  Jones  v.  Pouiidstone,  102  Mo.  240,  14 
V.  Atkinson,  37  Tex.  633  ;  Duff  v.  Moore,  S.  W.  Rep.  824. 

68  Tex.  270;  Moore  r.  Whitcomb  (Tex.),  «  Wil.son  v.  Hildretli,  118  Mass.  578; 
4  S.  W.  Rep.  373 ;  Ratliff  v.  Burleson  Lincoln  v.  Edgecomh,  28  Me.  275 ;  Meade 
(Tex.  Civ.  App),  25  S.  W.  Rei).  983;  v.  Land  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  22  S.  W. 
Bovdston    r.    Sumptcr,    78  Tex.  402,   14  Rep.  298. 

S.  "W.  Rep.  996  ;  Reed  v.  Marsh,  8  Ohio,  "  Owings  v.  Freeman,  48  Minn.  483,  51 
147  N.  W.  Rep.  477. 

325 


§^  39'2,  393.]  dksckii'Hon  and  boundaries. 

straight  line  ;'  but  tliis  pnvsiuuplion  (Iocs  not  liold  wlien  there  is 
anything  to  show  lh;vt  tiie  cours;^  is  to  be  deterni'uunl  by  a  fixed 
monument,  sucli  as  a  wall;  and  even  a  line  extending  beyond  the 
line  (^f  such  wall  may  be  deflected  from  a  straight  line  in  order 
to  conform  to  the  distance  given  for  the  next  boundary  line.'-^  A 
line  should  if  possible  be  construed  to  be  a  continuous  line."^ 

392.  A  call  for  another  and  older  survey  will  be  taken  to 
be  the  correct  boundary,  and  the  location  will  extend  to  such 
survey  when  no  material  excess  of  land  is  shown.* 

A  call  for  another  survey  definitely  located  is  properly  ignored 
where,  if  followed,  it  necessitates  a  total  disregard  of  course  and 
distance,  and  causes  the  remaining  bounds  to  conflict  with  other 
surveys,  and  to  make  the  quantity  of  land  very  different  from 
that  called  for.^ 

393.  A  line  defined  by  monuments  usually  runs  to  the 
centre  of  such  monuments,  unless  the  monuments  be  structures 
such  as  a  house,  which  ordinarily  includes  the  land  it  stands 
upon.6  Mr.  Justice  Gray,  after  referring  to  the  rule  that  a  boun- 
dary by  a  way  passes  the  title  to  the  middle  of  the  way,  and  that 
a  boundary  by  a  river  above  tide-water  passes  the  fee  in  the  soil 
to  the  thread  of  the  river,  unless  there  is  some  expression  of  a 
contrary  intention,  states  the  general  rule  of  construction  thus : '^ 
"  Whenever  land  is  described  as  bounded  by  other  land,  or  by 
a  building  or  structure,  the  name  of  which,  according  to  its  legal 
and  ordinary  meaning,  includes  the  title  in  the  land  of  which 
it  has  been  made  part,  as  a  house,  a  mill,  a  wharf,  or  the  like, 
the  side  of  the  land  or  structure  referred  to  as  a  boundary  is  the 
limit  of  the  grant ;  but  when  the  boundary  line  is  simply  by  an 
object,  whether  natural  or  artificial,  the  name  of  which  is  used 

1  Henshaw  /;.  Mullens,  121  Mass.  14.3;  *  Moore  v.  Reiley,  68  Tex.  668,  5  S.  W. 
Jenks  V.  Morgan,  6  Gray,  448;  Dickson     Rep.  618. 

V.  Wilson,  82  N.  C.  487  ;  Mains  v-  Rains         ^  Gregg  v.  Hill,  82  Tex.  405,  17  S.  W. 

(Kv.),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1099.  Rep.  838 ;  Boon  v.  Hunter,  62   Tex.  582  ; 

2  Ladies'  Friend  See.  v.  Halstead,  58  Duff  r.  Moore,  68  Tex.  270,4  S.  W.  Rep. 
Conn.  144,  19  Atl.  Rep.  658  ;  Kingsland  r.  5-30;  Gerald  r.  Freeman,  68  Tex.  201,4 
Chittenden,  6  Lans.  15;  Seneca  Nation  y.  S.  W.  Rep.  256;  Freeman  v.  Mahouey, 
Hugabooni,  132  N.  Y.  492,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  57  Tex.  621. 

983  ;  Lou-  v.  Long,  73  N.  C.  370 ;   Dick-  «  White's  Bank  v.  Nichols,  64  N.  Y.  65, 

son  V.  Wilson,  82  N.  C.  487.  71,  per  Allen,  J. 

8  Gallatin  Turnpike  Co.   v.   State,  16  "  Boston  v.  Richardson,  13  Allen,  146. 

Lea,  36;    Grand  Co.   v.  Larimer  Co.   9  And  see   Stewart   v.  Patrick,   68   N.   Y. 

Colo.  268.  450. 

326 


GENERAL  RULES  OF  CONSTRUCriON.         [§  3i'4. 

in  ordinary  speech  as  defining  a  boundary,  and  not  as  describing 
a  title  in  fee,  and  which  does  not  in  its  description  or  nature 
include  the  earth  as  far  down  as  the  grantor  owns,  and  yet  which 
has  width,  as  in  the  case  of  a  way,  a  river,  a  ditch,  a  wall,  a  fence, 
a  tree,  or  a  stake  and  stones,  then  the  centre  of  the  thing  so  run- 
ning over  or  standing  on  the  land  is  the  boundary  of  the  lot 
granted." 

394.  When  a  boundary  is  by  a  building,  -whether  the  boun- 
dary line  is  wholly  outside  of  every  portion  of  the  building 
is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  a  conflict  of  authority.  Tlius 
in  one  case,  whei-e  a  deed  described  one  of  the  boundaries  of  the 
land  as  four  feet  from  the  "  northerly  side  "  of  a  building,  the 
boundary  was  held  to  be  four  feet  from  the  exti'emest  part  of 
the  building,  which  in  that  case  was  the  edge  of  the  eaves. ^  But 
in  another  case,  where  a  deed  described  one  of  the  boundaries 
as  eight  feet  four  inches  from  the  "  south  side  "  of  a  building,  an- 
other court  held  that  measurement  should  be  made  from  the 
corner-board  on  the  side  of  the  building.^ 

The  decision  first  stated  seems  to  be  the  better  one  in  the  case 
of  a  boundary  by  a  building.  The  parties  niay  well  be  presumed 
to  intend  that  the  boundary  line  shall  be  wholly  on  one  side  of 
every  portion  of  the  building  ;  for  it  would  be  unreasonable  to 
assume  that  the  parties  to  the  conveyance  intended  that  the 
main  portion  of  the  building  should  be  on  one  side  of  the  line,  and 
the  cornices,  and  other  projecting  finish,  on  the  other.'^  This 
inference,  however,  may  be  controlled  by  other  expressions  in 
the  deed,  or  rebutted  by  competent  evidence  showing  a  practical 
location  by  the  parties,  or  working  an  estoppel  of  the  plaintiff.* 

But  however  this  may  be,  in  the  case  of  a  right  of  way,  even  if 
created  by  express  grant,  it  is  not  an  unreasonable  presumption 
that  such  way  was  intended  to  extend  under  the  projecting  finish 
of  a  building.^ 

'  Millett  V.   Fowlc,  8   Cush.  MiO.     To  "on  a  str.aif^ht  line  to  the  shop,"  it  was 

like  effect,   Meeks   v.  Wiliard   (N.  J.),  29  hold   that   the  line  ran  to  tlie  corner  of  a 

All.  Itej).  .318.  ))latf<)rni  which  was  a   jjan  of  the  hiiild- 

^  CitlniH  r.  Bradford,  51  Me.  414.  iiii,^  cither  jiernianent  or  temporary.    Dun- 

8  Farnsworth  v.  Rockland,  8.3   ISIe.  .508,  ham  v.  Gannett,  126  Mass.  151. 

22  At).  Ilcp.  394,   per  Walton,  J. ;  Meeks  *  Meeks  v.  Willard  (N.  J.),  29  Atl.  Kep. 

V.  Willard  (N.  .1 ),  29  Atl.  IJep.  318.  318. 

Where   the  hound  of   a  way  w.is    do-  '"  Farnsworth  v.  Rockland,  83  Mc.  508, 

scribed  as  runnin<r  from  a  certain   point  22  Atl.  Rep.  394.    Walton,  J.,  said  :"  Not 

327 


^  39').]  DESCRIPTION    AND   BOUNDAKIES. 

395.  The  angle  of  a  boundary  line  will  control  as  against  a 
measurement  of  aiiotlicr  bmiiulary  line,  wlieii  it  appears  to  have 
been  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  nuike  the  angle  a  controlling 
eonsideiation.  Tluis,  if  a  boundary  line  is  describod  as  running 
at  a  riL!,ht  angle  to  a  street,  this  detei'niines  the  shape  of  the 
lot,  though  this  makes  the  area  of  the  lot,  and  the  measurement 
of  it  on  the  street,  nnich  more  than  the  area  and  measurement 
expressed  in  the  deed,  these  being  given  with  the  qualification 
of  the  words  "  more  or  less."  ^ 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  coui-ses  control  measurements.  This 
can  hardly  be  given  as  a  I'ule.  When  there  is  a  discrepancy  be- 
tween a  course  and  distance,  one  or  the  other  is  preferred,  accord- 
ins  to  circumstances.^ 

A  deed  desciil>ing  a  line  as  running  at  right  angles  to  a  creek 
or  other  stream  of  water  is  not  on  its  face  void  for  uncertainty,  in 
the  absence  of  anything  to  show  that  the  creek  does  not  rim  in  a 
straight  course,  or  that  a  straight  line  drawn  along  the  thread  of 
the  stream  would  not  intersect  tlie  beginning  point.  A  perpen- 
dicular line  drawn  from  this  base  line  would  answer  the  call  in 
the  deed.2  A  call  in  a  deed  for  a  line  running  from  a  street  at 
rio'ht  ancrles  thereto  is  not  varied  because  the  n''xt  call  is  for  a 
distance  of  thirty'  feet,  more  or  less,  from  the  end  of  the  line  to  a 
monument,  when  in  fact  the  end  of  the  line  run  at  right  angles  is 
thirty-three  feet  and  six  inches  from  the  monument.*  Where  a 
boundary  line  is  to  run  to  an  extended  line,  such  as  a  rivei-,  a 
swamp,  or  the  line  of  another  tract  of  land,  such  line  must  run  to 
the  nearest  point  on  such  river,  swamp,  or  line  of  anoth(M-  tract; 
and  in  carrying  out  this  rule,  even  a  call  for  a  course  and  distance 

oiilv  coniices,  but  small  balconies  and  bay-  such  a  case  the  structure  would  be  a  pub- 

wiiiclcjws,  ofteu  overhanfi;  sidewalks ;  and,  lie   nuisance,   and   its   vemoval  could   be 

if  thi-y  do  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  coini)elled." 

or    incommode   the    public    travel,   such  i  Hall  v.  Eaton,  139   Ma^s.  217,  29  N. 

structures  are  not  unlawful.     The  owner  E.  Rep.  660;  Noble  y.  Goo<,'ins,  99  Mass. 

of  land  over   which   a  public  way  passes  231. 

has  a  right  to  occupy  the  land  above   and  -  Preston    r.   Bowniar,   6   Wheat.   580, 

below  its  surface  to  any  extent  that  "ill  per  Story,  J. 

not  impair  its  usefulness  for  a  way.     Of  •'  Irwin   v.  Townc,  42   Cal.  326  ;    Hicks 

course   a   i)ay-window,   or  a  balcony,  or  a  v.  ('olcniaii,  2.^)  Cal.  122,  143,  8.5  Am.  Dec. 

cornice  even,  may  be  so  low  down,  and  103. 

])roject  so  far  into  a  street,  as  to  obstruct  ^   Piatt   v.  Bente,    49   N.  J.  L.  679,  10 

or  incommode  the  ])ublic  travel ;  and  in  Atl.  Hep.  283. 

328 


GENERAL   RULES   OF   CONSTRUCTION.        [§§  396-398. 

will  be  disregarded.!  The  course  of  a  line  beginning  at  a  street 
or  any  other  extended  boundary  line  is  presumed  to  be  at  a  right 
angle  to  the  street  when  the  angle  is  not  specified. 

396.  Parallel  lines  are  strictly  and  usually  straight  lines  ;  but 
sometimes  lines  which  are  not  straight  are  so  designated.^  Thus 
a  line  may  be  described  ;is  parallel  to  a  winding  river. 

397.  The  terms  '••north,"  "south,"  ''east,"  and  '-west,"  or 
"northerly,""  '-southerly,"  "easterly,"  and  "  westerly,  '  when 
not  controlled  by  definite  coui'ses.  monuments,  or  other  definite 
dt  scriptions,  mean  due  north,  south,  east,  or  west.^^  But  these 
and  similar  terms  must  always  yield  to  monuments  and  other  defi- 
nite calls."*  Thus  the  word  "  northerly  "  in  the  description  in  a 
deed,  where  there  is  no  object  to  direct  its  course,  must  be  taken 
to  mean  due  north  ;  but  when  there  are  monuments  to  which  it  is 
applicable,  it  may  have  its  legitimate  meaning  and  full  force,  and 
yet  the  course  may  incline  either  way  any  distance,  provided  it 
tends  towards  the  north. ■'' 

398.  Estimates  of  quantity  are  usually  subordinate  both  to 
monuments  and  to  courses  and  distances,  unless  it  appears 
that  the  intention  of  the  parties  was  that  an  exact  quantity  of 
land  should  be  granted.  A  statement  of  the  quantity,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  express  covenant  that  the  land  conveyed  contains  that 
quantity,  has  very  little  weight  when  the  deed  contains  an  accu- 
rate description  b}^  permanent  boundaries  capable  of  being  ascer- 
tained.^    Tliis  is  particularly  the  case  where  the  words  "more  or 

1  Allen  V.  Sallinger,  108  N.  C.  159,  12  ^  Foster  v.  Fos.s,  77  Me.  279;  Segar  v. 
S.  E.  Rep.  896;  Austrian  v.  Davidson,  21  Bahcock,  18  R.  I.  188,  26  Atl.  Rep.  257; 
Minn.  117.  Garvin  ;•.  Dean,  115  Mass.  577;  Cunning- 

2  Fratt  I'.  Woodward,  32  Cal.  219,  91  ham  v.  Vnrnn,  ru  N.  II.  157;  Brandt  v. 
Am.    Dec.    573;    Hicks    v.    Coleman,    25  Ogden,  1  .Toliiis.  156. 

Cal.  122,  143,  85  Am.  Dec.  103.  «  Llewellyn   v.  Jcr.sey,  11    Mees.  &   W. 

•■^  Brandt  r.  Ogden,  1  John.s.  156  ;  Jack-  183;  Jackson   v.   Sprague,    1    Paine,  494 ; 

son   V.  Reeves,  3  Caincs,   293  ;  Fratt   v.  Field  v.  Columbct,  4   Sawyer,  523 ;  Ayers 

Woodward,  32  Cal.  219,  91  Am.  Dec.  573  ;  v.  Watson,  1 13  U.  S.  594,  5  S.  Ct.  Rep.  641 . 

Bosworth   r.  Danzien,  25  Cal.  296;  Fari.s  Alabama:   Hess  v.  Cheney,  83  Ala.  251,  3 

V  Plielan,  39  Cal.  612;  Irwin  v.  Towne,  So.  Rep.  791  ;  Rogers  v.  Peebles,  72   Ala. 

42  Cal.  326,  334;  Martin  ?;.  Lloyd,  94  Cal.  529;    Wright    v.    Wright,    34    Ala.    194. 

105,  29  Pac.  Rep.  491  ;  Currier  v.  Nelson.  Arkansas  :    Phillips  v.  Porter,  3  Ark.  18, 

96  Cal.   .505,   31   Pac.  Rep.  531  ;  Reed  r.  36  Am.    Dec.  448.     California:    Winans 

Tacoma  Build.   Asso.    2    Wash.    198,   26  ;•.  Cheney,  55  Cal.  567  :  Stanley  r.  Grem, 

Pae.  Rep.  252.  12  Cal.  148.     Connecticut :  Belden  y.  Sey- 

■'  Irwin  V.  Towne,  42  Cal.  326;  Moss  v.  mtmr,  8   Conn.   19;   Snow  v.  Chapman,  1 

Shear,  30  Cal.  467.  Root,  528;  Nichols  v.  Tnrney,  15  Conn. 

329 


§  o99.] 


DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDARIES. 


less"  are  addetl.^  The  quantity  is  the  least  part  of  the  descrip- 
tion, and  must  yield  to  the  description  by  boundaries. 

Parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  determine  whether  the 
words  relating  to  quantity  are  descriptive  merely,  or  are  used  as  a 
warranty  of  quantity.  The  meaning  of  the  words  used  must  he 
sought  in  the  deed  and  not  elsewheri^.'-^  The  deed  may  even  make 
quantity  the  controlling  element  in  the  description,  as  whert'  a 
deed,  after  describing  Llie  land  by  courses  and  distances,  declared 
tliat  "  said  tract  shall  contain  just  one  acre,  and  the  distances 
shall  be  so  construed."  -^ 

399.  But  when  the  boundaries  of  a  parcel  are  definite,  a 
statement  of  the  quantity  of  the  land  does  not  generally  have 


101.  Delaware  :  Dale  v.  Smith,  1  Del. 
Ch.  1,  12  Am.  Dec.  64.  Florida:  Au- 
dieu  V.  Watkiiis,  26  Fla.  390,  7  So.  Rep. 
876.  Georgia:  Beuton  v.  lIor.^ley,  71 
Ga.  619;  Harris  v.  Hull,  70  Ga.  831. 
Illinois:  Stevens  v.  Wait,  112  111.  544; 
Cottingham  v.  Parr,  93  111.  233;  Wad- 
hams  V.  Swan,  109  111.  46.  Iowa:  Uf- 
ford  y.  Wilkins,  33  Iowa,  110.  Kansas: 
Armstrong  v.  Browufield,  32  Ivans.  116, 
4  Pac.  Rep.  1 85.  Maine  :  Clark  v.  Scam- 
mon,  62  Me.  47  ;  Allen  v.  Allen,  14  Me. 
387;  Chandler  v.  McCard,  38  Me.  564. 
Maryland:  Hail  v.  Mayhew,  15  Md.  551. 
Massachusetts  :  Powell  v.  Clark,  5  Mns.s. 
355,  4  Am.  Dec.  67.  Michigan :  Moran 
V.  Lczotte,  54  Mich.  83,  88,  19  N.  W.  Rep. 
757,  per  Cooley,  C.  J.  Minnesota  :  Turn- 
bull  V.  Schroeder,  29  Minn.  49,  11  N.  W. 
Rep.  147.  Missouri:  Baker  i>.  Clay,  101 
Mo.  553,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  734  ;  Campbell  i: 
Johnson,  44  Mo.  247  ;  Ware  v.  Johnson, 
66  Mo.  662.  New  Jersey :  Fuller  v.  Carr, 
33  N.  J.  L.  157.  New  York :  Case  v.  Dex- 
ter, 106  N.  Y.  548,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  449 ; 
Thayer  v.  Finton,  108  N.  Y.  394,  15  N. 
F.  Rep.  615;  Jackson  v.  McConndl,  19 
Wend.  175;  Jackson  v.  Moore,  6  Cow. 
706;  Baldwin  v.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  359; 
Mann  v.  Pearson,  2  Johns.  37  ;  Hathaway 
V.  Power,  6  Hill,  453.  Oregon  :  K'aymond 
V.  Coffrey,  5  Oreg,  132.  Pennsylvania: 
Large  v.  Penn,  6  S.  &  R.  488.  Rhode 
Island:  Doyle  v.  Mellen,  15  R.  I.  'y23,  8 
,\!l.  licp.  700.  South  Caroline. :  Fu'uotid 
H:]0 


V.  Graham,  1  Rich.  491.  In  Baynard  v. 
Eddings,  2  Strob.  374,  it  is  said  :  "  It  is 
seldom  that  quantity  is  of  much  weight 
in  a  question  of  location."  In  Gourdin 
V.  Davis,  2  Rich.  481,  O'Neall,  J.,  said : 
"  I  deny  that  quantity  has  ever  been  re- 
garded as  a  certainty  in  a  deed.  It  is  al- 
together too  uncertain  a  matter  to  have 
such  an  effect."  Tennessee :  Miller  v. 
Beutley,  5  Sneed,  671.  Texas  :  Dalton  v. 
Rust,  22  Tex.  133;  Hatch  v.  Garza,  22 
Tex.  176  ;  Hunter  v.  Morse,  49  Tex.  219  ; 
Rand  u.  Cartwright,  82  Tex.  399,  18  S. 
W.  Rep.  794.  Vermont :  Grand  Tiunk 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Dyer,  49  Vt.  74.  Wisconsin : 
Bioux  V.  Cormier,  75  Wis.  566,  44  N.  W. 
Rep.  654. 

1  Kennedy  v.  Boykin,  35  S.  C.  61,  14 
S.  E.  Rep.  809.  As  far  back  as  1818, 
Nott,  J.,  said,  in  Executors  of  Peay  v. 
Briggs,  2  Mill  Const.  98,  recognized  in 
the  more  recent  case  of  Bratton  v.  Claw- 
son,  3  Strob.  127,  130,  "  that  where  a  per- 
son purchases  land  by  metes  and  bounds, 
represented  to  contain  a  certain  number 
of  acres  '  more  or  less,'  he  is  entitled  to  re- 
cover all  the  lands  within  the  prescribed 
limits,  whatever  the  number  of  acres  may 
be.  It  must  be  apparent  from  the  words 
'  more  or  less '  that  the  metes  and  bounds 
are  to  govern,  and  not  the  number  of 
acres." 

2  Hess  V.  Cheney,  83  Ala.  251 , 3  So.  Rep 
791  ;  Winston  v.  Browning,  61  Ala.  80. 

^  Sanders  v.  Godding,  45  Iowa,  463. 


GENERAL  RULES  OF  CONSIRUCTION. 


[§  400. 


any  effect.  Such  statement  is  considered  merely  as  descrip- 
tive, and,  as  the  quantity  is  the  least  certain  part  of  the  description, 
that  must  yield  to  the  boundaries,  or  other  definite  description  by 
name  or  number,  or  by  map  or  survey. ^  The  most  material  and 
particular  part  of  the  description  controls  that  which  is  less 
natural  and  certain.  It  is  only  in  the  absence  of  monuments, 
courses,  and  distances  that  the  quantity  of  land  named  in  the  deed 
will  govern.- 

400.  The  call  for  quantity  may  be  resorted  to  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  that  certain  "which  otherwise  would  be  uncer- 
tain, and  especially  is  this  the  case  when  the  lands  are  described 
by  sectional   subdivisions.'^     The   call   for  quantity  may  aid   the 


1  Fuller  V.  Carr,  33  N.  J.  L.  157  ;  Rich- 
wine  V.  Jones  (Ind.),  39  N.  E.  Rep.  460; 
Silver  Creek  Cement  Co.  v.  Union  Lime 
Co.  138  lud.  297,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  125; 
Thayer  v.  Fiuton,  108  N.  Y.  394,  15  N. 
E.  Rep.  615;  Jackson  v.  McConuell,  19 
Wend.  175  ;  Jackson  v.  Moore,  6  Cow.  706 ; 
Arden  V.  Thompson,  5  Cow.  371 ;  An- 
il lews  !'.  Pearson,  68  Me.  19  ;  Borken- 
hagen  v.  Vianden,  82  Wis.  206,  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  260;  Doctor  v.  Furch,  76  Wis.  153, 
44  N.  W.  Rep.  648 ;  Scull  c  Pi  uden,  92 
iS".  C.  168;  Rogers  v.  Peebles,  72  Ala. 
529  ;  Hess  v.  Cheney,  83  Ala.  251,  3  So. 
Rep.  791  ;  Hunter  v.  Hume,  88  Va.  24, 13 
S.  E.  Rep.  305  ;  Ayers  v.  Harris,  77  Tex. 
108,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  768;  Gwynn  v. 
Schwartz,  32  W.  Va.  487,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  880. 
In  Baker  v.  Light,  80  Tex.  627,  16  S. 
W.  Rep.  330,  the  deed  was  of  "  400  acres, 
more  or  less,  out  of  the  southeast  corner" 
of  a  certain  survey,  and  described  the 
tract  conveyed  by  metes  and  bounds, 
courses  and  distances.  Accordinsj  to  the 
courses  and  distances,  the  land  conveyed 
did  not  reach  to  the  east  line  of  the  sur- 
vey. It  was  proved  that,  when  the  tract 
conveyed  was  surveyed,  the  east  line  of  the 
survey  could  not  be  found,  and  that  the 
surveyor  only  established  the  west  corners 
of  the  tract.  The  position  of  tliese  cor- 
ners was  not  disputed.  Althous:li  there 
were  400  acres  within  ilie  courses  and  dis- 
tances named  in  the  deeil.the  deed  [lassed 
title  to  all  the  land  I)etween  ilu'  we^t  cor- 


ners of  the  tract  and  the  east  line  of  the 
survey. 

2  Allen  V.  Kersey,  104  Ind.  1,  3  N.  E. 
Rep.  557  ;  Silver  Creek  Cement  Co.  v. 
Union  Lime  Co.  138  Ind.  297,  35  N.  E. 
Rep.  125. 

'^  Field  V.  Columbet,  4  Sawyer.,  523  ; 
Morton  v.  Root,  2  Dill.  312;  White  v. 
Liming,  93  U.  S.  514  ;  Baldwin  v.  Brown, 
16  N.  Y.  359;  Hipiubotham  v.  Stoddard, 
72  N.  Y.  94  ;  Buffalo,  New  York  &  Erie 
R.  Co.  V.  Sti^ieler,  61  N.  Y.  348 ;  Davis  r. 
Raiusford,  17  Mass.  207  ;  Davis  v.  Hess, 
103  Mo.  31,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  324  ;  Burnett 
V.  McCluey,  78  Mo.  676  ;  Prior  r.  Scott, 
87  Mo.  303 ;  Wolfe  v.  Dyer,  95  Mu.  545, 
8  S.  W.  Rep.  551  ;  Davis  v.  Rainsford,  17 
Mass.  207  ;  Hall  v.  Shotwell,  66  Cal.  379, 
5  Pac.  Rep.  683  ;  Winans  v.  Cheney,  55 
Cal.  567  ;  Baxter  v.  Wilson,  95  N.  C.  137  ; 
Hicks  V.  Coleman,  25  CaL  122,  85  Am. 
Dec.  103  ;  Hoffman  v.  Port  Huron  (Mich.), 
60  N.  W.  Rep.  831  ;  Moran  v.  Lezotte, 
.54  Mich.  83,  19  N.  AV.  Rep.  757;  Kirk- 
land  V.  Way,  3  Rich.  4,  45  Am.  Dec. 
752;  Campbell  v.  Carruth,  32  Fla.  264, 
13  So.  Rep.  4.32  ;  Bowen  v.  I'rout,  52  111. 
354;  Smiley  v.  Fries,  104  111.  416;  Pen- 
nington V.  Flock,  93  Ind.  378;  Enochs  i\ 
.Miller,  60  Miss.  19  ;  Dorr  v.  School  Dist. 
40  Ark.  237  ;  Andrews  v.  Murphy,  12  Ga. 
431  ;  Jones  v.  Motley  (Ky.),  13  S.  W. 
Rep.  432;  Hale  r.  Cottle,  21  Ore;;.  580, 
28  Pac.  Rcj).  901  ;  Welder  v.  Hunt,  34 
Tex.  44. 

331 


s^  4i>l.J  DESCKIl'TION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 

description,  but  gene  rally  has  no  controlling-  (.■ft'ect.  The  call  for 
quantity  may  serve  to  show  that  the  courses  antl  »listauces  are 
right,  and  that  a  further  description  by  visible  monuments  is 
wiong.  Thus,  wlien  it  is  apparent  upon  the  face  of  a  deed  that 
the  intention  was  to  convey  a  specific  quantity  of  lands,  and  the 
courses  and  distances  give  that  precise  quantity,  but  the  tlescrip- 
tion  by  fixed  monuments  would  embrace  more  or  less  than  that 
quantity,  it  is  clear  that  the  desciiplion  by  courses  and  distances 
should  be  followed. ^ 

When  one  of  the  boundaries  is  uncertain,  upon  an  issue  as  to 
the  location  of  one  of  the  lines  the  jury  should  be  instructed  to 
take  into  consideration  the  quantity  of  land  granted  ;  and  they 
should  not  be  instructed  that  the  quantity  is  innnaterial  if  the 
boundaries  can  be  fixed  in  harmony  with  the  calls  of  the  survey.^ 

401.  Quantity  is  sometimes  an  essential  part  of  the  de- 
scription. Thus,  where  a  deed  conveys  a  given  quantity  of  land, 
and  describes  it  as  bounded  on  a  stream  on  one  side,  starting  front 
a  point  named,  and  containing  a  certain  number  of  acres  in  a 
square  form,  all  the  boundaries  may  be  determined  by  the  quan- 
tity given  and  the  location  on  the  stream. ^ 

There  are  numerous  cases  in  which  the  quantity  has  been  given 
controlling  effect.  Each  case  has  been  decided  upon  its  own 
merits;  the  only  general  rule  being  that,  if  possible,  effect  shall 
be  given  to  the  intent  of  the  parties,  if  this  can  be  ascertained.^ 
A  grant  of  a  mine  with  one  thousand  acres  of  land  "around, 
circumjacent,  and  adjoining  said  mine,"  the  grantor  owning  a 
larger  tract,  may  according  to  the  Califoinia  decisions  be  lo- 
cated in  a  square  form  around  the  mine,  taking  the  mine  as  the 
centre  of  the  location.'^ 

By  statute   in  some   States,  sales  for  the  payment  of  taxes  are 

1   Baldwin  v.  Brown,  16  N.  Y.  359  ;  Hig-  Iwtham  r.  Stoddnnl.  72  N.  Y.  94;  Mov.m 

inbotham  v.  Stoddard,  72  N.  Y.  94;   Biif-  v.   Lezotte,  54   Mich.  83,  19   N.   W.   Rep. 

falo,  N.  Y.  &  E.  K.  Co.  r.  Stigeler,  61  N.  757 ;  Bell  «.  Sawyer,  32  N.  H.  72 ;  Wliite 

Y.  348;    Danzi{,'er  v.  Bovd,   21  J.  &  S.  v.  Gay,  9   N.  IL  126,  3  Am.  Dec.  224; 

398;  McClintock  v.  Ko-ers,  11  111.  279.  Rioiix  v.  Cormier,  75  Wis.  566,  44  N.  \V. 

■^  Scott  y.  Pettigrew,   72   Tex.  321,    12  Rep.  654 ;  Lipscomb  y.  Underwood  (Tex. 

S.  W.  Rep.  161.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W.   Kep.  155  ;  Slack  v. 

3  Hail   c.  Shotwell,  66  Cal.  379,  5  I'ac.  Dawes,  3   Tex.   Civ.  App.  520,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  683  ;   Ilicks  v.  Coleman,  25  Cal.  122,  Rep.  10.53. 
85  Am.  Dec.  1(!3.  5  Santa  Clara    M.  A.>so.    v.    Qnicksil- 

■'  Herrick  v.  Sixby,  L.  R.  1  P.  (".  4.'36  ;  ver  M.  Co.  8  Sawyer,  330,  17  Fed.  Rep. 

Baldwin  v.  Browu,  16  N.  Y.  359 ;   Ilij^iu-  657. 

> '  €>  O 


GENERAL  RULES  OF  CONSTRUCTION. 


[§  402. 


made  of  so  much  of  the  land  subject  to  the  tax  as  will  suffice 
to  pay  the  amount  of  the  tax,  and  the  land  sold  is  frequenily 
described  as  being  in  a  square  form  in  a  certain  part  or  corner  of 
the  assessed  land.  Of  course  the  quantity  in  such  case  largely 
controls  tlie  description.^ 

402.  A  grant  of  a  part  of  a  section  or  lot  of  land  is  void 
-when  the  particular  part  is  not  indicated  ;  -  but  a  grant  of  the 
south  j)ii-i"t  of  a  subdivision  of  a  government  section  of  land  con- 
taining a  certain  number  of  acres  is  sufficiently  certain,  inas- 
much as  the  quantity  of  land  specified  may  be  laid  off  in  a  strip 
of  equal  depth  on  the  soutliern  boundary  of  the  subdivision 
named.^  If  the  land  conveyed  be  a  certain  number  of  acres  in  a 
certain  corner  of  a  section  nauied,  enough  land  may  be  selected 
in  such  corner,  in  a  square  bounded  by  four  equal  sides,  to  satisfy 
the  call  for  quantify.^ 

A  description  as  *■'  the  southeast  part  of  a  quarter  section  con- 
taining thirty-two  acres  "  is  insufficient,  because  it  is  impossible  to 
determine  whether  the  form  of  the  parcel  should  be  a  square  or 
some  other  shape  ;  ^  though  thei-e  are  numerous  decisions  that 
such  a  description  is  sufficient,  as  the  land  is  to  be  laid  off  in  such 
case  in  the  form  of  a  square.^    A  grant  of  a  hundred  acres  out  of  a 


1  Hansee  v.  Mead,  27  Hun,  162. 

2  Mutual  Build.  Asso.  v.  Wyeth  (Ala.), 
17  So.  Rep.  45 ;  Wilkinson  v.  Roper,  74 
Ala.  140;  Adams  v.  Edgerton,  48  Ark. 
419,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  628 ;  I^oberts  v.  Deeds, 
57  Iowa,  320,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  740  ;  Collins 
V.  Storm,  75  Ion  a,  36,  39  N.  W.  Rep.  161  ; 
Moulton  V.  Egery,  75  Me.  485  ;  Tierney 
V.  Brown,  65  Miss.  563,  5  So.  Rep.  104; 
Cogburn  v.  Hunt,  54  Miss.  675  ;  Dingey 
V.  Paxton,  60  .Miss.  1038;  Plenny  v.  Fer- 
rell  (Mi's),  11  So.  Rep.  0;  Goodhar  v. 
Dunn,  61  Miss.  618;  Campbell  v.  Johnson, 
44  Mo.  247  ;  Blow  v.  Vaughan,  105  N.  C. 
198,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  891  ;  Miz/cll  r.  Riiffin, 
113  N.  C.  21,  IS  S.  K.  Rep.  72  ;  McGlaw- 
ihorn  V.  Worthing  ion,  98  N.  C.  199,  3  S. 
E.  Rep.  633  ;  Overand  v.  Menczer,  83  Te.\. 
122,  18  So.  Rep.  301 ;  Tram  Lumber  Co. 
V.  Hancock,  70  Tex.  312,  7  S.  W.  Rep. 
724  ;  Morse  r.  Stockman,  73  Wis.  89,  40 
N.  W.  Rep.  679. 

2  Tierney  i'.  Brown,  65  Miss.  563,  5  So. 


Rep.  104;  Goodbar  v.  Dunn,  61  Miss. 
618;  Enochs  v.  Miller,  60  Miss.  19;  Me- 
Cready  i'.  Lansdale,  58  Miss.  877  ;  Cox 
v.  Hayes,  64  Cal.  32,  27  Rac.  Rep.  785  ; 
Soukup  V.  Union  Inv.  Co.  84  Iowa,  448, 
51  N.  W.  Rep.  167;  Watson  v.  Crutciier, 
56  Ark.  44,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  98. 

*  Wilkinson  v.  Hoper,  74  Ala.  140; 
Bybee  v.  Hageman,  66  111.  519;  Walsh  ?;. 
RingiT,  2  Ohio,  327,  15  Am.  Dec.  555  ; 
G<)odl)ar  V.  Dunn,  61  Miss.  618;  Lego  v. 
Medley,  79  Wis.  211,48  N.  W.  Rep.  375; 
Smith  r.  Nelson,  110  Mo.  552,  19  S.  W. 
Rep.  734;  McCartney  u.  Dennison  (Cal.), 
35  I'ac.  Rep.  706. 

5  Shoemaker  v.  McMoniglc,  86  Ind. 
421  ;  Buchanan  v.  Wliithiun,  ."6  Ind  257  ; 
White  V.  Hyatt,  40  Ind.  3S5.  And  sec 
Schattler  v.  Cassinelli,  56  Ark.  172,  19  S. 
W.  Rep.  746  ;  Stewart  r.  A  ten,  5  Ohio  St. 
257. 

^  McCartney  v.  Dennison  (Cal.),  35 
Pac.    Rep.    766;    Lovejoy  v.  Gaskill,   30 


§§  403,  404.]  DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 

larger  tract  Ji^scribod,  ''  it  being  tlie  ensterninost  portion  of  the 
farm,"  nuiy  be  located  by  running  a  line  due  north  and  south 
intersecting  the  boundaries  of  the  farm,  and  including  the  given 
area  to  the  east  of  sucli  line.^  A  grant  of  ''  sixteen  feet  of  the 
north  end  "  of  a  lot  described  is  not  so  uncertain  as  to  render  the 
grant  void.^ 

403.  A  right  given  the  vendee  to  select  a  definite  number  of 
acres  of  land  out  of  a  larger  tract  affords  the  means  of  rendering 
the  description  certain,^  but  no  title  passes  until  the  selection  is 
made.  The  deed  itself  only  gives  the  right  to  make  the  selec- 
tion, and  to  enforce  a  conveyance  of  the  land  that  may  be  chosen 
in  the  mannei'  provided  by  the  deed.^ 

A  deed  with  a  blank  description  is  of  course  void,  but  the 
grantor  may  authorize  his  agent  to  select  the  land  and  fill  in 
the  description,  though,  if  this  be  not  done  in  the  lifetime  of  the 
grantor,  the  deed  is  void.  If  the  grantee  enters  into  possession 
under  such  a  deed,  this  may  be  used  as  evidence  of  the  character 
of  his  possession.^ 

A  deed  of  land  located  by  a  general  description,  with  a  direc- 
tion that  a  certain  quantity  of  land  so  described  is  to  be  surveyed 
by  a  surveyor  designated  and  the  field-notes  attached  to  the  deed, 
is  not  void  for  indefiniteness  if  the  survey  be  made  and  the  field- 
notes  attached  as  provided.^ 

404.  A  conveyance  of  a  definite  quantity  of  land  out  of  a 
larger  tract  -well  described,  but  without  locating  the  land  thus 
conveyed,  is  construed  as  conveying  a  proportionate  undivided 
interest  in  the  larger  tract,  provided  the  deed  does  not  purport 
specifieallv  to  describe  the  smaller  tract  so  conveyed,  nor  attempt 
to  do  so  with  any  certainty.'^  But  if  the  deed  attempts  to  de- 
Minn.  137,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  583;  Smith  v.  mack,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  Cas.  3.54,  20  S. 
Nelson,  110  Mo.  552,  19  S.  W.  Rep  734;     W.  Rep.  9.50. 

Wilkinson    i-.   Roper,  74   Ala.  140;    Sou-  ■•   Dull  r.  Blum,  C8   Tex.  299,  4   S.  W. 

kup  V.  Union   Inve.stmcnt  Co.    84    Iowa,  Rep.  489. 

448,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  167  ;  Walsh  w.  Ringer,  ^  Tarrant  Co.  v.  McLemore   (Tex.),  8 

2  Ohio,  .327.  S.  W.  Rep.  94. 

1  Warren  v.  Makely,  85  N.  C.  12.  e  Nye   v.  Moody,  70  Tex.  434,  8  S.  W. 

2  Vaughn  v.  Schmalsle,  10  Mont.  186,  Rep.  606. 

25  Pac.  Rep.  102.  '  Gibbs  n.  Swift,  12  Cush.  393;  Brown 

3  Corbin  v.  .lackson,  14  Wend.  619,  28  v.  Bailey,  1  Met.  2.54;  Cullen  v.  Sprigg, 
Am.  Dec.  550;  Nye  v.  Moody,  70  Tex.  83  Cal.  56,  23  Rac.  Rep.  222,  224;  Schenk 
434,  8  S.  W.   Rep.  606;  Dohoney  v.  Wo-  v.  Evoy,  24  Cal.  104;  Grogan   v.  Vache, 

45  Cal.  610;  Lawrence  v.  Ballou,  37  CaJ. 

834 


GENERAL   RULES   OF   CONSTRUCTION.  [§  405. 

scribe  a  specific  part  of  the  larger  tract,  but  fails  to  give  sufficient 
description  to  convey  that  part,  the  deed  does  not  convey  any  un- 
divided interest  in  the  whole  tract,  tliongli  the  quantity  intended 
to  be  conveyed  is  given. ^  A  deed  describing  the  premises  con- 
veyed as  being  all  of  a  designated  tract  not  conveyed  by  the 
grantor  to  a  third  party  named  is  insufficient  of  itself,  and  with- 
out proof  as  to  what  part  of  the  tract  had  not  been  conveyed  to 
the  third  person,  to  show  title  to  any  part  of  such  lands  in  lite 
grantee.2  But  such  a  deed  is  rendered  certain  in  its  description 
b}-  showing  what  part  of  the  whole  tract  had  been  conveyed  ;  and 
said  deed  is  sufficient  to  convev  the  remaining  land  as  asainst  a 
subsequent  purchaser  for  value  without  notice.'^ 

A  deed  wliich  conveys  a  certain  number  of  acres  on  the 
north  side  of  a  lot  of  land,  described  by  its  number,  the  lot 
being  a  square,  is  sufficiently  certain  to  embrace  such  a  paral- 
lelogram as  would  result  from  drawing  a  line  across  the  lot,  par- 
allel with  its  northern  boundary,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  required 
quantity."* 

405.  The  word,  "half,"  when  used  in  describing  land, 
should  be  construed  as  meaning  "half  in  quantity,"  unless  the 
context  or  surrounding  facts  and  circumstances  show  a  coistrary 
intention.  It  was  so  held  in  a  case  where  two  tenants  in  com- 
mon of  a  parcel  of  land,  which  could  not  be  equally  divided  by  a 
north  and  south  line  drawn  equidistant  from  its  east  and  west 
lines,  conveyed  to  each  otiier  the  "east  half  "and  "west  half"  re- 
spectively of  said  parcel,  containing  an  equal  number  of  acres, 
and  without  reference  to  the  "government  survey."^ 

But  in  government  surveys  of  the  public  lands  the  terms  "  east 

518 ;  Lick  v.  O'Donnell,  3  Cal.  60,  58  Am.  76  Am.  Dec.  53  ;  Roth  v.  Gabbert  (Mo.), 

Dec.  383  ;    Wallace  v.  Miller,  52  Cul.  65.') ;  27  S.  W.  Hep.  528. 

Pipkin  V.  Allen,  29  Mo.  229;  McAfee  v.  ^  Maier  v.  Josliu,  46  Minn.  228,  48  N. 

Arline,  83  Ga.  645,  10  S.    E.  Rep.  441  ;  W.  Rep.  909. 

Jackson  v.  Livinj^ston,  7  Wend.  136  ;  Cor-  3  Baker  v.  Clay,  101  Mo.  553,  14  S.  W. 

bin  V.  Jackson,  14  Wend.   619;  Shcafe  v.  Rep.  734. 

Wait,  30  Vt.  735  ;   Dohoney  v.  Womack,  *  Gress  Lumber  Co.  v.  Coody  (Ga.),  21 

1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  354,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  883,  S   E.  Rep.  217  ;  Cobb  v.  Taylor,  133  Ind. 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  950;  Linnartz  v.  McCul-  605,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  615. 

loch  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.W.  Rep.  279;  5  Jone.s  r.   I'ashby,  62    Mich.   614,    29 

Slack  I'.  Dawes  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),   22  S.  N.   W.    Rep.  374;  Dart  v.   Barbour,    32 

\V.  Rep.  1053.  Mich.  267 ;  An  Gre.s  Boom  Co.  v.  Whit- 

1  Grogan  v.  Vaehe,  45  Cal.  610  ;  Dwyie  ney,  26  Midi.  42  ;  Farley  v.  Deslonde,  69 

V.  Speer  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W.  Rep.  'lex.  I.^)R,  6  S.  W.  Rep.  786. 
585;   Wofford  v.  McKinna,   23   Tex.  36, 

335 


§§  400,  407.]  DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 

lialt"*  ami  '•  west  Iiall' ""  ai(!  uiscd,  uol  with  let'rrence  to  (luaiitity, 
but  to  a  liiu'  t'ljuiilistaiit  Iroiii  tlu'  Ixui  ilarv  linens  ol"  the  [)aicel 
subdivitU'Ll,  and  those  terms  liave  tlie  same  siguiiication  in  patents 
issued  by  tlie  government ;  and  this  is  true  because  so  proviik'd 
by  net.  of  Congiess.  A  deed  of  the  "east  half"  of  a  parcel  of 
land  "aeeortling  to  the  Uniteil  States  survey"  is  definite,  and 
excludes  the  idea  of  two  equal  quantities,  and  fixes  the  dividing 
Hue  equidistant  from  the  boundary  lines  of  the  parcel  thus  sub- 
divided.i 

In  the  description  of  land  under  government  surveys,  if  part  of 
a  section  or  of  a  quarter  section  be  described  as  the  "  north  side  " 
or  the  "  north  end,"  the  words  may  be  taken  to  mean  the  north 
half  of  the  section  or  quarter  section.- 

406.  The  word  "part"  may  be  so  used  as  to  show  that  it 
means  ''half;  "^  but  it  may  be  so  used  that  it  is  uncertain  what 
meaning  is  attached  to  it,  and  in  that  case  the  description  will  be 
insufficient.^  Thus  a  conveyance  of  a  pait  of  a  certain  bounty 
warrant  is  void  for  uncertainty  as  to  the  part  of  the  certificate 
sold.'^ 

407.  The  Words  "  more  or  less,"  after  a  statement  of  the 
quantity,  are  intended  to  cover  only  a  I'easonable  excess  or  deficit. 
If  the  difference  is  very  great,  it  is  evidence  of  a  mistake  which  a 
court  of  equity  may  correct.  The  presence  of  these  words  does 
not  imply  that  the  purchaser  takes  the  risk  of  the  quantity.  If 
the  variation  is  slight,  the  purchaser  has  no  remedy;  but  if  the 
variation  is  large  or  material,  he  may  be  relieved  from  paying 
foi-  the  deficient  quantity .•"  The  use  of  these  words  does  not  bar 
an   inquiry  into  a  fraud   or   misrepresentation   as   to  quantity  on 

1  Jones    V.  Pashby,    62    Mich.    614,  29         5  Curdy  v.  Stafford  (Tex.   Civ.   App.), 
N.  W.  Rep.  374,  48   Mich.  634,  12  N.  W.      27  S.  W.  Kep.  823. 

Rep.  884.  6  Belknap  v.  Sealey,  14   N.   Y.    143,  67 

2  Winslow    );.    Cooper,    104   111.    235;     Am.  Dec.  120;  Blaney  y.  Rice,  20   Pick. 
Chiuiqiiy  c.  People,  78  111.  570.  62,  .^2  Am.  Dec.  204  ;  Hosleton  v.  Dick- 

^  Soukup  V.  Union   Inv.  Co.  84  Iowa,  insoii,  51    Iowa,  244,  1   N.  W.   Rep.  S.'jO; 

448,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  167.     The  de,«cript  on  Williamson  v.  Hall,  62  Mo.  405  ;  Estes  ;;. 

was:  "West  part  N.  E.  quarter,  N.  W.  Odoin,  91    Ga.  600,  18   S.  E.  Rep.   355; 

quarter,   20    acres."      This   was    held    to  Clark  w.  Scaminou,  62  Me.  47  ;  Armstrong 

mean   the  west  20   acres   of   the   40  de-  r.  Browufield,  32  Kans.  116,  4   Pac.   Rep. 

scribed.  185;  Baker  v.  Light,  80  Tex.  627,  16  S. 

*  Roberts  v.  Deeds,  57  Iowa,  320, 10  N.  W.  Rep.  330. 
W.  Rep.  740;  Collins  v.  Storm,  75  Iowa, 
36,39  X.  W.  Rep.  161. 

a36 


GENERAL    RULES   OF   CONSTRUCTION.  [§§  408,  409. 

the  part  of  the  grantor,  and  a  very  material  variation  in  quan- 
tity is  itself  some  evidence  of  such  fraud  or  misiepreseutation.^ 
The  purchaser's  previous  knowledge  of  the  land  or  of  its  boun- 
daries does  not  preclude  him  from  recovering  for  fraudulent 
misrepresentation  of  quantity  if,  without  fault  on  his  part,  he 
was  actually  deceived  and  defrauded  by  the  misrepresentation, 
jirovided  the  deficiency  is  more  than  can  be  fairly  covered  by  the 
phi'ase  "  more  or  less."^ 

The  words  "more  or  less  "  and  the  word  "  about,"  used  in  con- 
nection with  quantity  or  distances,  are  words  of  safety  and  pre- 
caution. They  are  intended  merely  to  cover  some  slight  or  un- 
important inaccuracy,  and,  while  enabling  an  adjustment  to  the 
imperative  demands  of  fixed  monuments,  they  do  not  weaken  or 
destroy  the  statements  of  distance  and  quantity  when  no  other 
guides  are  furnished.'^ 

408.  Undivided  part.  —  A  conveyance  by  metes  and  bounds  is 
limited  to  an  undivided  interest  by  the  addition  of  words  such 
as  "  being  an  undivided  half  thereof."  The  plain  meaning  of 
the  language  used  determines  the  interest  conveyed.* 

409.  Adjoining,  Adjacent,  Contiguous.  —  The  word  "adjoin- 
ing" in  a  description  means  next  to,  or  in  contact  with,  and  ex- 
cludes the  idea  of  any  intervening  space.°  The  word  "  adjoining" 
implies   a   closer    relation    than    "  adjacent."     The    latter    word, 

.  uncontrolled  by  the  context  or  subject-matter,  is  not  inconsistent 
with  the  idea  of  something  intervening.  The  description  of 
premises  as  "  adjoining  the  Atlantic  Ocean,"  with  the  additional 
wf>rds  "  bounded  on  the  ocean,"  carries  title  to  the  line  of  or- 
dinary high  water,  with  all  the  incidents  of  riparian  ownership 
upon  tidal  waters.^ 

The  word  "  contiguous  "  means  in  actual  contact  or  touching, 

1  M'Coun  w.  Delany,  3  Bibb,  46,  6  Am.  655;  I'cople   v.   Schtrmerhoin,    19    Barb. 

Dec.  635;  Estcs  c.  Odom,  91  Ga.  600,  18  540,    556;    In  re   Ward,   52   N.    Y:   395; 

S.  E.  Kep.  355.  Akers  v.  Railroad  Co.  43  N.  J.   L.   110. 

■^  Estes  V.  Odom,  91    Ga.  600,  18  S.   E.  In    Blow  v.  Vau-han,105  N.  C.    198,   10 

Rep.  355.  S.  E.   Rep.   891,  a  distinction  was   taken 

3  Oakcs   V.  De  Lancey,  133  N.  Y.  227,  between     the    words     "adjoining"    and 

231,  per  Finch,  J. ;  Belknap  y.  Sealey,  14  "  honnded,"    bnt  this  was  repndiated  in 

N.  Y.  143.  the  later  case  of  I'cny  v.  Scott,  109  N.  C. 

*  Maxwell  v.  Hosmer,  138  Mass.  207.  374,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  294. 

^  Yard  V.  Ocean  Beach  A.«so.  49   N.  J.         '■  Yard  v.  Ocean   Beach  Asso.  49  N.  J. 

Eq.  306,  24  All.   Rep.  729;    Jolui.s  ii  v.  Eq  "06,  24  Atl.  Rep.  729  ;  State  r.  Brown, 

District  of   Columbia,  9   CVnt.    I.Np.  65!,  27  N.  .7.  L.  13. 

VOL.  I.  337 


^  410.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


and  tlieri'l'ore  a  deed  conveying  certain  salt-works,  and  "  lands 
coiitiijftious  thereto,"  does  not  embrace  a  parcel  of  land  three 
qua  Tiers  of  a  mile  from  such  works,  and  separated  therefrom  by 
the  lands  of  other  persons.' 

V.    General  and  Particular  Descriptions. 

410.  Where  a  general  description  is  joined  with  a  particu- 
lar one,  it  is  a  ruU^  of  construction  that  the  latter  prevails  over 
the  former.^  A  general  description  may  be  limited,  restrained, 
or  controlled  by  a  particular  description  ;  but  as  a  rule  a  particu- 
lar desci'iption  is  not  limited,  restrained,  or  controlled  by  a  gen- 
eral description.  The  real  interest  of  the  parties  should,  where 
possible,  be  gathered  from  the  whole  description.-^  The  calls  in  a 
deed,  whether  natural  or  artificial,  are  divided  as  regards  their 
relative  value  into  two  classes,  —  descriptive  or  directory,  and  spe- 
cial locative  calls.  "  The  former,  though  consisting  of  rivers, 
lakes,  and  creeks,  must  yield  to  the  special  locative  calls,  for  the 
reason  that  the  latter,  consisting  of  the  particular  objects  upon 
the  lines  or  corners  of  the  land,  are  intended  to  indicate  the 
precise  boundary  of  the  land,  about  which    the  locator  and  sur- 


1  Ilolston  Salt  Co.  v.  Campbell,  89  Va. 
396,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  274. 

-  Howell  V.  Saule,  5  Mason,  410.  Ala- 
bama: Giiilniartin  v.  Wood,  76  Ahi.  204; 
yikes  V.  Show.s,  74  Ala.  382.  Arkansas : 
Doe  V.  Torter,  3  Ark.  18.  Connecticut: 
Benedict  v.  Gaylord,  11  Couii.  332,  29 
Am.  Dec.  299.  Indiana:  Gauo  v.  Ald- 
vidi^e,  27  Ind.  294.  Iowa :  Waldin  v. 
Smith,  76  Iowa,  652,  39  N.  W.  Rep.  82  ; 
Barney  v.  Miller,  18  Iowa,  460.  Maine: 
Heirick  v.  Hopkins,  23  Me.  217  ;  Moore 
I'.  Griffin,  22  Me.  350;  Thorndike  v.  Rich- 
ards, 13  Me.  430.  Massachusetts:  Mel- 
vin  V.  Rroprietors  Locks  &.  Canals,  5  Met. 
15,  38  Am.  Dec.  384;  Dana  v.  Middlesex 
Bank,    10    Met.    250 ;  Bott    v.    Biirnell, 

11  Mass.   162;    Makepeace    v.    Bancroft, 

12  Mass.  469;  Lovejoy  v.  Lovett,  124 
Mass.  270;  Smith  v.  Strong,  14  Pick. 
128;  Tyler  v.  Hammond,  11  Pick.  193; 
Whiting  V.  Dewey,  15  Pick.  428;  Winn 
V.  Cabor,  18  Pick.  553.  Michigan:  Jones 
V.  Pashby,  62  Mich.  614,  29  N.  W.  Rep. 
374.     Minnesota :  Witt  v.  St.  Paul  «&  N. 

338 


p.  Ry.  Co.  38  Minn.  122,  35  N.  W.  Rep. 
862.  Missouri :  Grandy  v.  Casey,  93  Mo. 
595  ;  Haunibiil  &  St.  Jo.  R.  Co.  v.  Green, 
68  Mo.  169.  New  Hampshire:  Tenny  v. 
Beard,  5  N.  H.  58  ;  Woodman  v.  Lane,  7 
N.  H.  241  ;  Bell  v.  Sawyer,  32  N.  H.  72  ; 
Nutting  V.  Herbert,  35  N.  H.  120;  Bar- 
nard V.  Martin,  5  N.  H.  536.  New  Jersey  : 
Wharton  v.  Brick,  49  N.  J.  L.  289,  8  Atl. 
Rep.  529  ;  McEowen  v.  Lewis,  26  N.  J.  L. 
451.  New  York:  Case  v.  Dexter,  106  N. 
Y.  548,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  449  ;  Jones  v.  Smith, 
73  N.  Y.  205.  North  Carolina  :  Carter  v. 
White,  101  N.  C.  30,  7  S.  E.  Rep.  473. 
Oregon  :  Raymond  n.  Coffey,  5  Oreg.  132. 
Tennessee :  Wright  v.  Mabry,  9  Yerg.  55. 
Texas :  Stafford  v.  King,  30  Tex.  257,  94 
Am.  Dec.  304;  Cullers  v.  Piatt,  81  Tex. 
258,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  1003.  Vermont :  Cum- 
mings  V.  Black,  65  Vt.  76,  25  Atl.  Rep. 
906;  Spiller  v.  Scribner,  36  Vt.  245; 
Fletcher  v.  Clark,  48  Vt.  211. 

3  Cullers  V.  Piatt,  81  Tex.  258,  264,  16 
S.  W.  Rep.  1003. 


GENERAL   AND   PARTICULAR   DESCRIPTIONS.  [§  411. 

veyoi'  should  be,  and  are  presumed  to  be,  very  particular  ;  while 
the  former  are  called  for  without  any  care  for  exactness,  and 
merely  intended  to  point  out  or  lead  a  person  into  the  region  or 
neigliborhood  of  the  tract  surveyed,  and  hence  not  considered  as 
entitled  to  much  credit  in  locating  the  particular  boundaries  of 
the  land  when  they  come  in  conflict  with  special  locative  calls, 
and  must  give  way  to  them."  ^ 

411.  A  particular  description  is  not  usually  limited  by  gen- 
eral -words  of  intention,  nor  does  such  language  restrict  the 
S^rantor's  covenants  to  his  title  and  interest,  when  the  land  itself 
is  the  subject-matter  of  conveyance.^  The  intent  to  restrict  the 
conveyance  as  made  in  the  particular  description  may,  however, 
be  made  so  clear  that  effect  must  be  given  to  the  general  expres- 
sion of  intent.  Thus,  where  three  parcels  of  land  were  described 
as  if  the  grantor  were  conveying  the  full  and  absolute  interest  in 
the  parcels,  but  he  added,  "  meaning  to  convey  all  the  land  I 
purchased '"  of  three  persons  named,  "  referring  to  their  deeds  for 
particulars,"  and  again  saying,  "  meaning  to  convey  all  the  land 
set  forth  in  said  deed,  and  no  more,"  and  it  appeared  that  the 
land  acquired  by  the  deeds  referred  to  was  only  an  undivided 
half  interest  in  the  land  described,  it  was  held  that  the  deed  con- 
veyed an  undivided  half  merely.'^ 

A  particular  description  also  prevails  over  a  general  reference 
to  the  premises  as  being  in  possession  of  the  grantor,  or  of  some 
other  person  named,*  or  as  belonging  to  a  person  named,^  or  as 
"  being  the  land  set-off "  by  a  certain  Indian  treaty  to  a  person 
named.^ 

1  Stafford  V.   King,   30  Tex.    257,  273,  Hobbs  v.  I'ayson,  85  Me.  498,  27  Atl.  Rep. 

94  Am.  Dec.  304,  per  Smith,  J.  519. 

•■2  Clement  v.   Bank  of  Rutland,  61  Vt.  ^  Hathorn  v.  Hinds,  69  Me.  326  ;  Cullers 

298,    17    Atl.    Rep.    717;    Cumming:.s   v.  i;.  Piatt,  81  Tex.  258,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  1003. 

Black,   65    Vt.    76,    25   Atl.    Rep.    906  ;  In  this  case  the  deed  described   the  laud 

Brunswick  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Crossman,  76  Me.  by  metes  and  bounds,  and   then  gave  a 

577;  Hobbs  v.   Rayson,   85   Me.   498,  27  general  description  of  it  as  being  "all  of 

Atl.  Rep.  519.  fhe  .  .  .  survey,  except  140  acres  belong- 

3  Fla"-'^''  V.  Bean,  25  N.  II.  49;  Wood-  ing  to"  a  certain  estate.     The  particular 

man  v.  Lane,  7  N.   II.   241  ;    Barnard   v.  description  was  held  to  control,  and  only 

Martin    5  N.  H.  536  ;  Oushy  ?;.   Jones,  73  the  land  contained  within   the  described 

j^  Y   f,21.  metes  anil  bounds  passed. 

*  Thnyer  v.  Finton,  108  N.  Y.  394,  15  ''  Prentice  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  154 

N.  E.  Rep.  615,  reversing  37  Ilun,  639  ;  IT.  S.   163,    14    Sup.  Ct.   Rep.  997,  per 

Jones  y.  Smith,  73  N.  Y.  205;  Maker  v.  Harlan,   J.      "The   case,   then,   is   this: 

Lazell    83  Me    562    22   Atl.    Rep.  474 ;  Looking  into  the  deed  under  which  the 

339 


§§  41'2,  413.]  DESCRIl'TION    AND    HOUXDAHIKS. 


After  a  drliiiite  description  by  metes  and  bounds,  the  grant  can- 
not be  enlaiged  by  the  addition  of  the;  wurds,  "  together  witii  the 
buihlings  thereon  standing,"  in  ease  the  buildings  project  beyond 
the  boundaries  first  described.' 

Where  the  parcel  described  was  of  a  specified  farm,  but  a  sched- 
ule and  plan  referred  to  did  not  include  a  close  which  was  proved 
to  have  been  held  and  treated  as  a  part  of  the  farm,  it  was  held 
that  this  close  did  not  pass.^ 

412.  A  clause  summing  up  the  intention  of  the  parties  as 
to  the  property  conveyed  may  be  given  a  controlling  effect  upon 
all  prior  phrases  used  in  a  general  description.^ 

A  conveyance  describing  land  by  lots,  blocks,  or  government 
subdivisions,  and  adding,  at  the  end  of  the  description,  "  also  to- 
gether with  all  other  lands  that  may  not  have  been  heretofore 
described  belonging  to  said "  grantor,  passes  title  to  a  lot  not 
expressly  mentioned.'* 

413.  A  particular  description  prevails  over  a  subsequent 
general  reference  to  a  prior  deed  made  for  another  purpose,  and 
such  reference  must  be  rejected.^  Such  a  reference  to  a  prior 
deed,  after  a  full  description,  does  not  alter  or  change  such  de- 
scription in  any  way,  but  is  regarded  as  having  been  inserted  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  the  grantor's  chain  of  title.     Even  when 


plaintiff  chiims  title,  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  intention  of  tlie  parties, 
we  find  there  a  specific  description,  by 
metes  and  bounds,  of  the  hinds  conveyed, 
followed  by  a  <ieneral  description  which 
must  be  held  to  have  been  introduced  for 
the  purpose  only  of  showing  the  grantor's 
chain  of  title,  and  not  as  an  independent 
description  of  the  lands  .so  conveyed." 

1  Carville    v.    Hutchins,   73    Me.    227 ; 
Tyler  i'.  Hammond,  11  Tick.  193. 

2  Barton  v.  Dawe.s,  10  C.  B.  261. 

8  Plummer  v.  Gould,  92  Mich.  1,  52  N. 
W.  Rej).  146;  Paddack  y.  Pardee,  1  Mich. 
421  ;  Ryan  v.  Wilson,  9  Mich.  262  ;  Chap- 
man V.  Crooks,  41  Mich.  595 ;  Moran  v. 
Lezotte,  54  Mich.  83 ;  Jones  v.  Pashby,  62 
Mich.  614,  621  ;  Bent  v.  Rogers,  137  Mass. 
192;  Sprague  v.  Snow,  4  Pick.  54,  56; 
Witt  V.  Railway  Co.  38  Minn.  122,  35  N. 
W.  Rep.  862,  865  ;  Bates  i'.  Foster,  59  Me. 
157,  3  Washb  Real  Prop.  (5th  ed.)  425; 
340 


Barney  v.  Miller,  18  Iowa,  460,  466,  467; 
Ousby  V.  Jones,  73  N.  Y.  621. 

*  Clifton  Heights  Land  Co.  v.  Randall, 
82  Iowa,  89,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  905. 

^  Cassidy  v.  Charlestown  Sav.  Bank, 
149  Mass.  325,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  372;  Dow 
v.  Whitney,  147  Mass.  1,  16  N.  E.  Rep. 
722;  Lovejoy  v.  Lovctt,  124  Ma.ss.  270; 
Zink  V.  McManus,  49  Hun,  583,  3  N.  Y. 
Supp.  487  ;  Mason  v.  White,  1 1  Barb.  173  ; 
Wilder  V.  Davenport,  58  Vt.  64'.^,  5  Atl. 
Rep.  753  ;  Sherwood  v.  Whitini:,  54  Conn. 
330,  8  Atl.  Rep.  80  ;  Brunswick  Sav.  Inst. 
V.  Crossman,  76  Me.  577  ;  Hatliorn  v. 
Hinds,  69  Me.  326 ;  Crosby  v.  Bradbury, 
20  Me.  61  ;  Willard  v.  Moulton,4  Me.  14; 
Child  V.  Ficket,  4  Me.  471  ;  Brown  v. 
Heard,  85  Me.  294,  27  Atl.  Rep.  182; 
Hobbs  V.  Payson,  85  Me.  498,  27  Atl.  Rep. 
519;  Jones  v.  Webster  Woolen  Co.  85 
Me.  210,  27  Atl  Rep.  105  ;  Drew  v.  Drew, 
28  N.  H.  489. 


GENKRAL    AND    PARTICULAR    DESCRIPTIONS. 


[§  414. 


the  deed  to  the  grantor  is  referred  to  "  for  a  more  particular  de- 
scription," but  the  grantor  acquired  by  the  deed  referred  to  only 
a  part  of  the  land  described  in  his  deed,  which  clearly  describes 
the  j)roperty,  the  whole  of  the  land  so  described  will  pass  to  the 
purchaser.^  Even  where  the  gnmtor  refers  to  a  former  deed,  and 
declares  his  intention  "■  to  convey  the  same  and  identical  real 
estate  conveyed  by  such  deed,"  the  grant  is  not  necessarily  con- 
trolled by  such  reference.^  Wiien  land  is  described  as  the  same 
conve^'ed  to  the  grantor  by  a  deed  referred  to  for  a  particular 
description,  the  title  to  a  lot  excepted  from  the  deed  referred  to 
does  not  pass,  although  the  grantor  at  the  time  of  executing  his 
deed  had  the  title  to  the  excepted  lot/^ 

A  general  description  of  a  farm  described  by  name,  or  as  that 
on  which  the  grantor  lives,  may  control  a  reference  to  a  deed  by 
which  the  grantor  holds  title,  so  that,  if  the  deed  referred  to 
describes  more  or  less  land  than  the  farm  contains  as  described, 
the  parcel  that  passes  is  the  farm  described  by  name  or  occu- 
pancy.'^ 

A  reference  to  a  description  in  a  prior  deed  becomes  of  impor- 
tance when  the  particular  description  is  imperfect  or  doubtful, 
and  the  particular  description  is  in  such  case  aided  rather  than 
controlled  by  the  reference.'^ 

414.  Very  much  depends  upon  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  and  the  nature  of  the  descriptions  used.  If  the  general 
description  is  definite  and  certain,  and  is  proved  to  be  correct  by 
reference  to  the  land  itself,  or  in  any  other  way,  or  if  in  any  way 
the  intention  of  the  parties  ajjpears  to   have  been  to  convey  the 


1  Crosby  v.  Bradbury,  20  Me.  61. 

-  Brunswick  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Grossman,  76 
Mf.  577. 

3  Gi'tchell  V.  Whittemore,  72  Me.  .393. 

*  Auburn  Conjr.  Church  v.  Walker, 
124  Mass.  69;  Hastings  v.  Hastin<j;s,  110 
Mass.  280;  Melvin  v.  Proprietors  of 
Locks  and  Canals,  .5  Met.  15,  38  Am.  Dec. 
384  ;  Green  Bay  &  IMiss.  Canal  Co.  v. 
Hewitt,  55  Wis.  96,  42  Am.  Rep.  701  ; 
Madden  v.  Tucker,  46  Me.  367  ;  Ela  .-. 
Card,  2  N.  H.  175,  9  Am   Dec.  46. 

■'  Weller  v.  Barber,  110  Mass.  44;  Ha- 
thorn  V.  IIind<,  G9  Me.  326.  In  Lovejoy 
V.  Lovett,  124  Mass.  270,  it  was  contended 
that  the  conchiding  clause  in  the  descrip- 


tion in  the  deed,  "  being  the  same  prem- 
ises conveyed  to  me  by  Ezra  Huldcn  by 
deed  dated  May  7,  1829,"  was  a  general 
description  of  the  lot  conveyed,  and,  as 
the  particular  description  was  uncertain 
and  indefinite  as  to  the  northerly  line,  the 
general  description  should  jjrevail.  It  was 
said  by  the  court  that  it  was  not  sufficient 
to  overcome  the  inferences  to  be  drawn 
from  the  other  parts  of  the  deed,  the  ref- 
erence being  made  to  show  only  chain  of 
title.  A  general  description  may  be  looked 
to  in  aid  of  a  particular  description  that 
is  defective  or  doubtful,  but  not  to  control 
or  override  a  particular  description  about 
which  there  can  be  no  doubt. 

341 


^  41,').]  DKSCKIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 

land  thus  generally  described,  the  general  description  will  prevail 
as  M^ainst  a  description  by  courses  and  distances,  so  far  as  these 
descriptions  dil't'er.^  It  is  a  recognized  fact  that  mistakes  are  very 
liable  to  occur  in  descriptions  by  courses  and  distances.^  Every 
part  of  the  description  is  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  in 
<>-eni'ral  that  part  of  the  description  will  control  which  is  the  most 
definite  and  best  expresses  tlie  intent  of  the  parties  as  shown 
from  the  whole  descriiition.-'  Thus,  when  at  the  end  of  the  descrip-  i 
tion  of  a  farm  there  was  added  the  statement  that  "the  above 
description  includes  a  small  lot  known  as  the  '  S  '  lot,"  but  the 
description  in  fact  did  not  include  quite  all  that  lot,  which  con- 
tained three  fourths  of  an  acre,  but  omitted  a  narrow  strip  com- 
prising one  eighth  of  an  acre,  it  was  held  that  the  deed  conveyed 
the  whole  of  tliat  lot.* 

415.  The  relative  importance  of  different  modes  of  de- 
scription depends  also  very  much  upon  the  accuracy  with  which 
the  descriptions  are  made.  Where  there  is  a  clear  and  definite 
description  of  the  parcels  by  boundaries,  any  subordinate  and 
additional  description  by  occupancy  or  the  like,  inconsistent  with 
such  essential  description,  should  be  rejected.^  A  mistake  shown 
to  have  been  made  in  one  form  of  description  discredits  that  part 
of  the  description,  and  makes  another  part  of  the  description, 
which  is  ordinarily  in  itself  not  so  important,  the  controlling 
description  in  that  instance.  Thus  a  description  by  occupancy  is 
ordinarily  a  minor  and  unimportant  form  of  description;  but  this 
form  of  description   may  through  inaccuracy  or  ambiguity  in  a 

1  Barney    v.    Miller,    18    Iowa,    460;  Inst.  w.  Crogsman,  76  Me.  577;  Bates)). 

Adams  i;.  Alkire,  20  W.  Va.  480;  Credle  Foster,   59    Me.    157,  8  Am.   Kep.    406; 

V.  Hays,  88  N.  C.  321  ;  Aranibula  v.  Sul-  Witt  v.  Railway  Co.  38  Minn.  122,  35  N. 

livan,   80  Tex.  615,  16  S.  W.   Rep.  436;  W.  Rep.  862;  Sprague  v.  Snow,  4  Tick. 

Harkey   v.   Cain,   69   Tex.   146,   6  S.  W.  54,   56;  Bent  v.   Rogers,  137   Mass.   192; 

Rep.  637;  Jackson  v.  Loomis,  18  Johns.  Paddack  v.  Pardee,  1  Mich.  421  ;  Ryan  v. 

81,   19  Johns.  449;  Jackson   v.  Clark,  7  Wilson,  9  Mich.  262  ;  Chapman  y.  Crooks, 

Johns.  217  ;  Hathaway  v.  Power,  6  Hill,  41  Mich.  595,  2  N.  W.  Rep.   924;  Jones 

453;  Wade  v.  Deray,  50  Cal.  376;  John-  v.  Pashby,  62  Mich.   614,  29  N.  W.  Rep. 

son  V.   Simpson,  36   N.   II.   91;    Bott   v.  374;  Pliunmer  v.   Gould,  92   Mich.  1,52 

Burnell,  11    Mass.   163;  Rayburn   u.  Wi-  N.  W.    Rep.    146;    Barney  i;.  Miller,  18 

nant,  16  Oreg.  318,  18  Pac.  Rep.  588.  Iowa,  460. 

■^  Houser  v.   Belton,    10    Ired.  358,   51  *  Ludlow  v.  Carr,  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  502. 

Am.  Dec.  391  ;  Davidson  v.  Arledge,  88         ^  Doe  v.  Galloway,   5  B.   &  Ad.   43  ; 

N.  C.  326.  Dyne  v.  Nutley,  14  C.  B.  122  ;  Lutcher  & 

3  Case  u.  Dexter,  106  N.Y.  548;  Oiisby  Moore   Lumber  Co.  v.   Hart   (Tex.   Civ. 

V.  Jones,  73  N.  Y.  621  ;  Brunswick  Sav.  App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  94. 
342 


GENERAL   AND   PARTICULAR   DESCRIPTIONS.       [§§  416,  417. 

more  important  form  of  description,  or  from  failure  to  employ  a 
more  important  form,  become  an  essential  part  of  the  description 
and  control  the  rest  of  it.  A  specific  reference  for  a  boundary  to 
the  land  of  another  person  controls  a  general  reference  to  the 
boundary  as  land  formerly  conveyed  to  the  grantor  by  a  person 
named.  "  Where  a  deed  contains  two  irreconcilable  descriptions 
of  the  entire  boundaries  of  a  tract  of  land,  or  of  a  single  line, 
calls  for  more  stable  monuments,  such  as  the  lines  of  other  tracts 
or  well-known  natural  objects,  will  be  adopted,  rather  than  course 
and  distauce."  ^ 

416.  A  rule  ■which  amounts  to  very  much  the  same  thing 
is  to  the  effect  that,  of  two  descriptions  equally  explicit  and  unam- 
biguous, that  must  control  which  best  expresses  the  intentions  of 
the  parties  as  manifested  by  the  whole  instrument.^  Thus,  where 
a  lot  was  described  as  bounding  on  a  street  named,  and  the  re- 
mainder of  the  description  was  definite  by  metes  and  bounds,  but 
this  further  description  was  added,  "  intending  to  include  only 
the  land  on  which  said  buildings  are  situated,  and  the  yard  in- 
closed within  the  fence  now  built,"  it  was  held  that  the  latter 
description  was  incorrect  because  it  would  leave  a  narrow  strip 
of  land  between  the  fence  and  the  street,  and  it  could  not  have 
been  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  do  this.^  I 

Several  lots  were  described  by  numbers,  with  the  further  de- 
scription, "  being  all  of  block  25."  The  lots  so  numbered  were 
not  in  that  block,  but  in  another.  But  it  appearing  to  be  the 
grantor's  intention  to  convey  the  block  in  which  he  resided,  and 
that  he  resided  in  the  block  named  in  the  deed,  it  was  accord- 
ingly held  that  that  block  passed  by  the  deed.**  A  general  de- 
scription controls  when  the  particular  description  is  uncertain  or 
impossible.'^ 

417.  A  rule  of  construction  that  the  first  description  in  a 
deed  is  presumed  to  express  the  true  intention  of  the  parties 
lias  been  invoked  "to  tip  the  nodding  beam."''     But  this  cannot 

1  Cox  V.   McGowan  (N.   C),  21    S.  E.  ney  v.  Miller,   18  Iowa,  460;  Mullaly  f. 

Rep.  108,  per  Avery,  J.  Noyes  (Tex.   Civ.  App.),    26  S.  W.   Kep. 

■^  Driscoll   V.   Green,    .59   N.    H.    101;  14.5. 

White  V.  Gay,  9  X.   H.  126.  31   Am.  Dec.  «  Dri^coU  r.  Green,  59  N.  H.  101. 

224;  Lane  v.   Thompson,  43   N.   H.  .320;  *  Sharp  i;.  Thompson,  100   111.  447,  39 

Richardson  v.  Palmer,  38  N.  H.  212 ;  liar-  Am.  Rep.  61. 

ris  V.  Hull,  70  Ga.  831  ;  Stafford  v.  King,  "  Sawyer  v.  Kendall,  10  Cush.  241. 

30  Tex.  257,  271,  94  Am.  Dec.  304  ;  B  ir-  '^  Vance  v.  Fore,  24  Cal.  435. 

343 


5$§  418,  419.]  DKSCKIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 

be  reo"arded  as  a  sound  rule  of  coiistrucliou.  "  A  specific  descrip- 
tion, wlu'ther  it  conies  before  or  after  a  general  designation,  must 
pD'vail,  upon  the  underlying  principle  that  the  law  will  always, 
tloniand  tlie  pioduction  of  the  highest  evidence,  and,  as  between 
two  descriptions,  will  prefer  that  which  is  most  certain."  ^ 

There  is  no  rule  that,  if  clauses  in  a  description  of  land  are 
repugnant,  the  first  necessarily  prevails  over  the  last.^ 

418.  It  is  a  rule  of  construction  that  a  private  grant  shall 
be  t  iken  most  favorably  for  the  grantee  in  case  the  construc- 
tion is  left  in  doubt  after  the  ap[)lication  of  other  rules,  for  it  is 
assumed  that  the  language  of  the  deed  is  the  language  of  the 
grantor.  Hence  it  is  said  that,  in  case  there  are  two  desei-iptions 
in  a  deed  which  are  inconsistent,  the  grantee  is  at  liberty  to  elect 
that  which  is  most  favorable  to  him.^ 

Where  there  are  two  descriptions,  the  one  general  and  the  other 
special,  which  are  repugnant,  the  grantee  may  rely  on  that  which 
is  most  beneficial  to  himself.*  The  argument  for  this  rule  rests 
upon  the  general  proposition  that  the  intention  of  the  parties 
must  prevail,  unless  it  contravenes  some  settled  rule  of  law ;  and 
a  deed  is  to  be  construed  most  beneficially  for  the  grantee  when- 
ever there  is  a  necessity  for  resorting  to  that  maxim. 

419.  But  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  a  grant  from  the 
sovereign.  The  rule  of  construction  applicable  to  public  grants 
is  quite  the  opposite.  Sir  William  Scott  thus  states  the  rule  and 
the  reason  for  it:  "All  grants  of  tiie  crown  are  to  be  strictly 
construed  against  the  grantee,  contrary  to  the  usual  policy  of  the 
law  in  the  consideration  of  grants,  and  upon  this  just  ground: 
that,  the  prerogatives  and  rights  and  emoluments  of  the  crown 
being  conferred  upon  it  for  great  purposes,  and  for  the  public  use, 
it  shall  not  be  intended  that  sucAi  prerogatives,  rights,  and  emolu- 

1  Cox  V.  McGowan  (N.  C),  21  S.  E.  Esty  r.  Baker,  50  Me.  325,  79  Am.  Dec. 
Rep.  108,  per  Avery,  J.,  in  substantially  616  ;  Sharp  u.  Thoni|ison,  100  111.  447,  .39 
li«  words.  In  Carter  v.  White,  101  N.  C.  Am.  Hep.  61  ;  Cottinjiham  v.  Parr,  93  111. 
30,  7  S.  E.  Rep.  473,  the  court  held  that  233;  Cox  v.  McGowan  (N.  C),  21  S.  E. 
the  first  description,  "known  as  Walker's  Rep.  108,  per  Avery,  J. 

Island,"   must    yield   to  a  more  specific  *  Brown  v.  Cranberry  Iron  Co.  59  Fed. 

one,  by  metes  and  bound.s  which  did  not  Rep.  4-34,  437  ;  Winter  v.  White,  70  Md. 

include  the  whole  island.  305,  17  Atl.  Rc]).  84  ;  Hall  v.  Gittinjrs,  2 

2  Rathbun  v.  Gear  (Conn.),  30  Atl.  H.  &  J.  112;  Buchanan  v.  Stewart,  3  H. 
Rep.  60.  &  J.  329 ;  Hager  v.  Spect,  52  Cal.  579 : 

*  Melvin    v.   Proprietors   of    Docks   &     Vance  v.  Fore,  24  Cal.  435. 
Canals,  5  Met.  15,  27,  38  Am.  Dec.  384; 

344 


GENERAL   AND   PARTICULAR   DESCRIPTIONS.  [§  420. 

ments  are  diminished  by  any  grant,  beyond  what  such  grant,  by 
necessary  and  unavoidable  construction,  shall  take  away."  ^ 

420.  Where  property  is  sufficiently  described  as  a  whole, 
the  description  is  not  validated  or  lestricted  by  a  further  general 
reference  or  statement  which  is  inconsistent  with  tlie  description 
as  a  whole.  Thus  a  description  of  property  as  the  grantor's  farm 
or  homestead  on  which  he  resides,  or  on  which  some  other  person 
lives,  is  sutlicient  to  pass  the  farm  or  homestead  so  occupied,  al- 
though some  particular  circumstance  be  added  which  is  inconsis- 
tent with  such  description,  as  for  instance  a  reference  for  boun- 
daries to  a  deed  which  embraced  only  a  part  of  the  farm  or 
homestead; 2  or  a  statement  of  quantity  which  is  much  less  than 
the  whole  f arm  ;  ^  or  even  a  particular  description  by  courses  and 
distances  which  does  not  include  the  whole  farm.*  Where  one 
made  a  deed  of  land  silnate  in  a  town  named,  and  containing  two 
hundred  and  thirty  acres,  more  or  less,  being  "all  the  lands  which 
I  own  in  said  town,  the  butts  and  bounds  to  be  found  in  the 
county  records,"  and  an  examination  of  the  records  showed  that 
the  grantor  owned  by  purchase  two  hundred  and  thirty-five  acres 
of  land  in  that  town,  but  it  appearing  that  he  had  acquired  title 
by  possession  to  another  tract  of  about  fifty  acres,  it  was  held  that 
the  latter  tract  as  well  as  those  of  which  he  had  record  title 
passed  by  his  deed.^  A  grant  of  all  the  grantor's  real  estate 
situated  in  a  town  named  conveys  all  his  land  there  situated.'' 

In  like  manner  a  particular  description  by  metes  and  bounds 
prev;dls  over  a  general  description  of  the  lands  as  being  "  all  "  of 
a  certain  tract,  though  the  particular  description  does  not  cover  all 
the  lands  in  the  tract  named." 

1  The  Kebcckali,  1  C.  Rob.  Adm.  227,  Wis.  96,  12  N.  W.  Rep.  382,  42  Am.  Rep. 

230.     To  the  same  effect,  Charles  River  701. 

Bridge   v.  Warren    Biidge,   11    Pet.   420,  ^  Andrews  r.  Pearson,  68  Me.  19  ;  Jack- 

544-.548 ;  Martin  ('.  Waddell,  16  Pet.  367,  son  v.  Barringer,  15  Johns.  471 ;  Ruther- 

411;    Central  Transp.    Co.   v.   Pnllnian's  ford  t'.  Tracy,  48  Mo.  325,  8  Am.  Rep.  104. 

Palace  Car  Co.  139  U.  S.  24,  49,  11   Snp.  *  Gate  v.  Thayer,  3   Me.  71  ;  Keith  v. 

Ct.  Rep.  478;    Shivcly  /•.  Bowlby,  152  U.  Reynolds,  3  Me.  393;  Lodge  v.   Lee,  6 

S.  1,  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  548,  per  Gray,  J.  Cranch,  237  ;  Union  Ry.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Skin- 

-  Eliot  V.  Thatcher,  2  Met.  44  ;  Thatch-  ner,  9  Mo.  App.  189  ;    Haley  r.  Amestoy, 

cr  ?;.   Ilowland,  2  Met.  41;    Hastings  v.  44Cal.  132. 

Hasting.s,  110  Mass.  280;  Melvin  v.  Pro-  '^  Field  v.  Huston,  21  Me.  69. 

prietors   of   Locks  &  Canals,  5  Met.   15,  '^  Ilobbs  v.  Payson,  85  Me.  498,  27  Atl. 

38  Am.  Dec.  384  ;  Auburn  Cong.  Chtircli  Rep.  519. 

V.   Walker,  124   Mass.   69;  Sherwood  r.  '  Cummings  r.  Black,  65  Vt.  76,  25  Atl. 

WhitinL',  54  Conn.  330,  8  All.    Rep.  80;  Rep.  906;  Spiller  v.  Scribuor,  36  Vt.  245. 

Green  Bay  &  M.  Canal  Co.  v.  Hewett,  55  345 


§§  4-1,  4--.]  DESCRIPTION    AND    HOUNDAKIES. 

421,  lu  like  manner  a  description  of  property  by  a  name 
well  known  and  usually  applied  to  it  prevails  over  a  desciip- 
tion  by  measurement.^  When  the  suhject-nuitter  of  a  conveyance 
is  completely  identified  by  its  name,  the  addition  of  another 
j>aitieular  which  is  inconsistent  will  be  rejected  as  surplusage. 
Thus,  where  land  conveyed  was  described  as  the  "  Mount  Pleas- 
ant Fishery,"  with  the  land  attached  to  the  same,  supposed  to  be 
one  thousand  yards  in  length,  bounded  by  the  brink  or  brow  of 
the  hill  on  one  side  and  by  the  river  on  the  other,  from  one  end 
of  the  beach  to  the  other,  it  was  held  that  only  that  part  of  the 
beach  known  as  the  "Mount  Pleasant  Fishery,"  and  the  land 
necessary  and  convenient  for  using  it,  passed,  there  being  no  cer- 
tain beginning  point.'^ 

422.  The  grant  of  a  house,  a  store,  a  wharf,  a  mill,  or  other 
structure  passes  the  fee  in  the  land  occupied  and  improved  at 
the  time  of  the  grant  for  the  use  or  purpose  designated  ;3  for 
the  grant  of  such  a  structure  necessarily  comprehends  and  aptly 
describes  the  entire  beneficial  occupation  and  enjoyment  of  the 
laud  itself  continuously  and  permanently,  and  clearly  indicates  an 
intent  to  pass  the  grantor's  whole  interest  in  the  soil,^ 

A  conveyance  of  "  a  messuage,"  described  merely  by  metes  and 
bounds,  cannot  be  construed  as  embracing  a  public  burial  ground, 
so  as  to  establish  a  claim  of  adverse  possession  thereto,  though 
the  conveyance  does  not  except  the  burial  ground.  A  parcel  of 
land  so  used  is  no  part  of  a  messuage.^ 

A  reservation  of  "  a  barn  "  includes  a  sheep-shed  connected  with 
it  and  the  barnyard  fenced  and  used  with  it,  and  the  land  cov- 
ered by  these  buildings  and  barnyard.  The  term  "barn"  should 
be  construed  to  include  in  addition  to  the  barn  itself  whatever  is 
connected  with  it,  and  is  essential  to  its  use  and  enjoyment  as  a 
barn.*^ 

1  Haley  v.  Amestoy,  44  Cal.  132;  Mar-  Dec.  238;  Esty  v.  Currier,  98  Mass.  500; 

till  V.  Lloyd,  94   Cal.    19.),    29   Pac.   Rep.  Hatch  ?;.  Brier,  71  Me.  542  ;  Cuuninyliaiu 

491  ;  Vejar  v.  Mound  City  Aaso.  97  Cal.  v.  Webb,  C9  Me.  93  ;  Moulton  v.  Trafion, 

659,  32   Pac.  Rep.  713;   Harkey  v.  Cain,  G4  Me.  218  ;    Pottkanip  v.  Buss  (Cal.),  31 

69  Tex.  146,  6  S.  W.  Rep.  637  ;  I'aroui  v.  Pac.  Rep.  1121. 

Ellison,  14  Nev.  60.  *  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  Co.  w.  Chaiid- 

■^  Scull  V.  Pruden,  92  X.  C.  108.  ler,  9  Allen,  159,  per  Bigelow,  C.  J. 

3  St.   Thomas's    Hospital    v.   Charing  ^  Southampton  v.  Post,  4  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Cross  Ily.  Co.  1  Johns.  &  H.  400  ;  Jamaica  75. 

Pond  Aqueduct  Co.  v.  Chandler,  9  Allen,  «  Cnnnin<;ham   v.  Wchh,  69    Me.   92; 

159;  Allen  v.  Scott,  21   Pick.  25,  32  Am.  Hilton  v.  Oilman,  17  Me.  263. 

346 


GENERAL    AND    PARTICULAR   DESCRIPTIONS.  [§  423. 

423.  A  description  of  a  lot  by  name  or  number,  upon  a  plat 
or  map  referred  to,  onlinarily  prevails  over  a  description  by 
courses  and  distances,  and  over  calls  for  monuments,  or  other  par- 
ticulars used  in  a  description,  for  the  reason  that  the  lot  itself, 
with  the  name  or  number  by  which  it  is  known,  is  the  prominent 
thing,  and  therefoi-e  there  is  less  likelihood  of  uncertainty  in 
regard  to  it  than  in  regard  to  the  particulars  of  the  description, 
which  are  employed  to  identify  more  particularly  the  principal 
thing,  the  lot  itself.^  Thus,  where  a  lot  conveyed  was  described 
by  number  upon  a  recorded  plat,  and  was  also  described  as  being 
sixty  feet  wide  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  feet  deep,  but  the 
lot  on  the  plat  was  only  twenty-six  feet  wide,  it  was  held  that, 
although  the  grantor  owned  the  adjoining  land,  his  deed  con- 
veyed only  tlie  lot  described  by  the  plat,  and  that  the  word  in 
the  deed  describing  the  width  of  the  lot  must  be  rejected  as  falsa 
demonstratio? 

Of  course,  if  there  is  evidence  indicating  an  intention  that  the 
description  by  monuments  or  measurement  shall  prevail  over  the 
general  description  b}^  lot,  this  intention  will  be  enforced.^  If  it 
appears  that  there  is  an  error  in  the  number  of  a  lot,  a  description 
by  definite  boundaries  will  prevail.  This  was  the  case  where 
"  beach  and  water  property  "  was  conveyed  by  definite  exterior 
boundaries,  and  was  further  described  as  blocks  numbered  one  to 
thirty-two  inclusive  on  a  map  referred  to,  but  one  block  within 
such  boundaries  was  numbeied  thirty-three:  it  was  held  that  the 
description  by  boundaries  controlled.* 

A  description  of  land  by  h)t  numbers  is  not  void  though  the 
recorded  plat  shows  no  division  of  it  into  lots,  but  merely  into 
blocks,  if  it  be  shown  that  the  owner  had  always  treated  it  as 
divided  into  lots,  and  it  appears  that  the  property  had  been  con- 
veyed and  generally  known  by  lot  numbers.^ 

1  Masterson  v.  Mtinro  (C:il.),  38  Pac.     W.   Rep.  436;  McAfee  y.  Arliue,  83  Ga. 
Hep.   1106;  O'lleriin  v.  Brooks,  67  Miss.     645,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  441. 
266,6  So.  Rep.  844;   Maf;uuii  r.  Lapham,         2  Arambula  v.  Sullivan,  80  Tex.  61.5, 
21    Pick.    13.5;    Rutherford   v.   Tracy,  48      16  S.  W.  Rep.  436. 

Mo.  320,  8  Am.  Rep.   104;   Union   Ry.  &         -^  Arambula  v.  Sullivan,  80   Tex.  615, 
T.  Co.  V.  Skinner,  9  Mo.  App.  189;  Nash     16  S.  W.  Rep.  436,  explainiu},^  Sikcs  v. 
V.  Wilmin<j;ton,  &c.  R.  Co.  67   N.  C.  413,     Showers,   74    Ala.   382  ;   Worthiiigton   v. 
416;  Ambst;.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.&O.  Ry.     Ilylyer,  4  Ma.ss.  196. 
Co.  44  Minn.  266,  46   N.   W.  Rep.   321  ;         *  Friedman  v.  Nelson,  53  Cal.  589. 
Arambula  v.  Sullivan,  80  Tex.  015,  10  S.         ^  Marvin  v.  Elliott,  99  Mo.  616,  12  S. 

\V.  Rep.  899. 

347 


§  ^24.J 


DESCRirriON    AND    HUUNDAIUES. 


VI.  References  to  3Iaps  (Did  Surveys. 
424.  The  effect  of  a  reference  to  a  plan,  map,  or  plat  of  the 
land,  wliether  this  be  recorded  or  not,  is  to  incorporate  it  in  the 
deeil.^  A  reference  to  a  survey,  whether  this  be  delineated  on  a 
plat  or  not,  makes  it  a  part  of  tlie  deed,  and  both  must  be  con- 
strued together.^  The  boundaries,  monuments,  courses,  and  dis- 
tances laid  down  on  a  map  referred  to  are  as  much  to  be  regaidod 
the  true  descriptions  of  the  land  as  if  they  were  expressly  recited 
in  the  deed."'^  If  the  plat  or  survey  enables  a  surveyor  to  locate 
the  boundary  lines  with  certainty,  a  reference  to  this  is  in  itself 
a  sufficient  description.^     A  reference  to  the  6eld-notes  of  a  sur- 


1  Jefferis  v.  East  Omaha  Land  Co.  134 
U.  S.  178;  Noonan  i'.  Lee,  2  Black,  499  ; 
Deery  v.  Cray,  10  WaU.  263.  California  : 
Chapman  v.  Polack,  70  Cal.  487,  11  Pac. 
Rep.  764  ;  Hudson  v.  Irwin,  .50  Cal.  450  ; 
Penry  v.  Richards,  52  Cal.  496;  Vance?;. 
Pore,  24  Cal.  435 ;  Powers  v.  Jackson,  50 
Cal.  429 ;  Spauldin;;  ;;.  Bradley,  79  Cal. 
449,  22  Pac.  Rep.  47.  Florida :  Andrea 
v.  Watkins,  26  Pla.  390,  7  So.  Rep.  876. 
Georgia:  Sears  v.  King,  91  Ga.  577, 18  S. 
E.  Rep.  830.  Illinois:  Piper  v.  Connelly, 
108  111.646.  Indiana:  Brophy  v.  Riche- 
sou  (Ind  ),  36  N.  E.  Rep.  424,  427.  Kan- 
sas :  Miller  v.  Land  Co.  44  Kans.  354,  24 
Pac.  Rep.  420.  Maine :  Kennebec  Pur- 
chase Co.  V.  Titfany,  1  Me.  219,  10  Am. 
Dec.  60;  Thomas  v.  Patten,  13  Me.  329; 
Erskine  v.  Moulton,  66  Me.  27f> ;  Line'oln 
V.  Wilder,  29  Me.  169.  Massachusetts: 
Walker  v.  Boynton,  120  Mass.  349;  Bos- 
ton Water  Power  Co.  v.  Boston,  127  Mass. 
374;  Morse  v.  Holers,  118  Mass.  572; 
Wliitman  v.  Boston  &  Me.  R.  Co.  3  Allen, 
133;  Chaffin  u.  Chaffin,  4  Gray,  280;  Al- 
len v.  Bates,  6  Pick.  460;  Foss  v.  Crisp, 
20  Pick.  121  ;  Majroun  r.  Lapham,  21 
Pick.  135;  Davis  v.  Rain.sford,  17  Mass. 
207.  Michigan :  Nichols  v.  New  Eny;. 
P'urniture  Co.  100  Micii.  2.30,  59  N.  W. 
Rep.  155;  Heffelman  v.  Otsejro  Water 
Power  Co.  78  Mich.  121,  43  N.  W.  Rep. 
1096,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  1151  ;  Wiley  v. 
Lovely,  46  Mich.  83,  8  N.  W.  Rep.  716; 
348 


Quinrim  v.  Rciniers,  46  Mich.  605,  10  N. 
W.  Rep.  35.  Minnesota  :  Borer  v.  Lange, 
44  Minn.  281,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  358;  San- 
born V.  Mueller,  38  Minn.  27,  35  N.  W. 
Rep.  666  ;  Coks  v.  Yoiks,  36  Minn.  388, 
31  N.  W.  Rep.  333  ;  Nicolin  v.  Schneider- 
han,  37  Minn.  63,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  33  ;  Reed 
V.  Laniniel,  28  Minn.  306,  9  N.  W.  Rep. 
858.  Missouri:  Whitehead  y.  Ragan,  106 
Mo.  231,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  307;  Dolde  v. 
Vodi -ka,  49  Mo.  98  ;  Shclton  v.  Maupin, 
16  Mo.  124;  St.  Louis  v.  Mi.-.souri  Pac. 
My.  Co.  114  Mo.  13,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  202. 
North  Carolina  :  Davidson  v.  Arledge,  88 
N.  C.  326,  97  N.  C.  172,  2  S.  E,  Rep.  378. 
Pennsylvania:  Birmingham  v.  Anderson, 
48  Pa.  St.  253.  Wisconsin :  Shnfe'dt  v. 
Spaulding,  37  Wis.  662  ;  Burbach  v. 
Schweinler,  56  Wis.  386,  14  N.  W.  Rep. 
449. 

^  Heffelman  v.  Otsego  Water  Power 
Co.  78  Mich.  121,  43  N.  W.  Rep.  1096, 
44  N.  W.  Rep.  1151  ;  Hudson  v.  Irwin,  .50 
Cal.  450;  Serrano  v.  Rawson,  47  Cal.  52  ; 
Black  V.  Sprague,  54  Cal.  266. 

*  Davis  I'.  Rainsford,  17  Ma.ss.  207; 
Grand  June.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  County  Com- 
missioners, 14  Gray,  553;  Cunningham 
V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  153  Ma.ss.  506, 
27  N.  E.  Rep.  660 ;  Er.skine  v.  Moulton, 
66  Me.  276  ;  Ambrose  i;.  Raley,  58  111. 
506. 

*  St.  Louis  V.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  15 
Mo.  App.  227. 


REFERENCES   TO   MAPS   AND    SURVEYS.       [§§  425,  426. 

"vey  for  a  description  of  the  land  renders  such  notes  admissible  in 
evidence  to  show  the  location  of  the  land.^ 

When  lands  are  granted  according  to  an  official  plat  of  a  sur- 
vey, the  plat  itself,  with  all  its  notes,  lines,  descriptions,  and 
landmarks,  becomes  as  much  a  part  of  the  grant  or  deed  by 
which  tliey  are  conveyed,  and  controls  so  far  as  limits  are  con- 
cerned, as  if  such  descriptive  features  were  written  out  upon  the 
face  of  the  deed  or  the  grant  itself.^ 

425.  An  unrecorded  plan  or  plat  which  is  referred  to  in  a 
deed  may  be  identified  by  parol  evidence  ;  ^  and  as  against  the 
grantor  and  his  privies  it  is  a  sufficient  identification  to  show  that 
he  exhibited  it  as  the  plat  referred  to."* 

Although  a  map  or  plat  may  be  identified  by  parol  evidence,^ 
in  order  to  avoid  questions  as  to  identity  it  is  desirable  that  the 
map  or  plat  should  be  annexed  to  or  indorsed  upon  the  deed,  if 
it  is  not  already  recorded.  Plans  made  at  the  time  of  a  convey- 
ance are  usually  recorded  with  it,  and  the  deed  should  then  refer 
to  the  plan  and  state  that  it  is  to  be  recorded  therewith.  But 
even  then  there  is  a  chance  that  the  question  of  identity  may  be 
raised  if  the  plan  is  not  annexed  to  or  indorsed  upon  the  deed. 

426.  A  map  or  diagram  drawn  on  a  deed,  in  such  relation 
to  or  connection  with  the  descriptive  words  of  the  deed  as  to 
indicate  to  any  reasonable  person  that  the  grantor  intended  it  to 
be  taken  as  a  part  of  the  description,  is  admissible  in  evidence  as 
a  purt  of  the  deed  when  that  is  admitted  in  evidence,  although 
not  referred  to  in  the  deed  itself.  "  When  the  map  is  on  the 
deed  itself,  the  court  of  necessity  must  examine  it,  and  from  it, 
taken  together  with  the  words  of  description,  determine  what  the 
deed  conveys."  ^  But  it  has  been  held  that  a  plan  or  map  attached 
to  a  deed,  but  not  referred  to  in  it,  cannot  be  used  to  explain  it.'^ 

1  Irvin  I'.  Bevil,  80  Tex.  332,  16  S.  W.  N.  W.  Rep.   358;    Hicklin    v.   McClear, 

Rep.  21  ;  Norton  v.  Conner  (Tex.),  14  S.  18  Oreg.  126,  22  Rac.  Rep.  1057;  Penry 

Vf.  Rep.  193;   Nye    v.  Moody,   70   Tex.  y.  Riclianli',  52  Cal.  496. 

434,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  606.  *  Redd   v.  Murry,  95  Cal.  48,  30  Pac. 

-  CrMgin  V.   Powell,    128  U.   S.   691,  9  Rep    132,  24  Pac.  Rep.  841. 

Sup.  Ct.   Rep.   203;   Woods  r.    West,  40  ^  Penry  r.  Richards,  52  Cal.  496 ;  Redd 

Neh.  307,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  938  ;  Whitney  v.  v.  Murry,  95  Cal.  48,30  Pac.  Rep.  132,  24 

Lumber  Co.  78  Wis.  240,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  Pac.  Rep.  841. 

425;  Jefferis  v.  Land  Co.   134  U.  S.  178,  "^  Murray  v.  Klinzing,  64  Conn.  78,  29 

10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  518.  Atl.  Rep.  244. 

s  Ilo.lges  1-.  Horsfiill,  1  Riiss.  &  Mylne,  "  Wyse  v.  Leahy,  Ir.  R.  9,  C.  L.  384. 
IIG;  Borer  t-.   Langc,  -!4   Minn.  281,  46 

349 


§§  427,  428.]  DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 

427.  Even  if  the  deed  does  not  expressly  refer  to  a  recorded 
plat  of  the  land  and  make  it  a  jxivt  of  the  description,  still,  if  the 
only  way  of  making  out  the  description  and  identifying  the  land 
is  by  means  of  the  plat,  it  may  properly  be  supposed  that  the 
parties  contracted  with  reference  to  the  plat,  aiul  this  may  be 
looked  to  as  a  part  of  the  dcsci'iption.^  Tlius,  where  one  granted 
two  lots,  each  sixty  feet  wide,  in  a  certain  block  owned  and  laid 
out  by  the  grantor,  a  plat  of  which  he  had  tiled  in  the  county 
clerk's  office,  according  to  which  the  block  contained  a  large  num- 
ber of  lots,  all  of  which  win-e  twenty-six  feet  wide,  it  Was  held 
that  the  words  describing  the  width  of  the  lot  must  be  rejected 
a,s  falsa  demonstratio,  and  that,  in  the  absence  of  competent  proof 
to  the  contrary,  the  parties  must  be  presumed  to  have  contracted 
with  reference  to  the  real  condition  of  the  property.^ 

A  plat  of  the  land  made  for  the  grantor,  but  not  shown  to 
the  grantee  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  or  before,  and  nt)t  re- 
ferred to  in  the  deed,  is  inadmissible  to  control  the  boundaries 
as  described  by  the  deed.-^ 

428.  The  loss  of  a  plat  referred  to  in  a  deed  does  not  invali- 
date the  deed  if  the  land  can  be  laid  out  upon  the  ground  in 
substantial  accordance  with  the  plan.*  A  plat  referred  to  as 
annexed  to  a  deed,  though  it  has  become  sepai^ated  from  it,  may 
be  identified  as  the  plat  annexed,  and  it  is  then  admissible  in  evi- 
dence.°     A  reference  in  a  deed  to  a  plat  is  evidence  as  against  the 


1  Arambula  v.  Sullivan,  80  Tex.  615, 
16  S.  W.  Rep.  436;  Redmond  v.  Mullo- 
nax,  113  N.  C.  505,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  708; 
Burbach  v.  Schweinler,  56  Wis.  386,  14 
N.  W.  Rep.  449 ;  Sheppiird  r.  Wilmott, 
79  Wi.s.  15,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  1054  ;  Elliott 
v.  Gibson  (Ky.),  29  S.  W.  Rep.  620;  ILin- 
lon  V.  Uniou  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Neb.)  58  N. 
W.  Rep.  590. 

2  Arambula  ;•.  Sullivan,  80  Tex.  f.15, 
16  S.  W.  Rep.  436.  Marr,  J.,  said  :  "  The 
language  of  this  description  indicates  that 
the  dominant  idea  in  the  mind  of  the 
grantor,  when  the  deeds  were  made,  was 
of  lots  Nos.  1  and  2,  in  block  No.  2,  as  a 
whole,  and  as  they  had  really  been  estab- 
lished in  his  addition,  and  not  the  partic- 
ular lines  by  which  they  might  be  de- 
scribed otherwise."     See,  also,  Haley  v. 

350 


Amestoy,  44  Cal.  132  ;  Wade  v.  Deray,  50 
Cal.  376. 

3  Hall  V.  Eaton,  139  Mass.  217,  29  N. 
E.  Rep.  660. 

■*  New  Hampshire  Land  Co.  v.  Tilton, 
19  Fed.  Rep.  73.  In  Hicklin  v.  McClear, 
18  Oreg.  126,  22  Pac.  Rep.  1057,  it  was 
held,  in  an  action  involving  the  title  to  cer- 
tain town  lots,  that  the  facts  relating  to 
platting  of  the  town  site  by  the  proprietors, 
their  dedication  of  the  streets  and  alleys 
by  conveying  lots  therein,  the  existence  of 
the  two  plats,  and  their  similitude  in  fact, 
were  admissible  in  evidence  to  identify  the 
property  then  in  controversy.  See  Sperry 
V.  Wesco  (Oreg.),  38  Pac.  Rep.  623. 

5  McCullough  V.  Wall,  4  Rich.  (S.  C.) 
68,  53  Am.  Dec.  715. 


REFERENCES   TO   MAPS   AND   SURVEYS.       [§§  429,  430. 

grantor  of  the  existence  of  such  a  plat ;  and  evidence  tending  to 
show  a  survey  of  the  town  prior  to  the  conveyance,  and  that  the 
grantor  produced  the  plat  in  question  some  years  afterwards  as 
such  plat,  is  sufficient  to  identify  it  as  that  mentioned  in  the 
deed.^ 

429.  If  a  plat  referred  to  for  the  description  of  the  parcels 
be  imperfect  or  incomplete,  the  description  will  nevertheless  be 
sufficient  to  pass  the  title,  if  the  parcels  intended  to  be  conveyeil 
are  known  to  the  parties,  and  are  susceptible  of  identification 
according  to  the  actual  survey  on  the  ground.-  A  description  of 
land  as  a  numbered  lot  or  block  on  a  certain  plat  is  sufficiently 
definite,  although  the  plat  on  its  face  furnishes  no  data  for  locat- 
ing the  lot  or  block,  if  with  the  aid  of  parol  evidence  the  land 
can  be  identified.'^  Though  the  plat  be  referred  to  as  recorded, 
when  in  fact  it  was  not  recorded,  the  grant  is  not  therefore  inval- 
idated, but  the  unrecorded  plat  may  be  used  to  identify  the  parcel, 
or  this  may  be  identified  by  parol  evidence.*  The  statement  that 
the  plat  referred  to  is  recorded,  when  it  is  not,  will  be  rejected 
'ds  falsa  demonstratio. 

Evidence  that  the  recorded  plat  referred  to  in  a  deed  differs 
from  the  original  plat  should  not  be  received.  If  there  is  any 
error  or  mistake  in  the  reference,  the  deed  should  be  reformed 
in  equity.^ 

Where  a  description  refers  to  a  map,  and  also  to  monuments  at 
the  corners  of  the  lot,  parol  testimony  is  admissible  to  show  that 
the  map  is  inaccurate,  and  was  compiled  from  other  maps  without 
an  actual  survey,  and  that  the  land  which  the  grantor  intended 
to  sell,  and  the  grantee  to  buy,  was  that  staked  off  and  located 
by  the  survey.*^ 

430.  The  fact  that  the  plat  referred  to  is  invalid,  because 
not  made  and  filed  in  accordance  with  statutory  provisions, 
does  not  affect  the  deed.  A  reference  to  a  void  deed,  or  a  void 
plat,  for  a  description,  is  just  as  effectual  as  a  reference  to  a  valid 

'   Redd  V.  Murry,  95  Cal.  48,  24  Pac.  3  i>edd  v.   Miirry,  95   Cal.  48,  30  J'ac. 

Rep.  841,  30  Pac.  Rep.  1.32.  Rep.  132. 

-  Noonan  v.  Lee,  2  Black,  499;  Borer  *  Johnstone   v.  Scott,    11    Mich.    232; 

I'.  Lange,  44   Minn.  281,  4G  N.  W.  Rep.  Wiley  v.  Lovely,  46  Mich.  83,  8  N.  W. 

358;   Wiley  v.  Lovely,  40  Mich.  83,  8  N.  Rep.  716. 

W.  Rep.  716;  Corbett  i>.  Noicross,  35  N.  ''  Jones  r.  Johiuston,  18  How.  1.50. 

n.  99.  "  Cleveland    v.  Choate,  77  Cal.  73,  18 

Pac.  Rep  875. 

351 


§  4;u.] 


DKSCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIKS. 


doi'il  or  vmUcI  j>lat,  if  tlic  description  is  correct  and  the  deed  or  plat 
rrft'iriHl  to  is  aeci^ssihli'.^ 

Miips  or  j)lans  tiiat  have  been  in  use  many  years,  and  agree 
with  the  original  surveys,  are  not  to  be  held  erroneous  because 
thi'V  di>  not  a^ree  witli  resurveys  made  k)no' afterwards,  and  based 
upon  infornnition  furnished  l)y  persons  living."-^ 

431.  "When  there  is  a  conflict  between  a  map  or  plat  and 
an  actual  survey  the  latter  controls,  and  the  reference  to  the 
map  may  be  rejected  as  surphisage.'^  This  is  true  though  the  map 
be  the  official  map  of  a  town.  Of  course  this  is  upon  the  sup[)o- 
sition  that  the  corners  and  lines  established  by  the  survey  can  be 
identified.'^  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  there  is  a 
conflict  between  the  survey  in  the  field  from  which  the  map  was 
made  and  the  map  itself,  in  order  to  determine  the  correct  boun- 
dary of  a  parcel.'^ 

A  call  in  a  deed  for  a  natural  boundary,  like  a  lake,  controls 
the  grant  as  against  a  plat  annexed  and  referred  to  upon  which 
the  lake  does  not  appear.^ 

The  lines  of  a  survey  marked  on  the  ground  constitute  the 
actual  survey  and  control  courses.^  They  control  a  general  de- 
scription of  a  boundary,  as  "  up  the  bayou."  ^ 

Where  tliere  is  a  variance  between  the  plat  and  the  field-notes 
of  the  original  survey  of  public  lands,  the  former  must  control, 
since  it  represents  the  lines  and  corners  as  fixed  by  the  surveyor- 
general,  and  by  which  the  land  was  sold.^ 


1  Yonnp:  V.  Cosgrove,  83  Iowa,  682,  49 
N.  W.  Rep.  1040;  Nicliols  v.  New  Eng. 
Furniture  Co.  100  Mich.  230,  59  N.  W. 
Rep.  1.55;  Brewington  ?;.  Jenkins,  85  Mo. 
57 ;  Cottingham  v.  Seward  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  25  S.  W.  Rep.  797. 


16    Johns.    257  ;    Jackson    v.    Freer,    17 
Johns.  31. 

«  O'Farrel  v.  Harney,  51  Cal.  125. 

6  O'Farrel  v.  Harney,  51  Cal.  125. 

^  Literary  Fund  v.  Clark,  9  Ired.  58. 

'   Riddleshurg  Iron,  &c.  Co.  v.  Rogers, 


^  Mi:Combs  V.  Sheldon  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),     65  Pa.  St.  416  ;  Hall  v.  Tanner,  4  Pa.  St. 


26  S.  W.  Rep.  1114. 


244,  45  Am.   Dec.  686 ;  Quinn  v.  Heart, 


3  Cleveland  v.  Choate,  77  Cal.    73,  18     43  Pa.   St.  337  ;  Bean   v.   Bachelder,  78 


Pac.  Rep.  875 ;  O'Farrel  v.  Harney,  51 
Cal.  125  ;  Penry  v.  Richards,  52  Cal.  496  ; 
Whiting  V.  Gardner,  80  Cal.  78,  22  Pac. 
Rep.  71  ;  Racine  v.  Case  Plow  Co.  56 
Wis.  539, 14  N.  W.  Rep.  599  ;  Koenigs  v. 


Me.    184,   3   All.    Rep.   279;    Heaton   i;. 
Hodges,  14  Me.  66,  30  Am.  Dec.  731. 

^  Lutcher,  &c.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Hart 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  94,  re- 
ferred to  and  distinguished  from  Bland 


Jung,  73  Wis.  178,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  801  ;  v.  Smith  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep. 

Mansh   v.   Mitchell,   25   Wis.  706  ;  Brad-  773. 

street  v.  Dunham,  65  Iowa,  248,250,  21  N.         ^  Beaty  v.  Robertson,   130  Ind.  589,  30 

W.  Rep.  592;  Root  y.  Cincinnati,  87  Iowa,  N.  E.   Rep.  706  ;   Doe?;.  Hildreth,  2  Ind. 


202,  54  N.  W,  Rep.  200 ;  Jackson  v.  Cole, 

352 


274;  Chapman  r.  Polack,  70  Cal.  487,  11 


REFERENCES   TO   MAPS   AND   SURVEYS.  [§  432. 

Ill  construing  a  deed  describing  land  by  the  government  survey 
the  court  nsust  ascertain  the  corners  of  the  survey  as  actually 
established,  and  not  as  they  ought  to  have  been  established.  The 
presuuipnon  is  that  the  deed  was  intended  to  convey  according  to 
the  established  corners.  This  presumption  may  be  rebutted  by 
evidence  that  the  parties  were  mistaken  as  to  the  locution  of  the 
government  line,  and  intended  to  convey  a  definite  tract.  But 
this  presumption  is  by  no  means  conclusive  ;  and,  while  parol  evi- 
dence will  not  be  admitted  to  dispute  the  written  contract,  it  may 
be  admitted  to  explain  it,  and  to  show  the  understanding  of  the 
parties.^ 

432.  Where  a  plat  delineates  an  actual  survey,  the  survey- 
rather  than  the  plat  fixes  the  location  and  the  boundaries  of 
the  land.  The  plat  is  a  picture,  the  survey  the  substance.  In  a 
convevance  referring  to  such  plat,  the  lot  bounded  by  the  lines 
actually  run  upon  the  ground  is  the  lot  intended  to  be  conveyed. 
The  plat  may  be  all  wrong,  but  that  does  not  matter  if  the  ac- 
tual survey  can  be  shown.^  A  boundary  by  a  street  which  has 
been  surveyed  and  marked  by  visible  monuments  prevails  as 
against  a  plat  which  varies  the  location  of  the  street.  The  line 
of  the  street  is  determined  by  the  survey  rather  than  by  the  re- 
corded plat.  The  courses  and  distances  of  a  survey  are  always 
regarded  as  more  or  less  uncertain,  and  always  give  place,  in  cases 
of  doubt  or  discrepancy,  to  known  monuments  and  boundaries 
referred  to  as  identifying  the  land,  whether  such  monuments  be 
natural  or  artificial  objects,  such  as  rivers,  streams,  springs,  stakes, 
marked  trees,  fences,  or  buildings.^ 

Pac.  Rep.  764;  Cornett  v.  Dixon  (Ky.),  125;    Penry  v.   Richards,  52    Cal.    496; 

11  S.  W.  Rep.  660.     In  Vance  v.   Fore,  Smith  v.  Boone,  84  Tex.  526,  19  S.  W. 

24  Cal.  435,  it  was  said  :  "  The  map  may  Rep.  702  ;   Graham   v.   Dewecs,   85   Ttx. 

be   regarded    as    a   dacuerreotype    of  the  .395,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  127  ;  Root  v.  Ciiicin- 

land  which  the  grantor  intended   to  con-  nati,  87   Iowa,  202,  54   N.  W.   Rep.  206  ; 

vev."  Bradstreet  v.  Dunham,  65  Iowa,  248,  21 

'   Squire  r.  Greer,   2    Wash.  St.  209,  26  N.   W.  Rep.  592  ;   Wliitebead  v.   Ra^an, 

Pac.  Rep.  222.  106  Mo.  235,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  307  ;  Kroncu- 

2  Bean   v.   Bachelder,   78    Me.    184,   3  herger  v.  Iloffncr,  44  Mo.  185;  Dolde  v. 

Atl.  Rep.  279  ;  Esmond  v.  Tarbox,  7  Me.  Vodicka,  49  Mo.  98. 

61,  20  Am.   Dec.  346;  Pike  v.  Dyke,  2  »  IIi;rneras  i\  United  States,  5  Wall.  827; 

Me.  213;   Williams  v.  Spauidinff,  29  Me.  United   States   v.  Sutter,  21    How.  170; 

112;  Burkhoidir   v.  Markley,  98   Pa.  St.  Cirier  v.  Penn.  Coal  Co.  128   Pa.  St.  79, 

37  ;  Riddlesbnrs  Iron,  &c.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  18  Atl.  Rep.  480;  Wolfe  y.  Scarborouffh,  2 

€5  Pa.  St.   416;    Marsh    v.    Mitchell,  2.")  Ohio  St.  361 ;  Ilallett  y.  Hunt,  7  Ala.  882 ; 
Wis.    706;  O'Farrel    v.    Harney,  51    Cal. 

VOL.  I.  '  353 


§  433.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND   BOUNDARIES. 


A  vofert'iice  in  a  deed  to  a  patent  of  i\\v  United  States  of 
tlie  same  land  makes  the  patent  and  tiie  survey  upon  which  the 
patent  was  issued  a  part  of  the  deed.^ 

A  survey  incorporated  into  a  deed  by  reference  eontrols  a  ih- 
scription  by  courses  and  boundary  lines  of  other  land.'-^ 

Tlie  testimony  of  an  experienced  surveyor  familiar  with  the  lt.nd 
that  he  had  surveyed  it  many  years  ago,  and  found  it  to  corre- 
spond with  certain  maps  then  in  existence,  and  his  further  testi- 
mony by  the  aid  of  those  maps  that  the  line  was  straight,  instead 
of  containing  a  jog  as  claimed  by  one  of  the  parties,  is  admissible 
although  such  maps  were  not  shown  to  be  authentic.^ 

433.  The  original  field-notes  and  plats  of  a  survey  are  ad- 
missible to  identify  the  land,  or  to  remove  doubts  as  to  the  de- 
scription, without  any  reference  being  made  to  tlieni  in  the  deed.^ 
In  a  case  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Mr. 
Justice  Bradley  said  :  "  If  we  had  any  hesitation  on  the  aduiissi- 
bility  of  such  evidence  as  a  general  question,  we  should  be  hugely 
influenced  in  the  present  case  by  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  State.  ...  In  this  country  a  liberal  rule  on  the 
sul)ject  has  been  adopted  in  most  of  tlie  States."  ^ 

The  boundaries  of  a  survey  may  be  located  by  surrounding  sur- 
veys referred  to  in  its  field-notes,  though  its  corners  and  lines 
cannot  be  found  on  the  ground,  and  though  there  is  a  discrep- 
ancy in  its  area  between  the  field-notes  and  its  boundaries  as  so 
loc-^.ted.*^ 


Bland  v.  Smith  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S. 
VV.  Rep.  773. 

1  Miller  v.  Topeka  Land  Co.  44  Kans. 
354,  24  Pac.  Rep.  420  ;  Davidson  v.  Ar- 
ledfje,  88  N.  C.  326  ;  Powers  v.  Jackson, 
.50  Cal.  429 ;  Tarpeuninj,'  v.  Cannon,  28 
Kans.  66.5. 

-  Hudson  V.  Irwin,  50  Cal.  450. 

'  Wineman  v.  Grummond,  90  Mich. 
280,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  509.  And  see  Bur- 
dill  V.  Taylor,  89  Cal.  613,  26  Pac.  Rep. 
1094. 

*  Ayers  v.  Watson,  137  U.  S.  584.  11 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  201  ;  Peterson  ;;.  Skjclver 
(Neh.),62  N.  W.  Rep. 43  ;  Ratliff  v.  Burle- 
son  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  1003; 
Cook  V.  Dennis,  61  Tex.  246  ;  Stanus  v. 
Smith  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W.  Rep. 
354 


262  ;  Boon  v.  Hunter,  62  Tex.  582 ;  Wil- 
liams V.  Win-slow,  84  Tex.  371,  19  S.  W. 
Rep.  513  ;  Turner  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
112  Mo.  542,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  673  ;  Hanson 
V.  Red  Rock  (S.  D.),  57  N.  W.  Rej).  11  ; 
Offilvie  V.  Copeland,  145  III.  98,  33  N.  E. 
Rep.  1085  ;  Morrison  v.  Neff,  18  Ngb.  133; 
Disney  y.  Coal  Creek  Min.  Co.  11  Len, 
607.  A  photoffraphic  cotiy  of  the  field- 
notes  of  a  snrvev  is  admissible  as  bearinj: 
on  the  question  whether  a  certain  line  was 
actually  menstired.  Ayers  v.  Harris,  77 
Tex.  108,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  768. 

5  Avers  v.  Watson,  137  U.  S.  584,  11 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  201. 

6  Lon^roria  v.  Shacffer,  77  Tex.  547,  14 
S.  W.  Rep.  160;  Standlee  r.  Burkitt,  78 
Tex.  616,  US.  W.  Rep.  1040. 


REFERENCES   TO   MAPS   AND   SURVEYS.       [§§  434,  435. 

Where  tlic  boundaries  of  a  survey  cannot  be  located  by  its  own 
calls  and  field-notes,  they  may  be  established  by  the  field-notes  of 
adjacent  surveys.^  Where  a  junior  survey  was  not  made  on  the 
ground,  and  the  calls  are  for  the  surrounding  surveys,  the  lines  of 
such  survey's  will  be  the  lines  of  the  junior  survey.^ 

434.  If  the  field-notes  of  a  survey  are  inconsistent  or  un- 
certain, the  true  location  of  the  survey  may  be  sho"wn  by  the 
testimony  of  the  surveyor  who  made  it.-^  A  plat  made  by 
such  surveyor  may  be  admitted  in  evidence  to  explain  and  illus- 
trate his  testimony  in  regard  to  the  lines  and  measurements  he 
has  made.*  The  surveyor  may  use  such  map  in  explaining  his 
testimony,  which  would  not  be  clearly  intelligible  without  it, 
though  the  plat  is  not  shown  to  be  correct  or  ofiicial.^ 

But  if  it  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  field-notes  that  thei'e  is 
a  mistake  in  them,  it  is  not  competent  for  a  witness  to  state  that 
there  is  such  a  mistake.^  This  must  be  determined  from  the 
paper  itself. 

Where  objects,  natural  or  artificial,  are  called  for  in  the  field- 
notes  of  official  surveyors,  the  presumption  is  that  such  objects 
actually  existed'  at  the  places  indicated  by  the  field-notes.^  If, 
however,  the  survey  was  a  mere  chamber  survey,  the  calls  for 
such  objects  affor:l  but  slight  evidence  of  their  existence.^ 

435.  A  corner  or  boundary  well  established  by  marks  or 
monuments  controls  a  description  by  a  map  or  plat  or  survey, 
although  this  was  made  contemporaneously  with  the  grant.  The 
map  or  p\a.t  made  by  the  surveyor  is  admissible  in  evidence  as 
indicating  the  location  of  the  survey,  but  at  last  the  question  of 
boundary  is  one  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  the  force  and  cliar- 
acter  of  the  testimony.  Looking  at  the  evidence  in  this  way,  the 
conclusion  whicli  is  the  most  reasonable  and  satisfactory  is  the 
one  to  be  adopted.!*^ 

1  Adair  v.  White  (Cal),  34   Pac.  Rep.     Rep.  168;  Gunn  v.  Harris,  88  Ga.  439,14 
338.  S.  E.  Rep.  593. 

2  Kuechler  i-.  Wilson,  82  Tex.  638,  18         «  Coleman  v.  Smith,  55  Tex.  254. 

S.  W.  Rep.  317.  '  Kuechler  v.  Wilson,  82  Tex.  638,  18 

=  Schley   v.   Blum,  85  Tex.  551,  22   S.  S.  W.  Rep.  317. 

W.  Rep.   264;  Gunn   v.  Harris,   88    Ga.  «  Cadeau  v.  Elliott,  7   Wash.   205,   34 

439,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  593.  Pac.  Rep.  916. 

*  Golilsbornuiih  v.   Pidduck,   87   Iowa,  ^  Pruner  v.  Brisbin,  98  Pa.  St.  202. 

599,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  431.  i^  Withers  v.  Connor,  76  Tex.  185,  13 

5  Griffith  V.  Rife,  72  Tex.  185,  12  S.  W.  S.  W.  Hep.  743,  per  Collard,  J. ;   Welder 

355 


§  4oC).]  DESCKII'TION    AND    HOUNUAKIl!:S. 

Where  two  corners  of  ;i  survey  can  be  deliiiitely  identified,  the 
courses  and  distances  may  be  ascertaiutHl  I'loiii  the  field-notes,  and 
the  entire  survey  constructed  therefrom  ;  and  in  sucli  case  the 
distance  and  (Quantity  must  yield  to  course. ^ 

Where  the  monuments  of  the  original  survey  of  a  town  site 
have  been  destroyed,  the  descriptive  words  in  a  plat  of  the  town 
site  are  controlliuir  as  to  the  location  of  the  town  site.'-^ 

Though  the  survey  be  an  official  one,  if  the  surveyors  were  di- 
rected to  establish  a  beginning  corner,  and  then  confine  them- 
selves to  strict  courses  and  distances,  inasmuch  as  such  a  direction 
adopts  the  most  unreliable  indicia  of  location  and  boundaries 
known  to  conveyancers,  the  courts,  in  locating  these  surveys,  will 
resort  to  every  kind  of  evidence  that  is  competent  to  establish  a 
disputed  boundary.'^ 

A  section  corner  of  a  government  survey,  when  shown  with  cer- 
tainty, must  control  even  though  it  is  in  a  different  place  from 
that  given  in  the  field-noLes  and  plat.* 

43o.  Where  adjoining  owners  have  entered  into  posses- 
sion of  land  according  to  boundaries  marked  by  stakes,  these 
are  monun\ents  which  prevail  over  the  courses  and  distances  of  a 
subsequent  corrected  survey.^  Subsequent  surveys  may  aid  in 
finding  lost  corners ;  but  where  the  old  and  recognized  corners  are 
well  known,  these  must  control.'^ 

If  a  purchaser  takes  possession  of  the  land  and  fences  it  soon 
after  the  making  of  a  survey,  and  tlie  person  who  made  the  plat 
pointed  out  the  bounds,  it  is  presumed  that  his  possession  was 
taken  according  to  the  lines  of  the  actual  survey.''  It  is  also  com- 
petent to  establish  the  lines  and  courses  of  a  tract  of  land  by  show- 
ing where  the  surveyor  actually  ran  when  making  the  survey  at 

r.  Carroll,  29  Tex.  317;  New  York  Land  ^  Yard  v.  Ocean  Beach,  49  N.  J.   Eq. 

Co.   V.  Thomson,  83  Tex.  169,  17  S.  W.  306,  24  Atl.  Rep.  729;  Scott  c.  Yard,  46 

Rep.  920 ;  Montague  Co.  v.  Clay  Co.  Land  N.  J.  Eq.  79,  88,  18  Atl.  Rep.  359. 

Co.  80  Tex  392,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  902 ;  Blei-  *  Peterson  v.  Skjelver  (Neb.),  62  N.  W. 

dorn   V.  Pilot   Mt.  M.  Co.  89   Tenn.  166,  Rep.  43  ;  Woods  v.  West,  40  Neb.  307,  58 

204,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  737  ;  Riley  v.  Griffin,  "  N.  W.  Rep.  938  ;  Thompson  v.  Harris,  40 

16   Ga.  141  ;  Jacobs  v.  Moseley,   91    Mo.  Neb.  2.30,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  712. 

457,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  135;  Reed   v.  Marsh,  8  ■"'  Jones  v.  Poiuidstoue,    102    Mo.    240, 

Ohio,  147.  14  S.  W.  Rep.  824. 

1  Rand  v.  Cartwright,  82  Tex.  399,  18  «  Iles^s  v.  Meyer,  88  Mich.  339,  50  N. 
S.  W.  Rep.  794.  W.  Rep.  290. 

2  Sperry  ?;.  Wesco(Oreg.),  38Pac.  Rep.  '^  Hoot  ?•.  Cincinnati,  87  Iowa,  202,  54 
623.  N.  W.  Rep.  206. 

356 


REFERENCES   TO    MAI'S   AND   SURVEYS.       [§§  4o7,  438. 

the  instance  of  the  parties  to  the  conveyance,  and  with  a  view  to 
its  execution.^ 

437.  The  plats  and  surveys  made  by  the  United  States 
government  cannot  be  contradicted  by  parol  evidence,  or  by 
private  surveys  and  pkits.'^  ■  Corners  shown  to  have  been  origi- 
nally made  by  governineut  surveyors  are  conclusive,  and  must  be 
acce[)ted  as  the  true  corners,  no  matter  how  inaccurately  they 
may  have  been  originally  established.-^ 

It'  the  corner-stones  or  other  monuments  established  b}'  the 
government  surveyor  can  be  ascertained  as  originally  located, 
these  control  the  survey,  and  the  lines  shown  by  the  field-notes  of 
the  survey  must  be  disregarded.'*  If  such  a  corner  is  made  a 
starting-point  of  a  description,  it  will  prevail  as  against  an  actual 
survey  and  a  corner  fixed  by  the  gi-antor  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
veyance.^ Where  it  is  doubtful  which  of  two  lines  of  monuments 
is  the  true  government  line,  other  things  being  equal,  that  one  is 
to  be  so  considered  which  most  nearly  conforms  to  the  field-notes.^ 

438.  Where  there  is  a  discrepancy  in  a  government  sur- 
vey between  the  monuments  and  the  distances  given  in  the 
field-notes,  the  monuments  will  control,  even  though  the  result 

1  Euliss  V.  McAdams,  108  N.  C.  507,  13  491,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  366  ;  Arneson  v. 
S.  E.  Rep.  162.  Spawn,  2  S.  D.  269,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  1066. 

2  Biitesy.  III.  Cent.  R.  Co.  1  Black,  204  ;  *  Cragin  v.  Powell,  128  U.  S.  697,  9 
Chapman  v.  Polack,  70  Cal.  487,  11  Pac.  Sup.  Ci.  Rep.  203  ;  Tarpenninjr  u.  Cannon, 
Rep.  764  ;  Breen  r.  Donnelly,  74  Cal.  301,  28  Kans.  665;  Greer  v.  Squire  (Wash. 
15  Pac.  Rep.  845  ;  Spawr  v.  Johnson,  49  St.),  37  Pac.  Rep.  545;  Hubhard  i;.  Dusj, 
Kans.  788,  31  Pac.  Rep.  664  ;  Arneson  r.  80  Cal.  281,  22  Pac.  Rep.  214;  Ne.ssel- 
Spawn,  2  S.  T>.  269,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  1066  ;  rode  v.  Parish,  59  Iowa,  570,  13  N.  W. 
Jones  V.  Kimble,  19  Wis.  429  ;  Chan  v.  Rep.  746  ;  Arneson  v.  Spawn,  2  S.  D. 
Brandt,  45  Minn.  93,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  461  ;  269,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  1066  ;  Woods  v.  West, 
Hess  7-.  Meyer.  73  Mich.  259,  41  N.  W.  40  Neb.  .307,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  938;  Peter- 
Rep.  422  ;  Brown  v.  Morrill,  91  Mich.  29,  .son  v.  Skjelver  (Neb.),  62  N.  W.  Rep.  43 ; 
51  N.  W  Rep.  700;  Britton  r.  Ferry,  14  Thompson  ;>.  Harris,  40  Neb.  230,  58  N.  W. 
Mich.  .53  ;  Knight  v.  Elliott,  57  Mo.  317  ;  Kep.  712  ;  Johnson  v.  Preston,  9  Neb.  474, 
Turner  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  1 12  Mo  542,  4  N.  W.  Rrp.  83;  Bruckner  r.  Lawrence, 
20  S.  W.  Rep.  673;  Campbell  v.  Clark,  8  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  19;  Jacobs  v.  Moseley, 
Mo.  553;  Nesselrode  r.  Pari.sh,  59  Iowa,  91  :\ro.  457,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  135  ;  Climer  v. 
570,  13  N.  W.  Rep.  746;  Milli'r  r.  White,  Wallace,  28  Mo.  556,  75  Am.  Dec.  135; 
23  Fla.  301,  2  So.  Rep.  614.  P.canisley  v.  Crane,  52  Minn.  537  ;  Chan  r. 

'-  Liberty  ;•.  Burns  (Mo.),  19  S.  W.  Rej).  Brandt,  45  Miim.  93,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  461. 

1107;  Billin<:.sley  v.   Bates,  30  Ala.  376,  ^  Powers  c.  Jackson,  50  Cal.  429  ;  Shel- 

68  Am.  Dec.  126;  Greer  r.  Squire  (Wash,  ton' r.  r:ionc  (Tex.  Civ.   Aj)]>.).  26  S.   W. 

St.),  37    Pac.  Rej).  545,  modifyintr  Squire  Rep.  26. 

V.  Greer,  2  Wash.  St.  209,  26  Pac.   Rep.  ^  Hubbard    v.  Dusy,    80   Cal.    281,    22 

222;   Ayers  v.  Beaty,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  Pac.  Rep.  214. 

357 


§  4;>8.] 


DKSCIUPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


be  that  some  of  the  quarter  sections  will  contain  less  than  their 
proper  number  of  acres.'  There  is  a  jiresumption,  however,  that 
the  corners  were  established  at  the  places  indicated  by  the  field- 
notes ;  and  the  proof  that  they  were  not  so  established  must  be 
clear  and  convincing  where  tlie  actual  location  as  claimed  does 
not  accord  with  the  section  lines  in  adjoining  sections,  and  will 
establish  the  claim  in  an  irregular  shape.^  In  relocating  lost  cor- 
ners on  townshi[)  lines,  when  the  monuments  claimed  to  be  gov- 
ernment monuments  are  disputed  and  not  clearly  established, 
these  should  be  established  on  a  line  coinciding  with  the  township 
line  at  the  points  indicated  by  the  government  field-notes  ;  that 
is,  on  a  stiaight  line  connecting  known  and  undisputed  govern- 
ment monuments  on  such  township  line.^ 

Monumimts  and  boundary  lines  as  established  by  the  govern- 
ment survey  control  the  description  of  lands  patented  by  the 
United  States,  and  mistakes  in  the  surveys  cannot  be  corrected  by 
the  judicial  department  of  the  government.*  If  the  field-notes  of 
the  government  survey  afford  sufficient  data  for  running  the  lines 
of  that  survey,  the  fact  that  cex-tain  monuments  marking  the  cor- 
ners of  the  survey  cannot  be  found  does  not  render  the  lines  un- 
known or  uncertain  so  that  they  can  be  proved  by  parol  evidence.^ 

1  Ogiivie  V.  Copeliiml,  145  111.  98,  33  (a  leading  case),  the  town  line  was,  by  a 
N.  E.  Ui-p.  11)85 ;  Enj:land  c.  Vandennark  resiirvey,  deflected  from  a  straight  line 
(111.),  35  N.  E.  Rep.  465;  Gordon  !?.  between  the  township  corners ;  but  an  ex- 
Booker,  97  Cal.  586,  32  Pac.  Rep.  593  ;  amination  of  the  case  will  disclose  the  fact 
Hubbard  v.  Busy,  80  Cal.  281,  22  Pac.  that  that  was  done  to  give  to  the  parties  the 
Rep.  214;  Goodman  v.  Myrick,  5  Oreg.  amount  of  land  to  which  tliey  were  en- 
65;  Van  Dusen  v.  Sliively,  22  Oreg.  64,  titled,  and  that  the  resurvey  followed  un- 
29  Pac.  Rep.  76  ;  Greer  v.  Squire,  2  Wash,  disputed  pernianent  monuments  along  the 
St.  209,  37  Pac.  Rep.  545  ;  McEvoy  v.  line  as  established  by  the  original  survey 
Loyd,  31  Wis.  142;  Martin  v.  Carliii,  19  and  the  government  field-notes."' 
Wis.  454,  88  Am.  Dec.  696.  In  Hall  v.  ^  Cragin  v.  Powell,  128  U.  S.  691,  9 
Tanner,  4  Pa.  St.  244,  it  was  .said  :  "  It  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  203.  It  is  very  clear,  as 
has  ever  been  held  that  the  marks  on  the  remarked  by  the  court  in  Ilaydel  v.  Du- 
grouud  constitute  the  survey.  The  cour.ses  fresne,  17  How.  30,  "  that  great  confusion 
and  distances  are  only  evidences  of  the  and  much  litigation  would  ensue  if  ju- 
siirvey."  dicial   tribunals,   state  and    federal,  were 

-  Cadeau  v.  Elliott,  7  Wash.  St.  205,  34  permitted  to  interfere  and  overthrow  the 

Pac.  Rep.  916;  Hess  ?;.  Meyer,  73  Mich,  public    surveys."      Chan    v.   Brandt,   45 

259,41   N.  W.  Rep.  422  ;  Hanson  v.  Red  Minn.  93,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  461  ;  Doolittle 

Rock  (S.  D.),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  11  ;   Rollins  v.  Bailey,  85  Iowa,  398,  52  N.  W.  Rep. 

V.  Davidson,  84  Iowa,  237.  337. 

3  Hanson  v.  Red  Rock  (S.   D.),  57  N.         »  pickett  v.  Nelson,  79  Wis.  9,  47  N. 

W.  Rep.  11,   per  Corson,  J.  :  "  It    is   true  W.  Rep.  936.     Surveys  from  known  gov- 

fhat  in  McClintock  u.  Rogers,  1 1  111.279  ernment   corners,  both  north   and   south 

358 


REFERENCES   TO    MAPS   AND   SURVEYS.  [§  489. 

An  original  government  survey,  under  which  adjoining  owners 
have  purchased,  governs  the  boundary  between  them  as  against 
a  subsequent  survey  made  many  years  afterwards  under  an  act 
of  Congress  which  recited  that  the  town  had  never  been  properly 
suiveved.^  Where  it  appears  that  a  purchaser  of  a  part  of  a 
o-overnment  section  of  land  built  a  fence  upon  the  boundary  lines 
as  located  by  a  surveyor  at  that  time,  and  he  testifies  that  he 
found  tlie  original  stake  of  the  government  survey  and  used  it  as 
a  starting-point,  this  line  will  prevail  over  one  surveyed  twenty 
years  later,  when  the  corner  stake  had  disappeared.^ 

439.  Calls  for  monuments  in  the  field-notes  of  a  govern- 
ment survey  control  in  relocating  the  boundaries.  Thus, 
when  a  patent  is  issued  with  boundaries  as  described  in  a  survey 
and  map  made  by  a  government  surveyor,  who  has  also  made 
field-notes  giving  not  only  courses  and  distances,  but  also  monu- 
ments and  the  various  topographical  features  of  the  country,  the 
calls  for  monuments  will  control  the  courses  and  distances.^  But 
incidental  calls  for  monuments,  or  natural  objects  noted  in  field- 
notes  as  such  in  passing,  unless  specially  designated  in  such  man- 
ner as  to  show  an  intention  to  make  them  locative,  are  not  such 
calls  as  will  ordinarily  have  precedence  over  calls  for  courses  and 
distances.* 

An  actual  survey  established  by  evidence  controls  course  and 
distance.5  Tlie  monuments  of  the  original  survey  control  if  these 
can  be  found,  or  the  places  where  they  were  established  can  be 
ascertained.'^ 

A  house  referred  to  in  the  field-notes  of  a  survey,  and  marked 

and  east  and  west  of  the  corner  in  dis-  -  Carpenter  t'.  Monks,  81  Mich.  103,  45 

pute,  by  which  the  corner  is  lociUed  on  a  N.  W.  Kep.  477. 

line  with  other  corners  on  both   of  said  ^  Tot.n]azzini  r.  Morganti,  84  Cal.  1.59, 

Hues,  and  each  landowner  is  thereby  given  23  Pac.  Kep.  1085. 

the  full  amount  of  land  called  for  by  his  *  Hanson  v.  Red  Rock  (S.  Dak.),  57  N. 

patent,  are  preferred   to  a  survey  which  W.   Rep.   11;  Randall    v.  Burk  Tp.    (S. 

was  not  begun  at  a  known   government  Dak.)  bl    N.  W.    Rep.  4  ;  Jones   v.  An- 

corner,  and  lacked  many  of   the  elements  drew.s,  72  Tex.  .5,  9  S.  \V.  Rep.  170. 

of  certainty,  and  which  gave  one  of  the  ^  Graham  v.   Dewee.s,  85  Tex.  395,  20 

landowners  much  more  than  he  was  en-  S.  W.  Rep.  127. 

titled  to  under  his  jjatent,  and  the  other  ''  McAninch  v.  Freeman,  69  Tex.  445, 

less.     Woods  u.  West,  40  N.  b.  307,  58  N.  4  S.  W.   Hep.  369;  Miner  v.  Brader,  65 

W.  Rep.  938,  37  Neb.  400,  56  N.  W.  Rep.  Wis.  537,  27  N.  W.  Rep.  313  ;  Truner  v. 

30.  Brisbin,  98  Pa.  St.  202. 

1  Burt  j;.  Busch,  82    Mich.   506,   46  N. 
W.  Rep   790. 

359 


^:;  440-44l'.J  DiscuirnoN  and  houndakiks. 

upon    a    map,    bcCDUU's   a  monument    as    nmcli    as    a    tree    or    a 

stakt>.' 

440.  Courses  and  distances  control  the  lines  of  a  survey  in 
the  absence  of  calls  for  natural  or  artificial  monuments  or 
lines,'-^  or  in  case  tlui  monuments  cannot  be  found,'^  or  in  case  the 
survey  was  erroneous  "* 

The  courses  and  c]  stanres  of  a  disputed  survey  prevail  over  the 
courses  a.ud  distances  of  ;idjacent  surveys.*' 

441.  If  the  original  government  survey  is  shown  with  cer- 
tainty, a  purchaser  of  a  subdivision  of  such  survey  takes  by 
that  survey,  and  calls  in  liis  deed  inconsistent  with  such  survey 
must  yiehl  to  it.^ 

Where  the  Hne  of  an  okler  survey  is  given  as  a  boundary,  but 
the  distance  given  in  the  course  towards  the  survey  will  not 
carry  the  land  to  the  line  thereof,  the  survey  line  will  control.^ 

But  in  a  conflict  between  two  surveys,  the  later  of  which  was 
not  made  on  the  ground,  but  in  the  office  of  the  surveyor  from 
his  memory  of  the  former  survey,  calls  for  certain  trees  as  an 
established  corner  must  yield  to  the  earlier  survey .^ 

A  deed  of  a  lot  by  number  conveys  the  lot  as  it  is  bounded  by 
the  lines  actually  run  by  the  survey,  when  they  can  be  ascer- 
tain-.l.^ 

4  i2.  The  original  survey  may  be  traced  backward  as  well 
as  forward.^'  It  is  well  settled  that  in  running  the  line  of  a 
survey  of  public  lands  in  one  direction,  if  a  difficulty  is  met  with, 

1  Wise  V.  Burton,  73  Cal.  160,  174,  14  trous  v.  Morrison,  33  Fla.  261,  14  So. 
Pac.  Rep.  678,  683.  Hep.  80.5. 

2  Ratliffe  v.  Burleson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  "^  Wor.sham  v.  Clii.sum  (Tex.  C\v.  App.), 
2.5  S.  W.  Rep.  983,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  1003;  28  S.  W.  Rep.  90.5  ;  Worsli;nn  r.  Morojan 
Layton  V.  New  York  Land  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S.  W.  Kep.  918; 
A])]))  29  S.  W.  Rep.  1120.  Williams  r.    Beckham  (Tex.   Civ.   Apj).), 

3  Tippen    v.   McCamphell     (Tex.     Civ.  20  S.  W.  Rep.  052. 

App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  647.  ^  Fenley  v.  Flower.s,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

*  Aransas   Pass.  Co.    v.   Flippen   (Tex.      I'n,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  749  ;  Shelton  v.  Bone 
Civ.  Ai)p.),  29  S.  W.  Rep.  813;   Kueeliler      (Tex.    Civ.   App.),   26    S.    W.   Rep.   224 
V.    Wilson,  82   Tex.   638,  644,   18  S.  W.      And    see   Wyatt    v.   Dunean 
U>-p.  317  ;  Reast  v.  Donald,  84  Tex.  648, 
6.51,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  79.5  ;  Greg,'  v.  Hill,  82 
Tex.  405,  409,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  838. 

s  Tippen    v.   McCampbell    (Tex.    Civ. 
App.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  647. 

6  Shelton    v.    Bone   (Tex.    Civ.   App.),     Curti.s  w.Aflronson,49  N.  J.  L.  68,  72,7  Atl. 
26    S.    W.    Rep.    224;    Smith    v.    Bo.mo,     Rep.  886  ;  Fuller  r.  Carr,  .33  N.  J.  L.  157  ; 
84  Tex.    .520,    19    S.    W.   Rep.    702;   Wa-     Ellinwood  y.  Stancliff,  42  Fed.  Rep.  316. 
860 


Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  605. 

9  Root  r.  Cincinnati,  87  Iowa,  202,  54 
N.  W.  Rep.  200 ;  Ufford  v.  Wilkiiis,  .33 
low.i,  110. 

1'  Colmrn    v.    Coxeter,   51    N.  H.   1.58; 


REFERENCES   TO   MAPS   AND    SURVEYS. 


[§  443. 


and  all  the  known  calls  of  the  survey  are  met  by  vunning  them 
in  the  reverse  direction,  this  may  properly  be  done.^  llie  begin- 
ning corner  of  a  survey  is  of  no  higher  dignity  than  any  other 
corner. 2  But  it  is  true  nevertheless  that  "  the  natural  order  of 
survey  is  that  which  the  deed  shows  the  parties  to  the  di-ed 
adopted  to  identify,  to  their  own  satisfaction,  the  land  intended  to 
be  conveyed  by  the  one  to  the  other.  It  may  be  considered  as 
their  direction  how  the  identity  shall  be  established  by  survey  at 
any  future  time,  and  it  supposes  certain  points  as  the  beginning 
to  be  established.  If,  therefore,  the  description  of  a  particular 
line  be  complete  in  itself,  the  court  cannot  vary  from  that  descrip- 
tion because  it  will  not  correspond  with  the  description  of  a  poste- 
rior line,  unless  the  description  of  the  latter  be  more  specific  than 
the  former,  and  unless  from  the  latter  a  mistake  in  the  former 
can  be  clearly  inferred."  ^ 

In  locating  an  intermediate  monument  on  a  survey  which  was 
run  also  by  courses  and  distances,  the  footsteps  of  the  surveyor 
should  be  followed,  instead  of  taking  a  reverse  course.* 

443.  The  actual  beginning  corner,  if  this  can  be  ascer- 
tained, must  control  in  locating  original  surveys ;  yet  when  a 
survey  is  made  upon  paper,  and  not  upon  the  ground,  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  making  the  survey  should  control.  This 
intention  is  to  be  ascertained  by  all  the  facts  and  circumstances 
connected  with  the  case.^ 

The  question  of  the  location  of  a  starting-point  of  a  survey  is 
one  of  fact  for  the  jury,  and  not  one  of  theory  to  be  determined 
finally  upon  the   opinion  of  surveyors  or  experts.     Their  opinion 


1  Avers  v.  Watson,  137  U.  S.  584,  11 
Sup.  Ct.  R'p.  201  ;  Simmons  Cifek  Coal 
Co.  V.  Boran,  142  U.  S.  417,  12  Sup.  Ct. 
Kc|).  2.39,  per  Fuller,  C.  J. ;  Scott  v.  Pet- 
tigrew,  72  Tex.  .321,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  Ifil  ; 
Avers  v.  Harris,  64  Tex.  296  ;  Ayers  v. 
Lancaster,  64  Tex.  305  ;  Swenson  v. 
Willsford,  84  Tex.  424,  19  S.  W.  Rep. 
613  ;  Miles  v.  Sherwood,  84  Tex.  485,  19 
S.  W.  Rep.  853  ;  Norwood  r.  Crawford, 
114  N.  C.  513,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  .349;  Simp- 
kins  V.  Wells  (Ky.),  26  S.  W.  Rep.  587  ; 
Edson  V.  Knox,  8  Wash.  642,36  Pae.  Rep. 
698. 

2  Miles  r.  Sherwood,  84  Tex.  485,  19  S. 


W.  Rep.  853.  And  see  Reast  v.  Donald, 
84  Ttx.  648,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  795;  Scott 
V.  Pettigrew,  72  Tex.  321,  12  S.  W.  Rep. 
161. 

•'  Harry  v.  Graham,  1  Dcv.  &  R.  76, 
79,  27  Am.  Dec.  226  ;  Norwood  r.  Craw- 
ford, 114  N.  C.  513,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  349; 
Redmond  v.  Stej.p,  100  N.  C.  212,  6  S.  E. 
Rej).  727. 

•»  Blackburn  v.  Nelson,  100  Cal.  336,  34 
Pae.  Rep.  775. 

■''  Ocean  Beach  Asso.  v.  Yard,  48  N.  J. 
Eq.  72,  20  Atl.  Rep.  763;  Norwood  v. 
('rawfor<I,  114  N.  C.  513,  19  S.  E.  Rep. 
349. 

361 


^§  444^  44").]  DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 

as  to  till'  location  ()f  a  corner  post  by  a  survey  made  more  than 
forty  years  before  is  inadmissible.^ 

'I'estimony  of  a  civil  engineer  that  lie  had  taken  pains  to  es- 
tablisli  the  correctness  of  a  stake  designating  a  section  corner; 
that  he  knew  it  to  be  approximately  the  location  of  the  origiind 
section  corner ;  tliat  he  had  nsed  the  stake  so  frequently  with 
reference  to  other  surveys  that  lie  was  perfectly  sure  of  its  correct- 
ness; and  that,  if  it  were  not  correct,  the  streets  would  all  be 
thrown  out  of  line,  —  is  sufficient  to  warrant  the  admission  of  a 
survey  the  starting-point  of  which  was  the  stake  alluded  to,  as 
against  an  objection  that  such  point  had  not  been  located.^ 

444.  Detached  and  block  surveys.  —  If  a  tract  is  part  of  a 
block,  it  must  be  so  located,  and  can  be  located  in  no  other  way. 
If  it  is  a  separate  survey,  it  must  be  located  by  its  own  monu- 
ments, aided,  if  need  be,  by  the  legal  presumption  that  the  lines 
were  run  as  returned.  Where  the  lines  which  inclose  four  sur- 
veys in  the  interior  of  a  block  of  surveys  are  marked  on  the 
ground  by  interior  lines  of  the  block  and  by  lines  peculiar  to  the 
four  surveys,  the  lines  which  separate  them  from  each  other  can- 
not be  located  by  marks  on  the  lines  which  inclose  the  block.  If 
marks  of  the  original  survey  are  found  on  three  sides  of  a  tract, 
and  some  of  these  marks  are  peculiar  to  the  tract,  and  are  not 
common  to  the  other  tracts  alleged  to  form  part  of  the  block,  an 
individual  or  separate  location  is  established.^ 

445.  Distribution  of  variance.  —  Where,  on  a  line  of  the 
same  survey  and  between  remote  corners,  the  whole  length  is 
found  to  be  variant  from  the  length  called  for,  it  is  not  to  be 
presumed  that  the  variance  was  caused  from  a  defective  survey 
in  any  part,  but  it  must  be  presumed,  in  the  absence  of  circum- 
stances showing  the  contrary,  that  it  arose  from  an  imperfect 
measurement  of  the  whole  line,  and  such  variance  must  be  distrib- 
uted between  the  several  subdivisions  of  the  line  in  proportion  to 
their  respective  lengths.*     Thus,  where  a  piece  of  land  is  subdi- 

I  Eurt  I'.  Biisch,  82  Mich.  5n6,46N.  W.  2  Manistee     Mannf.    Co.    v.    Cogswell 

Rep.  790;  Stewart  v.  Caileton,  31  Mich.  (Midi.),  61  N.  W.  Rep.  884. 

270;  Grc-^oiy  v.  Knight,  50  Mich.  6.3,  14  3  Fergusou  v.  Bloom,  144  Pa.   St.  549, 

N.  W.  Rep.  700;  Lemon  v.  Railway  Co.  23  Atl.  Rep.  49. 

.59   Mich.  618,  623,  26  N.   W.  Kcp.  791;  *  James  v.  Drew,  68   Miss.   518,9  So. 

Ran.iall  v.  Gill,   77   Tex.  351,   14   S.  W.  Rep.   293;  Westphal   v.   Schultz,  48  Wis. 

Rep.  134.  75,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  136 ;  Pereles  v.  Magoon, 

78  Wis.  27,  46  N.  W.  Rep.   1047;  Eshle- 
362 


REFERENCES   TO   MAPS   AND    SURVEYS.       [§§  446,  447. 

videcl  into  lots  and  a  plat  of  the  subdivision  recorded,  and  the 
actual  aggregate  frontage  of  such  lots  is  less  than  is  called  for  in 
the  plat,  the  deficiency  must  be  divided  among  the  several  lots  in 
prop)ortion  to  their  respective  frontage  as  indicated  by  the  plat.^ 

The  same  principle  maintains  where  the  actual  measurements 
are  in  excess  of  the  dimensions  specifically  designated  upon  the 
plat,  as  in  case  of  a  deficiency .^ 

Where  in  a  platted  block  the  lots  are  marked  on  the  plat  as 
having  the  same  number  of  front  feet  each,  except  one,  the  spe- 
cific dimensions  of  which  are  also  marked,  and  a  survey  shows 
that  the  whole  block  contains  more  front  feet  than  are  marked  on 
the  plat,  the  excess  must  be  distributed  between  all  the  lots,  and 
not  given  to  that  lot  only  whicli  differed  in  its  dimensions  from 
the  rest. 3 

446.  Where  the  description  of  land  in  a  deed  calls  for  a  legal 
subdivision  of  a  section  of  surveyed  land,  the  quarter-section 
corners  being  lost  and  the  section  exceeding  six  hundred  and  forty 
acres  in  area,  the  division  lines  of  the  fractions  of  the  section  are 
determined  by  a  division  pro  rata  of  the  lines  of  the  section  as 
they  appear  upon  the  ground.* 

But  where  a  tract  of  land  was  platted  into  many  lots,  all  but 
two  of  which  were  of  a  uniform  width  of  twenty-five  feet,  and  two 
were  irregular,  containing  the  remnant  of  the  tract,  but  the  tract 
was  too  small  to  leave  the  two  irregular  lots  as  wide  as  they 
appeared  upon  the  plat,  it  was  held  that  the  regular  lots  were 
entitled  to  the  full  size  as  platted,  and  that  tiie  width  of  the 
Irreguhir  lots  must  be  diminished.^ 

447.  A  space  left  between  two  surveys  made  at  the  same 
time  by  the  same  surveyor,  calling  for  each  other,  will  be  ap- 

man  I'.  Malter,  101  Cal.  233,  35  Pac.  Rep.  Boynton,   98   Pa.    St.    370;    Reimers   v. 

860  ;  Miller  v.  Topeka  Land  Co.  44  Kans.  Quiuiiin,  49  Mich.  449,  13  N.  W.  Hep.  813. 

354,  24   Pac.  Rep.   420  ;  Caylor  v.  Luzad-  -  Miller  v.  Land  Co.  44  Kaus.  354,  24 

der  (Lid.),  36  N.  E.  Rep.  909.  Pac.    Rep.    420;    Witham    v.    Cutts,   4 

1  Miller  v.  Topeka  Land   Co.  44  Kans.  Grceiil.    31  ;    Wolfe   v.     Scarborough,    2 

354,  24  Pac.  Rep.  420  ;  McAlpine  v.  Rei-  Ohio  St.  361  ;  McAlpiue  v.   Reichencker, 

chencker,   27    Kans.    257 ;    Newcomb   v.  27  Kans.  257. 

Lewis,  31  Iowa,  488;  Morehind  i\  Page,  ^  j^erelcs  v.  Magoon,  78  Wis.  27,  46  N. 

2  Iowa,  139 ;  O'Brien  v.  McGrane,  27  Wis.  W.  Rep.  1047. 

446  ;  Jones  v.  Kimble,  19  Wis.  429  ;  West-  *  Eshleman  v.  Malter,  101  Cal.  233,  35 

idial  ),-.  Schultz,  48  Wis.  78,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  Pac.   Rep.  860;   Miller  i".  Land  Co.  44 

136;    Francois  !-.   Maloney,   56   111.   399;  Kans.  354,  24  Pac.  Rep.  420. 

Mar-/,  r.  Williams,  67  111.   SOG  ;  Parks   v.  ^  Baldwin  v.  Shannon,  43  N.J.  L.  596. 

363 


§  44.S.J 


DlvSCKirilON    AND    liOUXDAHlKS. 


portioued  to  the  owners  of  the  tracts  in  proportion  to  their  respec- 
tive interests,  in  case  no  boundary  line  was  fixed  on  the  ground. ^ 
Tliis  rule  presupposes  that  the  other  corners  of  the  surveys  are  fixed 
and  feitain.  In  case  there  is  no  defined  line  between  the  two 
surveys,  and  a  common  boundary  is  not  reached  by  running  from 
the  ehtablislu'd  corners  towards  the  boundary  of  the  two  surveys 
by  course  and  distance,  though  there  was  a  manifest  ndstakc.  in 
the  distance,  there  is  no  rule  of  law  which,  in  the  absence  of 
evidence,  would  raise  a  presumption  agcdnst  or  in  favor  of  either 
survey.^ 

VIT.  Boundary  hy  Highway. 

448.  It  is  an  established  rule  that  a  conveyance  of  land 
bounded  by  or  along  an  existing  way,  whether  public  or  pri- 
vate, carries  the  title  to  the  centre  of  the  way,  subject,  of 
course,  to  the  public  use  of  it  as  a  highway,  unless  there  be  some- 
thing showing  an  intent  to  the  contrary.^     The  intent  is  to  be 


1  Ware  v.  McQuinn  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
26  S.  W.  Kep.  126. 

-  Duff  V.  Moore,  68  Tex.  270,  4  S.  W. 
Rep.  .530. 

8  Berridge  v.  Ward,  10  Com.  B.  N.  S. 
400;  Grose  v.  West,  7  Tamit.  39;  Steel 
V.  Prickett,  2  Stark,  463,  468  ;  O'Connor 
r.  Nova  Scotia  Tel.  Co.  22  Can.  Sup. 
276  ;  Banks  v.  Ogden,  2  Wall.  57.  Ala- 
bama :  Moore  v.  Johnston,  87  Ala.  220,  6 
So.  Rep.  50;  Columbus  &  W.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Witherow,  82  Ala.  190,  3  So.  Rep.  23. 
Arkansas :  Taylor  I'.  Armstrong,  24  Ark. 
102.  California:  Civil  Code,  §  1112. 
Moody  V.  Palmer,  50  Cal.  31  ;  Webber  v. 
Cal.  &  O.  R.  K.  Co.  51  Cal.  425  ;  Wat- 
kins  v.  Lynch,  71  Cal.  21,11  Pac.  Rep. 
808;  Eraser  y.  Oit,  95  Gal.  661,30  Pac. 
Rep.  793.  Connecticut:  Champlin  v. 
Pendleton,  13  Conn.  23;  Gear  v.  Bar- 
num,  37  Conn.  229 ;  Chatinim  v.  Brsln- 
erd,  11  Conn.  60;  Watrous  i\  South- 
worth,  5  Conn.  305  ;  Peck  v.  Smith,  1 
Conn.  103,  6  Am,  Dec.  216.  Florida: 
Jacksonville,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  r.  Lockvvood, 
33  Fla.  573,  15  So.  Rep.  327.  Georgia: 
Silvey  v.  McCool,  86  G<i.  1,  12  S.  E.  Rep. 
175.  Idaho:  R.  S.  1887,  §  2934.  Illi- 
nois :  Hehner  v.  Ca.stle,  109  111.  664 ; 
364 


Canal  Trustees  v.  Havens,  11  111.  554; 
Henderscm  v.  llaiterman,  146  111.  555,  34 
N.  E.  Rep.  1041.  Indiana  :  Cox  v.  Louis- 
ville, N.  A.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  48  Ind.  178; 
Terre  Haute,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  74  Ind. 
29 ;  Terre  Haute,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Rodel,  89 
Ind.  128;  Hamilton  Co.  v.  Indianapolis 
Nat.  Gas  Co.  134  Ind.  209  ;  Ilaslett  v. 
New  Albanv,  &c.  R.  Co.  7  Ind.  App.  603, 
34  N.  E.  Rep.  845  ;  Montgomery  v.  Hines, 
134  Ind.  221,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  1100  ;  War- 
iiritton  V.  Demorett,  129  Ind.  346,  27  N. 
E.  Rep.  730.  Kansas:  Tousloy  ?•.  (!alena, 
M.  &  S.  Co.  24  Knns.  328.  Kentucky: 
HawesvilJe  v.  Lander,  8  Bush,  679  ;  Jacob 
('.  \Vr,olfolk,  90  Ky.  426,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
415.  Maine:  Low  v.  Tihbetts,  72  Me. 
92,  39  Am.  Rep.  303 ;  Oxton  v.  Graves, 
68  Me.  371,  28  Am.  Rep.  75;  Johnson  v. 
Anderson,  18  Me.  76 ;  Bueknam  v.  Buck- 
uam,  12  Me.  463  ;  Sutherland  v.  Jackson', 
32  Me.  80;  Cottle  v.  Young,  59  Me.  105. 
Maryland:  Laws  1892,  ch.  684,  unle-s 
the  grantor  shall  in  express  terms  in  writ- 
ing reserve  all  title  to  the  street  to  himself. 
Baltimore  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gould,  67 
Md.  60,8  Atl.  Kep.  7.54;  Peabody  Heiiihis 
Co.  V.  Sad  tier,  63  Md.  533,  52  Am.  Rep. 
519;    Gump    v.    Sibley    (Md.),    28  Atl. 


BOUNDARY   BY   HIGHWAY. 


[§  44S. 


gathered  from  the  description,  iu  connection  with  other  parts  of 
the  grant,  and  by  reference  to  the  situation  of  the  land,  and  the 
relation  of  the  parties  to  the  land  conveyed  and  to  other  adjacent 


Rep.  977  ;  Foreman  v.  Presbyterian  Asso. 
(Md.)  30  Atl.  Kep.  1114;  Hur.t  v. 
Brown,  75  Md.  481,  23  Atl.  Rep.  1029; 
Albert  v.  Thomas,  73  Md.  181,  20  Atl. 
Rep.  912;  Kiemau  y.  Baltimore  Btlt  K. 
Co.  (Md.)  31  A.tl.  Rtp.  444.  Massachu- 
setts: Gould  V.  Eastern  R.  R.  142  Mass. 
85,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  543  ;  Deany.  Lowell,  135 
Mass.  55;  Motley  v.  Sargent,  119  Mass. 
231  ;  Newhall  v.  Iieson,  8  Cush.  595,  54 
Am.  Dec.  790 ;  Peck  v.  Denniston,  121 
Mass.  17  ;  Fisher  v.  Smith,  9  Gray,  441  ; 
White  V.  Godfrey,  97  Mass.  472;  San- 
born V.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387;  Dodd  v. 
Witt,  139  Mass.  63,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  475; 
Clark  V.  Parker,  106  Mass.  5.54;  O'Con- 
nell  V.  Bryant,  121  Mass.  557;  Boston 
V.  Richardson,  13  Allen,  1116,  overruling 
Tyler  v.  Hammond,  11  Pick.  193;  Sibley 
V.  Holden,  10  Pick.  249,  251,20  Am.  Dee. 
521.  Michigan:  Pnrkisi  v.  Benson,  28 
Mich.  538.  Minnesota :  In  re  Robbins, 
34  Minn.  99,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  356,  57  Am. 
Rep.  40;  Rich  v.  City  of  Minneapolis,  37 
Minn.  423,  35  N.  W.  Rep.  2 ;  Ellsworth  v. 
Lord,  40  Minn.  337,  42  N.  W.  Rep.  389  ; 
Lamm  v.  Railway  Co.  45  Minn.  71,  47  N. 
W.  Rep.  455  ;  Gilbert  v.  Emerson  (Minn.), 
61  N.  W.  Rep.  820.  Missouri :  Snoddy 
(,'.  Bolen  (Mo.).  25  S.  W.  Rep.  9.32.  New 
Hampshire :  Reed's  Petition,  13  N.  H. 
381  ;  Woodman  v.  Spencer,  54  N.  H.  507  ; 
McShane  v.  Main,  62  N.  H.  4.  New  Jer- 
sey :  Ayres  v.  Penn.  Ry.  Co.  52  N.  .1.  L. 
405,  20  At!.  Rep.  54  ;  Salter  v.  Jonas,  39 
N.  J.  L.  469,  23  Am.  Rep.  229  ;  Dodge  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  43  N.  J.  Eq.  351,  11  Atl. 
Rep.  751.  New  York:  Hennessy  v.  Mur- 
dock,  137  N.  Y.  317,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  330; 
Matter  of  Ladue,  118  N.  Y.  213,  219,  23 
N.  E.  Hep.  465  ;  Wallace  v.  Fee,  50  N.  Y. 
694;  Dunham  v.  Williams,  37  X.  Y.  251  ; 
Wager  v.  Troy,  &c.  R.  Co.  25  N.  Y.  526  ; 
Perrin  v.  Railioad  Co.  36  N.  Y.  120  ;  Bis- 
sell  V.  New  Y'ork  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  23  N.  Y. 
61;    Jackson    v.    Lonw,    12    Johns.    252; 


Jackson  v.  Hathaway,  15  Johns.  447  ; 
Story  V.  N.  Y.  Elevated  R.  Co.  90  N.  Y. 
122,  180,43  Am.  Rep  146;  Greer  v.  N. 
Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  37  Hun,  346  ; 
Lozier  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  42  Baib. 
465;  Holloway  v.  Southmayd,  139  N.  Y. 
390,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  1047  ;  McCtuden  v. 
Rochester  Ry.  Co.  5  Misc.  Rep.  59,  25  N. 
Y.  Supp.  114,  affirmed  28  N.Y.  Supp.  1 135 ; 
Cochran  v.  Smith,  73  Hun,  597,  26  N. 
Y.  Supp.  103;  Pollock  v.  Morris,  19  J. 
&  S.  112;  White's  Bank  v.  Nichols,  64 
N.  Y.  65;  Mott  v.  Mott,  68  N.  Y.  246; 
Dunham  v.  Williams,  37  N.  Y.  251  ;  Sher- 
man V.  McKeou,  38  N.  Y.  266;  Ham- 
mond V.  McLachlan,  1  Sandf.  323;  In  re 
Ladue,  118  N.  Y.  213,  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
465.  North  Dakota:  Comp.  Laws  1887, 
§  3252.  Pennsylvania :  Herbert  v.  Rainey, 
54  Fed.  Rep.  248,  250  ;  Ott  v.  Kreiter,  110 
Pa.  St.  370;  Cox  v.  Freedley,  33  Pa.  St. 
124,  75  Am.  Dec.  584;  Paul  v.  Carver, 
26  Pa.  St.  223,  67  Am.  Dec.  413;  Tran- 
sue  V.  Sell,  105  Pa.  St.  604 ;  Flick's  Est. 
6  Kulp,  329 ;  Trutt  ?;.  Spotts,  87  Pa.  St. 
339  ;  Falls  c.  Reis,  74  Pa.  St.  439  ;  Spack- 
man  v.  Steidel,  88  Pa.  St.  453 ;  Dobson  v. 
Hohenadel,  148  Pa.  St.  367,  23  Atl.  Rep. 
1128;  Firmstone  v.  Spaeter,  150  Pa.  St. 
616,  25  Atl.  Rep.  41,  30  W.  N.  C.  570; 
Lotz  V.  Reading  Iron  Co.  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
497;  Kohler  v.  Kleppinger  (Pa.),  5  Atl. 
Rep.  750.  Rhode  Island  :  Healey  r.  Bab- 
bitt, 14  R.  I.  53.'5 ;  Anthony  v.  Providence 
(R.  I.),  28  Atl.  Hep.  766.  South  Dakota  : 
Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  3252.  Vermont: 
Marsh  v.  Burt,  34  Vt.  289  ;  Morrow  v. 
Willard,  30  Vt.  118;  Maynard  v.  Weeks, 
41  Vt.  617  ;  Chur.'h  v.  Stiles,  59  Vt.  642, 
10  Atl.  Rep.  674.  Wisconsin:  Kimball  v. 
Kenosha,  4  Wis.  321,  331  ;  Milwaukee  v. 
Milwaukee  &  Beloit  R.  R.  Co.  7  Wis.  85; 
Jarstadt  v.  .Morgan,  48  Wis.  245,  4  N.  W. 
Rep.  27  ;  Gove  ;;.  White,  20  Wis.  425 ; 
Andrews  v.  Youmans,  78  Wis.  56,  47  N. 
W.  Rep.  304. 

365 


§  449.] 


DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 


laiuls ;  and,  if  an  intent  to  exclude  the  highway  appears  by  the 
terms  of  the  grant  as  interpreted  by  the  surroundhig  circum- 
stances, the  title  does  not  pass.'  'llie  intent  to  convey  to  the 
middle  line  of  the  highway  arises  from  the  presumption  that  the 
adjoining  owners  originally  furnished  the  land  for  a  right  of  way 
in  equal  proportions;  and  from  the  furtiier  |)resuniption  tluit  such 
owner,  in  selling  land  bounded  upon  the  highway,  intended  to  sell 
to  the  centre  line  of  the  street,  and  not  to  retain  a  narrow  strip 
wliich  could  iiardly  be  of  use  or  value  except  to  the  owner  of  the 
adjoining  land.'-^ 

Various  reasons  are  given  for  the  rule,  as  that  "the  way  was 
taken  out  of  the  party  that  hath  other  lands  adjoining,"  '■^  and  that 
the  owner  of  the  land  laid  out  in  lots  and  streets  gets  his  pay  for 
the  streets  in  tlie  increased  value  of  the  lots,*  and  so  purchasers, 
one  after  another,  pay  for  the  street  in  paying  for  tlie  lots.^  The 
rule  is  the  same  whether  applied  to  the  streets  of  a  city  or  to  the 
highways  in  the  country. '^ 

449.  This  rule  is  generally  applied  equally  to  boundaries 
by  public  and  by  private  ways  and  alleys."    Thus,  in  case  land 


1  White's  Bank  r.  Nichols,  64  N.  Y.  65  ; 
Mott  V.  Mott,  68  N.  Y.  246  ;  Jackson  v. 
Hathaway,  15  Johns.  447,  8  Am.  Dec. 
263;  Dexiery.  Riverside,  &c.  Mills,  15  N. 
Y.  Supp.  374,  per  Martin,  J.  ;  Baltimore 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Gould,  67  Md.  60,8  Atl. 
Rep.  754. 

2  In  re  Robbins,  34  Minn.  99,  24  N. 
W.  Rep.  356,  57  Am.  Rep.  40  ;  Matter  of 
Ladue,  118  N.  Y.  213,  219,  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
465  ;  Dunham  v.  Williams,  37  N.  Y.  251 ; 
Salter  v.  Jonas,  39  N.  J.  L.  469,  23  Am. 
Rep.  229  ;  Henderson  v.  Hatterman,  146 
111.  555,34  N.  E.  Rep.  1041. 

"  Holmes  v.  Bellingham,  7  C.  B.  N.  S. 
329;  Healey  v.  Babbitt,  14  R.  I.  533; 
(,'iiiireh  V.  Meeker,  34  Conn.  421  ;  Stiles 
r.  Curtis,  4  Day,  328,  333 ;  Dunham  v. 
Williams,  37  N.  Y.  251  ;  Jacksonville, 
&c.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Lockwood,  33  Ela.  573,  15 
So.  Rep.  .327. 

*  Paul  V.  Carver,  26  Pa.  St.  223. 

^  Antliony  v.  Providence  (R.  I.),  28 
Atl.  Rep.  766,  per  Stiness,  J. 

«  Biss.ll  >:  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  23  N. 
Y.  61 ;  Taylor  v.  Armstrong,  24  Ark.  102. 
366 


'  Holmes  v.  Bellingham,  7  C.  R.  N.  S. 
329;  Gould  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  142 
Mass.  85,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  543  ;  Fox  v.  Union 
Suj^ar  Refinery,  109  Mass.  292;  Fisheri;. 
Smith,  9  Gray,  441  ;  Motley  v.  Sargent, 
119  Mass.  231;  Peck  v.  Denniston,  121 
Mass.  17  ;  Bolaud  v.  St.  John's  Schools 
(Mass.),  39  N.  E.  Rep.  1035;  Matter  of 
Ladue,  118  N.  Y.  213  ;  Hennessy  r.  Mur- 
dock,  137  N.  Y.  317,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  330; 
Story  V.  N.  Y.  Elevated  R.  Co.  90  N.  Y. 
122,  165, 43  Am.  Rep.  146  ;  White's  Bank 
V.  Nichols,  64  N.  Y.  65  ;  Gear  v.  Barnum, 
37  Conn.  229  ;  Anthony  v.  Providence  (R. 
I.),  28  Atl.  Rep.  766  ;  Albert  v.  Thomas, 
73  Md.  181,  20  Atl.  Rep.  912;  Moore  v. 
Johnston,  87  Ala.  220,  6  So.  Rep.  50  ;  Cin- 
cinnati &  Ga.  R.  V.  Mims,  71  Ga.  240;  Ja- 
cob V.  Woolfolk  (Ky.),  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
415;  Schneider  r.  Jacob  (Ky.),  5  S.  W. 
Rep.  350  ;  Hawesville  v.  Lander,  8  Bush, 
679.  That  the  rule  does  not  apply  to 
private  streets,  see  Sutlierland  v.  Jackson, 
32  Me.  80;  Spackman  v.  Steidel,  88 
Pa  St.  453  ;  Transue  v.  Sell,  105  Pa.  St. 
604. 


BOUNDARY    BY   HIGHWAY. 


[§  449. 


is  laid  out  in  blocks  and  lots  as  represented  on  a  map  or  plat,  and 
lots  are  sold  bounded  upon  the  projected  streets,  the  deed  passes 
the  fee  to  the  centre  of  the  street  adjoining  such  land.^  The 
grantor  in  such  case  is  regarded  as  dedicating  the  ways  to  use  as 
streets  or  ways,  so  far  as  his- grantees  are  concerned,  and  he  is  not 
allowed  afterwards  to  say  they  are  not  streets  or  ways.  His  deed 
thus  operates  not  only  to  create  a  street,  but  also,  through  the  pre- 
sumption arising  from  the  fact  that  there  is  a  street,  to  extend 
the  grant  to  its  centre. ^  A  boundary  of  a  lot  upon  a  private  vfny, 
whether  defined  by  the  deed  or  shown  upon  a  recorded  plan,  im- 
plies the  existence  of  such  way  for  the  use  of  the  grantee,  and  the 
grantor  is  estopped,  as  to  the  grantee  and  all  claiming  under  him, 
from  denying  the  existence  of  such  way,  or  of  any  connecting  ways 
shown  upon  the  plan,  over  land  of  the  grantor,  which  enable  the 


1  Jarstadt  v.  Morgan,  48  Wis.  245,  4 
N.  W.  Rep.  27  ;  Fox  v.  Union  Sugar  Ke- 
finery,  109  Mass.  292;  Tufts  v.  Cliarles- 
towu,  2  Gray,  271  ;  Parker  v.  Smith,  17 
Mass.  413,  9  Am.  Dec.  157  ;  Livingston  v. 
New  York,  8  Wend.  85,  22  Am.  Dec.  622  , 
Henne.^sy  v.  Murdock,  137  N.  Y.  317,  33 
N.  E.  Rep.  3.30  ;  Thomas  r.  Poole,  7  Gray, 
83  ;  Guthrie  v.  New  Haven,  31  Conn.  308  ; 
Kittle  V.  Pfeiffer,  22  Cal.  484;  Rowan 
V.  Portland,  8  B.  Mon.  232  ;  Davi.s  v. 
Judge,  46  Vt.  655  ;  Garstang  v.  Davenport 
(Iowa),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  876  ;  Winter  v. 
Payne,  33  Fla.  470,  15  So.  Rep.  211, 
213;  Rogers  v.  Bollinger  (Ark.),  26  S. 
W.  Rep.  12. 

2  Banks  v.  Ogden,  2  Wall.  57  ;  Her- 
bert V.  Rainey,  54  Fed.  Rep.  248.  Cali- 
fornia: Currier  v.  Howes,  103  Cal.  431, 
37  Pac.  Rep.  521  ;  Stone  v.  Brooks,  35 
Cal.  489;  People  v.  Reed,  81  Cal.  70,  22 
Pac.  Rep.  474  ;  Archer  v.  Siilinas  City,  93 
Cal.  43,  28  Pac.  Rep.  8.39.  Michigan: 
Plumer  v.  Johnston,  63  Mich.  165,  29  N. 
W.  Rep.  687.  Minnesota:  Hurley  v. 
Mi.s.s.  Rum  River  liooni  Co.  34  Minn.  143, 
24  N.  W.  Rep.  917.  Missouri:  Stewart  v. 
Perkin.s,  110  Mo.  660,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  989. 
In  McShane  v.  City  of  Moberly,  79  Mo.  41, 
it  was  ruled  that  no  one  but  the  absolute 
owner  of  the  land  can  dedicate  land  to  a 
public  use  so  as  to  pass  the  fee,  and  that 
the  dedication   of  laiitl  upon  wiiich  there 


is  a  deed  of  trust  is  subject  to  be  avoided 
by  a  sale  under  the  deed.  New  Jersey: 
White  V.  Tide-Water  Oil  Co.  50  N.  J  Eq 
1,  25  Atl.  Rep.  199;  Prudden  ;;.  Railroad 
Co.  19  N.  J.  Eq.  386,  391,  20  N.  J.  Eq. 
535  ;  Booraem  v.  Railroad  Co.  40  N.  J. 
Eq.  557,  5  Atl.  Rep.  106.  In  Dodge  v. 
Railroad  Co.  43  N.  J.  Eq.  351,  11  Atl. 
Rep.  751,  affirmed  on  appeal,  45  N.  J.  Eq. 
366,  19  Atl.  Rep.  622,  Vice-Cliancellor 
Van  Fleet  states  it  to  be  established  that, 
where  land  is  conveyed  as  abutting  on  a 
proposed  street,  before  a  public  highway 
in  fact  exists  there,  and  a  way  o\er  such 
proposed  street  is  essential  to  the  bene- 
ficial enjoyment  of  the  land  granted,  or 
even  a  desirable  accessory  to  it,  the  impli- 
cation is  that,  until  the  proposed  street 
becomes  an  actual  highway,  the  grantee 
shall  have  tlie  use  of  it  as  a  means  uf  pas- 
sage to  and  from  his  land.  The  principle 
of  these  cases  is  also  recognized  and  ap- 
plied in  Dill  V.  Board,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  421, 
20  Atl.  Rep.  739;  McShane  v.  City  of 
Moherly,  79  Mo.  41.  New  York:  Bissell 
V.  New  York  Cent  R.  Co.  23  N.  Y.  61  ; 
In  re  Ladue,  118  N.  Y.  213;  Story  v.  N. 
Y.  Elev.  R.  Co.  00  N.  Y.  122,  165,43  Am. 
Hep.  146.  Oregon  :  Meier  v.  Railway  Co. 
16  Oreg.  .500,  19  Pac.  Rep.  610;  Hicklin 
V.  McClcar,  18  Oreg.  126,  22  Pac.  Rep. 
1057.  Pennsylvania:  Ferguson's  Appeal, 
117  Pa.  St.  426,  11  Atl.  Rep.  885. 
367 


•loO.J 


DKSCKU'TION    AND    BOUNUAKIKS. 


gfuiitee  to  reach  the  public  highways  in  any  direction.^  Where 
a  plat  of  hiiul  is  recorded,  and  hind  appears  ihereim  bounded  by 
lines  clearly  intended  to  represent  tlu;  lines  of  a  street,  and  h)ts 
aie  sold  as  being  bounded  on  such  street,  such  land  is  dedicated 
for  a  public  street,  though  not  named  as  such  on  the  plat.^  As 
to  the  grantee  in  such  case,  the  way  shown  upon  the  plat  is  a 
street,  and  it  makes  no  difference  whether  it  has  been  opened  or 
not.^ 

The  rule  is  the  same  even  when  the  land  is  laid  out  and  sold  by 
an  attorney  in  fact.  If,  having  unrestricted  power  to  sell  the 
kuul,  he  plats  the  Siune  and  sells  all  of  the  lots  by  numbers, 
the  fee  in  the  streets  of  the  plat  passes  to  the  grantee,  whether  the 
attorney  had  power  to  diMlicate  the  streets  to  the  public  or  not.'* 

45Cf.  In  case  of  sales  by  plats,  there  is  an  implied  covenant 
that  the  abutting  streets  or  ways  are  or  will  be  laid  out 
as  described,  that  they  are  of  the  width  represented,  and  that 
the  grantor  will  do  nothing  to  defeat  or  impair  the  right  of  way 
conveyed  to  the  grantee.^ 


1  Massachusetts :  Fox  v.  Union  Sugar 
Refiucry,  109  Mass.  292;  Boland  v.  St. 
John's  Sc-liools  (Mass.),  39  N.  E.  Rep. 
1035 ;  Rodj;ers  v.  Tarker,  9  Gray,  445  ; 
Clark  V.  Parker,  106  Mass.  554  ;  Walker 
V.  Boynton,  120  Mass.  349;  Walker  v. 
Worcester,  fi  Gray,  548  ;  Tliomas  v.  Poole, 
7  Gray,  83;  Loriiig  v.  Ot\<,  7  Gray,  563  ; 
Salishury  v  Andrtvvs,  19  Pick.  250  ;  Tufts 
V.  Churlestown,  2  Gray,  271  ;  Lincoln  v. 
Shaw,  17  Mass.  4!0  ;  Parker  v.  Bennett, 
11  Allen,  388.  See  Brainaid  v.  Boston  & 
Ji.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  12  Gniy,  407.  Indiana  : 
Cox  v.  Louisville,  &c.  K.  Co.  48  Ind.  178. 
Michigan:  Smith  i'.  Lock,  18  Midi  56; 
White  r.  Smith,  37  Mich.  291.  New  Jer- 
sey:  Hopkinsoti  v.  McKniL;ht,  31  N.  J.  L. 
422.  New  York:  White's  Bank  v.  Nichols, 
64  N.  Y.  65;  Matter  of  OpiMiing  of  Elev- 
enth Av.  81  N.Y.  436.  Pennsylvania:  Tran- 
sue  V.  Sell,  105  Pa.  St.  604.  Wisconsin: 
Weisbrod  i-.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  \\y.  Co.  18 
Wis.  35,  86  Am.  Dec.  743;  Knedand  v.  Van 
Valkenhiirgh,  46  Wis.  434,  1  N.  W.  Rep. 
63  ;  Pettihone  v.  Hamilton,  40  Wis.  402. 

2  San  Francisco  r.  Biiir  (Cal.),  36  Pac. 
Rep.  771. 

368 


8  Bissell  I'.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  23  N.  Y. 
61  ;  Dobsony.  Hohenadel,  148  Pa.  St.  367, 
23  Atl.  Hep.  1128;  Anthony  c.  Providence 
(R.  I.),  28  Atl.  Rep.  766. 

*  Anthony  v.  Providence  (U.  1.),  28 
Atl.  Rep.  766. 

°  Banks  v.  OL-^den,  2  Wall.  57;  Merrill 
V.  Newton,  99  Mich.  226,  58  N.  W.  Rep. 
70 ;  Capen  v.  Steven;-,  29  Mich.  496  ;  Mo- 
litor  V.  Sheldon,  37  Kans.  246,  15  Pac. 
Rep.  231  ;  Guthrie  v.  New  Haven,  31 
Conn.  308 ;  Thomas  c.  Poole,  7  Gray,  83  ; 
Gould  V.  Railroad  Co.  142  Mass.  85,  7  N. 
E.  Rep.  543;  Clark  v.  Parker,  106  Mass. 
554  ;  Kittle  v.  Pfciffer,  22  Cal.  484  ;  Hen- 
ncssy  V.  Murdock,  137  N.  Y.  317,  33  N. 
E.  Rep.  330 ;  Livingston  v.  New  York,  8 
Wend.  85,  22  Am.  Dec.  622;  Davis  v. 
Judge,  46  Vt.  655  ;  Winter  v.  Payne,  33 
Fla.  470 ;  Rowan  v.  Portland,  8  B.  Mon. 
232;  Suoddy  v.  Bolen,  122  Mo.  479,  25 
S.  W.  Rep.  932  ;  Jarstadt  v.  Morgan,  48 
Wis.  245,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  27  ;  Weisbrod  i-. 
P.ailroad  Co.  18  Wis.  35  ;  Cox  v.  Railroad 
Co.  48  Ind.  178;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co. 
V.  Gould,  67  Md.  60,  63,  8  Atl.  Rep.  7.54; 
Hall  V.  Baltimore,  56  Md.  187  ;  White  v. 


BOUNDARY    BY    HIGHWAY.  [§§  451,  452. 

But  the  purchaser  of  a  lot  according  to  a  plat  showing  a  street 
immediately  adjoining,  even  if  the  fee  of  the  street  to  the  centre 
thereof  is  conveyed  to  him,  acquires  only  an  easement  in  the  street, 
and  cannot  take  possession  of  any  part  thereof,  and  exclude  there- 
from the  vendor,  who  has  lots  on  the  other  side  of  the  street, 
though  the  street  has  not  been  accepted  as  a  public  street.^ 

451.  But  such  a  sale  is  not  strictly  a  dedication  of  the 
streets  indicated  on  such  plat  to  the  public  for  use  as  higli- 
■ways.-  The  acts  and  declarations  of  the  owner  niay  be  evidence 
tending  to  show  a  design  on  his  part,  presently  or  at  a  future  time, 
to  dedicate  the  streets  to  public  use,  but  they  are  not  in  them- 
selves a  conclusive  surrender  of  the  land  so  set  apart  for  use  as 
public  highways. 

But  if  the  plat  i-eferred  to  contains  a  statement  reserving  all 
rights  and  privileges  not  expressly  granted,  and  providing  that 
nothing  should  be  taken  by  implication  to  be  granted,  there  can 
be  no  implication  of  a  dedication  of  streets  or  land  reserved  for 
parks  to  the  use  of  the  public.  Even  if  the  grantor,  before  mak- 
ing the  deed,  has  represented  that  land  marked  upon  the  plat  for 
use  as  streets  or  parks  would  be  dedicated  to  the  public,  the 
purchaser  by  taking  such  deed  waives  the  benefit  of  such  repre- 
sentation.'^ 

452.  A  deed  of  land  by  a  plat  shov^ing  a  street  or  alley  as 
a  boundary  conveys  the  title  to  the  centre  of  the  street  or 
alley,  jDrovided  the  grantor's  title  extends  to  the  centre."^  Even 
if  the  grantor  retains  the  fee  of  the  streets,  the  grantee  acquires 
a  right  of  way  over  them  as  an  easement  appurtenant  to  the  land 
conveyed.^ 

Flannigain,  1   Md.  525 ;  Transue  v.  Sell,  Co.  v.  Bachman,  66  N.  Y.  261 ;  Baker  v. 

105   Pa.    St.  604;  Trutt  v.  Spott.s,  87  Pa.  Mott,  78  Hun,   141,   28   N.  Y.  Supp.  968; 

St.  339  ;  McKee  v.  Perchment,  69  Pa.  St.  Holdane  v.  Cold  Sjiriiifr,  21  N.  Y.  474. 

342;   McCmU   v.  Davis,  56   Pa.   St.   431;  '-^  Kelly   v.    West    Sentile    Laud    Co.  4 

Bin))inf;hi)iTi  i-  Andersou,  48  Pa.  St.  253  ;  Wash.  St.  194,  29  Pac.  Hep.  1054. 

Fergusotr.s  App.  117    Pa.  St.  426,  1 1    Atl.  *  Alameda    Macadamizing  Co.  v.   Wil- 

Rep.885.  Hams.    70  Cal.  534,    12    Pac.   Kep.   530; 

1  Merrill  v.  Newton,  99  Mich.  226,  58  Jacob  v.  WoolfoJk,  90  Ky.  426,  14  S.  W. 
N.  W.  Rej).  70 ;  Williams  v.  St.  Louis,  Rep  415;  Schneider  v.  Jacob,  86  Ky. 
120  Mo.  403,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  561.  And  101;  Gould  v.  Howe,  131  111.490,23  N. 
see  Boland  v.  St.  John's  Schools  (Mass.),  E.  Rep.  602. 

39  N.  E.  Rep.  1035.  ^  Smyles  i'.  Hastings,  22  N.  Y".  217; 

2  People  V.  Kellogg,  67  Hun,  546,  22  Baker  v.  Mott,  78  Hun,  141,  28  N.  Y. 
N.  Y.  Supp.  490;  Niagara   Falls  Bridge      Supp.  968. 

VOL.  I.  369 


§  4oo.]  DESCKirriuN  and  boundauil;s. 

Ill  two  or  tliree  States  this  rule  does  not  apply,  where  the  plat 
is  iiiaile  out  and  recorded  in  coiiforinity  Avith  the  statutes  of  such 
States  upon  that  subject;  but  this  is  becausi-  the  courts  of  those 
States  hohl  that  the  statutes  vest  the  entire  title,  beneficial  and 
otherwitie,  in  the  city,  town,  or  C(junty,  so  that  the  dedicator  lias 
no  interest  left  in  him  wliicli  is  the  subject  of  grant.^  Under 
such  a  statute  the  fee  in  the  streets  is  held  in  trust  for  street  pur- 
poses, and  for  no  other  use  or  purpose.  Every  other  beneficial 
use  is  in  the  lot-owners,  and  tliis  interest  of  the  lot-owners  will 
pass  by  a  conveyance  of  the  lot.'^  The  conveyance  of  a  lot  facing 
on  a  street  set  apart  in  the  plat  for  the  use  of  the  owner  of  the 
lots  abutting  thereon  conveys  only  an  easement  in  the  street.^ 

453.  When  a  grant  is  made  bounded  upon  a  "way  or  lane, 
with  the  privilege  of  using  it,  the  grant  of  the  easement  may, 
in  the  light  of  surrounding  circumstances,  tend  to  show  that 
there  was  no  grant  of  the  fee  of  any  part  of  the  lane.*  In  a 
grant  of  land  upon  a  higliway,  the  grantor  does  not  convey  to 
liis  grantee  a  right  of  way,  for  this  already  exists,  and  is  to  be 
kept  in  repair  at  the  public  expense.  The  grantor,  not  being 
burdened  with  any  covenant,  express  or  implied,  that  the  grantee 
shall  have  a  right  of  way,  has  no  occasion  to  retain  the  fee  of  the 
liighway  for  that  purpose;  but  when  the  way  is  one  that  the 
grantor  has  expressly  or  impliedly  assured  to  the  grantee,  it  is 
said  that  there  is  occasion  for  the  grantor  to  retain  the  fee  to  make 
his  assurance  good.^ 

But  the  better  view  is  that  the  grant  in  such  a  deed  of  a  privi- 
lege to  use  a  passageway  in  common  with  tlie  grantor  and  others 
does  not  exclude  the  inference  of  a  grant  of  one  half  thereof,  be- 
cause the  grant  of  such  a  privilege  is  designed  to  show  that  the 

1  Canal  Trustees  v.  Havens,  11  III.  554  ;  Snoddy  v.  Bolen,  122  Mo.  479,  25  S.  W. 

Union  Coal  Co.  v.  City  of  La   Salle,  136  Rep.  932. 

111.  119,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  506;  Des  Moines  2  Bridge   Co.   v.  Schaubacher,  57   Mo. 

V.  Hall,  24  Iowa,  234.     See,  alst),   Trus-  582  ;  Price    v.    Thompson,    48   Mo.    361  ; 

tecs  V.  Ilawes,  6  Bnsh,  232.     It  may  be  Ferrenbach  v.  Turner,  86  Mo.  416. 

observed    that   an   entirely  different  con-  '^  Tatum  v.   St.  Louis  (Mc),  28  S.  W. 

strnction  has  been  given  to  the  statutes  Rep.  1002. 

of  Wisconsin  and  Minnesota  concerning  *  Hobson  v.  Philadelphia,  150  Pa.  St. 

town  plats,  wbich  statutes  are  said  to  be  595,  24  Atl.   Rep.  1048,  31  W.  N.  C.  9 ; 

the  same  as  that  of  Illinois.     Kimball  v.  Mott  v.  Mott,  68  N.  Y.  246. 

Ki'nosha,  4  Wis.  321  ;  Milwaukee  v.  Mil-  ^  Bangor  House  v.  Brown,  33  Me.  309; 

waukee  &   B.  R.   Co.   7    Wis.  85  ;  Schur-  Ames   v.   Hilton,  70    Me.  36  ;  Palmer  r. 

nieier  v.  Railroad  Co.  10  Minn,  82.     See  Dougherty,  33  Me.  502,  54  Am.  Dec.  636. 

370 


BOUNDARY   BY   HIGHWAY.  [§  454, 

grantee  sliall  have  a  right  to  use  the  whole  width  of  such  pas- 
sageway.^ 

A  deed  describing  the  land  as  extending  "  to  a  driveway,  thence 
easterly  on  said  driveway  "  a  certain  distance,  and  reserving  all 
existing  rights  of  way  over  the  driveway,  and  declaring  that  said 
(hiveway  shall  remain  open  and  common  to  all  parties  having  a 
light  therein,  conveys  title  in  fee  to  its  centre,  subject  to  such 
easements,  and  with  a  corresponding  easement  over  the  other  half.^ 

454.  The  intention  as  regards  conveying  to  the  middle  of 
the  street  is  to  be  found  not  only  in  the  terms  used  in  tlie  deed, 
but  in  the  circumstances  attending  the  transaction.  Each  case  is 
to  be  decided  in  large  part  according  to  its  own  circumstances.-^ 
But  in  some  way  the  intent  to  exclude  the  entire  street  must 
appear,  else  the  general  presumption  will  prevail.  Such  intent 
is  not  presumed,  but  on  the  contrary  the  intent  to  include  the 
street  to  the  middle  line  is  presumed.*  A  manifest  intention 
not  to  grant  the  fee  to  the  centre  of  the  street  was  shown  in  a 
case  where  a  town  granted  to  the  owner  of  land  bordering  on 
a  highway,  the  fee  of  which  was  in  the  town,  a  strip  of  land 
from  the  highway,  and  discontinued  such  strip  as  a  part  of  the 
highway.^  The  mere  fact  that  the  land  is  not  described  as  abut- 
ting or  bounding  on  a  highway,  and  that  the  highway  is  not  men- 
tioned, does  not  prevent  the  application  of  the  rule  if  in  fact  the 
land  borders  on  it.^     Thus,  where  the  property  conveyed  was  de- 

1  Gould  V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  142  Mass.  Mass.  231  ;  Phelps  v.  Webster,  134  Mass. 
85,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  543;  Motley  v.  Sargent,  17;  Webber  v.  Eastern  R.  R,  Co.  2  Met. 
119  Mass.  231;  Peck  v.  Denniston,  121  147;  Codinan  v.  Evans,  1  Allen,  443; 
Mass.  17;  Stark  v.  Coflfin,  105  Mass.  328;  White's  Bank  v.  Nichols,  64  N.  Y.  65; 
Lewis  V.  Beattic,  105  Mass.  410  ;  Winslow  Mott  v.  Mott,  68  N.  Y.  246  ;  In  re  Ladue, 
i\  King,  14  Gray,  321  ;  Boston  v.  Rich-  118  N.  Y.  213;  Jackson  v.  Hathaway,  15 
ardson,  13  Allen.  146;  White  v.  Godfrey,  Johns.  447,  8  Am.  Dec.  263;  Augustine 
97  Mass.  472;  Boland  v.  St.  John's  v.  Britt,  15  Hnn,  395,  affirmed  80  N.  Y. 
Schools  (Mas-.),  39  N.  E.  Rep.  1035.  647;  Kiiiji's  County  Eire  Insurance  Co.  v. 

2  Boland  v.  St.  John's  Schools  (Mass.),  Stevens,  87  N.  Y.  287  ;  Dexter  i;.  Riverside 
39  N.  E.  Rep.  1035.  And  see  Eisher  v.  Mills,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  ,^74  ;  Hughes  i-.  Prov. 
Sniitl),  9   Gray,  441  ;  Boston  ?-.  Ri-hard-  &  W.  R.  Co.  2  R.  I.  508. 

son,   13    Allen,    146,   153,   154;  White  v.  *  Pollock   i-.   Morris,   19  J.  &  S.    112; 

Godfrey,    97    Mass.    472,    474;    Stark    v.  Mott   v.    Mott,   68   N.  Y.   246;  Marsh  v. 

Coffin,  105  Mass.  328,  330.  Burt,  .U   V't.  289;  Henderson   v.  Hatter- 

3  Salisbury  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  man,  146  III.  555,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  1041. 

5  C.  B    N.   S.   174;   Hamlin  v.  Pairpoint  ■'  Gaylord  v.  King,  142  Mass.  495,  8  N. 

Manuf.  Co.  141    Mass.   51,  6   N.  E.  Rep.  E.  Rep.  596. 

531  ;  Gaylord   v.   King,   142  Mass.  495,  8  «  Bissell  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.  23 

N.  E.  Rep.  596;  Motley  tj.  Sargent,  119  N.   Y.   61;    Gear   v.   Barnum,  37    Conn. 

371 


§§  45"),  450.]  DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDAKIES. 

scribed  as  a  store  buildino;,  and  the  land  on  which  it  stood  in  fact 
bounded  upon  the  higliway,  tlie  mere  fact  that  tlie  highway  is 
not  mentioned  does  not  vary  the  general  rule  tliat  a  conveyance 
bv  a,  highway  I'anies  the  feu  to  the  centre  of  it.' 

455.  The  fact  that  the  measurements  of  the  side  lines 
reach  only  to  the  outer  line  of  a  highway  is  not  sufficient  to 
control  the  piesum{)tion  of  an  intention  to  convey  the  fee  to  the 
centre  of  the  highway.'-^  Where  the  description  carried  the  parcel 
so  many  feet  to  a  street  named,  "•thence  along  the  northerly  side 
of  saitl  street,"'  it  was  held  that  the  fee  of  the  street  to  the  centre 
passed  by  the  deed.'^  The  presumption  of  a  conveyance  to  the 
cientre  of  the  street  is  not  rebutted  in  case  of  a  boundary  by  a 
road  '■'  to  a  stone  wall,"  and  thence  by  the  wall,  by  the  fact  that 
the  wall  terminated  at  the  side  of  the  street.  In  such  case  the 
boundary  is  by  the  centre  of  the  road  to  the  line  of  the  wall  ex- 
tended."* A  boundary  by  "  other  land  of  the  grantor  on  a  pas- 
sageway," when  in  fact  there  is  no  passageway  and  the  only 
reference  to  it  is  in  this  description,  includes  no  part  of  any  pas- 
sageway.     The  boundary  is  controlled  by  the  measurements.^ 

456.  The  fact  that  the  measurements  and  the  coloring  of  a 
plan  referred  to  exclude  the  streets  is  not  sufficient  to  control 
the  presumption  that  the  deed  passes  the  fee  to  the  centre  of  the 
streets.^  "  But  although  in  such  cases  the  literal  description  in 
the  conveyance  does  not  in  terms  include  the  grantor's  interest  in 


229;  Champlin  v.  Pendleton,  13  Conn. 
23. 

1  Gear  v.  Barnum,  37  Conn.  229;  Hen- 
derson V.  Hatterman,  146  111.  5.55,  34  N. 
E.  Rep.  1041. 

■^  Oxton  V  Groves,  68  Me.  371,  28  Am. 
Rep.  75;  Hunt  v.  Kicii,38  Me.  195;  John- 
son V.  Amlerson,  18  Me.  76  ;  Cottle  v. 
Younf(,  59  Me.  105;  Woodman  v.  Spen- 
cer, 54  N.  II  507  ;  Moody  v.  Palmer,  50 
Cal.  31  ;  Clark  v.  Parker,  106  Mass.  554  ; 
Siark  i;.  Coffin,  105  Mass.  328;  Motley  y. 
Sargent,  119  Mass.  231  ;  Codman  v.  Evans, 
1  Allen,  443;  Dean  v.  Lowell,  135  Mass. 
55 ;  Gould  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  142  Mass. 
85,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  543  ;  Walker  v.  Boyn- 
ton,  120  .Mass.  .349;  Phillips  v.  Bowers, 
7  Gray,  21  ;  Newliall  v.  Ireson,  8  Cu>h. 
595,55  Am.  Dec.  790;  Gear  t-.  Barnum, 

372 


37  Conn.  229  ;  Peck  v.  Smith,  1  Conn. 
103,  6  Am.  Dec.  216;  Cox  r.  Freedley, 
33  Pa.  St.  124,  75  Am.  Dec.  584;  Paul 
V.  Carver,  26  Pa.  St.  223 ;  Henderson  v. 
Hatterman,  146  III.  555,  34  N.  E.  Rep. 
1041. 

3  Paul  V.  Carver,  26  Pa.  St.  2:3,  67 
Am.  Dec.  413;  Cox  i'.  Frcedley,  33  Pa. 
St.  124,  75  Am.  Dec.  584;  Pollock  v. 
Morri.s,  19  J.  &  S.  112;  Foreman  u.  Pres- 
byterian Asso.  (Md.)  30  Atl.  Rep.  1114. 

*  Dean  v.  Lowell,  135  Mass.  55. 

5  Treat  v.  Joslyn,  139  Mass.  94,  29  N. 
E.  Rep.  653. 

6  Porridge  v.  Ward,  10  C.  B.  N.  S. 
400;  Gould  V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  142 
Mass.  85,  89,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  543  ;  White's 
Bank  V.  Nichols,  64  N.  Y.  65,  71  ;  Pollock 
V.  Morris,  19  J.  &  S.  112. 


BOUNDARY    BY   HIGHWAY.  [§§  457-459. 

the  adjacent  sti-eets  or  passageways,  yet  the  presumption  is  so 
stronf  that  a  grantor  under  such  circumstances  does  not  hitend  to 
retain  the  fee  therein,  sul^ject  to  the  right  of  way,  after  disposing 
of  all  his  interest  in  the  land  which  is  subject  to  exclusive  occu-  ' 
pancy,  that  it  lias  come  to  be  established  as  a  rule  of  law  that  the 
conveyance  will  by  implication  be  held  to  include  one  half  of 
such  adjacent  streets  and  passageways,  if  the  grantor  owns  the 
same,  unless  there  is  something  further  to  show  a  contrary  inten- 
tion."^ When  by  statute  the  fee  of  streets  shown  upon  recorded 
plats  is  vested  in  the  city,  town,  or  county,  land  conveyed  by 
reference  to  such  plats  necessarily  excludes  the  streets.^ 

457.  In  accordance  with  the  general  rule,  an  exception  of 
a  highway  is  not  an  exception  of  the  fee,  unless  such  cleai'ly 
appears  to  iiave  been  the  intention,  but  only  of  the  easement  of 
the  public  to  the  use  of  such  highway.^  In  like  manner  the 
grant  of  a  way  or  of  the  privilege  of  a  highway  carries  an  ease- 
ment oidy.*  A  reservation  by  the  grantor  of  a  road  through  the 
land  conveyed,  in  order  to  enable  him  to  reach  a  highway  from 
other  land  owned  by  him,  will  be  presumed,  in  the  absence  of  a 
clear  indication  in  the  deed  to  the  contrary,  to  be  a  reservation 
merely  of  the  use  of  the  road,  and  not  the  fee  therein.^ 

458.  The  general  rule  does  not  apply  when  the  grantor 
does  not  own  the  fee  of  the  street.  The  law  will  not  presume 
that  he  intended  to  convey  land  which  he  did  not  own.'^ 

If  land  taken  for  a  canal  has  been  acquired  in  fee  from  the 
adjoining  owners,  a  conveyance  by  such  owners  of  land  bounded 
by  the  canal  is  a  conveyance  only  to  the  exterior  line  of  the 
canal.' 

459.  Where  the  grantor  owns  the  fee  of  the  entire  street,  a 

1  Gould  r.  Eastern  R.  'R.  142  Mass.  85,  ^  "Redemptorist  v.  AVenig  (Md.),  29  Atl. 
89,  7  N.  K.  He]..  54.3,  per  C.  Allen,  J.  Rep.  667. 

2  Burbiifh  r.  Scliweiiiler,  .56  Wis.  386,  e  Church  v.  Stiles,  5!»  Vt.  C42,  10  Atl. 
14  N.  W.  Rep.  449.  Rep.  674  ;  Dunham  r.  Williams,  37  N.  Y. 

3  Rieluirdson  r.  Palmer,  38  N.  II.  212;  251;  fn  re  Robbiiis,  34  Minn.  99,  24 
Kuhn  r.  Farnsvvorth,  69  Me.  404  ;  Moid-  N.  W.  Rep.  356,  57  Am.  Rep.  40;  Cole 
ton  r.  Trafion,  64  Me.  218;  Elliot  v.  v.  Iladley,  162  Mass.  579,39  N.  E.  Rep. 
Small,  35  Minn.  396,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  158,  279  ;  Watrous  w.  Southworth,  5  Conn.  305; 
59  Am.  Hep.  329;  Peck  iv  Smith,  1  Conn.  Rurhach  v.  Schweinler,  56  Wis.  386,  14 
103,  6  Am.  Dec.  216.  N.  W.  Rep.  449.      Conlni,  Ayres  v.  Penn. 

«  .TaniMica  Pond  Aq.  Co.  v.  Chandler,  9  R.  R.  Co.  48  N.  J.  L.  44,  3  Atl.  Rep.  885, 
Allen,  1.59.  57  Am.  Rep.  538. 

■  Hunt  V.  Raplee,  44  Hun,  149. 
873 


§§  400,  4lil.]  DJ.SCKll'TlOX    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


presuinptioii  arises  tliut,  upon  a  sale  of  land  bounded  upon  the 
strci't,  he  intt'McK-d  to  convey  the  fee  in  the  stieet  to  the  opposite 
bounchirv,  if  he  owns  no  hind  on  the  opposite?  side  of  the  street, 
and  did  not  intend  to  retain  an  interest  in  any  portion  of  the 
sLrect  fronting  the  land  so  conveyed.^  Of  course,  if  there  is  any 
reason  for  supposing  the  grantor  did  not  intend  to  convey  the  fee 
(if  the  entire  width  of  the  street,  as  in  case  he  has  interests 
in  the  land  the  otlier  side  of  the  street,  such  as  riparian  rights, 
then  the  ordinary  presumption  will  apply,  and  the  grantee  will 
take  the  fee  only  to  the  niidelle  of  the  street."-^ 

460.  The  rule  does  not  apply  when  the  grantor,  after  mak- 
ing a  conveyance,  lays  out  a  street  adjoining  the  land  conveyed, 
without  having  referred  in  such  conveyance  to  any  street  or 
way.''^ 

461.  The  rule  of  construction  is  not  uniform,  for  in  some 
States  strong  language  indicative  of  the  intention  to  exclude  a 
grant  of  the  fee  of  the  street  is  required  to  rebut  the  presump- 
tion of  intent  to  grant  the  way.  Thus  in  several  States  the  rule 
seems  to  be  that  nothing  short  of  direct  expression  of  intention 
to  exclude  the  soil  of  the  highway  will  have  the  effect  of  exclud- 
ing it.'*    In  these  States  the  mere  mention  of  the  side  of  the  road, 

1  Healey  v.  Babbitt,  14  R.  I.  533;  Gray,  21  ;  Smith  i'.Slocomb,9  Gray,  36,  69 
Thomiison  v.  Major,  58  N.  H.  242;  In  re  Am.  Dec.  274 ;  Siblt-y  v.  Holden,  10  Tick. 
Robl)ins,  34  Minn.  99,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  356, 
57  Am.  Rep.  40  ;  Taylor  v.  Armstrong, 
24  Ark.  102;  Suoddy  u.  Bolen,  122  Mo. 
479,  25  S.  \V.  Rep.  932,  per  Black,  J. ; 
Wait  V.  May,  48  Minn.  453,  51  N.  W. 
Rep.  471  ;  Ilahermau  v.  Baker,  128  N.  Y. 
253,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  370. 

2  Crisbine  v.  St.  Paul  &  S.  C.  R.  Co. 
23  Minu.  114. 

3  Knott  V.  Jefferson  St.  Ferry  Co.  9 
Oreg.  530 ;  Valley  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v. 
We.>r,  58  Wis.  599,  17  N.  W.  Rep.  554. 

*  Connecticut :  Peck  v.  Smith,  1  Conn. 
103,  6  Am.  Dec.  216  ;  Gear  v.  Bariium,  37 
Conn.  229.  Maryland:  Laws  1892,  ch. 
684  ;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gould, 
67  Md.  60.  8  Atl.  Rep.  754;  Peabody 
Heights  Co.  v.  Sadtler,  63  Md.  533,  52 
Am.  Rep.  519  ;  Foreman  v.  Presbyterian 
Asso.  (Md.)  30  Atl.  Rep.  1114.  Massa- 
chnsetts :  Newhall  v.  Ireson,  8  Cush.  595, 
54   Am.   Dec.  790;   Phillips   f.  Bowers,  7 

374 


249,20  Am.  Dec.  521.  Missouri:  Grant 
V.  Moon  (Mo.),  30  S.  W.  Rep.  328  ;  Snoddy 
V.  Bolen,  122  Mo.  479,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  142, 
25  S.  W.  Rep.  932.  Rhode  Island:  An- 
thony V.  Providence  (R.  I.),  28  Atl  Rep. 
766.  Mr.  Justice  Stiness  said  :  "  The  law 
should  be  uniform,  and  that  which  is  es- 
tablished in  case  of  a  boundary  'upon' 
or  '  by  '  should  apply  to  all  cases,  except 
where  there  is  a  clear  and  express  reserva- 
tion. Such  a  rule  is  useful,  reasonable, 
and  just.  It  rests  upon  no  new  doctrine, 
out  it  is  the  unavoidable  logic  of  the  prom- 
ise which  in  any  case  extends  a  boundary 
into  the  highway.  Its  utility  is  evidenced 
by  statutory  enactment  in  several  States, 
and  its  authority  is  abundantly  sustained 
by  the  better  reason  and  greater  weight 
of  decision."  Pennsylvania  :  Cox  i;.  Freed- 
ley,  33  Pa.  St.  124;  Paul  v.  Carver,  26 
Pa.  St.  223 ;  Trutt  v.  Spotts,  87  Pa.  St. 
339  ;  Transue  v.  Sell,  105  Pa.  St.  604. 


BOUNDARY    BY   HIGHWAY.  [§  462. 

or  of  a  monument  on  the  side  of  a  road,  as  the  place  of  beghi- 
ning  or  end  uf  a  line,  is  not  sufficient  to  exclude  the  road  from 
the  grant. ^  Even  a  boundary  by  the  south  line  of  a  street  has 
been  held  to  pass  the  title  to  the  centre  line  of  it.^  If,  however,  in 
addition  to  such  words,  there  are  other  words  or  metes  and  bounds 
showing  an  intention  to  exclude  the  highway,  such  intention  must 
prevail.'^ 

462.  The  presumption  is  more  readily  met,  however,  in 
other  States,  and  the  intention  that  the  highway  shall  be  wholly 
excluded  from  the  grant  may  be  gathered  from  indirect  words 
interpreted  with  reference  to  attending  circumstances.  In  these 
States,  if  a  boundarj'  commences  at  a  point  or  monument  on  the 
side  of  a  road  and  thence  runs  along  the  road,  the  boundary  is 
by  the  margin  of  the  road  and  not  by  its  centre  line.^  The  rule 
is  the  same  although  the  deed  states  that  the  road  was  laid  out  for 
the  accommodation  of  purchasers  of  lots  bounding  upon  the  road, 
and  the  location  of  the  lots  and  of  the  road  is  shown  on  a  plat. 

In  a  recent  case  in  New  York  the  Court  of  Appeals  said  : 
*'  There  is  great  difficulty  in  reconciling  the  decisions  in  this  State 
upon  the  question  of  when  a  description  in  a  deed  which  bounds 
the  premises  upon  a  highway  or  street  shall  be  deemed  to  take 
in  the  fee  to  the  centre  line  of  the  roadbed  in  front  of  the  prem- 
ises. There  is  no  doubt  about  the  rule  being  settled  that  there  is 
a  legal  presumption  against  the  grantor's  intending  to  reserve  to 
himself  the  title  to  the  soil  of  the  highway,  and  that  such  pre- 
sumption is  only  overcome  b}'  language  in  the  conveyance  clearly 
indicating  such  an  intention  on  his  part ;  but   the  application  of 

1  Low  V.  Tibbetts,  72  Me.  92,  39  Am.  361 ;  English  v.  Brennan,  60  N.  Y.  609 ; 

Rep.  303;  Cottle  v.  Young,  59  Me.  105,  White's  Bank  v.  Nichols,  64  N.   Y.  65; 

109;  Johnson   c.  Anderson,  18  Me.  76;  Mead  v.  Kiley,   18  J.  &  S.   20;    Tag  v. 

Chamjilin  r.  Pendleton,  13  Conn.  23;  Bor-  Keteltas,    16   J.    &.   S.   241;    Jackson   v. 

oujrh  of  Easton's  App.  81  I'a.  St.  85  ;  Cox  Hathaway,   15  Johns.   447,   8  Am.    Dec. 

V.  Freedley,  33  Pa.  St.  124,  70  Am.  Dec.  263;  Lee  v.   Lee,  27   Hun,  1  ;  Dexter  v. 

684;  Paul   v.  Carver,  26  Pa.    St.   223,  67  Riverside  Mills  Co.  15  N.  Y.   Supp.  374  ; 

Am.  Dec.  413.  Greer  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  II.  K.  R.  Co.  37 

-  Kncoland    r.    Van    Valkeiil)iirj;h,    46  IIiui,  346;  De  IVv.^tir  i:  Mali,  27   Hiiu, 

Wi.s.  434,   32    Am.    Rep.  719.     Sec,  how-  43r) ;  Auf^ustinu  r.  Hritt,  15  Ilnn,  395,  af- 

ever,  §  463.  firmed  80  N.  Y.  647  ;  Morison  i\  New  York 

3  Hohoken    Land   Co.   r.  lurri-an,  31  Elevated    R.  Co.  74    Hun,  398,  26   N.   Y. 

N.  J.  L.  13.     See  §  465.  Supp.  641  ,  Holloway  i\  Sonthmayd,  139 

■•  Blacknian  r.  Rihy,  138  N.  Y.  318,  34  N.   Y.   .390,  64  Hun,  27,  18  N.   Y.    Supp. 

N.  K.  l{cp.  214;  King's  Co.  Fire  Ins  Co.  707,  28  Abb.  N.  C.  183,  190. 
V.   Stevens,  87   N.    Y.   287,  41    Am.  Rep. 

375 


§  403.] 


DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDAKIKS. 


tlu'  rule  is  made  uucirtaiii,  tliroiigli  the  varyiiij^'  opinions  of 
courts  as  to  the  iiil'ereiiccs  which  we  shall  draw  as  to  the  intention 
from  the  words  in  whicli  the  grant  is  couched."  ^ 

463.  It  is  quite  generally  held  tha.t  when  the  descriptive 
words  are,  ''by  the  side  of,"  "by  the  margin  of,"  or  "by  the 
line  of,"  or  equivalent  terms,  the  ice  of  tlie  highway  is  excluded.- 
A  boundarj'  line  whirh  runs  across  a  road,  antl  thence  by  the  side 
of  the  road,  is  by  the  margin  of  the  road  and  not  by  its  centre.  In 
such  case  the  hinguage  is  express  that  the  boundary  is  not  on  the 
road,  but  by  the  side  of  it.^ 

A  boundai'y  described  as  running  between  fixed  monuments 
on  the  side  of  a  street  does  not  include  the  fee  of  the  street  to 
the  centre.^     So,  also,  where  one  end  of  a  line  is  fixed  on  the  side 


1  Holloway  v.  Southmayd,  139  N.  Y. 
390,  400,  per  Gray,  J.  "  Hullicii'iit  evi- 
dence of  that  uncertainty  of  application 
will  be  found  from  rcadinji;  the  opinions 
since  the  early  case  of  Jackson  v.  Hath- 
away, 15  Johns.  447,  down  to  a  very  re- 
cent date." 

2  Angell  on  Highways,  §  314.  Cali- 
fornia: Moody  V.  Palmer,  50  Cal.  .31  ; 
Severy  v.  Central  Pac.  K.  Co.  51  tJal. 
194;  Alameda  Macadamizing  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 70  Cal.  534.  Illinois:  Chicago  ;;. 
Rumsey,  87  111.  348;  Helm  v.  Web-ter, 
85  111.  116.  Maine:  Cottle  v.  Young,  59 
Me.  105;  Oxton  v.  Groves,  68  Me.  371, 
28  Am.  Rep.  75.  Maryland:  Baltimore 
&  0.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Gould,  67  Md.  60,  8 
Atl.  Rep.  754;  Peabody  Heights  Co.  (;. 
Sailtler,  63  Md.  533,  52  Am.  Hep.  519. 
Massachusetts:  Hamlin  v.  Pairpoint 
Manuf.  Co.  141  Ma-s.  .'il,  6  N.  E.  Rep. 
.531;  Phelps  v.  Webster,  134  Mass.  17; 
Holmes  V.  Turner's  Falls  Co.  142  Mass. 
590,  8  N.  E.  Rep.  646  ;  Smith  v.  Slocomb, 
9  Gray,  36,  69  Am.  Dec.  274;  Phillips  v. 
Bowers,  7  Gray,  21  ;  Sibley  ?•.  Ilolden,  10 
Pick.  249,  20  Am.  Dec.  521  ;  Braliiard  v. 
Boston  &  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  12  Gray, 
407.  Michigan:  Grand  Rapids  &  Ind.R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Heisel,  38  Mich.  62,  31  Am.  Rep. 
306.  New  York:  Greer  v.  New  Yoik 
Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  37  Hun,  346; 
Clark  V.  Rochester  City  R.  Co.  2  N.  Y. 
Supp.  563  ;  Mead  r.  Riley,  18  J.  &  S.  20 ; 

:;76 


.Jackson  v.  Hathaway,  1 5  Johns.  447,  8  Am. 
Dec.  263  ;  King's  Co.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stevens, 
87  N.  Y.  287,  41  Am.  Rep.  361 ;  Starr  v. 
Child,  5  Den.  599  ;  Halsey  v.  McCormiek, 
13  N.  Y.  296;  Fearing  v.  Irwin,  4  Daly, 
385 ;  De  Peyster  v.  Mali,  27  Hun,  439 ; 
Dexter  v.  Riverside  Mills,  15  N.  Y.  Su|)p. 
374  ;  Holloway  r.  Delano,  139  N.  Y.  390, 
34  N.  B.  Rep.  1052,  affirming  18  N.  Y. 
Supp.  704;  Holloway  v.  Southmayd,  139 
N.  y.  390,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  1047.  New  Jer- 
sey :  Salter  v.  Jonas,  39  N,  J.  L.  469,  23 
Am.  Rep.  229;  Hoboken  Land  Co.  v. 
Keiri^zan,  31  N.  J.  L.  13.  Ohio:  Lough 
V.  Machlin,  40  Ohio  St.  332.  Rhode  Is- 
land:  Hughes  V.  Providence  R.  R.  Co.  2 
R.  I.  508  ;  Anthony  v.  Providence  (R.  I.), 
28  Atl.  Rep.  766.  Vermont:  Morrow  ?-. 
Willard,  30  Vt.  118.  Wisconsin:  Knee- 
land  f.  Van  Valkcuburg,  46  Wis.  434,  32 
Am.  Rep.  719. 

3  Holmes  i:  Turner's  Falls  Co.  142 
Mass.  590,  8  N.  E.  Roj).  646. 

4  Peabody  Heights  Co.  v.  Sadtler,  63 
Mil.  533  ;  Hunt  v.  Brown,  75  Md.  481,  23 
Atl.  Rep.  1029,  per  Robinson,  J.  "At 
the  same  time  we  cannot  shut  our  eyes  to 
the  fact  that  in  nitie  cases  out  of  ten  there 
is  no  intention  either  way  on  the  part  of 
the  grantor  or  the  grantee.  .  .  .  And  to 
av(]i(l  litigation  of  this  kind,  involving  the 
construction  as  to  the  intention  of  the 
parties,  at  the  best  sometimes  doubtful,  it 
would  be  l;etter,  it  seems  to  us,  to  declare 


BOUNDARY    BY   HIGHWAY. 


[§  464. 


of  a  highway,  no  rule  of  construction  will  justify  the  location  of 
the  other  end  of  that  line  in  the  centre  of  it.  Such  a  location 
should  be  made  only  when  required  by  express  words  to  that 
eff.ct.i 

464.  A  deed  merely  describing  land  as  situate  on  the  side 
of  a  street  passes  the  title  to  the  centre  of  the  street. ^  And  so 
a  deed  describing  land  ;is  "beginning  on  the  southerly  side"  of  a 
road,  at  the  corner  of  land  belonging  to  a  third  person  named, 
and  thence  running  on  said  road,  conveys  the  title  to  the  middle 
of  the  road.'^  In  these  cases  no  fixed  monument,  such  as  a  stake 
and  stones  at  the  edge  of  the  road,  is  referred  to,  and  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  the  application  of  the  general  rule.  In  case 
a  stake  and  stones  referred  to  are  not  to  be  found,  it  seems  the 
title  to  the  centre  line  of  the  road  would  pass.* 

On  the  other  hand,  some  of  the  cases  go  even  to  the  extent  of 
holding  that  the  point  of  intersection  of  two  streets  taken  as  a 
starting-point  may  indicate  an  intention  to  exclude  a  grant  of  the 
fee  of  a  street.  The  point  thus  established  is  regarded  as  control- 
ling the  other  parts  of  the  description,  and  lines  running  thence 
along  the  streets  are  confined  to  the  exterior  lines  of  the  streets, 
and  the  soil  of  the  street  is  not  included.^ 


by  legislative  enactment  tliat  all  grants 
hereafter  niiide  of  land  bordering  on  a 
hiL;liway  shall  carry  the  fee  to  the  middle 
of  the  highway,  jirovidcd  the  grantor  is 
the  owner  of  the  fee,  nnless  the  fee  is  re- 
served in  exijress  terms  to  the  grantor." 
Such  a  statute  wMs  eiuicied.  Laws  1892, 
ch.  684. 

1  Ricnian   v.   Baltimore    Belt    R.   Co. 
(Md)  31    Atl.  Rep.   444.     In    Sibley  v. 


*  Chadwick  v.  Davis,  143  Mass.  7,  8  N. 
E.  Rep.  601. 

5  Rieman  i\  Baltimore  Belt  R.  Co. 
(Md.)  31  Atl.  Rep.  444.  The  description 
in  a  deed  was  as  follows :  "  Beginning  .  .  . 
at  the  southeast  corner  or  interjection  of 
H  and  G  streets,  and  running  thence  east- 
erly, bounding  on  G  Street,  25  feet ;  then 
southerly,  parallel  with  H  Street,  80  feet, 
to  an  alley;  tlien  westerly,  bounding  on 


Holden,  10  Pick.  249,  the  Supreme  Court  said  alley,  to  11  Street,  25  feet ;  and  thence 

of    Massachusetts    uses    this    language:  northerly,  bounding  on  H  Street,  to  the 

"  As  one  point  in  this  line  is  fixed  by  the  place   of   beginning."     It  was   held   that 

description  to  the  side  of  the  road,  we  are  "the    southeast   corner"    of    II    and    G 

satisfied  thnt,  by  a  just  and  necessary  con-  streets   was   the  point   of    intersection  of 

struction,  the  other  point  must  be  taken  the  east  side  of  M  Street  and  the  .■■otith  side 

to  be  iit  the  sMine   side  of  the   road,  and  of  G   Street,  and  no  jiart  of  the  roadbed 

therefore  the  soil  of  the  road  is  not  in-  of  H  Street  passed  by  the  deed.     White's 


cludc'l." 

2  White  v.  Godfrey,  97  Mass.  472. 

8  Chadwick  v.  Davis,  143  .Mass.  7,  8  N. 
E.  Rep.  601  ;  O'Conncll  v.  Bryant,  121 
Mass.  557  ;  Peck  r.  Denni.ston,  121  Mass. 
17;  Phillips  v.  Bowers,  7  Gray,  21. 


Bank  v.  Nichols,  64  N.  Y.  65  ;  English  i-. 
Brennan,  60  N  Y.  609;  Augustine  (;. 
Britt,  15  Ilun,  395,  aflirmed  80  N.  Y.  647. 
See,  however,  Mott  v.  Mott,  68  X.  Y.  246  ; 
Cochran  v.  Smith.  73  Ilun,  597,  26  N.  Y. 

377 


S^    lO.J,  4t'iG.]  DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUNDARIES. 

465.  When  a  road  is  a  terminus  a  quo,  there  is  more  uncer- 
tainty whether  the  boundary  is  the  centre  of  the  road  than 
lluMO  is  wlirii  the  roail  is  made  the  tcnninus  ad  quern;  for  it 
seems  that  in  some  pUiees  it  is  a  eommon  method  of  measurement, 
in  me.isuriiiL;-  from  a  road,  to  measure  from  the  side  of  the  road 
instead  nf  the  centre;  and  there  might  be  a  reasonabU^  presump- 
tion that  tlie  measurement  was  in  fact  made  in  this  way,  unless 
sonietliing  appears  ailirmatively  to  show  that  the  measurement 
began  at  tlie  centre  of  the  road.  Such  a  presumption  would  be 
controlled  by  evidence  that  the  parties  at  the  time  of  the  convey- 
ance establislu'd  monuments  at  the  distance  called  for  from  the 
centre  line  of  the  road,  and  that  the  land  was  afterwards  fenced 
and  occupied  in  accordance  with  such  monuments.^ 

For  the  purposes  of  measurement  and  quantity,  a  deed  of  a 
platted  lot  giving  the  measurement  from  a  corner  of  the  lot  at 
the  street  may  convey  the  land  according  to  the  measurement 
from  the  border  of  the  street,  and  not  from  its  centre,  although 
tlie  plat,  in  giving  the  size  of  the  lot,  measures  to  the  centre  of 
the  street.^ 

466.  A  grant  of  land  bounded  upon  a  public  street  will  be 
referred  to  the  street  as  actually  built  and  used,  rather  than  to 
the  street  as  shown  upon  a  recorded  plat  or  map,  or  by  a  survey, 
especially  when  these  lines  nearly  coincide.^  The  street  is  a  mon- 
ument, and,  like  any  other  object  mentioned  as  a  monument,  it  is 
something  visible  and  existing  in  fact.  A  road  or  highway  men- 
tioned as  a  boundary  means  the  apparent  and  existing  road  or  high- 

Siipi).  103  ;  Holluway  v.  Delano,  18  N.  Y.  Den  Brooks  v.  Correon,  48  Mich.  283,  12 

Supp.  704.  N.  W.   Kep.  206  ;  Atwood  v.  Canrike,  86 

1  Dodd  V.  Witt,  139  Mass.  63,  29  N.  E.  Midi.  99,  103,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  950  :  Orena 

Kep.  475,  52  Am.  Rep.  700.  v.  Santa  Barbara,  91  Cal.  621,  28  Pac.  Rep. 

•■2  Moutgomery  v.  Hines,  134    Iiid.  221,  268  ;  Brown  v.  Heard,  85  Me.  294,  27  Atl. 

33  N.  E.  Rep.  1100.  Rep.  182  ;   Tcbbetts  v.  Estes,  52  Me.  566  ; 

•5  Foley  V.   McCarthy,   157  Mass.  474,  Blackman  v.  Riley,  138  N.Y.  318,34  N. 

32  N.  E.  Rep.  669;  O'Brien  ;;.  King,  49  E.  Rep.  214;  Falls  Village  W.  Power  Co. 

N.  J.  L.  79,  7  Atl.  Rep.  34  ;  De  Veney  v.  v.  Tibhetts,  31  Conn.  165;  Bristol  Mannf. 

Gallagher,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  33;  Ilaring  v.  Co.  r.  Barnes,  54  Conn.  53,  5  Atl.   Rep. 

\'au  Ilouten,  22  N.  J.  L.  61  ;  Jacksou  v.  593  ;  Fisher  v.  Bennehoff,  121  III.  426,  13 

Perrine,  35  N.  J.  L.  137  ;  Smith  v.  State,  N.  E.  Rep.  150;  Cleveland  v.  Obenchain, 

23  N.  J.  L.   130;  Aldrich  l:  Billings,  14  107  Jnd.  591,  8  S.  E.  Rep.  624  ;  Bradstreet 

R.  I.  233;  Draper  v.  Monroe  (R.  I.),  28  v.  Dunham,  65  Iowa,  248,  21   N.  W.  Rep. 

Atl.   Rep.   340;  Hoffman  v.   Port  Huron  592;  Winter  r.  Payne,  33  Fla.  470,  15  So. 

(Mich.),  60  N.  W.  Rep.  831  ;  Twogood  r.  Kep.  211. 
llovt,  42  Mich.  609, 4  N.  W.  Rep.  44i  ;  Vin 
"378 


BOUNDARY   BY   HIGHWAY.  [§  467-  . 

way,  and  not  that  which  may  exist  of  record,  or  that  may  be  deter- 
mined by  a  survey.  It  is  like  any  other  monument  described  as  a 
boundary,  a  monument  existing  in  fact.^  But  where  Lind  is  con- 
veyed bounded  by  the  line  of  a  highway,  parol  evidence  is  admis- 
sible to  show  whether,  by  such  description,  the  parties  meant  the 
surveyed  line  of  the  highway  or  the  line  as  actually  used  and 
occupied.2  If  the  road  had  not  been  actually  opened  at  the  date 
of  the  conveyance,  but  there  was  then  a  recorded  plat  of  it,  the 
location  of  it  must  be  determined  by  the  plat,  as  the  description 
in  the  deed  must  necessarily  refer  to  that.^ 

Where  land  is  bounded  on  the  west  by  a  street,  according  to  a 
map  referred  to,  the  meaning  of  the  deed  is  that,  wherever  the 
eastern  line  of  the  street,  as  it  was  laid  out  or  actually  surveyed, 
is,  there  also  is  the  western  boundary  of  the  land  conveyed.'^ 

A  deed  describing  land  as  beginning  at  a  point  "  ranging " 
with  the  south  line  of  a  street  refers  to  the  street  as  extended  to 
the  pioperty  on  a  recorded  plat,  and  not  as  it  actually  exists  some 
distance  away.° 

Where  the  question  was  whether  a  lot  was  conveyed  with  ref- 
erence to  the  street  which  formed  its  eastern  boundary,  as  opened 
and  used,  or  as  shown  on  a  certain  map  which  represented  a  wider 
street,  the  circumstances  were  considered  material  and  conclusive. 
There  was  no  reference  to  the  map  in  the  deed,  and  nothing  was 
said  as  to  the  eastern  boundary.  The  purchaser  was  familiar 
with  the  actual  location  of  the  street  when  he  made  the  purchase. 
The  street  existed  before  the  map  was  nuide,  but  had  never  been 
open  or  used  to  the  width  shown  by  the  map  ;  and  the  trees,  side- 
walk, and  fences  indicated  tlie  width  to  be  different  from  that 
shown  by  the  map.  It  was  held  that  a  finding,  that  the  parties 
intended  to  make  the  boundary  by  the  street  as  it  appeared  and 
WHS  Mctually  used  when  thf^  deed  was  executed,  was  proper.^ 
467.   A    proposed  street,  or  one  which  does  not   exist   in 

1  Falls   Village   W.iter    Power    Co.    v.  ^  Atwood    /•.  Caiirike,  86   Mich.    99,  48 

Tibbetts,  31    Conn.    167  ;  Bristol    Manuf.  N.  W.  Rep.  9.50. 

Co.  1-.  Barnes,  .'54  Conn.  5.3,  .5  Atl.  Hep.  *  Andreu  v.  Watkins,  26  Pla.  390,  7  So. 

.593  ;  Brown  v.  Heard,  8.5  Me.  294,  27  Atl.  Rep.  876. 

Ucp.  182  ;  Frost  v.  Angler,  127  iMn.ss.  212  ;  ^  ^cid  v.   Klein  (Ind.),  37   N.   E.   Rep. 

!{'cine  v.  Emerson,  85  Wi.s.  80,  55  N.  \V.  967. 

Kip.  177.  6  Barrow.s  v.  Webster  (\.  Y.),39  N.  E. 

-  Wead  V.  St.  Jolin-hury  &  L.  C.  K.  Co.  Rep.  357.     And  see  McShane  v.  Main,  62 

64  Vt.  52,  24  All.  Hep.  .361.  N.  H.  4. 

379 


.§  4(J8.J  DKSCRirTION    AND    UOUNDAKIKS. 

fact,  maybe  used  as  a  monument.  Tluis,  where  a  street  extends 
up  to  an  uii[)latte(l  and  nn.survrvi'd  tract  ot"  land,  Imt  has  not  yet 
bern  oxtendi'd  into  sufh  tract,  antl  a  lot  is  sold,  and  its  bounda- 
ries lixed  by  such  street,  just  as  if  it  had  been  extended  into  the 
tract,  and  there  is  no  doubt  as  to  just  where  the  street  when  ex- 
tended Would  be,  the  lixinj^  of  it  as  a  boundary  will  control  the 
courses  and  distances  of  the  conveyance.^ 

Where  a  boundary  is  made  by  a  street  which,  is  practically 
located  after  the  execution  of  the  deed,  such  location  may  be 
looked  to  for  the  location  of  the  land,  and  when  the  street  is 
accepted  it  is  presumably  the  street  referred  to  in  the  deed.^ 

If  a  lot  is  b(junded  upon  a  projected  street,  and  the  street  is 
laid  out  and  opened  on  the  gi-antor's  land  some  distance  in  front 
of  the  lot,  according  to  the  measurements  and  the  plat  referred  to, 
the  land  between  the  lot  as  described  and  the  street  as  laid  out 
passes  by  the  deed.^ 

Where  land  was  conveyed  to  a  railroad  company  for  purposes 
of  its  business  by  a  deed  which  described  the  land  by  reference  to 
the  line  of  the  road  of  such  company  as  then  located,  but  not 
built,  the  boundary  lines  are  not  affected  by  a  subsequent  change 
in  the  location  of  the  road.^ 

The  fact  that  land  conveyed  is  described  in  the  deed  as  situated 
on  a  certain  street  is  not  an  implied  covenant  on  the  part  of  the 
grantor  that  such  street  exists,  where  theie  is  no  reference  to  any 
plan  or  to  the  street  except  in  the  description  of  the  land.^ 

468.  When  a  street  or  way  is  discontinued,  the  owners  of 
land  adjacent  to  it  as  a  rule  are  entitled  to  the  full  possession  and 
use  of  the  land  which  was  already  theirs  in  fee.  The  easement 
of  the  public  is  at  an  i^nd,  and  the  adjacent  owners  take  posses- 
sion under  their  respective  titles,^  Where  by  statute  the  fee  of 
streets  and  ways  vests  absolutely  in  the  city,  tf)wn,  or  county,  it  is 
in  several  States  provid(Ml  l)y  statute  that,  when  any  street  or  way 

'  I'otts   V.    Canton  Warehouse    Co.  70  *  King  ?•.    Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  (Va.) 

Miss.  462,  12  So.  Kcp.  147;  Stark  v.  Cof-  17  S,  E.  Hop.  8(58. 

fin,  105  :\Iass«.  328  ;  Johnson  v.  Arnold,  91  ^  Q^,](.  ,._  Hadlcv,  162  Mass.  579,  39  N. 

Ga.  659,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  370.  E.  ]?ep   279. 

-  Payne  ;;.  Englisli,  101  Cil.  10,35  Pac.  '^  Wallace  ?-.  Fee,  50  N.  Y.  694;  Moody 

Rep.  348.     And  see  Orcna  v.  Santa  Bur-  v.  Palmer,  50  Cal.  31  ;  Ott  v.  Kreiter,  110 

bnra,  91  Cal.  621,  28  Pac.  Rep.  268.  Pa.  St.  370,  1  Atl.  Rep.  724  ;  Kinihall  v. 

•'  Draper  v.  Monroe  (R.  I ),  28  Atl.  Rep.  Kcnoslia,  4  Wis.  321  ;  Ilealey  v.  Babbitt, 

340.  14  R.  I.  533. 
380 


BOUNDARY    BY   HIGHWAY.  [§  469. 

is  vacated,  the  same  shall  revert  to  the  owners  of  the  real  estate 
adjacent  thereto  on  each  side,  subject  to  tlie  right  of  the  city  to 
reopen  the  street  without  expense. ^  Under  such  a  statute  in  Illi- 
nois it  was  held  that  the  title  reverted  to  the  original  proprietor, 
and  not  to  adjacent  landowners ;  but  in  Iowa  and  Kansas  it  is 
held  that  it  passes  to  the  adjacent  landowner.^ 

469.  Even  if  the  grantee  does  not  acquire  the  fee  to  any 
part  of  the  street,  he  may  have  a  perpetual  easement  of  way, 
to  be  kept  open,  though  it  be  tliscontinued  as  a  public  highway. 
Thus,  in  case  a  grantor  has  bounded  land  by  a  street  in  such  a  way 
as  to  retain  title  U)  the  soil  of  the  entire  street,  and  the  street  is 
afterwards  discontinued  as  a  public  highway,  the  grantee  still  re- 
tains an  implied  grant  of  a  private  easement  in  the  street.^  It  is 
the  grantee's  right  in  such  case  to  have  the  space  of  ground  which 
was  the  street  left  open  forever  as  a  way  to  be  used  for  every 
purpose  that  may  be  usual  for  the  accommodation  of  the  adjoin- 
ing land  of  the  grantee.  This  rule  is  stated  by  Chief  Justice 
Shaw  *  vv^ith  the  force  and  perspicuity  usual  in  his  opinions  :  "  It 
seems  reasonable,  and  quite  within  the  principle  of  equity  on 
which  this  rule  is  founded,  to  apply  it  to  the  discontinuance  of  a 
highway,  so  that,  if  a  man  should  grant  land  bounding  expressly 
on  the  side  of  a  highway,  if  the  grantor  own  the  soil  under  the 
highway,  and  the  highway,  by  competent  authority,  should  be  dis- 
continued, such  grantor  could  not  so  use  the  soil  of  the  highway 
as  to  defeat  his  grantee's  right  of  way,  or  render  it  substantially 
less  beneficial.  Whether  this  should  be  deemed  to  operate  as  an 
implied  grant  or  as  an  implied  warranty  covenant  and  estoppel, 
binding  on  the  grantor  and  his  heirs,  is  immaterial.  The  right 
itself  would  be  inferred  from  that  great  principle  of  construction 
that  every  grant  and  covenant  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  secure  to 
the  grantee  the  benefits  intended  to  be  conferred  by  the  grant, 
and  that  the  grantor  shall  do  nothing  to  defeat  or  esentially 
impair  his  grant." 

In  a  recent  important  case  in  New  York   the   owner  of  land 

1  Gebhardt  !;.  Reeves,  75  111.  301.  Nichols,   64    N.    Y.    65;    liuttemeier   v. 

2  Day  V.  Schroeder,  46  low.i,  546;  Alhro,  18  N.  Y.  48 ;  De  Peyster  v.  Mali, 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  11.  Co.  v.  Patch,  28  92  N.  Y.  262;  Ilolloway  v.  Delano,  139 
Kans.  470.  N.  Y.  390,  .'U  N.  E   Rep.  1052. 

■''  Parker  «;.  Framinf^liam,  8  Met.  260;  ••  Parker  r.  Frainiii^rhjuri,  8  Met.  260. 
Ilolloway  ('.  Souihiiiayd,  139  N.  Y.  390,  See,  however,  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  Co.  v. 
34    N.    E.   Rep.    1047  ;    While's  Bank   v.      Gould,  67  Md.  60,  8  Atl.  Rep.  754. 

381 


§  470.]  DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 

conveyed  a  portion  of  it,  bounding  it  upon  a  public  highway  in 
such  terms  that  the  fee  of  the  road  was  not  transferred  by  the 
deed.  Subsequently  the  road  was  legally  closed  as  a  highway, 
autl  an  heir  of  the  grantor  claimed  to  be  entitled  in  fee  to  tlu; 
land  lying  in  front  of  the  parcel  conveyed.  His  claim  was  based 
upon  the  ground  that  the  grantor's  conveyance  did  not  pass  the 
fee  in  the  road  in  front  of  the  parcel,  and  that  therefore,  when  the 
road  was  closed,  the  land  was  relieved  of  the  public  easement  and 
reverted  to  the  grantor's  heirs.  The  Court  of  Appeals  said  :  "  We 
hold  that,  though  the  fee  of  the  soil  of  the  road  may  not  have  been 
transferred  to  the  grantee  by  the  conveyance  and  may  have  re- 
mained in  the  grantors,  and  those  deriving  title  from  them,  yet, 
in  bounding  the  granted  premises  upon  the  Bloomingdale  Road, 
and  by  including  the  easements  and  appurtenances  thereto  be- 
longing, the  grantors  impliedly  warranted  to  the  grantee  that  so 
much  of  the  road  should  perpetually  exist  as  an  open  way  as  bor- 
dered upon  the  premises  granted,  and  in  legal  effect  granted  such 
usual  and  more  or  less  necessary  easements  as  would  be  compre- 
hended in  the  free  flow  of  light  and  air  over  and  in  the  free  use 
of  the  open  way  as  such,  pro  tanto,  and  which  survived  the  ex- 
tinguishment of  the  puWIic  easement  in  the  highway  by  act  of 
law.  To  those  easements  the  fee  in  the  land  embraced  in  the 
highway  remained  perpetually  subject.  That  the  ownership  of 
the  fee  may  be  barren  of  profit  has  notliing  to  do  with  the  ques- 
tion. In  the  original  sale  the  owner  received,  presunuibly,  a 
value  proportioned  to  the  fact  that  the  land  sold  was  upon  the 
Bloomingdale  Road,  which  gave  to  it  access  and  other  advantages. 
To  permit  the  successors  in  interest  of  the  original  grantor,  in  the 
face  of  the  grant,  to  resume  dominion  over,  and  to  have  the  bene- 
ficial use  of,  the  land  in  the  old  highway,  would  be  unjust,  as  well 
as  without  sufficient  warrant  in  the  law."  ^ 

VIII.   Boundary  by  the  Sea,  Rivers,  and  Lakes. 

470.  Land  by  the  sea,  between  high  and  low  water  mark, 
and  by  rivers  where  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  is  vested  in  the 
State.  The  rule  of  law  in  regard  to  public  and  private  owner- 
ship of  the  shore  is  exhaustively  stated  in  a  recent  decision  of  the 
Supreme   Court  of  the  United   States    rendered  by  Mr.   Justice 

1  Holloway  v.  Southmayd,  139  N.  Y.  390,  410,  per  Gray,  J. 
382 


BOUNDARY   BY    THE   SEA,    RIVERS,    AND   LAKES.  [§  470. 

Gray :  ^  ''  By  the  common  law,  both  the  title  and  the  dominion  of 
the  sea,  and  of  rivers  and  arms  of  the  sea,  where  the  tide  ebbs  and 
flows,  and  of  all  the  lands  below  high-water  mark,  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  crown  of  England,  are  in  the  king.  Such 
waters,  and  the  lands  which  they  cover,  either  at  all  times,  or  at 
least  when  the  tide  is  in,  are  incapable  of  ordinary  and  private 
occupation,  cultivation,  and  improvement;  and  their  natural  and 
primary  uses  are  public  in  their  nature  for  highways  of  naviga- 
tion and  commerce,  domestic  and  foreign,  and  for  the  purpose 
of  fishing  by  all  the  king's  subjects.  Therefore  the  iitk^,  jus  jjri- 
vatum,  in  such  lands,  as  of  waste  and  unoccupied  lands,  belongs 
to  the  king,  as  the  sovereign,  and  the  dominion  thereof,  jus  pub- 
licum, is  vested  in  him,  as  the  representative  of  the  nation  and 
for  the  public  benefit.  ...  In  England,  from  the  time  of  Lord 
Hale,  it  has  been  treated  as  settled,  that  the  title  in  the  soil  of 
the  sea,  or  of  arms  of  the  sea,  below  ordinary  high-water  mark, 
is  in  the  king,  except  so  far  as  an  individual  or  a  corporation 
has  acquired  rights  in  it  by  express  grant,  or  by  prescription  or 
us;ige,2  and  that  this  title,  jus  privatum,  whether  in  the  king  or 
in  a  subject,  is  held  subject  to  the  public  right,  jus  publicum, 
of  navigation  and  fisliing.^  The  same  law  has  been  declared  by 
the  House  of  Lords  to  prevail  in  Scotland.*    .  .  . 

"  Tlie  common  law  of  England  upon  this  subject,  at  the  time 
of  the  emigration  of  our  ancestors,  is  the  law  of  this  country, 
except  so  far  as  it  has  been  modified  by  the  charters,  constitu- 
tions, statutes,  or  usages  of  the  several  colonies  and  States,  or  by 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States.  The  English 
possessions  in  America  were  claimed  by  right  of  discovery.  Hav- 
ing been  discovered  by  subjects  of  the  king  of  England,  and 
taken   possession   of  in   his   name,  by  his  authority  or  with  his 

1  Shively   v.   Bowlby,  152   U.   S.   1.  14  M.  &  G.    206,4  De  Gex  &  J.  55 ;  Mal- 

Sup.  Ct.   Rep.    548.     Mr.  Justice   Gray's  coin.><on    v.    O'Dea,    10   II.   L.    Cas.   593 ; 

opinion  is  so  important  that  much   use  of  Attorney-General     v.     Emerson,     [1891] 

it  and  of  his  citations  is  made  in  the  fol-  App.  Cas.  649. 

lowiii<r  patjcs  on   the    subject   of    private  ^  Attorney-Gencnil   v.  Parinetcr,  above 

ownership  (.f  the  shore.  cited;    Attorney-General    v.   Johnson,    2 

■•!  Fitzwalter's  Case,  .^  Keb.  242,  1  Mod.  Wils.  Ch.  87;  Gaun   v.   Free  Fishers,  11 

105,  3  Shep.  Abr.  97;  Com.  Di^-  "  Navi-  11.  L.  Cas.  192. 

^ration,"  A,  B  ;  Bac.  Abr.    "  Prerogative,"  *  Smith  v.  Stair,  6  Bell  App.  Cas.  487  ; 

B;  Kiniji'.  Smith,  2Dou[r.  441  ;  Attorney-  Lord  Advocate  v.  Hamilton,  1    Macq.  46. 

General   v.   I'armcter,  10  Trice,  378 ;  At-  49. 
torney-General  v.   Chambers,  4  Ue  Gex, 

383 


§  471.]  DEscHirnoN  and  houndariks. 

assent,  they  were  held  by  the  king  us  the  representative  of,  and 
in  trust  for,  the  nation,  and  all  vacant  lands,  uiul  tlie  exelusive 
])o\ver  to  grant  them,  were  vested  in  him.  The  various  charters 
granted  by  ilift'erent  monarchs  of  the  Stuart  dynasty  for  large 
tnifts  of  territory  on  the  Atlantic  coast  conveyed  to  the  grantees 
bt)ih  the  territory  described  and  the  powers  of  government,  in- 
cluding the  property  and  the  dominion  of  lands  under  tide- 
waters; and  upon  the  American  Revolution  all  the  rights  of  the 
crown  and  of  Parli;unent  vested  in  the  several  States,  subject  to 
the  rights  surrendered  to  the  national  government  by  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States."^ 

471.  The  law  of  the  several  States  bordering  on  the  sea,  in 
regard  to  the  private  ownership  of  the  shore,  is  stated  in  de- 
tail by  Mr.  Justice  Gray  in  the  case  already  cited.^  Passing  by  the 
New  England  States  for  the  present,  because  an  exceptional  rule 
prevails  there,  the  following  is  a  summary  of  the  law  of  the  other 
original  States  :  In  New  York  it  was  long  considered  as  settled  law 
that  the  State  succeeded  to  all  the  rights  of  the  crown  and  Parlia- 
ment of  England  in  hinds  under  tide-waters,  and  that  the  owner  of 
land  bounded  by  a  navigable  river  within  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the 
tide  had  no  private  title  or  right  in  the  shore  below  high-water 
mark,  and  was  entitled  to  no  compensation  for  the  construction, 
under  a  grant  from  the  legislature  of  the  State,  of  a  railroad 
along  the  shore  between  high  and  low  water  mark,  cutting  off  all 
access  from  his  land  to  the  river,  except  across  the  railroad.^ 
The  owner  of  tiie  upland  has  no  right  to  wharf  out  without  legis- 
lative authority  ;  and  titles  granted  in  lands  under  tide-water  are 
subject  to  the  right  of  the  State  to  establish  harbor  lines.^  The 
law  of  that  State,  as  formerly  understood,  has  been  recently  so 
far  modified  as  to  hold'^  that  the  owner  of  land  bounded  by  tide- 

1  Sliively  c.  Bowlby,s«pra,  citing  John-  Langdon  y.  Mayor,  93  N.  Y.  129;  New 
8on  I'.  Mcintosh,  8  Wheat.  .543,  595  ;  Mar-  York  v.  Hart,  95  N.  Y.  443  ;  In  re  Stnten 
tin  V.  Wadiiell,  16  Pet.  367;  Common-  Island  Rapid  Transit  Co.  103  N.  Y.  251, 
wealth  V.  Koxl.ury,  9  Gray,  451  ;  Stevens  260,  8  N.  E.  Rep.  548. 

V.  Railroad  Co.  34  N.  J.  L.  532;  People  v.         *  People  v.  Vanderbilt,  26  N.  Y.  287, 
New  York  &  S.  I.  Ferry  Co.  68  N.  Y.  71.     28  N.  Y.  396  ;  People  v.  New  York  &  S.  I. 

2  Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152   U.   S.  1,   14     Ferry  Co.  68  N.  Y.  71. 

Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  548.  ^  In   accordance    with    the    decision  in 

3  Lansing  v.  Smith,  4  Wend.  9,  21  ;  Bnccleiich  v.  Board  of  Works,  L.  R.  5 
Gould  V.  Railroad  Co.  6  N.  Y.  522  ;  People  H.  L.  418,  and  contrary  to  the  decisions 
I'.  Tibbetts,  19  N.  Y.  523,  528;  People  v.  in  Gould  v.  Railroad  Co.  6  N.  Y.  522, 
Canal    Appraisers,    33    N.   Y.    461,467;  and  in  Stevens  v.  Railroad  Co.  34  N.  J.  L. 

384  532. 


BOUNDARY    BY    THE   SEA,    RIVERS,   AND   LAKES.  [§  471. 

water  may  maintain  an  action  against  a  railroad  corporation  con- 
structing its  road,  by  authority  of  the  legislature,  so  as  to  cut  off 
his  access  to  the  water.^ 

In  New  Jersey  it  is  the  settled  rule  that  the  lands  under  water, 
including  the  shore  on  the  tide-waters  of  New  Jersey,  belong 
absolutely  to  the  State,  which  has  the  power  to  grant  them  to 
any  one,  free  from  any  right  of  the  riparian  owner  in  theni.^ 

In  Pennsylvania  likewise,  upon  the  Revolution,  the  State  suc- 
ceeded to  the  rights,  both  of  the  crown  and  of  the  proprietors,  in 
the  navigable  waters  and  the  soil  under  them.'^  But,  by  the 
established  law  of  the  State,  the  owner  ot"  lands  bounded  by 
navigable  water  has  the  title  in  the  soil  between  high  and  low 
water  mark,  subject  to  the  public  right  of  navigation  and  to  the 
authority  of  the  legislature  to  make  public  improvements  upon 
it,  and  to  regulate  his  use  of  it.* 

In  Delaware,  all  navigable  rivers  within  the  State  belong  to 
the  State,  not  merely  in  right  of  eminent  domain,  but  in  actual 
propriety.^ 

In  Maryland,  the  owner  of  land  bounded  by  tide-water  is  au- 
thorized, according  to  various  statutes  beginning  in  1745,  to 
build  wharves  or  other  improvements  upon  the  flats  in  front  of 
his  land,  and  to  acquire  a  right  in  the  land  so  improved.^ 

1  Williams  v.  New  York,  105  N.  Y.  389,395.  And  see  Willson  r.  Marsh  Co. 
419,    436,    11   N.  E.   Kep.    829;  Kane    v.     2  Pet.  245,  251. 

Railroad  Co.  125  N.  Y.  164,  184,  26  N.  E.  ^  Casey    v.  Inloes,    1    Gill,  430  ;  Balti- 

Rep.  278 ;  Ruinsey  v.  Railroad   Co.  133  more  v.  McKim,  3  Bland,  453 ;  Goodseil 

N.  Y.  79,  30  N.   E.   Rep.   654,  136  N.  Y.  v.  Lawson,  42  Md.348;   Garitee  v.  Balti- 

543,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  979.  more,  53  Md.  422  ;   Horner  v.  Plea.sants,  66 

2  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  New  York  &  Md.475,  7  Atl.  Rep.  691  ;  Potomac  Stcam- 
L.  B.  R.  Co.  23  N.  J.  Eq.  157,  159.  See,  boat  Co.  v.  Upper  Potomac  Steamboat  Co. 
also.  New  York,  Lake  Erie,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  109  U.  S.  672,  3  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  445,  4 
Yard,  43  N.  J.  L.  632,  636;  American  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  15,  in  which  the  question  was 
Dock  Co.  V.  Trustees,  39  N.  J.  Kq.  409,  who  was  the  riparian  owner,  and  as  such 
445.  entitled  to  wharf  out  into   the  Potomac 

•■i  Rundle    v.    Canal    Co.    14    How.    80,  River,  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  under 

90;    Oilman  v.  Philadelphia,  3  Wall.  713,  the  authority  todo  so  expressly  conferred 

726.  under  the  laws  of   Maryland   in  force  in 

*  Tinicum  Fi-hing  Co.  v.  Carter,  61  the  District.  This  court,  speaking  by  Mr. 
Pa.  St.  21,  30,  31  ;  Wainwright  ?•.  McCul-  Justice  Curtis,  in  affirming  the  right  of 
lough,  63  Pa.  St.  66,  74  ;  Zng  v.  Common-  the  State  of  Maryland  to  protect  the  oys- 
wealth,  70  Pa.  St.  138  ;  Philadelphia  v.  ter  fishery  within  its  boundaries,  said  : 
Scott,  81  Pa.  St.  80,  86;  Wall  v.  Harbor  "  Whatever  soil  below  low-water  mark  is 
Co-  152  Pa.  St.  427,  25  Atl.  Rep.  647.  the    subject    of   exclusive   propriety    and 

*  Bailey  v.  Railroad  Co.  4  Harr.  (Del.)  ownership  belongs  to  the  State  on  whose 

385 


^  471.]  DESCRIPTION    AND    ROUNDARIES. 

Ill  Virti"inia,  by  virtue  of  statutes  beginning  in  1679,  the  owner 
of  laiul  bouiuled  by  tide-waters  lias  the  title  to  ordinary  low- 
water  mark,  and  the  right  to  build  wharves,  provided  they  do  not 
obstruct  navigation.^ 

In  North  Carolina,  when  not  otherwise  provided  by  statute, 
the  private  ownership  of  land  bounded  by  navigable  waters  stops 
at  high-water  mark,  and  the  land  between  high  and  low  water 
mark  belongs  to  the  State,  and  may  be  granted  by  it.^  The  stat- 
utes of  that  State,  at  different  periods,  have  either  limited  grants 
of  land  bounded  on  navigable  waters  to  high-water  mark,  or  have 
permitted  owners  of  the  sliore  to  make  entries  of  the  land  in 
front,  as  far  as  deep  water,  for  the  purpose  of  a  wharf ;  and  any 
owner  of  the  shore  appears  to  have  the  right  to  wharf  out,  sub- 
ject to  such  regulations  as  the  legislature  may  prescribe  for  the 
protection  of  the  public  rights  of  navigation  and  fishery.'^ 

In  South  Carolina  the  rules  of  the  common  law,  by  which  the 
title  in  the  land  under  tide-waters  is  in  the  State,  and  a  grant  of 
land  bounded  by  such  waters  passes  no  title  below  high-water 
mark,  appear  to  be  still  in  force.* 

In  Georgia,  also,  the  rules  of  the  common  law  would  seem  to 
be  in  force  as  to  tide-waters,  except  as  affected  by  statutes  of  the 
State  providing  that  the  right  of  the  owner  of  lands  adjacent  to 
navio-able  streams  extends  to  low-water  mark  in  the  bed  of  the 
stream.^ 

This  summary  "shows  that  there  is  no  universal  and  uniform 
law  upon  the  subject,  but  that  each  State  has  dealt  with  the  lands 

maritime  border  and  within  whose  terri-  75  Va.  150;   McDonald  v.  Whitehurst,  47 

tory  it  lies,  subject  to   any  lawful   i,'rants  Fed.  Rep.  757. 

of  that  soil  by  the  State,  or  the  sovereign  -  Hatfield  r.   Grimstead,  7  Ired.   139; 

power  which  governed  its  territory  before  Lewis  r.  Keeling,  1  Jones,  299,  306. 

the  Declaration  of  Independence ;  but  this  ^  Wilson  v.  Forbes,  2  Dev.  30  ;  Collins 

soil   is  held  by  the  State,  not  only  subject  v.    Benbury,    3  Ired.    277,    5    Ired.    118; 

to,    but  in  some  sense  in  tru-t  for,  the  Gregory  v.   Forbes,  96  N.  C.  77,  1   S.  E. 

enjoyment  of  certain  public  rights,  among  Rep.  541  ;  State  v.  Narrows  Island  Club, 

which  is  the  common  lil)erty  of  raking  fish,  100  N.  O.  477,  5  S.  E.  Rep.  411  ;  Bond  y. 

a-;  well  shellfish  as  floating   fi.sh."     Smith  Wool,  107  N.  C.  139,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  281. 

V.  Maryland,  18  How.  71,  74.  *  State  v.  Pacific   Guano  Co.  22  S.  C. 

1  Code  1887,  §  1339  ;  5  Op.  Attys.  Gen.  .OO  ;    State  r.  Pinckney,  22  S.  C.  484. 

412,   43.5-440;    French    v.   Bankhead,   11  ^  Code  Ga.   1882,  §§   962,  2229,  2230; 

Gratt.    136;    Hardy   v.  McCullough,    23  Howard  v.  Ingersoll,    13  How.  381,  411, 

Gratt.  251,  262;  Norfolk   City  v.  Cooke,  421  ;  Alabama  v.  Georgia,  23  How.  ,505; 

27  Gratt.  430,  434,  435  ;  Garrison  v.  Hall,  Savannah  v.  Georgia,  4  Ga.  26,  39  ;  Young 


V.  Harrison,  6  Ga.  130,  141. 


386 


BOUNDARY    BY   THE   SEA,   RIVERS,    AND   LAKES.  [§  472. 

under  the  tide-waters  within  its  borders  according  to  its  own 
views  of  justice  and  policy.  Great  caution,  therefore,  is  neces- 
sary in  applying  precedents  in  one  State  to  cases  arising  in  an- 
other." 

Tlie  new  States  admitted  into  the  Union  have  the  same  richts 
as  the  original  States  in  the  tide-waters,  and  in  the  lands  below 
the  high-water  mark,  within  their  respective  jurisdictions.  Thus, 
upon  the  admission  of  the  State  of  Alabama  into  the  Union,  the 
title  in  the  lands  below  high-water  mark  of  navigable  waters 
passed  to  the  State,  and  could  not  afterwards  be  granted  away  by 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States.^  The  same  doctrine  is  ap- 
plicable to  California,  which  was  acquired  from  Mexico  by  the 
treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo  of  1848.2 

472.  The  law  is  general  that  private  ownership  of  land 
bordering  upon  tide-waters  extends  only  to  high-w^ater  mark. 
The  space  between  high  and  low  water  mark  is  variously  denom- 
inated "  the  shore,"  "  the  beach,"  "  the  flats,"  "  the  strand,"  "  the 
sand,"  and  is  also  designated  by  several  other  less  familiar  terms. 
The  proprietor  of  land  on  the  shore  or  bank  is  presumed  to  own 
to  high-water  mark  only.  If  he  claims  ownership  below  this 
line,  it  is  for  him  to  establish  his  claim.'^  The  general  rule  is, 
that  a  boundary  on  the  sea,  a  bay,  navigable  or  tide-water  river 
is  a  boundary  at  the  ordinary  high-water  mark.*     This  rule  is  not 

1  Pollard  i\  Hagan,  3  How.  212,  221,  of  the  territory  from  Mexico,  the  United 
222;  Shively  1-.  Bowlbv,  152  U.S.I,  14  States  acquired  the  title  to  tide- lands 
Sup.  Cr.  Rep.  548,  per  Gray,  J.  equally  with  the  title  to  upland  ;  but  with 

2  United  States  r.  Pacheco,2  Wall.  .587  ;  respect  to  the  former  they  held  it  only  in 
Mumfordy.Wardwell,6  Wall.  42.3;  Weber  trust  for  the  future  States  that  might  be 
V.  Commissioners,  18  Wall.  57  ;  Packer  v.  erected  out  of  such  territory." 

Bird,  137  U.  S.  661,  666,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  ^  Gould  on  Waters,  2d  ed.  §  27  ;  Gann 
210  ;  San  Francisco  v.  Le  Roy,  138  U.  S.  v.  Free  Fishers,  II  H.  L.  Cas.  192  ;  Bar- 
656,  671,  1 1  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  364  ;  Knight  v.  ney  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324, 336  ;  Shively 
U.  S.  Land  Asso.  142  U.  S.  161, 12  Sup.  Ct.  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1,  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
Rep.  258.  In  the  latter  case  Mr.  Justice  548;  United  States  v.  Pacheco,  2  Wall. 
Lamar,  in  deliverini:  judgment,  said  :  "  It  587  ;  Oblenis  v.  Crecth,  67  Fed.  Rep.  303  ; 
is  the  settled  rule  of  law  in  this  court  that  Jones  v.  Martin,  35  Fed.  Rep.  348;  Gougli 
absolute  property  in,  and  dominion  and  i*.  Bell,  21  N.J.  L.  156;  Gould  v.  Rail- 
Sf)vereignty  over,  the  soils  under  the  fide-  road  Co.  6  N.  Y.  522;  Brookhaven  v. 
w:iters  in  the  original  State?  were  reserved  Strong,  60  N.  Y.  56  ;  De  Lancey  v.  Piep- 
to  the  several  States,  and  that  the  new  gras,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  681  ;  Martin  v. 
States  since  admitted  have  the  same  rights,  O'Brien,  34  Miss.  21  ;  Boulo  v.  New  Or- 
sovereigtity,  and  jurisdiction  in  that  behalf  leans  M.  &  T.  R.  Co.  55  Ala.  480;  Mid- 
as the  ori;;inaI  States  (lossess  within  their  dieton  v.  Pritchard,  4  III.  510. 
respective  borders.     Upon  the  acquisition  •♦  Storer    v.    Freeman,    6    Mass.   435 ; 

387 


§  473.] 


DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDARIES. 


applicable  to  a  case  where,  by  the  cutting  of  a  canal  between  a 
fresh-water  pond  and  some  body  of  salt  water,  the  water  of  the 
former  bect)nies  salt,  ixud  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows  therein.^  It  is 
a  gt'ueral  lulo  that  a  bomuhuy  by  ihe  beach,  the  shore,  the  stranii, 
or  the  space  between  high-waLer  and  low-water  mark,  whatever 
name  may  be  given  to  it,  excludes  such  space  unless  there  is 
something  else  in  the  tleed  to  indicate  an  intention  to  pass  the 
titlii  to  low-water  mark.'-^  Where,  however,  there  is  a  tract  of 
land  conveyed  by  metes  and  bounds,  and  within  the  tract  thus 
exactly  ilelined  there  is  a  portion  of  tide-water,  then  the  gcant 
carries  the  land  under  the  water,  subject  to  the  right  of  naviga- 
tion over  it,  and  the  continuance  of  the  water's  conditions  there 
prevailing.'^ 

473.  A  grant  from  the  sovereign  of  land  bounded  by  the 
sea,  or  by  any  navigable  tide-water,  does  not  pass  any  title  below 
high-water  mark,  unless  either  the  language  of  the  grant,  or  long 
usage   under   it,  clearly   indicates   that  such  was    ihe   intention.* 


Mayor  v.  Hart,-  95  N.  Y.  443,  16  Hiin, 
380;  People  o.  Tibbetts,  19  N.  Y.  523; 
G.Mild  V.  Kailroad  Co.  6  N.  Y.  522; 
Wheeler  v.  Spinola,  54  N.  Y.  377  ;  Rogers 
V.  Jonus,  1  Weud.  237,  19  Am.  Dec.  493; 
Caual  Com'rs  v.  People,  5  Wend.  423, 
481  ;  Wi^wall  v.  Hall,  3  Paige,  313  ;  Cham- 
plaiu  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Valentine, 
19  Barb.  484;  Oakes  v.  De  Lancy,  14  N. 
Y.  Supp.  294,  affirmed  133  N.  Y.  227  ; 
East  ll.:mptuu  v.  Kirk,  68  N.  Y.  459  ; 
Bell  V.  (iough,  23  N.  -J.  L.  624;  Goiigh  v. 
Bell,  21  N.  J.  L.  156;  Yard  v.  Ocean 
Beach  As.so.  49  N.  J.  Eq.  306,  24  Atl. 
Rep.  729  ;  Martin  i:  O'Brien,  34  xMiss.  21  ; 
More  V.  Massiui,37  Cal.  432  ;  Long  Beacli 
Land  Co.  v.  Riihiirdson,  70  Cal.  206,  11 
Pac.  Rep.  6'.)5.  In  Connecticut  the  State 
is  prima  furit'  the  owner  of  the  shore  be- 
tween high  and  low  water  mark,  l)ut  the 
jiruprietor  of  land  on  the  shore  may  own 
and  use  it  for  any  purpose  not  injurious 
to  the  public,  as  for  a  wharf  or  stores. 
Nichols  V.  Lewis,  15  Conn.  137  ;  Ladies' 
Friend  Soe.  v.  Halstead,  58  Conn.  144  ; 
P3a.st  Haven  v.  Hemingway,  7  Conn.  186; 
Adams  V.  Pease,  2  Conn.  481  ;  CiiaprUan 
' .  Kimball,  9  Conn.  38,  21  Am.  Dec.  707  ; 
Mather   v.  Chapman,  40    Conn.   382,    16 


Am.  Rep.  46 ;  Lockwood  v.  New  York  & 
N.  II.  R.  R.  Co.  37  Conn.  387 ;  De  Lancey 
V.  Piepgras,  63  Hun,  169,  17  N.  Y.  Supp. 
681  ;  Brookhaveu  v.  Strong,  60  N.  Y.  65. 
Where  the  words  "  shore  of  the  bay " 
were  used  as  a  boundary  of  land  in  a 
decree  of  the  circuit  court  confirming  a 
claim  to  lauds  in  California  under  a  Mex- 
ican grant,  the  ordinary  high-tide  line  will 
be  the  boundary,  though  "  shore,"  under 
the  Mexican  law,  extended  only  to  the 
extraordinary  high  tide  line,  and  the  Mex- 
ican grant  described  the  land  as  bounded 
by  the  shore,  as  words  used  in  a  common- 
law  court  decree  must  be  given  the  com- 
mon-law interpretation.  Valentine  v.  Sloss, 
103  Cal.  215,  37  Pac.  Rep.  328. 

1  Wheeler  v.  Spinola,  .54  N.  Y.  377. 

-  People  V.  Jones,  112  N.  Y.  597,  20 
N.  E.  Rep.  577;  Mayor  v.  Hart,  95  N.  Y. 
443 ;  Oblenis  v.  Creeth,  67  Fed.  Rep. 
303. 

3  Knight  V.  U.  S.  Land  Asso.  142  U.  S. 
161,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  258;  Lowndes  v. 
Board,  1.53  U.  S.  1,  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  758; 
Oblenis  ;-.  Creeth,  67  Fed.  Rep.  303. 

4  Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1,  14 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  548,  per  Gray,  J.,  citing 
Lord  Hale  in   Ilarg.  Law  Tracts,  pp.  17, 


BOUNDARY    BY    THE    SEA,    RIVERS,    AND    LAKES.  [§  474. 

Thus  it  was  held  that  a  grant  from  the  Mexican  goveinment, 
confirmed  by  a  decree  of  a  court  of  the  United  States  under 
authority  of  Congress,  of  land  bounded  "by  the  bay"  of  San 
Fiancisco,  did  not  include  land  below  ordinary  high-water  maik 
of  tlie  bav.^  It  was  also  held  that  a  person  afterwards  acquiring 
the  title  of  the  city  in  a  lot  and  wharf  below  high-water  mark 
had  no  right  to  complain  of  works  constructed  by  comniissioneis 
of  the  State,  under  authority  of  tiie  legislature,  for  the  protection 
of  the  harl)or  and  the  convenience  of  shipping,  in  front  of  his 
wharf,  and  preventing  the  appi'oach  of  vessels  to  it;  and  Mr. 
Jus  ice  Field,  in  delivering  judgment,  said:  "Although  the  title 
to  the  soil  under  the  tide-waters  of  the  bay  was  acquired  by  the 
United  States  by  cession  from  jNIexico,  equally  with  the  title  to 
the  uphmd,  they  held  it  only  in  trust  for  the  future  State.  Upon 
the  udmission  of  California  into  the  Union  upon  equal  footing 
with  the  original  States,  absolute  property  in,  and  dominion  and 
sovereignty  over,  all  soils  under  the  tide-waters  within  her  limits, 
passed  to  the  State,  with  the  consequent  right  to  dispose  of  the 
title  to  any  part  of  said  soils  in  such  manner  as  she  might  deem 
proper,  subject  only  to  the  paramount  right  of  navigation  over  the 
waters,  so  far  as  such  navigation  might  be  required  by  the  neces- 
sities of  commerce  with  foreign  nations  or  among  the  several 
States,  tlie  regulation  of  which  was  vested  in  the  general  govern- 

J.    V  9 

ment.    " 

474.  The  common-law  rule  that  the  title  to  the  shore  is 
in  the  State  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  private  title  de- 
rived from  the  sovereign  oi-  obtained  by  prescription.  Thus  in 
New  York,  where  the  common-law  rule  generally  prevails,  there 
may  be  private  title  to  land  under  bays  and  harbors,  as  well  as 
to  beaches  and  the  shore,  to  low-water  mark,  derived  from  early 

18,  27;  Somerset   i>.  Fo<,nvell,   .5   Barn.  &  Eq.   I'l.    (4th  ed.)    14.');  Bluiuldl  v.   Cat- 

C.  87.5,  88.5,  8  Dowl.  &  R.  747,  755  ;  Smith  terall,  5    Barn.  &   Aid.  -208,  298,  305 ;  At- 

V.    Stiiir,   f.    Bill    A])!).  Cas.  487;  United  torney-Oeneral  v.  Richards,  2  Anstr.  603, 

States  y.  Pacheco,  2  Wall.  587.  616;    Attorney-General    /•.    Parmeter,    10 

By    the    law    of   England,    also,    every  Price,  378,  411,  412  ;    At  omcy-General  u. 

building  or  wharf  erected  without  license  Terry,  9  Ch.  App.  423,  429,  note;  Weber 

below  high-water  mark,  where  the  soil  is  ;;.  Conimi-sioncr.«,  18  Wall.  57,  65;  Barney 

the  king's,  is  a  pnrpresture,  and  may,  at  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324,  3."!7. 

the  suit  of  the  king,  either  be  demolished,  '   Unit'  d  States  r.  Pacheco,  2  Wall.  587. 

or  be  seized  and  rented  for  his  benefit,  if  -  Weber   i;.   Commissioners,   18    Wall, 

it  is  not  a  nuisance  to  navigation.     Lord  65.     Sec,  also,  Knight  v.  U.  S.  Land  Asso. 

Hale,  in  Ilarg.  Law  Tracts,  p.  85  ;  Mitf.  142  U.  S.  ICl,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  258. 

889 


§  47.".]  DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDARIES. 

colonial  giMiits,  or  giants  I'roni  the  English  sovereign.^  The  shore, 
says  Loril  Hale,-  "  dnih  j)riin<i  facie  and  ot"  conniion  right  belong 
ti)  ihe  king,  both  in  the  shore  of  the  sea  and  the  shore  of  the 
anns  ot"  the  sea.  .  .  .  Yet  they  may  belong  to  the  subject  in  point 
ol'  prt)priety,  not  only  by  charter  or  gi-ant,  whereof  there  can  be 
bill  litth^  doubt,  but  also  by  prescription  or  usage." 

475.  In  the  New  England  States  the  rule  of  private  own- 
ership of  the  shore  was  established  by  the  Massachusetts 
colonial  ordinance  of  1641-1647,'^  and  by  usage  founded  thereon. 
This  ordinance,  which  remains  in  force  to  this  day,  relates  to 
land  adjoining  creeks,  coves,  and  other  places  about  and  upon  salt 
Avater,  where  the  sea  ebbs  and  flows.  "It  establishes  that  the 
proprietor  of  such  land  '  shall  have  propriety  to  the  low-watermark, 
where  the  sea  doth  not  ebb  above  a  hundred  rods,  and  not  more 
wheresoever  it  ebbs  further.'  By  low-water  mark  is  meant  the 
lowest  line  made  by  the  receding-  tide  with  the  land  ;  not  the 
lowest  line  which  a  stream  of  fresh  water  emptying  into  the  sea, 
or  a  cove  or  a  tidal  river,  makes  with  the  land.  It  has  nothing 
to  do  with  a  fresh-water  stream,  or  with  a  tidal  channel  through 
which  only  fresh  water  flows  at  low^  tide.  Nothing  in  the  ordi- 
nance indicates  an  intention  to  pieserve  the  fresh-water  stream  or 
channel  as  a  boundary  below  ordinary  high-water  mark.  And 
the  eases  cited  show  it  has  not  been  done  in  applying  it.  The 
channel  would  not  be  the  boundary  even  above  high-water  mark. 
The  rules  of  proprietorship  on  a  fresh-water  stream  may  furnish 
in  a  given  case  the  best  analogy  for  the  division  of  interjacent 
flats  on  a  stream  below  a  point  where  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  but 
beyond  that  they  have  no  force.'* 

"  The  rule  or  principle  of  the  Massachusetts  ordinance  has  been 
adopted  and  practiced  on  in  Plymouth,  Maine,  Nantucket,  and 
Martha's  Vineyaid  since  their  union  with  the  Massachusetts  col- 
ony under  the  Massachusetts  j^rovince  charter  of  lf)92.^ 

1  Oakes  v.  De  Lancey,  71    Hun,  49,  af-  to  flats,  must  be  one  from  whirh  the  tide 

lirmeil  14:3  \.  Y.  673,  UN    Y.  Siipp.  294,  docs  not  ebb  at  low  water, 

afliiined   1.3.3  N.  Y.   227,   30  N.   E.    Rep.  Grants  l)y  the  colony  of  Mnssachusetts, 

974.  before  the  ordinnnce,  of  binds  hounded  l)y 

-  Har;.^  Law  Tracts,  ))[).  11,  12.  tidewatrr,  did  not  include  any  luid  below 

3  Ma.ss.  Colntiy  Laws  (cd.  16G0),  p.  50;  hi;;h-water  niaik.     Commonwealth   r.  Al- 

Mass.  Culo:iy  Laws  (ed.  1672),  pp.  90,  91.  ^er.  7  Cush.  .53,  66  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Ci:y 

*  Titjipan  y.  Boston   Water-Powcr   Co.  of  Koxbury,  9  Gray,  451,  401-493.     See, 

157  Ma.ss.  24,  29,  per  Morton,  J.     Tliis  also,  Litchfield  v.  Scituate,  136  Mass.  39. 

case  holds  that  achanml,  tobealjouiniary  ""  Hhively  r.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1,  14  Sup. 

3;t0 


BOUNDARY    BY   THE   SEA,    RIVERS,    AND    LAKES. 


[§  ^T6. 


"  In  New  Hampshire  a  right  in  the  shore  has  been  recognized 
to  belling  to  the  owner  of  the  adjoining  npland,  either  by  reason 
of  its  ]ia\  iiig  once  been  under  the  jurisdiction  of  ^Massachusetts, 
or  b}-  early  and  continued  usage.^ 

"  In  Rhode  Island  the  owners  of  land  on  tide-water  have  no 
title  below  high-water  mark,  but  by  long  usage,  apparently  sanc- 
tioned by  a  colonial  statute  of  1707,  they  have  been  accorded 
tlie  right  to  build  wharves  or  other  structures  upon  the  flats  in 
front  of  their  lands,  provided  they  do  not  iiiipede  navigation,  and 
have  not  been  prohibited  by  the  legislature  ;  and  they  may  re- 
covei-  damages  against  one  who,  without  authority  from  the  legis- 
lature, fills  uj)  such  flats  so  as  to  impair  that  i  ight.^ 

"  In  Connecticut,  also,  the  title  in  the  land  below  high-water 
mai'k  is  in  the  State.  But  by  ancient  usage,  without  Jiny  early 
legislation,  the  proprietor  of  the  uj)land  has  the  sole  right,  in  the 
nature  of  a  franchise,  to  wharf  out  and  occupy  the  flats,  even 
below  low-water  mark,  provided  he  does  not  interfere  with  navi- 
gation ;  and  this  right  may  be  conveyed  separately  from  the  up- 
land, and  the  fee  in  flats  so  reclaimed  vests  in  him."  ^ 

476.  By  virtue  of  this  ordinance  the  owner  in  fee  of  upland 
adjoining  tide-waters,  w^hether  of  the  sea  or  of  a  tidal  stream, 
becomes  the  owner  also  of  the  adjacent  shore,  flats,  or  beach 
one  hundred  I'ods  in  extent,  if  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows  that  dis- 
tance ;  and  a  conveyance  of  upland  bounded  by  such  waters  passes 
the  grantor's  title  to  tiie  same  extent."*    This  ordinance  or  custom 


Ct.  Rep.  548,  per  Gray,  J.,  citiufr  Com- 
monwealth V.  Ali;er,  7  Cush.  5.3,  66,  and 
otlicr  authoii;it'S  collected  in  C/Oiiiiiiou- 
wealth  r.  Hoxlmry,  9  Gray,  4.">1. 

'  Niiiid  V.  Hohbs,  17  N.  H.  524,  526; 
Clement  r.  Burns,  43  N.  H.  609,  621  ; 
Concord  Maniif.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  66  N. 
H.  1,  26,  27,  25  Atl.  Rep.  718. 

2  Ang.  Tide- Waters  (2d  ed),  236,  237 ; 
FoUom  i:  Freeborn,  13  R.  I.  200,  204,210. 
It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  owner  of 
the  upland  has  no  riyht  of  action  ajrainst 
anv  one  fillinj^  up  the  fl;iis  by  authority 
of  the  State  for  any  )iiiblic  purj)ose. 
Gerhard  v.  Commission!  rs,  15  R.  I. 
334,  5  Atl.  Rep.  199;  Clark  r.  City  of 
Providence,  16  R.  I.  337,  15  Atl.  Rep. 
763. 


3  Ladies'  Friend  Soc.  ;;  Halstead,  58 
Conn.  144,  19  Atl.  Rep.  658;  Prior  v. 
Swartz,  62  Conn.  132,  136-138,  25  Atl. 
Rep.  398.  The  exercise  of  this  tight  is 
subject  to  all  regulations  the  State  may 
see  fit  to  impose  by  authorizing  commis- 
sioners to  establish  harbor  lines  or  other- 
wise. State  v.  Sargent,  45  Conn.  358.  But 
it  has  been  intinuued  liiat  ir  caiiiiot  be 
appropriated  by  the  Siate  to  a  different 
public  use  without  comjicns.ition.  Farist 
Steel  Co.  I'.  Bridgejiort,  60  Conn.  278,  22 
Atl.  Hep.  561. 

•*  Maine:  Clanccy  v.  Iloudletie,  .■!9  Me. 
451  ;  Parsons  v.  Clark,  76  .Me.  476  ;  Hmi- 
rows  ().  McDermott,  73  Me.  441  ;  Low  i\ 
Knowlton,  26  Me.  128,  45  Am.  Dec.  100; 
Moulton   V.   Libbey,   37  Me.  472,  485,  59 

391 


§4,1),]  DKSCRirTION-    AND    liOUNDARlES. 

does  not  ap[)lv  to  sti-cains  a^DVc  the  luiinl  where  they  iir(^  affected 
bv  the  ebb  aiul  i\n\\  of  the  tide  ;  but  it  applies  wherever  the  tide 
ebbs  and  ilows,  though  the  water  be  fresh  and  is  merely  thrown 
back  by  the  inlhix  of  the  sea.^  In  tlicse  States  a  bnuiidai-y  by 
the  sea  or  seashore,  or  beaeli  or  Uda-wAivr,  prhna  facie  incbides 
the  bind  between  high  and  h)W^  water  mark  to  the  extent  of  the 
grantor's  title.^  ^\  drcd  witli  such  a  bouiuhiry  passes  the  fiats 
ailjniniiig  tlie  U[)hind  eonvi-yt'd,  thougli  the  description,  botli  as 
regards  the  quantity  of  hmd  conveyed  and  the  length  of  the 
lines,  would  be  satistied  by  a[)[)lying  it  to  the  upland  alone/'^  A 
boundary  by  a  tidal  creek,  the  bed  of  which  is  bare  at,  low  water, 
prima  facie  conveys  the  title  to  the  centie  of  the  channel  of  the 
creek."*  The  grant  of  a  wdiarf  will  cairy  witli  it  the  grantor's 
flats  in  front  of  the  wharf  to  low-water  mark,  unless  tliere  are 
words  in  the  deed  that  restrict  its  operation  in  respect  to  the  land 
covered  by  the  water. ^ 

The  title  to  an   island   situated  within  one  hundred  rods  from 


Am.  Dec.  57  ;  Snow  v.  Mt.  Desert  Isl.  Co. 
84  Me.  14,  34  All.  Rep.  429.  Massachu- 
setts:  Litchfield  v.  Scitu.ite,  136  M;iss. 
39  ;  Storer  v.  Freeman,  6  Mass.  43.5,  4 
Am.  Dec.  155  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Kox- 
bury,  9  Gray,  451  ;  Common  wealth  v. 
Alger,  7  Cush.  53;  Sale  v.  Pratt,  19  Pick. 
191  ;  Boston  v.  Richardson,  13  Allen,  146, 
105  Mass.  351,  355.  The  owner's  title  ex- 
tends to  extreme  low-water  mark.  *5ewaii 
<0o-  •).  Boston  Wotpr-Povver  Co.  147  Mass. 
61,  16  N.  E.  Rep.  782.  New  Hampshire: 
Clement  v.  Burns,  43  N.  II.  009  ;  Niukl  v. 
Hobbs,  17  N.  H.  524.  Connecticut:  There 
may  be  private  ownership  lietween  hi:j;h 
and  low  water  mark,  and  use  for  any  pur- 
pose that  does  not  interfere  with  public 
interest.  East  Haven  v.  Hemini^way,  7 
Conn.  186;  Ladies'  Friend  See.  v.  Ilal- 
stead,  58  Conn.  144,  19  Atl.  Hep.  658  ; 
Nichols  V.  Lewis,  15  Conn.  137. 

1  Attorney-General  v.  Woods,  108  Mass. 
436,  11  Am.  Re|).  380;  Lapish  v.  Banyor 
Bank,  8  Me.  85. 

2  Doane  v.  Willcul,  5  Gray,  328,  66 
Am.  Dec.  369  ;  Storer  v.  Freeman,  6  Ma-s. 
435,  4  Am.  Dec.  15.t;  Charlcstown  ??. 
Tufts,  111  Mass.  348;  Dr^ikc  c.  Cuni.s,  1 
Cush.  395;   Valentine   v.  Pijier,  22   Piik. 

392 


85,33  Am.  Dec.  715;  Boston  v.  Uicliard- 
son,  105  Mass.  351,  13  Allen,  146;  Sal- 
tonstall  r.  Lon-  Wharf,  7  Cush.  195  ; 
Green  v.  Chelsea,  24  Pick.  71  ;  Jackson 
V.  Boston  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  1  Cush.  575  ; 
Hathaway  v.  Wilson,  123  Mass.  359; 
Litchfield  V.  Scituate,  136  Mass.  39;  Ilai- 
low  y.  Fi.sk,  12  Cush.  302;  Litchfield  /-. 
Ferguson,  141  Mass.  97,  6  N.  E.  Rep.  721. 
Maine  :  Montgomery  v.  Reed,  69  Me.  510  j 
King  i:  Young,  76  Me.  76;  Pike  v.  Mon- 
roe, 36  Me.  309,  58  Am.  Dec.  751  ;  Ste- 
vens V.  King,  76  Me.  197;  Erskine  v. 
Moulton,  66  Me.  276  ;  Winslow  v.  Parten, 
34  Me.  25  ;  Moore  v.  Griffin,  22  Me.  350  ; 
Snow  V.  Mt.  Desert  Isl.  Co.  84  Me.  14,  34 
Atl.  Rep.  429  ;  Babson  v.  Tainter,  79  Me. 
368,  10  Atl.  Rep.  63. 

3  Mayhew  i\  Norton,  17  Pick.  357,  28 
Am.  Dec.  306  ;  King  r.  Young,  76  Me. 
76,  49  Am.  Rep.  .'590. 

■*  Harlow  v.  Fi>k,  12  Cush.  302;  King 
V.  Young,  76  Me.  76,  49  Am.  Rep.  596. 

5  Central  Wharf  v.  India  Wharf,  123 
Ma>s.  561,  566,  per  Gray,  C.  J. ;  Common- 
wcaMi  V.  A\j.ev,  7  Cu-h.  53;  Wheeler  v. 
Stone,  1  Cush.  313  ;  Amniidown  r.  Gran- 
ite Bank,  8  Allen,  285;  A.-hby  /•.  K  strra 
n.  i;.  Co.  5  Met.  368,  38  Am.  Dec.  426. 


BOUNDARY   BY   THE    SEA,   RIVERS,    AND   LAKES.       [§§  477,  478. 


the  oj)posite  upland,  there  being  no  channel  between  the  island 
and  the  mainland  at  low  watei-,  does  not  extend,  as  between  the 
island  and  the  mainland,  unless  hj  special  grant,  to  any  flats  cir- 
cling the  island,  except  such  as  lie  on  the  sea  side  of  the  island, 
between  the  island  and  the  receded  sea,^ 

477.  There  is  a  presumption  that  the  grantor  conveys  the 
title  to  land  covered  by  water  so  far  as  his  own  title  extends, 
whether  the  conveyance  is  bounded  by  the  sea,  a  tidal  river,  or  a 
fresh-water  stream,  unless  he  express!}'  reserves  the  land  under 
the  water,  or  the  terms  of  the  deed  indicate  an  intention  to 
reserve  it.^  The  presumption  is  similar  to  that  already  mentioned 
which  pertains  to  a  conveyance  bounded  by  a  highwav,  street,  or 
private  way.  It  is  also  a  presumption  founded  upon  a  similar 
reason  ;  and  that  renson  is,  tliat  the  land  adjacent  to  the  bank 
of  a  stream,  or  to  the  shore  of  the  sea  or  other  tidal  waters,  is  ne- 
cessary or  valuable  to  the  adjoining  proprietor,  but  ordinarilv  is 
of  no  use  to  one  who  has  conveyed  his  land  bounded  upon  the 
water. 

478.  This  presumption  may  always  be  overcome  by  lan- 
guage in  the  deed  showing  an  intention  not  to  convev'  an}-  title 
to  the  land  covered  by  water. -^  The  grantee's  title  will  be  limited 
to  the  shore  land  in  case  he  purchases  by  a  plat  which  shows  that 
the  land  in  front  of  the  granted  land  is  platted  into  blocks  which 


1  Babson  v.  Tainter,  79  Me.  368.  Pe- 
ters, C.  J.,  said:  "What  riyht  iu  flats, 
islands  situated  within  the  one  hundred 
rods  from  high-water  mark  at  the  shore 
shall  have,  when  not  regulated  by  the 
special  terras  of  any  grant,  seems  not  to 
have  been  very  much  considered  in  the 
cases.  The  ordinance  is  in  very  general 
terms.  The  colonial  government  oi  the 
mother  commonwealth  granted  the  great 
boon  to  landholders  without  much  thought 
or  intimation  about  the  manner  of  divid- 
ing tlie  flats  among  its  grantees.  No  rule 
can  compass  all  cases.  The  Massachu- 
setts court  has  adopted  different  rules  for 
different  classes  of  cases,  and  has  fre- 
(piently  hud  occasion  to  remark  upon  the 
ilifl[ic-nlty  and  endiarrassment  atti'iidiiig  a 
j)ractical  application  of  any  construction 
of  the  ordinance.  Gray  i'.  Dcliice,  .5  Cush. 
9;  Rust  V.  Mill  Corporation,  6  Pick.  158  ; 


Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cash.  53,  69. 
.  .  .  Our  own  rule  has  not  received  much 
commendation  fiom  other  courts.  Emer- 
son V.  Taylor,  9  Me.  42,  23  Am.  Dec.  531, 
537,  with  note  ;  Stockham  v.  Browning.  18 
N.  J.  Eq.  390;  Treat  v.  Ciiipman,  35  Me. 
34  ;  Call  v.  Carroll,  40  Me.  31." 

-  Boston  V.  Richardson,  13  Allen,  146; 
Pratt  V.  Lamson,  2  Allen,  275  ;  Ingraham 
V.  Wilkinson,  4  Pick.  268,  16  Am.  Dec. 
342;  Paine  v.  Woods,  108  Mass.  160; 
Brown  v.  Chadbourne,  31  Me.  9,  1  Am. 
Dec.  641  ;  Starr  v.  Child,  20  Wend.  149, 
4  Hill,  369,  5  Denio,  399;  Carter  ^!.  Rail- 
way Co.  26  W.  Va.  644 ;  Cobb  v.  Lavalle, 
89  III.  .331,  31  Am.  Rep.  91;  Plouck  f. 
Yates,  82  III.  179. 

3  Hatch  V.  Dwight,  17  Mass.  289,  9 
Am.  Dec.  145  ;  Morrison  v.  Keen,  3  Me. 
474;  People  v.  Madison  Co.  125  111.  9,  17 
N.  K.  Hep.  147. 

393 


§  479.]  DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDARIES. 

have  boi'U  solil  or  reserved  for  sale  ;  and  he  acquires  no  riparian 
ri>'hts  in  the  unplatted  land  between  the  water  blocks  and  navi- 
<»able  water;  foi'  the  plat  contemplates  on  its  face  that  the  exte- 
ri'M'  liui'  of  the  outermost  bU)eks  is  to  be  treated  as  the  shore  line, 
and  that  the  rights  usually  appurtenant  to  riparian  land  attach  to 
these  blocks.^ 

479.  Of  course  the  owner  in  any  sale  may  sever  the  up- 
land from  the  flats,  selling  either  without  tlie  other  at  his  pleas- 
ure.- He  may  by  appropriate  words  restrict  his  conveyance  to 
the  line  of  high  water.-'^  Thus  a  deed  calling  for  a  line  running 
to  the  shore  or  bank  of  a  tide-iiver  and  thence  along  the  bank  or 
shore,  or  for  a  line  running  on  the  beach  or  shore  of  the  sea,  ex- 
cludes the  shore  or  flats,  which  is  the  term  applied  to  the  ground 
between  hiofh  and  low  water  mark.*  The  bank  or  shore  becomes 
a  monument  limiting  the  land  thereto  when  the  deed  clearly 
shows  this  to  be  the  intention  of  the  grantor.  But  when  the 
land  is  described  as  bounded  by  a  monument  standing  on  the 
bank  of  a  tidal  stream,  or  on  the  shore  of  the  sea  and  thence  by 
the  stream  or  sea,  the  monument  does  not  generally  restrict  the 
boundary  to  the  bank  or  shore.'^  Moreover,  while  a  boundary  by 
tiiH  shore  is  ordinarily  a  boundary  by  high-water  mark,  yet  it  may 
appear  from  the  whole  instrument  and  from  monuments  referred 
to  that  the  term  was  used  as  importing  low-water  mark.  The 
word  may  always  be  controlled  by  other  expressions  used  in  the 
conveyance.*^     A   deed    conveying  a   parcel   of  land    bounded   by 

1  Gilbert  v.  Einersou,  55  Minn.  254,  261,  Am.  Dec.  715  ;  Storer  v.  Freeman,  6  Muss. 
56  N.    W.    Kep.  818.     Mitchell,  J.,  said:     435;  Palmer  r.  Fairell,  129  Pa.  St.   162, 


"  Tiie  platiinir  of  these  water-blocks,  and 
convi-yiny:  them  with  reference  to  the  plat, 
niiinife-tly  contemplated  reclainiinf^  them 
and  filling  them  in,  or  otherwise  improving 


18  Atl.  Rep.  761. 

3  Duulap    r.   Stetson,    4    Mason,    349 ; 
Nickerson  v.  Crawford,  16  Me.  245. 

^  Montgomery  o.   Reed,   69    Me.   510; 


tliem  for  ii.se;  and  we  cannot  see  what  Nickerson  y.  Crawford,  16  Me.  245  ;  Brad- 
difference  it  makes  whether  this  hud  been  ford  v.  Cressey,  45  Me.  9;  Stone  v.  Au- 
done  before  tiie  grantor  conveyed,  or  was  gnsta,  46  Me.  127;  Brown  t-.  Heard,  85 
only  in  cunteniiilaiion."  Me.  294,  27  Atl.  Rep.  182;  Litchfield  v. 
-Ladies'  Friend  Society  v.  IlaUiead,  Fer^insoii,  141  Mass.  97,  6  N.  E.  Kep.  721  ; 
58  Conn.  144,  19  Atl.  Rep.  6.t8  ;  Er.>kine  Storer  r.  P'reeman,  6  Mass.  435,  4  Am. 
V.  Moulton,  66  ile.  276,  84  Me.  243,  24  Dec.  l')5;  Chapman  v.  Edmauds,  3  Allen, 
All.  Rep.  841  ;  Stone  v.  Au<:u-la.  46  Me.  t^X'l  :  Niles  r.  Patch,  13  Gray,  234;  Litch- 
127  ;  Knox  y.  Pickering,  7  Me.  106;  Deer-  field  c.  S^itnate,  136  Ma.ss.  39;  East 
ing  V.  Long  Wharf,  25  Me.  51  ;  Porter  Jianiploii  v.  Kirk,  68  N.  Y.  459,  463. 
V.  Sullivan,  7  Gray,  441,  447,  per  Shaw,  ^  ]■:r^kine  c.  Moulton,  66  Me.  276;  Pike 
C.  J.;  Lufkin  v.  Haskell,  3  Pick.  356;  r.  .Miniroc,  .'Ui  Me.  309,  58  Am.  Dec.  751. 
Valentine  v.  Piper,  22  Pick.  85,  94,  33  «  Hathaway  v.  Wilson,  123  Mass.  359, 
394 


BOUNDARY    BY    THE   SEA,    RIVERS,   AND    LAKES.  [§  480. 

the  sliore  of  the  sea  at  high-water  mark,  "including  all  the  privi- 
leges of  the  shore  to  low-water  mark,"  was  held  to  pass  the  fee  in 
the  land  to  low-water  mark.^ 

Under  a  statute  giving  the  owner  of  land  on  tide-water  the 
title  to  low-water  mark,  a  conveyance  by  metes  and  bounds  which 
are  substantially  coincident  with  high-water  mark  carries  all  the 
rights  of  the  grantor  to  the  strip  lying  between  high  and  low 
water  mark.- 

If  land  be  described  as  running  "  to  a  cove  and  thence  along 
the  margin  of  the  cove,"  the  grant  excludes  adjoining  flats,'^  The 
same  effect  follows  when  the  call  is  "  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
creek ;  "  ^  also  where  the  words  are  "■  by  the  bank  of  the  stream."  ^ 

480.  The  land  covered  by  fresh-water  streams  not  naviga- 
ble is  prima  facie  the  property  of  the  riparian  proprietors, 
usque  ad  filum  aquse.*^  If  the  same  person  owns  the  land  on 
both  sides  uf  the  stream,  he  owns  the  entire  river-bed  so  far  as 
his  lands  extend.'  One  who  owns  the  bank  on  one  side  of  the 
stream  only,  owns  the  bed  of  the  stream  ad  medium  filum  aquce. 
By  the  common  law,  even  such  rivers  as  the  Mississippi,  the 
Missouri,  the  Ohio,  the  Hudson,  and  the  Connecticut  and  other 
great  rivers,  above  the  point  where  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  are 
not  navigable  rivers,  though  they  are  navigable  in  fact ;  and 
therefore,  where  such  a  river  forms  the  boundary  of  land  the 
grantee  becomes  a  riparian  owner,  and  his  grant  extends  to  the 
centre  of  the  river.^ 

361,  per  Gray,  C.  J. ;  Litchfield  v.  Scitu-  rence  in  New  York,  —  as  well  as  in  Ohio, 

ate,  136  Mass.  39.  Illinois,  Michigan,  and  Wi>cunsin.     But 

1  Dillingham  i'.   Roberts,  75  Me.  469,  it  has  been  wholly  rejected  as  to  rivers 

46  Am.  Kep.  419.  navigable  in  fact,  in  Pennsylvania,  Vir- 

-  McDonald  V.  Wliitehurst,  47  Fed.  Rep.  giuia,  and  North  Carolina,  and  in  most  of 

757.  the  new  States."    Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152 

3  Nicker.son  i-.  Crawford,  16  Me.  245.  U.  S.  1,  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  548,  per  Gray, 

■i  Bradford  '•.  Cres.scy,45  Me.  9.  J.  ;  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  371,  11 

5  Stone  V.  August!!,  46  Me.  127.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  808,  838. 

6  Lord  Hale,  in  Harg.  Law  Tracts,  5  ;  '  Packer  v.  Bird,  137  U.  S.  CGI,  11  Sup. 
Bickett  r.  Morris,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  47;  Ct.  Rep.  210  ;  Smith  v.  Roche>ter,92  N.  Y, 
Murphy  v.  Ryan,  2  Ir.  Com.  Law,  143;  463.44  Am.  Rep.  393;  People  i7.  Jones, 
Ewing  V.  Colquhoun,  2  A^^p.  Cas.  839.  112  N.  Y.  597,  20  N.  E.  Hep.  577;  Dela- 
"The  rule  of  the  common  law  on  this  plainc  i>.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  42  Wis. 
point  appears  to  have  been  followed  in  all  214,  24  Atn.  Rep.  386  ;  Gavii  v.  Chambers, 
the  orijiiuiil  States,  —  except  in  Peiiii-  3  Ohio,  495;  Benner  r.  I'latter,  6  Ohio, 
sylvania,  Viruinin,  and  North  Carolina,  504;  Rockwell  ;,'.  Baldwin,  53  111.  19. 
and  except  as  lo  1:1  cat  rivers,  .such  as  the  ^  St.  Louis  v.  Rutz,  138  U.  S.  226,  11 
Hudson,  tlie  .Mohawk,  and   the  St.   Law-  Sup.  Ct.   Rep.  337;  Jones  v.  Soulard,  24 

395 


n-'lj 


DKSCRIPTION    AND    nOUXDAKlES. 


481.  In  many  States  the  common-law  rule  as  regards  navi- 
gable lakes  and  rivers  has  been  changed,  and  in  its  place  the 
civil-law  lull'  lias  been  adopted,  which  recognizes  as  navigable  all 
streams  and  lakes  which  are  really  so,  though  tliey  are  not  tide- 
water rivers.^     This  has  now  become  the  pie  vailing  doctrine  in 


How.  41  ;  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  .371, 
1 1  Still.  Ct.  lli'p.  808,  838,  au  Illinois  case. 
Connecticut :  Adams  c.  Pease,  '2  Conn. 
4S1 .  Illinois  :  Fuller  v.  Dauphin,  124  111. 
542.  IG  N.  E.  Hep.  917;  Ilouek  v.  Yates, 
82  III.  179;  Middleton  v.  Pritchard,  4  111. 
510,  38  Am.  Dec.  112;  Cobb  v.  Lavalle, 
89  111.  331,  31  Am.  Rep.  91  ;  Braxon  v. 
Bressler,  64  111.  488 ;  Beckiiian  v.  Krea- 
mer,  43  111.  447  ;  Chieaj;o  &  Pac.  R.  Co. 
V.  Stein,  75  111  41  ;  Chieago  v.  Laflin,  49 
111.  172;  Butteruiuli  i;.  St.  Louis  Bridge 
Co.  123  111.  535,550,  17  N.  K.  Rep.  439; 
Trustees  v.  Schroll,  120  111.  509,  12  N.  E. 
Rep.  243,  60  Am.  Rep.  575;  Wasliington 
Ice  Co.  V.  Shortall,  101  111.  46,40  Am. 
Rep.  196.  Maine  :  Brown  r.  Chadlmurue, 
31  Me.  9,  1  Am.  Dec.  641.  Maryland: 
Browne  v.  Kennedy,  5  H.  &  J.  195,  9  Am. 
Dec.  503.  Massachusetts:  Commonwealth 
V.  Vincent,  lOS  ^la.ss.  441,  447  ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Chapin,  5  Pick.  199,  16  Am. 
Dec.  386  ;  Kuii;ht  v.  Wilder,  2  Ciish.  199, 
209,  48  Am.  Dec.  660 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53,  97,  101,  jjer  Shaw, 
C.  J.;  Lunt  v.  Holland,  14  Mass.  149. 
Michigan:  Backus  v.  Detroit,  49  Mich. 
110,  13  N.  W.  Rep.  380,  43  Am.  Rep.  447  ; 
Watson  V.  Peters,  26  Mich.  508;  Ryan  r. 
Brown,  18  Mich.  196  ;  Lorman  v.  Benson, 
8  Mich.  18,  77  Am.  Dec.  435  ;  \Vel)l)er  r. 
Pere  Marquette  Boom  Co.  62  Mich.  026, 
30  N.  W.  Rep.  469.  Mississippi:  I'lie 
Magnolia  v.  Marshnll,  39  Miss.  109  ;  Mor- 
gnn  r.  Reading,  3  S.  &  M.  366.  New 
Hampshire  :  Claremont  i\  Carlton,  2  X. 
H.  369,  9  Am.  Dec.  88.  Ne-.v  Jersey: 
Attoiney-G<-neral  v.  Del.  &  B.  Brook  R. 
Co.  27  X.  J.  V.q.  631  ;  Kannuse  v.  Slock- 
bower,  4S  X.  ,1.  Eq.  42,  21  Atl.  Rep.  197. 
North  Carolina:  Bond  c.  Wool,  107  N.  C. 
139,  140,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  2S1  ;  State  v. 
Glen,  7  .Jones  L.  321.  325;  Williams  /■. 
Buchanan,  1   Ired.   L    535,  35  Am.    Dec. 

396 


760.  Ohio:  June  v.  Purcell,  36  Ohio  St. 
396;  Ciavit,  v.  Chambers,  3  Ohio,  496 ; 
niaiiehard  y.  Porter,  1 1  Oliio,  138;  Walker 
r.  Public  Work<,  16  Ohio,  540.  Oregon: 
Moore  v.  Willamette,  T.  &  L.  Co.  7  Oieg. 
355.  South  Carolina:  McCullough  v. 
Wall,  4  Rich.  68,  53  Am.  Dec.  755;  State 
V.  Columbia,  27  S.  C.  137,3  S.  E.  Rep. 
55.  Tennessee  :  Holbert  r.  Edetis,  5  Lea, 
204,  40  Am.  Ik'p.  26.  Wisconsin:  Nor- 
cross  i;.  Giiffiths,  65  Wis.  599,  27  N.  W. 
Rej).  606,  56  Aui.  Rep.  642  ;  Jones  ;;.  Pet- 
tibone,  2  Wis.  308. 

1  Alabama:  Hess  v.  Cheney,  83  Ala. 
251,  3  So.  Rep.  791  ;  Williams  u.  Glover, 
66  Ala.  189;  Bullock  (,-.  Wilson,  2  Port. 
436.  California:  Packer  r.  Bird,  137  U. 
S.  661,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  210,  71  Cal.  134, 
11  Pac.  Rep.  873  ;  Lux  v.  Hagunn,  69  Cal. 
255, 10  Pac.  Rep.  674.  Indiana  :  Martin  v. 
Evansville,  32  Ind.  85.  Iowa:  McManus 
V.  Carmichael,  3  Iowa,  1  ;  HaiLiht  v.  Keo- 
kuk, 4  Iowa,  199  ;  Tomlin  v.  Dubuque  R. 
R  Co.  32  Iowa,  106,  7  Am.  Rep.  176; 
Wood  V.  Railroad  Co.  60  Iowa,  456,  15 
N.  W.  Rep.  284  ;  Barney  v.  Keokuk,  94 
U.  S.  324.  Kansas:  Wood  v.  Fowler,  26 
Kan<.  682,  689,  40  Am.  Rep.  330.  Ken- 
tucky: Tburman  v.  Morrison,  14  B  .Mon. 
367.  Minnesota:  Lam]»rey  '■.  State,  52 
Minu.  isi,  .53  N.  W.  Rep.  1139.  Mis- 
souri: Benson  v.  Morrow,  61  Mo.  -345, 
351  ;  Meyers  v.  St.  Louis,  8  Mo.  Ap)).  266. 
North  Carolina  :  Wilson  v.  Porhes,  2  De\'. 
30;  Collins  v.  Benbury,  3  Ired.  L.  277,  38 
Am.  Dec.  722;  State  v.  Glen,  7  Jones  L. 
321  ;  Broadnax  v.  Baker,  94  N.  C.  675, 
681,  55  Am.  Rep.  633;  Hodges  r.  Wil- 
liams, 95  N.  C.  331,  59  Am.  Rep.  242; 
Fagan  i:  Armstead,  11  Ired.  4.33  ;  State 
V.  Eason,  114  N.  C.  7'*7,  10  S.  E.  Rep. 
.  88.  New  York:  Smith  r.  Rorbcster,  92 
N.  Y.  4i)3,  44  Am.  Rep.  393;  People?'. 
Jones,  112  X.  Y.  597,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  577  ; 


BOUNDARY    BY    THE    SEA,    RIVERS,    AND    LAKES. 


[§  4«1- 


this  country.  The  earliest  judicial  statement  of  it  is  found  in 
a  case  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  in  1807,  in 
which  Chief  Justice  Tilghman,  after  observing  that  tiie  rule  of 
the  common  law  upon  the  subject  had  not  been  adopted  in  Penn- 
sylvania, said:  "The  common-law  principle  is,  in  fact,  that  the 
owners  of  the  banks  have  no  right  to  the  water  of  navigable  riv- 
ers. Now,  the  Susquehanna  is  a  navigable  river,  and  therefore 
the  owners  of  its  banks  have  no  such  right.  It  is  said,  however, 
that  some  ot  the  cases  assert  that  by  navigable  rivers  are  meant 
rivers  in  which  there  is  no  flow  or  reflow  of  the  tide.  This  defi- 
nition may  be  very  proper  in  England,  wliere  there  is  no  river  of 
considerable  importance  as  to  navigation  which  has  not  a  flow 
of  the  tide  ;  but  it  would  be  highly  unreasonable  when  applied 
to  our  large  rivers,  such  as  the  Ohio,  Allegheny,  Delaware, 
Schuylkill,  or  Susquehanna  and  its  branches."  ^ 

Congress,  by  early  legislation  with  regard  to  the  survey  of 
public  lands,  recognized  the  same  rule,  declaring  that  navigable 
rivers  shall  be  public  highways.^ 

In  view  of  this  legislation  the  Federal  courts,  in  construing 
grants  of  the  United  States,  hold  that  the  common-law  rules  of 
riparian  ownership  do  not   apply  to  navigable  streams,  even  in 

People  V.  Canal  Appraisers,  33  N.  Y.  461  ;  rope  and  which  took  its  rise  in  a  country 
Canal  Commissioners  v.  People,  5  Wend,  where  there  was  a  tideless  sea,  recognized 
423,    17    Wend.   571.      See  Commission-     all  rivers  as  navigable  which  were  really 

so ;  and  this  common-sense  view  was 
adopted  by  the  early  founders  of  Penn- 
sylvania, whose  province  was  intersected 
by  large  and  valual)ie  streams,  some  of 
which  are  a  mile  in  breadth." 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  has  recognized  these  precedents  as 
binding  in  cases  coming  from  that  State. 
Rundle  v.  Canal  Co.  14  How.  80,  91,  93, 
94;  Fisher  v.  Ilaldeman,  20  How.  186, 
194.  South  Carolina:  Catos  ?>.  Waiiling- 
toi),  1  McCord,-580.  Tennessee:  Stdart 
V.  Clark,  2  SwMn,  9.  KMer  v.  Htirrns.  0 
Ilnmpli.  3.58.  West  Virginia  :  Brown  Oil 
Co.  v.  CMldwcll.  .'i.^.  W.  V.i.  95,  i;)  S.  E. 
Rep.  42. 

'  Carson  v.  iJlazer,  2  IJiun.  475,  477, 
478,  4  Am.  Dec.  46^. 

'^  Act  of  Miiy  18,  1796,  ch.  29,  §  9,  1 
Stats,  at  Large,  468  ;  R.  S.  §  2476. 

397 


ers  I'.  Kempshall,  26  Wend.  404.  Penn- 
sylvania :  The  common-law  doctrine  was 
never  recognized  here.  Wood  v.  Ap- 
pal, 03  Pa.  St.  210;  Carson  v.  Blazfr,  2 
Binn.  475,  4  Am.  Dec.  463;  Mononga- 
hela  Bridge  Co./-.  Kirk,  46  Pa.  St.  112, 
84  Am.  Dec.  527.  In  the  latter  case 
Read,  J.,  delivering  the  opinion,  said : 
■"  We  are  aware  that,  by  the  common  law 
of  Kngland,  such  streams  as  the  Missis- 
sippi, the  Mi.ssouri,  the  rivers  Amazon 
and  IMatte,  the  Rhine,  the  Danube,  the 
Po,  the  Nile,  the  Kuphrates,  the  Ganges, 
and  the  Indus  were  not  navigable  rivers, 
but  were  the  subject  of  private  property  ; 
whilst  an  insitrniticant  creek  in  a  .small  i.s- 
land  was  elevated  to  the  dignity  of  a  ]nib- 
iie  river,  because  it  was  so  near  the  ocean 
that  the  tide  ebbed  and  flowed  uj)  the 
whole  of  its  petty  course,  'i'he  Ronnin 
law,  which   has  pervaded  Continental  Eu- 


§  482.]  DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 

tlioso  States  in  wliich  this  rule  has  been  adopted.^  "  But  what- 
ever iiu'idents  or  riglits  attach  to  the  ownersliip  of  property  con- 
veveil  bv  the  Li;overuinent  will  he  determined  by  the  States,  subject 
to  the  condition  that  their  rules  do  not  iin[);iir  the  efHeienc}^  of  the 
grants,  or  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  property  by  the  grantee. 
As  an  incident  ff  such  ownership  the  right  of  the  riparian  owner, 
where  the  waters  are  above  the  influence  of  the  tide,  will  be  lim- 
ited, accortling  to  the  law  of  the  State,  either  to  low  or  high  water 
mark,  or  will  extend  to  the  middle  of  the  stream."  ^  Xhe  ques- 
tion, whether  a  riparian  owner  holds  the  fee  to  the  middle  thread 
of  the  stream  or  the  river's  bank,  is  governed  by  the  law  of  the 
States.  It  depends  upon  the  laws  of  each  State  to  what  extent 
the  prerogative  of  the  State  to  lands  under  water  shall  extend; 
and  therefore  it  happens  that  the  Mississippi  River,  by  the  settled 
policv  of  the  State  of  Iowa,  is  regarded  as  a  navigable  river,  and 
the  title  of  a  riparian  owner  on  the  banks  of  this  liver  extends 
only  to  ordiiuiry  high-water  mark,  and  that  the  shore  between 
high  and  low  water  mark,  as  well  as  the  bed  of  the  river,  belongs 
to  the  State  ;  while  on  the  other  side  of  the  same  great  river,  in 
the  States  of  Illinois  and  Mississippi,  the  common-law  doctrine 
pi-evails,  and  in  those  States  the  title  of  the  riparian  proprietor 
extends  to  the  middle  of  the  current.^ 

482.  A  division  of  waters  into  public  and  private  waters 
has  been  adopted  in  some  recent  decisions,  and  undoubtedly 
the  tendency  is  to  extend  and  assert  public  rights  as  against  private 
ownership  in  lakes  and  rivers,  without  much  regard  to  any  test  or 
definition  of  navigability.  The  tendency  is  well  illustrated  in  a 
recent  important  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Miimesota, 
in  which  Mr.  Justice  Mitchell  says:  ''In  this  country,  while  still 
retaining  the  common-law  classification  of  navigable  and  non-navi- 
gable, we  have,  in  view  of  our  changed  conditions,  rejected  its 
test  of  navigability,  and  adopted  in  its  place  that  of  navigability 
in  fact;  and,  while  still  adhering  to  navigability  as  the  criterion 
whether  waters  are  public  or  private,  yet  we  have  extended  the 

1  Packer  v.  Bird,  137  U.S.  601,  11  Sup.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  337  ;  Packer  r.  Bird.  137 
Ct.  Rep.  210;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Schurmeir,  U.  S.  6bl,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  210;  St.  Louis 
7  Wall.  272,  ;iffirniing  Schurmeir  v.  Rail-  v.  Myers,  113  U.  S.  .56f>,  .'>  Snp.  Ct.  Rep. 
road  Co.  10  Minn.  82,  88  Am.  Dec.  .59.  640;   Bnriiey    r.    Keokuk,  94   U.   S.   324; 

2  Packer  v.  Bird,  137  U.  S.  661,  669,  Ilrtrdiii  r.  .Ionian,  140  U.  S.  371,  11  Sup. 
])er  Field,  .J.  Ct   Rep.  808,  838. 

*  St.  Louis  V.  Rntz,  138  U.    S.  226,  11 
398 


BOUNDARY   BY    THE   SEA,    RIVERS,   AND   LAKES.  [§  4S2. 

meaning  of  tliiit  term  so  as  to  declare  all  waters  public  highways 
which  afford  a  cliainiel  for  any  useful  commerce,  including  small 
streams,  merely  floatable  for  logs  at  certain  seasons  of  the  year. 
Most  of  the  definitions  of  'navigability'  in  the  decided  cases, 
while  perhaps  conceding  that  the  size  of  the  boats  or  vessels  is 
not  important,  and,  indeed,  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  naviga- 
tion should  be  by  boats  at  all,  yet  seem  to  convey  the  idea  that 
the  water  must  be  capable  of  some  commerce  of  pecuniary  value, 
as  distinguished  from  boating  for  mere  pleasure.  But  if,  umJer 
present  conditions  of  society,  bodies  of  water  are  used  for  public 
uses  other  than  mere  commercial  navigation  in  its  ordinary  sense, 
we  fail  to  see  why  they  ought  not  to  be  held  to  be  public  waters, 
or  navigable  waters,  if  the  old  nomenclature  is  preferred.  Cer- 
tainly, we  do  not  see  why  boating  or  sailing  for  pleasure  should 
not  be  considered  navigation,  as  well  as  boating  for  mere  pecu- 
niary profit.  ...  If  the  term  '  navigable  '  is  not  capable  of  a 
sufficiently  extended  meaning  to  preserve  and  protect  the  rights 
of  the  people  to  all  beneficial  public  uses  of  these  inland  lakes 
to  which  they  are  capable  of  being  put,  we  are  not  prepared  to 
say  that  it  would  not  be  justifiable,  within  the  principles  of  the 
common  law,  to  discard  the  old  nomenclature  and  adopt  the  clas- 
sification of  public  Avaters  and  private  waters.  But,  ht)weveL' 
that  may  be,  we  are  satisfied  that,  so  long  as  these  lakes  are  capa- 
ble of  use  for  boating,  even  for  pleasure,  they  are  navigable 
within  the  reason  and  spirit  of  the  common-law  rule.  When  the 
waters  of  any  of  them  have  so  far  receded  or  dried  up  as  to  be 
no  longer  capable  of  any  beneficial  use  by  the  public,  they  are  no 
longer  public  waters,  and  their  former  beds,  under  the  principles 
already  announced,  would  become  the  private  property  of  the 
riparian  owners."  ^ 

A  boundary  upon  a  public  navigable  river  or  lake  is  a  boun- 
dary by  the  edge  of  the  watei-  at  ordinar}^  low-water  mark;  that 
is,  the  deed  with  such  boundary  passes  to  the  grantee  the  title 
to  the  land  between  such  stage  of  the  water  and  high-water 
mark. 2 

In  acoi'dance  with  this  rule,  where  a  navigable  river  is  one  of 
the  boundaries  of  a  municipality,  the  low-water  line,  and  not  the 

1  Lamproy  v.  Slate,  r)2  Minn.  181,  199,     Rep.   791  ;   Williams  v.   Glover,   66  Ala. 
200,  .53  N.  W.  Rep.  1 139.  189. 

2  Hess  V.  Cheney,  83  Ala.  251,  3  So. 

399 


§§  483,  484.]  i)i:scKii'TioN  and  boundaries. 

thread  of  the  streiiu),  is  the  boundary,  in  the  absence  of  expres3 
lan>'iiai;e  to  the  contrary  in  the  act  of  incorporation.^ 

483.  The  rule  to  determine  the  division  line  between  adjoin- 
ing holdings  in  the  shallow  waters  of  the  ocean,  or  of  a  navi- 
gable river  or  lake,  of  owners  of  hmd  boinU'ring  thereon,  and  lo- 
catO(.l  (111  a  curved  or  inei;uhir  shore,  is  (1)  to  measure  the  whole 
extent  of  the  shore  line,  and  compute  how  many  rods,  yards,  or 
feet  each  riparian  pro[)rietor  owns  thereon ;  (2)  to  divide  the 
navigable  water  line  into  as  many  ecpial  parts  as  such  shore  line 
contains  rods,  yards,  or  feet,  and  then  appropriate  to  each  pro- 
prietor as  many  of  such  j)arts  of  such  navigable  water  line  as  he 
owns  i-ods,  yards,  or  feet  of  the  shore  line ;  and  (3)  to  draw  a  line 
from  the  point  of  division  on  the  shore  line  to  the  point  thus  deter- 
mined as  the  point  of  division  on  the  navigable  water  line.  This 
general  rule  was  early  adopted  in  Massachusetts,  and  has  since 
been  adhered  to  there,  and  adopted  by  the  United  States  courts, 
and  the  courts  of  New  York,  Michigan,  and  Wisconsin.- 

484.  A  sale  of  land  bounded  on  a  non-tidal  river  (except 
■where  the  common  law  has  been  changed  in  respect  to  rivers 


1  Coldwater  v.  Tucker,  36  Mich.  474, 
24  Am.  Rep.  601  ;  Ogdensburj^h  v.  Lyon, 
7  Lans.  215;  State  v.  Eason,  114  N.  C. 
787,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  88;  Brown  Oil  Co. 
V.  Caldwell,  35  W.  Va.  95,  13  S.  E. 
Rep.  42. 

-  Deerfield  v.  Arms,  17  Pick.  41,  28 
Am.  Dec.  276;  Rusty.  Mill  Corp.  6  Pick. 
158;  Sp.'irhawk  v.  Bullard,  1  Met.  95; 
Hopkins  Academy  v.  Dickinson,  9  Cusli. 
552  ;  VVonson  v.  Wonson,  14  Allen,  71,  85  ; 
Johnston  v.  Jones,  1  Black,  209, 223  ;  Jones 
V.  Johnston,  18  How.  150;  O'Donnell 
V.  Kelsey,  10  N.  Y.  412;  Nott  v.  Thayer, 
2  Bosw.  10;  Blodi;ett,  &c.  Co.  ;;.  Peters, 
87  Mich.  498,  506,  507,  49  N.  W.  Rep. 
917  ;  Northern  Pine  Land  Co  r.  Bigelow, 
84  Wis.  157,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  496  ;  Mena-ha 
Ware  Co.  v.  Lawson,  70  Wis.  600, 36  N.  W. 
Rep.  412.  In  the  Michigan  case  Cham- 
plin,  C.  J.,  speaking  for  the  court,  said : 
"  The  object  to  be  kept  in  view  in  cases 
of  this  kind  is  to  secure  to  each  proprietor 
access  to  navigable  water,  and  an  equal 
share  of  the  dockage  line  at  navigable 
water  in  proportion  to  his  share  on  the 

400 


original  shore  line  of  the  bay.  .  .  .  We 
cannot  deal  with  Green  Bay  as  we  would 
with  the  rivers  in  this  State,  where  the 
lines  are  to  be  drawn  at  right  angles  to 
the  thread  of  the  stream.  The  rules  laid 
down  for  the  boundaries  of  owners  of 
land  bordering  upon  the  ocean  and  great 
inland  seas  are  more  jjroper  for  the  dis- 
position of  the  case  before  us."  And  see 
Bay  City  Gaslii:ht  Co.  v.  Industrial  Works, 
28  Micii.  182  ;  Clark  v.  Campau,  19  Mich. 
325;  Batchelder  v.  Keniston,  51  N.  H. 
496;  Aborn  v.  Smith,  12  R.  I.  370; 
Emerson  v.  Taylor,  9  Me.  42;  Newton  v. 
Eddy,  23  Vt.  319  ;  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  V.  Hannon,  37  N.  J.  L.  276  ;  Stockham 
V.  Browning,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  390.  In  Attor- 
ney-General V.  Boston  Wharf  Co.  12  Gray, 
5.53,  558,  the  court  say  that,  "in  general, 
where  there  are  no  circumstances  or  pe- 
culiarities in  the  formation  of  the  shore 
or  the  course  of  the  channel,  the  lines  of 
division  are  to  be  made  to  tie  channel  in 
the  most  (ilnct  ciiursc  from  the  lateral 
bnundaries  of  the  several  tracts  of  upland 
to  which  the  flars  are  appended." 


BOUNDARY   BY   THE   SEA,    RIVERS,   AND   LAKES.  [§  485. 

navigable  in  fact)  passes  the  title  ad  medium  fllum  aquae, 
unless  there  is  something  in  the  deed  to  indicate  an  intention  to 
restrict  the  title  to  the  hank  of  the  river. ^  The  effect  of  the 
deed  depends  upon  its  terms  and  the  presumptions  arising  there- 
from, unless  the  terms  used  are  uncertain  or  ambiguous,  so  that 
parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  explain  them.^ 

485.  By  the  thread   of  the  stream   is  strictly   meant    the 
centre   of  the   main   channel   of    the   stream.'^     Ordinarily  the 


1  Mickletliwait  y.  Xewlay  Brid}:e  Co.  33 
Ch.  D.  133  ;  Wright  v.  Howard,  1  Sim.  & 
Stu.  190,  203;  Devonsliire  u.  Patiinson,  L. 
R.  20  Q.  B.  D.  263  ;  Thomas  v.  Hatch,  3 
Sumn.  170;  Hardiu  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S. 
371,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  808.  Colorado  :  Den- 
ver V.  Pearee.  13  Colo.  383,  22  Pac.  Rep. 
774.  Connecticut :  Adams  v.  Pease,  2  Comi. 
481  ;  Warner  c.  Southworth,  6  Conn.  471. 
Illinois:  Houek  v.  Yates,  82  111.  179; 
Braxon  v.  Bressler,  64  111.488;  Trustees 
V.  Schroll,  120  111.  509, 12  N.  E.  Rep.  243, 
60  Am.  Rep.  57.5;  People  v.  Madison  Co. 
125  111.  9,  17  N.  E.  Rep.  147  ;  Indiana: 
Ross  V.  Faust,  54  Ind.  471,  23  Am.  Rep. 
655  ;  Brophy  v.  Richeson  (Ind.),  36  N.  E. 
Rep.  424;  Indiana  v.  Milk,  11  Biss.  197, 
11  Fed.  Rep.  389;  Ridgway  v.  Ludlow, 
58  Ind  248;  Edwards  v.  Oj:le,  76  Ind. 
302.  Kentucky :  Berry  v.  Snyder,  3  Bush, 
266,  96  Am.  Dec.  219  ;  Williamsburg 
Boom  Co.  V.  Smith,  84  Ky.  372,  1  S.  W. 
Rep.  765.  Maine:  Warren  r.  Thomaston, 
75  Me.  329,  40  Am.  Rep.  397  ;  I'ike  v. 
Monroe,  36  :Me.  309,  58  Am.  Dec.  751  ; 
Granger  r.  Avery,  64  Me.  292  ;  Xickerson 
V.  Crawford,  16  Me.  245;  Hathorn  v. 
Stin.son,  10  Me.  224,  227,  25  Am.  Dec. 
228;  Lapi.-h  i-.  Bangor  Bank,  8  Me.  85; 
Morrison  v.  Keen,  3  Me.  474.  Massachu- 
setts :  King  V.  King,  7  Mass.  496  ;  Hatch 
r.  Dwight,  17  Mass.  289,9  Am.  Dee.  145; 
Ingraham  v.  Wilkinson,  4  Pick.  268,  16 
Am.  Dec.  342  ;  Commonwealth  r.  Alger, 
7  Cush.  53.  Michigan:  Twogood  r.  II"yt, 
42  Mich.  609,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  445;  Lor- 
man  v.  Benson,  8  Mich.  18,  77  Am.  Dec. 
435;  Norris  v.  Hill,  1  Mich.  202;  Moore 
V.  Sanborne,  2  .Mich.  519.  Minnesota: 
Lamprey  v.  State,  52  Minn.  181,  .53  N. 
VOL.  I. 


W.  Rep.  1139.  New  Hampshire  :  State 
V.  Canterbury,  28  N.  H.  195  ;  Greeiiliaf  v. 
Kihon,  11  N.  H.  530;  State  v.  Gilmauton, 
9  N.  H.  461 ;  Claremont  v.  Carlton,  2  N. 
H.  369,  9  Am.  Dec.  88 ;  Sleeper  v.  Laco- 
nia,  60  N.  H.  201,49  Am.  Rep.  311  ;  Nich- 
ols V.  Suncook  Mauuf.  Co.  34  N.  H.  345. 
New  Jersey  :  Kanouse  v.  Slockbower,  48 
N.  .J.  Eq.  42,  21  Atl.  Rep.  197.  New 
York  :  Smith  v.  Rochester,  92  N.  Y.  463 
44  Am.  Dec.  393;  People  v.  Jones,  112  N. 
Y.  597,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  577  ;  Morgan  v. 
King,  35  N.  Y.  454;  People  v.  Canal  Ap 
]jraisers,  13  Wend.  355  ;  Canal  Commis 
sioners  v.  People,  5  Wend.  423 ;  Canal 
Apjjraisers  v.  People,  17  Wend.  571. 
Ohio :  Niebaus  v.  Shepherd,  26  Ohio  St. 
40;  Hopkins  v.  Kent,  9  Ohio,  13;  Gavit 
r.  Chambers,  3  Ohio,  495.  Rhode  Island: 
Hughes  v.  Providence  &  W.  R.  Co.  2  R. 
I.  508.  South  Carolina :  McCullough  v. 
Wall,  4  Rich.  68,  53  Am.  Dec.  715.  Ten- 
nessee :  Martin  v.  Nance,  3  Head,  649. 
Virginia:  Crenshaw  v.  Slate  River  Co.  6 
Rand,  245;  Hayes  v.  Bowman,  1  Rand, 
417.  West  Virginia:  Carter  v.  Railway 
Co.  26  W.  Va.  644  ;  Camden  v.  Creel,  4 
W.  Va.  365.  Wisconsin:  Norcross  v. 
Griffiths,  65  Wis.  599,  27  N.  W.  Rep.  606, 
56  Am.  Rep.  642;  Arnold  v.  Elmore,  16 
Wis.  509;  Chaiidos  v.  M:uk,  77  Wis.  573, 
46  N.  W.  Rep.  803. 

-  See  §§  338,  339.  In  Devonshire  v. 
Pattinson,  L.  R.  20  Q.  B.  263,  the  pre- 
sumjjtion  that  the  conveyance  included 
tiic  bed  of  the,  river  iis(iue  ad  mfdiuin  fVnin 
was  rebutted  l>y  jiroof  of  surrounding 
circumstance-^. 

3  Cessill  V.  State,  40  Ark.  501. 

401 


§  485.] 


DESCRIPTION    AND    BOUXDAKIKS. 


niitlillo  line  between  the  shoivs  is  regarded  as  the  thread  of  the 
stn-am,  taking  it  in  the  natural  and  ordinaiy  stage  of  the  water, 
irrespective  of  the  deptli  of  the  channeh^  Moreovei-,  it  is  the 
middle  line  of  the  stream  for  the  time  being  that  is  the  boundary. 
The  boundary  line  may  change  from  time  to  time  by  the  gradual 
wearing  away  of  tlie  bank  upon  one  side  of  the  stream  and  the 
di^positing  of  tlie  soil  upon  the  opposite  side,  and  the  land  before 
covered  by  water  belongs  to  the  riparian  proprietoi',^  though,  if 
the  bed  of  the  stream  be  suddenly  changed  by  a  freshet,  the  boun- 
dary is  not  changed  ;  the  ownership  remains  according  to  former 
bounds.^ 

If  one  owning  land  on  both  sides  of  a  river  grants  the  land  on 
the  westerly  side  of  it,  bounding  it  by  the  river,  the  grant  in- 
cludes an  island  lying  between  the  westerly  bank  and  the  middle 
of  the  main  channel  of  the  river."*  If  such  owner  in  making  a 
grant  excepts  an  island,  he  makes  the  thread  of  the  channel  between 
the  island  and  the  mainland  the  boundary.^     If  an  island,  grad- 


1  Hopkins  Academy  v.  Dickinson,  9 
Cush.  552  ;  Warren  v.  Thoniaston,  75  Me. 
329,  46  Am.  Rep.  .397  ;  Boscawen  v.  Can- 
terbury, 23  N.  H.  188;  McCulIongh  v. 
Wall,  4  Rich.  68,  53  Am.  Dec.  715. 

2  Nebraska  v.  Iowa,  143  U.  S.  359,  12 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  396;  St.  Louis  v.  Rutz,  138 


Burlcyson,  106  N.  C.  381,  11  S.  E.  Rep. 
590  ;  Niehaus  v.  Shepherd,  26  Ohio  St.  40  ; 
Lamb  v.  Rickets,  11  Ohio,  311;  Collins 
V.  State,  3  Tex.  Ct.  App.  323 ;  Jones  v. 
Pettibone,  2  Wis.  308;  Walker  v.  Shep- 
ardson,  4  Wis.  486,  65  Am.  Dec.  324. 
The    fact    that     accretions     are    due 


U.  S.  226,  11   Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  337;  New  wholly  or  in  part  to  obstructions  placed 

Orleans  v.   United   States,   10   Pet.   662,  in  the  river  by  third  parties  does  not  pre- 

717;    Jones    v.    Soulard,    24    How.    41;  vent  the  riparian  owner  from   acquiring 

Banks  v.  Ogden,  2  Wall.  57;  Saulet  v.  title  thereto.     Tatum  v.  St.  Louis  (Mo.), 

Shepherd,  4  Wall.  502;  St.  Clair  v.  Lev-  28  S.  W.  Rep.  1002. 
ingston,  23  Wall.  46  ;  Jefferis  v.  Land  Co.         s  gt    l.oms  v.  Rutz,  138  U.   S.  226,  11 


1.34  U.  S.  178,  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  518; 
Hagan  v.  Campbell,  8  Port.  (Ala.)  9,  33 
Am.  Dec.  267 ;  Warren  v.  Chambers, 
25  Ark.  120,  91  Am.  Dec.  538,  4  Am. 
Rep.  23 ;  Lovingston  v.  St.  Clair,  64 
111.  56,  16  Am.  Rep.  516;  Butternuth  v. 
Bridge  Co.  123  111.  535,  17  N.  E.  Rep. 
439  ;  Steele  v.  Sanchez,  72  Iowa,  65,  33 
N.  W.  Rep.  366;  Kraut  v.  Crawford,  18 
Iowa,  549,  87  Am.  Dec.  414;  Hopkins 
Academy  v.  Dickinson,  9  Cu.sh.  544 ; 
Primm  v.  Walker,  38  Mo.  94,  98  ;  Mincke 
V.  Skinner,  44  Mo.  92 ;  Lammers  v.  Nis- 
sen,  4  Neb.  245  ;  Gill  v.  Lydick,  40  Neb. 
508,  59  N.  W.  Rep.  104  ;  Murry  ;•.  Ser- 
mon, 1  Hawks  (N.  C),  56 ;  Wilhelm  v. 
402 


Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  337  ;  Nebraska  y.  Iowa,  143 
U.  S.  3.59,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  396;  Lynch 
V.  Allen,  4  Dev.  &  B.  62  ;  Hopkins  Acad- 
emy V.  Dickinson,  9  Cush.  544  ;  Holbrook 
V.  Moore,  4  Neb.  437  ;  Henning  v.  Ben- 
nett, 63  Hun,  592,  18  N.  Y.  S.  645  ;  Bv.;- 
tenuth  V.  St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.  123  111. 
535;  Degman  v.  Elliott  (Ky.),  8  S.  W. 
Rep.  10. 

*  Miller  v.  Mann,  55  Vt.  475  ;  Bran- 
ham  V.  Turnpike  Co.  1  Lea,  704  ;  Walker 
V.  Board  of  Works,  16  Ohio,  540;  Wat- 
son V.  Peters,  26  Mich.  508.  So  in  case  of 
a  navigable  river,  Missouri  v.  Kentucky, 
11  Wall.  395. 

«  Stolp  V.  Hoyt,  44  111.  219. 


BOUNDARY    BY   THE   SEA,    RIVERS,   AND   LAKES.  [§  486. 

ually  forms  in  tlie  bed  of  a  river  wholly  one  side  of  the  thread  of 
the  stream,  it  is  the  property  of  the  riparian  owner  on  that  side ;  ^ 
but  if  the  island  is  so  situated  that  it  is  partly  on  one  side  and 
partly  on  the  other  of  the  thread  of  the  river,  it  belongs  in  sev- 
eralty to  the  propi-ietors  on  each  side,  the  division  line  being  the 
thread  of  the  old  river  before  the  formation  of  the  island.^  So,  of 
course,  if  a  point  of  land  on  one  side  is  cut  off,  making  an  island, 
this  belongs  to  the  original  owner. 

If  the  old  bed  of  the  river,  being  gradually  deserted  by  the 
current,  fills  up  and  new  land  is  formed,  this  belongs  to  the  ripa- 
rian proprietors  on  each  side,  the  division  line  being  the  thread  of 
the  old  river.3  But  if  the  bed  of  the  river,  as  it  existed  at  the 
time  of  the  grant,  cannot  be  found  or  traced,  the  courses  and  dis- 
tances of  a  survey  giving  the  meander  line  of  the  river  may  be 
resorted  to.'* 

The  right  of  the  riparian  proprietor  to  alluvion,  or  accretions  to 
his  land  through  the  gradual  action  of  the  water,  is  everywhere 
admitted.  The  rule  api)lies  equally  to  lands  bounding  on  tide- 
waters or  on  fresh  waters.  It  applies  to  the  king  or  the  state 
equally  as  to  private  persons  ;  and  it  is  independent  of  the  law 
governing  the  title  in  the  soil  covered  by  the  water.^ 

486.  If  there  are  two  or  more  channels,  the  middle  line  of 
the  channel  having  the  greater  depth  of  water,  and  being  the  one 
generally  used  for  the  purposes  of  navigation,  is  regarded  as  the 
thread  of  the  stream,  though  the  greater  quantity  of  water  may 
flow  in  the  other  channel.^     If  there  be  a  main  channel  through 

1  Jones  V.  Soulard,  24  How.  41.  *  Martin  v.  Cooper,  87  Cal.  97,  25  Pac. 

2  St.  Louis  V.  Kiitz,  1.38   U.    S.   226,  11      Rep.  262. 

Sup.  Ct.  Kep.  3.37;  Ingraham  y.  Wilkin-  '^  Sliively  v.  BowlUy.  1.52  U.   S.   1,  14 

son,  4  Pick.  268,  16  Am.  Dec.  342  ;  Deer-  Sup.   Ct.   Rej).   548,   per  Gray,  J.,  citing 

field  V.  Arms,  17   Pick.  41,  28  Am.  Dec.  Lord  Hale  in  Harg.  Law  Tracts,  pp.  5, 

276;    McCullough    v.    Wall,   4   Rich.  68,  14,28;  Rex  y.  Yarborough  in  the  King's 

53  Am.  Dec.  715  ;  Gerrish  v.  Ciougli,  48  Bench,  3  Barn,  &  C.  91,  and  4  Dowl.  &  R. 

j;f   jj.  9.  790,  and  in  the  House  of  Lords,  1  Dow.  & 

3  Hopkins  Academy  v.  Dickinson,  9  C.  178,2  Bligh,  N.  S.  147,  and  5  Ring. 
Gush.  544;  Warren  t-.  Chambers,  25  Ark.  163;  Doe  v.  East  India  Co.  10  Moore 
120,  91  Am.  Dec.  538,  4  Am.  Rep.  23  ;  P.  C.  140  ;  Foster  v.  Wright,  4  C.  P.  Div. 
St.  Louis  V.  Mo.  P.  Ry.  Co.  114  Mo.  13,  438;  Handly  v.  Anthony,  5  Wheat.  374, 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  202  ;  Buse  v.  Ru.s.><ell,  86  380;  Jefferis  r.  Land  Co.  134  U.  S.  178, 
Mo.  209;  St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  189-19.3,  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  518 ;  Nebraska 
Risley,  40  Mo.  356;  Victoria  v.  Schott  v.  Iowa,  143  U.  S.  359,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29  S.  W.  Rep.  681.  396  ;  Minto  v.  Delaney,  7  Oreg.  337. 

c  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clinton 
403 


§§  487,  488.]  DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDARIES. 

whu'li  the  water  Hows  at  all  times,  and  an  auxiliary  channel 
uliicli  furnishe.s  a  [)assage  for  surplus  water  in  times  of  freshet, 
the  I'entrc  of   the  main  ehannel  is  the  thread  of  the  stream.^ 

487.  If,  however,  the  course  of  a  river  is  changed  by  dig- 
ging an  artificial  channel,  a  deed  of  land  hounded  by  the  river 
may  mean  the  river  as  it  i"an  in  its  old  chaimel.  Thus  where, 
before  the  making  of  a  deed  of  land  on  the  north  side  of  a  river, 
the  owners  of  the  land  on  the  south  side  had  dug  a  channel 
through  a  part  of  the  grantor's  land,  and  the  river  changed  its 
•course  to  the  artificial  channel,  so  that  it  ran  in  a  straight  line, 
the  old  channel  being  a  bow,  leaving  a  strip  of  land  belonging  to 
the  grantor  lying  between  the  old  channel  and  the  new  channel, 
his  deetl  bounding  upon  the  river  was  held  to  convey  the  land  to 
the  old  river-bed,  and  to  include  the  strip  in  question.^ 

488.  The  owner  may,  however,  sell  or  reserve  his  title  to 
the  soil  in  the  bed  of  the  river,  separate  from  the  upland,  or 
the  upland  without  the  bed  of  the  river.^  It  is  only  necessary  to 
use  such  terms  in  describing  the  laud  that  the  ordinary  presump- 
tion shall  not  apply.     He  may  convey  his  land  bounding  it  by  a 


(Iowa),  r,5  N.  W.  Kep.  462 ;  Iowa  v.  Illi- 
nois H"  U.  S.  1,  13  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  239; 
JoDes  V.  Soulard,  24  How.  41  ;  Schools  v. 
Risley,  10  Wall.  91  ;  Graves  v.  Fisher,  .5 
Me.  69,  17  Am.  Dec.  203;  Keokuk  &  H. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  People,  145  111.  .596,  34 
N.  E.  Rep.  482 ;  Dutilieth  &  D.  Bridge  Co. 
V.  Dubuque,  55  Iowa,  558,  8  N.  W.  Rep. 
443;  Butteniuth  v.  Bridge  Co.  123  111. 
S35,  1 7  N.  E.  Rep.  439  ;  Benner  v.  Platter, 
€  Ohio,  504;  Branham  v.  Turnpike  Co.  1 
Lea,  704. 

1  Pike  V.  Hood  (N.  H.),  27  Atl.  Rep. 
139;  Claremont  v.  Carleton,  2  N.  H.  369, 
9  Am.  Dec.  88;  Greeuleaf  v.  Kilton,  11 
X.  H.  530 ;  State  v.  Canterbury,  28  N.  H. 
195,  219-221;  ^'ichols  v.  Manufacturing 
Co.  34  N.  H.  34.5,  349  ;  Kimball  v.  Schoff, 
40  N.  H.  190;  Cessill  v.  State,  40  Ark. 
501;  Lunt  v.  Holland,  14  Mass.  149; 
Missouri  v.  Kentucky,  11  Wall.  395; 
Crooker  v.  Bragg,  10  Wend.  260. 

^  Macdonald  v.  Morrill,  154  Mass.  270, 
28  N.  E.  Rep.  259.  Holmes,  J.,  said  : 
"There  was  such  a  latent  anibiguiiv  that 

404 


the  jury  would  have  been  warranted  in 
finding  that  the  deed  meant  the  river  de 
jure,  so  to  speak,  and  not  the  river  de 
facto.  See  Waterman  v.  John.son,  13  Pick. 
261,267;  Gerrish  i'.  Town e,  3  Gray,  82, 
88,  89;  Paiue  r.  Woods,  108  Muss.  160, 
171  ;  Emery  v.  Webster,  42  Me.  204,  66 
Am.  Dec.  274  ;  Hill  v.  Evans,  4  De  Gex, 
F.  &  J.  288,  293,  et  seq.,  31  L.  J.  Ch.  457, 
460,  ct  sr(j.  ;  Belts  V.  Menzies,  10  H.  L. 
Cas.  117,  152,  154;  Bischoff  v.  Wethered, 
9  Wall.  812,  816  ;  Altham's  Case,  8  Coke, 
1.50  ^»,  155/*." 

3  People  V.  Jones,  112  N.  Y.  597,  20  N. 
E.  Rep.  577  ;  Knight  v.  Wilder,  2  Ciish. 
199,  48  Am.  Dec.  660  ;  Denver  v.  Pearce, 
13  Colo.  383,  22  Pac.  Rep.  774  ;  Watson 
V.  Peters,  26  Mich.  508  ;  Church  v.  Meeker, 
34  Conn.  421  ;  Ladies'  Friend  Soc.  v.  Hal- 
stead,  58  Conn.  144,  19  Atl.  Rep.  658; 
Simons  v.  P'rench,  25  Conn.  346;  Smith 
!•.  Ford,  48  Wis.  116,  164,  2  N.  W.  Rep. 
134,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  462  ;  Norcross  v.  Grif- 
fiths, 65  Wis.  599,  27  N.  W.  Rep.  606,  56 
Am.  Rep.  642. 


BOUNDARY    BY    THE    SEA,    RIVERS,    AND    LAKES. 


l^  488. 


river  at  high-water  mark  or  at  low- water  mark.^  A  boundary  on 
or  along  the  "bank  of  "  a  stream,  or  "  the  shore  "  of  a  stream,  in- 
stead of  on  or  along  the  stream,  is  generall}'  held  to  restrict  the 
title  to  the  water's  edge,  at  low-water  mark.^  Where  a  line  is 
described  as  running  across  a  brook  to  a  monument  placed  on  its 
farther  bank,  and  the  boundary  is  thence  down  said  brook  to  a 
stake  and  stones  on  said  bank,  the  boundary  is  along  the  bank'  of 
the  brook,  and  not  by  the  centre  line  of  the  stream. ^ 

Where  the  langruaofe  of  a  deed  shows  a  manifest  intention  to 
stop  at  the  water's  edge,  it  will  prevail  over  the  general  presump- 
tion.    The  intention   of  the  party  is  the  real  object  sought.     If 


1  Cook  V.  McClure,  58  N.  Y.  437  ; 
Hopkins  v.  Kent,  9  Ohio,  13  ;  Lamb  v. 
Kickets,  11  Ohio,  311  ;  Seneca  Nation  v. 
Knight,  23  N.  Y.  498;  Halsey  v.  Mc- 
Coimick,  13  N.  Y.296  ;  Hatch  v.  Dwight, 
17  Mass.  289,  9  Am.  Dec.  145  ;  Rockwell 
r.  Baldwin,  53  111.  19;  Allen  v.  Weber, 
80  Wis.  531,  50  N.  W.  Rep.  514;  Jones 
V.  Tarker,  99  N.  C.  1 8. 

2  Howard  v.  Inixersoll,  13  How.  381  ; 
Handly  v.  Anthony,  5  Wheat.  374;  Dun- 
lap  V.  Stetson,  4  Mason,  349  ;  Thomas  v. 
Hatch,  3  Sumn.  170;  Gary  v.  Daniels,  5 
Met.  236;  Crittenton  v.  Aljrcr,  11  Met. 
281  ;  Hatch  i'.  D wight,  17  Mass.  289,  9  Am. 
])ec.  145;  Bradford  v.  Cressey,  45  Me. 
9;  Stone  v.  Augusta,  46  Me.  127;  Hal- 
sey  V.  McCorniick,  13  N.  Y.  296;  Child 
r.  Starr,  4  Hill,  3fi9  ;  Starr  v.  Child,  20 
"Wend  149,5  Denio,  599  ;  Yates  v.  Van 
De  Bogert,  56  N.  Y.  526 ;  Babcock  v.  Ut- 
ter, 1  Abb.  Dec.  27  ;  Rockwell  v.  Baldwin, 
53  111.  19;  People  r.  Supervi-ors,  125  111. 
9;  Daniels  v.  Cheshire  R.  R.  Co.  20  N.  II. 
85  ;  Watson  v.  Peters,  26  .Mich.  508  ;  Car- 
ter v.  Railway  Co.  2f.  W.  Va.  644;  Mar- 
tin >■.  Xance,  3  Head,  049;  Holbcrt  v. 
Edciis,  5  Lea,  204,  209,  40  Am.  Rep.  26; 
Ilolden  r.  Chandler,  61  Vt.  291,18  Atl. 
Rep.  310;  Chandos  v.  Mack,  77  Wis. 
573,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  803;  Greene?;.  Nun 
nemacher,  36  Wis.  .50 ;  Allen  r.  Weber, 
80  Wi.s.  531,  50  N.  W.  Rep.  514.  In  thi.< 
last  case  Ortoii,  J.,  cites  the  following 
cases  in  which  the  line  is  limited  by  the 
description,  and  no  jiart  of  the  bed  of  the 


stream  is  conveyed  :  "  Thence  northeast- 
erly up  the  west  bank  of  Pine  Creek." 
Mur)5hy  v.  Copeland,  51  Iowa,  515,  58 
Iowa,  409,  43  Am.  Hep.  118,  1  N.  VV. 
Rep.  691,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  786.  "  To  and 
along  the  bank."  Halsey  v.  McCormick, 
13  N.  Y.  296 ;  People  v.  Supervisors,  125 
111.  9,  17  N.  E.  Rep.  147.  "As  far  as 
high-water  mark  "  is  the  outer  line  of  the 
overflow  of  a  mill-pond  so  described  in 
the  conveyance.  Jones  v.  Parker,  99  N. 
C.  18,  5  S.  E.  Rep.  383.  "To  the  Gene- 
see River,  thence  northwardly  along  tlie 
shore  of  said  river."  Starr  v.  Child,  20 
Wend.  149.  In  Murphy  v.  Copeland,  51 
Iowa,  515,  1  N.  W.  Rep.  691,  it  was  held 
that  "  along  the  bank  "  was  cqiiivalent  to 
"  along  low-water  mark  ; "  and  the  same 
in  Halsey  v.  McCormick,  13  N.  Y.  296. 
In  Cook  r.  McClure,  58  N.  Y.  437,  the 
language  is:  "To  a  stake  near  the  hi;:h- 
watcr  mark  of  the  pond,  running  thence 
along  the  high-water  mark  of  said  pond, 
to,"  etc. ;  and  it  was  held  that  the  line 
was  limited  at  high-watermark,  and  would 
not  extend  even  to  low-water  mark.  This 
case  is  exactly  in  point.  In  Bradford 
V.  Cressey,  45  Me.  9,  the  language  is: 
"  Thence  east  nntil  it  strikes  the  creek  on 
which  the  mill  stands ;  thence  southwest- 
crlv  on  the  west  bank  of  said  creek;" 
and  it  was  held  that  "the  grantee  was 
restricted  to  the  bank  of  the  creek." 

3  Nichols  r.  Ilowland,  52  Hun.  287,  5 
N.  Y.  Supp.  252;  Kiiigsland  v.  Chitten- 
den, 6  Lans.  15. 

405 


§§  489,  490.]  DESCRIPTION   AND    HOUNDARIKS. 

tlie  meiuiiiii;-  is  not  clear,  resort  is  hail  to  lailes  of  construction. 
"■If  the  intention  is  still  doubtful,  the  deed  may  be  examined  in 
the  li'dit  of  the  cireunistHUces  attending  its  execution,  such  as 
the  actual  condition,  situation,  and  occupation  of  the  property 
o-ranted.  But  the  intent,  when  apparent  and  not  repugnant  to 
any, rule  of  law,  will  control  teclmical  terms,  for  the  intent,  and 
not  the  words,  is  tlie  essence  of  every  agreement.  In  the  exposi- 
tion of  deeds  the  construction  must  be  upon  the  view  and  com- 
parison of  the  whole  instrument."  ^ 

489.  As  bearing  upon  the  construction  of  the  deed  in  this 
respect,  other  instruments  may  be  considered,  if  they  were 
executed  between  the  same  parties  at  the  same  time  and  respect- 
ing the  same  subject-matter.^  But  such  instruments  are  not  to  be 
considered  for  this  purpose  unless  they  are  between  the  same  par- 
ties, or,  if  they  are  between  different  parties,  unless  they  relate  to 
the  same  transaction  and  are  in  effect  parts  of  one  transaction.^ 
Thus,  if  one  advertises  and  sells  land  bounded  on  a  stream,  and 
on  the  same  day,  and  as  part  of  the  same  sale,  sells  the  bed  of 
the  stream  to  another  person,  the  deeds  being  executed  the  same 
day  and  containing  the  same  recitals,  the  intention  thus  shown 
to  separate  the  ownership  of  the  bed  of  the  stream  from  the 
ownership  of  the  lot  overcomes  the  presumption  that  the  deed 
of  the  lot  carries  the  title  to  the  bed  of  the  stream  to  its  centre."* 

490.  When  the  starting-point  is  a  monument  on  the  bank 
of  a  river,  and  the  line  runs  thence  along  the  river  or  by  it,  or 
on  it,  the  boundary  is  still  by  the  thread  of  the  stream,  unless,  by 
other  terms  used  in  the  deed,  it  appears  that  it  was  intended  to 
limit  the  boundary  to  the  bank  of  the  stream.^     The  same  rule 

1  liaight  V.  Hamor,  83  Me.  453,  22  Atl.  ^  Cornell  v.  Todd,  2  Deiiio,  130  ;  Put- 
Eep.  369,  per  Wliitchoiise,  J.;  Bradford  nam  v.  Stewart,  97  N.  Y.  411;  Hexford 
V.  Cressey,  45  Me.  9  ;  Erskine  v.  Moulton,     v.  Marquis,  7  Lans.  249. 

€6  Me.   276  ;    Salisbury  v.  Andrews,    19  ■*  Denver  v.  Pearce  (Colo.),  22  Pac.  Rep. 

Pick.  250 ;  Jackson  v.  Myers,  3  Johns.  388,  774. 

3  Am.  Dec.  504,  per  Kent,  C.  J.  ;  Buck  ^  St.  Clair  Co.  v.  Lovins-ston,  23  Wall. 

V.  Sfpiiers,  22  Vt.  484;  Dunham  v.  Wil-  46;   Railroad  Co.  v.    Schurmeir,  7  Wall, 

liams.  37  N.  Y.  251;  Chicajro  y.  Rumsey,  272;  Whitehurst  u.  McDonald,  52  Fed. 

87  III.  .348;  Stolp  v.   Hoyt,  44   III.   219;  Rep.  633,3  C.   C.   A.  214,  8  U.  S.  App. 

Rockwell  V.  Baldwin,  53  111.  19;  .Mott  v.  164,  affirming  47  Fed.   Rep.   757;    Gou- 

Mott,  68  N.  Y.  240.  verneur    v.    Nat.    Ice     Co.    134    N.     Y. 

2  HaiRht  y.  Ilamor,  83  Me.  453,  22  Atl.  355,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  865,  reversing  11 
Eep.  3C9,  per  Waterhouse,  J. ;  Cloves  v.  N.  Y.  Supp.  87 ;  Luce  v.  Carley,  24 
Sweetser,  4  Cush.  403  ;  King  v.  King,  7  Wend.  451,  35  Am.  Dec.  637  ;  People  v. 
Mass.  496.  Jones,  112  N.  Y.  597,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  577  ; 

406 


BOUNDARY   BY   THE   SEA,    KIVERS,   AND    LAKES.  [§  490. 

applies  when  a  boundary  line  runs  to  a  terminus  on  the  bank  of 
a  river,  and  thence  by  or  along  the  river  to  another  terniiiius.  "•  It 
is  very  difficult,"  says  Cowan,  J.,  "  for  the  human  mind  to  resist 
that  the  parties  never  mean  to  leave  a  narrow  strijj  between  the 
land  and  the  river  merely  because  some  stake  or  tree,  or  even  all 
the  stakes  and  trees  of  the  line,  stand  at  a  slight  distance  from 
the  river.  The  expression  of  an  intent  to  run  the  line  along  the 
stream  reaches  a  distinct  natural  monument  which  overcomes 
the  others.  They  are  rather  intended  to  indicate  or  point  down 
to  the  termini  of  the  water  line."^  Thus,  where  the  starting-point 
was  a  hickory-tree  standing  on  the  bank  of  the  Ohio  River, 
thence  after  several  courses  to  a  corner  iron  wood-tree  on  the 
bank  of  the  river,  and  thence  by  the  river  to  the  starting-point, 
the  boundary  was  held  to  be  by  the  river.^  A  boundary  line  run- 
ning from  a  post  on  the  north  bank  of  a  creek,  "thence  down 
the  same  and  along  the  seveial  meanders  thereof  to  the  place  of 
beo-innins,"  which  was  also  on  the  bank,  includes  the  bed  of  the 
stream  to  the  centre.^  A  survey  running  to  a  point  on  a  river, 
and  "thence  down  said  river,  and  binding  thereon,"  to  another 
point,  includes  a  sand-bar  on  the  same  side  of  the  river,  between 
the  two  points.^ 

While,  as  already  noticed,  in  many  States  a  boundary  starting 

Newton  V.  Eddv,  23  Vt.  319;  Robinson  in,  or  on  a  stream  or  its  bank,  and  there 

V.  White,  42  Me.  209  ;  Low  v.  Tibbetts,  is  an   intermediate   Hue  extemiing  from 

72   Me.  92,  39  Am.  Rep.  303 ;  Lowell  v.  one  such  corner  to  the  other,  the  stream 

Rohiusou,  16  Me.   357,  33  Am.  Dec.  671  ;  is  the  boundary,  unless  there  is  something 

Lunt   V.   Holland,    14   Mass.    149;    Cold  which  excludes  the  operation  of  this  rule 

Spring  Iron  Works  v.   Tolland,  9  Cush.  by  showing  the  intention  of  the  parties 

492  ;  Woodman  v.  Spencer,  54  N.  H.  507  ;  was  otherwise."     St.  Clair  County  v.  Lov- 

Rix  V.  Johnson,  5  N.  H.  520,  22  Am.  Dec.  ingstou,  23  Wall.  46,   64;   Railroad  Co.  v. 

472  ;  Kent  v.  Taylor,  64  N.  H.  489,  13  Atl.  Schurmeir,  7  Wall.  272. 

Rep.  419;  Wood  v.  Appal,  63  Pa.  St.  210;  i  Starr  v.  Child,  20  Wend.   149,  156,  5 

Grant  v.  White,  63   Pa.  St.  271  ;  Coovert  Denio.  599;  Child  v.   Starr,  4   Hill,  369; 

r.  O'Connor,  8  Watts,  470;  Klincensmith  Halsey   v.   McCormick,    13    N.    Y.   296; 

V.   Ground,  5  Watts,  458;  McCuUock   v.  Luce   v.  Carley,   24   Wend.  451,  35   Am. 

Aten,  2  Ohio,  307  ;  Turner  v.   Parker,  14  Dec.  637  ;  Ex  parte  Jennings,  6  Cow.  518, 

Oreg.  340;  Hayes  v.  Bowman,  1    Raud.  16  Am.  Dec.  447;  Mott  v.  Mott,  68  N.  Y. 

417;  Mead  y.  Haynes,  3  Hand.  33;  Brown  246;  Gouverneur  v.  Nat.  Ice  Co.  134  N. 

Oil  Co.  c.  Caldwell,  35  W.  Va.  95,  13  8.  Y-  355,  31  N.  K.  Rep.  865. 

E.  Hep.  42;  Camden  v.  Creel,  4  W.  Va.  ^  Wood  v.  Appal,  63  Pa.  St.  210. 

365.     "  It  may  be  considered,"  say   the  ^  Seneca  Nation  v.   Knight,  23  N.  Y. 

Supreme   Court,  "a  canon   in   American  498. 

jurisprudence  that  where  tlie  calls  in  a  ^  Asher  Lumber  Co.  v.  Lunsford  (Ky.), 

conveyance  of  land  are  for  two  corners  at,  30  S.  W.  Hep.  968. 

407 


§-i«'l-] 


DESGKIPTIOX    AND    BOUXDAKIES. 


at  :i  nioiuiment  on  llie  bank  ot"  a  stream,  and  tliencn  running- 
alouii  llie  stream,  includes  the  stream  to  tlie  middle  of  the  chau- 
iiel,  yet  there  aie  decisions  to  the  effect  that  in  such  case  the 
stream  is  wliolly  or  partly  excluded.' 

491.  Even  if  the  monument  is  some  distance  from  the 
river,  the  boundai-y  thence  by  the  river  will  be  by  the  thread 
of  the  stream,  if  there  is  nothing  fui'tlu'r  in  the  deed  to  show  au 
intention  to  limit  the  boundary  to  tlie  bank.^  A  corner  tree  or 
other  moiuuueut  is  not  always  to  be  iuid  near  a  river,  and  there- 
foi-e  one  may  be  taken  at  some  distance  from  it ;  but  if  the  course 
is  by  the  river,  this  is  regarded  as  the  boundary.'^  The  stream  is 
a  natural  boundary,  and  controls  a  call  for  a  monument  on  the 
bank;  audit  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  the  grantor  retains  a 
strip  of  land  between  the  line  indicated  by  the  monuments  and 
the  line  of  low  water.^  But  this  presumption  does  not  apply 
when  the  boundary  is  a  mill-race  owned  and  retained  by  the 
grantor  ;  for  in  such  case  there  is  an  obvious  reason  why  the 
grantor  should  wish  to  retain  such  narrow  strip  between  the  top 
of  the  bank  of  the  mill-race  and  the  water-edge  of  the  mill-race 
at  low-water  mark.^ 

Where  land  is  described  as  lying  on  a  river  named,  the  meander 
line  of  the  river  as  surveyed  does  not  constitute  the  boundary 
of  the  land,  but  the  grantee  is  a  riparian  owner,  and  has  title 
to  the  land  lying  between  such  meander  line  and  the  river,  or 
to  the  thread  of  the  river  in  case  the  boundary  line  is  governed 
by  the  common-law  rule.*^ 


1  Dunlap  V.  Stetson,  4  Mason,  349 ; 
Bradford  v.  Cressey,  45  Me.  9 ;  Lamb  v. 
Rickets,  11  Ohio,  311  ;  Murphy  v.  Cope- 
land,  .51  Iowa,  515,  1  N.  W.  Hep.  691; 
Holbert  i'.  P^dens,  5  Lea,  204,  40  Am. 
Rep.  26 ;  Babcock  v.  Utter,  1  Abb.  App. 
Dec.  27 ;  Fleniing  v.  Kenney,  4  J.  J. 
Marsh.  155. 

2  Grant  v.  White,  63  Ta.  St.  271,  where 
the  corner  tree  was  fourteen  perches  from 
the  river;  Cansler  v.  Hender.son,  64  X.  C. 
469. 

^  Klingensmith  r.  (rroiiinl, .')  Wntts,  4.'')8. 

*  Carter  v.  Railway  Co.  26  W.  Va.  644  ; 
Grant  v.  White,  63  Pa.  St.  271. 

=  Carter  v.  Railway  Co.  26  W.  Va.  644  ; 
Martin  v.  Nance,  3  Head,  649. 

408 


6  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  371,  II 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  808,  16  Fed.  Rep.  823; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Schurmeir,  7  Wall.  272; 
Ladd  V.  Osborne,  79  Iowa,  93,  44  N.  W. 
Rep.  235  ;  Kraut  v.  Crawford,  18  Iowa, 
.549,  87  Am.  Dec.  414;  Houck  v.  Yates 
82  111.  179;  Sphung  r.  Moore,  120  In<l. 
352,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  319  ;  State  v.  Ports- 
moutli  Sav.  Bank,  106  Ind.  435  ;  Edwards 
V.  Oi;]e,  76  Ind.  302  ;  Ridgway  v.  Ludlow, 
58  Ind.  248;  Ro<s  !.-.  ?\uist,  54  Ind.  471, 
23  Am.  Rep.  65.') ;  Miuto  v.  Delauey,  7 
Oretr.  337  ;  Galveston  Co.  v.  Tankcrsley, 
.".9  Tex.  651  ;  Hills  v.  Homton,  4  Salver, 
105;  Ilicks  ('.  Coleman,  25  Cal.  122,85 
Am  Dec.  lO'J;  Pc'0)ile  v.  IIendci-sop,  40 
Cal.   29 ;  Monasha  Wooden  Ware  Co.  v. 


BOUNDARY   BY   THE   SEA,    RIVERS,   AND   LAKES.  [§  492. 

492.  In  government  grants  meander  lines  are  not  bounda- 
ries, but  the  watercourse  is  itself  the  boundary.^  "  Meander 
lines  are  run,  in  surveying  fractional  portions  of  the  public  lands 
bordering  upon  navigable  rivers,  not  as  boundaries  of  the  tract, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  defining  the  sinuosities  of  the  banks  of 
the  stream,  and  as  the  means  of  ascertaining  the  quantity  of  the 
land  in  the  fraction  subject  to  sale,  and  which  is  to  be  paid  for 
by  the  purchaser.  In  preparing  the  official  phit  from  the  field- 
nutes,  the  meander  line  is  represented  as  the  border  line  of  the 
stream,  and  shows  to  a  demonstration  that  the  watercourse,  and 
not  the  meander  line  as  actually  run  on  the  land,  is  the  boun- 
dary." 2 

In  ascertaining  the  measurement  from  one  point  to  another 
on  navigable  water,  the  measurement  is  by  its  meanders  and  not 
in  a  direct  line.'^  But  in  determining  the  division  line  between 
adjoining  owners  on  navigable  water  the  measurement  is  b}^  the 


Lawson,   70    Wis.    600,  36  N.   W.    Rep. 
412. 

1  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  371,381, 
11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  808,  838;  Mitchell  v. 
Sinale,  140  U.  S.  406,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
819,  840;  JefFeris  v.  Land  Co.  134  U.  S. 
178,  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  518,  affirmin<c  40 
Fed.  Rep.  386  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Schur- 
meir,  7  Wall.  272,  per  CliflFord,  J. ;  Banks 
V.  Ogden,  2  Wall.  67  ;  Forsyth  v.  Smale, 
7  Biss.  201  ;  Cragin  v.  Powell,  128  U.  S. 
691,  9  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  203.  Illinois  :  Fuller 
c.  Dniiphin,  124  111.  542,  16  N.  E.  Rep. 
917.  Indiana:  Sphung  t;.  Moore,  120  Ind. 
352,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  319;  Ridgway  r.  Lud- 
low, 58  Ind.  248;  Stoner  v.  Rice,  121  Ind. 
51,  22  N.  PI  Rep.  968.  Iowa:  Kraut  i-. 
Crawford,  18  Iowa,  549,87  Am.  Dec.  414. 
Michigan:  Clute  v.  Fislier,  65  Mich.  48, 
31  N.  W.  Rep.  614  ;  Rere  Marquette  Room 
Co.  t'.  Adams,  44  Mich.  403,  6  N.  W.  Rep. 
857;  Rice  >■.  Ruddiman.  10  Mich.  125; 
Palmer  v.  Dold,  64  Midi.  474,  31  N.  W. 
Rej).  209.  Minnesota  :  Schurmeir  v.  Rail- 
rond  Co.  10  Minn.  82,  88  Am.  Dec.  59; 
St.  Paul,  &c.  H.  Co.  V.  Fir>t  Divi.sion,  &c. 
R.  Co.  26  Minn.  31,  1  N.  W.  Rep.  .580, 
49  N.  W.  Rej).  303 ;  Everson  v.   Waseca, 


44  :\Iinn.  247,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  405 ;  Lam- 
prey V.  State,  52  Minn.  181,  53  N.  W. 
Rep.  1139.  Oregon:  AYeiss  v.  Oregon 
Iron  Co.  13  Oreg.  496,  11  Pac.  Rep.  255  ; 
Minto  V.  Delauey,  7  Oreg.  337 ;  Turner 
V.  Parker,  14  Oreg.  340,  12  Pac.  Rep.  495. 
Utah  :  Kuudsen  v.  Otnanson  (Utah),  37 
Pac.  Rep.  250.  Wisconsin  :  Lally  v.  Ross- 
man,  82  Wis.  147,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  1132; 
Whitney  v.  Lumber  Co.  78  Wis.  240,  249, 
47  N.  W.  Rep.  425;  Northern  Pine  Land 
Co.  V.  Bigelow  (Wis.),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  496 ; 
Boorman  v.  Sunnuchs,  42  Wis.  233 ;  Me- 
uasha  Ware  Co.  v.  Lawson,  70  Wis.  600, 
36  N.  W.  Rep.  412. 

See,  also,  decision  of  Secretary  of  Inte- 
rior in  Hemphill's  Case,  in  February, 
1888,  6  Dec.  Dep.  Int.  555. 

Otherwise  in  Nebraska :  Harrison  r. 
Stipes,  34  Neb.  431,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  976  ; 
Lammers  v.  Nissen,  4  Neb.  245  ;  Bissell 
V.  Fletcher,  19  Neb.  725,  28  N.  W.  Rep. 
303. 

■-'  R.-iilroad  Co.  r.  Schurmeir,  7  Wall. 
272,  286,  per  Clifford,  .1 . 

•i  Rayburn  i-.  Winant,  16  Oreg.  318,  18 
Pac.  Rep.  588 ;  People  v.  Henderson,  40 
Cal.  32. 

409 


§§  4'.>o,  494.]  DESCRIPTION   AND    BOUNDARIES. 

i^oiu-ral  treiul  of  the  water  line.^     Measurement  in  a  straight  line 
is  si>inetinies  adopti^l  in  the  case  of  streams  not  navigaUle.'-^ 

493.  The  fact  that  the  quantity  of  land  called  for  in  a  deed 
is  satisfied  without  including  the  bed  of  a  stream  wliicli  c(>n- 
stitutes  the  boundary  does  not  limit  the  title  to  the  bank  of  the 
stream.'^  In  the  purchase  of  land  bounded  upon  a  river  at  a 
stipulated  [U'ice  per  acre,  it  would  seem  that  the  purchaser  would 
be  required  to  pay  for  land  to  the  line  of  ordinary  low  water 
only,  thouo-h  his  title  might  extend  to  the  thread  of  the  stream.'* 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  quantity  of  land  and  n::easurements 
require  the  inclusion  of  the  shore,  or  land  covered  by  the  water 
between  high  and  low  water  mark,  this  affords  a  reason  for  ex- 
tending a,  boundary  to  jneet  this  requirement.  Thus,  in  a  deed  of 
land  on  Long  Island  Sound,  the  first  course,  starting  from  a  point 
accurately  fixed,  ran  a  certain  distance  to  a  point  on  the  Sound, 
thence  along  the  shore  to  the  intersection  of  the  centre  line  of  a 
certain  street,  and  thence  by  said  street  a  certain  distance  to  the 
point  of  beginning.  It  appeared  by  a  survey  that  the  first  and 
last  courses,  if  run  in  obedience  to  the  distance  given,  would  ex- 
tend to  low-water  mark,  and  that,  to  give  the  quantity  the  deed 
purported  to  convey,  the  land  to  low- water  mark  must  be  included. 
It  was  accordingly  held  that  the  boundiiry  line  was  along  the 
low- water  mark.^ 

494.  A  boundary  by  a  ditch  or  canal  ordinarily  extends  the 
grant  to  the  centre  line  of  the  ditch,  if  the  grantor's  title  extends 
SO" far  and  not  farther.*"  If  the  ditch  is  wholly  upon  the  grantor's 
land,  his  deed  bounding  his  land  upon  the  ditch  would  caia-y  the 
title  to  the  whole  of  the  ditch,  because  it  would  not  be  prvsumed 
that  he  would  retain  a  strip  of  land  occupied  by  half  of  the  ditch, 

^  Northern  Pine    Land  Co.  v.  Bigeiow  veys,  wlicn  ni;ule,  to  so  describe    the  iip- 

(Wi.s.),  .54  N.  W.  Rejj.  496.  liuids  as  to  compute  the   mimher  of  acres 

-  Hicks    V.   Coleman,   25    Cal.    122,  85  tliey  contain." 

Am.  Dec.   103  ;   IVople  v.  Heudersou,  40  *  Ilolbcrt  r.  Edeus,  5  Lea,  204,  40  Am. 

Cal.  29,  per  Temple,  J.  I^ep.  20. 

»  D\v\er  V.  Rich,  Ir.  R.  4  C.   L.   424;  ^  Oakes  v.   De   Laucey,  \S3  N.  Y.  227, 

Kent  V.  Taylor,  64  X.  H.  489,  1.3  Atl.  Rep.  14  X.  Y.  Supp.  294. 

419;  Gouverneur  c.  Xat.  Ice.  Co.  I'i4  ''  (lOodyear  r.  Shanahau,  43  Conn.  204 ; 
N.Y.  355,368,  31  .N.  E.  Rep.  865.  In  the  Warner  v.  Soiuhworlh,  6  Conn.  471; 
last  case  Bradley,  J.,  s.tid  :  "  It  is  a  mat-  A<;a\vam  Canal  Co.  v.  Edward-,  36  Conn, 
ter  of  common  knowled<,'e  in  respect  to  476;  Bi-liop  i-.  Seelev,  18  Conn.  389  j 
lands  bordering  on  streams  and  other  Cansler/-.  Hen. lerson,  64  N.  C.  469  ;  Dunk- 
bodies  of  water,  that  it  is   usual   in    snr-  ]ce  v.  Wi\um  R.  Co.  24  N.  H.  489. 

410 


BOUNDARY   BY    THE   SEA,    RIVERS,    AND   LAKES.  [§§  495,  496. 

which  would  be  useless  without  the  land  adjoining.  But  this 
rule  does  not  apply  in  case  of  a  boundary  upon  an  artificial  wa- 
tercourse, like  a  mill-race,  flume,  or  ditch,  in  which  the  grantor 
still  has  an  interest  as  owner  of  a  mill,  or  of  other  land  for  the 
beneficial  use  of  which  such  watercourse  is  necessary,  or  in  case 
the  flume  or  ditch  is  owned  by  another.^ 

495.  A  boundary  by  an  artificial  pond,  formed  by  erecting  a 
dam  across  a  stream,  passes  the  land  to  the  thread  of  the  stream.^ 
It  seems  not  to  be  material  how  long  a  time  the  pond  has  ex- 
isted ;  for  in  one  case  the  rule  was  applied  to  a  mill-pond  which 
bad  been  in  existence  more  than  two  hundred  years.-^  A  boun- 
dary line  given  as  commencing  at  "  a  stake  near  the  high-water 
mark  "  of  a  pond,  thence  running  "  along  the  high-water  mark," 
is  fixed  at  the  high-water  mark,  and  that  mark  is  a  permanent 
one,  and  does  not  follow  the  changes  in  the  high-water  mark  of 
the  poiid.^  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  it  was  in- 
tended to  limit  the  grant  to  the  margin  of  the  water  as  it  over- 
flowed the  land  in  the  spring.^ 

496.  The  common-law  rule  is  that  a  deed  of  land  border- 
ing on  a  small  lake  not  navigable  is  presumed  to  convey 
title  to  the  centre  of  the  lake,  unless  it  appears  that  there  was 
an  intention  otherwise  ;  for  the  riparian  owner  has  title  to  the 
land  under  such  lake  or  pond  extending  to  the  centre.^     The  rule 

1  Carter  v.  Railway  Co.  26  W.  Va.  644  ;  18  ;  Lynch  v.  Allen,  4  Dev.  &  Bat.  62,  92, 

Uoffv.  Tobey,  66   Barb.  347;  Morgan  v.  32  Am.  Dec.  671. 

Bass,  14  Fed.  Rep.  454.  ^  Lowell   v.  Robinson,  16  Me.  357,  33 

-  Mill    River    Woolen    Manuf.    Co.   v.  Am.  Dec.  671. 

Smith,  34  Conn.  462;  Phinney  i'.  Watts,  «  Bristow   v.   Cormican,   3    App.  Cas. 

-9  Gray,  269,  69  Am.  Dec.  288;  Paine  v.  641.     This  case  related  to  riparian   rights 

Woods,  108  Mass.  160;   West  Roxbury  v.  in   Lough   Neagh,  a  lake  in  the  north   of 

Sioddard,  7  Allen,  158;  Mansur  v.  Blake,  Ireland,  about  fifteen   miles  in  length  and 

62  Me.  38  ;  Lowell  v.   Robin.son,    IG  Me.  ten   miles  in  breadth,  the  longest  iuhuid 

357,  33  Am.  Dec.  671  ;  Robinson  r.  White,  lake  in  the  United   Kingdom,  and  one  of 

42  Me.  209  ;  State  v.  Gilmanton,  9  N.  II.  the  largest  in  Europe.     It  was  held  that 

461  ;   Union   Ry.   &  T.  Co.  c.  Skinner,  9  the  crown   had   no   property  in  the  land 

Mo.   A])p     189;  Wheeler    v.   Spinola,   54  under  the  lake,   but  that  it  belonged  to 

N.  Y.  377  ;  Primm  v.  Raboteau,  56  Mo.  the  adjoining  owners  of  the  land  on  the 

407;   Holdcn  v.  Chandler,  61  Vt.  291,  18  borders  of  tlie  lake.     Hardin   v.  Jordan, 

Atl.  Rep.  310;  Church  v.   Stiles,   59   Vt.  140  U.  S.  371,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  808,  838; 

642,  10  Atl.  Rep.  674.  Forsythe  v.  Smale,  7  Biss.  201.     Indiana: 

■^  Mill    liiver    Woolen    Manuf.    Co.    v.  Ridgway  v.  Ludlow,  58  Ind.  248,  holding 

Smith,  34  C'(jnn.  462.  also  that  a  prcscrijjtive  right   acquired  by 

••  Cnok  V.   McClure,  58  N.  Y.  437,  17  adver.se  possession  to  land  adjacent  to  such 

Am.  Rep.  270  ;  Jones  v.  Parker,  99  N.  C.  lake  extended  to  the  middle  of  it.     Stoner 

411 


497.] 


DKSCini'TION    AND    BOUNDAHIKS. 


is  otluMwiso  in  Massachusetts,  because  of  the  colonial  law  or  ordi- 
iKuu'c  ;uloi)ted  in  1041,  and  amended  in  1647,  declaring  great 
ponds,  which  were  defined  as  those  containing  more  than  ten 
acres,  to  be  public  property,  and  since  that  time  such  ponds  have 
not  been  subject  to  private  ownership. ^  In  New  York,  and  other 
States  having  no  similar  statute,  the  land  under  small  lakes  and 
ponds  is  the  subject  of  private  ownership,  and  a  boundary  thereon, 
in  a  conveyance  by  the  owner  of  the  adjoining  lands,  passes  his 
title  to  the  centre  line  of  such  lake  or  pond. 

497.  The  general  rule  of  private  cwnership  of  lakes  ap- 
plies to  natural  lakes  of  considerable  size,-  such  as  a  lake  about 
seven  miles  long  and  half  a  mile  wide,'^  or  a  lake  three  miles  in 
length  and  one  mile  in  width,*  or  a  lake  four  or  five  miles  long 
and  eight  hundred  feet  wide.^ 

In  case  government  surveys  have  been  extended  over  suuill 
lakes,  just  as  though  the  whole  was  dry  laud,  and  titles  have  been 
conveyed  with  reference  to  such  surveys,  the  boundaries  of  lands 
under  such  surveys  may  be  confined  to  the  terms  of  the  patents 
and  deeds ."^ 


r.  liice,  121  Ind.  51,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  968. 
Michigan:  Kice  v.  Rudiiiman,  10  Mich. 
12.-);  Ckite  V.  Fisher,  65  Mich.  48,  31  N. 
W.  Rep.  614.  Missouri:  Kirkpatrick  r. 
Yates  Ice  Co.  45  Mo.  App.  3.35.  New 
Jersey  :  Cobb  v.  Davenport,  32  N.  J.  L. 
369,  33  N.  J.  L.  223,  97  Am.  Dec.  718;  Ka- 
nouse  V.  Slockbovver,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  42,  21 
Atl.  Rep.  197  ;  Fowler  v.  Vreeland,  44  N. 
J.  Eq.  268,  14  Atl.  Rep.  116.  New  York  : 
Gouverneur  v.  National  Ice  Co.  134  N. 
Y.  355,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  865,  reversinjr  11 
N.  Y.  Supp.  87;  Smith  v.  Rocliestcr,  92 
N.  Y.  463,  44  Atn.  Rey).  393  ;  Ledyard  v. 
Ten  Eyck,  36  Barb.  102.  Ohio:  Lemlieck 
V.  Nve,  47  Ohio  St.  326,  24  N.  K.  Rep.  686. 
1  West  Koxbuiy  V.  Stoddard,  7  Allen, 
158;  Hittingcr  ;■.  Eame'!,  121  Mass.  539  ; 
Wa!ui>pa,  &c.  Co.  i:  Fall  River,  154  Mass. 
305,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  257.  "  When  the  col 
ony  of  Ma.ss;ichu.sctts,  two  hundred  and 
fifty  years  ago,  reserved  to  pnblic  use  her 
'great  ponds,'  probably  only  fishing  and 
fowling  were  in  mind.  But,  as  is  said  in 
one  case  (We.'-t  Hoxhury  v.  Stoddard,  7 
Allen,  158),  '  with  the  growth  of  the  com- 

412 


niunity  and  its  progress  in  the  arts,  tiicse 
pnblic  reservations,  at  first  set  apart  with 
reference  to  certain  sjiecial  uses  otdy,  be- 
came capable  of  many  others,  which  are 
within  the  desiju  and  intent  of  the  origi- 
nal appropriation.  The  devotion  to  pub- 
lic use  is  sufficiently  broad  to  include  them 
all  as  they  arise.'  "  Lamprey  i\  State,  52 
Minn.  181,  200,  per  Mitchell,  J. 

2  Lembeck  r.  Nye,  47  Ohio  St.  336,  24 
N.  E.  Rep.  686  ;  Hogg  v.  Beerman,  41 
Ohio  St.  81. 

3  Smith  V.  Rochester,  92  N.  Y.  463.  44 
Am.  Rep.  393.  In  Lcdyanl  v.  Ten  Eyck, 
36  Barb.  102,  it  was  held  that  land  con- 
veyed by  deed  bounding  it  on  Cazenovia 
Lake,  which  was  five  miles  long  and  three 
fourtlis  of  a  mile  in  width,  extended  to 
its  centre.  But  the  conclusion  reached  in 
that  case  may  have  been  su])ported  upon 
another  ground. 

*  Cobb  y.  Davenport,  32  N.  J.  L.  369, 
33  N.  J.  L.  223,  97  Am.  Dec.  718. 

^  Kirkpatrick  v.  Yates  Ice  Co.  45  Mo. 
App.  .335. 

6  Kirkpatrick  v.  Yates  Ice  Co.  45  Mo. 
ApT).  3"i5. 


BOUNDARY    BY    THE   SEA,    RIVERS,   AND   LAKES.       [§§  498-500. 

498.  The  presumption  of  a  boundary  by  the  centre  of  a 
pond  or  lake  may  be  excluded  by  any  (lescriptioii  which  indi- 
cates an  intention  to  limit  the  grant  by  the  shore  or  edge  of  the 
lake.  Thus,  if  the  boundary  is  described  to  be  ''  at  low-water 
mark,"  ^  (^r  "  meandering  along  tlie  water's  edge,"  ^  by  the  "  mar- 
gin "  of  the  lake,'^  "  on  the  edge  of  the  pond,"'  •*  a  boundary  by  the 
centre  of  the  lake  is  exckuled. 

The  land  covered  by  a  lake  or  mill-pond  which  is  the  subject  of 
private  ownership  may  be  conveyed  separate  and  apart  from  the 
land  surrounding  the  lake  or  pond  ;  as  when  such  owner  conveys 
a  mill  and  mill  privilege  "  embracing  as  far  as  high-water  mark."  ^ 

499.  The  rule  of  ownership  ad  filum  aquae  is  not  applica- 
ble to  the  great  fresh-water  lakes  which  form  the  boundary 
between  the  United  States  and  Canada,  or  to  lakes  which  form 
the  boundary  between  States,  such  as  Lake  Champlain,  for  ex- 
ample. These  are  regarded  as  inland  seas,  and  the  title  of  their 
beds  is  in  the  adjoining  States,  and  not  in  the  individual  owners 
of  the  adjoining  land.  The  matter  of  title  to  the  beds  of  such 
lakes  is  wholly  unprovided  for  by  the  common  law  of  England.^ 
In  this  country  the  rule  has  been  adopted  that  such  lakes  are 
not  private  property  but  public.  There  may  be  a  reason  for  this 
exception  to  the  rule,  not  depending  upon  the  size  of  the  lake  as 
regards  those  lakes  which  form  the  natural  boundaries  between 
this  country  and  a  foreign  nation,  or  those  that  form  the  bounda- 
ries between  States,  but  the  reason  for  the  exception  may  also  be 
founded  upon  the  size  and  navigable  character  of  such  lakes.' 

500.  The  State  is  the  owner  of  the  fee  of  all  lands  under 
the  navigable  waters   of  the   great  lakes,  but  in    trust  for  the 

1  Allen  V.  Weber,  80  Wis.  531,  50  N.  Smith  v.  Kuchester,  92  N.  Y.  463,  44  Am. 

W.  Rep.  514.  Rep.  393;  People  v.  Jones,    112    N.    Y. 

•■!  Brophy  v.  Richeson  (Ind.),  36  N.  E.  597,  606,  20  N.  K.  Rep.  577. 

Rep.  424.  "  '  Chumplaiu  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  y.  Valen- 

3  Lembcckr.  Andrews,  47  Ohio  St.  336;  tine,  19   Baib.  484.     This  case  had   rela- 

Fowler  v.  Vreeland,  44   N.  J.  Hq.  268,  14  liou  lo  rights  in  Lake  Champlain,  a  large 

Atl.  Rep.  116.  ntn  livable    lake    about  one   hundred    and 

*  Ilolden  y.  Chandler,  61  Vt.291, 18  Atl.  thirty  miles   in  Icngih.  and  varyiii}>-  from 

Rep.  310;  Eddy  ;•.  St.  Mars,  53  Vt.  462.  about  tifteen  miles  to  less  in  width.     State 

5  Jones  V.  Parker,  99  N.  C.  18,  5  S.  E.  v.  Milk,  11  Biss.  197  ;  Wheekry.  Spinola, 

Rep.  383.  54   N.    V.  377  ;  Canal   Commissioners   r. 

'■>  Hardin   v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.   371,   11  People,  5  Weud.  423;  Fletcher  v.  Phelps, 

Sup.  Ct.  Rep    808,   838;   Canal   Commis-  28  Vt.  257;   Hathorn   y.  Stinson,  10   Me. 

sioners  v.  People,  5  Wend.  423,  447  ;  Canal  224,  238  ;  Dillingham  v.  Smith,  30  Me. 

Appraisers     v.    People,    17    Wciiii.    571;  370. 

413 


§  nOl.] 


DESCRIPTION   AND   BOUNDARIES. 


use  of  the  public.^  "  TJie  title  to  such  himls  beiug  in  the  State, 
*  they  are  subject  tt)  state  reguhition  and  control,  under  the  condi- 
tion, however,  of  not  interfering  with  the  regulations  which  may- 
be made  by  Congress  with  regard  to  public  navigation  and  com- 
merce, .  .  .  stale  control  and  ownership  therein  being  supreme, 
subject  only  to  the  paramount  authority  of  Congress  in  making 
regulations  of  commerce,  and  subjecting  the  lands  to  the  neces- 
sities and  uses  of  commerce.' "  ^  To  what  extent  a  State  may 
exercise  its  prerogative  over  the  land  covered  by  the  waters  of 
these  lakes  depends  upon  the  law  of  each  State,  just  as  it  does 
in  the  case  of  the  great  navigable  rivers.  The  States  may,  if 
they  so  determine,  resign  to  the  riparian  proprietor  rights  which 
properly  belong  to  them  in  their  sovereign  capacity.^ 

Where  land  bordering  upon  a  large  lake,  such  as  the  Winni- 
pesaukee  or  any  navigable  lake,  is  conveyed,  the  right  of  the 
purchaser  to  erect  a  wharf  or  building  in  the  lake  below  low- 
water  mark,  as  against  everybody  but  the  State,  passes  as  an 
appurtenance  to  the  land.'* 

501.  The  boundary  line  upon  a  large  natural  lake  or  great 
pond  is  the  low-^water  line  at  which  the  water  usually  stands 
when  free  from  disturbing  causes.^  If  the  water  be  raised  to  an 
artificial  height  in  the  winter,  but  in  summer  is  allowed  to  remain 
at  its  natural  level,  a  boundary  by  the  lake  or  pond  conveys  the 
land  to  the  low-water  mark  of   the  lake  or  pond  in  its  natural 


i  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  146 
U.  S.  387,  13  Sup.  Ct.  Eep.  110  ;  IMcLen- 
nan  v.  Prentice,  8.5  AVi.s.  427,  3.5  N.  W. 
Rep.  764  ;  Diedrich  v.  Northwest.  Ry.  Co. 
42  Wis.  -248;  Stevens  Point  Boom  Co.  v. 
Reilly,  44  Wis.  235  ;  Winnipesaukee  As.so. 
V.  Gordon  (N.  H.),  29  Atl.  Rep.  412  ;  Con- 
cord Manuf.  Co.  r.  Robertson,  66  N.  H.  1, 
18,  25  Atl.  Rep.  718. 

2  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  371,  382, 
11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  808,  838. 

3  Barney  r.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324  ; 
Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  371,  382,  11 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  808,  838 ;  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.  V.  Illinois,  146  U.  S.  387,  13  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  110. 

*  Winnipesaukee  As.so.  r.  Gordon  (N. 
H.),  29  Atl.  Rep.  412. 

5  Paine  v.  Woods,  108  Mass.  160; 
West  Roxbury  v.  Stoddard,  7  Allen,  158; 

414 


Waterman  v.  Johnson,  13  Pick.  261  ;  Sea- 
man V.  Smith,  24  111.  521  ;  Indinna  v. 
Milk,  11  Biss.  197,  11  Fed.  Rep.  389; 
Trustees  v.  Schroll,  120  111.  509,  2  N.  E. 
Rep.  243,  60  Am.  Rep.  575.  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  how- 
ever, in  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  371, 
11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  808,  838,  review  this 
case,  and  discard  it  as  not  correctly  de- 
claring the  commo!i  Inv  of  the  State; 
Wheeler  v.  Spinola,  54  N.  Y.  377  ;  Canal 
Commissioners  v.  The  People,  5  Wend. 
423,  447 ;  Champlain  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Valentine,  19  Barb.  N.  Y.  484  ;  Lincoln 
V.  Davis,  53  Mich.  375,  19  N.  W.  Rep.  103, 
51  Am.  Rep.  116;  Rice  v.  Ruddiman,  10 
Mich.  125  ;  Sloan  v.  Biemiller,  34  Ohio 
St.  492;  Wood  v.  Kelley,  30  Me.  47; 
Bradley  v.  Rice,  13  Me.  198,  29  Am.  Dec. 
501  ;   Stevens    v.   King,    76  Me.    197,   49 


BOUNDARY   BY   THE   SEA,    RIVERS,    AND   LAKES.  [§  502. 

state,  and  iL  is  immaterial  that  the  conveyance  was  executed  in 
the  winter,  when  the  water  was  high.^  In  case  a  natural  pond 
has  been  permanently  enlarged  and  raised  by  means  of  a  dam  at 
its  outlet,  a  boundary  upon  the  pond  carries  the  title  to  the  low- 
water  mark  of  the  pond  in  its  enlarged  state.^  Of  course  the 
general  rule,  that  the  boundary  by  a  natural  lake  is  a  boundary 
by  low-water  mark,  gives  way  to  any  clearly  expressed  intent  to 
the  contrary.*^ 

The  grant  of  an  island  in  a  swamp  or  natural  lake  carries  the 
title  to  low-water  mark ;  but  if  the  swamp  or  lake  is  afterwards 
drained  by  artificial  means,  the  grantee's  title  does  not  extend  to 
and  include  the  land  laid  bare  by  such  drainage,  but  remains  at 
the  line  of  low  water,  as  it  was  when  the  grant  was  made,  and 
evidence  to  determine  where  such  line  was  is  admissible.*  If 
there  is  a  stream  running  through  the  swamp,  a  boundary  by 
the  swamp  is  by  the  middle  of  the  stream.'^  A  boundary  b}'  a 
slough  or  arm  of  a  navigable  river  is  by  the  middle  of  the  slough.^ 

502.  A  boundary  by  the  shore  of  a  lake  conveys  all  the 
riparian  rights  of  the  grantor  in  the  lake,  in  front  of  the  land 
conveyed,  and,  as  agauist  the  grantor,  any  land  made  by  filling 
in  the  lake  at  the  shore."  It  is  never  presumed  that  the  grantor 
reserves  to  himself  any  proprietary  rights  in  front  of  the  land 
conveyed.  The  intention  to  do  so  must  clearly  appear  from  the 
conveyance ;  and  the  mere  fact  that  the  boundary  of  the  lot  con- 
veyed is  indicated  by  a  line  on  the  plat  will  not  limit  the  grant 
to  the  lines  on  the  plat,  or  operate  to  reserve  to  the  grantor  pro- 
prietary rights  in  front  of  the  lot.^ 

Am.  Rep.  609;  Delaplaine  v.  Chicago  &  Dec.  501  ;  Hathorne  v.   Stinson,   12  Me. 

N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  42  Wis.  214,  24   Am.  Hep.  183,  28  Am.  Dec.  167. 

386  ;  Boorman  v.  Sunnuch.s,  42  Wis.  233  ;         ^  -Wood  v.  Kelley,  30  Me.  47. 

State  V.  Gilmsmton,  9  N.  H.461  ;  Fletcher         ^  people  v.  Jones,  112  N.   Y.  .597,  20 

r.  Phelps,  28  Vt.  257  ;  .Jakeway  v.  Barrett,  N.  E.  Rep.  577  ;  Goiiverncur  v.  National 

38  Vt.  316;    Austin  v.    Kutlnnd  R.   Co.  Ice  Co.  r-,7  Huu,  474,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  87. 

45Vt.  215;  Kanouse  v.   Slockbower,  48         ■»  Lewis  r.  Roper  Lumber  Co.   109  N. 

N.  ,J.  Eq.  42,  21   Atl.  Rep.  197;   Wayznta  C.  19,  18  S.  E.   Rep.   52,  13   S.  E.  Rep. 

V.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  50  :Minn.  438,  701. 

52    N.    W.    Rep.   913;    Castle    v.    Elder         ^  Felder  r.  Bonnett,  2  McMuU  (S.  C), 

(Minn.),  59  N.  W.  Rep.  197.  44.  37  Am.  Dec.  545. 

1  Paine  «.  Woods,  108  Mass.  100;  West         '''  Fuller   r.   Dauphin,    124   111.    .542,  16 

Roxbury  v.  Stoddard,  7  Allen,  158;  Wa-  N.  E.  Rep.  917. 

terman  v.  .Johnson,  13   Pick.  261  ;   Wood         ^  Castle   v.   Ehler    (Minn.),   59  N.  W. 

V.  Kelley,  30  Me.   47,  practically  overrul-  Rep.  197. 
ing  Bradley  v.  Rice,  13  Me.  198,  29  Am.         »  Gilbert  v.  Emerson,  55  Minn.  254,  56 

415 


■)0±] 


DESOiaPTlON    AND    BOUNDARIES. 


A  Street,  one  side  of  which  is  by  a  luivigable  hike  or  river, 
extenils  to  Unv-water  mark,  and  the  dedication  of  it  to  public  use 
is  held  to  have  been  intended  to  enable  the  pubhc  to  get  to  the 
water  for  the  better  enjoyment  of  the  public  right  of  navigation.^ 
A  purchaser  of  a  lot  fronting  on  such  street  acquires  the  fee, 
subject  to  the  public  easement,  to  the  entire  street  and  shore  to 
low-water  mark,  including  all  riparian  rights.^ 


N.  W.  Rep.  818,  citing  Watson  v.  Peters, 
26  Mich.  508. 

1  Wiuzata  V.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co. 
50  Minn.  438,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  913,  per  Gil- 
fillan,  C.  J.  The  court  say  :  "  We  know 
of  no  rnle  for  determining  the  extent  of  a 
grant  or  dedication  of  land  to  ])ublic  use, 
where  a  navigable  lake  or  river  i.s  adopted 
as  one  of  the  boundaries,  other  tlian  that 
applied  in  the  case  of  a  private  grant. 

416 


Where,  in  a  private  grant,  the  land  is 
bounded  only  by  navigable  water,  the 
grantee  takes  to  the  low-water  mark." 
See,  however,  Banks  v.  Ogden,  2  Wall. 
57  ;  Lotz  V.  Reading  Iron  Co.  10  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  497. 

2  Wait  V.  May,  48  Minn.  453,  51  N. 
W.  Rep.  471.  See,  however,  Codman  u. 
Winslow,  10  Mass.  146. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 


EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 


I.  How  distinguished,  §§  503-515. 
II.  General  requisites  and  rules  of  con- 
struction, 516-535. 


III.  Of  particular  exceptions  and  reser- 

vations, 536-547. 

IV.  Whether  a  reservation  is  personal  or 

appurtenant  to  the  land,  548-560, 


I.  Hoiv  Distinguished. 

503.  In  general.  —  An  exception  in  a  deed  withholds  from  its 
operation  some  part  or  parcel  of  the  thing,  which,  but  for  the 
exception,  would  pass  by  the  general  description  to  the  grantee. 
A  reservation,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  creation  of  some  new 
right  issuing  out  of  the  thing  granted,  and  which  did  not  exist 
before  as  an  independent  right,  in  behalf  of  the  grantor  and 
not  of  a  stranger. 1     It  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  between  an 


1  Lord  Coke  (Coke's  Litt.  47a)  says: 
"Note  a  diversity  between  an  exception 
(which  is  ever  of  part  of  the  thiiif;  granted 
and  of  a  thing  in  esse),  for  which  exreptis, 
salvo,  prater,  and  the  like,  be  apt  words, 
and  a  reservation,  which  is  always  of  a 
thing  not  in  esse,  but  newly  created,  or  re- 
served out  of  the  land  or  tenement  de- 
mised." Sheppard  (Touch,  p.  80)  says : 
"  A  re.servation  is  a  clause  of  a  deed 
whereby  the  feoffor,  donor,  lessor,  grantor, 
etc.,  doth  reserve  some  new  thing  to  him- 
self out  of  that  which  he  granted  before." 
And  again  :  "  This  doth  differ  from  an  ex- 
cef)tion,  which  is  ever  of  part  of  the  thing 
granted,  and  of  a  thing  in  esse  at  the  time  : 
but  this  is  of  a  thing  newly  created,  or 
reserved  out  of  a  thing  demised,  that  was 
not  in  esse  before  ;  so  that  this  doth  always 
reserve  that  whiith  was  not  before,  or 
abridge  the  tenure,  i.  e.  '  tenor,'  of  that 
which  was  before."  And  again  :  "  It  must 
be  of  some  other  thing  issuing  or  coming 
out  of  the  thing  granted,  and  nor  a  iiart 
VOL.  I. 


of  the  thing  itself,  nor  of  something  issu- 
ing out  of  another  thing." 

See,  also,  Douglas  v.  Lock,  4  Nev.  & 
M.  807,  824 ;  Cardigan  v.  Armitage,  2  B. 
&  C.  197;  Brown  v.  Cranberry  Iron,  &c. 
•Co.  59  Fed.  Rep.  434,  440.  Connecticut : 
Marshall  v.  Trumbull,  28  Conn.  183,  73 
Am.  Dec.  667.  Georgia  :  McAfee  v.  Ar- 
line,  83  Ga.  645,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  441.  Hli- 
noia:  Gould  v.  Howe,  131  111.  490,  496, 
23  N.  E.  Rep.  602.  Kentucky  :  Brown 
V.  Anderson,  88  Ky.  577,  11  S.  W.  Rep. 
607.  Maine  :  Winthrop  v.  Fairbanks,  41 
Me.  307  ;  State  v.  Wilson,  42  Me.  9  ;  Gar- 
land V.  Ilodsdon,  46  Me.  511  ;  Engel  v. 
Ayer,  85  Me.  448,  27  Atl.  Rep.  352.  Mary- 
land :  Herbert  i;.  Pue,  72  Md.  307,311, 
20  Atl.  Rep.  182;  Schaidt  v.  Blaul,  66 
Md.  141,  6  Atl.  Rep.  669.  Massachu- 
setts: Wood  V.Boyd,  145  Mass.  176,  13 
N.  K.  Rpp.  476  ;  Murphy  v.  Lee,  144  Mass. 
371,  11  N.  E.  Rep.  5.50;  Ashcroft  v.  East- 
ern Railroad,  126  Mass.  196,  .30  Am.  Rep. 
672  ;  Perkins  y.  Stockwell,  131  Mass.  529  ; 

417 


i03.] 


KXCKPTIONS   AND    KESKRVATIONS. 


exd'ption  and  a  reservation  in  a  det'd,  and  the  words  "  reserv- 
ing-"' and  '' exceptini;- "'  are  not  conclusive  in  determining  which 
is  intended.  Tlie  I'hai'acter  and  effect  of  tiie  provision  itself,  in 
which  such  words  occur,  must  determine  what  is  intended.^  If 
tlie  intent  of  the  deed  is  to  vest  in  the  grantor  some  new  right 
or  interest  which  ilid  not  before  exist  in  him,  it  is  a  resei'vation  ; 
but  if  it  was  the  plain  purpose  of  the  parties  not  to  reserve  a 
new  right  which  should  vest  in  the  grantor,  but  to  recognize  and 
except  from  the  grant  an  existing  right  which  would  otherwise 
pass  to  the  grantee,  it  is  the  purpose  of  the  parties  to  create  an 
exception,  whatever  may  be  the  language  used.^ 

Stockwell   V.    Couillard,  129    Mass.   2.31  ;  v.  Howe,  131  111.  490,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  602. 

Stoikbridj^e  Iron  Co.  v.  Hudson  Iron  Co.  A  railroad  company  having  platted  a  town, 

107    Mass.    290.     Michigan:    Martin    v.  sold  a  parcel  "  reserving  streets  and  alleys 

Cook  (Mich.),  60  N.  W.  Rep.  679.     Min-  according  to  recorded  plat  of   the  town," 

nesota  :    Elliot  v.  Small,  35  Minn.  396,  29  and  it  was  held  the  deed  passed  the  fee  in 

X.  W.  Rep.  158,  59  Am.  Rep.  329.     Mis-  such  streets  when  such  fee  was  at  the  time 


sissippi :  McAllister  r.  Honea  (Miss.),  14 
So.  Hep.  264.  New  York :  Craig  v.  Wells, 
11  N.  Y.  315;  Ives  v.  Van  Auken,  34 
Barb.  566  ;  Starr  ;•.  Child,  5  Denio,  599  ; 
Blackmau  i\  Striker,  142  N.  Y.  555,  37 
N.  E.   Rep.  484,   29  Abb.  N.  C.  467,    21 


held  by  the  grantor  subject  to  the  ease- 
ment of  the  public  therein.  Scholfield, 
J.,  delivering  judgment,  said:  "If  here 
there  had  been  no  public  easement  in  the 
streets  and  alleys,  and  the  company  had 
desired  to  retain  for  its  servants  and  em- 


N.  Y.  Supp.  563  ;  Mitchell  v.  Thorne,  134     ployees  a  private  way  across  the  land  con- 


N.  Y.  536,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  10;  Langdon  r. 
Mayor,  6  Abb.  N.  C.  314.  North  Carolina  : 
Wauy:h  v.  Richardson,  8  Ired.  470.  Penn- 
sylvania :  Whitaker  v.  Brown,  46  Pa.  St. 
197.   Rhode  Island  :  In  re  Young,  11  R.  I. 


veyed,  it  would  have  been  a  reservation; 
it  would  have  been  the  creation  of  a  new 
right,  issuing  out  of  the  thing  granted,  in 
behalf  of  the  grantor.  But  the  streets 
and  alleys  were  already  in  existence.    The 


636.     Washington  :  Biles  v.  Tacoma,  &c.  municipality  had  an  easement  in  them  for 

R.  Co.  5  Wash.  509,32  Rac.  Rep.   211.  the  public.     The  land  occupied  by  them 

Wisconsin  :    Fischer   v.  Laack,    76  Wis.  was  included  by  the  terms  of  the  deed  in 

313,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  104;  Rich  v.  Zeils-  the  general  description  of   the  property 

dorff,  22  Wis.  544,  99  Am.  Dec.  81.  conveyed,  and  hence,  but  for  the  provision 

^  Shep.  Touch.  80  ;  Bowman  v.  Wal-  withholding  them  from  its  operation,  they 

then,   2  McLean,  376,  392;    Ashcroft  v.  would  have  been  included  in  the  grant. 


Eastern  R.Co.  126  Mass.  196, 30  Am.  Rep. 
672;  Stockwell  r.  Couillard,  129  Mass. 
231 ;  Siockbridge  Iron  Co.  v.  Hudson  Iron 
Co.  107  Mass.  290,  321  ;  Perkins  v.  Stock- 
well,    131    Mass.   529,   530;  Wluthrop  v. 


Beach  v.  Miller,  51  111.  206,  2  Am.  Rep. 
290.  The  language  of  the  deed  could  only 
be  held  to  withhold  the  fee  of  the  streets 
and  alleys  from  its  operation  upon  the 
hypothesis  that,  '  according    to  recorded 


Fairbanks,  41  Mo.  307  ;  Bowen  v.  Conner,     plat  of  town   of  Wenona,'  the  fee  of  the 
6Cush.  132;  Gould  r.  Howe,  131  111.  490,     streets  and  alleys  is  vested  in  the  raunici- 


23  N.  E.  Rep.  602. 

2  Wood  I'.  Boyd,  145  Mass.  176,  13  N. 
E.  R','p.  476;  Snoddy  v.  Bolen,  122  Mo. 
479,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  932. 

This  is  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Gould 

418 


pality,  for  that  is  the  measure  of  what  is 
withheld  from  the  operation  of  the  deed  ; 
and  therefore,  since  '  according  to  re- 
corded plat  of  town  of  Wenona'  an  ease- 
ment oiilv  in  tiie  soil  of  the  streets  and 


HOW   DISTINGUISHED.  [§  504. 

An  exception  operates  to  retain  in  the  grantor  some  portion  of 
his  former  estate,  which  is  thus  taken  out  of  or  excluded  from 
the  grant.  Whatever  is  thus  excepted  remains  in  him  as  of  his 
former  title,  because  it  is  not  granted.  An  exception  retains  the 
title  in  the  grantor,  though  the  purpose  for  which  the  exception 
is  made  be  a  future  one.  Thus,  in  a  conveyance  by  a  city,  an 
exception  of  so  much  of  the  land  as  is  required  for  streets  is  an 
exception  in  prcesenti  of  so  mucli  of  the  land  as  the  city  should 
afterwards  require  for  such  use.^  An  exception  is  always  of 
some  part  of  the  estate  not  granted  at  all.  A  reservation  is 
always  of  something  taken  back  out  of  that  which  is  clearly 
granted.  Reservations  of  right  of  way,  of  water,  of  light,  or  of 
any  other  right  or  profit  to  arise  out  of  the  thing  granted,  are 
instances  of  reservations  properly  so  called,  whatever  name  the 
parties  may  have  given  to  such  reservations.^ 

Any  exception  or  reservation  out  of  the  conveyance  is  properly 
mentioned  immediately  after  the  description  of  the  parcels.^ 

604.  A  right  of  way  reserved  for  the  use  of  the  grantor  is 
usually  a  new  thing,  derived  from  the  land  conveyed.  Tiie 
grantor  before  giving  his  deed  had  a  right  of  way  wherever  he 
chose  to  exercise  it ;  but  when  he  has  conveyed  the  land,  re- 
serving a  right  of  way,  this  is  a  new  thing  separated  from  the 
grantee's  interest  in  the  land.*     If,  however,  a  particular  way  al- 

alleys  is  vested  in  the  municipality  for  the  thing  granted,   and    not  of   some    other 

use  of   the  puhlic,    that  only  is  witliheld  thinjr ;  3,  it  must  be  a  part  of  the   thing 

from  the  operation  of  the  deed."  only,  and  not  of  all,  the  greater  part,  or 

1  Wood  V.  Boyd,  145  Mass.  176,  13  N.  the  effect,  of  the  thing  granted  ;  4,  it  must 
E.  Rep.  476  ;  Ashcroft  r.  Railroad  Co.  be  of  such  thing  as  is  .severable  from  the 
126  Mass.  196,  30  Am.  Rep.  672  ;  Cutler  thing  which  is  granted,  and  not  of  an  in- 
V.  Tufts,  3  Pick.  272,  277  ;  Cocheco  Manuf.  separable  iucidenf ;  5,  it  mu.st  be  such  a 
Co.  V.  Whittier,  10  N.  H.  .30.5,  310;  Mayor  thing  as  he  that  doth  accept  may  have 
v.  Law,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  628 ;  Fisher  v.  Cid  and  doth  properly  belong  to  him ;  6,  it 
Copper  M.  Co.  97  N.  C.  95,  4  S.  E.  Rep.  must  be  of  a  particular  thing  out  of  a 
772;  Waugh  v.  Richardson,  8  Ired.  470;  general,  and  not  of  a  particular  thing  out 
Brown  ?;.  "cranberry  Iron  Co.  59  Fed.  of  a  particular  thing,  or  of  a  part  out 
Rep.  434,  440.  of  a  certainty;   7,  it   must  be   certainly 

2  State  V.  Wilson,  42  Me.  9;  Gay  r.  described  and  set  down."  McAllister  v. 
Walker,  36  Me  54,  58  Am.  Dec.  734;  Ilonea,  71  Miss.  256, 14  So.  Rep.  264,  cit- 
Kister  v.  Reeser,  98  Pa.  St.  1,42  Am.  ing  Shcp.  Touch.  77. 

Rep.  608 ;  .Jones  v.  De  Lassus,  84  Mo.  «  If  placed  after  the  covenants,  an  ex- 
541  ception  might  be  regarded  as  excepting 
"  To  a  good  exception  these  things  from  the  covenants  only.  Knapp  v.  Wool- 
must  concur:  1,  the  exception  mu.st  be  verton,  47  Mich.  292,  1 1  N.  W.  Rep.  164. 
bv  apt  words  ;  2,  it  mu.'^t  be  of  part  of  the  ■»  Moffitt  v.  Ly tlf,  1 65  Pa.  St.  1 73, 30  Atl. 

419 


§  505.] 


EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 


reiuly  existing  is  reserved,  the  reservation  may  be  construed  as  an 
exception,  if  from  the  deed  itself,  and  the  situation  of  the  parties, 
such  appears  to  have  been  the  intention  of  the  parties.'  'Jlius, 
where  the  grantor  reserved  to  the  pubHc  the  use  of  a  way  across 
the  granted  parcel,  and  it  appeared  that  the  way  referred  to  was 
a  way  wliicli  had  long  been  l.iid  out  and  used  by  the  jDublic,  it 
was  regarded  as  the  manifest  intention  of  the  parties  to  withhold 
from  the  operation  of  the  conveyance  the  use  and  enjoyment  by 
the  public  of  such  existing  way,  and  to  relieve  the  grantor  from 
any  liability  under  his  covenants  of  warranty.^ 

505.  A  reservation  sometimes  has  the  force  of  an  excep- 
tion. It  is  so  construed  when  it  falls  within  the  definition  of 
an  exception,  and  it  appears  to  have  been  the  intention  of  the 
parties  that  it  should  so  operate.'^  Thus  where  a  deed  in  fee 
was  made,  the  giantor  "saving  and  reserving,  nevertheless,  for 
his  own  use,  the  coal  "  contained  in  said  parcel,  it  was  held  that 
the  saving  clause  operated  as  an  exception  of  the  coal,  and  that, 
therefore,  the  entire  and  perpetual  property  in  it  remained  in  the 
grantor.  The  words  of  reservation  must  be  construed  as  an 
exception,  because  the  subject  of  the  reservation  was  not  some- 
thing newly  created,  but  a  thing  corporate  and  in  esse  when  the 


Rep.  922;  Kister  /•.  Ueeser,  98  Pa.  St.  1. 
In  the  latter  case  Mr  Justice  Tininkey,  de- 
liveriuj?  the  opinion,  said:  "  Where  land 
is  granted,  and  the  right  of  way  reserved, 
that  right  becomes  a  new  thing  derived 
from  the  land ;  and  although  before  the 
deed  the  grantor  had  the  right  of  way  over 
the  land  whenever  he  chose  to  exercise  it, 
;yet  when  he  conveyed  the  land  the  res- 
nervation  was  the  thing  separated  from 
the  right  of  the  grantee  in  the  land.  A 
reservation  is  the  creation  of  a  right  or 
interest  which  had  no  j)rior  existence  as 
such  in  a  thing  or  part  of  a  thing  granted. 
It  is  distinguished  from  an  exception  in 
that  it  is  of  a  new  right  or  interest.  An 
exception  is  always  of  part  of  the  thin{ 


!'.  Wilson,  42  Me.  9 ;  Moulton  v.  Traftou, 
64  Me.  218,  223.  See  Gould  r.  Howe,  131 
111.  490,  23  N.  P:.  Rep.  602. 

•^  State  V.  Wilson,  42  Me.  9. 

3  Co.  Litt.  143  ;  Doe  v.  Lock,  4  Nev.  & 
M.  807;  Stockwell  v.  Couillard,  129  Mass. 
231  ;  Wood  v.  Boyd,  145  Ma.ss.  176,  13 
N.  E.  Rep.  476 ;  Kimball  v.  Withington, 
141  Mass.  376,  6  N.  E.  Rep.  759  ;  Dennis 
V.  Wilson,  107  Mass.  591,593;  Pettee  ?;. 
Hawes,  13  Pick.  323  ;  Bowen  v.  Conner, 
6  Cush.  132;  White  v.  New  York  &  N. 
E.  R.  Co.  156  Mass.  181,  30  N.  E.  Rep. 
612  ;  Hurd  v.  Curtis,  7  Met.  94  ;  Winthrop 
V.  Fairbanks,  41  Me.  307  ;  State  v.  Wil- 
son, 42  Me.  9;  Smith  v.  Ladd,  41  Me. 
314;   Kerriek  v.  Marshall,  66   Me.  435; 


granted ;  it  is  of  the  whole  of  the  part  Green  Bay  &  Miss.  Canal  Co.  r.  Hewitt, 

excepted."    Also  Carlson /;.  Duluth  Short  66  Wis.  461,  29   N.  W.   Rep.  237;   Case 

Line  Ry.  Co.  38  Minn.  505,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  v.  Ilaight,  3  Wend.  632 ;  Snoddy  v.  Bolen, 

•341.  122  Mo.  479,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  932;   Brown 

'  Bridger   v.   Pierson,  45  N.    Y.   601;  v.  Rickard,  107  N.  C.  639,  12  S.  E.  Rep. 

Chappell   17.   New  York,  &c.   R.   Co.  62  570  ;  Watkins  v.  Tucker,  84  Tex.  428,  19 

Conn.  19.5,  204,  24   Atl.  Rep.  997;  State  S.  W.  Rep.  570. 

420 


HOW    DISTINGUISHED.  [§  506, 

grant  was  made.  The  reservation  amounting  to  an  exception, 
the  grantor  had  the  same  dominion  over  the  property  that  he 
would  have  had  if  he  had  made  no  deed  of  the  hind;  and  the 
limitation  "  for  his  own  use  "  does  not  restrict  his  absolute  pro- 
prietorship.^ In  a  grant  of  land  upon  a  river,  a  reservation  of  a 
riglit  previously  granted  to  another  to  maintain  a  dam  is  con- 
strued to  be  an  exception,  as  this  construction  is  necessary  to 
carry  out  the  manifest  intention  of  the  co.iveyance.^  The  lan- 
guage used  must  be  considered  with  reference  to  the  subject-mat- 
ter and  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case.^  "  Whether,  in 
a  given  case,  the  language  shall  be  construed  to  ci'eate  an  excep- 
tion or  reservation  will  depend  upon  the  situation  of  the  property 
and  the  surrounding  circumstances,  in  the  absence  of  a  declara- 
tion in  the  deed  by  the  parties  of  their  intention  as  to  the  nature 
of  a  way."  * 

506.  A  reservation  of  an  existing  right  may  properly  be 
construed,  as  an  exception.^  A  deed,  after  the  description  of 
the  land  by  metes  and  bounds,  contained  this  clause  :  "  Reserv- 
ing to  the  owner  of  the  estate  and  others  adjoining  ...  a  right 
of  passageway  over  the  within  granted  premises,  as  specified  "  in 
a  former  deed.  This  right  of  way  had  been  created  many  years 
previously  by  the  owner  of  the  entire  tract  of  which  the  premises 
in  question  then  formed  a  part,  who  had  also  subsequently  con- 
veyed the  passageway,  which  was  a  defined  and  existing  one,  to 
a  grantee  of  a  part  of  the  tract.  It  was  lield  that  the  clause  in 
the  deed  was  an  exception  and  not  a  reservation.''  In  like  manner, 
where  the  owner  of  land  had  conveyed  a  part  of  it,  with  a 
riglit  to  maintain  a  dam  on  the  rest,  and  afterwards  conveyed  to 
a  third  person  the  whole  parcel,  "reserving"  all  the  rights  of  the 

1  Whitaker  v.  Brown,  40  Pa.  St.  197.  l.'iG  Muss.  181,  30  N.  E.  Kep.  012,  per 
This  case  is  cited  and  approved  in  Kister  iMorlon,  J.,  citing  Denni.s  v.  Wilson,  107 
V.  Reeser,  98  Pa.  St.  1,  42  Am.  K'ep.  008,     ]Mass.  .591. 

where  it  is  said:  "These  terms  [' excep-         ^  Murphy  v.  Lee,  144  Mass.  371,  11  N. 

tion  '  and  '  reservation  ']  arc  often  used  in  E.  Hep.  .5.'j0  ;  Engel  i'.  Ayer,  85  Me.  448, 

the   .same  sens;',,  the  teclinical  ili>tinction  27  Atl.  Kep.  3.52  ;    Winthrop  y.  P'airhanks, 

being  disregarded.     Though  apt  words  of  41  Me.  307;   State  v.  Wilson,  42    Me.  9  ; 

reservation  be  used,  they  will  he  con.strucd  Wliitakcr    v.   Brown,  46    Pa.    St.     197; 

as  an  exception  if  such  was  the  design  of  Bri<iger  v.  Piersou,  45  N.  Y.  601  ;  Painter 

the  parties."  i\  Pasailena,  &c.  Co.  91  f'al.  74,  27  Pac. 

2  Siockwcll  y.  Couillard,  129  Mass.  231.  Kep.  539;    Brown   v.   Anderson,  88   Ky. 

3  Snoddy  v.    Bolen,   122    Mo.    479,    25  577,  1 1  S.  W.  Kep.  007. 

S.  W.  Kep.  932.  '^  Wood  u.  Boyd,  145  Mass.  170,   13  N. 

*  White  V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.      E.  Kep.  476. 

421 


§§  507,  508.]  EXCKI'TIONS   AND   RKSKRVATIONS. 

fornuM-  y;r;iutee,  il  was  held  that  the  rLservatiou  was  in  effect  an 
exeoplioii.^ 

A  reservation  or  exception  of  all  I'oads  built  over  the  premises 
is  not  an  exception  of  the  soil  of  the  roads,  but  merely  of  the 
easement  of  the  public  in  such  roads.^ 

507.  A  reservation  of  minerals  and  mining  rights  is  usually 
construed  as  an  exception,  or  even  an  actual  re-grant  of  them  ; 
and  though  a  reservation  is  to  be  construed  most  strongly  against 
tlie  grantor,  still  he  will  be  regarded  as  retaining  all  that  it  was 
the  clear  intention  of  the  parties  to  reserve  or  except  from  the 
conveyance.'^  The  ground  of  this  construction  is  that  the  min- 
erals are  in  esse  at  the  time  the  grant  is  made,  and  not  something 
newly  created,  such  as  a  rent,  or  other  interest  strictly  incorpo- 
real.^ A  reservation  of  an  exclusive  right  of  mining  coal  or  ores 
from  the  granted  land  clearly  operates  as  an  exception  of  the 
mines  from  the  grant.^  Minerals,  coals,  and  ores  excepted  from 
a  grant  remain  in  the  grantor  as  before  the  grant.  They  are  a 
distinct  and  separate  property,  which  may  be  conveyed  separately 
from  the  surface.^ 

508.  A  reservation  cannot  be  construed  as  an  exception 
when  the  intention  was  to  confer  upon  the  grantor  a  new 
right  not  previously  vested  in  him,  and  which,  therefore,  could 
not  be  the  subject  of  an  exception.  Thus  a  reservation  of  a  right 
to  maintain  an  aqueduct  through  a  culvert  of  a  railroad,  with  a 
provision  that  the  grantee  is  to  build  the  culvert  and  keep  it 
in  repair,  is  an  essential  part  of  the  grant,  and  confers  upon 
the  grantor  a  new  right  not  previously  vested  in  him.  It  cannot, 
therefore,  be  the  subject  of  an  exception.*"  A  reservation  of  the 
right  of  mining  a  certain  quantity  of  ore  annually  is  not  a  reserva- 
tion of  any  title  to  the  land,  or  in  the  ore  befoi'e  it  is  mined  and 
separated  from  the  land,  and  does  not  of  itself  restrict  the  grantee 
from  mining  at  the  same  time,  even  to  the  extent  of  exhausting 

1  Stockwelli'.  Coiiilhird,  129  Mass.  231.         ^Cardigan    v.    Armitage,    2    B.    &    C. 

2  Capron  v.  Kingman,  (J4  N.  II.  571,  14      197. 

Atl.  Rep.  868.  5  Stockbiidgc  Iron  Co.  v.  Hudson  Iron 

3  Cardigan  v.  Armitage,  2  B.  &  C.  197 ;  Co.  107  Mass.  290,  322,  per  Wells,  J. 
Whitaker  y.  Brown,  4C  Pa.  St.  197 ;  War-  e  g§  537    533.  Snoddy  v.   Bolen,   122 
dell   V.  Watson,   93   Mo.  107  ;   Snoddy  v.  Mo.  479,  2.5  S.  W.  Rep.  932. 

Bolen,  122  Mo.  479,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  932  ;         '  Ashcroft  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.  126  xMass. 
Sloan  V.  Lawrence  Furnace  Co.  29  Ohio     196,  30  Am.  Rep.  672. 
St.  568. 

422 


HOW   DISTINGUISHED.  [§§  609,  510. 

the  ore.  That  which  is  reserved  is  merely  a  license  to  enter 
upuu  the  granted  premises  and  extract  a  limited  quantity  of  ore.^ 

Where  a  railroad  company,  before  its  line  of  road  had  been 
located,  reserved  and  excepted  a  strip  of  land  for  a  right  of  way 
shcndd  the  line  be  located  over  the  grunted  land,  a  meie  easement 
of  a  right  of  way  was  created.  Tliere  was  no  exception  of  tlie 
strip  from  the  operation  of  the  grant,  but  the  ownership  in  fee  of 
the  whole  tract  described  in  the  deed  passed  to  the  grantee.  At 
the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  deed  no  road  had  been  located 
over  the  granted  land,  but  the  railroad  company  deemed  it  pos- 
sible tiiat  it  might,  at  some  time  in  the  future,  extend  its  road, 
or  a  branch  of  it,  over  the  land.  No  particular  portion  of  the 
land  was  excepted  from  the  operation  of  the  deed,  but  a  new 
right  to  issue  out  of  the  land  conveyed  was  provided  for  in  case 
the  railroad  company  should  wish  to  use  it.  This  must  be  con- 
strued as  a  reservation  of  a  right  of  way.^ 

509.  An  exception,  so  called  by  the  parties,  may  be  in  fact 
a  reservation.  If  the  thing  excepted  is  a  new  right  carved  out 
of  that  which  the  grantor  conveyed,  it  is  in  fact  a  reservation. 
Whether  a  provision  creates  an  exception  or  a  leservation  is 
always  to  be  determined  from  its  nature  and  effect,  and  not  from 
the  name  given  to  it.'^  An  exception  of  a  strip  on  one  side  of 
the  granted  land  for  a  road  may  be  held,  under  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  transaction,  to  be  a  reservation  merely  of  a  right 
of  way  for  a  road,  and  not  an  exception  of  the  fee  of  the  strip."^ 
Thus  an  exception  of  a  strip  of  land  from  one  side  of  a  lot,  to 
be  used  as  an  alley  to  the  adjoining  lots,  is  a  reservation  in  favor 
of  the  grantor,  and  it  is  not  the  gi'ant  of  a  right  of  way  over  the 
adjoining  lots  in  favor  of  the  grantee.^ 

610.  Though  a  reservation  must  be  of  something  out  of 
the  thing  granted,  the  grantor  may,  by  apt  words,  acquire 
some  right  in  the  grantee's  estate.  "  It  is  not,  however,'"  says 
Chief  Justice  Shaw,  "strictly  by  way  of  reservation,  but  by  way 

1   Stockbridtre   Iron  Co.  v.  Hudson  Iron  Collnirn,  7  Allon,  9  ;  Fischer  c.  Liiack,  7(i 

Co.  1(1"  Mass.  290.  Wis.  .31.'$,  45   N.  \V.  lie]!.  104;    Winihroj) 

-  Biles  V.  Taconiii,  &c.  U.  Co.   .'i  Wash.  ;;.   F:iirl)anks,  41    Me.   307  ;    Whitakur  v. 

509,  S-2   Pac.    Hep.   211.     See,  also,  Dun-  Brown,  40  Pa.  Sr.  197;    Bilis  y.  TaconiM, 

Stan  V.  Northern   Pac.  R.  Co.  2  N.  D.  46,  &e.  K.  Co.  .'i  Wasli.  .509,  32  Pac.  Re]).  211. 

49  N.  W.  Rep.  426.  ■*   Abraham  v.  Al)hot.f,  8  Orep.  .")3. 

3  .'^tockwell  ('.  Couillanl.  129  Mas.s.  231  ;  ^  Fisclicr  v.   Laiiek,  76  Wis.  313,  4.5  N. 

Hurd  I'.   Curtis,  7    .Met.  94;   Cowdrey  v.  W.  Kep.  104. 

423 


§  511.]  KXCKl'TIONS    AXl)    HHSKIIVATIONS. 

ot"  coiulition  or  implied  i-oveiumt,  even  though  the  term  '  reserv- 
ing'  or  '■  reservation  '  is  used.  If  a  grant  is  uiadt!  to  A,  reserving 
the  performance  oi"  a  duty,  to  wit,  tlu'  payment  of  a  .sum  of  money 
to  a  third  person  for  the  benefit  of  the  grantor,  an  acceptance  of 
the  grant  binds  A  to  the  payment  of  the  mone}'.^  So,  where  a 
demise  is  made  to  A,  reserving  a  n-nt  in  money  or  in  service,  it  is 
not  strictly  a  reservation  out  of  the  demised  premises;  but  the 
acceptance  of  it  raises  an  implied  obligation  to  pay  the  money. 
So  we  think  a  grant  may  be  so  made  as  to  create  a  right  in  the 
grantee's  land  in  favor  of  the  grantor.  For  instance :  suppose  A  has 
close  No.  2,  lying  between  two  closes,  Nos.  1  and  3,  of  B  ;  and  A 
grants  to  B  the  right  to  lay  and  maintain  a  drain  from  close  No. 
1  across  his  close  No.  2,  thence  to  be  continued  through  his  own 
close.  No.  3,  to  its  outlet;  and  A  in  his  grant  to  B  should  reserve 
the  right  to  enter  his  drain,  for  the  benefit  of  his  inteimediate 
close,  with  the  right  and  privilege  of  having  the  waste  water 
therefrom  pass  oft"  freely  through  the  grantee's  close  No.  3  for- 
ever. In  effect  this,  if  accepted,  would  secure  to  the  grantor  a 
right  in  the  grantee's  land  ;  but  we  think  it  would  inure  by  way 
of  implied  grant  or  covenant,  and  not  strictly  as  a  reservation. 
It  resiilts  from  the  plain  terms  of  the  contract."^ 

The  right  to  light  and  air  passing  over  land  is  an  easement, 
which  may  be  acquired  by  reservation,  though  it  is  strictly  an 
easement  newly  created  by  way  of  grant  from  the  grantee  in  the 
deed  of  the  estate  to  the  grantor.^  Thus,  if  a  gi-antor  in  convey- 
ing land  reserves  the  right  to  the  "free  use  of  light  and  air  over 
said  tract"  conveyed,  the  reservation  is  equivalent  to  the  grant 
of  an  easement  of  light  and  air  by  the  grantee  to  the  grantor  in 
favor  of  the  land  retained  by  the  latter. 

511.  A  reservation  need  not  be  annexed  to  any  particular 
estate,  nor  be  limited  as  to  the  place  or  manner  of  its  enjoyment. 

1  Goodwin  v.  Gilbert,  9  Mass.  510.  that  an  equitable  easement  in  the  grantee's 

2  Dyer  v.  Sanford,  9  Met.  395,  405,  4.3  laud  may  be  created  by  a  deed  which  he 
Am.  Dec.  399.  The  court  adhered  to  this  accept.s  as  grantee,  see  Emerson  v.  Moon- 
ruling  in  the  subsequent  case  of  Bowen  ey,  50  N.  II.  315. 

V.  Conner,  6   Gush.    132,  declaring   that  '■^  Hagerty  v.  Lee,  54  N.  J.  L.   580,  25 

"it  is  immaterial  whether  the  easement  Atl.  Kep.  319,  citing  Washb.  Easem.  20 ; 

for  the  way  intended  to  be  established  is  Durham  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Walker,  2  Q.  H. 

technically  considered  as  founded  on  an  940;   Wickhani  v.  Hawker,  7  Mees.  &  W. 

exception,   a   reservation,   or   an  implied  63  ;  Dyer  y.  Sanford,  9  Mete.  395,  43  Am. 

grant."  Dee.  399.     And  .see  Tinker  v.  Forbes,  136 

For  further  illustrations  of  the  doctrine  111.  221,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  503. 

421 


HOW  DISTINGUISHED.  [§  512. 

"  A  right  of  way  may  be  as  well  created  by  a  reservation  or 
exception  in  the  deed  of  the  grantor,  reserving  or  retaining  to 
himself  and  his  heirs  a  right  of  way,  either  in  gross  or  as  annexed 
to  lands  owned  by  him,  so  as  to  charge  the  lands  granted  with 
such  easement  and  servitude,  as  by  a  deed  from  the  owner  of  the 
hind  to  be  charged,  granting  such  way  either  in  gross  or  as  appur- 
tenant to  other  estate  of  the  grantee."  1  And  so  a  grantor  may 
reserve  to  himself,  his  heiis  and  assigns,  the  right  of  taking  water 
from  a  spring  situated  upon  the  land  conveyed,  through  pipes  of 
certain  dimensions,  though  the  riglit  is  not  annexed  to  any  par- 
ticular estate,  or  limited  as  to  the  place  or  manner  of  its  enjoy- 
ment. The  riglit  is  an  interest  in  the  land,  and  is  assignable. 
"  We  are  aware  of  no  case,"  say  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massa- 
chusetts, "  which  denies  that  the  right  to  an  aqueduct  may  be 
so  created  as  to  exist  independently  of  any  particular  parcel  of 
land  owned  by  the  grantee  thereof,  and  be  enjoyed  by  him  and 
his  heirs  on  any  estate  which  he  or  they  may  own  or  acquire, 
and  be  capable  of  assignment  or  conveyance  in  gross.  The  water 
itself  may  not  be  the  subject  of  property,  but  the  right  to  take 
it  and  to  have  pipes  laid  in  the  soil  of  another  for  that  purpose, 
and  to  enter  upon  the  land  of  another  to  lay,  repair,  and  renew 
such  pipes,  is  an  interest  in  the  realty,  assignable,  descendible, 
and  devisable."^ 

512.  A  reservation  by  verbal  agreement  entered  into  prior 
to  the  execution  of  the  deed,  inconsistent  with  the  deed,  is 
void,  and  evidence  of  it  is  inadmissible.''     A  parol  reservation  of 

1  Bowen  ?;.  Conner,  6  Cush.  132,137,  land  the  liyht  to  lay  pipes  therein,  nor  can 

per  Shaw,  C.  J.  he  use  the  water  in  a  liouse  until  he  oh- 

-  Goodrich  v.  Bnrbank,  12  Allen,  459,  tains  the  right  to  possess  that  house.  But 
461,90  Am.  Dec.  161,  per  Foster,  J.  On  these  may  be  acquired  afterwards.  lu- 
this  subject  Jud^e  Curtis,  in  a  case  in  the  corporeal  rights  may  be  inseparably  an- 
Circiiit  Court  of  the  United  States,  said  :  nexed  to  a  [jarticular  messuage,  or  tract 
"  I  know  of  no  rule  of  the  common  law  of  land,  by  the  grant  which  creates  them, 
which  prohibits  grants  of  the  incorporeal  and  makes  them  incapable  of  8e])arate  ex- 
right  to  divert  water  from  being  made  in  istence.  But  they  may  also  be  granted  in 
gross.  If  I  have  a  spring,  I  may  sell  the  gross,  and  afterwards,  for  ])urposrs  of  en- 
right  to  take  water  from  it  by  pipes  to  one  joymcnt,  be  annexed  to  a  messuage  or 
who  does  not  own  the  land  across  which  land,  and  again  severed  therefrom  by  a 
the  pipes  are  to  be  carried,  and  I  may  conveyance  of  the  messuage  or  land  with- 
either  restrict  the  use  to  a  i)articular  house,  out  the  right,  or  a  conveyance  of  tlie  right 
or  not,  as  I  please.  It  is  true  the  grantee  without  the  land."  Lonsdale  Co.  v.  Moies, 
cannot  make  the  grant  useful  without  ac-  21  Law  Rep.  G.58,  664. 
quiring  from  the  owner  of  the  intermediate  '  Smith  v.  Price,  39  111.  28,  89  Am.  Dec. 

425 


i;§  513,  514.]  EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 

a  crop  upon  the  hind  conveyed  is  not  binding  as  against  such 
deed,  thougii  a  parol  license  by  the  grantee  after  the  execution  of 
the  deed,  it"  acted  upon  and  the  crop  is  severed  before  the  revoca- 
tion of  the  license,  will  vest  the  title  to  the  crop  severed  in  the 
licensee.^ 

Hut  a  parol  reservation  of  an  {'asenient  in  land  granted  is  not 
Avitliin  till'  statute  of  frauds,  when  the  grantee  lias  accepted  the 
grant  with  the  reservation,  has  constructed  the  improvements 
necessary  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  easement,  and  has  allowed 
the  grantor  and  his  assigns  to  use  such  easement  for  more  than 
tiiirty  years.^ 

A  grantee,  uniltu-  a  deed  made  by  an  attorney  in  fact,  cannot 
object  to  a  reservation  therein  that  the  attorney  had  no  power  to 
make  it.  The  grantee  is  bound  by  his  acceptance  of  the  deed, 
and  to  prove  the  reservation  it  is  unnecessary  to  introduce  the 
power  under  whicli  tlie  deed  was  made.^ 

513.  An  agreement  in  a  deed  to  construct  a  "way  across 
the  land  operates  as  a  reservation  or  implied  grant  to  create 
an  easement  over  the  land  for  the  benefit  of  the  grantor's  other 
land.  Thougli  the  agreement  is  that  the  way  shall  be  constructed 
and  kept  open  as  a  public  way  until  it  should  be  accepted  as  a 
public  street,  it  does  not  make  it  any  the  less  a  reservation  for 
the  grantor's  benefit.* 

An  absolute  deed  and  a  bond  by  the  grantee  to  the  grantor, 
conditioned  inter  alia  that  the  grantor  should  have  a  certain  part 
of  the  crops  produced  upon  the  land  conveyed  during  his  life, 
and  should  have  the  privilege  of  opening  oil  wells  and  at  his 
pleasure  removing  the  machinery  of  such  wells,  do  not  amount 
to  a  reservation  or  exception  of  anything  out  of  the  conveyance ; 
but  the  grantor's  rights  are  measured  by  the  provisions  of  the 
bond,  which  is  merely  tlie  personal  obligation  of  the  grantee. 
The  right  to  remove  the  machinery  is  purely  a  personal  privilege 
of  the  trrantor  during;  his  life,  and  eannot  be  exercised  after  his 
death.-'' 

514.  An  exception  is   not    defeated   because   the   property 

284 ;  Damery  v.   Fcrfruson,  48  111.  App.  ^  Waco   Bridge  Co.   v.  Waco,  85  Tex. 

224.  320,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1.37. 

1  Carter  !-•.  Wiiigard,  47  111.  App.  296.  •*  Hathaway   v.   Hathaway,   159   Mass. 

2  Ague  I'.  Seitsinger,  85  Iowa,  305,  52  584,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  85. 

N.  W.  Rep.  228.  ^  Shields   v.  Delo,  145   Pa.  St.  393,  22 

Atl.  Rep.  701,  28  W.  N.  Cas.  427. 

426 


GENERAL   REQUISITES   AND   RULES   OF   CONSTRUCTION.       [§^  515,  516. 

excepted  is  not  used  for  the  purpose  declared  in  the  excep- 
tion. A  grantor  who  states  in  bis  deed  that  he  excepts  a  certain 
portion  of  the  hind,  because  he  wants  it  for  a  certain  purpose, 
cannot  be  hekl  to  have  conveyed  that  which  he  has  expressly  ex- 
chided  because  be  afterwards  devotes  it  to  a  different  jjurpose. 
The  excepted  land  was  not  included  in  the  grant,  and  no  title  to 
it  passed.^ 

515.  A  statement  in  a  deed  that  the  conveyance  is  subject 
to  a  mortgage,  lease,  or  other  incumbrance  named,  is  an  ex- 
ception of  the  rights  outstanding  under  such  mortgage,  lease,  or 
other  incumbrance.  If  a  deed  is  made  subject  to  a  certain  lease 
executed  by  the  grantor,  it  excepts  from  its  operation  only  the 
rights  of  the  lessee,  and  not  the  privileges  reserved  to  the  lessor.^ 

II.    General  Requisites  and  Rules  of  Construction. 

516.  A  reservation,  exception,  or  condition  which  is  repug- 
nant to  the  grant  is  void.'^  So  is  a  prohibition  of  the  use  of  the 
property  inconsistent  with  the  title  granted.^  Thus,  if  one  con- 
veys twenty  acres  of  land,  excepting  one  acre,  the  exception  is 
contradictoiy,  and  must  be  rejected.  So  if  one  conveys  a  moiety 
of  a  parcel,  and  in  a  subsequent  ckuse  says  he  meant  to  convey 
a  fourth  part,  or  excepts  one  half  of  this  moiety.  The  grantor 
cannot  have  the  benefit  of  an  interpretation  or  of  an  exception 
which  he  has  introduced  into  the  deed  which  has  the  effect  of 
destroying  his  own  grant.^ 

1  IMayor  v.  New  York  Cent.  &e.  R.  Co.  to  it,  tliat  the  grant  would  be  practically 
69  Hun,  324,  326,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  562,  inoperative,  and,  as  it  cannot  be  presumed 
per  Van  Brunt,  P.  J.  that  this  was  the  intention,  the  exception 

2  Shelby  v.   Chicago,  &c.   11.   Co.   143  in  such  case  must  be  treated  as  invalid." 
111.  385,  32  N.  E.  Hep.  438,  42  111.  Apj).         In  Alabama  it  is  provided   by  statute 
339^  that  when  the  grantor  in  any  conveyance 

3  Shep.  Touch.  129,  130;  Daniel  v.  reserves  to  him.self,  for  his  own  benefit, 
Veal,  32  Ga.  589  ;  Pynchou ',-.  Stearns,  1 1  an  absolute  power  of  revocation,  such 
Met.  312,  45  Am.  Dec.  210;  Cutler  v.  grantor  must  be -taken  as  the  absolute 
Tufts  3  Pick.  272;  Gay  v.  Walker,  36  owner  of  the  estate  conveyed,  as  to  the 
Me.  54,  58  Am.  Dec.  734;  Littlefiold  v.  '  right  of  creditors  and  purchasers.  Code, 
Mott,  14  K.  I.  288  ;  Young,  Petitioner,  1 1  1886,  §  1849. 

R.  I.    636;    Stockwcl!    v.  Couillard,    129  '  Craig  i-.  Wells,  1 1   N.  Y.  315. 

Mass.  231,  233.   Per  Endicott,  .J. :  "  Every  *  Cutler   v.  Tufts,    3    Pick.   272.     But 

exception  may  be  said  to  be  inconsistent  where  a  deed  described  the  land  conveyed 

with   the  grant,  but  it  is  not  void  because  by  courses  and  distances,  and  conveyed  no 

inconsistent;  it  must  be   so   inconsistent  .specific  number  of  acres  it  was  competent 

with  the  errant  itself,  that  i.s.  so  repugnant  for    the    grantor    to  except  a    swamp   or 

427 


§  517. J  EXCEPTIONS    AND    RESEUVATIONS, 

An  excoption  of  a  parci'l  specilk'ally  granted  is  void  for  repug- 
nancy. The  exception  will  not,  however,  be  declared  repugnant 
unless  it  is  so  inconsistent  with  the  general  grant  that  both  can- 
not stand  together.  Effect  will  be  given  to  the  intention  of  the 
parties  if  practicable.' 

An  exct'i^tion  of  a  tract  of  land  described  by  metes  and 
bounds,  wliieli  include  a  portion  of  another  tract  previously  con- 
veyed by  the  grantor  to  the  grantee,  is  repugnant  to  the  prior 
grant,  and  has  no  effect  as  against  it.^  The  exception  of  a  lot 
out  of  a  larger  grant  does  not  estop  the  grantee  from  setting  up 
a  title  to  the  excepted  lot  afterwards  acquired  through  a  source 
hostile  to  the  title  of  the  grantor ;  and  it  does  not  matter  that 
the  clause  containing  the  exception  declares  that  such  lot  "re- 
mains vested  "  in  the  grantor.^ 

A  conveyance  of  a  parcel  of  land  by  metes  and  bounds  passes  all 
the  grantor's  interest  in  the  land  described.  It  includes  all  mines 
and  minerals  and  other  rights  beneath  the  surface,  unless  these 
are  excepted  or  reserved.  If,  therefore,  in  such  a  conveyance  the 
grantor,  more  particularly  describing  the  subject-matter  conveyed, 
adds  "  that  is,  the  one  half  of  the  mineral  interest  in  the  said 
land,"  this  clause  is  to  be  regarded  as  subordinate  to  the  general 
terms  first  used,  and  perhaps  repugnant  thereto.  It  cannot  be 
construed  as  implying  an  exception  of  the  other  half  of  the  min- 
erals in  the  land,  because  there  are  no  apt  words  of  exception  or 
certain  description  to  keep  any  part  of  the  minerals  from  passing 
by  the  grant.  The  two  clauses  of  the  deed  may  be  reconciled  by 
construing  the  second  as  embi'acing  the  entire  mineral  interest 
claimed  in  the  land  described  in  the  first  clause."^ 

517.  The  grantor  of  an  absolute  fee  cannot  reserve  to  him- 
self the  right  to  the  purchase-price,  or  any  part  of  it,  upon  a 
subsequent  sale  by  the  grantee  of  the  land  conveyed.^  He  cannot 
reserve  to  himself  the.  damages  which  the  land  may  sustain  by 
the  building  of  a  railroad  across  it  after  the  conveyance,  though 
the  railroad  company  had  taken  possession  of  the  land  before  the 

marsh  from   the  operation  of  tlie   deed.  •'*  Champlaiii  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Valen- 

Painter  v.  Tasadena  Land  &  Water  Co.  tine,  19  Barb.  484. 

91  Cal.  74,  27  Pac.  Rep.  5:39.  ^  Brown  i'.  Cranberry  Iron  Co.  59  Fed. 

1  Witt  V.  St.  Paul  &  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  38  Rej'-  434. 

Minn.   122,  35  N.  W.   Rep.   862;  Gay  i>.         ^  De   P.'vster  ;•.    Michael,  6  N.  Y.  467, 
Walker,  36  Me.  54,  58  Am.  Dec.  734.  492,  .57  Am.  Dec.  47o ;  Denuison  v.  Tay 

2  Hampton  v.  Helms,  81  Mo.  631.  lor,  15  Abb.  N.  C.  439. 

428 


GENERAL   REQUISITES   AND   RULES   OF   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  518. 

conveyance,  but  did  not  acquire  title  to  it  till  afterwards.^  A 
reservation  of  '•'all  the  damages  sustained  in  consequence  of  the 
railroad  crossing  the  lands  conveyed  "  relates  to  damages  already 
sustained,  and  not  to  those  to  be  suffered  after  the  making  of  the 
deed.2  But  a  grantor  may  reserve  damages  already  awarded  him 
for  a  right  of  way  over  the  granted  land,  but  not  paid  at  the  time 
of  the  conveyance.''^ 

518.  When  land  is  conveyed  by  general  terms,  an  excep- 
tion of  some  portion  of  it  from  the  grant  is  valid.*  Thus,  if 
one  conveys  a  block  of  land  containing  several  lots,  not  naming 
them,  but  describing  the  whole  as  one  parcel,  he  may  except  one 
or  more  of  the  lots.  The  exception  in  such  case  is  regarded  as 
limiting  the  general  description  in  the  grant,  and  is  therefore  not 
repugnant  to  it.  This  is  certainly  the  rule  where  the  exception 
appears  in  the  description  as  part  of  the  substance  of  the  grant- 
ing clause.-^  One  may  convey  a  farm,  excepting  the  land  covered 
by  wood  or  timber.  One  may  convey  land  described  by  courses 
and  distances,  and  except  from  the  operation  of  the  grant  the 
marshy  or  swampy  lands  within  the  boundaries.^  One  may  con- 
vey a  tract  of  land  and  except  from  it  a  smaller  parcel  described 
by  metes  and  bounds.'  When  there  is  no  express  grant,  a  restric- 
tive clause  is  not  considered  contradictory  or  repugnant.  Thus, 
if  a  grantor  describes  a  tract  of  land  without  mentioning  a 
stream  included  within  its  bounds,  and  then  declares  that  it  is 
the  intention  of  the  deed  to  convey  to  the  grantee  so  much  of  the 
privilege  of  the  water  as  shall  be  sufficient  for  the  use  of  a  fulling- 
mill,  whenever  there  is  sufficient  therefor,  the  clause  is  not  re- 
pugnant to  the  grant,  but  is  a  good  reservation  of  tiie  surplus 
water.s  The  fact  that  a  grantor  reserves  the  use  of  a  certain 
part  of  the  land  for  purposes  specified  affords  a  presumption  that 

1  Dennison  v.  Taylor,  15   Abb.  N.  C.  *  Grecnleaf  v.   Birth,  6  Pet.  302 ;  Bab- 

439.  cock  V.  Latterner,  30  Minu.  417, 15  N.  W. 

■-:  Dennison   v.  Taylor,   15  Abb.  N.  C.  Rep.  080;  Koenig:beim  v.  Miles,  67  Tex. 

439.  113,  2  S.  W.  Rep.  81  ;  Cravens  v.  White, 

3  Richardson  v.  Palmer,  38  N.  II.  212.  73  Tex.  577,  1 1  S.  W.  Rep.  543. 

*  Sprnguc  V.  Snow,  4   Pick.  54;  Stock-  *  Painter  i'.   Pasadena,  &c.  Co.  91  Cal. 

well  ;;.  Couillard,  129  Mass.  231  ;  Cutler  74,  27  Pmc.  Rep.  539. 

r.  Tufts,  3  Pick.  272;  Babcock  i-.  Latter-  ">   Watkins  v.  Tucker,  84   Tex.  428,19 

ner,  30  Minn.  417,  15  N.  W.   Rep.  fi89 ;  S.  W.   Rep.  570;  KoeniKheim  v.   Miles, 

Witt  V.  St.  Paul  &  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  38  Minn.  67  Tex.  1 13,  121,  2  S.  W.  Hep.  81. 

122,  35  N.  W.  Rep.  802;  Howe  v.   Sad-  »  Sprague  v.  Snow,  4  Pick.  54. 
dler  (Kv.),  25  S.  W.  Rep.  277. 

429 


§§  olO,  520.]  EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 

the  title  to  such  restM-vod  part  passed  with  the  other  land  to  the 
iTanteo,  and  such  presumption  can  be  overcome  only  by  very 
satisfactory  and  convincing  evidence. ^ 

An  exception  out  of  the  hind  described  by  metes  and  bounds  of 
a  part  covered  by  a  certain  h-ase  is  an  exception  of  the  fee  of  such 
part.  If  it  had  been  intended  to  convey  the  fee  of  the  whole 
parcel,  this  would  naturally  have  been  done  by  simply  adding  the 
words  "  subject  to  the  lease  named." '-^ 

519.  When  the  terms  used  in  excepting  a  parcel  out  of  a 
grant  are  too  vague  and  uncertain  to  enable  such  parcel  to  be 
located,  the  exception  will  be  ineffectual  to  exclude  any  portion 
of  the  territory  from  the  defined  tract.^  The  language  of  a 
reservation  nuist  be  as  explicit  as  that  of  a  grant.  A  provision 
in  a  deed  that  ''sixteen  feet  east  of  said  house  shall  be  kept 
open  as  far  back  as  the  south  end  of  said  house  "  cannot  be  con- 
strued to  be  a  reservation  of  a  right  of  way,  for  the  clause  does 
not  express  or  import  the  idea  of  a  reserved  right  of  way.*  But 
effect  will  be  given  to  a  reservation  vague  in  its  terms  if  the 
intention  of  it  is  apparent.  Thus,  in  a  conveyance  of  a  lot 
bounded  on  tide-water,  a  reservation  "  of  all  and  every  privilege 
around  said  lot  "  was  held  to  operate  as  a  reservation  of  the  right 
to  build  a  wharf.^ 

Ambiguity  in  the  description  of  land  excepted  does  not,  how- 
ever, make  the  conveyance  itself  void  for  uncertainty.  The 
grantee  and  not  the  grantor  has  the  benefit  of  the  uncertainty.^ 

520.  A  part  excepted  from  a  grant  must  be  as  clearly 
described  as  the  parcel  granted.'  As  regards  the  boundaries 
of  an  excepted  part,  the  same  rules  should  apply  that  apply  to 
a  granted  parcel.  The  facts  and  circumstances  existing  at  the 
time  of  the  conveyance  are  to  be  considered,  if  the  terms  used  in 
the  deed  are  ambiguous.^  If  a  way  appurtenant  to  a  particular 
parcel  of  land  belonging  to  the  grantor  is  reserved,  and  the  way 

1  Small  V.  Wright,  74  Me.  428.  Johns.  394 ;  Jackson  v.  Hudson,  3  Johns. 

2  Howe  V.  Saddler  (Ky.),  2.5  S.  W.  Rep.     37.5. 

277.  ■^  Co.  Litt.  142a;  Cook  v.  Wesner,   1 

8  Ditman  v.  Clybourn,  4  111.  App.  542;  Cin.  Sup.  Ct.  249;  Darling  (■.  Crowell,  6 

McCormick  v.  Monroe,  1  Jones,  13.  N.  H.  421  ;  Grennan  r.  McGregor,  78  Cal. 

*  Wilder  r.  Wheeldon,  .56  Vt.  344.  258,  20  l*ac.  Rep.  559;  Tructt  v.  Adams, 

5  Parker  >■.  Rogers,  8  Oreg.  183.  66  Cal.  218,  5  Pac.  Rep.  96. 

6  McAllister  v.  Honea,  71  Miss.  256,  «  See  Bennett  v.  Caddell  (Ky.),  20  S. 
14  So.  Rep.  264 ;  Jackson  v.  Gardner,  8  VV.  Reji.  274. 

430 


GENERAL   REQUISITES   AND    RULES    OF   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  521. 

is  not  defined,  the  situation  of  tlie  land  and  its  natural  features 
are  elements  in  determining  wLere  the  way  shall  be.^  In  an  ex- 
ception of  "  the  bottom  at  the  ford  of  the  creek,  which  bottom  is 
now  under  fence,  and  supposed  to  contain  nine  acres,  more  or  less," 
the  words  "  now  under  fence  "  should  be  considered  as  descriptive 
merely,  and  not  as  limiting  the  boundary  ;  and,  though  the  fence 
was  set  back  from  the  creek  out  of  the  reach  of  the  water,  the 
exception  should  include  the  land  up  to  the  creek,  although  there 
is  more  than  an  acre  of  land  outside  the  fence.^ 

An  exception  out  of  a  grant  of  "  one  acre  in  the  southeast 
corner,  together  with  the  buildings  thereon,"  possession  of  which 
was  retained  by  the  grantor,  should  be  construed  to  be  an  excep- 
tion of  one  acre  of  land  of  such  shape  as  to  include  the  buildings, 
if  a  square  acre  in  such  corner  would  not  include  them.^ 

In  a  conveyance  of  a  part  of  a  section  defined  by  a  government 
survey,  an  exception  of  a  certain  number  of  acres  on  a  desig- 
nated side  of  the  land  is  to  be  ascertained  by  taking  a  strip  of 
land  of  uniform  width  across  that  side  of  the  land  sufficient  to 
include  the  quantity  named.* 

521.  An  exception  is  good  if  the  means  of  determining  the 
excepted  part  are  pointed  out.  It  is  a  sufficient  description  of 
an  excepted  parcel  to  designate  it  by  the  name  by  which  it  is 
generally  known,  just  as  a  grant  is  sufficiently  described  by  such 
a  name.^  It  is  also  a  sufficient  description  of  an  excepted  parcel 
to  state  that  it  is  the  same  conveyed  to  the  grantor  by  a  person 
named,  even  if  it  appears  from  the  records  that  the  grantor  made 
a  mistake  in  reciting  the  given  name  of  such  person.*^  It  is  also 
a  sufficient  description  to  say  that  the  resei'ved  land  is  the  same 
that  the  grantor  has  previously  occupied  for  a  certain  purpose,- 
when  the  occupation  of  the  hind  for  this  purpose  distinguishes  it 
from  the  other  land  conveyed.' 

An  exception  of  land  previously  conveyed  by  the  grantor  is 
not  void  for  uncertainty  because  the  means  is  pointed    out  for 

1  Brown  v.  Meady,  10  Mc.  391,  25  Am.  ^  Truott  v.  Adams,  66  Cal.  21,  5  Pnc. 
Dec.  248.  Kep.  96 ;  McCormick  v.  Monroe,  1  Jones, 

2  Jones  V.  Motley  (Ky.),  1.3  S.  W.  Rep.  1.3;  Melton  v.  Monday,  64  N.  C.  295; 
432.  Eastern  Carolina  Land  Co.  v.  Frcy,  112 

3  Lego  V.   Medley,  79  Wi.s.   211,  48  N.  N.  C.  158,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  902. 

W.  Rep.  .375.  '"'  Hetcliell  v.  Whittcmore,  72  Mc.  393. 

*  Jolinson  r.  Ashland  Luniher  Co.  47  '  KN-idiiiger  v.  Cleveland  Iron  M.  Co. 
Wis.  326,  2  N.  W.  Rep.  552.  39  Midi.  30. 

431 


{n  ;V22.]  KXCEITIONS    AND    KKSKRVATIONS. 

imiking  the  excepted  pait  certain.^  A  deed  of  a  large  tract  of 
laiiiK  exci'pling  therefrom  a  tract  of  fifty  acres  sold  to  another 
person,  does  not  pass  to  such  grantee  the  legal  title  to  such  ex- 
chuled  tract,  although  no  deed  of  this  tract  has  been  made  to  the 
person  who  purchased  it.^  If  the  parcel  excepted  be  otherwise 
sulliriently  described,  the  statement  that  it  had  been  sold  may  be 
rejected  US  faha  demonstration  An  exception  of  "all  the  lots 
heretofore  sold,"  with  no  further  desci-iption  of  the  excepted  lots, 
would  necessarily  cover  only  such  lots  as  had  in  fact  been  sold, 
for  in  that  case  the  sale  of  the  lots  was  the  only  means  of  point- 
ing them  out.-*  In  a  grant  by  a  State,  an  exception  of  a  tract 
previously  entered  and  surveyed  is  a  valid  exception.^  So  an 
exception  of  a  portion  of  the  land  conveyed  which  is  then  occu- 
pied for  certain  purposes  is  valid,  because  the  means  of  identifi- 
cation are  supplied  by  the  reservation  itself.'' 

522.  An  exception  of  a  dower  right  already  set  off  suflB- 
ciently  describes  both  the  estate  and  the  boundaries  of  the 
land.  A  reservation  or  exception  of  a  dower  right  in  the  land 
already  conveyed  is  a  reservation  of  only  such  interest  as  the 
widow  had  a  legal  right  to  convey ;  and  if  she  has  conveyed  in 
fee  the  land  allotted  to  her,  an  exception  in  the  deed  of  the  heir 
of  the  dower  right  already  conveyed  is  an  exception  of  a  life 
estate,  and  not  of  an  estate  in  fee  simple." 

An  exception  of  a  widow's  right  of  dower  not  then  assigned 
is  a  good  exception,  because  this  right  may  be  made  certain  by 
setting  it  off.^     An  exception  of  land  within  the  granted  parcel 

1  Cornwell  v.  Thurston,  59  Mo.   156;  ^  Brown  v.  Rickard,  107  N.  C.  639,  12 

McConnick  v.  Monroe,  1  Jones,  13;  King  S.  E.  Rep.  570;  Midj^ett  v.  Wharton,  102 

'v.  Wells,  94   N.   C.  344 ;    Rockafeller  v.  N.  C.  14,  8  S.  E.  Rep.  778. 

Arlint,'ton,  91   111.  375;  Johnson   r.   Ash-  ^  Reidinger   v.   Cleveland  Iron  Co.  39 

land  Lumber  Co.  47  Wis.  326,  2  N.  W.  Mich.  30. 

Rep.  552;  McAfee  v.  Arline,  83  Ga.  645,  '  Bird  v.  Cruse,  114  N.  C.  435,  19  S.  E. 

10  S.  E.  Rep.  441.  Rep-  276  ;  Austin  v.  Willis,  90  Ala.  421, 

-  Low  V.  Settle,  32  W.  Va.  600,  9  S.  E.  8  So.  Rep.  94,  where  there  was  an  admin- 
Rep.  922;  Roberts  v.  Robertson,  5.'?  Vt.  istrator's    sale    excepting    certain    land 
690,  38   Am.    Rep.   710;    Rockafeller  v.  allotted  to  the  widow  as  dower. 
Arlington,  91  111.  375.  ^  Stockwell    v.   Couillard,    129     Mass. 

3  Roberts  v.  Robertson,  53  Vt.  690,  38  231,    234;    Canedy  v.   Marcy,   13    Gray, 

Am.  Rep.  710.  373;  Meserve  v.  Me.serve,  19  N.  H.  240; 

*  Roberts  v.  Robertson,  53  Vt.  690,  38  Swick  v.  Sears,  1  Hill,  17  ;  Clark  v.  Cot- 
Am.  Rep.  710,  per  Powers,  J.  trel,  42  N.  Y.  527.     In  the  latter  case  it 
432 


GENERAL   REQUISITES   AND   RULES    OF   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  523. 

previously  conveyed  by  the  grantor  is  a  valid  exception,  because 
the  means  is  pointed  out  for  determining  the  excepted  part.^ 

523.  The  construction  of  a  reservation  may  be  determined, 
by  the  acts  of  the  parties  under  the  deed.  The  courts  will  not 
disregard  the  construction  put  upon  the  reservation  by  the  acts 
and  conduct  of  the  parties  for  a  period  of  years  following  the 
conveyance.^  Thus,  where  there  was  an  exemption  and  resei*- 
vation  "  of  sixty-eight  feet  of  land  from  the  east  end  of  the  de- 
scribed jiremises,"  and  the  grantor  retained  possession  of  a  lot  of 
that  widtli  along  the  whole  east  side  of  the  land,  putting  the 
purchaser  in  possession  of  the  I'emainder,  and  the  parties  built  a 
fence  along  the  line  thus  fixed,  and  the  grantor  built  a  house  and 
barn  on  the  portion  held  by  him,  and  after  many  years  conveyed 
the  tract  as  being  sixty-eight  feet  wide,  it  w^as  held  that  the  acts 
of  the  parties  established  the  interpretation  that  the  exception 
was  of  a  strip  sixty-eight  feet  wide  along  the  east  side  of  the  lot, 
and  not  merely  of  sixty-eight  square  feet,  which  would  be  a  strip 
of  the  width  of  only  six  inches.^  If  the  location  of  the  excepted 
parcel  or  of  a  right  of  way  is  left  to  the  election  of  the  grantor, 
either  expressly  or  impliedly,  the  uncertainty  of  location  may  be 
cured  by  his  election  within  a  reasonable  time.*  Until  the  right 
reserved  is  exercised  it  is  inoperative,  and  the  grantee  may  assert 
all  the  rights  of  an  owner  in  fee.'^ 

On  an  issue  as  to  whether  a  person  deceased  executed  a  deed 
of  certain  property,  reserving  therein  a  life  estate,  declarations 
made  by  him  after  the  alleged  date  of  the  deed,  while  in  pos- 
session of  the  property,  are  inadmissible  to  show  the  character 
of  his  possession.  But  where  it  is  necessary  to  inquire  into  the 
nature  of  a  particular  act,  and  the  intention  of  the  person  who 
did  it,  proof  of  what  that  person  said  at  the  time  of  doing  it  is 

was  held  that  in  a  deod  of  a  farm  a  res-  2  Jones  v.   De   Lassus,    84    Mo.   .041 ; 

crvalion  of  thirty  acres,  which   had  been  Hardwick   v.    Laderoot,    39    Mich.     419; 

set   off   to    the  grantor's  mother  as    her  Choate  v.  Burnham,  7  Pick.  274. 

dower,  was  not  merely  an  exemption  of  »  Monfort  v.  Stevens,  G8  Mich.  61,  35 

the  dower  interest,  but  an  exception   of  N.  W.  Hep.  827.    Anrl  see  Louk  v.  Woods, 

that    portion  of   the    farm    identified    by  1.5  111.  2.56. 

reference  to  the  assignment  of  dower.  *  Benn  v.  Hatcher,  81  Va.  2.5  ;  Hart  v. 

1  Stockweli    V.   Couillard,    129     Mass.  Connor,  25  Conn.  331  ;  Jackson  y.  Smith, 

231  ;    Rockafeller    v.   Arlington,   91    111.  9  Johns.  100. 

375.  5  Dygert  v.  Matthews,  11  Wend.  35. 

VOL.  I.  433 


s  •• 


•J4.] 


EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 


juluiissihle  as  a  part  of  tlio  res  gest<t\  provided  such  act  itself  is 
innterial  to  the  issue. ^ 

524.  The  grantor  may  reserve  a  rent  for  the  granted  prop- 
erty. ""If  one  u,raiit  land,  yielding  for  rent  money,  corn,  a  horse, 
spurs,  a  rose,  or  any  such  like  thing,  this  is  a  good  reservation; 
but  if  the  reservation  be  of  the  grass  or  of  the  vesture  ot"  the 
land,  or  of  a  common  or  other  profit  to  be  taken  out  of  the  land, 
then  these  reservations  are  void."-  He  may  also  make  a  reser- 
vation of  his  "  support,  comfort,  and  maintenance  "  by  the  grantee 
during  the  term  of  the  grantor's  natural  life.'^  But  a  reservation 
not  in  the  way  of  rent  of  the  profits  of  the  land,  or  a  reservation 
of  its  annual  products,  such  as  the  grass  or  the  fruit,  is  not  a  good 
reservation ;  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  grant.'*  Neither  can  a 
reservation  be  made  of  something  that  did  not  pass  by  the  grant, 
and  is  not  a  legal  right  attached  to  or  issuing  out  of  the  thing 
granted.  Thus,  in  a  conveyance  of  a  sawmill,  a  reservation  of 
"all  the  slabs  made  at  said  mill"  is  not  a  valid  reservation.  It 
is  at  most  a  covenant  by  the  grantee  that  the  grantor  may  take 
the  slabs  while  the  grantee  owns  the  mill ;  but  it  is  not  a  valid 
reservation  as  against  subsequent  purchasers.'^ 

A  reservation  "  of  the  full  and  entire  profits,  use,  and  control " 
of  the  land,  during  the  life  of  the  grantor,  gives  him  no  right  to 
impair  the  freehold  estate.     He  cannot  cut  timber  upon  the  land 


1  Kobbins  i-.  Spencer  (Ind.),  38  N.  E. 
Rep.  522. 

^  Sheppard's  Touch.  81. 

3  Bates  V.  Swiger  (W.  Va.),  21  S.  E. 
Rep.  874. 

*  Co.  Liu.  47  a  ;  Turner  v.  Cool,  23 
Ind.  56,85  Am.  Dec.  449;  Chapman  v. 
Lon^,  10  Ind.  465. 


good,  if  not  void  as  being  a  part  of  tlie 
profits.  Why  ?  Because  it  is  a  thing 
issuing  out  of  the  mill  granted,  and  sepa- 
rated as  the  mill's  portion.  But  a  reserva- 
tion of  one  half  of  all  the  corn  or  wheat 
brought  to  that  mill  to  be  ground,  by 
strangers,  would  not  be.  If  a  man  should 
give  a  deed  of  a  cotton  factory  and  land 


5  Adams  1-.  Morse,  51  Me.  497,  500.    Per  therewith,  it  would  hardly  be  contended 

Kent,  J.  :    "  But  surely  everything  that  that  he  might  reserve  every  tenth  yard  of 

may  be  manufactured  at  a  mill  does  not  cotton  cloth  manufactured  at  the  mill  for- 

arise,  come  out  of  the  thing  granted,  so  ever.     So  of  a  fulling-mill  or  a  tannery, 

as  to  become  a  part  of  the  realty,  or  so  as  If  slabs  may  be  reserved   in   a  deed  of  a 

to  be  the  subject  of  a  grant  or  reservation  .sawmill,  then  every  tenth  board  may  be 

in  the  conveyance  of  the  estate.     What-  reserved,  whoever  ma}'   be   tlie   occupier, 

ever  does  come  out  maybe,  —  as  rent,  or  No  man  can  thus   attnch  another  man's 

timber  on  the  land   granted.     A  gristmill,  personal  property  to  his  realty,  and  either 

whicli  derives  its  pay  and  its  profits  from  ]iass  it  or  reserve  it,  simply  on  the  ground 

toll  in  kind,  as  most  of  sucli  mills  do,  may  that   he,    or   his  mill,    have    changed   the 

be  granted,  and  a  reservation  of  a  portion  form  of  it  by  manufacturing  it." 
of  the  toll,  after  it  is  separated,  might  '"e 

434 


GENERAL   REQUISITES   AND   RULES   OF   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  525. 

except  sucli  u.s  is  necessary  for  improvements,  in  ordinary  re- 
pairs, or  ordinary  firewood  for  liimself,  liis  wife,  and  tenants.^ 

One  conveying  a  farm  may  reserve  to  himself  during  his  life- 
time pasturage  for  a  cow.^ 

525.  The  reservation  of  a  life  estate  in  the  land  granted  is 
not  void  as  repugnant  to  the  grant. ^  Though  the'  language  used 
by  the  grantor  in  the  reservation  be  "  all  the  right,  title,  and 
interest  in  and  unto  the  above-named  land  and  buildings  for  and 
during  my  natural  life,"  no  inference  can  be  drawn  that  anything 
more  than  a  life  estate  was  intended  to  be  reserved.'*  In  a  deed 
by  a  father  to  his  children,  a  reservation  of  the  use,  management, 
and  control  of  the  property  during  his  life,  for  the  education, 
maintenance,  and  support  of  the  grantees,  is  not  repugnant  to 
the  grant.  It  is  a  reservation,  not  of  a  title  or  estate,  but  of  a 
power  to  exercise  an  active  trust  in  behalf  of  the  grantees  during 
the  life  of  the  grantor.^  The  grantor  may  reserve  a  power  to 
create  a  life  estate  for  the  benefit  of  another  in  the  land  con- 
veyed. Thus  a  deed  reserved  to  the  grantor  "  the  power  to 
devise,  by  last  will,  an  undivided  one  third  part  of  said  premises 
unto  any  hereafter  taken  wife  of  him,  the  party  of  the  first  part, 
for  and  during  the  term  of  her  natural  life,  or  (at  his  option)  to 
give  and  grant  by  deed,  to  said  hereafter  taken  wife,  or  to  any 
person  in  trust  for  her,  the  same  premises,  for  and  during  the 
term  of  her  natural  life."  It  was  held  that  the  reservation  was 
a  rio-ht  which  the  grantor  might  exercise  or  not,  at  his  pleasure, 
and  was  not  a  special  power  in  trust  which  equity  would  enforce.*^ 
A  deed  in  which  the  grantor  reserves  the  use  and  occupation  of 
the  land  during  his  life  may  be  operative  as  a  covenant  to  stand 
seised  to  the  use  of  tlie  grantee  in  whom  the  estate  vests  in 
possession,  upon  the  determination  of  the  life  estate.' 

1  Stewart  I'.  Wood,  48  111.  App.  378.  Conn.   512,52  Am.  Rep.  610;  Colby  v. 

2  Bray  v.  Ilussey,  83  Me.  329,  22  Atl.  Colby,  28  Vt.  10  ;  Crosby  v.  Montgomery, 
Rep.  220.  38  Vt.  238. 

■■*  Achorn    v.    Jackson,   86    Me     215;  ^  Varner  v.   Rice,  44  Ark.  236;  Rich- 
Watson  V.  Cressey,  79  Me.  381  ;  Drown  ardson  v.  York,  14  Me.  216. 
V.  Smith,  52  Me.  141  ;  Wyman  v.  Brcwn,  «  Towler  v.  Towler,  142  N.  Y.  371,  36 
50  Me.  139  ;   iMc Daniel  v.  Johns,  45  Miss.  N.  E.  Re]).  869. 

632;  Hurd   v.   Kurd,  64  Iowa,  414,20  N.  '  West  v.   West,  155  Mass.  317,  29  N. 

W.  Ken.  740.  1^-    ^^P-   ^^-  '<   Jackson  v.    McKenny,  3 

*  Webster  r.  Webster,  33  N.  H.  18,  66  Wend.  233,  20  Am.  Dec.  690;  McDaniel 

Am.  Dec.  705;  Cates  r.  Cates  (Ind.),  34  v.  .lolins,  45  Miss.  632;  Varner  v.  Rice, 

N.  E,  Rep.  957 ;  Graves  v.   Atwood,  52  44  Ark.  2.i6. 

435 


§  5"2G.]  EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 

But  wliore  tlie  owner  of  a  farm  conveyed  to  liis  son  one  half  of 
it  by  description,  res(>rvinu;  to  himself  the  otlicr  part  of  the  farm, 
describing  it,  ''for  nnd  (luring  his  natural  life,  and  after  iiis  de- 
cease to  revert  to  the  party  of  the  second  part  and  his  lieirs  for- 
ever," it  was  held  that  no  title  to  the  land  reserved  passed  to  the 
grantee  ;  Mr.  Justice  Campbell  saying  that  "  no  estate  can  pass 
bv  deed  that  is  not  embraced  plainly  within  tlie  words  of  grant."  ^ 

526.  A  deed,  in  whatever  terms,  reserving  to  the  grantor 
the  enjoyment  of  the  property  during  his  life,  is  generally  con- 
strued as  a  present  conveyance  of  the  fee  to  the  grantee,  subject 
to  the  reservation,  and  not  as  testamentary  in  character.  Where 
the  habendum  clause  of  a  formal  conveyance  in  fee  reserves  to 
the  grantors  the  right  and  use  of  the  land  during  their  natural 
lives,  and  the  covenant  of  warranty  contains  the  clause,  "  With 
the  exception  as  above  stated,  the  right  of  living  and  using  said 
lot  while  they  [the  grantors]  live,"  the  right  thus  excepted  out  of 
the  grant  does  not  prevent  the  title  from  passing  to  the  grantee.^ 
And  so  where  a  grantor  in  a  conveyance  to  his  daughter  reserved 
to  liimself,  and,  "should  [liis  wife]  survive  him,  then  at  his  death 
she  shall  have  for  her  own  use  the  full  right,  title,  and  estate  in  the 
undivided  one  half  of  the  whole  of  the  above-described  properties, 
or  one  half  of  the  rents,  issues,  and  profits  thereof,  for  and  during 
her  natural  life,"  it  was  held  that  such  deed  was  not  a  will,  but 
the  reservations  were  entirely  consistent  with  a  presently  passing 
estate  in  fee  simple  in  the  grantee.'^ 

A  general  warranty  deed  in  the  statutory  form  contained,  after 
the  description,  the  following  clause :  "  The  grantor,  C,  hereby 
expressly  excepts  and  reserves  from  this  grant  all  the  estate  in 
said  lands,  and  the  use  and  occupation,  rents  and  proceeds  thereof, 
unto  himself  during  his  natural  life."  It  was  held  that  the 
reservation  did  not  give  the  instrument  a  testamentary  character, 
but  passed  a  present  estate  in  fee  to  the  grantee,  subject  to  a  life 
estate  in  the  grantor.*     In  a  Georgia  case  the  deed  contained  this 

1  Ryan  v.  Wilson,  9  Mich.  262.  *  Cates  v.  Gates  (Ind.),  34  N.  E.  Rep. 

-  Cable  V.  Cable,  146   Pa.  St.  4,51,  23  957,  Hackney,  J.,  saying :  "  The  intention 

Atl.  Rep.  223.  to  reserve  a  life  estate  i.s  so  clearly  mani- 

3  Knowlson;;.  Fleming  (Pa.  St.),  30  Atl.  fested  by  the  words  of  reservation  that  it 

Rep.   519.     See  Eckman    v.   Eckman,  68  is  difficult  to  believe  that  it  was  the  inten- 

Pa.   St.  460;  Waugh   v.  Waugh,  84  Pa.  tion  to  confer  no  interest  upon  the  appel- 

St.  350,  24  Am.  Rep.   191  ;  Dreisbach  v.  lees  nntil  after  liis  death.     It  is  more  dif- 

Serfass,  126  Pa.  St.  32,  17  Atl.  Rep.  513.  ficult  to  believe  that  it  was  the  grantor's 

436 


GENERAL    REQUISITES    AXD    RULES    OF    CONSTRUCTION.       [§  527. 

provision  :  "  The  title  to  the  above-described  tract  of  hmd  to  still 
remain  in  the  said  grantor  for  and  during  his  natural  life,  and  at 
his  death  to  immediately  vest  in  the  said  "  grantee.  It  was  held 
that  the  grantee  took  an  immediate  estate  in  fee,  subject  to  a  life 
interest  in  the  grantor. ^ 

A  conveyance  to  one  to  hold  "during  the  term  of  her  natural  life, 
and  after  her  death  to  revert  to  "  the  grantor  and  his  heirs,  creates 
a  life  estate  only  in  the  grantee,  the  fee  remaining  in  the  grantor. 
The  land  subject  to  the  life  estate  may  be  sold  to  pay  the  grant- 
or's debts.  The  provision  in  the  grantor's  words,  "  to  revert  to 
me  and  my  heirs,"  is  not  a  granting  phrase,  and  therefore  does 
not  create  a  limitation.  The  fee  cannot  remain  in  abeyance,  ex- 
cept in  cases  of  necessity,  and  in  the  case  in  hand  there  is  nothing 
in  the  deed  that  requires  the  passing  of  the  fee  from  the  grantor.^ 
And  so  a  deed  to  a  grantee  to  hold  "  during  the  term  of  her  nat- 
ural life,"  and  after  death  for  the  use  of  the  grantor,  "  as  fully 
and  to  all  intents  and  purposes  as  if  this  deed  had  never  been 
executed,"  gives  the  grantee  only  a  life  estate,  inasmuch  as  the 
deed  does  not  in  express  terms  convey  a  fee,  and  the  intention  to 
convey  a  less  estate  is  clearly  expressed.'^ 

527.  Even  a  declaration  that  the  deed  shall  not  go  into 
effect  until  the  death  of  the  grantor  does  not  give  it  a  testa- 
mentary character.^  Thus  where  a  deed  provided  that  the  land 
should   be  divided  between  the  grantees  at  the   decease   of    the 

intention  to  expressly  withhold    the   fee  59  Ala.  349;  Griffith   v.    iMarsli,  86   Ala. 

from   the  grantees  until  after   his  death,  302,  5  So.   Rep.  569  ;  Daniel   v.   Hill,  .52 

for  to  have  done  so  by  the  exception  would  Ala.  430  ;  Bunch  v.  Nicks,  50  Ark.  367. 

have  rendered  the  reservation  of  the  'use  -  Clark  v.  Ilillis  (Ind.),  34  N.  E.  Rep. 

and  occupation,   rents  and  proceeds,'   an  13. 

idle  ceremony."  »  Kelly  v.  Hill  (Md.),  25  At).  Rep.  919. 
1  White  V.  Hopkins,  80  Ga.  1.54,4  S.  And  see  Winter  i>.  Gorsuch,  51  Md.  180; 
E.  Rep.  863,  the  court  citing  Gumming  Farquharson  r.  Eichelberger,  15  Md.  63. 
V.  Gumming,  3  Kelly,  460;  Spalding  v.  *  Btinch  v.  Nicks,  50  Ark.  367,  7  S.  W. 
Grigg,  4  Ga.  75  ;  Robinson  v.  Schly,  6  Rep.  563 ;  Shackclton  v.  Sebroe,  86  111. 
Ga.  515;  Taylor  i\  Sutton,  15  Ga.  103,  616;  Wall  v.  Wall,  30  Miss.  91,  64  Am. 
60  Am.  Dec.  682;  Moye  ;•.  Kittrcll,  29  Dec.  147;  Wyman  zj.  Brown,  50  Me.  139; 
Ga.  677;  Bunn  v.  Biinn,  22  Ga.  472;  Abbott  r.  Ilolway,  72  Me.  298;  Chancel- 
Watson  V.  Watson,  22  (ia.  460 ;  Meek  y.  lor  v.  Windham,  1  Rich.  161,  42  Am. 
Holton,  22  Ga.  491  ;  Johnson  r.  Hines,  31  Dec.  411;  Owen  v.  Williams,  114  Ind. 
Ga  720.  In  the  l.'i«t  case  the  grant  was  179,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  678;  rhilip.s  v.  Lum- 
"  to  have  and  to  hold,  after  my  deatli,  the  ber  Co.  (Ky.)  22  S.  W.  Rep.  652  ;  Rey- 
aforesaid  property."  See,  also,  Williams  nolds  r.  Towell  (Ky.),  1 1  S.  W.  Rep.  202 ; 
V.  Tolbert,  66  Ga.  127 ;  Hall  v.  Burkham,  Waugh  v.  Waugh,  84  Pa.  St.  3.50. 

487 


§  ^-^^-^ 


KXCKPTIONS    AND    RESKRVATTONS. 


i;Tantor,  and  ihiit  then  the  title  sliould  vest  in  them  absolutely,  it 
was  held  that  it  vested  a  present  estate  in  fee  simple,  possibly  re- 
sei'vin^' a  life  estate.  The  court  said:  '•'•  The  lade  is,  that  unless 
an  instrument,  which  has  been  fully  executed,  from  every  point 
of  view  seems  to  be  a  nullity,  it  will  not  be  intended  that  the 
parties  meant  that  it  should  be  invalitl,  and  some  effect  will,  if 
possible,  be  givt>n  it."  • 

Where  a  father  conveyed  land  to  his  son,  reserving  a  life  estate 
to  himself  and  another,  on  condition  that  yearly  payments  should 
be  made  to  them  during  their  lives,  with  a  provision  that  at  the 
death  of  the  grantor  the  title  should  be  in  the  grantee,  it  was  held 
that  the  son  took  a  vested  remainder  at  the  time  the  deed  was 
executed.  His  title  was  therefore  superior  to  that  of  a  mortgage 
executed  by  the  father  after  the  recording  of  the  deed  to  the 
son. 2 

528.  A  reservation  to  a  third  person,  not  a  party  to  the  deed, 
is  void.3  The  same  is  true  of  a  condition  or  of  a  restriction  by 
way  of  an  implied  covenant.'*  Thus,  if  the  owner  of  land  in 
making  a  covenant  reserves  a  privilege  in  the  well  on  the  granted 
premises  for  the  lots  owned  by  third  persons  named,  the  reserva- 
tion is  inoperative  as  being  made  to  strangers  to  the  deed.     This 


1  Spencer  v.  Robbins,  106  Ind.  580,  5 
N.  E.  Rep.  726.  The  cases  of  Turner  r. 
Scott,  51  Pa.  St.  126,  and  Leaver  v.  Gauss, 
62  Iowa,  314,  17  N.  W.  Rep.  522,  seem  to 
be  in  conflict  with  the  numerous  cases 
cited  iu  this  and  the  preceding  section. 
Babb  V.  Harrison,  9  liich.  Eq.  Ill,  70  Am. 
Dec.  203. 

2  Hitchcock  V.  Simpkins,  99  Mich.  198, 
58  N.  W.  Rep.  47. 

3  Shep.  Touch.  80;  Stockwell  v.  Conil- 
lard,  129  Mass.  231,  233;  Murphy  v.  Lee, 
144  Ma.'ss.  371,  11  N.  E.  Rep.  550;  Plorn- 
beck  V.  Westbrook,  9  Johns.  73 ;  Ives 
V.  Van  Auken,  34  Barb.  566;  Walrath 
V.  Redfield,  18  N.  Y.  457;  Blackmnn  v. 
Striker,  142  N.  Y.  555, 37  N.  E.  Rep.  484  ; 
Bridget  v.  Pier.son,  1  Lan.s.  481,  45  N.  Y. 
601  ;  Jackson  v.  Swart,  20  Johns.  85,  87  ; 
Voorhees  v.  Presbyterian  Church,  8  Barb. 
135,  147;  Borst  i'.  Empie,  5  N.  Y.  33, 
38;  Craiir  v.  Wells,  11  N.  Y.  315;  Corn- 
ing V.  Troy  Iron  Factory,  40  N.  Y.  191, 

4o8 


209 ;  Schaidt  v.  Blaul,  66  Md.  141  ;  Her- 
bert V.  Pue,  72  Md.  307,  20  Atl.  Rep. 
182;  Littletield  v.  Mott,  14  R.  L  288; 
Young,  Petitioner,  11  R.  I.  636.  In  this 
case  the  grantor  reserved  a  life  estate 
in  the  realty  conveyed,  and  "  also  the 
right  and  privilege,  for  those  who  may  be 
appointed  to  settle  my  affairs  after  ray 
decease,  to  cut  off  and  sell  all  the  wood 
and  timber — or  so  much  thereof  as  may 
be  necessary  to  pay  whatever  debts  I  may 
owe,  and  the  expense  of  my  last  sickness 
and  funeral  expense.*,  after  my  personal 
property  left  at  my  decease  shall  have 
bc'-n  appropriated  and  used  for  that  pur- 
pose, growing  upon  the  ten  acres  of  the 
easterly  part  of  said  premises."  Thi.s 
])rovision  was  held  void  as  a  reserva- 
tion because  made  to  others  than  the 
grantor. 

*  Shep.  Touch.  120;  Jackson  i\  Top- 
ping.  1  Woiid.  388.  19  Am.  Dec.  515; 
Craig  v..  Wells,  11  N.  Y.  315. 


GENERAL   REQUISITES    AND    RULES    OF   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  529. 

rule  of  construction  is  not  changed  by  the  fact  appearing  that 
llie  grantor  was  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  in  possession  of 
one  of  the  lots  under  a  contract  of  purchase,  the  lot  being  owned 
at  that  time  by  a  stranger,  as  recited  in  the  deed.^  A  reservation 
for  the  benefit  of  the  grantor  and  his  successors  cannot  be  taken 
advantage  of  by  persons  not  claiming  title  through  the  grantor. ^ 
A  reservation  in  favor  of  a  third  person,  though  not  good  as  a 
reservation,  has  sometimes  been  held  to  preclude  the  grantor 
from  interfering  with  the  exercise  of  the  right  nominally  re- 
served.'^ But  a  reservation  is  considered  as  made  to  the  grantor 
when  valuable  rights  are  secured  to  him,  although  others  may 
also  be  benefited  by  the  reservation,  as  where  one  granted  a  lot 
of  land  opposite  his  house,  "to  be  in  common  and  unoccupied."* 

An  attorney'  in  fact  executing  a  deed  for  his  principal  cannot 
make  a  sood  reservation  to  himself  and  his  descendants.  He  is 
a  stranger  to  the  deed,  and  no  interest  can  vest  in  him,  and  much 
less  in  his  descendants,  by  a  reservation.^ 

Under  a  reservation  of  a  right  of  several  use  to  two  or  more 
persons,  either  of  them  may  maintain  an  action  for  damages  re- 
sulting from  the  obstruction  or  interference  wath  the  enjoyment 
thereof,  without  joining  with  him  others  not  affected  by  the  ob- 
struction or  interference  complained  of.*' 

529.  But  although  a  reservation  will  not  give  any  title  to 
a  stranger,  it  may  operate  as  an  exception  to  the  grant,  if 
such  appears  to  be  the  intention  of  the  parties.  The  tendency 
of  the  decisions  upon  this  subject  is  to  give  effect  to  the  intention 
of  the  parties  as  manifested  by  the  whole  instrument,  witliout 
much  regard  to  the  strict  literal  sense  of  the  terms  used."  The 
Supreme   Court   of  Michigan  in  a  recent  case  say:*^  '"From  an 

1  Ives  V.  Van  Aiiken,  34  Barb.  566.  «  Herbert   t-.   Pue,  72   Mci.  307,  'JO  AiL 

2  MoultOD  V.  Faufrbt,  41    Me.  298.     It     Rep.  182. 

is  competent  for  a  prantor  to  re.serve  an  "  jMiirtui    v.   Cook   (Mieh),   60   N.    W. 

la-^ement  for  burial  purposes  for  himself  Kep.  679,  eiting  Shop.  Toucli.  86  ;  Biiil;;er 

and  the  other  heirs  of  his  father.     Black-  v.    Pierson,  45    N.  •  Y.  601;  West   Point 

man  v.  Striker,  142  N.  Y.  555,  37  N.  E.  Iron  Co.  v.  Reymert.  45  N.  Y.  703  ;  Rich- 

Keji.  484,  29  Abb.   N.   C.   467,  21    N.   Y.  ardson  i'.  Palmer,  38  N.  II.  21 S;  Coining 

Supp.  563.  V.  Nail  Factory,  40  N.  V.  191 ,  209  ;  Hall  v. 

3  Hodge  r.  Boolliby,  48  Me.  68  ;  Knight  Ionia,  38  Mich.  493  ;  Ericson  v.  Iron  Co. 
V.  Mains,  12  Me.  41.  50  Mich.  604,  16  N.  W.  Rep.  161  ;  Basselt 

*  Gay  V.  Walker,  36   Me.   54,  58  Am.  v.  Budlong,  77  Mich.  338,  43  N.  W.  Ren. 

Dec.  734.  'JM. 

6  Herbert  v.  Pue,  72  Md.  307,  20  Atl.  "  Martin    v.   Cook  (Mich.),  60   X.    W. 

Rep.  182.  Rip.  679. 

439 


§  5o0.]  EXCEI'TIONS    AND    KKSKUVA  I  IONS. 

examination  of  the  cases  cited,  and  the  decisions  of  the  courts  of 
this  ooiintry  generally  upon  the  question  here  involved,  it  will 
be  observed  that,  wliilc  the  rule  that  a  reservation  in  favor  of  a 
stranger  to  the  iiistruuient  is  invalid  as  a  reservation  has  been 
adhered  to,  yet,  in  order  to  effectuate  the  intention  of  the  grantor, 
siieh  a  reservation  lias  uniforndy  been  treated  as  excepting  from 
the  grant  the  thing  reservi'd.  Nor  has  this  holding  becni  con- 
fined to  eases  where  the  reservation  had  been  previously  cai'ved 
out.  It  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  a  conveyance  of  land, 
reserving  or  excepting  the  dower  interest  of  a  stranger  to  the 
deed,  was  a  good  exception."  ^  In  the  case  from  which  this  quo- 
tation is  made  it  was  held  that,  where  the  grantor  reserved  to 
himself  and  to  his  daughter,  who  was  a  stranger  to  the  deed,  an 
estate  for  the  lives  of  both  in  the  propei'ty  conveyed,  the  reserva- 
tion of  the  life  estate  was  valid  as  an  exception  to  the  grant  in 
the  deed. 

The  owner  of  land,  over  which  a  third  person  had  a  right  of 
way,  in  conveying  it  i-eserved  to  such  person  the  right  of  way. 
It  was  held  that,  although  strictly  a  reservation  in  a  deed  is 
ineffectual  to  create  a  right  of  way  in  any  person  not  a  party 
thereto,  yet,  there  being  in  fact  a  right  of  way  existing  at  the 
time  of  the  grant,  the  clause  must  be  construed  as  an  exception 
from  the  property  conveyed.-  In  a  similar  case  a  grantor  re- 
served to  a  stranger  to  the  deed  "  the  right  he  has  to  the  ore-bed, 
and  the  right  of  way  to  the  West  Point  foundry  as  now  used." 
The  court  say :  "  A  reservation  in  a  deed  will  not  give  title  to  a 
stranger,  but  it  may  operate,  when  so  intended  by  the  parties,  as 
an  exception."  2  A  grantor  in  conveying  land  reserved  one  acre 
to  a  stranger  to  the  deed.  It  was  held  that  as  a  reservation  it 
would  be  void,  it  being  in  behalf  of  a  stranger  to  the  deed.  It 
was  therefore  held  to  be  an  exception  of  the  acre,  although  the 
stranger  took  notlijng.* 

530.  A  reservation  expressed  to  be  in  favor  of  the  public 
confers  no   rights   in  favor  of  any   one   except  the   grantor,'^ 

1  Canedy  v.   Marcy,    13     Gray,    373;  •*  Corning  r.  Troy  Iron  Factory,  40  N. 

Meserve  v.  Meserve,  19  N.  H.  240 ;  Crosby  Y.  191,  209. 

V.   Montgomery,  38  Vt.    238;    Swick   v.  »  Hill  v.   Lord,  48  Me.   83;   Elliot   v. 

Sears,  I  Hill  (N.  Y.),  17.  Small,  35  Minn.  396,  .'Sg  Am.  Rep.  329; 

-  Bridger  v.  Pierson,  4.")  N.  Y.  601.  Horubeck  v.  Westbrook,  9  Johns.  73. 

3  West  Point  Iron  Co.  v.  Reymert,  45 
N.  Y.  703. 

440 


GENERAL   REQUISITES   AND   RULES    OF   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  5o0. 

though  there  are  Intimations  in  some  cases  that  such  a  reserva- 
tion is  valid  in  favor  of  the  public.^  The  reservation  in  such 
case  may  operate  as  an  exception  from  the  grant,  and  as  notice 
to  the  grantee  of  adverse  claims  or  rights  as  to  the  thing  re- 
served.2  In  general  it  may"  be  said  that  an  exceptiun  or  reserva- 
tion may  recognize  existing  rights  in  third  persons  who  are  not 
parties  to  the  deed.'^  A  reservation  of  a  portion  of  the  land  con- 
veyed, that  portion  being  ''  now  owned  and  occupied  by  "  a  third 
person,  is  merely  a  recognition  of  the  title  of  such  third  person, 
and  not  a  declaration  of  trust  in  his  favor.'*  A  reservation  of  the 
right  to  open  a  highway  on  one  side  of  the  grunted  land,  with  a 
provision  that,  if  the  highway  shall  be  laid  out,  all  the  grantor's 
rights  in  it  shall  pass  to  the  grantee,  gives  the  grantor  a  right  to 
dedicate  the  reserved  land  for  a  highway.^ 

A  reservation  was  held  to  operate  as  an  exception  where  one 
made  a  conveyance  of  a  farm,  "  reserving  to  the  public  the 
use  of  the  road  through  said  farm,  also  reserving  to  the  White 
]Mountains  Railroad  the  roadway  for  said  road,  as  laid  out  by  the 
raih-oad  commissioners,  and  also  reserving  to  myself  the  dam- 
ages appraised  for  said  railroad  way  by  the  commissioners."  The 
court  say  :  "  The  result  at  which  we  arrive,  therefore,  upon  a 
careful  examination  of  the  deed,  and  a  deliberate  considera- 
tion of  all  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  executed,  is 
tliat  the  plaintiff  must  have  intended  to  sell,  and  the  grantee  to 
purchase,  the  farm,  just  as  it  was  at  the  date  of  the  conveyance, 
subject  to  the  incumbrance  of  the  public  highway  and  of  the  White 
Mountains  Railroad,  as  laid  out  through  it ;  the  plaintiff  retain- 
ing his  claim  for  the  unpaid  damages  awarded  for  the  laying  out 

1  Tuttle  V.  Wiilker,  46  Me.  280;  Cin-  At  the  time  of  the  conveyance  there  was 

ciiinati  v.  Newell,  7  Ohio  St.  37.  a  ])ass!igcway  four  feet  wide  over  which  a 

-  West  Point  Iron  Co.  v.  Reymert,  45  right  of  way  had  been  conveyed  by  the 

N.  Y.  703  ;  Hill  v.  Lord,  48  Me.  83.  grantor  as  appurtenant  to  adjoining  land 

3  Murphy  v.  Lee,  144  Mass.  371,  11  N.  which  he  had  before  that  time  conveyed. 

E.  Rep.  550;  Wood  v.  Boyd,  145  Mass.  It  was  held  that  the  right  of  way  reserved 

176,    13   N.    E.    Rep.    476;    Cornwell    v.  in  the  words  above  quoted   was  not   re- 

Thurston,  59    Mo.    156.     In    Murphy   v.  served  as  appurtenant  to  the  land  of  sucli 

Lee,    snjira,    the    deed    contained    these  third  person.     It  is  an  exception  from  the 

words :  "  There  is  a  passageway  on  the  grant  of  an  existing  riglit  of  way,  and 

southeasterly  side  of  tlie  said   premises,  does  not  create  a  new  right, 

wliieh  is  to  be  used  in   common  with  ilie  ■♦  King  v.  Bishop,  02  Miss.  553. 

abuttors  thereon."     A  third  person  owned  ^  Dunn  v.  Sanford,  51  Conn.  443. 
land  abutting  on  the  land  so  conveyed. 

441 


§  oai.j 


EXCErTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 


of  tlie  railroad  ;  and  that  proper  and  apt  words  were  used  in  the 
doed  of  conveyance  to  carry  out  that  intention,  without  resorting 
to  any  doubtful  construction,  or  giving  to  the  grantee  any  advan- 
tage from  the  imperfection  or  uncertainty  of  the  phraseology 
employed;  the  words  expressing  a  reservation  being  made  to 
operate,  as  only  under  the  circumstances  they  can  operate,  as 
an  exception  to  the  general  terms  of  the  grant  which  precedes 
them."  1 

531.  An  exception  or  reservation  is  construed  most  strongly 
against  the  grantor,  on  the  ground  that  the  words  are  his.'-^ 
When,  however,  t!ie  intention  of  the  parties  can  be  fairly  ascer- 
tained from  the  instrument,  such  intention  must  govern  its  con- 
struction.'"^  If  tiie  terms  of  the  instrument  leave  the  intention  of 
the  parties  uncertain  and  susceptible  of  more  than  one  interpreta- 
tion, the  court  will  look  to  the  surrounding  circumstances  exist- 
ing when  the  deed  was  executed,  such  as  the  situation  of  the 
parties  and  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  deed.^  The  meaning  of 
ii  reservation  may  often  be  determined  by  the  expression  of  the 
purpose  for  which  it  was  made.^ 


1  Hichardson  v.  Palmer,  38  N.  H.  212. 

-  Shep.  Touch.  87 ;  Blackman  v.  Striker, 
142  N.  y.  555,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  484;  Jack- 
son V.  Gardner,  3  Johns.  394;  Jackson  v. 
Hudson,  3  Johns.  375,  3  Am.  Dec.  500 ; 
Diiryea  v.  Mayor,  62  N.  Y.  592  ;  Ives  !-•. 
Van  Auken,  34  Barb.  566  ;  Jackson  v. 
Myers,  3  Johns.  388  ;  Grafton  v.  Moir,  130 
N.  Y.  465,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  974  ;  Provost 
r,  Calder,  2  Wend  517;  Borst  v.  Empie, 
5  N.  Y.  33,  40 ;  Craig  v.  Wells,  1 1  N.  Y. 
315  ;  Noble  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  1 11  111. 
437  ;  Sharp  v.  Thompon,  100  111.  447, 
450,  39  Am.  Rep  61  ;  Alton  v.  111.  Trans. 
Co.  12  111.  38,  58,  .52  Am.  Dec.  479  ;  Gates 
V.  Gates  (Ind.),  34  N.  E.  Hep.  957,  per 
Hackney,  J.;  Scott  v.  Michael,  129  Ind. 
250,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  546  ;  Darling  v.  Crow- 
ell,  6  N.  H.  421  ;  D:uia  r.  Conant,  30  Vt. 
246;  Green  Bay  Canal  Co.  v.  Hewitt,  66 
Wis.  461,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  237;  Elliot  v. 
Small,  35  Minn.  396,  59  Am.  Rep.  329. 
Thus  in  a  lease  a  reservation  of  "  all  tim- 
ber trees  and  other  trees,  but  not  the  an- 
nual fruit  thereof,"  was  held  not  to  apply 
to  apple-trees,  for  the  word  "  trees  "  does 

442 


not  generally  include  orchard  trees,  but 
only  trees  for  timber;  and  the  word 
"  fruit "  was  in  the  old  books  used  to  de- 
note the  product  of  timber  trees.  At  any 
rate,  it  being  doubtful  whether  it  was  in- 
tended to  except  fruit  trees,  the  words  of 
exception  Hre  construed  favorably  to  the 
lessee.  Bullen  r.  Denning,  5  B.  &  C.  842. 
A  reservation  in  a  deed  of  land  by  a  rail- 
road company,  "  reserving  and  excepting 
...  a  siri])  extending  through  the  same 
...  of  the  width  of  400  feet,  —  that  is, 
200  feet  on  each  side  of  the  centre  line  of 
the  railroad,  or  any  of  its  branches, —  to 
be  used  for  right  of  way,"  covers  one  such 
strip  only ;  and,  under  such  reservation, 
the  railroad  compiiny  cannot  claim  a  right 
of  way,  both  for  its  main  line  and  a  branch 
line,  over  the  tract  so  conveyed.  Dunstan 
V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  2  N.  D.  46,  49  N, 
W.  Rep.  426. 

•^  Wiley  V.  Sidrorus,  41  Iowa,  224; 
Warden  v.  Watson,  93  Mo   107. 

■»  French  ;,-.  Carhart,  1  N.  Y.  96. 

6  Kedcr  v.  Wood,  30  Vt.  242  ;  Hays  v. 
Askew,  5  Jones,  63. 


GENERAL   REQUISITES    AND   RULES    OF    CONSTRUCTION.       [§  532. 

An  exception  of  the  fee  is  not  implied.  The  intent  to  make 
such  exception  must  appear  in  express  terms.  If  the  grantor 
intends  to  except  his  right  to  the  soil  it  is  easy  for  him  to  do  so, 
and,  if  he  does  not  express  an  intention  so  to  except  it,  such 
intention  will  not  be  implied.^  A  deed  containing  a  reservation 
of  pasturage  for  two  cows  during  the  lifetime  of  the  grantor,  or 
with  a  stipulation  that  the  grantee  is  not  to  incumber  or  convey 
the  hmd  meantime,  does  not  create  an  estate  on  condition,  but 
conveys  a  ft^e  subject  to  the  reservation.^ 

A  reservation  of  certain  apple-trees  in  the  orchard,  two  stalls 
in  the  southwest  corner  of  the  barn,  and  twelve  feet  square  over 
said  stalls  for  hay,  which  reservation  is  for  the  use  of  the  grantor's 
mother,  was  held  to  be  a  reservation  for  the  life  of  his  mother, 
and  not  an  exception.'^ 

532.  One  tenant  in  common  cannot,  in  a  conveyance  of  his 
interest  to  a  stranger,  reserve  a  right  of  way  or  other  easement 
in  any  particular  part  of  the  land,  for  this  would  be  an  attempt 
to  create  a  several  interest  in  the  land  held  in  common.^  But  he 
may  do  this  in  a  conveyance  to  the  other  tenant  in  common,  for 
the  latter  upon  such  conveyance  has  the  entire  property,  and  the 
reservation  operates  by  way  of  an  implied  re-grant.^  Where  two 
tenants  in  common  made  partition  of  the  land  which  they  had  in 
•common,  and  one  of  them  in  his  deed  of  release  reserved  all  the 
wood  standing  on  a  certain  lot,  with  the  right  to  him,  his  heirs 
and  assigns,  to  enter  and  cut  the  wood  and  take  it  away,  the 
court  remarked  that  a  reservation  or  exception  could  onl}^  be  out 
of  the  estate  granted ;  and  therefore  that  this  clause  could  not 
operate  by  way  of  reservation  or  exception  upon  the  undivided 
half  of  the  land,  which  had  never  been  in  the  grantor,  but  which 
was  before  the  division,  and  afterwards  remained  in  the  grantee. 
As  to  the  other  undivided  half,  the  clause  might  operate  strictly 
as  a  reservation  or  exception.  The  court,  however,  regarded  the 
clause  as  having  the  effect  of  a  parol  transfer  of  the  wood  then 
standing  on  the  premises,  as  personal  property,  and  a  license  to 
€nter  and  cut  the  same;,  which  was  good  until  revoked,  was  assign- 

1  CarlHOU  V.  Duluth  Sliort  Line  Ky.  Co.  ■•  Marshall  v.  Trumbull,  28  Conn.  183, 

58  Minn.  30.5,  37  N.  W.  Ke|).  341.  73  Am.  Dec.  667;  Adam  v.  Briggs  Iron 

-  Bray  v.  llu.ssey,  83  Me.  329,  22  Atl.  Co.  7  Cush.  361. 

Rep.  220.  ^  Jones  v.  De  Lassus,  84  Mo.  541. 

8  Keeler  v.  Wood,  30  Vt.  242. 

443 


§§  .").)8,  534.]        Kxcia'TiONS  and  kkskuvations. 

able  without  deed,  and  wliicdi,  after  it  luid   been  acted  upon  and 
tlie  trees  cut  down,  could  not  be  countevMianded.' 

533.  A  reservation  includes  rights  not  mentioned  "which 
are  indispensably  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  the  right  s[)ecifi- 
eully  reserved.  Thus  a  right  reserved,  to  flow  the  granted  land 
to  a  certain  point,  includes  the  right  to  nuxintain  a  dam  necessary 
to  flow  the  land  to  such  point. ^  Thus,  also,  the  grant  of  a  mill 
which  is  worked  by  water  power  carries  with  it  the  use  of  the 
water,  the  dam,  and  all  things  necessary  for  using  the  mill.  The 
grant  of  a  farm  carries  with  it  the  grantor's  interest  in  a  ditch 
and  water-right  necessary  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  land.^  An 
exception  of  mines  and  minerals  carries  with  it  all  powers  and 
easements  necessary  for  working  the  same.*  Powers  of  working 
expressly  reserved  do  not  abridge  the  powers  which  the  law  con- 
fers as  incident  to  the  exception.''' 

534.  A  way  of  necessity  arises  in  case  the  grantor  has  other 
land  which  can  only  be  reached  by  passing  over  the  land  con- 
veyed. Such  a  way  is  regarded  as  a  way  created  by  tacit  i-eserva- 
tion  or  exception.*^  The  way  is  annexed  to  the  land  for  which 
it  is  required,  and  passes  to  the  grantor's  assigns  as  owners  of 
such  land."  "  A  right  of  way  over  the  grantor's  land  may 
arise  in  several  aspects,  as  when  one  man  sells  to  another  land 
wholly  surrounded  by  other  lands  which  he  retains,  or  where  the 
parcel  sold  is  surrounded  partly  by  that  retained  and  partly  by 
that  of  a  stranger,  over  which  there  is  no  right  of  access.  The 
way  in  such  cases  is  a  necessary  incident  to  the  grant,  and  with- 

1  Hill  V.  Cuttinjr,  107  Mass.  596.  Rep.  245  ;  rettingill  v.  Porter,  8  Allen,  I, 

2  St.  Anthony  Falls  Water  Power  Co.  85  Am.  Dec.  671,  675,  note;  Mitchell  v. 
j>.  Minneapolis,  41  Minn.  270,43  N.  W.  Seipel,  53  Md.  251,  36  Am.  Rep.  404,  415- 
Rep.  56.  421. 

3  Tucker  v.  Jones,  8  Mont.  225,19  Pac.  "  Clarke  v.  Coj^cre,  Cro.  J.uc.  170.  "  If 
Rep.  571  ;  Cave  v.  Crafts,  53  Cal.  1.35.  a  man  hath  four  closes  lying  fo;:cther,  and 

*  Aspden  v.  Seddon,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  394.  sells  three  of  them,  reserving  the  middle 

»  Cardigan  v.  Armitage,  2  B.  &  C.  197  ;  close,  and  hath  not  any  way  thereto,  biiL 

Erickson  i'.   Mich.  Land  &  Iron  Co.  .50  through  one  of  those   which  lie  sold,  al- 

Mich.  604,  16  N.  W.  Rep.  161.  though  he  reserved  not  any  way,  yet  lie 

8  Holmes    v.    Goring,    2    Bing.    76,    9  shall  have  it,  as  reserved  unto  him  by  the 

Moore,    166,  per  Best,  C.  J.;  Davies  v.  law."      See,   al.so,    Bowen  v.   Conner,   6 

Sear,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  427;  London  v.  Riggs,  Cush.  132;  Collins  v.  Prentice,  15  Conn. 

L.  R.  13  Ch.  D.  798;  Brigham  v.  Smith,  39  ;  Myers  v.  Dunn,  49  Conn.  71  ;  Chap- 

4  Gray,  297,  64  Am.  Dec.  76;  Nichols  v.  pell  v.  New  York,  &c.  R.   Co.  62  Conn. 

Luce,  24  Pick.   102,  35   Am.  Dec.   302;  195,  204,   24  Atl.   Rep.  997;  Stevens  v. 

Rightsell  V.  Hale,  90  Tenn.  556,  18  S.  W.  Oir,  69  Me.  323. 

444 


GKNERAL   REQUISITES   AND   RULES   OF   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  534. 


out  it  the  grant  itself  would  be  useless.  Tlie  necessity  of  the 
case  raises  an  implication  that  the  parties  intended  that  the  right 
of  way  would  pass  with  the  grant,  though  not  expressed  therein."  ^ 
A  way  of  necessity  ceases  as  soon  as  the  necessity  for  its  use 
ceases."^  A  reservation  of  a  way  required  by  the  grantor  for  the 
occupancy  and  use  of  his  other  land  gives  no  greater  right  than 
a  way  of  necessity,  and  ceases  when  the  necessity  for  it  ceases.'^ 
Such  a  I'ight  of  way  is  limited  to  the  purposes  for  which  it  was 
necessary  at  the  date  of  the  conveyance  under  which  it  arose,  and 
it  cannot  be  used  for  any  other  purposes ;  *  and  it  is  limited  as  to 
its  duration  by  the  continuance  of  the  necessity  for  it.^  Thus  a 
way  of  necessity  ceases  if  at  a  subsequent  time  the  person  who 
is  entitled  to  it  can  have  access  to  the  land  to  which  the  way  led 
by  passing  over  his  own  land.^ 

But  tliis  general  rule  as  to  ways  of  necessity  has  no  application 
as  against  the  State  in  grants  of  unsettled  lands. '^ 

A  way  of  necessity,  according  to  most  of  the  authorities,  arises 
onl}"^  when  the  necessity  for  it  is  absolute,  or  clearly  necessary 
to  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the  estate  conveyed  or  reserved;^ 
though  according  to  some  authorities  the  necessity  need  be  only 
reasonable  and  not  strict.^ 


1  Pearne  v.  Coal  Creek  Co.  90  Tenn. 
619,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  402.  It  is  also  held  in 
this  ca.se  that  a  grant  of  minerals  by  the 
owner  of  the  surface  land  carries  with  it, 
by  implication,  a  right  to  the  reasonable 
use  and  enjoyment  of  the  surface  for  all 
necessary  mining  purposes.  So  held,  also, 
in  Marvin  v.  Mining  Co.  55  N.  Y.  538,  14 
Am.  Kep.  322. 

-  Holmes  u.  Goring,  2  Bing.  76,  9 
Moore,  166;  Pierce  v.  Selleck,  18  Conn. 
321  ;  Collins  v.  Prentice,  15  Conn.  39,  423, 
38  Am.  Dec.  61. 

3  Viall  V.  Carpenter,  14  Gray,  126. 

■•  London  v.  Riggs,  13  Ch.  D.  798. 
Thu.s,  if  the  land  to  which  the  way  of 
necessity  led  wa.s  at  the  date  of  the  con- 
veyance agricultural  land,  the  owner  can 
claim  such  a  way  as  i.s  suitable  to  the  en- 
joyment of  land  in  that  condition  ;  but  he 
cannot  claim  a  right  of  wny  suiiable  to 
the  use  of  it  as  building  land. 

^  Holmes  v.  Gorinir,  2  liing.  7fi ;  Howen 
r.  Conner.  G  Cush.  l.'iJ. 


^  Holmes  v.  Goring,  2  Bing.  76. 

''  Pearne  a.  Coal  Creek  Co.  90  Tenn. 
619,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  402.  Caldwell,  J., 
said  :  "By  public  statutes,  the  State  pro- 
vides for  the  establisbinent  and  mainte- 
nance of  public  roads  penetrating  every 
neighborhood,  and  sufficiently  numerous 
to  meet  the  general  wants  of  her  citizens. 
Beyond  this,  and  the  full  protection  of  the 
title  conferred,  she  owes  her  grantees,  as 
such,  no  duty  or  obligation.  It  would  be 
ruinous  to  establish  the  precedent  con- 
tended for,  since  by  it  every  grantee,  fi-om 
the  earliest  history  of  the  State,  and  those 
who  succeed  to  his  title,  would  have  an 
im])lied  right  of  way  over  all  surround- 
ing and  adjacent  lands  held  under  junior 
grants,  even  to  tlie  utmost  limits  of  the 
State." 

■^  Stevens  ?•.  Orr,  69  Me.  323  ;  Warren 
V.  Blake,  54  Me.  276,  89  Am.  Dec.  748 ; 
Dolliff  y.  Boston  &  M.  K.  6S  Me.  173; 
Buss  r.  Dyer,  125  Mass.  287. 

'•*  Goodall  V.  Godfrey,  53  Vt.  219;  Col- 

44.*) 


§§  535,  536.]        EXCEPTIONS  and  reservations. 

A  way  i)f  necessity  iiiay  be  located  and  established  by  a  court 
of  i'(|nitY,  in  such  place  and  manner  as  may  be  necessary  for  the 
use  of  the  party  entitled  to  such  way,  without  unreasonably  bur- 
dening' the  servient  estate.^ 

535.  The  construction  of  a  reservation  or  exception,  when 
this  depends  upon  the  terms  used  in  the  deed,  is  a  matter  of 
law  to  bi'  determined  by  the  court :  but  when  the  terms  used 
leave  the  matter  in  doubt,  and  it  is  necessary  to  introduce  extrhi- 
sic  evidence  to  solve  the  doubt,  the  construction  is  then  generully 
a  question  for  the  jury.^  ''■The  primary  rule  of  construction 
ap})licable  to  a  clause  in  a  deed  in  the  form  of  an  exemption 
or  i-eservation  is  to  gather  the  intention  of  the  parties  from  the 
words  by  reading,  not  simply  a  single  clause,  but  the  entire  con- 
text, and,  where  the  meaning  is  doubtful,  by  considering  such 
surrounding  circumstances  as  they  are  presumed  to  have  consid- 
ered."' ^ 

III.    Of  Particular  Exceptions  and  Reservations. 

536.  A  reservation  or  exception  of  a  house  or  other  struc- 
ture is  ordinarily  a  reservation  or  exception  of  the  grantor's  title 
to  the  land  on  which  the  house  or  other  structure  stands.'^  An 
exception  of  a  mill  is  an  exception  of  the  land  under  it,  indis- 
pensable to  its  use,  unless  there  is  something  in  the  conveyance  in- 
dicating a  different  intention,  just  as  a  grant  of  a  mill  under  the 
same  circumstances  is  a  grant  of  the  land  under  it.^  The  partic- 
ular words  used  in  the  deed,  and  the  facts  and  circumstances 
existing  at  the  time,  must  be  considered  in  arriving  at  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties.  Thus,  regarding  the  language  used,  a  reser- 
vation "  of  all  the  buildings  on  the  premises  "  is  a  reservation  of 
the  buildings  only,  and  not  of  the  land  upon  which  the}'  stand.^ 
A  reservation  of  a  mill  notv  standing  secures  to  the  gi'antor  only 

lins   r.   Prentice,  15  Conn.  39;  Phillip   v.  i-.  Scott,  21    Pick.  25,32  Am.   Dec.  238; 

Phiilip.s,  48  Pa.  St.  178.  Shannon    r.  Pratt,  131    Mass.  434;  John- 

1  Pearne  v.  Coal  Creek  Co.  90  Tenn.  son  v.  Rayner,  6  Gray,  107,  110;  Stock- 
619,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  402.  well  v.  Hunter,  11  Met.  448,  455,  45  Am. 

2  School  District  v.   Lynch,  33   Conn.  Dec.  220. 

330.  6  Moulton   v.    Trafton,    64    Me.   218; 

3  Blackman  v.  Striker,  142  N.  Y.  555,  Forbush  v.  Lombard,  13  Met.  109;  Esty 
37  N.  E.  Rep.  484;  Clark  v.   Devoe,  124     v.  Currier,  98  Mass.  500. 

N.  Y.  150,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  275.  6  Sanborn  v.  Hoyt,  24  Me.  118. 

■«  E^tv  ,-.  Currier,  98  Mass.  .500;  Allen 

446 


OF    PARTICULAR   EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS.       [§  587. 

the  light  to  the  use  of  the  mill  standing  at  the  time  of  the  exe- 
cution of  the  deed.^ 

An  exception  of  buildings  does  not  include  the  land  under  the 
buildings  when  it  appears  to  have  been  the  intention  of  the  par- 
ties not  to  include  the  hind.  The  owner  of  land  granted  an 
undivided  half  thereof,  "  excepting  and  reserving  all  buildings 
and  improvements,  including  a  sawmill."  At  the  time  of  the 
grant,  a  change  in  the  condition  and  use  of  the  premises  was  con- 
templated by  the  ])arties,  whicli,  when  made,  necessitated  the 
abandonment  of  such  buildings  and  improvements.  It  was  held 
that  the  exception  did  not  include  any  hind  or  right  to  land, 
except  the  right  to  leave  the  buildings  standing  thereon. ^  An 
exception  of  a  building  and  one  rod  of  land  around  it,  the  build- 
ing being  rectangular  in  form,  is  construed  to  be  an  exception  of 
land  in  a  rectangular  form,  though  small  portions  of  the  land  at 
the  corners  of  the  lot  would  be  more  than  one  rod  distant  from 
the  building. 3 

A  different  construction  is  applicable  to  the  reservation  of  a 
right  or  easement  in  land,  which  may  well  coexist  and  be  enjoyed 
by  the  grantor  while  the  ownership  of  the  fee  is  in  the  grantee; 
such,  for  instance,  as  a  reservation  of  a  right  of  way,  or  a  privi- 
lege of  a  highway.'^  In  such  case  the  fee  does  not  pass  by  impli- 
cation, because  it  is  not  incidental  or  essential  to  the  right  or 
interest  which  is  described  by  the  deed. 

537.  Of  mines  and  minerals.  —  The  surface  of  the  land  may- 
belong  to  one  man,  and  the  minerals  beneatii  the  surface  may 
belong  to  another.  Each  may  own  a  distinct  part  of  the  land.^ 
The  owner  of  the  land  may  convey  a  surface  estate  in  fee  in  it, 
and  reserve  to  himself  an  estate  in  fee  in  the  minerals,  or  any 
particular  species  of  them,  or  in  any  particular  strata  of  min- 
erals ;  in  which  case  the  vendee  holds  a  distinct  and  separate 
estate  in  the  surface  or  soil,  and  the  vendor  holds  a  distinct  and 

1  Howard  v.  Wadsworth,  3  Mc.  471.  Rep.  802,  804  ;  Snoddy  v.  Bolen,  122  Mo. 

2  81iannon  v.  Pratt,  131  Ma.ss.  434;  479,  2.')  S.  W.  Rej).  931;  Wardell  r. 
Green  Bay  &  Mississippi  Canal  Co.  v.  AVatson,  93  Mo.  107,  5  S.  W.  Rep.  60.') ; 
Hewitt,  66  Wi';.  461,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  Caldwell  /■.  Ftilton,  31  Pa.  St.  475,  72  Am. 
237.  Dec.  760  ;  Lillihriiljre  v.  Lackawanna  Coal 

3  Perkin.s  v.  Aldrich,  77  Me.  96.  Co.  143  Pa.  St.   293,  22   Atl.  Rep.  1035; 
■»  .Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  Co.  i\  Chand-     Chartiers  Coal  Co.  v.  Mellon,  152  Pa.  St. 

ler,  9  Allen,  159.  286,  25  Atl.  Rep.  597. 


5  Kincaid  v.  McGowan  (Ky.),  4  S.  W. 


447 


§  538.]  KXCKPTIOXS   AND   RKSEKVATIONS. 

separate  estate  in  the  minerals.  There  may  be  as  many  different 
owners  beneath  the  surface  as  there  are  dilTerent  strata  of  min- 
erals. By  this  severance  each  estate  is  subject  to  the;  laws  of 
descent,  of  devise,  or  conveyance.  Each  estate  is  as  distinct  prop- 
erty in  the  respective  owners  as  is  the  property  in  a  two-story 
house  where  the  title  to  the  lower  story  is  in  one  person  and  the 
title  to  the  upper  story  is  in  another  person.  An  action  of  eject- 
ment will  lie  in  behalf  of  the  owner  of  the  surface  to  recover  it; 
also  an  action  will  lie  on  behalf  of  the  owner  of  the  mineral 
estate  to  recover  that ;  and  the  right  of  either  owner  may  be 
barred  by  the  statute  of  liuiitatioiis.^ 

When  the  owner  of  the  surface  of  land  has  granted  to  another  the 
coal  under  his  land,  he  has  a  right,  apart  from  any  reservation  of 
It  in  the  deed,  to  access  through  the  coal  to  the  strata  underlying 
it.-  The  purchaser's  estate  in  the  coal  is  determinable  upon  the 
removal  of  the  coal ;  and  when  all  the  coal  is  removed,  the  space  it 
occupied  reverts  to  the  grantor  by  operation  of  law.  For  this 
purpose  there  is  no  need  of  any  reservation  in  the  deed.  The 
purchaser  of  the  coal  strata  has  no  interest  in  the  strata  under- 
lying the  coal,  aside  from  the  servitude  for  support,  until  the  coal 
is  removed.'^ 

538.  An  exception  of  mines  or  ores  is  a  corporeal  heredit- 
ament ;  it  is  an  exception  of  the  substance  of  the  land.*  Under 
the  English  system,  when  livery  of  seisin  was  regarded  as  indis- 
pensable to  a  conveyance  of  land,  inasmuch  as  livery  could  not 
be  made  of  an  unopened  mine,  the  right  to  take  ores  from  a  mine 
was  regarded  as  incorporeal.  But  in  this  country,  where  livery 
of  seisin  is  supplied  b}'  the  deed  and  its  registration,  a  grant  or 
exception  of  the  ores  of  an  unopened  mine  is  regarded  as  a  grant 
or  exception  of  part  of  the  inheritance  of  the  land,  as  much  as  a 


1  Knight  V.  Indiana  Coal  Co.  47  Ind.  Va.  ,315,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  3.     A  privilege  of 
105,  110,  17  Am.  Rep.  692.  taking  ore  is  an  incorporeal  hereditament. 

2  Chartiers  Coal  Co.  v.  Mellon,  152  I'a.  It  is  not  a  sale  or  reservation  of  the  ore, 
St.  286,  31  W.  N.  C.  425.  but  a  right   to   be   exercised  within   the 

'  Chartiers  Coal  Co.  y.  Mellon,  152  I'a.  lands  of  another.     It  is  not  an  exclusive 

St.  2»6,  31  W.  X.  C.  425.  right,  but  one  to  be  enjoyed  in  common 

*  Caldwell  i-.  Fulton,  31  Pa.  St.  475,  72  with  the  owner.     Johnstown  Iron  Co.  v. 

Am.  Dec.  760 ;  Knight  v.  Indiana  Coal  &  Cambria  Iron  Co.  32  Pa.  St.  241,  72  Am. 

Iron  Co.  47  Ind.   105,  110,   17  Am.  Rep.  Dec.  783;    Gloninger   v.   Franklin   Coal 

692  ;  Kincaid  v.  McGowan  (Ky.),  4  S.  W.  Co.  55  Pa.  St.  9,  93  Am.  Dec.  720. 
Rep.   802,   804;  Lee  v.   Bumgardner,   86 
448 


I 


OF   PARTICULAR   EXCEPTIONS   AND    RESERVATIONS.       [§  538. 

grant  or  exception  of  the  surface  would  be.^  Even  an  exception 
of  one  half  of  the  profits  of  all  coal  and  other  minerals  which 
may  be  found  in  the  land  is  held  to  be  an  exception  of  the  profits 
of  all  such  coal  and  minerals  in  place.^ 

The  right  cannot  be  exercised  to  the  damage  of  the  surface, 
unless  provision  for  such  damage  is  contemplated  and  provided 
for,  even  if  the  value  of  the  right  is  destroyed  by  this  restriction.^ 
Only  such  use  of  the  surface  can  be  made  as  the  reservation  pro- 
vides for.*  If  the  parties  have  provided  that  the  grantor  shall 
make  compensation  for  injury  done  to  the  surface,  he  will  not 
be  restrained  from  doing  such  injui-y,  or  made  subject  to  an  action 
of  ejectment,  but  the  owner  of  the  surface  will  be  left  to  the 
remedy  provided  for.° 

An  exception  of  "all  and  all  manner  of  metals  and  minerals, 
substances,  coals,  ores,  fossils,  and  also  all  manner  of  composi- 
tions, combinations,  and  compounds  of  any  or  all  the  foregoing 
substances,  and  also  all  valuable  earths,  clays,  stones,  paints,  and 
substances  for  the  manufacture  of  paint  upon  or  under  the  said 
tract  of  land,"  includes  clay  suitable  for  making  bricks,  and  is 
not  restricted  to  the  kind  of  clay  from  which  paint  could  be 
manufactured.*^ 

1  Caldwell  v.  Fulton,  31  Pa.  St.  475,  72  Hext  v.  Gill,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  699.  And  see 
Am.  Dec.  760;  Algonquin  Coal  Co.  v.  Shell  v.  German  Coal  Co.  139  111.  21,  28 
Northern  Coal  Co.  (Pa.)  29  Atl.  Rep.  402.     N.  E.  Rep.  748. 

Williams,  J.,  said  :    "  Until   a   severance  *  Dietz  v.  Mission  Transfer  Co.  95  Cal. 

takes  place  between  the  surface  and  an  un-  92,  30 1'ac.  Rep.  380,  25  Pac.  Rep.  423.    In 

derlying  estate,  the  owner's  title  reaches  this  case  the  owner  of  a  ranch,  in  convey- 

frora  the  centre  to  the  surface,  and  from  ing  a  portion  of  it,  reserved  the  oils  and 

the  surface   to  the  heavens;  and  with  a  minerals,  with  the  right  to  do  whatever 

grant  of  the  land,  or  an  acquisition  of  title  was   necessary    to    obtain    and    transj)ort 

by  an  adverse  holding,  the  entire  estate  of  such  minerals,  including  the  erection  of 

the  former  owner  passes.     When  a  sev-  proper  machinery  and  the  laying  of  pijies. 

erance  takes   place,  and  the  holder  of  a  It  was  held  that  the  owner  of  the  oils  and 

stratum  of  coal  or  other  mineral  records  minerals,  who  had  also  acquired  the  oils 

his  title,  or  enters  into  possession  of  his  and  minerals  in  the  remaining  portion  of 

sub-surface  estate,  he  is   not  affected  by  the  ranch,  was  not  authorized  to  use  the 

the  state  of  the  title  to,  or  the  possession  land    first  conveyed   for  the   purpose   of 

of,  the  surface.     This  was  very  recently  pumping  or  storing  oil  found  in  other  por- 

said  in  Plummer  v.  Iron  Co.  (Pa.)  28  Atl.  tions  of  the  ranch. 

Rep.  853."     And  see  Kingsley  v.  Hillside  ^  Bucclcuch  v.  Wakefield,  L.  R.  4  H.  L. 

Coal  Co.  144  Pa.  St.  613,  29  \V.  N.  C.  368.  377  ;  Aspden  v.  Seddon,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  394  ; 

2  Weakland  v.  Cunningham  (Pa.),  7  Erickson  v.  Michland  Iron  Co.  50  Mich. 
Atl.  Rep.  148.  604,  16  K  W.  Rep.  161. 

»  Davis  i;.  Treharne,  L.  R.  6  App.  Cas.  "  Foster  v.  Runk,  109  Pa.  St.  291,  58 
460 ;  Love  v.  Bell,  L.  R.  9  App.  Cas.  286  ;     Am.  Rep.  720. 


VOL.   I. 


449 


§§  .')o9,  540.]  EXCEPTIONS   AND    RESERVATIONS. 

A  rosorvation  of  ''all  mincvals  "  does  not  iuclude  petroleum 
oil.  'Hioiii^h  petroleum  is  a  mineral,  such  is  not  the  general 
unih'rstandiiig,  and  the  })arties  are  supposed  to  have  contracted 
with  reference  to  the  general  meaning  of  the  terms  used.^ 

A  reservation  to  the  grantor,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  of  the  right 
to  mine  a  sufficient  quantity  of  iron  ore  for  the  supply  of  any 
one  furnace  carries  with  it  the  right  to  supply  any  furnace  which 
the  grantor  or  his  assigns  may  choose  to  use.  The  ore  taken 
from  the  mine  under  such  reservation  is  the  absolute  property  of 
the  grantor  or  his  assigns,  and  he  may  use  it  or  sell  it,  provided 
the  quantity  so  used  or  sold  does  not  exceed  the  quantity  meas- 
ured by  the  capacity  of  one  furnace.^  A  reservation  to  the 
grantor,  his  heirs  and  assignees,  of  "a  free  toleration  of  getting 
coal  for  their  own  use,"  does  not  reserve  all  the  coal  beneath  the 
surface,  but  merely  an  incorporeal  right,  concurrent  with  the 
mining  right  of  the  grantee,  to  get  and  carry  away  such  coal  as 
the  grantor  and  his  assigns  may  personally  need  for  fuel.^ 

539.  A  reservation,  in  a  deed  of  lands  by  a  boom  company, 
of  a  free  and  unobstructed  passage  with  teams  and  men  along  the 
banks  of  a  river  and  across  the  granted  premises,  in  carrying  on 
its  "  business,"  gives  it  the  right  to  enter  on  the  lands  for  the  pur- 
pose of  removing  into  the  river  logs  that  in  time  of  high  water 
had  floated  over  the  banks  and  had  lodged  upon  the  granted 
premises ;  it  appearing  that  a  very  considerable  portion  of  the 
company's  business,  when  the  deed  was  executed,  consisted  in 
making  such  removals.^ 

540.  One  may  reserve  to  himself  the  "water  in  a  stream 
upon  the  land  conveyed  ;  or  he  may  reserve  a  portion  of  the 
water,'^  or  the  use  of  the  water  at  certain  times  specified,  as,  for 
instance,  "in  times  of  low  water,  when  it  is  wanted  for  the  grant- 
or's mill."  ^-'     He  may  reserve  sufficient  water  to  operate  a  mill, 

'  Dunham  v.  Kirkpatrick,  101    I'a.  St.  elude  in    the  reservation  marhle  or  ser- 

36,  47  Am.  Rep.  696  ;  Deer  Lake  Co.   v.  pentine  deposits  subsequently  discovered. 

Michigan  Land  Co.  89  Mich.  180,  ,50  N.  2  Alden's  Appeal,  93  Pa.  St.  182;  Cole- 

W.  Kep.  807.     In  the  last-named  case  the  man  v.  Brooke,  12  Phila.  .503. 

deed  contained  the  reservation  :  "  Saving  ^  Algonquin  Coal  Co.  v.  Northern  Coal 

and  reserving  to  the  grantor  herein  ...  Co.  (Pa.)  29  Atl.  Rep.  402. 

all  mines  and  ores  of  metal  that  are  now  *  Bradley  v.  Tittabawassee  Boom  Co. 

or  rnay  be  hereafter  found  on  said  lands."  82  Mich.  9,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  24. 

It  was  held   that,   as   the  only  valuable  ^  Hurd  v.  Curtis,  7  Met.  94. 

mineral  found  in  that  region  at  the  time  ^  jjood  v.  Johnson,  26  Vt.  64 
was  iron,  it  was  not  the  intention  to  in- 

450 


OF  PARTICULAR  EXCEPTIONS  AND  RESERVATIONS.   [§  541. 

such  as  a  sawmill  or  gristmill,  or  to  propel  certain  specified 
machinery  ;  and  in  such  case  it  is  considered  that  the  limitation 
applies  particularly  to  the  quantity  of  water  to  be  used,  and  not 
to  the  purpose  for  which  it  may  be  used,  and  therefore  the 
grantor  is  entitled  to  use  the  water  for  any  purpose  not  requiring 
a  greater  power  than  that  reserved.^  A  reservation  of  the  right 
to  divert  a  stream  of  water  from  its  channel,  to  be  used  for  cer- 
tain purposes  and  returned  to  its  channel,  gives  no  right  to  divert 
or  use  it  for  other  purposes,  and  an  injunction  lies  to  restrain  its 
use  for  unauthorized  purposes.^ 

A  deed  of  a  water  power,  "  except  sufficient  to  operate  the 
mills  .  .  .  limited  to  one  hundred  horse-power,"  is  a  reservation 
of  only  so  much  as  may  be  needed  to  operate  the  mills,  not  ex- 
ceeding the  amount  named,  and  not  a  reservation  of  that  amount 
in  any  event.-^ 

The  reservation  of  a  mill  and  water  privilege,  in  a  grant  of  land 
bounded  on  or  near  a  pond  or  stream,  is  a  reservation  of  the  right 
to  flow  the  granted  lands  as  far  as  necessary  or  convenient,  or  so 
far  as  it  has  been  usual  to  flow  them  for  the  use  of  the  mill.* 

541.  A  reservation  of  a  spring  of  water  gives  the  grantor  a 
right  of  action  against  the  grantee  for  a  conversion  of  the  water 
by  putting  down  an  aqueduct  which  diverts  the  water  continu- 
ously from  the  spring,  and  he  is  at  least  entitled  to  nominal  dam- 
ages.'5  A  reservation  of  the  right  to  take  from  a  well,  cistern,  or 
spring  "  all  the  water  which  the  grantee,  his  heirs  or  assigns,  shall 
not  use,"  means  only  so  much  of  the  water  as  he  or  they  may  not 
use  in  a  reasonable  enjoyment  of  the  property  conveyed.  The 
grantor  has  no  ground  of  complaint  if  the  grantee's  use  of  the 
water  is  a  reasonable  one.^ 

A  reservation  of  a  well  of  water  means  not  only  the  opening 
which  reaches  down  to  the  water,  but  the  whole  opening  in  the 
earth,  with  the  stone  laid  in  the  well,  and  the  water  therein. 
The  owner  is  entitled  to  cover  the  well  with  an  erection  not  ex- 
tending beyond  the  well.'^ 

1  Cromwell  v.  Sclden,  3  N.  Y.  253.  6  Peck  v.  Clark,  142  Mass.  436,  8  N.  E. 
And  see  Garland  v.  Hodsdon,  46  Me.  511.     Rep.  335. 

2  Mall  V.  Ionia,  38  Mich.  493.  «  Wilcox  v.  Kendall,  C3  N.   H.  609,  3 
8  Moore  r.  Wilder,  66  Vt.  33,  28  Atl.     Atl.  Rep.  633. 

Rep  320.  ''  Mixer  v.  Reed,  25  Vt.  254. 

*  Pettee  v.  Hawes,  13  Tick.  323  ;  French 
i;.  Carhart,  1  N.  Y.  96. 

451 


§  542.]  EXCEPTIONS  AND   RESERVATIONS. 

A  reservation  of  a  right  to  take  water  from  a  well  imposes 
upon  the  grantee  no  obligation  to  keep  the  well  in  repair,  or  to 
preserve  its  existence.^  A  reservation  of  "the  use  of  a  well"  does 
not  <'ive  the  grantor  the  exclusive  use  of  it  if  the  water  is  ample 
for  the  use  of  both  the  grantor  and  the  grantee.^ 

542.  An  exception  or  reservation  of  an  existing  highway 
passing  tlirough  the  granted  land  is  usually  for  the  purpose  of 
relieving  the  grantor  from  his  covenant  against  incumbrances, 
and  the  fee  in  the  land  so  excepted  passes  to  the  grantee.'^  The 
grantor  might  make  it  plain  that  he  retained  the  fee  in  the  high- 
way in  himself  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  exception  maybe  made 
in  terms  that  make  it  certain  that  the  grantor  did  not  intend  to 
retain  the  fee  in  himself,  but  only  to  guard  against  any  claim  that 
miixht  be  made  under  his  covenants.  This  is  the  case  where  the 
exception  was  made  in  a  clause  which  stated  the  quantity  of  the 
land  exclusive  of  the  county  road,  which  the  grantor  reserved."^ 

A  deed  conveying  land  in  a  town,  but  "reserving  streets  and 
alleys  according  to  recorded  plat  of  the  town,"  passes  the  fee  in 
such  streets,  when  such  fee  was  at  the  time  held  by  the  grantor, 
subject  to  the  easement  of  the  public  therein.  The  language  of 
tiie  deed  could  only  be  held  to  withhold  the  fee  of  the  streets  and 
alleys  from  its  operation,  upon  the  hypothesis  that  the  fee  of  the 
streets  and  alleys  is  vested  in  the  municipality,  for  that  is  the 
measure  of  what  is  withheld  from  the  operation  of  the  deed  ;  and 
therefore,  if  an  easement  only  in  the  soil  of  the  streets  and  alleys 
is  vested  in  the  municipality  for  the  use  of  the  public,  that  only 
is  withheld  from  the  operation  of  the  deed.'"' 

^  Ballard  v.  Butler,  30  Me.  94.  Coombs  did  not  intend  by  those  words  to 
-  Barnes  v.  Burt,  38  Conn.  541.  except  from  his  conveyance  of  the  whole 
2  Day  V.  Philbrook,  8.5  Me.  90,  26  Atl.  farm  the  soil  or  land  under  this  town 
Rep.  999.  The  grantor's  farm  was  di-  road.  He  did  not  intend  to  interpose 
vided  into  two  parcels  by  a  town  road,  a  barrier  between  different  parts  of  the 
He  sold  the  northerly  parcel,  bounding  it  farm.  We  cannot  see  any  motive.  It  is 
by  such  road,  and  afterwards  sold  the  evident,  we  iliink,  that  he  merely  intended 
southerly  parcel,  making  the  road  the  to  exclude  from  his  covenants  of  war- 
northerly  line.  In  the  first  deed  the  grant-  ranty,  etc.,  the  incumbrance  of  the  town 
or  at  the  end  of  the  description  added  the  road.  We  think  the  words  used  have  no 
following  words :  "  Reserving  the  town  effect,  and  that,  in  spite  of  them,  the  fee 
road  leading  through  the  farm."  It  was  in  the  strip  occupied  by  the  road  passed 
held  that  the  fee  of  the  road  was  not  re-  to  Rowell,  and  hence  not  to  the  plaintiff, 
served,  but  only  its  use  as  an  incumbrance,  who  docs  not  claim  under  Rowell." 
The  court,  Emery,  J.,  said:  "As  to  this  *  Kuhn  v.  Farnsworth,  09  Me.  404. 
ciyutcn'.'.ow,  it  seems  clear  to  us  that  ^  Gould  v.  Howe,  131  111.  490,  23  N.  E. 
4")2  Rep.  602. 


OF   PARTICLE    iR   EXCEPTrONS   AND    RESERVATIONS.        [§  542. 


An  exception  of  sc  much  vi  the  land  conveyed  as  has  been 
taken  for  a  public  roa..<  is  an  exception  of  the  land  covered  by 
the  road,  the  fee  remaining  ii,  the  grantor.^  But  ordinarily  an 
exception  of  a  road  or  highwi»y  laid  out  through  the  land  is  an 
exception  of  the  public  easement  only,  the  fee  of  the  land  pass- 
ing to  the  grantee.^  Even  an  exception  of  a  street,  defined  in 
location  and  width,  to  be  Lid  out  for  the  use  of  the  public,  in 
lieu  of  an  existing  street  Laving  a  different  location,  is  regarded 
as  a  reservation  of  the  ea^oment  of  the  street,  the  title  to  which 
passed  to  the  grantee.^ 

Under  a  reservation  oi  a  strip  on  one  side  of  the  tract  con- 
veyed "  for  a  public  street^  '  the  fee  passes  to  the  grantee.  If  the 
grantor  intended  to  except  xhe  fee  of  the  street,  his  intention  was 
not  expressed  by  reserving  the  strip  for  a  public  street  and  for  no- 
thing else.^ 

A  reservation  of  a  r-oad  tnrough  the  land  conveyed  for  the  use 
of  the  parties  to  the  deed,  iheir  heirs  and  assigns,  to  enable  the 
grantor  to  reach  other  lands  owned  by  him  from  a  highway,  is 


1  Munn  V.  Worrall,  53  N.  Y.  44, 13  Am. 
Rep.  470 ;  In  re  Board  of  Street  Oi>ening, 
68  Hun,  562,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  1021  ,  ^{ush- 
ton  V.  Hallett,  8  Utah,  277,  30  Pac.  Rep. 
1014. 

A  deed,  after  describing  land,  provided  : 
"It  being  understood  that  the  public 
thoroughfare  formerly  existing  along  the 
edge  of  the  river  at  this  point  is  nut,  in- 
tended to  be  conveyed,  .  .  .  the  city  .  .  . 
having  the  right  to  open  said  tho»ough- 
fare  when  it  sees  fit."  It  was  h./ud  an 
absolute  reservation  of  the  lana  upon 
which  the  street  had  formerly  be»n,  and 
not  a  mere  right  of  use  to  the  '^ixWic 
Umscheid  v.  Scholz,  84  Tex.  2G5, 16  Vs.  AV. 
Rep.  1065. 

A  contract  to  convey  land  in  a  cUy  spe- 
cified two  parcels  between  whicrt  was  a 
strip  that  had  been  surveyed  as  n  street, 
but  had  never  been  conveyed  to  the  city 
as  a  street  or  otherwise.  The  weed  given 
pursuant  to  the  contract  de«critaed  the 
land  as  one  parcel,  and  incluaexi  the  strip, 
but  excepted  "  the  street  hereeoTOre  deeded 
to  said  ciiy."     Held,  that  t..e  exception 


ing  clause  that  the  strip  was  "  deeded  "  to 
the  city  was  merely  descriptive  of  the 
strip.  Rushton  r.  Hallett,  8  Utah,  277, 30 
Pac.  Rep.  1014. 

-  Peck  V.  Smith,  1  Conn.  103,  6  Am. 
Dec.  216  ;  Leavitt  v.  Towle,  8  N.  H.  96; 
Richardson  v.  Palmer,  38  N.  H.  212; 
Tuttle  V.  Walker,  46  Me.  280;  Cottle 
V.  Young,  59  Me.  105;  Hays  v.  Askew,  5 
Jones,  63  ;  Long  v.  Fewer,  53  Minn.  156, 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  1071.  In  a  deed  of  a  lot 
of  land  fronting  on  the  river,  the  following 
provision  was  held  to  amount  to  an  ex- 
ce])tion  :  "  It  being  understood  that  the 
pul)lic  thoroughfare  formerly  existing 
along  the  edge  of  the  river  at  this  point 
is  not  intended  to  be  conveyed  by  these 
presents,  the  corporation  of  the  city  of 
Bexan  having  the  right  to  open  said  thor- 
oughfare when  it  sees  tit."  The  grantee 
took  no  title  in  such  land.  Umscheid  v. 
Scholz,  84  Tex.  265,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  1065. 

3  Cincinnati  v.  Newell,  7  Ohio  St.  37; 
Dunn  V.  Sanford,  51  Conn.  443. 

■»  Elliott  V.  Small,  35  Minn.  396,  29  N. 
W.  Rep.   158;  Carlson  v.  Dulutli  Short 


excluded  the  strip  from  tiib  operation  of     Line  Ry.  Co.  38  Minn.  305,  37  N.  W.Rep. 
the  deed,  since  ti?.  >4!cil>-t,l  In  the  cxcc])!-     341  ;  Hays  v.  Askew.  5  Jones,  63. 

453 


§§  o43,  544.]         KXCi-.PTioNs  and  heservations. 

])iosuiiu'(.l,  ill  the  absence  of  a  clear  induration  in  the  deed  to  the 
contraiv,  to  he  merely  a  reservation  of  the  use  of  the  road  and 
not  of  the  fee  therein.  • 

543.  In  a  deed  by  a  city,  an  exception  of  streets  is  an 
exception  of  the  fee  of  the  streets,  in  case  the  city  generally 
owns  the  fee  of  the  streets.  Thus,  an  exception  of  so  much  of 
the  land  ilescribed  as  may  be  required  for  streets  laid  down  upon 
a  map  annexed  to  the  deed  is  an  exception  of  the  fee  of  such 
streets,  and  not  merely  a  reservation  of  an  easement  in  the 
streets.  The  terms  of  the  deed  itself  demand  such  a  construction, 
which  may  be  enforced  by  the  circumstances  of  the  particular 
case  ;  as  where  it  appears  to  be  the  settled  policy  of  the  city  to 
own  in  fee  its  streets.  "  As  the  city,  then,  owned  in  fee  the  land 
upon  which  all,  or  nearly  all,  its  streets  vi^ere  constructed,  and  as 
it  was  the  settled  policy  of  the  city  to  condemn  or  purchase  land 
in  fee  for  its  streets,  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  it  meant  to  depart 
from  the  usual  course  in  this  grant,  and  actually  convey  away  the 
fee  of  the  land  needed  for  streets,  and  to  reserve  to  itself  only 
street  easements  therein."^ 

544.  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  explain  the  purpose 
and  extent  of  a  reservation  of  a  right  of  way,  when  these  are 
left  in  doubt  by  the  deed.  Thus,  vs^here  a  right  of  way,  as  previ- 
ousl}^  used,  is  reserved  to  the  grantor,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  the 
boundary  of  the  tract  conveyed  being  in  pai't  along  the  road,  it 
may  be  shown  that  the  grantor  had  other  lands  bordering  on  the 
road,  and  that  the  termini  of  the  road  were  in  his  lands ;  and 
upon  such  evidence  the  reservation  will  be  held  to  be  a  right 
appurtenant  to  the  land  of  the  grantor  not  conveyed,  and  will 
pass  to  a  subsequent  purchaser  of  that  land.'^  It  is  admissible  to 
ascertain  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time  the  deed  was 
executed,  though  evidence  of  what  the  parties  said  or  agreed  at 
that  time  is  inadmissible.* 

A  reservation  of  a  right  of  way  to  the  grantor's  other  land,  "  as 
usually  occupied,"  gives  him  a  right  of  way  for  all  purposes  con- 
nected with  the  customary  use  of  such  land.     If  such  land  has 

1  The  Redemptorist  v.  Wenig  (Md.),  Y.  592,  96  N.  Y.  477;  Coffin  v.  Scott,  102 
29  Atl.  Rep.  667.  N.  Y.  730. 

2  Mayor  v.  Law,  125  N.  Y.  380,  390,  26  3  French  v.  Williums,  82  Va.  462,  4 
N.  E.  Rep.   471;  Langdon   r.   Mayor,  93  S.  K.  Rep.  591. 

N.  Y.  129,  149;  Duryea  v.   Mayor,  62  X.         ■>  Swiik  r.  Sears,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  17. 

454 


OF   PARTICULAR   EXCEPTIONS   AND    RESERVATIONS.       [§§  545-547. 

usually  been  used  for  the  production  of  hay  and  other  crops, 
though  the  grantor  had  never  carted  hay  across  the  granted  prem- 
ises, lie  has  the  right  to  use  the  reserved  way  for  this  purpose, 
and  to  do  so  he  may  cut  a  limb  from  an  overhanging  tree.^  But 
a  reservation  of  a  right  to  pass  over  an  old  pathway  to  a  lot 
described  confers  no  right  to  pass  farther  upon  the  same  pathway 
to  another  lot." 

The  reservation  of  the  right  of  ingress  and  egress,  on  foot 
and  with  teams,  to  and  from  the  land  on  one  side  of  that  con- 
veyed, reserves  a  right  of  way  reasonably  wide  for  the  passage 
of  teams.3 

545.  Under  a  reservation  of  a  right  to  open  a  highway 
across  the  grantee's  land,  the  grantor  may  exercise  his  own 
judgment  as  to  its  location,  if  there  are  no  restrictions  as  to  its 
location,  or  after  observing  such  restrictions  as  are  set  out  in  the 
deed.  The  grantee  cannot  demand  that  a  jury  shall  pass  upon 
the  reasonableness  of  the  exercise  of  the  right  in  respect  to  the 
location  of  highway,  having  in  view  all  the  surrounding  circum- 
stances and  the  situation  of  the  land.  The  grantor  has  the  right 
under  such  reservation  to  exercise  his  own  judgment,  provided  he 
acts  fairly  and  not  wantonly.'^ 

546.  A  passageway  reserved  by  the  grantor  may  be  cov- 
ered over  with  a  building  by  the  grantee,  provided  he  does  not 
place  any  part  of  it  upon  the  passageway,  and  leaves  it  of  con- 
venient height,  of  the  stipulated  width,  and  with  light  sufficient 
for  the  purpose  for  wliich  the  passageway  was  reserved.  The 
owner  of  the  land  has  the  entire  beneficial  use  of  it,  subject  only 
to  the  easement.^  This  is  a  right  to  use  the  surface  of  the  soil 
for  the  purpose  of  passing  and  repassing  with  sufficient  light. 
If  the  dimensions  of  the  way  are  not  expressed,  but  the  object  is 
expressed,  the  dimensions  must  be  such  as  are  reasonably  suffi- 
cient for  sucli  object.'' 

547.  A  reservation  of  all  gravel  on  the  granted  land  gives 
the  right  to  remove  all  deposits  of  which  the  greater  part  is 
gravel,  or  such  as  are  commonly  known   as  gravel,  though   they 

1  Sargent  t'.  Ilnhhard,  102  Mhb.h.  380.  ^  (Jeirisli   r.  Shattnck,  132   Mass.  235; 

2  Farley  v.  IJiyaiit,  32  Mo.  474.  Atkins   v.  Hordman,  2    Met.  457,  37  Am. 

3  Glensoii   i:   Burroughs  (Wis.),  63   N.     Dec.  100. 

W.  Rep.  292.  •*  Atkins  v.  Bonlman,  2   Met.  457,  467, 

<  Hurt  (•.  Connor,  25  Conn.  331.  37  Am.  Dec.  100,  per  Shaw,  C.  J. 

455 


§  548.]  r.XCKrilONS    and    liKSKUVATlONS. 

rontain  a  mixturo  of  sand;  but  it  gives  no  right  to  reserve  sand 
alone.'  In  a  deed  by  a  town  of  tlie'^sand  and  gravel "  on  a 
be;ieh  *' for  making  and  repairing  the  highways,"  evidence  is  not 
admissible  that  material  afterwards  taken  from  the  beach  by  the 
town  was  universally  known  in  the  town  as  gravel,  and  that  it 
■was  not  know^n  or  called  by  any  other  name  ;  but  evidence  is 
admissible  that  such  nuiterial  was  the  same  that  the  town  had 
always  used  for  making  and  repairing  highways.^ 

IV.    Whether  a  Reservation  is  Personal  or  Appurtenant  to  the 

Land. 

548.  A  reservation  by  the  grantor  of  a  right  or  interest 
forever,  gives  him  only  a  life  estate.  As  in  a  grant,  so  in  a 
reservation  to  create  an  estate  of  inheritance,  the  necessary  word 
of  limitation,  the  word  "  heirs,"  must  be  used,  and  in  general  its 
place  cannot  be  supplied  by  any  other  words  of  perpetuity .^  A 
reservation  operates  by  way  of  an  implied  grant.  It  is  either  a 
right  personal  to  the  grantor,  or  is  appurtenant  to  his  lands,  for  the 
benefit  of  which  it  was  reserved.  In  the  latter  case  it  cannot  be 
separated  from  or  transferred  independently  of  the  land  to  which 
it  adheres.  If  it  is  a  personal  privilege,  it  is  not  assignable,  and 
does  not  pass  to  the  grantor's  heirs  or  personal  representatives. 
It  is  a  privilege  strictly  personal  to  the  grantor.'* 

A  reservation  of  a  right  of  way  to  a  barn  standing  on  a  dwell- 
ing-house lot  belonging  to  the  grantor  makes  the  right  of  way 
appurtenant  to  the  dwelling-house  lot  for  such  purposes  as  a  way 
to  a  barn  might  properly  be  used,  and  it  is  not  lost  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  barn  standing  thereon  at  the  time  of  the  reservation.^ 

1  Noble  V.  111.  Cent.  R.  K.  Co.  Ill  111.  wharf  at  tlic  westerly  corner  of  the  lot, 

437.  to  be  improved  and  kept  in  repair  at  the 

^  Brown  v.  Brown,  8  Met.  573.  joint  expense  of  the   said  parties,    their 

'  Ashcroft  V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.   126  heirs  and  assigns,"  it  was  held  that,  the 

Mass.   196,  30  Am.  Rep.  672;    Bean  v.  obligation  to  improve  and  repair   being 

French,  140  Mass.  229,  3  N.  E.  Rep.  206  ;  imposed  on   heirs  and  assigns,  the  right 

Cuiiis  V.  Gardner,  13  Met.  457 ;  Jamaica  reserved    must   by  implication   have  the 

Pond  Aqueduct  r.  Chandler,  9  Allen,  159;  same  duration  and  transmissible  quality. 

Bridger  v.  Picrson,  1   Lans.  481  ;  Horn-  Perry  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  55  N.  J.  L. 

beck  V.  Westbrook,  9  Johns.  73  ;  Knottsv.  178,  26  Atl.  Rej).  829,  832. 

Hydrick,  12  Rinh.314;  Koelle  y.  Knecht,  ^  Kister    v.  Reescr,   98   Pa.   St.    1,  42 

99  111.  396.     But  where  one  conveyed  a  Am.  Rep.  608. 

part  of  a  larger  tract,  "  reserving  the  free  ^  Bangs  v.  I'arker,  71  Me.  458. 
and   common    iise  and  privilege   of    the 
456 


WHETHER  A  RESERVATION   IS   PERSONAL.       [§§  549,  550. 

A  reservation  b}'  the  grantor  to  himself  or  his  heirs  may  be 
construed  to  be  a  reservation  to  himself  a7id  his  heirs. ^ 

An  exception  need  not  be  made  with  words  of  limitation,  be- 
cause the  estate  or  rights  excepted  remain  the  grantor's  property, 
and  inure  to  the  benefit  of  his  heirs  and  assigns,  just  as  any  of 
his  property  does.'^ 

549.  There  is  a  distinction  between  easements  and  servi- 
tudes that  are  personal  and  those  that  are  real.  The  former 
exist  in  favor  of  a  particular  person,  and  upon  the  sale  of  his  land 
the  personal  right  does  not  go  with  it.'^  But  if  the  right  attaches 
to  the  land,  it  jjasses  by  a  conveyiince  of  the  land,  even  without 
the  use  of  any  words  descriptive  of  the  right.  A  reservation  of 
a  right  appurtenant  to  other  land  of  the  grantor  passes  with  the 
land  to  wdiich  it  is  appurtenant,  witliout  any  words  of  limitation, 
to  the  heirs  and  assigns  of  the  grantor.* 

A  reservation  will  not  be  regarded  as  personal  unless  the  inten- 
tion that  it  shall  be  such  appears  from  the  language  used  in  the 
deed,  or  from  the  nature  of  the  subject-matter.  Thus  the  reser- 
vation of  the  use  and  occupancy  of  the  granted  land  for  a  stated 
period,  if  the  grantor  should  choose  to  do  so  for  that  length  of 
time,  but,  if  he  should  leave  the  possession  and  occupancy  of  the 
premises  before  the  expiration  of  such  period,  then  the  reserva- 
tion should  determine,  is  not  a  limitation  personal  in  its  nature, 
and  is  not  determined  in  part  or  in  whole  by  the  grantor's  leas- 
ing a  portion  of  the  property  reserved.^ 

In  a  conveyance  of  a  mill  with  a  dam  and  a  slip  made  for  driv- 
ing logs,  a  reservation  of  the  right  to  drive  logs  through  the  slip 
free  of  toll  is  a  personal  right  not  assignable.^ 

In  a  conveyance  by  a  parent  to  his  daughter,  a  reservation  of 
a  house  upon  the  granted  property  gives  the  grantor  no  right  to 
turn  his  daughter  out,  and  to  put  a  stranger  in  possession  of  the 
propel  ty ;  he  has  no  such  possessory  right  in  it  as  is  the  subject 
of  conveyance.' 

550.  A  permanent  easement  in  favor  of  the  grantor's  other 

1  AVhite  V.  Crawford,  10  Mass.  183.  v.  Conner,  G  Cush.  132;  Borst  v.  Empie, 

2  Emerson  v.  Mooney,  50  N.  II.  31. 5.  .5  N.  Y.  33. 

3  Cave  V.  Crafts,  .53  Cal.  135;  Tucker  ^  Cooncy  v.  Hays,  40  Vt.  478,  94  Am. 
V.  Jones,  8  Mont.  225,  19  Pac.  Rep.  571.  Dec.  425. 

♦   En^el   r.  Aver,  85   Me.   448,   27  Atl.         "  Wadsworth  v.  Smith,  11  Mc.  278,  :>6 
Rep.  352  ;  Wiiithrop  r.  Fairbanks,  41  Me.     Am.  Doc.  525. 
307  ;  Smith  v.  Ladd,  41  Me.  314  ;  Bowcn         '  Fisher  i;.  Nelson,  8  Mo.  App.  00. 

457 


j^  550.1  EXCEPTIONS   AND    RESERVATIONS. 

land  may  be  created  without  words  of  limitation.     In  a  recent 
case  in  CiMiiiootiout,  the  orantors,  in  selling  a  right  of  way  across 
their  himl  to  a  railroad  company,  reserved  the  right  of  crossing, 
atul  provided  tluit  the  company  should  lay  the  railroad  track  on  a 
level  with  the  giouiul  of  the  grantor's  wharf  beyond  the  track. 
Tlie  reservation  was  not  made  to  the  grantors  and  their  heirs,  and 
it  was  contended  that  the  right  to  cross  lasted  only  during  the  lives 
of    tlie   ^Trantors.      The   court  declared  this   contention    not  well 
fouiuleil.  and  said  :  "  If  the  deed  had  been  silent  as  to  the  right  to 
cross,  the  law  would  have  given  an  adequate  '  way  of  necessity ' 
in  favor  of  the  owners  of  the  premises.     In  the  absence  of  any 
relinquishment  of  such  a  way  of  necessity  in  the  deed,  it  is  hard  to 
believe  that  the  parties  intended  by  an  express  reservation,  made 
umler  these  circumstances,  to  give  to  the  grantors  or  allow  them 
to  retain  a  less  extensive  right  than  the  law  would  have  given  if 
notliing  luul  been  said  in  the  deed  about  the  right  to  cross.    Then, 
too,  the  right  to  cross  was,  in  a  certain  sense,  a  right  existing  in 
the  grantors  at  the  date  of  the  deed.     It  was  a  part  of  their  full 
dominion  over  the  strip  about  to  be   conveyed  by  the  deed,  and 
not   a  right  to  be  in  effect  conferred  upon  them  by  the  grantees. 
It  was  something  which  the  'reservation'  in  effect  '  excepted'  out 
of  the  operation  of  the  grant.     Hence  it  is  quite  reasonable  to 
conclude  that  the  stipulation  as  to  the  right  of  way  was  intended 
by  both  parties  to  give  a  right  not   temporary  and  personal,  but 
permanent,  and  for  the  benefit  not  so  much  of  the  grantors  as  of 
the  premises  they  continued  to  hold.     In  such  cases  we  think  the 
rule  is  well  settled   that   a  permanent  easement  in  favor  of  the 
retained  land  may  be  made  without  words  of  limitation."  ^ 

In  another  case,  where  a  reservation  was  made  of  the  right  to 
draw  water  for  the  use  of  a  mill  owned  by  the  grantor,  it  was 
contended  that  the  agreement  was  only  a  license  to  the  grantor  to 
draw  water  for  so  long  a  time  as  he  should  own  the  mill.  The 
court,  however,  said  :  "  This  claim  is  in  conflict  with  all  the  facts 
of  the  case.  The  right  to  the  water  is  reserved  without  limitation 
as  to  time.  It  was  made  for  the  benefit  of  the  mill  below,  and 
manifestly  was  designed  to  be  appurtenant  to  it.  It  would  not 
only  be  beneficial  so  long  as  the  grantor  should  own  the  mill,  but 
would  enhance  its  value  to  some  extent  when  sold."  ^ 

1  Chappell  V.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  62  -  Randall  v.  Latham,  36  Conn.  48, 
Conn.  19.5,  203,  24  Atl.  Rep.  997.  .'53. 

458 


WHETHER   A   RESERVATION   IS   PERSONAL.  [§  551. 

In  a  deed  of  a  mill  upon  a  stream  upon  which  the  grantors  had 
another  mill,  they  reserved  the  right  to  use  water  and  conve}'  it 
from  tlie  dam  "  for  the  necessary  accommodation  and  use  of  the 
old  shop"  which  the  grantor  still  owned  in  fee  simple.  The 
reservation  was  made  without  words  of  inheritance,  but  it  was 
held  that  the  grantors  had  an  assignable  interest  in  the  privilege 
reserved.  In  determining  what  the  parties  intended  by  the 
reservation,  the  court  said  it  was  proper  to  take  into  consideration 
the  condition  of  the  property  and  the  circumstances  of  the  par- 
ties in  relation  thereto,  and  to  inquire  for  what  purpose  the  reser- 
vation was  made.  "It  was  'for  the  necessary  accommodation 
and  use  of  the  old  shop.'  Of  this  they  were  the  owners  in  fee 
simple ;  and  can  it  be  supposed  that  they  meant  to  limit  the  use 
of  the  water,  without  which  the  establishment  was  of  no  value, 
to  their  own  personal  occupancy  ?  And  can  it  be  beheved  that 
such  was  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  this  deed  ?  The  idea  is 
opposed  to  every  presumption  and  to  all  probability.  Are  we, 
then,  prevented,  by  any  rigid  rule  of  construction,  from  giving 
effect  to  tiie  intention  of  the  parties?  We  know  of  none;  and 
we  think  this  part  of  the  case  entirely  free  from  doubt."  ^ 

551.  A  reservation  of  a  right  in  the  nature  of  a  servitude 
in  the  land  granted,  for  the  benefit  of  the  grantor's  other  land, 
is  not  a  bare  license  to  the  grantor  himself  while  he  may  own 
the  land,  hut  the  right  reserved  is  a  permanent  right  for  the 
benefit  of  the  principal  estate,  whoever  may  be  the  owner.  Such 
right  is  manifestly  designed  to  be  appurtenant  to  the  grantor's 
estate,  and  to  constitute  a  part  of  it.^  But  a  subsequent  vendee 
of  the  party  making  the  reservation  can  exercise  no  greater  right 
than  that  reserved.^ 

A  reservation  of  an  easement  is  never  presumed  to  be  for  the 

1  Kennedy  v.  Scovil,  12  Conn.  317,  132;  Cowdrey  c.  ('olburn,  7  Allen,  9,  13 ; 
326.  Whitney  v.  Uuiou  Ky.  Co.  1 1  Gray,  359 ; 

2  Randall  v.  Latham,  36  Coun.  48;  Smith  v.  ITi;j;l)ee,  12  Vt.  113;  Fuller  v. 
Chappell  V.  New  York,  &c.  \\.  Co.  62  Arms,  45  Vt.  400;  Borst  v.  Empic,  5  N. 
Conn.  195,24  At).  Hep.  997;  Tinker  v.  Y.  33 ;  Barrow  v.  Kichard,  8  I'aifre,  351, 
Forbes,  136  111.  221.  26  N.  E.  Hep.  503;  35  Am.  Dec.  713  ;  Rexford  v.  Marquis,  7 
Shelby  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  143  111.  Lans.  249  ;  Baker  v.  Mott,  78  Ilun,  141* 
385,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  438 ;  Mendell  v.  De-  28  N.  Y.  Siipp.  968 ;  Ilerrick  v.  Marshall, 
lauo,  7  Met.  176;  Dyer  v.  Sanford,  9  Met.  66  Me.  435  ;  Karmuiler  v.  Krotz,  18  Iowa, 
395,  43  Am.    Dec.  399;  Brown   i-.   This-  352. 

sell,  6  Cut^h.  254;  Dennis  v.  Wilson,  107         •'  Palfrey  i;.  Foster,  47  La.  Ann.  — ,  17 
Mass.  591  ;    Bowen   v.   Conner,   6  Cush.     So.  Rep.  425. 

459 


>s  ,")5'2.J  EXCKIMIONS    AND    Kl^KUVA  1  lOiNS. 

porsoiuil  uso  of  the  grantor,  if  it  can  be  fairly  construed  to  be  ap- 
purtenant to  other  hxnd  of  the  grantor.^  Thus,  where  the  owner 
of  land  conveyed  it,  excepting  and  reserving,  without  words  of 
inheritance,  a  right  of  way  extending  from  the  liighway  along  the 
line  of  division  between  the  land  sold  and  the  grantor's  other 
land,  it  was  held  that  the  right  was  appurtenant  to  the  grantor's 
other  land.  Mr.  Justice  Wells,  delivering  judgment,  said :  "  If 
the  nature  of  the  right,  as  appurtenant  or  in  gross,  depended 
upon  its  duration  or  inheritable  quality,  it  might  be  necessary  to 
consider  whether  the  clause  in  this  deed  is  one  of  exception,  carving 
the  way  out  of  the  premises  described  in  the  deed,  and  retaining 
it  in  the  grantor  as  a  part  of  his  former  estate,  or  whether  it  created 
a  new  right  in  the  land  of  the  grantee  by  way  of  reservation  or 
implied  grant.  But  we  do  not  think  it  is  so  dependent.  Even  if 
it  were  conceded  that  the  clause  in  question  is  to  be  construed  as 
one  of  reservation  strictly,  and  that,  for  want  of  words  of  inher- 
itance, the  right  is  limited  to  the  life  of  the  grantor,  it  does  not 
follow  that  it  is  a  mere  personal  right  not  assignable.  Its  char- 
acter must  be  determined  by  the  purposes  for  which  the  way  was 
intended  to  be  used.  Those  purposes  being  ascertained  from  the 
terms  of  the  deed,  aided,  if  necessary,  by  the  situation  of  the 
property  and  the  surrounding  circunistances,^  the  deed  is  to  be 
construed  accordingly." ^ 

Where  upon  a  division  between  tenants  in  common  one  grantor 
reserved  a  right  of  way  over  the  land  he  conveyed  for  the  benefit 
of  the  land  he  retained,  the  reservation  created  an  easement 
which  ran  with  the  land.* 

552.  Thus,  too,  if  the  grantor  reserves  the  right  to  the  free 
use  of  light  and  air  of  the  land  conveyed  for  the  benefit  of  his 
other  land,  the  reservation  will  be  regarded  as  appurtenant  to 
the  grantor's  land,  and  the  benefit  of  it  will  pass  with  the  land  to 
his  heirs  and  assigns,  though  they  are  not  mentioned  in  the  reser- 
vation. "The  tendency  of  the  adjudications  on  this  subject  is 
properly  to  disregard  technical  distinction  between  reservation 
and  exception,  and  construe  the  language  used  so  as  to  effectuate 
the  intention  of  the  parties.  A  covenant  or  stipulation  inserted 
in  a  deed  poll  binds  the  grantee,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  where  such 

'Smith  r.  ]'ortrr,  10  Ciray,  G6;  Dennis  3  pennis    r.    Wilson,    107    Mass.   591, 

r.  Wilson,  107  Mass.  ."j'Jl.  593. 

2  Green  v.  Putnam,  8  Cush.  21.  ^  :Menddl  v.  Delano,  7  Met.  176. 
460 


WHETHER    A    RESERVATION    IS    PERSONAL. 


[§  553. 


stipulation  relates  to  the  premises  conveyed.  The  easement  in 
such  case  may  be  acquired  by  a  clause  of  reservation."  ^ 

553.  In  a  reservation  of  a  right  to  take  profit  out  of  the 
soil,  no  words  of  perpetuity  are  necessary  to  create  an  estate 
in  fee  simple  in  such  right.^  Thus  a  reservation  of  the  right  to 
maintain  a  boom  on  Penobscot  River,  '■'•  on  the  flats  between  hipfh 
and  low  water  marks  of  said  river,  along  the  premises  hereby 
conveyed,  either  to  use  myself  or  to  let  or  sell  to  other  persons," 
was  held  to  be  a  right  of  profit  in  Uind  which  would  pass  to  the 
grantor's  heirs  upon  his  death,  and  miglit  be  assigned  by  them.^ 

In  a  conveyance  of  land  to  a  railroad  company  for  the  purposes 
of  the  road,  the  grantor  reserved  "  the  right  to  use  any  portion  of 
the  land  not  required  by  the  said  company,  he  yielding  possession 
of  the  same  whenever  the  land  shall  be  needed  by  the  company." 
It  was  held  that  the  failure  of  the  company  to  occupy  any  part  of 
the  land  for  forty  years  did  not  affect  its  rights  in  the  land.  The 
right  of  the  grantor  passed  by  his  will  to  his  devisee.* 

In  a  deed  of  a  right  of  way  to  a  railroad  company,  a  provision 
that  "  the  said  grantor  and  his  family  shall  have  and  enjoy  the 
right  of  free  passage  "  in  its  cars  over  the  road,  ''  so  long  as  the 
land  and  appurtenances  hereinbefore  described  shall  continue  to 


1  Hagerty  v.  Lee,  54  N.  J.  L.  580,  583, 
25  Atl.  Rep.  319,  per  Van  Syckel,  J.,  cit- 
ing Finley  v.  Simpson,  22  N.  J.  L.  311 ; 
Cooper  V.  Louanstein,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  284 ; 
Newhoff  V.  Mayo,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  619,  23 
Atl.  Rep.  265;  Rosenkrans  i'  Snover,  19 
N.  .J.  Eq.  420.  And  the  gran  tee  in  a  deed, 
and  tho>;i'  clain)in<;  under  him,  cannot  deny 
the  binding  authority  of  a  reservation  in 
a  deed.  Sheppard  v.  Hunt,  4  N.  J.  Eq. 
277  ;  Fitzgerald  i-.  Faunce,  46  N.  J.  L.  536, 
598.  Vice-Chancellor  Van  Fleet,  in  Cou- 
dert  V.  Sayre,  46  N.  J.  i:q.  386,  19  Atl. 
Rep.  190,  expresses  in  substance  this  view 
of  tiie  rule  :  When  by  the  construction  of 
a  grant  it  appears  tiiatit  was  the  intention 
of  the  parties  to  create  or  reserve  a  right 
in  the  nature  of  a  servitude  in  the  hind 
granted,  for  the  benefit  of  other  Innd 
owned  by  the  grantor,  no  matter  in  what 
form  such  intention  may  be  expressed, 
such  right,  if  not  against  public  jiolicy, 
wid  be  held  to  be  a]>]MirteiiHiit  to  the  bind 


of  the  grantor,  and  binding  on  that  con- 
veyed to  the  grantee,  and  the  right  and 
burden  thus  created  and  imposed  will 
jjass,  with  the  lands,  to  all  subsequent 
grantees. 

2  Engel  V.  Ayer,  85  Me.  448,  27  Atl. 
Rep.  352. 

3  Kngel  1-.  Ayer,  85  Me.  448,  27  Atl. 
Rep.  352.  The  right  reserved  was  "  not 
a  mere  easement  properly  so  called,  but 
a  profitable  interest  in  the  land  itself 
which  pas-sed  to  his  [the  grantor's]  chil- 
dren by  the  devise,  and  was  by  them 
granted  to  the  defendant.  And  it  is  a 
satisfaction  to  observe  that  this  conclu- 
sion is  not  only  in  harmony  with  the 
authorities,  but  it  effectuates  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  clearly  manifested  by 
the  language  of  the  exception  exam- 
ined in  the  light  of  the  attending  facts." 
Per  \Vhitehou.';.    J. 

*  King  I'.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  90  Va. 
210,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  868. 
4G1 


§§  5i')4,  555.]  EXCEPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 

be  used  "  for  railroad  purposes  under  its  charter,  does  not  entitle 
a  descendant  of  the  grantor  who  is  not  a  member  of  tlie  grantor's 
household  to  a  free  pass  over  the  road  as  a  member  of  his  family. 
The  words,  "so  long  as  the  land  .  .  .  shall  continue  to  be  used 
as  a  railroad  .  .  .  under  the  charter  of  said  corporation,"  do  not 
imply  perpetual  succession.  They  are  words  of  limitation  of 
the  grant,  and  not  words  extending  the  meaning  of  the  word 
'  family.'  "  ' 

554.  In  those  States  in  which  words  of  inheritance  are  not 
necessary  to  a  transfer  in  fee,  such  words  are  not  necessary 
in  a  reservation  in  order  to  give  the  grantor  an  assignable  in- 
terest. Thus,  a  reservation  of  a  profit  or  interest  in  the  soil, 
profit  a  prendre  in  alieno  solo,  being  assignable  at  common  law 
with  words  of  inheritance,  is  assignable  without  such  words  in 
such  States.  "There  is  certainly  no  I'eason  why  an  absolute  estate 
should  pass  without  words  of  inheritance,  and  the  reservation  of 
a  right  of  profit  a  prendre  should  not."  - 

555.  When  a  reservation,  so  called,  is  in  fact  an  exception, 
no  words  of  inheritance  are  necessary  in  order  that  the  rights 
reserved  or  excepted  may  go  to  the  heirs  or  assigns  of  the  grantor.^ 
A  reservation  of  a  right  of  way  over  the  granted  premises  in 
suitable  places,  to  other  lands  of  the  grantor  particularly  men- 
tioned, confers  on  the  grantor  the  benefit  of  an  exception  in  favor 
of  the  grantor,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  as  the  occupants  of  such 
other  lands,  the  privilege  reserved  being  appurtenant  to  such 
lands.4 

A  land-owner  conveyed  to  a  railroad  company  a  strip  of  land 
already  appropriated  by  it  for  its  location,  "  reserving  the  pass- 
way  at  grade  over  said  lailroad  where  now  made."  Tiie  strip 
divided  the  land  of  such  owner  into  tracts  containing  four  and 
thirty-three  acres  respectively.     The  former  adjoined  ;i  highwa}', 

1  Dodge  V.  Boston  &  P.  R.  Co.  154  Iron  Co.  107  Mass.  290;  Emerson  v. 
Mass.  299,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  243.  Mooney ,  50  N.  H.  3 1 5 ;  Whitaker  v.  Brown, 

2  Painter  v.  Pasadena,  &c.  Co.  91  Cal.  46  Pa.  tSt.  197;  Keeler  v.  Wood,  30  Vt. 
"4,  82,  27  Pac.  Kep.  5.39.  242  ;    Painter   v.    Pasadena,    &c.    Co.  91 

3  Enjrel  V.  Ayer,  85  Me.  448.  27  Atl.  Cal.  74,  27  Pac.  Rep.  539  ;  Chappell  v. 
Rep.  352;  Randall  «.  Randall,  59  Me.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  62  Conn.  195,203, 
338;  Winthrop  v.  Fairbanks,  41  Me.  307;  24  Atl.  Rep.  997. 

Smith  V.  Ladd,  41   Me.  314;  Mendell  v.         ^  Winthrop  v.  Fairbanks.  41   Me.  307. 
Delano,  7  Met.  176;  Brown  y.  Conner,  6     See,  however,  Smith  i;.  Higbee,   12   Vt. 
Cush.  132  ;   White  v.  Crawford,  10  Mass.      113. 
183;    Swxkbridge   Iron    Co.   v.   Hudson 
462 


WHETHER   A   EESERVATION   IS   PERSONAL,       [§§  556,  557. 

but  the  only  lawful  access  to  the  other  was  by  the  passway  over 
the  smaller  tract  and  the  railroad,  which  passway  was  in  use 
before  the  construction  of  the  railroad,  and  continued  to  be 
used  without  objection  for  nearly  forty  years  thereafter.  It  was 
held  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  annex  the  use  of 
the  passway  as  a  perpetual  right  to  the  larger  tract.^ 

55G.  When  the  purpose  of  an  exception  or  reservation  is 
specified,  the  use  of  property  or  right  is  limited  to  that  purpose. 
Thus,  under  a  clause  in  a  deed  ''  excepting  and  reserving  one  half 
acre  of  land,  being  the  old  family  graveyard  of  the  grantor,  to- 
gether with  a  right  of  way  "  to  the  same,  the  grantor  is  restricted 
to  the  use  of  the  graveyard  for  a  place  of  burial  of  the  grantor's 
family  only,  and  he  cannot  license  others  to  use  the  right  of 
way.^  A  reservation  of  a  lot  of  land,  to  be  used  as  a  graveyard 
for  the  grantor  and  his  family,  is  a  privilege  personal  to  the 
grantor  and  his  family  which  cannot  be  assigned  to  a  stranger.^ 

Where  a  railroad  company  reserved  a  strip  of  land  to  be  used 
for  a  right  of  way  or  other  railroad  purposes,  in  case  the  line  of  said 
railroad  or  any  of  its  branches  should  be  located  on  or  over  the 
granted  land,  another  railroad  company  is  not  entitled  to  the 
benefit  of  such  reservation  for  a  right  of  way  for  a  branch  road, 
though  in  fact  such  branch  road  is  constructed  by  the  company 
that  granted  the  land  and  reserved  the  right  of  way,  this  com- 
pany not  being  authorized  by  its  charter  to  construct  such 
branch.'* 

557.  When  a  determinable  fee.  —  An  exception  of  a  saw- 
mill, with  land  enough  about  it  to  carry  on  the  lumbering  busi- 
ness, and  a  right  of  way  to  the  same,  so  long  as  the  grantor 
"occupies  said  privilege  with  mills,"  constitutes  a  determinable 
or  qualified  fee  which  can  be  assigned.  The  duration  of  the 
estate  is  not  limited  to  the  personal  occupancy  of  the  mill  by  the 

1  White  V.  New  York  &  X.  E.  11.  Co.  (Iowa),  56  N.  W.  Rep    515;  Cliai)pell  v. 

156  Mass.  181,  30  N.  E.   Rep.  612.     Per  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  62  Conn.  195,  203, 

Morton,  J. :  "As  already  stated,  tlie  only  24  Atl.  Rep.  997. 

reasonable    construction    in    the    present         -  Brown  r.  Anderson,  88   Ky.   577,   11 

case  would  seem  to  be  that  it  was  the  in-  >S.  W.  Rep.  607.     See  Herbert  v.  Pue,  72 

tention  of  the  parties  to  annex  the  ri;;l)t  Md.  307,  20  Atl.  Rep.  182. 
of  passing  to  the  larger  tract  as  a  i)erpet-         ''  Pearson  v.  Ilartman,  100  Pa.  St.  84. 
ual  casement,  and,  the  language  of  tlie         '  Biles  v.  Tacoma,  &c.  R.  Co.  5  Wash, 

deed  being  sufficient  for  that  purpose,  it  509,  32  Pac.  Rep.  211.     And  see  Duustan 

follows  that  the  passngcway  is  to  be  so  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  2  N.  D.  46, 49  N. 

regarded."     See,   also,    Bonson   v.   Jones  W.  Rej).  426. 

463 


§§  0.38,  550. J  EXCEl'TIONS   AND    RESERVATIONS. 

grantor,  hut  is  limited  to  the  existence  of  the  inilL  The  test  of  the 
liniitatiim  is  the  jjurpose  for  Avliieh  the  estate  may  be  occupied. ^ 
A  ri'scrvation  of  a  cider-mill,  "so  long  as  the  same  shall  stand" 
on  the  land,  gives  a  title  in  the  building  and  tlu;  land  under  it 
so  long  as  the  building  sliall  stand  on  the  land,  though  it  be  used 
for  a  dilferent  purpose.'-^ 

558.  A  reservation  for  a  limited  time  of  an  easement,  such 
as  tlie  right  of  mining  ores,  of  (quarrying  marble,  or  of  taking- 
stone  from  the  land,  is  not  a  mere  personal  privilege  to  the 
grantor,  but  a  right  and  interest  in  the  use  of  the  land  for  the 
time  designated,  which  he  may  assign  to  another.'^  A  reserva- 
tion of  the  use  of  a  quarry  until  the  expiration  of  a  lease  of  the 
same,  which  the  grantor  had  previously  made  for  the  term  of  ten 
years,  is  a  reservation  till  the  end  of  the  ten  years,  although  the 
lease  be  cancelled  with  the  consent  of  the  parties  to  it  within 
that  time.  The  reservation  inures  to  the  use  of  the  grantor  as 
well  ;is  his  lessee.* 

559.  A  reservation  of  the  right  to  cut  and  remove  trees 
within  a  definite  time,  is  only  a  reservation  of  the  right  to  enter 
and  cut  the  trees  within  such  time,  and  not  an  exception  of  the 
trees  out  of  the  grant.^  In  cases  where  the  trees  themselves 
are  reserved,  the  property  in  them  remains  in  the  grantor, 
with  the  right  to  so  much  of  the  soil  as  is  necessary'  to  sustain 
them  during  the  time  within  which  the  grantor  may  enter  upon 
the  land  and  remove  them.*^  The  reservation  is  an  exception,  and 
the  stipulation  that  the  trees  shall  be  cut  and  removed  within 
a  given  time  does  not  make  the  exception  conditional  on  such 
removal.  The  grantor  owning  the  trees  may  enter  the  grantee's 
land  and  remove  them  after  the  stipulated  time  has  expired  ;   but 

1  Moiilton  V.  Trafton,  64  Me.  218;  6  Goodwin  v.  Hubbard,  47  Me.  59.5; 
Farnsworth  i;.  Perry,  83  Me.  447,  22  Atl.  Howard  v.  Lincoln,  13  Me.  122;  Knotts 
Rep  373,  where  the  reservation  was  of  a  v.  Hydrick,  12  Rich.  314.  "  A  reserva- 
fltore  upon  the  land  granted,  "  with  the  tion  of  '  all  the  standing  wood '  ujmn  a 
privile;:e  of  remaining:  as  long  as  the  store  lot,  to  be  removed  at  any  time  within  three 
stands.  years,  includes  trees  suitable  for   timber 

2  Esty  V.  Currier,  98  Mass.  .500.  as  well  as  trees  suitable  for  fuel ;  and  if 
2  Munn  V.  Stone,  4  Cush.  146  ;  Farnum     there  is  nothing  in  the  deed  to  show  that 

V.  Piatt,  8  Pick.  ,3.39,  19  Am.  Dec.  330.  the  term    'standing  wood'   is  used  in  a 

Farnum  v.  Piatt,  8  Pick.  .339,  19  Am.  more  limited  sense,  parol  evidence  is  not 

Uec.  330.  admissible    to    restrict   the   meaning    of 

"  Ricli    v.  Zeil.sdorff,  22    Wis.  .544,    99  these  words."     Stroul  v.  Harper,  72  Me. 

Am.  Dec.  81.  270 

464 


WHETHER   A   RESERVATION   IS   PERSONAL.  [§  660. 

he  will  be  liable  for  damages  in  breaking  and  entering,  though 
such  damages  would  not  include  the  value  of  the  trees,  for  these 
are  already  the  property  of  the  grantor. ^  The  grantor  is  liable 
in  damages  for  leaving  the  timber  on  the  land  longer  than  the 
stipulated  time,  and  for  all  damages  done  to  the  grantee's  land 
by  its  removal  after  such  period ;  but  the  grantee  cannot  claim 
the  timber  already  cut  not  then  removed,  or  the  value  of  it  as 
part  of  the  damages.  The  timber,  having  been  severed  from 
the  land,  became  personal  proj)erty,  and  the  title  was  fully  vested 
in  the  grantor.^ 

When  wood  and  timber  are  reserved  without  fixing  any  definite 
time  for  their  removal,  a  reasonable  time  is  implied.'^ 

No  interest  remains  in  the  grantor  in  the  land  or  in  the  trees 
which  are  parcel  of  it  after  the  time  limited  in  the  reservation, 
in  case  the  property  in  the  trees  is  reserved  conditionally  upon 
their  removal  within  a  limited  period,  or  within  a  reasonable 
time.*  If  a  definite  period,  say  ten  years,  is  reached,  during 
"which  the  trees  are  allowed  to  stand  and  grow  without  payment, 
and  further  time  beyond  such  period  is  allowed  on  the  payment  of 
a  stipulated  yearly  rent,  the  reservation  is  lost  by  the  grantor's 
failure  to  elect  to  have  the  trees  stand  and  grow  for  such  further 
time  by  making  payment  or  offer  of  payment  of  the  rent  named. 
The  reservation  will  expire  by  its  own  limitation  with  the  ten 
years,  nothing  having  been  done  to  keep  it  alive  beyond  that 
time.^ 

560.  A  reservation  may  be  released  by  the  grantor's  subse- 
quent deed  which  grants  and  warrants  the  jDroperty  without 
reservation  or  exception.^  If  the  reservation  be  of  an  interest  in 
the  land,  such  as  an  easement  in  it,  it  cannot  be  extinguished  or 

1  Irons  V.  Webb,  41    N.  J.  L.  203,32  Knott  d.  Hydrick,  12  Rich.  314.     Sec  Put- 
Am.  Rep.  193  ;  Plumer  v.  Prescott,  43  N.  nam  v.  Tuttle,  10  Gray,  48. 
H.  277;  Iloit  v.  Stratton   Mills,  54  N.  H.  *  Plumer  y.  Prescott,   43   N.    II.    277; 
109.     See,  however,  Knott  v.  Hydrick,  12  Iloit  v.  Stratton  Mills,  54  N.  II.  109,  20 
Rich.  314.  Am.  Rep.  119;  Judevine  «;.  Goodrich,  35 

-  Irons  i;.  Webb,  41    N.  .1.   L.  203,  32  Vt.  19.     And  see  Boisaubin   v.    Heed,   2 

Am.  Rep.  193;  Plumer  v.  Prescott,  43  N.  Keyes,  323,  1   Abb.   Dec.   161 ;  Mclntyre 

H.  277.  V.  Rarnard,  1   Saiidf.  Ch.  52  ;  Warren  v. 

3  Hill  );.  Hill,  113  Mass.    103,    18  Am.  Leland,  2  Rarb.  013,622;  Pease  v.  Gib- 

Rep.  45.5;  Gilmore  v.  Wilbur,   12  Pick,  son,  6  Me.  81. 

120,  22  Am.  Dec.  410;  Hoit   v.    Stratton  ^  Perkins  v.  Stockweil,  131  Mass.  529. 

Mills,  54  N.  H.   109,  20^  Am.   Rep.   119  ;  «  Clifton  v.  .lackson  Iron  Co.  74  Mich. 

183,  41  N.  W.  Rep.  S'.U. 

VOL.  I.  465 


§  560.]  EXCKPTIONS   AND   RESERVATIONS. 

renounced  by  ii  parol  agreement,  lint  an  abandonment  of  an 
easonient  reserved  may  be  shown  by  parol  evidence.  A  license 
by  the  owner  of  the  dominant  estate  to  the  owner  of  the  servient 
estate,  to  obstruct  an  easement,  is  not  revocable  after  it  is  exe- 
cuted, and  may  operate  as  an  abandonment  of  the  easement  to 
the  extent  of  such  license.^ 

1  Dyer  v.  Sanford,  9  Met.  395,  43  Am.  Dec.  399. 

466 


CHAPTER   XX. 

THE   HABENDUM,    OR   THE   ESTATES   CREATED. 


I.  The  office   and  effect  of  the  haben- 
dum chuise,  561-570. 
II.  The  naming  of  the  grantee  in  the 
habendum  clause,  571-574. 


HI.  The  word  "  heirs "  essential  at  com- 
raon  hvw  to  create  an  estate  in  fee, 
575-600. 

IV.  The  rule  in  Shelley's  Case,  601-610. 
V.  Estates  tail,  611-618. 


I.   The  Office  and  Effect  of  the  Habendum  Clause. 

561.  An  estate  in  fee  is  an  estate  of  inheritance.  A  fee 
simple  is  the  greatest  interest  and  the  most  absolute  in  the  rights 
conferred  that  one  can  have  in  real  property.  The  word  "  fee  " 
means  inheritance,  and,  as  Lord  Coke  says,  "'simple'  is  added, 
for  that  it  is  descendible  to  the  heirs  generally,  that  is,  simply, 
without  restraint  to  the  heirs  of  the  body,  or  the  like."  ^  The 
word  "  absolute "  added  does  not  impart  anything  to  the  legal 
effect  of  the  term  "  fee"  or  "fee  simple."^ 

562,  The  office  of  the  habendum  is  to  define  the  grantee's 
estate.  "  It  is  to  set  down  again  the  name  of  the  grantee,  the 
estate  that  is  to  be  made  and  limited,  or  the  time  that  the  grantee 
shall  have  in  the  thing  granted  or  demised,  and  to  what  use."  ^ 
The  essential  words  of  the  clause  are  "  to  have  and  to  hold."  The 
latter  word  originally  served  to  indicate  that  the  property  was 
to  be  held  of  a  superior  lord.  The  nature  and  duration  of  the 
estate  are  sometimes  defined  in  the  "  premises,"  by  which  term 
are  designated  all   those   parts  of  a  deed  which  go   before   the 

^  Co.  Litt.  111.     Littleton  says :  "Ten-  i.  e.  pnvdium  hetie/iciarium,  and   legally 

ant  in  fee  simple  is  he  which  hath  lands  signifieth  inheritance,  as  our  author  him- 

or  tenements  to  hold  to  him  and  his  heirs  self  exj)oundeth  it.    And  '  simple '  is  added 

forever.    And  it  is  called  in  Latin,  yeorf!<;rt  for  that  it  is  descendible  to  his  heirs  geii- 

simplex,  ior  feodum  is  the  same  that  in-  erally,  that  is,  simply,  without  restraint  to 

heritance  is,  and  simplex  is  as  much  as  to  the  heirs  of  his  body,  or  the  like."     Co. 

say  lawful  or  pure.     And  so  /iodum  sim-  Litt.  .345  «. 

plex   signifies  a   lawful    or    pure    inherit-         -  Clark  v.  Baker.  14  Cal.  612,  631,  pel 

ance."     Coke  comment.s  thereupon  as  fol-  Field,  C.  J. 
lows:  "  '  Fee  '  cometli  of  the  French  yiV/',         *  Shep.  Touch.  74. 

467 


§  ,'}Go.]  THE   HABENDUM,    OR   THE    ESTATKS   CREATED. 

liabeiuluin.  In  naming  the  grantee  in  the  granting  clause,  if  the 
words  ''and  his  heirs  "  are  atlded,  the  grantee  takes  an  estate  in 
fee  simple,  though  the  habendum  clause  be  wholly  omitted.^  It 
is  not  necessary,  therefore,  that  there  should  be  any  habendum 
clause.  "  Originally,  under  the  feudal  system,  the  office  of  the 
habeutluni  and  tenendum  clauses  was  to  define  the  quantity  of 
interest  or  the  estate  wiiich  the  grantee  is  to  have  in  the  property 
granted,  and  the  tenui-e  upon  or  under  which  it  was  to  be  held. 
Since  the  practical  abolition  of  feudal  tenures,  the  only  object  of 
the  clause  is  to  state  the  character  of  the  grantee's  estate.  But 
although  the  words  of  limitation  usually  appear  in  the  habendum 
as  an  independent  clause  of  the  deed,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
they  should,  if  they  appear  in  some  other  part,  as  in  the  premises."  ^ 

If  the  fi'ranting;  clause  is  either  silent  or  ambiq;uous  as  to  the 
estate  intended  to  be  granted,  the  habendum  must  be  resorted 
to  in  order  to  ascertain  the  nature  and  extent  of  such  estate. ^ 

A  deed  which  in  the  granting  clause  is  to  a  woman  "  and  her 
children  and  assigns,"  habendum  to  her  "and  her  heirs  and  as- 
signs," conveys  to  her  an  estate  in  fee.'* 

If  the  habendum  be  omitted,  the  grantee  takes  the  estate 
limited  in  the  premises.  If  in  the  premises  the  land  is  granted 
to  one  without  words  of  inheritance,  and  there  is  no  habendum, 
the  grantee  takes  an  estate  for  life.  If  the  grant  in  the  premises 
is  to  one  and  his  heirs,  he  takes  an  estate  in  fee  without  the  aid 
of  any  habendum.^ 

663.  The  habendum  may  explain,  enlarge,  or  qualify,  but 
cannot  contradict  or  defeat,  the  estate  granted  by  the  premises.*' 

1  Shep.  Touch.  75 ;  Buckler's  Case,  2  ^  Shep.  Touch.  75  ;  Major  r.  Bukley, 
Coke,  55  6;  Goodtitle  v.  Gibbs,  5  B.  &  C.  51  Mo.  227  ;  Kenworthy  v.  TuHis,  3  Ind. 
717,  8  D.  &  Ry.  .502.  96;  Fulhright  v.  Yoder,  113   N.  C.  456, 

2  Karchner  v.  Hoy,  151  Pa.  St.  383,  390,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  713. 

25  Atl.  Rep.  20,  per  Sterrett,  J.     And  see  •>  Co.  Litt.  299  a  ;  Tyler  v.  Moore,  42 

Major   V.   Bukhy,    51    Mo.    227  ;    Mont-  Pa.   St.  374,  386  ;  Walters  v.  Bredin,  70 

gomery  v.  Sturdivant,  41  Cal.  290.  Pa.  St.  235;  Warn  v.  Brown,  102  Pa.  St. 

8  Mitchell   v.  Wilson,  3  Cranch   C.  C.  347;  Moss  v.  Sheldon,  3  Watts  &  S.  160; 

242 ;    Havens  v.   Seashore   Land  Co.  47  Rincs  v.  Mansfield,  96  Mo.  394,  9  S.  W. 

N.  J.  Eq.  .365,  371,    20  Atl.   Rep.   497;  Rep.  798;  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  Co. 

Staffordville  Gravel  Co.  u.  Newell,  53  N.  r.    Chandler,   9    Allen,    159;    Breed    v. 

J.  L.  412,  41.5,  19  Atl.  Rep.  209;  Riilgin  Osborne,    113    Mass.    318;     Chaffee    v. 

V.  Love,  72  111.  553 ;   Bodine  v.  Arthur,  nod^e,  2  Root,  205 ;  Thompson  v.  Carl, 

91  Ky.  53,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  904.  51  Vt.  408. 

*  Rines  v.  Mansfield,  96  Mo.  394,  9  S. 
W.  Rep.  798. 

468 


THE   OFFICE   AND   EFFECT    OF   THE   HABENDUM   CLAUSE.       [§  564. 

The  premises  of  a  deed  are  often  expressed  in  general  terms 
which  admit  of  explanations  which  are  usually  found  in  the 
habendum.  The  premises  frequently  do  not  describe,  or  profess 
to  describe,  the  quantum  or  extent  of  the  estate  granted  or  in- 
tended to  be  granted.^  If  no  words  of  inheritance  are  used  in 
the  premises,  tlie  grantee  by  the  premises  takes  by  implication 
only  a  life  estate  at  most.  The  habendum  may  then  by  express 
limitation  define  the  estate  granted  as  an  estate  for  life  in  fee,  or 
in  fee  tail,  and  the  estate  so  expressly  defined  necessarily  excludes 
the  uncertain  implication  from  the  premises.^ 

Thus,  where  a  deed  grants  certain  lands  to  the  grantee  without 
defining  the  interest  intended  to  be  conveyed,  habendum  to  the 
use  of  the  grantee  "during  the  term  of  her  natural  life,"  even 
under  a  statute  which  makes  every  conveyance  a  fee,  when  no 
contrary  intention  appears  by  the  use  of  express  terms,  or  is 
necessarily  implied,  the  grantee  takes  only  a  life  estate.  "  As, 
then,  the  premises  do  not  in  express  terms  convey  a  fee,  and  as, 
in  the  absence  of  words  of  inheritance,  an  implication  that  a  fee 
was  designed  to  be  conveyed  can  only  arise  where  the  intention 
to  convey  a  less  estate  is  not  disclosed,  and  as  the  intention  to 
convey  a  less  estate  than  a  fee  is  most  unequivocally  expressed,  it 
follows,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  there  is  no  repugnancy  be- 
tween the  granting  clause  and  the  habendum,  and  that  the  haben- 
dum must  be  given  effect,  because  it  is  the  only  part  of  the  deed 
which  purports  to  describe  the  quantum  of  estate  conveyed."  ^ 

564.  If  the  premises  express  an  estate  in  fee,  this  cannot 
be  wholly  annulled  by  anything  in  the  habendum.  The  ha- 
bendum may  confirm,  qualify,  or  limit  the  estate  or  fee  declared 
in  the  premises  ;  ^  but  so  far  as  the  habendum  is  inconsistent 
witli  tlie  declaration  in  the  premises  it  must  be  rejected.^ 

It  is  largely  from  this  distinction  that  the  rule  is  drawn  that,  in 
case  the  premises  and  the  habendum  of  a  deed  are  irreconcihible, 

1  Doren  v.  Gilluin,  136  Ind.  134,  35  N.  ^  Kelly  v.  Hill  (Mil.),  25  All.  Ke]).  919, 

E.  Kej).   1101;  Edwards  (•.  Bcall,  75  Ind.  per   McSherry,   J.     See,   also,  Winter  v. 

401  ;  Carson  v.  McCaslin,  00  Ind.  334.  Gorsuch,  51   Md.   180,  183  ;  Farquharson 

-  Berry  v.  Billings,  44  Me.  410,  423,  69  v.  Kichelberjrer,  15  Md.  63,  72. 

Am.   Dec.   107;  Ri<,'-iin  v.  Love,  72  III.  •*  Breed  c.  O.«l.ornc,  113  Mass.  318. 

553  ;  Mont-omerv  r.  Sturdivant,  41   Cal.  '■  Bahhvin'.s  Case,  2  Coke  Kep.  23  ;  Earl 

290  ;  Bodinc  v.  Arthur,  91   Ky.  53,  14  S.  of  Hntland's  Ca.se,  8  Rep.  55  a;  Winter  v. 

W.  Rep.  904 ;  Bean  v.  Kenmuir,  86  Mo.  Gorsueh,  51  Md.  180 ;  Riggin  v.  Love,  72 

666  111-  •^■>^>  I'cr  SchoKield,  J. 

469 


§  i>G^.] 


THE  HABENDUM,  OR  THE  ESTATES  CHEATED. 


the  piviuist'S  will  control  ;  as  where  in  the  premises  the  grant  is 
to  one  and  his  ln-irs,  and  the  habendum  is  to  him  for  life.' 

Other  reasons,  however,  have  been  assigned  for  the  ride  that 
the  premises  shall  control  when  repngnant  to  the  habendum. 
"This  doctrine  proceeds  upon  the  principle  that,  where  there  are 
two  clauses  in  a  deed  repugnant  to  each  other,  the  first  shall  pre- 
vail;- and  every  deed  is  expounded  most  strongly  against  the 
giantor,  and  most  for  the  advantage  of  the  grantee;  and  there- 
fore the  grantee  shall  take  by  the  premises,  if  that  be  most  bene- 
ficial for  him,  and  not  by  the  habendum  ;  and  the  grantor  shall 
not  be  allowed,  by  any  subsequent  part  of  the  deed,  to  contradict 
or  retract  the  gift  n)ade  in  the  premises."^  The  latter  reason, 
namely,  that  deeds  shall  be  construed  most  strongly  against  the 
grantor,  is  assigned  in  several  American  cases.'* 

565.  A  habendum  clause  which  is  repugnant  to  the  estate 
already  vested  by  the  deed  is  void.^  It  does  not  matter 
whether  the  repugnancy  be  in  respect  to  the  estate  conveyed,  the 
grantee  who  is  to  take,  or  the  quantit}'  of  the   thing  conveyed. 


1  Goodtitle  v.  Gibbs,  5  B.  &  C.  709  ; 
Faivre  v.  Daley,  93  Cal.  664,  29  Pac.  Rep. 
256;  Karchner  v.  Hoy,  151  Pa.  St.  383, 
25  Atl.  Rep.  20;  Moore  v.  Waco,  85  Tex. 
206,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  61  ;  Bodine  v.  Arthur, 
'^l  Ky.  53,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  904,  where  the 
court  say:  "It  is  uii.doiibtedly  true  that 
in  case  of  repugnancy  betweeu  ihe  two, 
aud  it  cannot  be  determined  from  the 
whole  in'^trument  and  attending  circum- 
stances wiih  reasonable  certainty  that  the 
grantor  intended  that  the  habendum 
should  control,  the  conveyancing  clause 
must  in  that  case  control,  for  the  reason 
that  words  of  conveyance  are  necessary 
to  the  passage  of  the  title,  and  the  ha- 
bendum is  not  ordinarily  an  indispensable 
part  of  a  deed." 

2  Leicester  y.  Biggs,  2  Taunt.  113.  In 
Barnett  v.  Barnett  (Cal.),  37  Pac.  Rep. 
!049,  it  is  stated  that  this  rule  is  only  an- 
other form  of  the  rule  of  construction 
given  in  Civ.  Code,  §  1070,  that,  "  if  sev- 
eral parts  of  a  grant  are  absolutely  irre- 
concilable, the  former  parr  ]irevails." 

^  Baldwin's  Cise,  2  Coke  Rep.  23, 
Thomas'  ed.,  note. 

470 


*  Budd  V.  Brooke,  3  Gill,  198;  Winter 
V.  Gorsuch,  51  Md.  180,  185. 

6  Co.  Litt.  299a;  Goodtitle  v.  Gibbs,  5 
Barn.  &  C.  709 ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  71  Mich. 
633,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  21  ;  Havens  v.  Sea- 
shore Land  Co.  47  N.  J.  Eq.  365,  20  Atl. 
Rep.  497  ;  Henderson  v.  Mack,  82  Ky. 
379 ;  Ratcliffe  v.  Marrs,  87  Ky.  26,  7  S. 
W.  Rep.  395,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  876;  Clay 
V.  Chenault  (Ky.),  10  S.  W.  Rep.  650; 
Bodine  v.  Arthur,  91  Ky.  .53, 14  S.  W.  Rep. 
904 ;  Hafner  v.  Irwin,  4  Dev.  &  B.  433, 
435,  34  Am.  Dec.  390  ;  Robinson  v.  Payne, 
58  Miss.  690;  Huntington  v.  Lyman,  138 
Mass.  205;  Pynchon  v.  Stearns,  11  Met. 
312,  316,  45  Am.  Dec.  210;  Winter  v. 
Gorsuch,  51  Md.  180;  Farquharson  v. 
Eichelberger,  15  Md.  63;  Budd  v.  Brooke, 
3  Gill,  108,  235,  43  Am  Dec.  321  ;  Fore- 
man V.  Presbyterian  Asso.  (Md.)  30  Atl. 
Rep.  1114;  Nightingale  v.  Hidden,  7  R.  L 
115;  Flagg  v.  Fames,  40  Vt.  16,  94  Am. 
Dec.  3G3;  Warn  v.  Brown,  102  Pa.  St. 
347  ;  Tyler  v.  Moore,  42  Pa.  St.  374,  387, 
per  Strong,  J. ;  Wager  v.  Wager,  1  Serg.  & 
R.  374  ;  Green  Bay  Canal  Co.  v.  Hewett, 
55  Wis.  105,  12  N.  W.  Rep.  382. 


THE  OFFICE  AND  EFFECT  OF  THE  HABENDUM  CLAUSE.   [§  566. 

The  habendum  can  affect  the  grant  only  when  it  can  be  construed 
as  consistent  with  the  premises.  It  cannot  frustrate  the  grant 
ah-eady  made  in  the  premises,  nor  abridge  or  lessen  such  grant. 
Thus,  where  a  grant  was  made  by  a  father  to  his  son  "  and  to  his 
heirs  for  the  use,  benefit,  and  support  of  himself  and  his  family, 
and  the  proper  education  of  his  children,"  but  the  habendum  was 
"  for  the  period  of  his  natural  life,  and  after  his  death  to  his  chil- 
dren in  fee  simple,  for  the  purposes  and  uses  above  set  forth," 
with  a  covenant  that  the  grantee  should  use  the  property  for  such 
purposes,  and  not  convey  it  or  any  interest  in  it  during  the  life- 
time of  any  of  his  children,  or  of  any  of  his  brothers  or  sisters, 
it  was  held,  that  by  the  premises  a  fee  vested  in  the  grantee, 
and  the  habendum,  being  repugnant  to  the  granting  clause,  must 
be  I'ejected.^ 

566.  Effect  will  be  given  to  both  the  granting  clause  and 
the  habendum,  if  possible  to  do  so  by  fair  construction,  where 
the  interest  intended  to  be  conveyed  is  defined  in  both  clauses. 
If  the  habendum  is  to  the  grantee  for  the  life  of  another,  after  a 
grant  to  him  and  his  heirs,  there  is  no  repugnancy.  The  haben- 
dum is  in  such  case  consistent  with  the  grant,  since  the  word 
"heirs"  will  still  have  effect ;  ^  "for  when  an  estate  is  given  to  one 
and  his  heirs  for  the  life  of  another,  the  heir  may  take  and  hold 
after  tlie  death  of  his  ancestor  as  a  special  occupant.  The  rule 
of  construction  in  such  cases  is  held  to  be  that,  when  the  estate  is 
given  in  the  premises  to  one  and  his  heirs  generally,  habendum 
to  him  and  otlier  heirs,  the  habendum  may  be  used  to  explain 
the  premises,  by  showing  what  heirs  are  meant  by  the  grantor, 
and  will  not  be  repugnant ;  for  such  explanation  is  held  not  to 
retract  the  gift  in  the  premises,  because  tiie  word  '  heirs '  has  still 
its  operation,  and  by  construction  is  more  conformable  to  the  will 
and  intentions  of  tlie  donor."  ^ 

Thus  an  estate  tail  given  in  the  premises  is  not  enlarged  to  an 
estate  in  fee  simple  by  an  habendum  to  the  grantee  and  his  heirs; 
for  it  is  easy  and  congruous  to  suppose  tiiat  the  word  "  iieirs  "  in 
tlie  liaben.hun  m'-aiis  tlie  same  and  was  intended  t.)  mean  the 
same,  as  the  heirs  designated  in  the  premises.'*     This  is  still  more 

1  Smith  V.  Smith.  "1  Mich.  633,40  N.         ■'  Kowland   v.  Rowland,  93   N.   C.  214, 

W.  Hop.  21.    And  see  Kobinsou  y.  Psiyne,  220,  i>(t  Aslie,  J. 
58  Mi.«   690  *  Co.  Utt.  21  a;  Thompson  r.  Carl,  51 

■'  Slifp.  Touch.  200.  Vt.  408  ;  Corbin  i-.  Healy.  20  Pick.  514. 

471 


§  567.]      THE  HABENDUM,  OR  THE  ESTATES  CHEATED. 

clear,  where  the  habeinhun  is  to  ''his  heirs  as  aforesaid."  And 
so,  a<^ain,  a  j^raiit  to  one  and  his  heirs  may  be  reduced  to  an  estate 
tail  bv  a  limitation  in  the  habendum  to  the  lieirs  of  his  body.^ 
The  habendum  does  not  in  such  case  contradict  the  premises,  but 
only  defines  what  heirs  of  the  grantee  were  intended  by  the 
grant. 

There  is  no  repugnancy  between  the  premises  and  the  haben- 
dum where  by  the  ft)rmer  there  is  a  grant  in  fee,  and  by  the  lat- 
ter tlie  fee  is  restricted  to  a  base  or  determinable  fee  ;  for  the 
estate  is  still  a  fee.  It  may  continue  in  the  grantee  and  his  heirs 
forever,  but  may  be  terminated  by  the  act  or  event  expressed  in 
the  limitation.  In  this  respect  it  is  similar  to  a  grant  npon  con- 
dition.2 

567.  If  the  premises  and  the  habendum  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled by  construction,  that  clause  will  control  which  most 
precisely  defines  the  estate  intended  to  be  conveyed,  if  this  is  in 
harmony  with  the  general  intention  as  gathered  from  the  whole 
instrument.^  Thus,  where  the  granting  clause  of  a  deed  of  settle- 
ment by  a  husband  on  his  wife  gave  her  the  fee,  but  the  haben- 
dum provided  that  she  should  hold  the  land  while  she  remained 
his  widow,  and  that  at  her  decease  it  should  revert  to  the  grantor 
and  his  heirs,  it  was  held  that  the  habendum  controlled  the  con- 
struction of  the  deed.  The  court  regarded  the  intention  as  ex- 
pressed and  as  indicated  by  the  situation  of  the  grantor,  who  was 
an  old  man,  providing  for  a  young  wife  and  one  child,  an  infant 
at  the  time,  and  having  no  other  property  or  estate.* 

The  habendum,  when  not  clearly  contradictor}'-  to  the  gr-anting 
words,  is  to  be  resorted  to  equally  with  the  other  parts  of  the 
deed  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  grantor's  intention.'' 

A  grantor  conveyed  land  to  his  daughter  and  her  husband, 
"  their  heirs  and  assigns,"  by  a  deed  containing  the  following 
provision  in  the  premises  after  the  description  :  "  It  is  expressly 
understood  by  all  parties  hereto  that,  if  the  said  husband  and  wife 

1  Altham's  Case,  8  Coke  Rep.   150  b,  Atl.  Rep.  1065.     Per  Paxson,  C.  J. :  "It 

154  6;  Tyler  I'.  Moore,  42  Pa.  St.  374,  386,  would  be  a  violent  presumption,  too  vio- 

per  Strong,  J.  lent  to  be  entertained  for   a  moment,  to 

-  .Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  Co.  r.  Chand-  suppose    that  he   intended  this  estate  to 

ler,  9  Allen,  159,  168,  per  Bigelow,  C.  .J.  go  to  a  second  husband  of  his  wife,  after 

3  Karchner  i;.  Hoy,  151  Pa.  St.  383,  25  her  death,  to   the   exclusion  of   his  own 

Atl.  Rep.  20.  child." 

*  Whitby  V.  Duffv,  135  Pa.  St.  G20,  19  '"  Henderson  v.  Mack,  82  Ky.  379. 
472 


THE   OFFICE   AND   EFFECT    OF   THE   HABENDUM   CLAUSE.       [§  567. 

should  have  a  child  or  children  of  their  two  bodies  begotten  and 
born,  then  the  land  herein  convej-ed  shall  vest  in  the  said  hus- 
band and  wife  and  their  heirs  forever.     But  should  this  event  not 
happen,  then  the  said  husband  and  wife,  or  the  survivoi-  of  either 
of  them,  shall  have  and  enjoy  a  life  estate  in  the  said  land."     It 
was  provided  that  if  no  issue  were  born  the  land  should  be  sold, 
and  the  jn'oeeeds  divided  among  certain  persons  mentioned.     The 
habendum  clause  was  as  follows:  "To  have  and  to  hold  the  said 
lands,  hereditaments,  and  premises  hereby  granted  or  mentioned, 
and  intended  so  to  be,  with  the  appurtenances,  unto  the  said  pai'- 
ties  of  the   se<  oud  part,  their  heirs  and  assigns,  to  and  for  the 
only  proper  use  and  behoof  of  the  said  parties  of  the  second  pai't, 
their  hei'.s  and  assigns  forever."     The  wife  died  before  her  hus- 
band, never  having  had  any  child  or  children.     It  was  held  that 
the  husband  took  a  life  estate  only  in  the  land.     The  court  said : 
"  We  think  the  quantum  of  interest  intended  to  be  conveyed  is 
clearly  and  expressly  defined  in  the  premises  of  the  deed.     If  the 
habendum  were  entirely  eliminated  from  the  instrument,  it  would 
still  be  an  undoubtedly  good  and  valid   conveyance  of  the  estate 
intended  to  be  granted.    Whether  we  regard  the  special  provision 
for  enlarging  the  estate  into  a  fee,  in   the  event  of  the  grantees 
having   'a   child  or  children   of    their  two  bodies  begotten    and 
born,'  as  a  condition  precedent  to  such  enlargement  or  not,  the 
result  is  the  same.     Nor  does  it  make  any  difference  that  the  pro- 
vision referred  to  is  separated  from  other  clauses  or  phrases  relat- 
ing to  the  quantum  of  interest.  .  .  .  The  interest  granted  is  so 
fully,  circumstantially,  and  precisely  defined  and   limited  in  the 
special  clause  referred  to,  that  there  can  be  no  mistake,  in  that 
regard,  as  to  the  expressly  declared  understanding  and  intention 
of  the  parties  to  the  deed;  and  there  appears  to  be  no  good  rea- 
son why  that  intention  should  not  prevail,'  ^ 

If  tlie  estate  is  briefly  defined  in  the  premises  and  more  specifi- 
cally in  the  habendum, "^the  latter  will  have  a  controlling  effect, 
for  it  is  the  legitimate  office  of  this  clause  to  enlarge  and  fully 
define  thc^  estate  described  in  less  specific  terms  in  the  preinises.2 
A  recital  in  the  jm-miscs  of  a  deed,  that  the  grantors  -convey 

1  Karohn.-r   ,-.    IIov.    151    Pa.   St.  383,  r.  TaU.m,  SI    Ala.  388.1    So.   Rep.  195 ; 
389,  391 ,  per  SterrCt,  J  Ki"-"  '■•   M--fi«''l-  «*'  ^'"-  ^'"'^  ^- Z' 

2  Karclin.-r  v.  Hoy,  151  Pa.  St.  383,  390,  Hep.  798  ;  Green  v.  Sutton,  50  Mo.  186. 
25  All.  Ri'p.  20,  per  Sterrctt,  J. ;  Tatum  192. 

473 


THE    HABENDUM,    OR   THE   ESTAl'ES    CREATED. 

it "  the  huid  to  persons  named,  is  not  totally  repugnant 

lenduni    clause  which  piovides  that  they  are  to  hold 

^  their  natural  lives,  and  then  to  descend  to  another." 

The  use  of  the   word  "  descend  "  does  not  necessarily  show  that 

the  first  takers  were  to  take  an  estate  in  fee.' 

568.  The  inclination  of  many  courts  at  the  present  day  is 
to  regard  the  wliole  instrument,  without  reference  to  formal 
divisions.  The  deed  is  so  construed,  if  possible,  as  to  give  effect 
to  all  its  provisions,  and  thus  to  elftctuate  the  intent  of  the  par- 
ties. When  an  instrument  is  informal,  the  interest  transferred 
by  it  depends  not  so  much  upon  the  words  and  phrases  it  contains 
as  upon  the  intention  of  the  parties  as  indicated  by  the  whole 
instrument.'-^  This  view  is  expressed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
California  in  a  recent  case  :  '■^  "  The  intention  of  the  parties  to  the 
grant  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  instrument  itself,  and  deter- 
mined by  a  proper  construction  of  the  language  used  therein  ; 
but,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  this  intention,  the  entire 
instrument,  the  habendum  as  well  as  the  premises,  is  to  be  con- 
sidered ;  and,  if  it  appear  from  such  consideration  that  the 
grantor  intended  by  the  habendum  clause  to  restrict  or  limit  or 
enlarge  the  estate  named  in  the  granting  clause,  the  habendum 
will  prevail  over  the  granting  clause." 

Where  a  husband  conveyed  land  to  his  wife  "and  her  heirs  and 
assigns  forever,"  but  the  habendum  limited  the  conveyance  to 
her  separate  use,  "  with  power  to  sell,  and,  by  deed  made  and 
executed  jointly  with  her  husband,  convey  the  land  and  invest 


1  Doren  r.  Gillum,  136  Ind.  134,  35  N. 
E.  Kep.  1101. 

-  California :  Faivre  v.  Daley,  93  Cal. 
664,  2'J  Pi\f.  Kep.  256.  Connecticut: 
liariliolDmew  v.  Muzzy,  61  Coun.  387, 
23  Atl.  Hep.  604;  Bryan  ;-.  Bradley,  16 
Conn.  474.  Illinois:  Mittel  v.  Karl,  133 
III.  65,  24  N.  E.  Kep.  5.53  ;  Ki-giii  r. 
Love,  72  111.  5.53  ;  P(  o\  /;.  Blakie,  53  111. 
495.  Indiana:  CarsDii  v.  McCaslin,  60 
Ind.  334,  337  ;  Edwards  v.  Beali,  75  Ind. 
401.  Kentucky:  Henderson  z;.  Mack,  82 
Ky.  379.  Maine:  IligKin.s  v.  Wasgatt, 
34  Me.  305.  Massachusetts:  Bridge  v. 
Wellington,  1  Mass.  219,  229;  Breed  v. 
Osborne,  113  Mass.  318.  Minnesota: 
Grueber  v.  Liudenmeier,  42  Minn.  99,  43 

474 


N.  W.  Rep.  964.  Oregon :  Beebe  v.  Mc- 
Kenzie,  19  Oreg.  296,  24  Pac.  Rep.  236. 
Pennsylvania :  Ogden  v.  Brown,  33  Pa. 
St.  247  ;  Lemon  r.  Graham,  131  Pa.  St. 
447,  453,  19  Atl.  Kep.  48;  Dreisliaeh  v. 
Serfass,  126  Pa.  St.  32;  Tyler  v.  Moore, 
42  Pa  St.  374,  387;  Wager  v.  Wager,  1 
S.  &  R.  374.  Tennessee  :  Hanks  v.  Fol- 
soin,  11  Lea,  555,  560;  Beeclier  r.  Hicks, 
7  Lea,  207,  212;  Fogarty  v.  Stoek,  86 
'I'enn.  610,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  846.  Texas: 
Hancock  v.  Butler,  21  Tex.  804. 

3  Bavnett  v.  Barnett,  104  Cal.  298.  300, 
37  Pac.  Rep.  1049.  And  sec  Ratcliffe  v. 
Marrs,  87  Ky.  26,  7  S.  W.  Rep.  395,  8 
S.  W.  Rep.  876  ;  Bodine  i-.  Arthur,  91  Ky. 
53,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  904. 


THE    OFFICE    AND    EFFECT    uF    THE    HABENDUM    CLAUSE.      [§§  569,  570. 

the  proceeds  in  other  property,  to  be  held  "  in  the  same  manner, 
and  also  provided  that  if  the  husband  should  survive  the  land 
should  revert  to  him  in  fee  simple,  it  was  held  that  the  habendum, 
though  repugnant  to  the  estate  granted  in  the  premises,  should 
be  given  controlling  effect,  as  being  in  accord  with  the  intention 
of  the  grantor  as  gathered  from  the  entire  instrument.^ 

This  rule  of  construction  does  not,  however,  demand  tliat  all 
parts  of  the  deed  shall  be  treated  as  of  equal  weight  in  determin- 
ing the  effect  of  the  instrument. ^ 

569.  In  Kentucky  it  has  been  declared  that  the  habendum 
controls  the  granting  clause  when  these  clauses  are  repug- 
nant, since  the  statute  declaring  words  of  inheritance  unneces- 
sary. Although  by  the  granting  clause  a  conveyance  in  fee 
simple  is  implied,  but  the  habendum  is  repugnant  to  such  an 
inference,  the  habendum  will  be  given  controlling  effect.  Thus, 
where  a  f;ither,  "  for  and  in  consideration  of  natural  affection" 
for  his  daughter  and  son,  conveyed  certain  land,  habendum  to  them 
and  their  children  forever,  there  being  nothing  in  the  deed  indi- 
cating that  the  gi'antor  used  the  word  "  children  "  in  the  sense  of 
*'  heirs,"  it  was  held  that,  as  the  habendum  controls  the  granting 
clause  when  they  are  repugnant,  and  as  the  statutory  provision, 
that  every  estate  created  by  deed  "  without  words  of  inheritance  " 
shall  be  deemed  a  fee  simple,  applies  only  where  a  different  pur- 
pose does  not  appear  "  by  express  words  or  necessary  inference," 
the  daughter  and  son  took  only  a  life  estate,  remainder  to  tlieir 
children.^ 

It  has  also  been  said  tliat  the  habendum  sliould  control  because 
it  is  the  last  expression  of  the  grantoi-.'^ 

570.  An  absolute  conveyance  in  fee  is  not  defeated  or  qual- 
ified by  a  subsequent  recital.  Thus,  a  deed  by  a  father  to  his 
infant  daugliter  and  her  heirs,  wliich  also  recites  that  the  same  is 
to  be  held  in  trust  by  her  grandfather  until  she  shall  become 
of  age,  jiasscs  the  title  to  the  proi»erty  directly  to  the  daughter 
upon  delivery  of  the  deed,  and  no  title  or  trust  is  vested  in  the 
grandfather.'^ 

1  Fofiarty  v.  Stock,  80  Tenn.  010,  8  S.  *  Ilendorson  ;-.  Mack,  82  Ky.379;  Rat- 
W.  ]{ep.  846.  cliffi'  r.   Marrs,  87   Ky.  26,  7  S.  W.   Keji. 

2  Moore  v.  Waco,  85  l\x.  200,  20  S.  395,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  876.  See  Bodi.in  v. 
W.  Rep.  61.  Arthur,  91  Ky.  53,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  904. 

3  Baskeit  V.  Sellers  (Ky.),  19  S.  W.  ^  Aunis  r.  Wilson,  15  Colo.  2.'?f,.  L'.')  !'ac. 
Rep.  9.     See   BoJiiie   v.  Arthur,   91    Ky.  Rep.  304. 

53,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  904.  -J'-' 


^  oil.]  TllK    IIABKNDUM,    OU    THE    ESTATKS    (flKATED. 

Alter  a  conveyance  in  fee,  a  clause  in  the  deed,  indicating  the 
motive  or  purpose  of  the  conveyance,  will  not  limit  its  effect  as  a 
conveyance  of  the  fee.  Thus,  where  a  wife  conveyed  to  lier  hus- 
band certain  land  in  fee,  and  immediately  following  the  descrip- 
tion in  the  deed  there  was  a  clause  which  declared  that  the  object 
and  intention  of  the  conveyance  was  to  make  good  certain  mort- 
o-ao-es  which  the  husband  had  given  upon  the  land,  it  was  held 
that  her  deed  was  effectual  as  a  conveyance  of  the  fee,  and  that 
the  motive  for  making  the  conveyance  was  immaterial.^ 

But  the  context  may  show  that  the  word  "  heirs"  is  to  be  re- 
jected, as  when  the  habendum  is  to  one,  his  heirs  and  assigns, 
"from  the  perfection  of  these  presents  for  and  during  the  term 
of  his  natural  life."  ^ 

A  deed  in  fee  and  an  instrument  executed  at  the  same  time  by 
the  grantee,  declaring  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  be  that  the 
grantee  should  hold  only  a  life  estate,  should  be  read  together  as 
one  instrument ;  and  the  grantor  is  entitled  to  relief  in  equity 
either  by  reforming  the  deed  so  that  it  should  express  only  a  life 
estate,  or  by  restraining  the  grantee  from  asserting  any  greater 
estate  or  interest/^ 

Where  the  granting  clause  conveyed  an  estate  in  fee,  "subject 
to  the  limitations  hereinafter  expressed  as  to  part  thereof,"  and 
the  habendum  limited  one  half  part  of  the  land  to  the  grantee 
for  life,  and  at  his  decease  to  descend  to  his  children,  it  was  held 
that  the  habendum  reducing  the  estate  in  one  half  part  to  a 
tenancy  for  life  was  not  repugnant  to  the  premises ;  for  the  prem- 
ises indicate  a  limitation  of  the  estate  in  fee  as  to  a  part  of  the 
land,  and  this  limitation  is  found  in  the  habendum.  The  premises 
are  not  in  such  case  complete  without  the  words  of  the  habendum. 
There  is  no  repugnancy  between  these  clauses.* 

II.    The  naming  of  the  Cirantee  in  the  Habendum  Clause. 

671.  The  grantee  should  be  named  in  the  habendum  as  well 
as  in  the  granting  clause.  If  no  grantee  be  named  in  the  prem- 
ises, the  grantee  named  in  the  habendum  takes  the  estate.^    If  two 

1  Bodwell  Granite  Co.  v.  Lane,  83  Me.  »  Scofield  '•.  Quiun,  54  Minn.  9,  .55  N. 
168,  21  Atl.  Kep.  829  ;  Fowler  v.  Black,     W.  Rep.  745. 

136  111.  363,  26  N.  E.  Kep.  .596.  *  Tyler  v.  IMoore,  42  Pa.  St.  374. 

2  Re  Hammersly,  11  Ir.  Ch.  229,  12  &  Co.  Litt.  7  «,  26/;;  Shep.  Touch.  75; 
Ir.  Ch.  319.  Spyve  v.  Topham,  3  East,  115;  Sumner  v. 

476 


NAMING  OF  THE  GRANTEE  IN  THE  HABENDUM.  [§§  572-574. 

ov  more  persons  are  named  in  tlie  premises,  and  only  one  of  them  is 
named  in  the  habendum,  he  alone  will  take  an  immediate  estate. 
In  such  case  there  is  iio  i-epugnancy  between  the  premises  and  the 
habendum,  and  the  manifest  intention  of  the  grantor  is  effectu- 
ated by  making  the  person  named  in  the  habendum  the  grantee 
under  the  deed. 

572.  A  stranger  to  the  premises  in  which  a  grantee  is 
named  cannot  take  as  a  grantee  in  fee.  If  in  the  premises  one 
person  be  named  as  grantee  with  words  of  inheritance,  but  the 
habendum  is  to  another,  the  habendum  is  repugnant  and  void, 
and  the  person  named  in  the  premises  will  take.^ 

573.  A  use  may  be  declared  in  the  habendum  to  a  person 
to  whom  no  estate  is  granted  in  the  premises. - 

A  remainder  may  also  be  declared  in  the  habendum  to  one  who 
is  not  named  in  the  premises.^ 

574.  If  one  grantee  is  named  in  the  premises,  and  in  the 
habendum  the  same  person  with  another  is  named,  the  grantee 
named  in  the  premises  will  take  the  estate  conveyed,  and  the 
person  not  so  named  will  take  nothing.* 

In  South  Carolina,  however,  it  is  held  that  if  in  the  premises 
a  person  is  named  as  grantee  without  words  of  inheritance,  and 
in  the  habendum  he  is  again  named  Nvith  another  person  not 
named  in  the  premises,  with  words  of  inheritance  as  to  both,  the 
habendum  will  control,  and  each  of  them  will  take  an  estate  in 
fee  in  the  land.^ 

Williams,  8  Mass.   162,  174,  5  Am.  Dec.  GO  ;  Spyve  v.  Topham,  3  East,  Wo;  Kerr 

8.3.  per  Sed-wick,  J.  ;  Berrv  r.  Billings,  v.  Kerr,  4  Ir.  Ch.  493  ;  Blair  ..  Osborne. 

44  Me.  416.  69  Am.  Dec.  io7  ;  Irwin  r.  84  N.  C   417;  Beecher  ..  H.cks  7  Lea. 

Longworth,   20    Ohio,    581;    McLeod   v.  207.  213.  per  Cooper,  J.;  M^'C"  lock  v. 

Tarrant,  39  S.  C.  271,274,280,  17  S.  E.  Holmes.    \U    Mo.   445,    19  b^  W.    Kep. 

Rep.  773,  per  Pope,  J.,  and  Mclver,  C.  J.  1096;    Wager    v.   Wager,    1    Serg.  &  R. 

1  Blair  v.  Osborne,  84  N.  C.  417  ;  Haf-     374. 

T     •      ^  T^        p    n     111    Q.1    Am  *  Sa.mme8' Ca.se,  13  Coke,  54;  Winds- 

Tier  I'.  Irwin,  4  Dev.   &   B.   433.  34   Am.  oaraiiito   v  a.    , 

Dec.  390;  McLeod  v.  Tarrant.  .39  S.  C.  more   v.   Hobart.  Hob.  313/.,  Cro.   iMiz. 

271,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  773,  per  Mclver.  C.  J.,  58.                                         „  o    r.  «-,    i- 

dissenting  '  >I«^Leod  v.  Tarrant,  39  S.  C.  2, 1,  1 . 

■^  Sammes'  Case,  13  Coke,  54  ;  Spyve  ..  S.  E.  Rep.  773.  Mclver.  C.  J.,  d.ssent.ng 

Topham,  3  East,  115.  <"'  tl-c  ground  that  a  person  cannot  take 

3  Co    Eitt.  27  a,  231  a;  Windsmore  v.  an  immediate  estate  by  the  habendum  to 

Hobart,  Hob.  313  6;  Owen's  Case.3  Leon,  whom  no  grant  is  ma-le  in  the  premises. 

477 


§  575.]     THK  HABENDUM,  OR  THE  ESTATES  CREATED. 

III.    The  Word  '•'•  Heirs'"  essential  at   Common  Law  to  create  an 

Estate  in  Fee. 
575.  To  create  an  estate  in  fee  simple  by  deed  it  is  essen- 
tial that  the  limitation  shall  be  to  the  grantee  '•'  and  his  heirs." 
Littleton  states  the  universal  rule  :  ^  "  If  a  man  would  purchase 
lands  or  tenements  in  fee  simple,  it  belioveth  him  to  have  these 
\Yor(ls  in  his  purchase,  'to  have  and  to  hold  to  him  and  to  his 
heirs  ; '  for  these  words  'his  heirs  '  make  the  estate  of  inheritance. 
For  it"  a  man  purchase  lands  by  these  words,  'to  have  and  to  hold 
to  him  forever,'  or  by  these  words,  'to  have  and  to  hold  to  him 
and  his  assigns  forever,'  — in  these  two  cases  he  hath  but  an  estate 
for  term  of  life,  for  that  there  lack  these  words,  '  his  heirs,'  which 
words  only  make  an  estate  of  inheritance  in  all  feoffments  and 
grants."  An  estate  in  fee  cannot  be  created  by  describing  it  as 
such,  as  "  to  have  and  to  hold  to  him  in  fee  simple."  ^  Only  an 
estate  for  life  is  created  by  such  a  deed.  The  words  "  his  heirs  " 
are  absolutely  essential  to  the  creation  of  an  estate  in  fee  simple. 
No  other  words  and  no  description  of  the  estate  is  sufficient. 
"These  words  only,"  says  Littleton,  "make  an  estate  of  inher- 
itance in  all  feoffments  and  grants."  ^     It  does  not  avail  to  say 


1  Littleton,  §  1,  Co.  Litt.  6  a. 

2  By  statute  in  Ensland  these  are  now 
the  appropriate  words  to  create  an  estate 
in  fee. 

3  Shep.  Touch.  106;  Bridgewater  v. 
Bolton,  0  Mod.  106,  109.  Arkansas  :  Pat- 
terson V.  Moore,  15  Ark.  222.  Illinois: 
Edwardsville  II.  Co.  v.  Sawyer,  92  111. 
377.  Maryland:  before  the  act  of  1856, 
ch.  154,  Code,  art.  21,  §  11  ;  Handy  «.  Mc- 
Kira,  64  Md.  560,  4  Atl.  Rep.  125 ;  Brady 
V.  I":vans  (Md.),  28  Atl.  Rep.  1061  ;  Hofsass 
/•.  Mann,  74  Md.  400,  22  Atl.  Rep.  65; 
Merritt  v.  Di.'^ney,  48  Md.  344.  Massa- 
chusetts :  Buffum  i'.  Hutchinson,  1  Allen, 
58 ;  Scd;;wick  v.  Laflin,  10  Allen,  430  ; 
Curtis  V.  Gardner,  13  Met.  457  ;  Ashcroft 
V.  Eastern  I?.  Co.  126  Mass.  196,  30  Am. 
Rep.  672. 

In  the  earliest  years  of  the  Massachu- 
setts colony  a  very  loose  practice  had 
grown  ujjof  making  conveyances  intended 
to  be  in  fee  without  the  use  of  the  word 

478 


"  heirs."  To  stop  this,  a  statute  was  en- 
acted by  the  General  Court  in  May,  1651, 
which  recited  that  "  whereas,  through  un- 
skilfulness  of  some  that  make  deeds  and 
conveyances  of  lands  and  houses,  the  word 
'  lieir '  is  oftentimes  omitted  ;  .  .  .  for  pre- 
vention whereof  for  the  time  to  come, 
this  court  ordereth,  that  in  all  deeds  and 
conveyances  of  houses  and  lands  in  this 
jurisdiction,  wherein  an  estate  of  inherit- 
ance is  to  pass,  it  shall  be  expressed  to 
have  and  to  hold  to  the  grantee,  '  his 
heirs  and  assigns  forever.'  "  In  Feoffees  of 
Grammar  School  v.  Andrews,  8  Met  584, 
592,  the  court  say  :  "  In  construing  con- 
veyances mnde  early  after  the  settlement 
of  the  country,  when  conveyancing  was 
little  understood,  the  intention  of  the  par- 
ties is  to  govern,  without  regarding  the 
rigid  nile.s  of  construction  whieli  would 
be  applicable  to  rect  lit  conveyances,  and 
which   iiii"ht  defeat  the  intention   of  the 


THE    WORD    "  HEIRS  "    ESSENTIAL    AT    COMMON    LAW.       [§  676. 


that  the  grantee  is  to  have  and  to  hold  to  him  forever,  or  to 
him  and  Ins  assigns  forever.  No  matter  how  plainly  it  is  de- 
clared that  the  grantee  is  to  have  an  estate  in  fee  simple  or  in 
perpetuity,  the  deed  without  the  word  "  heirs  "'  will  convey  to 
him  only  a  life  estate.^ 

The  rule  that  the  word  "  heiis  "  is  essential  to  create  by  deed 
an  estate  in  fee  is  a  purely  arbitrary  rule  of  the  common  law. 
It  is  a  term  of  art,  which  cannot  be  dispensed  with  except  b}^ 
legislation. 

576.  In  most  of  the  States  the  word  "  heirs  "  is  declared 
by  statute  not  to  be  necessary  to  convey  an  estate  in  fee  sim- 
ple, or  it  is  declared  that  every  estate  in  lands  is  taken  to  be  an 
estate  in  fee  simple,  unless  a  less  estate  is  expressly  limited  or 
appears  to  be  conveyed  b}-  operation  of  law.'^ 

parties,    however  clearly    that    mij^ht    be     61,  where  the  grants  were  to  one  and  his 


made  to  appear." 

Missouri:  Hogan  v.  Welcker,  14  Mo. 
177;  Reaume  v.  Chambers,  22  Mo  36; 
Martin  v.  Long,  3  Mo.  391.  New  Jersey  : 
Trusdell  v.  Lehman,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  218,  20 
Atl.  liep.  391 :  Adams  v.  Ross,  30  N.  J.  L. 
50.5,  82  Am.  Dec.  237  ;  Kearney  v.  Ma- 
comb, 16  N.  J.  Eq.  189  ;  Sisson  v.  Don- 


"  successors  and  assigns."  Hofsass  v. 
Mann,  74  Md.  400,  22  Atl.  Rep.  6.5; 
Clearwater  v.  Rose,  1  Blackf.  137  ;  and 
Taylor  v.  Cleary,  29  Gratt.  448,  where 
tlie  grants  were  to  one  and  liis  "execu- 
tors, admini.'itrators,  and  assigns."  Kear- 
ney V.  Macomb,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  189,  wheie 
the  grant  was  to  one  and  "  his  legal  rep- 


nelly,  36  N.  J.  L.  432  ;  Melick  i;.  Pidcock,     rcsentatives     and    assigns."      Foster    v. 
44  N.  J.  Eq.  525,  540  ;  Chancellor  r.  Bell,     Joice,  3  Wa.sh.  C.  C.  498,  where  the  grant 


45  N.  J.  Eq.  538,  541.  New  York  :  Jack- 
son V.  Myers,  3  Johns.  388,  3  Am.  Dec. 
504.  North  Carolina  :  before  Code  of  1883, 
Stell  V.  Barham,  87  N.  C.  62;  Roberts 
V.  Forsythe,  3  Dev  26.  Ohio:  Young  v. 
Mahoning  Co.  53  Fed.  Rep.  895.  Penn- 
sylvania:  Lemon  v.  Graham,  131  Pa.  St. 
447,  19  Atl.  Rep.  48,  25  W.  N.  C.  339; 
Brown  v.  Mattocks,  103  Pa.  St.  16  ;  Hile- 
man  v.  Bouslaugh,  13  Pa.  St.  344,  .53 
Am.  Dec.  474.  South  Carolina :  Bradford 
V.  Griffin,  40  S.  C.  468,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  76; 
McLeod  V.  Tarrant,  39  S.  C.  271,  17  S.  E. 
Rep.  773  ;  Bratton  v.  Massey,  15  S.  C. 
277,  284;  Varn  ;;.  Varn,  32  S.  C.  77,  85, 
10  S.  E.  Rep.  829;  Jones  v.  Swearingcn 
(S.  C),  19  S.  E.  Rep.  947  ;  Lorick  v.  Mc- 
Crcery,  20  S.  C   424,  430. 

1  Curtis  V.  Gardner,  13  Met.  457  ;  Engel 
w.  Ayer,  85  Me.  448,  27  Atl.  Rej).  352; 
Sedgwick  v.  Laflin,  10  Allen,  430 ;  and 
Miles  1-.  Fisher,  10  Ohio,  1,  36  Am.  Dec. 


was  to  one  "  and  his  generation,  to  endure 
.so  long  as  the  waters  of  the  Delaware 
should  run."  See,  however,  Stevens  v. 
Dewing,  2  Vt.  411  ;  and  Arms  i'.  Burt,  I 
Vt.  303,  18  Am.  Dec.  680,  where  a  grant 
to  one  "so  long  as  wood  grows,  and 
water  runs  "  was  held  to  create  a  fee. 

-  Alabama:  Code,  1886,  S  '^24.  Ari- 
zona: R.  S.  1887,  1"  217.  Arkansas  :  Dig. 
of  Stats.  1884,  §641.  California:  Civ. 
Code,  §§1072,  1105;  Montgomery  «;. 
Sturdivant,  41  Cal.  290.  Colorado:  G.  S. 
18S3,  §204;  Annot.  Stats.  1891,  §433. 
Georgia:  Code  1882,  §2248,  being  act 
of  1821  ;  Greer  v.  Pate  (Ga.),  11  S.  E. 
Rep.  869.  Idaho:  R.  S.  1887,  §§  2905, 
2927.  Illinois:  R.  S.  1889,  ch.  30,  §  13. 
Indiana:  H.  S,  1894,  §  3348,  act  of  May 
6,  1852.  Iowa:  R.  S.  1888,  §  3100.  Kan- 
sas: G.  S.  1889,11  1109.  Kentucky:  G. 
S.  1894,  §2342.  Maryland:  I'ub.  G.  L. 
1888,  art.  21,  IT  11.     Prior  to  the  act  of 

479 


§  577.]  TUIC   HABKNDUM,  OR   THE   ESTATES    CREATED. 

The  intent,  under  such  a  statute,  to  pass  a  less  estate  than  a 
fee  is  shown  by  a  limitation  in  a  habendum  for  the  life  of  the 
grantee,  reiuaiiuler  to  his  children.  Unih'r  the  strict  rules  of  the 
coiHinon  law  a  remainder  may  be  declared  in  the  habendum  to 
one  not  mentioned  in  the  premises. ^ 

The  English  Conveyancing  and  Law  of  Property  Act  of  1881  ^ 
provides  that  ''  it  shall  be  sufficient,  in  tin;  limitation  of  an  estate 
in  fee  simple,  to  use  the  words  'in  fee  simple,'  without  the  word 
'heirs  ;  '  and  in  the  limitation  of  an  estate  in  tail,  to  use  the  words 
'  in  tail '  without  the  words  '  heirs  of  the  body  ; '  and  in  the  limi- 
tation of  an  estate  in  tail  male  or  in  tail  female,  to  use  the  words 
*  in  tail  male  '  or  '  in  tail  female,'  as  the  case  requires,  without  the 
words  '  heirs  male  of  the  body  '  or  '  heirs  female  of  the  body.' " 
Regarding  this  change  it  is  observed  in  Bythewood's  Precedents  ^ 
that  it  "  may  be  doubted  whether  there  is  much  advantage  to  be 
obtained  from  this  clause  so  far  as  regards  ordinary  purchase 
deeds.  Words  of  limitation  must  still  be  used,  and  the  new  stat- 
utory words  of  limitation  do  not  seem  to  be  an  improvement 
upon  the  accustomed  form." 

577.  Coke  declares  that  the  word  "  heirs"  must  be  used  in 
the  plural  number.  "  For,"  he  observes,*  "  if  a  man  give  land 
to  a  man  and  to  his  heir  in  the  singular  number,  he  hath  but  an 


1856,  ch.  154,  the  rule  of  the  common  law 
prevailed.  Michigan:  Aniiot.  Stats.  1882, 
§  5730.  Minnesota:  G.  S.  1894,  §  2163. 
Mississippi:  Annot.  Code,  1892,  §2435. 
Missouri :  R.  S.  1879,  §  3939  ;  R.  S.  1889, 
§88:34;  McCullock  v.  Holmes,  HI  Mo. 
44.5,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  1096.  Montana: 
Comp.  Stats.  1887,  p.  664,  §278.  Ne- 
braska: Comp.  Stats.  1893,  ch.  73,  §  49. 
Nevada:  G.  S.  1885,  §2612.  New  Hamp- 
shire :  In  Cole  v.  Lake  Co.  54  N.  H.  242, 
290,  it  was  judicially  determined  without 
the  aid  of  a  statute  that  the  word  "  heirs  " 
is  not  essential  to  the  creation  of  an  estate 
in  fee:  "Our  conclusion  is,"  says  Mr. 
Justice  Ladd,  "  that  the  rule  which  wonld 
defeat  the  obvious  intention  and  destroy 
the  plainly  expressed  contract  of  the  par- 
ties in  the  present  case  is  not  ndaptpd  to 
our  in.stitutions,  or  the  condition  of  tliinj^s 
in  this  State;  and  tliat  ic  never  I'ecame 
part  of  the  law  of  the  Staie.''  New  York  : 
480 


4  R.  S.  1889,  p.  2461.  North  Carolina: 
Code  1883,  §  1280,  act  of  1879;  Ful- 
bright  V.  Yoder,  113  N.  C.  456,  18  S.  E. 
Rep.  713.  North  Dakota:  Comp.  Stats. 
1887,  §  3241.  Oklahoma:  R.  S.  1893, 
§  1639.  Oregon:  G.  L.  1892,  §  3005. 
South  Dakota:  Comp.  Stats.  1887,  §  3241. 
Tennessee:  Code  1884,  §  2812,  act  of 
1851,  ch.  33;  Hanks  v.  Folsom,  11  Lea, 
555,  560  ;  Reecher  v.  Hicks,  7  Lea,  207, 
211.  Texas:  R.  Civ.  Code  1889,  art.  551. 
Virginia:  Code  1887,  §  2420.  Washing- 
ton: G.  S.  1891,  §  1429.  West  Virginia: 
Code  1891,  ch.  71,  §  8.  Wisconsin: 
Annot.  Stats.  1889,  §  2206.  Wyoming: 
R.  S.  1887,  §  34. 

1  McCullock  V.  Holmes,  111  Mo.  445, 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  1096;  Farrar  v.  Christy, 
24  Mo.  453. 

2  44  &  45  Vict.  ch.  41,  §  51, 

3  Vol.  V.  p.  207. 
*  Co.  Litt.  8  b. 


THE    WORD    "  HEIRS  "    ESSENTIAL    AT    COMMON    LAW.       [§§  578,  579. 

estate  for  life,  for  bis  lieir  cannot  take  a  fee  simple  by  descent, 
because  be  is  but  one,  and  tberefore  in  that  case  bis  btirs  sball 
take  notbing."  But  Coke's  opinion  has  been  denied  by  later 
autborities,^  and  it  is  doubtful  if  it  sbould  be  followed  at  the 
present  day.  Tbe  word  "•  heir  "  would  doubtless  be  regarded  as 
nomen  collectivum,  or  a  clerical  mistake,  for  "  heirs."  ^  Tbe  ha- 
bendum must  be  to  tbe  grantee  and  his  beirs,  and  not  "  or  bis 
heirs."  In  the  latter  form  he  would  take  only  an  estate  for  life, 
for  the  uncertainty ;  though,  as  suggested  by  Lord  Hardwicke, 
the  word  "or"  might  be  construed  as  a  clerical  error  for  "and."^ 
If  tbere  be  more  than  one  grantee,  the  habendum  must  be  to 
tbem  and  "  their  heirs."  *  If  the  word  "  their  "  be  omitted,  the 
grantees  "  have  but  an  estate  for  life  for  the  uncertainty."  But 
it  is  said  that  if  land  be  given  to  one  man  "and  beirs,"  omitting 
"his,"  the  fee  passes  notwitbstanding.^ 

578.  The  word  "  issue,"  when  used  in  place  of  the  word 
*'  heirs  "  in  a  deed,  is  a  word  of  purchase,  and  not  of  limita- 
tion.'^ Tbe  word  "issue"  may  describe  a  class  of  persons  who 
are  to  take  as  joint  tenants  with  an  ancestor  named.  It  may 
describe  a  class  wbo  are  to  take  as  purchasers  at  a  time  fixed.  In 
wills  it  may  denote  an  indefinite  succession  of  lineal  descend- 
ants who  are  to  take  by  inheritance."  It  seldom  has  tbe  latter 
meaning  in  deeds. 

579.  The  word  "  children  "  is  a  word  of  purchase  and  not 
a  word  of  limitation.^     It  will  be  taken  to  have  been  used  in 

1  Ilargrave,  note  4,  Co.  Litt.  8  6;  Dub-  Watts  &  S.  160;  Mcndenhall  v.  INIower, 
ber  V.  Trollop,  8  Vin.  Abr.  233,  p.  13,  per  16  S.  C.  303,  31 1  ;  Bradford  v.  Griffin,  40 
Eyre,  C.  J.,  who  says  that  the  opinion  of     S.  C.  468,  19  S.  E.  Kep.  76. 

Coke  is  not  warranted  by  anything  in  Lit-  '  Mendeuhall  v.  Mower,  16   S.  C.  303, 

tleton;  Whitinf?  v.  Wilkins,  1    Biils.  219,  311  ;  IMaiigum  v.  Piester,  16  S.  C.  316. 

a  case  of  a  devise;    Hall   v.  Vandegrift,  »  Alabama:  Dunn  r.  Davis,  12  Ala.  135  ; 

3  Binn.  374,  also  a  case  of  a  devise;  Man-  May  v.  Uitchie,  e.-)  Ala.  602.     Georgia  : 

waring  v.  Tabor,  1   Root,  79,  a  case  of  a  Ewing  i;.  8hroi)shire,  80  Ga.  374,  385,  7 

deed.  S.  E.  Rep.  5.')4.    Indiana  :  Burns  r.  Wees- 

2  Huntington  v.  Lyman,  1.38  Mass.  ner,  134  Ind.  442,  34  N.  E.  Kep.  10;  Tin- 
205.  der  v.  Tinder,  131  Ind.  381,  30  N.  E.  Hep. 

a  Wri-ht  V.  Wright,   1    Ves.   Sr.  409,  1077  ;  Mcllhinny  v.  Mcllhinny,  137  Ind. 

^j,         '  411,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  147  ;  Jackson  v.  Jack- 

^  Mallory's  Case,  5  Rep.  1116.  son,   127  Ind.  346,  26   N.  E.    Rep.  897; 

5  Co  Litt   8  b  Fountain  C.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Bcckk-heimer, 

0  Mcllliinny   v.    Mcllhinny,    137    Ind.  102  Ind.  76,  1    N.  E.  Rep.  202,  52   Am. 

411  37   N.   E.   Rep.   147;  Melsheiincr   v.  Rep.  645;  Shimer  v.  Man,  99   Ind.  190, 

Gro'ss   .58l'a.St.  412;  Moss  r.  Sheldon,  3  50   Am.   Rep.    82;    Owen   v.   Cooper,   46 


VOL.  1. 


481 


§  580.]  THE   HABENDUM,    OR   THE    ESTATES    CREATED. 

its  natunil  sense  unless  it  is  so  conti'olled  aiul  limited  by  other 
expressions  in  the  deed  as  to  show  it  was  intended  as  a  word  of 
limitation.^ 

580.  A  deed  to  a  parent  and  his  children  makes  the  childnMi 
tenants  in  common  with  their  parent,  liut  only  the  children  ia 
esse  and  living  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance,  including  a  child 
671  ventre  sa  mere,  take  under  the  deed,^  unless  the  deed  expressly 
or  impliedly  includes  children  thereafter  to  be  born. 

But  other  authorities  hold  that  a  conveyance  to  a  parent  and 
his  children  vests  a  life  estate  only  in  the  parent,  with  remainder 
in  fee  to  the  children  as  a  class,  so  that  those  in  being  at  the  date 
of  the  deed  as  well  as  those  subsequently  born  are  entitled  to 
take  in  distribution  on  the  termination  of  the  life  estate.^  One 
reason  for  regarding  such  a  conveyance  as  creating  an  estate  in 
remainder  in  the  children,  rather  than  an  estate  in  common  in 
the  mother  and  her  children,  especially  in  case  the  conveyance  is 
bv  the  father  of  the  children,  is  that  it  is  presumed  that  he 
intends  to  provide  for  his  children,  and  the  provision  is  more 
effectuil  if  it  be  regarded  as  creating  an  estate  in  remainder 
in  the  children,  as  otherwise,  upon  the  death  of  the  mother,  part 
of  tht'  property  might  pass  to  strangers  in  blood  to  the  grantor.^ 

A  deed  to  a  grantee  named  in  the  premises  without  words  of 
limitation,  habendum  to  him  for  life,  and  at  his  decease  in  equal 


Ind.  524;  Andrews  v.  Spurlin,  35  Ind. 
262.  Illinois:  Chapin  v.  Crow,  147  111. 
219,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  536;  Beacroft  v. 
Strawn,  67  111.  28 ;  Baker  v.  Scott,  62  111. 
86.  Kentucky:  Baskett  v.  Sellers  (Ky.), 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  9  ;  Goodridne  i:  Goodridge, 
91  Ky.  507,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  270.  Missis- 
sippi:  Cannon  v.  Barry,  59  Mis'.  289. 
New  Jersey  :  Adams  i\  Ross,  30  N.  J.  L. 
.505,  82  Am.  Dec.  237 ;  Price  v.  Sisson,  13 
N.  J.  Eq.  1 68.  New  York :  In  re  Sanders, 
4  Paige,  293  ;  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  3  Wend. 
503,  20  Am.  Dec.  716  ;  Chrystic  v.  Phyfe, 
19  N.  Y.  344.  Pennsylvania:  Hague  v. 
Hague,  161  Pa.  St.  643,  29  Atl.  Rep.  261  ; 
Edward's  App.  108  Pa.  St.  283;  Guthrie's 
App.  37  Pa.  St.  9;  Melsheimer  v.  Gross, 
58  Pa.  St.  412.  Vermont:  Ford  v.  Flint, 
40  Vt  382. 

1  Chapin  v.  Crow,  147  111.  219,  35  N.  E. 
Rep.  536. 

482 


■^  Faloon  v.  Simshauser,  130  111.  649,  22 
N.  E.  Rep.  835  ;  Glass  v.  Glass,  71  Ind. 
392;  Heath  v.  Heath,  114  N.  C.  547,  19 
S.  E.  Rep.  155  ;  Dupree  v.  Dupree,  Busbee 
(N.  C.)  Eq.  164,  59  Am.  Dec.  590;  Powell 
V.  Morisey,  84  N.  C.  421  ;  Gay  v.  Baker, 
5  Jones  Eq.  344,  78  Am.  Dec.  229  ;  Hunt 
V.  Satterwhite,  85  N.  C.  73 ;  Hampton  v. 
Whueler,  09  N.  C.  222,  6  S.  E.  Rep.  236. 

3  Courscy  v.  Davis,  46  Pa.  St.  25,  84 
Am.  Dec.  519;  White  v.  Williamson,  2 
Grant,  249 ;  Wolford  v.  Morgcuthal,  91 
Pa.  St.  30;  Haskins  v.  Tate,  25  Pa.  St. 
249;  Tyler  v.  Moore  (Pa.  St.),  17  Atl, 
Rep.  216;  Hague  v.  Hague,  161  Pa.  St. 
643,  29  Atl.  Rep.  261,  overruling  Shirlock 
V.  Shirlock,  5  Pa.  St.  367 ;  Smith  v.  Up- 
ton (Ky.),  13  S  W.  Rep.  721  ;  Kinney  v. 
Mathews,  69  Mo.  520. 

■*  Smith  V.  Upton  (Ky.),  13  S.  W.  Rep. 
721. 


THE   WORD    "  HEIRS  "    ESSENTIAL    AT    COMMON   LAW.      [§§  581,  582. 

shares  to  his  cliildren,  passes  a  life  estate  to  the  grantee,  with 
remainder  to  his  children.  There  is  in  such  case  no  repugnancy 
between  the  grantin^-plause  and  the  habendum. ^ 

581.  Tiae  limitation  to  heirs  need  not  be  made  in  direct 
terms,  nor  need  the  word  be  used  immediately  after  the  name  of 
the  grantee;^  but  the  word  must  appear  in  some  part  of  the 
deed  other  than  in  connection  with  the  name  of  the  grantor,  in 
order  to  create  an  estate  in  fee.'^ 

A  limitation  to  one  and  his  "right  heirs"  is  the  same  as  a 
limitation  to  him  and  "  his  heirs."  * 

582.  The  use  of  the  \7ord  "heirs"  in  the  •warranty  clause 
alone  is  not  sufficient  to  create  an  estate  in  fee.  A  grant 
without  words  of  inheritance  in  the  premises,  and  with  no  ha- 
bendum clause,  is  not  enlarged  into  a  fee  by  a  general  warranty 
to  the  grantee  and  his  heirs.  The  warranty  clause  cannot  operate 
to  enlarge  the  estate  granted.^  The  rule  in  Nortli  Carolina  is 
otherwise,  and  was  so  even  before  the  passage  of  the  act  providing 
that  the  word  "heirs"  shall  not  be  necessarj^  to  create  an  estate  in 
fee,  and  that  every  estate  shall  be  regarded  as  an  estate  in  fee 
unless  a  less  estate  appears  to  be  conveyed.  There  the  use  of 
the  word  "heirs"  in  the  clause  of  warranty  is  a  sufficient  mani- 
festation of  an  intent  to  convey  an  estate  in  fee  simple.  "  In- 
deed, the  word  '  heirs,'  as  used,  has  no  meaning  pertinent,  or 
application  if  the  purpose  was  to  convey  but  a  life  estate.  Why 
shall  the  warranty  extend  to  the  heirs  of  the  bargainee  if  he  is 
to  have  but  a  life  estate  ?  "^  Again,  the  Supreme  Court  of  that 
State  say  :  "  The  courts,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  intent  of  the 
grantor,  where  it  could  be  gathered  from  the  face  of  a  deed,  liave, 
in  a  liberal  spirit,  construed  conveyances  as  passing  an  estate  of 
inheritance  in  all  cases  where  the  word  'heirs'  was  joined  as  a 
qualification  to  the  name  or  designation  of  the  bargainees,  even 

1  Rijigin  V.  Love,  72  111.  553;  Rupert  ^  Jordan  ;;.  Neece,  36  S.  C.  295,  15S.  E. 
V.  Penner,  35  Neb.  587,  .53  N.  W.  Rep.  Rep.  202  ;  Roberts  v.  rorsythc,3  Dev.  26  ; 
598;  Bodiiie  v.  Arthur,  91  Ky.  53,  14  S.  Sncll  v.  Youug,  3  Ircd.  379;  Register  v. 
W.  Rep.  904.  Rowell,  3  Jones,  312;  Hof-^aHS  r.   Mann, 

2  Melkk  r.  Pidcock,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  .525,  74  Md.  400,  22  Atl.  Rep.  65;  Sisson  v.. 
540  ;  ILuci.s  v.  Seashore  Land  Co.  47  N.  Donnelly,  36  N.  J.  L.  432  ;  Adams  v. 
J.  Eq.  365.  371,  20  Atl.  Rep.  497.  Ross,  30  N.  J.  L.  505,  82  Am.  Dec.  237 ; 

3  Anderson  v.  Loj,aiu,  105  N.  C.  266,  11  Patterson  v.  Moore,  15  Ark.  222. 

S.  E.  Rci).  361.  ''  Saunders  v.  Saunders,  108  N.  C.  327, 

4  Fleteher  v.  Fletcher,  88  lud.  418.  332,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  909. 

483 


68.i.J 


TIIK    IIABKXDUM,   OR    THP:    ESTATKS    CIM'ATED. 


in  the  ohiuse  of  wunanty,  or  where  tlie  covenant  of  warranty 
was  confused  with  tlie  premises  or  habendum,  if,  by  a  transposi- 
tion of  it,  or  by  making  a  parenthesis,  or  in  any  way  disregard- 
ing  punctuation,  the  word  'heirs'  could  be  made  to  qualify  tlie 
apt  words  of  conveyance  in  the  premises,  or  the  words  'to  have 
and  to  lu)ld  "  in  the  habendum  and  tenendum,  even  though  it  was 
made  to  do  double  duty  as  a  part  of  the  covenant  of  warranty,"  ^ 

583.  The  word  "heirs  ''  may  in  exceptional  cases  be  inter- 
preted to  mean  "  children,"  and  to  be  a  -word  of  purchase  and 
not  a  w^ord  of  limitation  ;  but  to  have  this  effect  the  language 
used  and  tiie  intention  gathered  from  the  whole  deed  must  fully 
and  clearly  authorize  such  interpretation.^  Technical  words 
must  be  given  their  legal  effect,  unless  it  is  clear  that  they  were 
not  used  in  their  proper  sense.^ 

The  word  "heirs"  was  held  to  mean  "  children "  where  the 
deed  was  to  a  married  woman  and  the  heirs  of  her  husband 
by  her,  both  husband  and  wife  being  alive  at  the  time  of  the 
execution  of  the  deed.  The  conveyance  was  to  the  woman  and 
her  children  as  tenants  in  common  in  equal  shares.  The  estate 
passed  directly  out  of  the  grantor  to  the  designated  grantees.* 


1  Anderson  i'.  Logan,  105  N.  C.  266, 
270,  1 1  S.  E.  Rep.  361,  per  Avery,  J.  The 
following  cases  fall  under  this  principle : 
Staton  V.  Miilli-s,  92  N.  C.  623  ;  Graybcal 
V.  Davis,  95  N.  C.  508 ;  Hicks  v.  Bullock, 
96  N.  C.  164,  1  S.  E.  Rep.  629;  Bunn 
V.  Wells.  94  N.  C.  67 ;  Ricks  v.  rulliam, 
94  N.  C.  225 ;  Phillips  r.  Thompson,  73 
N.  C.  543;  Waugh  v.  Miller,  75  N.  C. 
127  ;  Allen  v.  Boweu,  74  N.  C.  155  ;  Phil- 
lips i;.  Davis,  69  N.  C.  117;  Mitchell  i-. 
Mitchell,  108  N.  C.  542,  13  S.  E.  Rep. 
187;  Winborne  v.  Downing,  105  N.  C. 
20,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  888  ;  "Vickers  v.  Leigh, 
104  N.  C.  248,  257,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  308, 
Several  of  these  cases  related  to  deeds 
executed  before  the  act  of  1879  dispens- 
ing with  the  necessity  for  the  use  of  the 
word  "  heirs."  A  deed  in  which  the  word 
"  heirs  "  does  not  appear  in  any  part,  ex- 
cept in  connection  with  the  name  of  the 
bargainor,  or  with  some  expression  such 
as  "party  of  the  first  part,"  used  in  the 
clause  of  warranty  or  elsewhere  to  des- 
ignate the  grantor,  vests  only  a  life  estate 

484 


in  the  bargainee.  Batchelor  v.  Whitaker, 
88  N.  C.  350;  Stell  v.  Barham,  87  N.  C. 
62;  Anderson  v.  Logan,  105  N.  C.  266, 
271,  11  S.  E.  Rep.  361. 

-  Pritchard  v.  James,  93  Ky.  306,  20  S. 
W.  Rep.  216;  Mitchell  v.  Simp.son,  88 
Ky.  125,  10  S.  W.  Rep.  372;  Griswold 
V.  Hicks,  132  111.  494,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  63  ; 
Carpenter  v.  Van  Olindcr,  127  III.  42,  19 
N.  E.  Rep.  868  ;  Ridgeway  v.  Lanphcar, 
99  Ind.  251  ;  Shimer  v.  Mann,  99  Ind.  190, 
50  Am.  Rep.  82;  Allen  v.  Craft,  109  Ind. 
476,  9  N.  E.  Rep.  919,  58  Am.  Rep.  425; 
Taney  v.  Fahnley,  126  Ind.  88,  25  N.  E. 
Rep.  882;  Watrous  v.  Allen,  57  Mich. 
362,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  104, 58  Am.  Rep.  363 ; 
Warn  v.  Brown,  102  Pa.  St.  347;  Tyler 
V.  Moore,  42  Pa.  St.  374,  389,  per  Strong, 
J. ;  Ware  v.  Richardson,  3  Md.  505,  56 
Am.  Dec.  762  ;  Taylor  v.  Cleary,  29  Gratt. 
448. 

3  Jesson  V.  Wright,  2  Bligli,  l.'i6,  per 
Lord  Rtdesdale;  Doe  v.  Gallini,  5  Barn. 
&  Adol.  621. 

■*  Tinder  v.  Tinder,  131  Ind.  381,  30  N. 


THE    WORD    "  HEIRS  "    ESSENTIAL   AT    COMMON    LAW.     [§§  584-58G. 

While  the  word  "  children  "  used  in  the  habeiKlnm  may  be 
held  to  mean  "  heirs,''  if  such  was  the  evident  intention  of  the 
grantor,  yet,  if  the  children  are  specified  by  name,  any  inference 
that  the  term  was  used  to  designate  the  persons  who  might  be 
the  grantee's  heirs  at  his  death  is  clearly  excluded,  for  at  that 
time  the  children  mentioned  might  not  be  living,  and  other  chil- 
dren might  be  born  to  him  who  would  be  his  heirs  at  his  death. ^ 

584.  A  deed  to  a  woman  "  and  her  heirs  "  does  not  pass 
any  title  to  the  heirs.  There  is  no  sufficient  indication  that 
the  word  "heirs"  was  used  in  the  sense  of  "children,"  and  the 
word  must  be  given  its  usual  interpretation  as  a  word  of  limi- 
tation.2  And  so  a  deed  to  a  woman  and  "her  bodily  heirs" 
vests  in  her  an  estate  in  fee  where  it  does  not  appear  from  the 
whole  instrument  that  such  words  were  used  in  the  sense  of 
"children."  3 

585.  In  a  deed  to  one  and  "  his  present  heirs  "  the  word 
"  heirs "  is  not  employed  in  a  technical  signification,  but  as 
words  of  purchase.  The  deed  does  not  vest  an  estate  in  fee  in  the 
grantee,  but  vests  an  estate  in  the  grantee  and  his  heirs-apparent 
as  tenants  in  common.*  A  conveyance  to  the  heirs  of  a  person 
livinof,  and  having  children  in  beino;  at  the  time,  vests  the  title  in 
such  children  to  the  exclusion  of  children  subsequently  born.^ 

By  statute  in  North  Carolina  a  limitation  to  the  heirs  of  a 
living  person  is  to  be  construed  as  a  limitation  to  the  children 
of  such  person,  unless  a  contrary  intention  appears.^ 

586.  If  the  "  heirs  "  referred  to  in  the  habendum  are  not 

E.  Rep.  1077.    And  see  Fountain  County  ^  Lanham  v.  Wilson  (Ky.),  22   S.  W. 

Coal  Co.  V.  Beckleheimer,  102  Ind.  76,  1  Rep.  438  ;  Short  v.  Terry  (Ky.),  22  S.  W. 

N.  E.  Rep.  202,  52  Am.  Rep.  G4.5  ;  Tharp  Rep.  841.     In  this  case  it  was  snid  that 

V.  Yarbrough,  79  Ga.  382,  4  S.   E.  Rep.  the  repetition  of  the  expression  "  heirs  of 

915,    11    Am.    St.    Rep.  439;    Tucker   v.  the  hody,"  in  the  covenants  of  the  deed, 

Tucker,  78  Ky.  503 ;  Brann  v.  Elzey,  83  docs  not  change  the  meaning  of  tiie  in- 

Ky.  440 ;  Stamper  v.  Armstrong  (Ky.),  strnmcnt. 

15  S.  W.  Rep.  513  ;  Bodine  v.  Arthur,  91  *  Fountain  County  Coal  Co.  v.  Beckle- 

Ky.  .53,  14   S.   W.    Rep.   904;    Heath  v,  heimer,  102   Ind.  76,  1  N.  \V.  Rep.  202, 

Hewitt,  127  N.  Y.  166,  27  X.  E.  Rep.  959;  52  Am.  Rep.  645;    Chess-Carley  Co.  v. 
Heard   v.    Horton,  1    Denio,  165,  4.3   Am.  '  Purtcll,  74  Ga.  467. 

Dee.  059.  ■'  Tharp  v.  Yiirhrongli,   79   Ga.   382,  4 

1  Bra.sington   v.   Hanson,    149   Pa.   St.  S.  E.  Rep.  915  ;  Heard  r.  Ilorton,  1  Denio, 

289,  24  Atl.  Rep.  344  ;  Rupert  v.  Pcnner,  165,  43  Am.  Dec.  659. 

35  Neb.  587,  601,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  598.  «  Code  1883,  §  1329  ;  Jarvis  v.   Davis, 

Pritchard  v.  James,  93   Ky.  306,  20  99  N.  C.  37,  5  S.  E.  Rep.  227. 


S.  W.  Rep.  216. 


485 


§  587.]  THK    IIAr.KXDUM,    OR    TIIK    ESTATES    CREATED. 

the  heirs  of  the  grantee,  the  word  is  one  of  purchase.  Thus, 
where  a  deed  is  made  to  a  married  woman  and  th(!  heirs  of  her 
husband,  the  woid  '"heirs"  is  synouyiuous  with  "children,"  and  an 
absolute  estate  vests  in  prcesenti  in  the  grantee  and  the  children 
then  living  of  her  husband. ^ 

587.  In  case  a  deed  contains  a  reference  to  some  other  in- 
strument which  contains  a  limitation  to  heirs,  and  conveys 
the  same  (\state  as  therein,  the  deed  may  pass  a  fee  simple  without 
the  use  of  the  word  '•  heirs  "  in  express  terms.  "  Words  of  direct 
and  immediate  reference  will  suffice.  The  word  'heirs'  or  'suc- 
cessors '  need  not  be  in  the  identical  deed  of  grant,  or  other 
mode  of  assurance  by  which  the  estate  is  granted  or  conveyed. 
Thus,  when  one  to  whom  laiuls  have  been  granted  in  fee,  after 
reciting  the  grant,  or  without  any  recital,  grants  the  lands  to 
another  as  fully  as  they  were  granted  to  him,  or  where  a  man 
grants  two  acres  to  A  and  B,  to  hold  one  acre  to  A  and  his  heirs, 
and  the  other  acre  to  B,  in  form  aforesaid,"  ^  the  fee  will  pass. 

A  deed  which,  after  referring  to  the  conveyance  to  the  grantor, 
conveyed  "all  the  grantor's  estate,  right,  title,  interest,  term  of 
years  to  come,  property,  claim,  and  demand,  both  in  law  and  in 
equity,"  conveys  the  property  as  fully  as  it  was  conveyed  to  the 
grantor,  and  as  the  conveyance  to  the  grantor  gave  him  the  estate 
in  fee,  the  grantor's  conveyance  vests  the  fee,  even  though  the 
word  "heirs  "  does  not  appear  in  the  deed.'^ 

But  a  deed  by  a  distributee  of  an  intestate  estate  of  all  his 
interest  in  the  estate,  without  words  of  inhei-itance,  conveys  only 
a  life  interest,  the  fee  remaining  in  the  distributee.^ 

1  Tucker  v.  Tucker,  78  Ky.  .503.  in  the  last  case  cited  that  a  fee  simple  may 

2  Preston  on  Estates,  vol.  2,  p.  2  ;  Co.  be  created  in  Pennsylvania,  by  deed  with- 
Litt.  9/j,-  Mercier  v.  Missouri  River,  &c.  out  words  of  inheritance,  by  a  reference 
R.  Co.  54  Mo.  506 ;  Hofsa.ss  r.  Mann,  74  to  another  instrument  in  which  such 
Md.  400,  22  Atl.  Rep.  65;  Lytle  v.  Lytic,  words  are  found  ;  and  it  was  made  clear 
10  Watts,  259;  Lemon  v.  Graham,  1.31  that  such  was  the  rule  in  England  at  a 
Pa.  St.  447,  19  Atl.  Rep.  48,  25  W.  N.  C.  very  early  date."  And  see  examples  from 
339.     Per  Williams,  J.  :    "  Where  techni-  Rhcppard's  Touchstone,  101 . 

cal  words  an-.  sup])lied  by  referonce  to  an-  In   Reaume  v.   Chambers,  22   Mo.  36, 

other   instrument  which    contains    them,  and   Lytle    r.   Lytle,  in   Watts,   259,   the 

the  case  was  recognized  as   an  exception  reference  to  the  other  instrument  was  in- 

as  early  as  the  days   of  Lord  Coke;  and  sufficient  to  create  an  estate  in  fee. 

this  exception  was  recognized  bv  our  own  ''  Brady  ?•.   Evans   (VId.),  28  Atl.   Rep. 

case  of  Lytle  i;.  Lytle,  10  Watts,  259,  and  1061. 

followed.     The  rule  was  plainly  laid  down  *  Lorick  v.  McCreery,  20  S.  C.  424. 

486 


THE   WORD    "heirs"    ESSENTIAL   AT    COMMON    LAW.       [§§  588-5U0. 

588.  A  release  by  one  of  several  joint  tenants  seised  in  fee 
simple  may  be  made  ■without  words  of  inheritance.^  The 
release  is  regarded  as  simply  extinguishitig  tlie  right  or  interest  of 
the  releasor,  leaving  the  others  as  sole  owners. 

589.  An  indorsement  placed  by  the  grantee  upon  a  deed 
which  conveys  to  liim  an  estate  in  fee  simple  may  be  sufficient  to 
transfer  such  an  estate  without  words  of  inheritance  in  the  in- 
dorsement; as  where-a  grantor  placed  upon  tlie  back  of  such  a 
deed  an  assignment,  under  his  hand  and  seal,  of  all  his  right, 
title,  and  interest  "  in  and  to  the  within  deed,"  and  delivered  the 
deed  so  indorsed  under  circumstances  indicating  an  intention  to 
transfer  a  fee  simple  estate  in  the  land  described.^ 

But  other  and  perhaps  the  more  consistent  authorities  hold  that 
the  eft'ect  of  such  an  indorsement  is  at  most  to  pass  an  equitable 
title  only.'^ 

590.  A  deed  to  a  person  without  words  of  limitation,  but 
with  an  unlimited  power  of  disposal,  vests  in  him  an  absolute 
fee.4 

But  a  conveyance  to  one  for  life,  with  a  power  of  appointment 
at  his  decease  in  fee,  is  not  enlarged  by  the  power  to  an  estate 
in  fee.^ 

A  power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  without  words  of  inheritance 
does  not  operate  to  give  the  mortgagee  an  estate  in  fee,  at  least 
before  the  power  is  executed.*^ 

But  tlie  mere  fact,  that  the  permanent  and  exclusive  use  of  land 

1  Co  j^itt_  9  /,_  ence  to  '  the  within  deed '  for  a  descrip- 

2  Lemon  v.  Graham,  131  Pa.  St.  447,  tion  of  tlie  estate;  and  the  fee  simple 
4.54,  19  Atl.  Kep.  48,  25  W.  N.  C.  339.  wliich  the  father  took  hy  the  deed  from 
Williiims,  J.,  in  the  last-named  case,  John  he  transfers  hv  his  assignment  to 
speakin-  of  the  assignor,  said:  "He  Allen."  See,  also,  llarlowe  r.  llud^iins, 
transferred  his  whole  estate,  as  vested  in  84  Tex.  107,  19  S.  W.  Hep.  364. 

him  by  virtne  of  the  deed,  by  the  refer-  •'  Dnponty.  VVcrthcnmn,  10  Cal.  354; 

ence  to  its  terms  in  the  assignment.     He  Porter  v.  Read,  19   Me.  303;  Keaume  i: 

said,  in  snhstance  and  in  legal  effect,  'as  Chambers,  22  Mo.  30. 

fullv  as  the  within  deed  clothes  me  with  *  Jackson    i-.    Roiniis,  10  .Johns.  .537; 

the  title   to   the  land  described   in   it,  so  Ciok  r.   Walker,   15  (U\.  457;  Green  v. 

fully  and  completely  do  I  transfer  the  Sutton,  50  .Mo.    ISO;   Pollanl    v.    Union 

same  land   to  my  son   AHen.     He  is  to  Nat.  Bank,  4  Mo.  A,.p.  408;  Tremmel  v. 

take  from  me  the  title  which  I  took  from  Klciboldt,  G  M<>.  A])p.  5-19. 

my  grantor.'     The  tcchnic.il  words  that  "  Graves  r.  Trnehlood.  90  N.  C.  495,  1 

are  wanting  in  the  a.-^signmcnt,  standing  S.  K.  Hep.  918. 

by  itself,  are  thus  supplied   by  the  refer-  «  Sedgwick  v.  Laflin,  10  Allen,  430. 

487 


§§  r)91-593.]     Till-:  HABENDUM,  ok  the  estates  created. 

is  osscMitial  to  tlie  enjoyment  of  a   right  granted  tlirreiii,  is  not 
sutlii'ient  to  niako  it  operate  as  a,  conveyance  in  fee.' 

591.  Parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  show  that  a  deed 
to  a  person  without  words  of  inheritance  was  intended  to 
convey  an  estate  in  fee,  where  there  is  no  ambiguity  in  Ihe 
terms.  Thus,  it  cannot  be  shown  that  a  deed  which  recites 
merely  that  the  grantor  assigns  all  his  present  interest,  and  all 
that  he  may  hereafter  acquire,  in  the  estate  of  his  father,  was  in- 
tended to  convey  anything  more  than  a  life  estate  to  the  grantee.^ 

592.  The  word  "  assigns  '"  is  without  legal  effect  in  a  limi- 
tation to  one  "  and  his  heirs,"  though  it  is  customary  to  add  the 
words  "and  assigns  forever."  These  words  add  nothing  to  the 
legal  effect  of  the  instrument,  and  are  in  fact  superfluous.^  A  grant 
to  one  and  his  heirs  carries  with  it  the  estate  to  his  assigns  by 
operation  of  law.* 

593.  There  is  an  exception  to  the  rule  that  the  word 
*'  heirs  "  is  necessary  to  create  a  fee  in  case  of  a  trust.  Where 
upon  the  face  of  the  deed  it  appears  that  the  conveyance  is  in 
trust  for  a  use,  the  full  performance  of  which  requires  or  may 
possibly  require  the  vesting  of  a  fee  in  the  trustee,  he  is  held  to 
take  an  estate  in  fee  simple  without  the  use  of  the  word  "  heirs  "  as 
a  word  of  limitation  upon  the  estate  conveyed.^  Thus,  a  deed  to 
trustees  and  their  successors  in  trust  to  sell  and  convey  in  fee  sim- 
ple absolute,  without  the  word  "  heirs  "  in  either  the  habendum  or 
granting  clause,  conveys  to  the  trustees  an   estate  in  fee  simple. 

1  Munro  v.  Meech,  94  Mich.  596,  .54  N.  45  Am.  Dec.  187  ;  Stearns  v.  Palmer,  10 

W.  Rep.  290.  Met.  32 ;    Newhall  v.   Wheeler,  7  Mass. 

-  Jones  V.  Swearingen  (S.  C),  19  S.  E.  189;  Cleveland  v.  Hallett,  6  Cus^h.  403; 

Rep.  947.  Sears  v.  Russell,  8  Gray,   86 ;  Attorney- 

3  Brookman  i-.   Smith,  L.  R.  6  Exch.  General    v.   Proprietors    of   Federal    St. 

291,  306,  aflSrmed  L.  R.  7  Exch.  271.  Meeting-House,    3    Gray,   1  ;    Fisher    v. 

*  Brasington  v.   Hanson,   149  Pa.   St.  Fields,  10  Johns.  495,  505,  per  Kent,  Ch. ; 

289,  24  All.  Rep.  344.  Welch  v.  Allen,  21  Wend.  147  ;  Hawley 

5  Perry  on  Trusts,  §§  312-320;  Gates  v.  James,  5  Paige,  318;  Kirkland  v.  Cox, 
V.  Cooke,  3  Burr.  1684;  Villiers  v.  Vil-  94  111.  400;  Preachers'  Aid  Society  v. 
licrs,  2  Atk.  72;  Neilson  r.  Lagow,  12  England,  106  111.  125;  North  v.  Phil- 
How.  98;  Webster  v.  Cooper,  14  How.  brook,  34  Me.  532 ;  Merritt  i'.  Disney,  48 
488,  499  ;  Poor  r.  Considine,  6  Wall.  458,  Md.  344;  Farqiihar.'on  y.  Eichelberger, 
471;  Ward  v.  Amory,  1  Curtis,  419;  15Md.  63,  72;  Hawkins  r.  Chapman,  36 
Young  V.  Mahoning  Co.  53  Fed.  Rep.  895  ;  Md.  83  ;  Spessard  v.  Rohrer,  9  Gill,  261  ; 
Mackall  v.  Richards,  1  Mack.  444;  King  Ewing  i-.  Shannahan,  113  Mo.  188,  20  S. 
V.  Parker,  9  Cu.sh.  71  ;  Brooks  v.  Jones,  W.  Rep.  1065;  Wilcox  v.  Wheeler,  47  N. 
11  Met.  191 ;  Gould  V.  Lamb,  11  Met.  84,  H.  488. 

488 


THE   WORD    "  HEIRS  "    ESSENTIAL   AT   COMMON   LAW.       [§  594. 

The  trust  required  an  estate  in  fee  simple  for  its  execution,  and 
consequently  a  legal  estate  commensurate  with  this  requirement ; 
and  therefore  the  trustees  took  such  an  estate  without  the  use  of 
the  usual  words  of  limitation. ^  In  like  manner,  where  a  city- 
conveyed  land  to  a  bnilding  committee,  omitting  words  of  limita- 
tion, empowering  them  either  to  sell  and  convey  the  land  in  fee 
simple  to  a  purchaser,  or  to  exchange  for  other  land,  or  to  use  it 
for  the  erection  of  a  court-house,  and  then  donate  it  to  the  county 
commissioners,  it  was  held  that  such  deed  conveyed  a  title  com- 
mensurate with  the  purposes  of  the  trust,  namely,  a  fee  simple.^ 

A  conveyance  to  a  trustee  will  give  him  a  legal  estate  in  fee  if 
the  trust  limited  upon  it  be  to  the  cestui  que  trust  and  his  heirs ; 
for,  though  the  words  of  inheritance  in  such  case  are  connected 
with  the  estate  of  the  cestui  que  trust,  they  will  be  held  to  relate 
to  the  legal  estate  of  the  trustee,  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the 
intention  of  the  parties.-^ 

A  conveyance  to  a  trustee,  without  words  of  inheritance,  to 
permit  the 'grantor's  grandchildren  to  take  the  rents  and  profits, 
does  not  convey  a  fee.  The  court  will  not  presume  that  a  fee  was 
intended  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  show  that  such  an  estate 
was  necessary  to  effectuate  the  purposes  of  the  trust. '^ 

594.  Words  of  inheritance  are  not  necessary  in  an  agree- 
ment showing  that  one  who  has  taken  the  title  to  certain  property 
holds  the  same,  or  some  interest  in  it,  for  the  benefit  of  another 
who  advanced  the  purchase-money.  In  a  suit  by  the  executor  of 
the  party  who  had  made  the  advances  to  recover  one  half  of  the 
net  profits  of  a  sale  of  the  property,  it  was  contended  that  the 
agreement  gave  him  only  a  life  estate,  inasmuch  as  the  agreement 
made  no  mention  of  his  heirs;  but  the  court  iield  that  the  ab- 
sence of  the  word  "  heirs "  did  not  limit  his  interest  to  a  life 
estate  merely,  Mr.  Justice  Holmes  saying:  "  We  may  add  that, 
in  a  case  of  this  kind,  we  should  go  no  further  tlian  we  were 
compelled  to  go,  by  binding  authority,  in  defeating  the  plainly 
expressed  meaning  of  the  instrument,  for  want  of  a  technicalily 

1  Neilson  v.  Lapovv,  12    How.  98,  110;  -  Young  r.  Malioniiig  Co.  53  Fed.  Hep. 

Ewiiig  7'.  Shaunahan,  113  Mo.   188,  20  S.  895. 

W.   Rep.   10f,5;   Clevelflnd  v.  Halk-tt,  6  ^  Mclick  r.  Tidcock,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  52.5,  15 

Cnsb.   403  ;  Gould  v.  Lamb,  1 1   Met.  84,  Atl.  Rep.  3  ;  Stearns  v.  Palmer,  10  Mot.  32. 

45  Am.  Dec.  187;  North  ;;.  Philbrook,  34  *  Duly   r.    I?ernstiin    (N.   M.),  28  Tac. 

Me.  532;  Angell  v.  Rosen  bury,  12  Micb.  Kcp.  704.     Ami  see  Kearney  t;.  Macomb, 

241.  10  N.  J.  Eq.  189. 

489 


§  595.]  THE    HABENDUM,    OR    THE  ESTATES    CREATED. 


■wliii-h  has  been  done  away  with  altogether  in  many  jurisdictions, 
and  wiiich  would  be  simply  vexatious  if  applied  to  a  nienioran- 
duni  like  this.''  ^ 

595.  An  equitable  estate  may  have  the  character  of  in- 
heritability  though  the  -word  '•'  heirs "'  is  not  used  in  declar- 
ing the  trust,  provided  it  appears  from  the  context  that  such  was 
the  clear  intention  of  the  party  declaring  the  trust.  This  is  an 
instance  where  courts  of  chancery  do  not  adopt  the  same  rules  of 
construction  that  prevail  in  courts  of  law.  If  the  meaning  of 
the  grantor  is  clear  that  he  intended  the  beneficiary  under  the 
trust  should  have  an  estate  in  fee,  he  will  take  sucii  an  estate, 
though  technical  terms  of  the  common  law  used  in  the  limitation 
of  such  an  estate  have  been  disregarded  ;  so  that  the  beneficiary 
may  have  an  equitable  fee  without  the  word  "  heirs,"  and  an  equi- 
table entail  without  the  words  "heirs  of  the  body."  ^ 

Ordinarily,  an  equitable  estate  in  fee  is  subject  to  the  same 
incidents  which  attach  to  a  legal  estate  in  fee,  and,  generally 
speaking,  these  include  the  right  to  dispose  of  the  estate  b}' 
alienation  as  well  as  by  devise.^  If  a  deed  in  trust  declares  the 
trust  to  be  for  a  person  named  "and  his  heirs,"  the  beneficiary 
takes  an  equitable  estate  in  fee  simple  which  he  may  devise,  the 
word  "  heirs  "  being  a  word  of  limitation.'* 

But  an  equitable  estate  created  by  the  premises  cannot  be  en- 
larged to  an  estate  in  fee  by  a  limitation  to  heirs  in  the  haben- 


1  Dorr  V.  Ckpp,  160  Mass.  538,  36  N. 
pj.  Kep.  474.  "  Tliis  is  not  thu  case  of  a 
formal  conveyance  creating  a  trust,  as  in 
McElroy  r.  McElroy,  113  Mass.  509.  It 
is  a  memorandum  of  a  barj^ain  ])reviously 


same  conclusion.  Tiie  purport  of  the 
agreement,  as  applied  to  the  jiresent  state 
of  facts,  a  sale  having  taken  place,  is 
hiinilar  to  that  of  the  one  construed  and 
Iield   sufficient  in  Uraun    v.   Coates.     In 


made,  and  is  put  in  writing  to  satisfy  the  the  latter,  heirs  were  not  mentioned.    See, 

statute  (Tub.  St.  ch.  141,  §  I)  and  to  fur-  al-o,  Earrell   v.  Joy,  16  Mass.    221,  223; 

nish  evidtnce.     This   is  ajjparent  on   the  Anns  v.   Ashley,  4  Pick.  71  ;  Scituate  v. 

face  of  the  wriiing.     It  is  agreed  that  the  Hanover,  16  Pick   222;  Fisher  v.  Fields, 

efjiiity  in  the  real  estate  is,  as  well  as  that  10  Johns.  495  ;   Wright  v.  Douglass,  7  N. 

it  shall  be,  owned  by  Clapj)  and  Russ  in  Y.  564  ;  Loring  v.  Palmer,  118  U.  S.  321, 

equal  shares  ;  and  a  r.-ason  is  statnd  which,  6  Sup.  Ct.  Pep.  1073  ;  Lewin,  Trusts  (9th 

even  if  not  true  or  bindinir  in  such  a  sense  ed.),  54,  55." 

as  to  show  a  resulting  trust,  shows  a  con-  '^  Lewin    on    Trusts,    44  ;    Holmes   v. 

sideratioii,  goes  back  to  the  beginning  of  Holmes,  86  N.  C.  205. 

the  transaction,  and  imports  that  the  un-  '^  Lewin,  Tru.sts,  692;    Story  Eq.  Jur. 

derstanding   as  to  ownershif.  dates  from  §974;  Popes  v.   Upton,  125   Mass.   258; 

then.    If  the  parol  evidence  be  considered,  Gnnn    r.    Brown    (Md.),    23    Atl.    Kep. 

as    it   seems   to    have    been    in  Urann  v.  462. 

Coates,  109  Mass.  581,  584,  it  leads  to  the  '  Knowldcii  v.  Leavitt,  121  Mass.  307. 

490 


THE   WORD    "heirs"    ESSENTIAL    AT   COMMON   LAW.       [§§596-599. 

duni.i  Thus,  where  a  conveyance  was  made  to  the  trustees  of  a 
vohiutaiy  association,  "  in  trust  for  the  stockholders  of  said  asso- 
ciation," to  have  and  to  hokl  "  to  the  said  stockholders,  their  heirs 
and  assigns,"  it  was  held  to  give  to  the  stockholders  an  equitable 
and  not  a  legal  estate.^ 

596.  A  sale  by  an  oflBcer  of  the  law  under  an  order  of 
court  may  operate  to  pass  an  estate  in  fee  without  the  use  of 
the  word  "  heirs  ;"  as  where  a  sheriff,  on  an  execution  sale  of 
real  estate  owned  by  the  juilgtnent  debtor  in  fee,  executes  to  the 
purchaser  at  such  sale  a  deed  of  "all  the  estate,  title,  and  inter- 
est "  which  the  judgment  debtor  had  in  such  land,  the  deed  passes 
a  fee  in  the  land,  though  the  word  "heirs"  is  omitted.  The 
sheriff  had  no  authority  to  sell  less  than  the  debtor's  entire  estate, 
which  was  an  estate  in  fee.'^ 

597.  There  is  an  exception  to  the  rule  in  case  of  a  grant  to 
a  corporation  sole ;  "  for  if  lands  be  given  to  a  sole  body  politic 
or  corporate,  as  to  a  bishop,  vicar,  master  of  a  hospital,  etc., 
there,  to  give  him  an  estate  of  inheritance  in  his  politic  or  corpo- 
rate capacity,  he  must  have  these  words,  'to  have  and  to  hold  to 
him  and  his  successors  ; '  for  without  these  words  .  .  .  there  pass- 
eth  no  inheritance  ;  for,  as  the  heir  doth  inherit  to  the  ancestor, 
so  the  successor  doth  succeed  to  the  predecessor."  * 

598.  A  deed  to  a  corporation  aggregate  conveys  a  fee  sim- 
ple estate,  though  it  does  not  contain  words  of  limitation  or 
succession.'^  "  In  strictness,  wiiile  a  corporation  scjIc  has  success- 
ors, a  corporation  aggregate  has  none,  for  it  continues  to  exist, 
one  and  the  same,  as  the  river  retains  its  identity  while  tlie  cur- 
rents of  water  that  form  it  are  continually  flowing  in  and  passing 
out.  There  is  a  succession  among  the  constituent  niembeis,  but 
none  in  the  corporation  itself."  ^ 

599.  The  deed  may  be  reformed  in  equity  in  case  the  words 
of  inheritance  are  omitted  by  mistake,  contrary  to  the  intention 

1  Hastings  ?•.  Merriam,  IIT  Muss.  24.5;  N.  II.  488;  Olcott  v.  Gilbert,  86  Tex.  121, 
Chapin   v.   First   Universalist  Society,  8     23  S.  W.  Hep.  98.5. 

Gray,  .580.  ''  Wilkes   Harre  i'.  Wyoming   Hist.  So- 

2  bhapin  v.  First  Universalist  Society,  ciety,  134  Pa.  St.  616,  19  Atl.  Rep.  809;- 
8  Grav,  580.  Wilcox  v.  Wheeler,  47  N.  H.  4SS  ;  Clian- 

3  Carolina  Sav.  Bank  v.  McMahon,  37  cellor  v.  Bell,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  538,  541. 

S.  C.  .309,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  31.  ''  A>heville  Division  v.  Aston,  92  N.  C. 

•*  Co.  Litt.  8  b,  94  h ;  Overseers  v.  Sears,     578,  584,  per  Smith,  C.  J. 
22  Pick.  122,  126;  Wileox  v.  WiieLlcr,  47 

491 


§  GOU.J  illK    IIABKXDUM,    OR    THE    ESlAThS    CliEATKD. 

of  the  parties. ^  The  equitable  power  of  reformation  can  be  in- 
voked only  by  pli'adiiig  the  mistake.^  But  the  court  is  not  war- 
ranteii  in  decreeing  the  correction  of  a  deed  containing  no  words 
of  inlieritance,  by  a  simple  inspection  of  the  deed,  where  there 
is  nothin<»-  to  indicate  that  they  were  omitted  by  mistake,  or  that 
the  grantor  intended  to  convey  a  fee,  except  the  reservation  of 
the  possession  during  his  lifetime.'^ 

Where  land  was  conveyed  to  several  persons  named  as  "trus- 
tees of  the  Methodist  Church,  .  .  .  and  their  successors  in  office 
forever,"  without  using  the  word  "  heirs,"  it  was  held  that  the 
intention  to  convey  a  fee  simple  was  manifest,  although  tlie  ab- 
sence of  the  word  "  heirs  "  prevented  a  court  of  law  from  giving 
effect  to  it ;  that  the  intention  to  convey  to  the  Methodist  Church 
named,  a  regularly  incorporated  religious  society,  was  quite  clear; 
and  that  the  heir  at  law  of  the  grantor,  having  recovered  in  eject- 
ment the  land  conveyed,  sliould  be  perpetually  enjoined  from 
enforcing  his  judgment,  although  the  conveyance  was  without 
other  consideration  than  the  attendance  of  the  grantor  upon  the 
ministrations  of  the  church.^ 

600.  On  the  other  hand,  a  deed  in  fee  may  be  reformed  so 
that  it  will  pass  only  a  life  estate,  as  intended  by  the  parties ;  as 
where  a  conveyance  was  made  in  fee,  and  at  tlie  same  time  the 
grantee  executed  and  delivered  to  the  grantor  an  instrument,  not 
under  seal,  declaring  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  be  that  the 
grantee  should  hold  only  a  life  estate,  especially  where  the  deed 
was  made  by  a  daughter  to  her  mother  without  other  considera- 
tion than  filial  affection.  "  It  was  intended  by  both  parties  to  be 
restricted  to  a  life  estate.  They  adopted  means  supposed  to  be 
adequate  to  thus  limit  the  operation  of  the  deed.  By  their  fail- 
ure to  comprehend  the  legal  effect  of  the  writing,  the  entire 
estate  was  legally  conveyed.     If  that  effect  is  to  be  given  to  the 

1  Trusdell  v.  Lehman,  47  N.J.  Eq.  218,  was  manifest  that  the  grantor  could  have 

20  Atl.  Kep.  391  ;  Chancellor  v.  Bell,  4.5  had  no  other  intention  than  to  convey  an 

N.  J.  Eq.  5.38;   Weller  v.  Rolason,  17  N.  estate  in  fee. 

J.  Eq.  13 ;  Wanner  v.  Sisson,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  -  Anderson  v.  Logan,  105  N.  C.  266,  11 

141,  147  ;  Rackley  v.  ChesniUt,  110  N.  C.  S.  E.  Eep.  361. 

262,  14  S.  E.  Kep.  750;  Vickers  (,•.  Leigh,  ^  jj^y  „.  Durham   Co.    110  N.   C.   169, 

104  N.  C.  248,  10  S.  E.  Rej).  308;  Moore  14  S.  E.  Kep.  646. 

v.  Quince,  109  N.  C.  85,  13   S.   E.   Rep.  *  Visitors  M.  E.  Church   v.   Town,  47 

872;    Saunders  v.   Saunders,  108   N.    C.  N.  J.  Eq.  400,  20  Atl.  Rep.  488. 
327,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  909.     In  these  cases  it 
492 


THE   RULE   IN   SHELLEY's    CASE.  [§  601. 

transaction  it  would  operate  as  a  fraud  on  the  plaintiff,  divesting 
her  without  consideration  of  the  estate  which  both  parties  in- 
tended should  remain  in  her.  It  may  be  said  that  the  instru- 
ments were  in  the  form  intended,  and  that  the  mistake  was  only 
as  to  the  legal  effect.  But  even  in  such  a  case  equity  will  grant 
relief  under  proper  circumstances."  ^ 

IV.   Tlie  Rule  in  Shelley's  Case. 

601.  The  rule  in  Shelley's  Case^  is  this:  Where  a  freehold 
estate  is  limited  to  one  for  life,  and  by  the  same  instrument  the 
inheritance  is  limited,  either  immediately  or  after  another  estate 
in  freehold,  to  his  heirs,  or  the  heirs  of  his  body,  the  whole  estate 
vests  in  him,  either  in  fee  simple  or  in  fee  tail,  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  if  the  estate  had  been  given  to  him  and  his  heirs,  or  to 
him  and  the  heirs  of  his  body  ;  and  the  words  "  heirs  "  and  "  heirs 
of  his  body  "  are  words  of  limitation  and  not  of  purchase. 

This  rule  was  an  ancient  dogma  of  the  common  law  at  the 
time  of  the  decision  from  which  the  rule  finally  took  its  name,  its 
origin  having  been  traced  by  Justice  Blackstone  to  a  case  decided 
in  the  reign  of  Edward  11.^  The  earliest  intelligible  decision 
upon  the  subject,  however,  is  to  be  found  in  the  case  of  the  Pro- 
vost of  Beverly,  in  the  time  of  Edward  III.,  and  reported  in  the 
Year  Books,  in  which  the  rule  is  substantially  declared  as  in 
Shelley's  Case. 

The  rule,  though  of  feudal  origin,  has  been  repeatedly  declared 
to  be  in  accordance  with  the  general  policy  of  modern  jurisjiru- 
dence.*  The  reason  for  the  rule  in  the  first  instance  is  undoubt- 
edly the  same  as  tliat  which  makes  the  word  "heirs,"  when  used 
in  a  conveyance,  a  word  of  limitation,  giving  an  absolute  estate 
in  fee  to  the  grantee.  Professor  Wasliburn  clearly  and  forcibly 
states  this  view  in  his  excellent  treatise,  saying:  '^It  was  at  first 
understood  that  in  case  of  such  a  limitation  the  estate  was  in  fact 

1  Scofield  .•.  Quinn.  r,4  Miiai.  9,55  N.  882;  Ilardage  v.  Stroopc.  58  Ark.  303. 
W.  Rep.  745.  See,  also,  Benson  r.  Mar-  307  ;  Kinmer.son  ;;.  HuglifS,  110  Mo.  627, 
koe,  37  Minn.  30,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  38.  19  S.  W.  Hop.  979. 

2  1  Coke,  88,  93  h.  And  .sec  Lorin-  v.  »  Perrin  r.  Blake,  A  Burrow,  279.  1  W. 
Eliot,   16   Gray,   568,   572;  Mcllhiuny  v.  Bi.  672. 

Mcllhinny    137  Ind.  411,  37  N.  E.  Rep.         '  Terrin  v.  Blake,  4  Burrow,  2579,  1  W  . 

147    148-    Andrews    ,-.    Spurlin,  35  Ind.  Bl.  672;  Starncs  r.  IliU,  112  N.  C.   1,  16 

262';  Doe  V.  Jackman.  5  Ind.  283  ;  Taney  S.  E.  Rep.  101 1,  p.r  Sliepherd,  C.  J. 
V.  Fahnley,   126  Ind    88,  2.')   N.   K.   R.-p- 

41'3 


§  00:2.]  THE    HABENDUM,    OR   THE    ESTATES   CREATED. 

to  i^o  to  the  heirs  of  the  grantee  named  ;  that,  though  he  had  a 
rio-ht  to  enjoy  it  during  life,  he  liad  no  right  to  cut  off  the  de- 
scent by  alienation  ;  and  that  when,  therefore,  the  word  '  heirs,' 
in  the  prc^gress  of  estates,  came  to  be  legarded  as  a  mere  teim 
of  limitation,  giving  the  grantee  a  complete  ownership,  with  an 
unrestrie-ted  rii;lit  of  alienation,  it  was  not  easy  to  distinguish 
between  a  case  where  the  limitation  was  to  one  and  his  heirs, 
anil  tliat  where  it  was  to  him  for  life,  and  after  his  death  to  his 
lunrs;  the  effect  at  common  law  being  the  same  in  both  forms 
of  limitation."'  ^ 

602.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  grounds  of  the  rule  in 
its  origin,  there  was  a  reason  for  its  preservation  in  modern 
times,  after  the  feudal  reason  of  the  prevention  of  frauds  upon  the 
feudal  lord  had  ceased  to  exist  with  the  feudal  systtnu  itself ; 
"and  that  subi^equent  reason,"  says  F(Mirne,  "  is  the  desire  to  facil- 
itate alienation  by  vesting  the  inheritance  in  the  ancestor,  instead 
of  allow^ing  it  to  remain  in  abeyance  until  his  decease."  ^  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Blackstone  also  adopts  the  same  view,  saying  that  the  reason 
for  the  preservation  of  the  rule  is  "laid  in  a  principle  diametri- 
cally oppo.site  to  the  genius  of  feudal  institutions,  namely,  a  desire 
to  facilitate  the  alienation  of  land,  and  to  throw  it  into  the  track 
of  commerce  one  generation  sooner  by  vesting  the  inheritance  in 
tlie  ancestor."  ^ 

In  America  the  rule  has  been  abrogated  in  many  States,* — the 

1  2  Waslib.  Real  Prop.  647.  laugh,  1.3  Pa.   St.  344,  53  Am.  Dec.  474, 
-  Fearne,  Rem.  §  421.  Gibson,  C.  J.,  says:  "Though  of  feudal 

2  Perrin  v.  Blake,  4  Bunow,  2579,  1  origin,  it  is  not  a  relic  of  barbarism,  or  a 
W.  Bl.  672.  In  Polk  v.  Paris,  9  Yerg.  part  of  the  rubl)ish  of  the  dark  ages.  .  .  . 
209,  30  Am.  Dec.  400,  Reese,  J.,  in  vin-  It  has  other  than  feudal  objects,  to  wit, 
dication  of  the  rule,  says:  "It  is  a  rule  the  unfettering  of  estates  by  vesting  the 
or  canon  of  property  which,  so  far  from  inheritance  in  the  ancestor,  and  making 
being  at  war  with  the  genius  of  our  in-  it  alienable  a  generation  sooner  than  it 
stitutions,  or  with  the  liberal  and  com-  otherwi.se  would  be."  See,  al.so,  Hamner 
mercial  spirit  of  th<!  age,  which  alike  j;.  Smith,  22  Ala.  433,  per  Chilton,  C.  J. 
abhor  the  locking  up  and  rendering  in-  *  Alabama:  Code  1 886,  §  1829.  It  pre- 
alienable  real  estate  and  other  property,  vailed  until  the  Code  of  1852  became  op- 
seems  to  be  in  perfect  harmony  with  both,  erative,  January  17, 1853.  May  r.  Ritchie, 
It  is  owing,  perhaps,  to  this  circumstance,  65  Ala.  602  ;  Ma.son  v.  Pate,  34  Ala.  379. 
that  the  rule  —  a  Gothic  column  found  California:  Civ.  Code,  §  779  ;  Barnett  v. 
among  the  remains  of  feudality — has  Barnett,  104  Cal.  298,  37  Pac.  Rej).  1049  ; 
been  preserved,  in  all  its  strength,  to  aid  Estate  of  Utz,  43  Cal.  200.  Connecticut: 
in  sustaining  the  fabric  of  the  modern  G.  S,  1888,  §  2953,  stat.  of  1S21  ;  Leake 
social    system."     In    Hijeman    v.    Bous-  v.    Wntson,   60  Conn.  498,  511,  21   Atl. 

494 


THE   RULE   IN   SHELLEY  S   CASE. 


[§  602. 


first  taker  has  a  life  estate  onl}',  and  tlie  heirs  or  heirs  of  the  body 
of  sucli  person  take  the  remainder  as  purchasers,  —  but  remains 
a  rule  of  property  in  .the  construction  of  both  deeds  and  wills  in 
several  States.^ 


Rep  1075  ;  Goodrich  v.  Lambert,  10  Conn. 
448.  Georgia:  The  rule  was  alirc/gated 
when  the  Code  of  1862  went  into  effect. 
Children  take  the  remainder.  Code  1882, 
§§  2248,  2249,  2250.  Wdkersuu  v.  Chirk, 
80  Ga.  367,  7  S.  E.  Rep.  319;  Ewiug 
V.  Shropshire,  80  Ga.  374,  7  S.  E.  Rep. 
554;  Duraut  v.  Muller,  88  Ga  251,  14 
S.  E.  Rep.  612;  Smith  v.  Collins,  90  Ga. 
411,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  1013.  Idaho:  R.  S. 
1887,  §  2855.  Kentucky:  Was  never  in 
force  in  this  State.  The  statute  declares 
the  effect  of  a  deed  or  devise  on  which 
the  rule  would  oi.erate  to  be,  as  above 
stated.  G.  S.  1894,  §  2345.  Turman  v. 
White,  14  B.  Mou.  560  ;  Brown  i'.  Ferrell, 
83  Ky.  417  ;  Clay  v.  Cheuault  (Ky.),  10 
S.  W.  Rep.  650.  Maine:  R.  S.  1883,  ch. 
73,  §  6  ;  Read  v.  Fog<r,  60  Me.  479  ;  Read 
V.  Hilton,  68  Me.  139.  Massachusetts: 
P.  S.  1882,  ch.  126,  §  4.  Abolished  as  to 
wills  by  Stat.  1791,  ch.  60,  §3.  As  to 
deeds  also.  R.  S.  1836,  ch.  59,  §  9  ;  Loring 
V.  Eliot,  16  Gray,  568,  572;  Putnam  v. 
Gleason,  99  Mass.  454.  Michigan  :  How- 
ell's Annot.  Stat.  1882,  §  5544;  Eraser 
V.  Chene,  2  Mich.  81.  Minnesota:  G.  S. 
1894,  §  4389;  Whiting  v.  Whiting,  42 
Minn.  548,  550,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  1030. 
Mississippi:  Annot.  Code  1892,  §2446. 
Missouri:  R.  S.  1889,  §  8838,  first  enacted 
in  1835;  Riggins  v.  McClellan,  28  Mo. 
23;  Tesson  r.  Newman,  62  Mo.  198; 
Muldrow  V.  White,  67  Mo.  470  ;  Worn- 
mack  V.  Whitmore,  58  Mo,  448;  Emmer- 
8on  V.  Hughes,  110  IVIo.  627,  19  S.  W. 
Rep.  979 ;  Wood  ?•.  Kice,  103  Mo.  329,  15 
S.  W.  Rep.  623.  Montana  :  Codes  1895, 
Civ.  Code,  §  1228.  New  Mexico  :  Conij). 
Laws  1884,  §  1425.  New  York:  R.  S. 
1889,  p.  2433,  §  28.  Act  took  effect  Jan- 
uary 1,  1830.  Barber  v.  Gary,  11  N.  Y. 
397;  Moore  v.  Littel,  41  N.  Y.  66,  40 
Bnrh.  488  ;  Brown  j;.  Lyon,  6  N.  Y.  420. 
North  Dakota  :  Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  2752. 
Oklahoma:    Comp.    Stats.    1892,  §  3716. 


South  Dakota:  Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  2752. 
Tennessee:  Code  1884,  §2814,  first  en- 
acted in  1851-52;  Hnr.«t  r.  Wilson,  89 
Tenn.  270,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  778.  Vermont: 
The  rule  is  in  force  only  as  one  of  construc- 
tion and  intention.  Sniith  v.  Hastings, 
29  Vt.  240.  Virginia:  Code  1887,  §  2423. 
So  in  Code  18.50,  p.  .501,  §  11.  West 
Virginia  :  Code  1891,  ch.  71,  §  11.  Wis- 
consin :  Annot   Stats.  1889,  §  2052. 

1  Arkansas:  The  rule  in  Shelley's  Case 
is  in  force  in  this  State,  except  in  so  far 
as  it  has  been  repealed  by  the  statute 
abolishing  fees  tail.  A  conveyance  of 
land  to  a  grantee  "for  and  during  her 
natural  life,  and  then  to  the  heirs  of  her 
body  in  fee  simple,  and,  if  at  her  death 
there  are  no  heirs  of  her  body  to  take  the 
said  land,  then  in  that  case  to  he  divided 
and  distributeil  according  to  the  laws  for 
descent  and  distribution  in  this  State," 
comes  within  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case, 
and  vests  an  estate  of  inheritance  in  the 
grantee,  so  that  she  becomes  seised  of  the 
land  in  fee  simple.  Hardage  r.  Stroope, 
58  Ark.  303,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  490.  Illinois : 
Except  in  case  of  estates  tail.  Fowler  v. 
Black,  136  111.  36.3,  26  N.  E,  Rep.  596 ; 
Riggin  V.  Love,  72  111.  553;  Baker  v. 
Scott,  62  111.  86  ;  Ilageman  v.  Hageman, 

129  111.  164.  21  N.  E.  Rep.  814  ;  Butler  v. 
Hucslis,  68  111.  594,  23  Am.  Uep.  589; 
Carpenter  v.  Van  Olinder,  127  111.  42,  19 
N.  E.  Rep.  868     Indiana :  Lane  v.  Utz, 

130  Ind.  235,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  772  ;  Taney 
V.  Fahnley,  I'^G  Ind.  88,  25  N.  E.  Rep. 
882  ;  Earnhart  v.  Earnhart,  127  Ind.  397, 
26  N.  E.  Rep.  895,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  652 ; 
Jackson  )•.  Jackson,  127  Ind.  346,  26  N. 
E.  Rep.  897  ;  Fountain  County  Coal  Co. 
V.  Boekhdieimer,  102  Ind.  76;  Shinier  r. 
Mann,  99  Ind.  190,  50  Am.  Rep.  82  ;  King 
)'.  Ren,  56  Ind.  1  ;  Andrews  v-  Si)urliu,35 
Ind.  262  ;  Sieeloff  v.  Redman,  26  Ind.  251  ; 
Small  r.  Ilowland,  14  Ind.  592;  Hull  r. 
Reals,  23  Ind.  25  ;  Doe  v.  Jackman,  5  Ind. 

495 


$§  G03,  604.]   THE  HABENDUM,  OR  THE  ESTATES  CREATED. 

Ill  a  few  States  the  rule  has  been  abrogated  as  to  wills,  but 
remains  in  force  as  a  rule  of  property  as  to  deeds. ^ 

603.  The  rule  applies  to  equitable  as  Avell  as  legal  estates 
when  the  trust  is  executed  and  not  executory.^  if  the  trust 
is  a  passive  one,  requiring  no  active  dutu'S  on  the  part  of  the  trus- 
tee, as  where  it  is  for  the  use  of  a  inai-rivd  woman  for  her  life  and 
after  her  tlecease  to  her  heirs  in  fee,  and  in  the  mean  time  to  per- 
mit her  to  receive  for  lier  own  use  the  rents  of  the  land,  and  no 
purpose  can  be  subserved  in  keeping  the  declared  trust  alive,  the 
Statute  of  Uses  executes  the  trust,  and  the  wife  becomes  seised 
under  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case  of  a  legal  estate  in  fee,  with 
power  to  convey  the  same.'^ 

604.  The  rule  in  Shelley's  Case  is  an  arbitrary  one  which 
does  not  regard  the  intention  of  the  parties  in  any  particular 
case.     Indeed,  the   rule   is  enforced   in  many  cases    in   which   it 


283.  Iowa  :  Broliar  v.  Marquis,  80  Iowa, 
49,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  395  ;  Fierson  v.  Liuie, 
60  Iowa,  60,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  90.  Mary- 
land :  Ware  v.  Richardson,  3  Md.  505,  56 
Am.  Dec.  762;  Thomas  v.  Iliggins,  47 
Md.  439.  North  Carolina:  Starnes  v. 
Hill,  112  N.  C.  1,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  1011, 
holding  that  the  rule  is  still  iu  force,  and 
not  affected  by  the  statute  of  1854,  §  5, 
ch.  43,  of  the  Rev.  Code,  and  §  1329  of 
the  present  Code.  Pennsylvania:  Car- 
son V.  Fuhs,  131  Pa.  St.  256,  18  Atl. 
Rep.  1017,  25  W.  N.  C.  230;  Kk-ppner 
V.  Laverty,  70  Pa.  St.  72  ;  Yarnidl's  App. 
70  Pa.  St.  335 ;  Doebler's  App.  64  Pa. 
St.  9;  Daley  v.  Koons,  90  Pa.  St.  246. 
South  Carolina:  Act  of  1853,  12  Stat. 
298,  lias  not  abrogated  the  rule.  Car- 
rigan  v.  Drake,  36  S.  C.  354,  366,  15  S. 
E.  Rep.  339 ;  Fields  v.  Watson,  23  S.  C. 
4-'. 

'  Kansas:  G.  S.  1889,  §  7256.  New 
Hampshire  :  P.  S.  1891,  §  8  ;  Cloutman  v. 
Bailey,  62  N.  H.  44.  New  Jersey  :  Rev. 
1877,  p.  299,  Descent,  §  10;  Akers  v. 
Akers,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  26,  30.  Rhode  Island  : 
P.  S.  1882,  ch.  182,  §  2  ;  Cooper  v.  <  'ooper, 
6  R.  I.  261.  Ohio:  R.  S.  1892,  §  5968; 
Mack  V.  Cham7>ion,  26  W.  L.  B.  113, 115, 
per  Hunt,  .1.;  Connecticut  Mutual  Life 
Insurance  Co.  i-.  Skinner,  4  Ohio  C.  C. 

496 


526;  Smith  v.  Haukins,  27  Ohio  St.  371  ; 
Carter  v.  Reddish,  32  Ohio  St.  1.  Oregon : 
2  Annot.  Stat.  1892,  §  3093.  Texas  :  The 
rule  seems  to  be  recognized  as  regards 
deeds.  Hancock  v.  Butler,  21  Tex.  804  ; 
Hawkins  v.  Lee,  22  Tex.  544.  But  not  as 
applied  to  wills.  Tendick  v.  Evetts,  38 
Tex.  275. 

2  Carrigan  v.  Drake,  36  S.  C.  354,  15 
S.  E.  Rep.  339;  Carson  v.  Fuhs,  131  Pa. 
St.  256,  18  Atl.  Rep.  1017,  25  W.  N.  C. 
230;  Starnes  v.  Hill,  112  N.  C.  1,  16  S.  E. 
Rep.  1011  ;  Cannon  v.  Barry,  59  Miss. 
289  ;  Bullard  v.  Goffe,  20  Pick.  252  ;  Lor- 
ing  V.  I<:iiot,  16  Gray,  568.  572  ;  Davis  v. 
Hay  den,  9  Mass.  514  ;  Wayne  v.  Lawrence, 
58  Ga.  15. 

8  Carson  v.  Fuhs,  131  Pa.  St.  256,  266, 
18  Atl.  Rep.  1017.  Paxson,  C.  J.,  said: 
"  The  trustee  iu  this  case  had  no  active 
duties  to  perform;  it  is  a  passive,  dry 
trust,  with  no  interest  to  guard,  no  rights 
to  protect.  In  such  case,  the  cestui  que 
trust  is  entitled  to  a  reconveyance  of  the 
legal  title  ;  equity  will  consider  that  done 
which  ought  to  be  done,  and  declare  the 
legal  title  in  Mrs.  Hamilton.  It  then 
comes  within  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case, 
and  the  life  estate  and  remainder  coalesce, 
the  effect  of  which  is  to  give  the  fee  to 
Mrs.  Hamilton." 


THE   RULE   IN   SHELLEY's   CASE.  [^5  605. 

directly  interferes  with  either  the  presumed  or  declared  intention 
of  the  parties  that  a  life  estate  shall  vest  in  the  first  taker  with 
a  remainder  over  to  the  heirs  of  his  body.  But  if  the  rule  in  Shel- 
ley's Case  is  applicable,  the  question  of  intention  is  foreign  to  the 
construction  of  the  deed.^  ''  The  rule  in  Shelley's  Case  was  never 
a  rule  of  intention  or  of  construction  to  reach  and  carry  out  the 
settlor's  intention,  but  has  been  defined,  as  it  was  established,  as 
an  absolute  rule  of  property  to  obviate  certain  difficulties  that 
would  arise  in  relation  to  tenures,  if  certain  persons  to  whom  the 
property  was  limited  w^ere  allowed  to  take  as  purchasers  and  not 
by  descent."  2  It  is  not  a  rule  of  construction  or  interpretation, 
but  a  rule  of  property.-^ 

605.  This  rule  even  overrides  the  expressed  intention  of 
the  grantor  that  it  shall  not  operate.  Preston  on  Estates  ujion 
this  point  uses  the  following  language  :  "  Neither  the  express  dec- 
laration, first,  that  the  ancestor  shall  have  an  estate  for  his  life 
and  no  longer;  nor,  secondly,  that  he  shall  have  only  an  estate 
for  life  in  the  premises,  and  after  his  decease  it  shall  go  to  his 
heirs  of  his  body,  and,  in  default  of  such  heirs,  vest  in  the  person 
next  in  remainder,  and  that  the  ancestor  shall  have  no  power 
to  defeat  the  intention  of  the  testator;  nor,  thirdly,  that  the 
ancestor  shall  be  tenant  for  his  life  and  no  longer,  and  that  it 
shall  not  be  in  his  power  to  sell,  dispose,  or  make  away  with  any 
part  of  the  premises,  —  will  change  the  word  '  heirs  '  into  words 
of  purchase."* 

1  Mcllhinny  ..  Mcllhinuy,  137  Ind.  411,  not  his  heirs,  yet  they  cannot  as  heirs  take 

37   N    E.    Rep.  147;  Ridgeway  ..  Lan-  otherwise  by  descent;  and,  to  take  b^- de- 

phear.99lnd.251;  Shimer  .    Mann,  99  scent   at  all,  they  must   take   from    h.m 

Ld    190    50   Am.    Rep.  82;    Fowler   v.  whose  heirs  they  are,  and  not  from   h.m 

Black,  136  111.  363,  26  N.  Iv  Rep.  596;  who  conveyed    the  property    and    nom.- 

Carpenrer  ..  Van  Olinder,  127  III.  42.  47.  na.ed  them  to  succeed  m  .ts  owner..h.p.    It 

19  N    E.  Rep.  868;    Doebler's  App.  64  may  be  .hat  U- rule  has  o  ten  been  m..- 

Pa  Sr  9  per  Sharswood,  J.  applied,  for  it  is  a  rule  of  law  and  no    a 

In  Smith  ..  Collins,  90  Ga.  411,  412,  17  rule  of  construction.     It  :s  -t  ava.lab  e 

S    E    Rep    101.3,  Chief  Justice  Bleckley  to  ascertain  m.ent.on,  but  only  to  hx  the 

.aid-'"In   its  substance  the  rule  is  not  consequences  of  a  pn^n  n.tcnUon  after  .t 

arbitrary,  but  locrical  .and  apparently  ne-  has  been  ascertained. 

ccs,sarv  in  any  system  of  law  which  is  self-  '^  Mack  ..   Cbamp.on.   26   W.    L.   Bui. 

consi..;ont,    for"  the    distinction     between  ''^'  '''' ^'^^  l^"'''"^;,  ,,,    .. 

descent  and  purcha.sc  is  radical  and  fnnda-  ^'  Baker  r.  Scott.  62  111   86. 

r  ■    1-   •  1     1,.  4   1    I'rcston   on   Estates,  p.  oo.t.     Aiiu 

mental  ;  and  while  a  group  of  ,ndiv.,lu.il.s,  1  rcston  on   i.st       ,  p 

though  they  he  heirs  of  another,  may  take     see  Taney  ..  I  ahnley,  126  Ind.  88.  2.    N. 
tnou^n  inej  oe  Hoclist.dler  v.  Hochstedlcr, 

by  purchase  the  same  as  those  wtio  are     u.  "cp  , 

VOL.  I. 


^§  liOG,  607.]       TITK    HABENDUM,    OR    THE    ESTATES    CREATED. 

The  application  of  the  rule  to  a  conveyance  by  a  father  to  his 
dano-hter,  "and  to  the  heirs  of  her  body,"  is  not  affected  by  the 
fact  th;it  the  conveyance  was  intended  as  a  gift  or  advancement.^ 

TIio  application  of  the  rule  is  in  no  way  affected  by  a  declara- 
tion or  r.'cital  after  a  habendum  to  one  for  life,  and  upon  his 
death  "■  to  his  heirs  and  assigns  forever,"  that  the  true  meaning  of 
the  deed  is  that  the  grantee  is  "  to  hold  only  during  his  natural 
life,"  and  upon  his  death  "said  premises  to  be  held  in  fee  simple 
by  his  heirs  and  assigns  forever."  The  grantee  under  the  rule 
takes  an  estate  in  fee  simple,  and  not  merely  for  life.^ 

606.  There  is  a  distinction  between  deeds  and  "wills  in  the 
application  of  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case.  As  applied  to  wills 
the  rule  is  not  allowed  to  override  the  manifest  and  clearly  ex- 
pressed intention  of  the  testator,  but  the  intention  will  always 
be  carried  into  effect  if  it  can  be  ascertained.  If  the  language 
of  the  will  is  such  as  to  bring  the  case  within  the  rule,  full  force 
and  effect  will  be  given  to  it ;  but  if  it  clearly  appears  that  the 
testator  had  a  meaning  and  intention  different  from  the  rule,  this 
will  not  be  allowed  to  frustrate  his  intention.  This  distinction 
between  deeds  and  wills  in  the  application  of  the  rule  is  in 
accordance  with  the  general  rule  applicable  to  the  construction  of 
wills,  that  the  intention  of  the  testator  shall  so  far  as  possible  be 
observed.'^ 

607.  The  rule  applies  only  "when  the  life  estate  is  a  vested 
freehold.  A  limitation  to  a  married  woman  for  life,  and,  in  the 
event  that  her  husband  shall  survive  her,  then  to  him  for  life,  and 
after  the  termination  of  the  life  estates  then  to  the  heirs  of  the 
husband,  fjives  to  the  latter  a  continfjent  I'emainder:  and  until  the 
contingency  of  his  survival  of  his  wife  happens,  the  rule  in  Shel- 
ley's Case  cannot  operate  to  vest  in  him  an  indefeasible  fee  ;  and 
until  this  contingency  happens,  the  husband's  heirs  have  a  contin- 
gent remainder  in  fee.  expectant  upon  the  determination  of  the 
life  estate  of  the  wife,  she  surviving  her  said  husband.'* 

It  is  sufficient  that  the  freehold  in  the  ancestor  is  implied,  and 
not  created  in  express  terms.^ 

108  Ind.  506,  9  N.  E.  Rep.  467  ;  Shimer  3  Kidgeway  v.  Lanphear,  99  Ind.  2.51  ; 

V.  Mann,  99  Ind.  190,  50  Am.  Hep.  82.  Mcllhinny  v.  Mcllhinny,  137  Ind.  411,  37 

1  Lane  v.  Utz,  130  Ind.  235,  29  JST.  E.  N.  E.  Kep.  147. 

Rep.  772.  4  Starnes  v.  Hill,  112  N.  C  1,  10  S.  E. 

-  Fowler  v.  Black,  136  111.  363, 26  N.  E.  Rep.  1011. 

Rep.  596.                                           ,  6  -Wills  V.   Palmer,  5   IJiir.  2615,  2  Bl. 

498  Rep.  687;  Pibus  v.  Mitford.  1  Vent.  372. 


THE   RULE   IN  SHELLEY'S   CASE.  [§§  608,  G09. 

608.  The  rule  applies  where  the  limitation  is  to  one  for  life, 
and  after  his  death  to  his  heirs,  or  the  heirs  of  his  body.  Such  a 
limitation  is  the  same- in  effect  as  a  limitation  simply  to  one  and 
liis  heirs,  or  tiie  heirs  of  his  body.  It  applies  where  the  limita- 
tion is  to  one  for  life,  with  remainder  to  another  for  life,  or  in 
tail,  with  remainder  to  the  heirs,  or  heirs  of  the  body  of  the 
first  taker ;  lie  has  a  life  estate  in  possession,  and  an  estate  in  fee 
simple  or  fee  tail  in  remainder,  expectant  on  the  life  estate  in 
the  other  person. ^  The  rule  applies  though  the  remainder  be 
contingent,  as  where  the  limitation  is  to  one  for  life  with  re- 
mainder to  another  for  life,  with  remainder,  if  the  first-named 
tenant  shall  die  before  the  second  life  tenant,  to  the  heirs  of  the 
iii'st  named ;  for  he  takes,  in  addition  to  his  life  interest  in  pos- 
session, a  contingent  remainder  in  fee  simple.  The  rule  applies 
also  where  the  particular  estate  is  for  the  life  of  another.^ 

A  conveyance  to  a  woman  "  during  the  term  of  her  natural 
life,"  and  "  to  descend  "  to  her  heirs  in  equal  portions,  is  governed 
by  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case,  and  the  grantee  takes  an  absolute 
title  in  fee.  "  The  word  'descend,'  as  used  in  the  deed,  means  to 
pass  from  the  grantee  to  her  heirs,  and  is  to  the  same  effect  as  if 
it  read  '  to  her  during  her  natural  life  and  to  her  heirs.' "'  ^  The 
rule  is  the  same  in  case  the  deed  is  to  one  for  life,  and  at  his  de- 
cease "  to  go  and  pass  to  his  heirs."  ^ 

The  rule  was  apj^lied  where  a  husband  conveyed  to  his  wife 
"and  her  children  and  joint  heirs  with  her  and  myself,"  and  to 
two  others  named.  The  wife  was  the  third  wife  of  the  grantor, 
by  whom  he  had  two  children,  and  the  others  named  wcn-e  the 
children  of  the  grantor  by  his  second  wife.  It  was  held  that 
under  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case  th(?  wife  and  the  two  other  per- 
sons named  in  the  deed  tnok  an  estate  in  fee  as  tenants  in  com- 
mon, and  that  the  children  of  the  wife  took  nothing.'' 

609.  The  word  ''heirs  '  is  essential  to  justify  the  applica- 
tion of  the  rule,  just  as  it  is  to  create  an  ordinary  estate  in  fee 
simple.  Thus,  the  rule  does  not  apply  when  the  limitation  is  to 
such  person  or  persons  as  would  be  entitled  to  take  from  the  life 

1  Feme,  Ilemniiiders,  29  ;  Edwards,  See,  however,  Tyler  v.  Moore,  42  I'a.  St. 
Prop,  in  Land,  2d  cd.  378.  374,  17  Atl.  Rep.  216. 

2  Fcrne   P>einiunders,  31,  32.  ••  Gonneeticnt   Mutual    Life  Insurance 

3  Taney  v.  Falinley,  120  Ind  88,  25  N.     Co.  r.  Skinner,  4  Ohio  C.  C.  .526. 

E.  Rep.  882  ;  Andrews  c  Spurlin,  35  Ind.         ■'  Rroliar  v.  Marquis,  80  Iowa,  49,  45  N. 
262;   McQueen   v.   Logan,  80  Ala.  304.     W.  lie]..  395. 

409 


§  GlO.j  THE   HABENDUM,    OK    THE    ESTATES    CHEATED. 

tenant  by  doseent.^  It  does  not  apply  when  tlio  word  "  issue"  or 
the  word  "  cliiUh-cn  "  is  used  instead  of  "licirs."-  It  does  not 
ii[>ply  wlien  iho  word  '' hc^irs,"  in  the  phrase  "-heirs  of  the  body," 
is  used  in  tlie  sense  of  ''children,"  and  as  a  word  of  purcliase.^ 

The  rule  siniplv  acts  upon  the  words  of  inheritance,  and  does 
not  affect  the  rules  for  deteruiiniiig  the  quantity  of  the  estate 
conveyed,  whether  a  fee  simple  or  a  fee  tail.'*  It  does  not  affect 
the  words  of  procreation  in  a  fee  tail. 

The  rule  operates  to  enlarge  the  estate  of  the  ancestor,  whose 
lieirs  gencually,  or  the  heirs  of  whose  body,  are  the  objects  of 
the  limitation,  and  who  can  take  by  descent  from  him  and  not  as 
purchasers  under  the  deed.  It  therefore  has  no  application  when 
the  deed  is  to  the  husband  for  his  life  and  that  of  his  wife,  with 
contingent  remainder  to  the  heirs  of  the  body  of  the  wife  wlio 
may  survive  them.^  The  heirs  of  the  body  of  the  wife  may  not 
be  the  heirs  of  the  husband,  and  therefore  the  rule  might  not 
operate  to  enlarge  the  estate  of  the  husband,  the  first  taker. 
The  rule  does  not  appl}'  unless  an  estate  is  limited  to  the  heirs  of 
the  donee  in  tail.  It  does  not  apply  unless  it  is  limited  to  the 
heirs  of  the  same  person  to  whom  the  preceding  estate  is  given ; 
therefore  it  does  not  apply  where  the  conveyance  is  to  a  woman 
for  her  life,  and  at  her  death  to  the  children  born  of  her  body, 
to  them  and  their  heirs  forever.  The  children  in  such  case 
would  take  as  purchasers.^ 

610.  The  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  word  "  heirs  "  is 
used  to  describe  a  class  to  take  as  purchasers,  and  not  to  de- 
scribe persons  who  are  to  take  simply  as  heirs  general  or  special 

1  Handy  v.  McKim,  64  Md.  560,  572,  4  3  CarriKan  v.  Drake.  36  S.  C.  354,  15 
Atl.  Rep.  125;  Hofsass  v.  Mann,  74  Md.  S.  E.  Rep.  339;  Tyler  v.  Moore,  42  Pa, 
400,  22  Atl.  Rep.  65  ;  Hardage  i'.  Stroope,  St.  374,  17  Atl.  Rep.  216;  Jackson  v. 
58  Ark.  303.  Jackson,  127  Ind.  346,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  897  ; 

2  Gourdin  r.  Deas,  27  S.  C.  479,  4  S.  Sorden  v.  Gatewood,  1  Ind.  107;  Doe  v. 
E.  Rep.  64  ;  Wilson  (?.  McJunkin,  11  Rich.  Jacknian,  5  Ind.  283;  Andrews  v.  Spur- 
Eq.  5i7;  Mellichamp  v.  Mellichamp,  28  lin,  35  Ind.  262,  267;  Owen  v.  Cooper,  46 
S.  C.   125,  5  S.  E.  Rep.   333  ;  Myers  v.  Ind.  524. 

Anderson,  1  Strobh.  Eq.344,  47  Am.  Dec.  *  Lehndorf  v.  Cope,  122  III.  317,  13  N. 

.537  ;  Mclntyre  v.  McTntyre,  16  S.  C.  290  ;  E.  Rep.  505 ;  Fields  v.  AVatson,  23  S.  C. 

Cannon   v.  Barry,  59  Miss.  289  ;  Estate  of  42,  47. 

Utz,  43  Cal.  200.   In  Indiana,  liowcver,  the  "^  Williamson  r.  Mason,  23  Ala.  488. 

rule  applies  where  the  limitation  is  to  the  ^  Smith  v.  Collins,  90  Ga.  41 1,  17  S.  E. 

"issue  of  the  body"  instead  of  "heirs  of  Rep.  1013. 
the  body."    King  v.  Rea,  56  Ind.  1  ;  Lane 
V.  Utz,  130  Ind.  235.  29  N.  E.  Rep.  772. 

r-oo 


THE    RULE    IN    SHLLLEY's    CASE.  [§  610. 

of  the  grantee.^  Tlius  the  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  limi- 
tation is  to  the ''present  heirs,"  or  the  "heirs  now  living,"  of  the 
grantee,  or  his  "■  apuaient  heirs."  ^ 

It  was  held  not  to  apply  where  the  deed  was  to  a  woman  to 
hold  during  her  natural  life,  "  and  after  her  death  to  be  equally 
divided  between  the  lawful  heirs  of  her  body."  These  words 
were  construed  to  be  words  of  purchase  and  not  of  limitation.'^ 

"  The  underlying  question  in  all  controversies,  when  it  is  con- 
tended that  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case  applies,  is,  are  the  words 
'heirs,'  'heirs  of  the  body,'  or  'issue,'  to  be  construed  ns  words 
of  limitation  or  words  of  purchase?  If  the  former,  the  rule  of 
Shelley's  Case  applies,  denying  any  estate  to  the  'issue,'  'heirs  of 
the  body,'  but  enlarging  the  estate  of  the  life  tenant  to  a  fee 
simple  or  fee  conditional,  as  the  case  maybe."*  The  technical 
words  of  limitation  may  be  explained  by  words  added  thereto 
which  show  that  the  words  of  limitation  were  not  used  in  their 
technical  sense,  but  as  words  of  purchase.^ 

A  conveyance  to  the  grantor's  children  named,  "  and  the  heirs 
of  their  bodies,"  contained  after  the  words  of  grant  the  following 
clause  :  "  Meaning  and  intending  by  this  conveyance  to  convey  to 
my  said  children  the  use  and  control  of  said  real  estate  during 
their  natural  lives,  and  at  their  death  to  go  to  their  children  ; 
should  they  die  without  issue,  to  their  legal  representatives." 
The  habendum  was  to  their  heirs  and  assigns  forever.  It  was 
held  that  the  word  "  heiis"  in  the  habendum  clause  meant  the 
children  of  the  grantees,  and  that  the  children  of  the  grantor 
took  only  a  life  estate,  and  their  children  took  the  remainder  in 
fee.6 

The  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  limitation  is  to  tlie  heirs  or 
issue  of  the   first  taker  and  their  heirs,  for  in  such  case   there  is 

1  Williamson  v.  Mason,  23  Ala.  488;  50  Am.  Hep/Sa ;  Fountain  County  Coal 
Norris  r.  Ilenslev,  27  Cal.  439  ;  Baker  v.  Co.  r.  Ikcklehtimer,  102  Ind.  7f>,  1  N.  E. 
Scott   62  111.  86.  ^^t'I>-  202,  .'J2  Am.  Kop.  64.') ;  Carpenter  v. 

2  Fountain  County  Coal  Co.  ,•.  Borklc-  Van  Olin.l.T,  127  111.  42,  1!)  N.  E.  Hep. 
heimer,  102  Ind.  76,  I  N.  E.  Kep.  202,  .'52  868;  Ilatremnn  r.  IlMpeman,  129  111.  164. 
Am,  Bcp.  64.5.  21  N.  E.  IVp- 8'■^• 

3  Fields  V  Watson,  23  R.  C.  42  Sec,  '^  Fountain  County  Coal  Co.  v.  Beckle- 
however,  Moor-  r. 'Brooks,  12  Gratt.  hein.er,  102  Ind.  76.  1  N.  E.  Bep.  202.  52 
J3r,  Am.  liep.  64.') ;  Blake   i-.   Stone,  27    Vt. 

•»  Carri^an  v.  Drake,  36  S.  C.  354,  366,     475. 
15  S.  E.  Hep.  339  ;  McCowu  v.  Kin-,  23         «  Griswold  v.  Hicks,  132  111.  494,  24  N. 
S.  C.  232  ;  Shimer  v.  Maun,  99  Ind.   190,     E.  Kep.  63. 

501 


§  (ill.]  THK    IIABKXDUM,    OR    THE    ESTATES   CREATED. 

evinced  a  puri^osf  to  cre.ite  in  the  heirs  of  tlie  first  taker  an  estate 
in  fee  simple.' 

Till'  mil'  (liH's  not  apply  where  there  is  no  precedent  estate  for 
life  to  the  first  taker,  as  where  the  conveyance  was  to  a  person 
"for  the  benefit  )f  the  heirs  of  his  body.''^ 

It  applies  only  where  the  freehold  estate  to  the  first  taker  and  j 
the  remainder  to  his  heirs,  or  the  lieirs  of  liis  body,  are  created  _ 
by  the  same  instrument.'^ 

V.    Estates  Tail. 

611.  An  estate  tail  is  an  estate  of  inheritance  limited,  not  to 
the  grantee's  heirs  in  general,  but  to  heirs  of  his  body.  To 
create  an  estate  in  tail  it  is  essential  to  use  not  merely  the  word 
"  iieirs,"  but  some  word  indicating  the  body  from  which  the  heirs 
are  to  come,  or  some  word  of  procreation  from  a  particular  person.** 
While  the  words  of  limitation  generally  used  are  "  heirs  of  his 
body,"  other  equivalent  words,  which  clearly  make  the  limitation 
to  the  heirs  of  the  body  of  the  grantee,  are  sufficient.  When  the 
grantee  in  tail  is  alone  mentioned  as  the  person  from  whose  body 
the  heirs  are  to  be  derived,  the  estate  is  in  tail  general.  When 
both  the  parents  from  whose  bodies  the  heirs  must  be  derived  are 
specified,  as  where  the  grant  is  to  one  and  the  heirs  of  his  body  by 
a  woman  named,  the  estate  is  a  tail  special.  The  estate  may  be 
confined  to  heirs  male  or  heirs  female,  and  then  the  descent  must 
be  traced  through  heirs  male  in  the  one  case,  or  heirs  female  in 
the  other,  and  the  estate  is  in  tail  male  or  tail  female. 

At  the  common  law,  before  the  statute  of  Westminster^  known 
as  de  donis  conditionalibus,  such  an  estate  was  one  in  fee  simple 
on  condition  that  the  grantee  should  have  issue  of  the  specified 
class.  When  this  condition  was  fulfilled  the  estate  became  a  fee 
simple,  dischaiged  of  the  condition,  so  that  the  donee  might  freely 
convey  the  land.^  The  statute  ordained  that  "  the  will  of  a  donor, 
according  to  the  form  of  the  deed  of  gift  manifestly  expressed,  be 
henceforth  observed  ;  so  that  they  to  whom  a  tenement  was  given 

^  Mclntyre  v.  Mclntyre,  16  S.  C.  290  ;  -  McCown  v.  King,  23  S.  C.  232. 

Lemacks  v.  Glover,  1  Rich.  Eq.  141  ;  Dott  ^  Cannon  v.  Barry,  59  Miss.  289. 

V.  Cunnington,  1  Bay,  4.53  ;  Myers  r.  An-  ^  Adams  v.  Koss,  30  N.   J.   L.   505,  32 

derson,  1   Strobh.  Eq.  344,  346,  47  Am.  Am.  Dec.  2-37. 

Dec.  537;  Fields  v.  Watson,  23  S.  C.  42,  "  13  Kdw.  I.  1285. 

56,  per  Mclver,  J.  6  §  154. 
502 


ESTATES   TAIL.  [§  612. 

under  such  condition  shall  have  no  power  to  alien  the  tenement 
so  given,  but  that  it  shall  remain  unto  the  issue  of  them  to  whom 
it  was  given  after  their  death,  or  shall  revert  to  the  donor  or  his 
heirs,  if  issue  fail,  or  there  is  no  issue  at  all."  The  effect  of  the 
statute  was,  not  to  create  a  new  estate,  but  to  prevent  the  dis- 
cliarge  of  the  condition  by  the  donee's  having  issue  of  the  pre- 
scribed class.  The  fee  was  preserved  to  such  issue  while  there 
existeJ  any  to  take  it,  and  when  there  was  a  failure  of  such  issue 
the  reversion  was  secured  to  the  donor. 

612.  An  estate  tail  descends  only  to  the  heirs  of  the  pre- 
scribed kind  who  issue  from  the  body  of  the  person  to  whom  the 
estate  is  first  granted,  and  it  ceases  when  such  heirs  are  extinct. 
The  estate  "  lasts  so  long  as  there  exists  issue  of  the  prescribed 
class  ;  so  long  as  there  is,  as  it  were,  a  stream  flowing  from  the 
fountain."  ^  On  the  failure  of  such  issue  the  estate  reverts  to  the 
original  donor  or  his  heirs,  unless  the  entail  has  been  barred  in 
the  manner  provided  by  statute,  or  by  a  recovery  at  common  law. 
This  remedy  for  barring  an  entail,  an  invention  of  ecclesiastical 
subtlety,  came  into  use  about  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, and  not  only  restored  the  power  of  alienation,  but  enabled 
the  tenant  in  tail  to  prevent  a  reverter  to  the  lord.  By  it  an  es- 
tate tail  was  converted  into  one  in  fee  simple.  While  in  theory 
an  entail  secures  a  succession  in  perpetuity  to  the  oldest  son,  and 
to  the  oldest  son  of  the  oldest  son,^  in  effect  there  is  no  such  suc- 
cession. Conthiuous  entails  ceased  in  England  under  the  opera- 
tion of  recoveries  at  common  law  ;  and  in  this  country,  where 
they  have  not  been  wholly  abolished  by  statute,  under  the  opera- 
tion of  statutes  enabling  the  tenant  in  tail  to  bar  the  entail  by 

1  Goodeve's  Real  Prop.  3d  ed.  58.  laws  of  descent  was,  because  the  descent 

2  Wight  V.  Thayer,  1  Gray,  284.  In  of  such  estates  was  not  provided  for  under 
Price  V.  Taylor,  28  Pa.  St.  9.5,  105,  106,  our  old  statutes,  and  tlierefore  the  old 
Lowrie,  J.,  said:  "If  it  was  an  error  to  common  law  alone  f(inii>hed  tiie  rule  fur 
admit  the  eldest  son  as  the  heir  to  an  ihem.  .  .  .  The  judiciiil  sidoption  of  the 
e^ta;e  tail  general,  under  our  law,  it  was  English  law  of  jirimogeniture  in  estates 
perhai)S  an  inevitable  one,  for,  inheriting  tail  has  entirely  ceased  to  have  any  su])- 
all  our  forma  of  wills  and  convevances,  port  in  our  law.s  anil  customs,  and  is 
and  (if  le"-al  practice,  from  England,  we  now  jdainly  iiicompatihle  with  them  all. 
could  not,  if  we  would,  at  once  build  up  Therefore  we  can  no  longer  ])resunie, 
a  jierfcetly  consistent  system  of  legal  from  general  words  of  entailment,  that  a 
principles  founded  on  our  new  circnm-  lineal  descent  according  to  the  English 
stances.  .  .  .  The  reason  why  estates  t.ail  law  is  intended." 

descended  to  the  eldest  son  under  our  old 

503 


§  613.]     THE  HABENDUM,  OR  THE  ESTATES  CREATED. 


deed,  continuous  entails  have  ceased  to  exist.  There  may  be  tem- 
porary entaihiients  where  estates  tail  have  not  been  converted 
into  other  estates  by  statute,  but,  owing  to  the  facility  with  wliich 
they  may  be  barred,  they  are  seldom  of  long  duration. 

613.  In  the  United  States  the  statute  de  donis  -was  recog- 
nized in  the  Colonies  and  original  States  as  being  in  force, ^  ex- 
cept in  South  Carolina,  where  the  fee  conditional  as  at  common 
law  existed  from  the  first.^  There  the  heirs  of  the  body  take  per 
formam  doni,  but  subject  to  the  debts  of  the  first  taker.^ 

Recoveries  for  barring  entails  were  adopted  in  several  of  the 
colonies,  and  generally  continued  in  use  till  more  effectual  rem- 
edies were  secured  by  statute* 

But  now  in  many  States,  by  statute,  estates  tail  have  been 
converted  into  estates  in  fee  simple.^  In  those  States  in  which 
statutes  in  terms  convert  estates  tiiil  into  estates  in  fee  simple, 
the  words  of  procreation  used  in  deeds,  which  without  tiie  statute 
would  have  created  estates    tail,    are    to    be  wholly  disregarded, 


1  Allin  V.  Bunce,  1  Root,  96 ;  Giddiugs 
V.  Smith,  15  Vt.  344,  350;  Hall  v.  Vau- 
degrif  t,  3  Biun.  374 ;  Pollock  v.  Speidd, 
17  Ohio  St.  439,  447 ;  Corbin  v.  Healy,  20 
Pick.  514,  517. 

2  Wright  V.  Herron,  5  Rich.  Eq.  441  ; 
Murrell  v.  Mathews,  2  Bay,  397 ;  Archer 
V.  Ellison,  28  S.  C.  238,  5  S.  E.  Rep. 
713. 

8  Burnett  v.  Burnett,  17  S.  C.  545. 

*  Jackson  v.  Van  Zandt,  12  Johns.  169 ; 
Baker  v.  Mattocks,  Quincy  (Mass.),  69  ; 
H:>wley  V.  Northampton,  8  Mass.  3,  34; 
Lyle  V.  Richards,  9  S.  &  R.  322;  Den  v. 
Smith,  10  N.  J.  L.  39. 

°  Alabama:  Code  1886,  §  1825;  Mar- 
tin V.  McRee,  .30  Ala.  116;  Sullivan  v. 
McLaughlin,  99  Ala.  60,  11  So.  Rep.  477. 
California  :  Civ.  Code,  §  763  ;  Barnett  v. 
Barnett,  104  Cal.  298,  37  Pac.  Rep.  1049. 
Florida:  R.  S.  1892,  §  1818.  Georgia: 
Code  1882,  §2250;  Whatley  v.  Barker, 
79  Ga.  790,  4  S.  E.  Rep.  387,  except  where 
the  term  "  heirs  of  the  body  "  is  used  as  a 
limitation  over  after  the  death  of  the  first 
taker  ;  Wilkerson  v.  Clark,  80  Ga.  367  ; 
Ewing  V.  Shropshire,  80  Ga.  374,  7  S.  E. 
Rep.  554.  Indiana  :  2  R.  S.  1894,  §  3378  ; 
Mcllhinney  v.  Mcllhinnev,  137  Ind.  411, 

504 


37  N.  E.  Rep.  147;  Allen  v.  Craft,  109 
Ind.  476,  9  N.  E.  Rep.  919,  58  Am.  Rep. 
425.  Kentucky  :  G.  L.  1894,  §  2.343  ;  Mc- 
Gennis  v.  McGennis  (Ky.),  29  S.  W.  Rep. 
333  ;  Short  v.  Terry  (Ky.),  22  S.  W.  Rej). 
841.  Michigan:  Annot. Stats.  1882,  §  5519. 
Minnesota:  G.  S.  1894,  §  4364.  Missis- 
sippi: Annot.  Code  1892,  §  2436;  Jordan 
y.  Roach,  32  Miss.  481.  Montana:  Codes 
1895;  Civ.  Code,  §  1212.  New  Hamp- 
shire: Stat,  of  1789;  Jewell  v.  Warner, 
35  N.  H.  176;  Dennett  v.  Dennett,  40  N. 
H.  498,  500,  43  N.  H.  499.  New  York  : 
R.  S.  1889,  p.  2431.  North  Carolina: 
Since  January  1,  1877,  Code  1883,  §  1.325. 
North  Dakota:  Comp.  L.  1887,  §2736. 
Oklahoma:  G.  S.  1893,  §§  3700,  3701. 
Pennsylvania:  Brightly's  Purdon's  Dig. 
1894,  p.  810,  §  5,  act  of  April  27,  185.5. 
The  effect  of  the  act  is  to  repeal  the  stat- 
ute de  donis,  and  to  revive  the  common 
law  as  it  previously  existed.  Nicholson 
V.  Bettle,  57  Pa.  St.  384;  Price  v.  Taylor, 
28  Pa.  St.  95.  South  Dakota:  Comp. 
L.  1887,  §  2736.  Tennessee :  Code  1884, 
§2813.  Virginia:  Code  1887,  §2421. 
West  Virginia:  Code  1891,  ch.  71,  §9. 
Wisconsin:  Anuot.  Stats.  1889,  §§  2027, 
2028. 


ESTATES    TAIL. 


[§  614. 


leaving  the  limitation  simply  to  the  heirs  of  the  grantee  and  cre- 
ating in  him  a  fee  simple. ^ 

In  several  Stales  the  first  donee  in  tail  takes  a  lite  estate,  and 
the  heirs  of  the  body  of  such  donee  take  as  purchasers,  the 
remainder  in  fee  simple.^ 

The  statutes  of  several  States  enable  the  tenant  in  tail  to  bar 
the  entail  by  a  conveyance  in  fee  simple.'^  The  disentailing  deed 
may  be  either  a  conveyance  to  a  purciiaser,  or  to  a  person  to  hold 
to  the  use  of  the  tenant  himself  and  his  heirs  as  tenants  in  fee 
simple.  Such  deed  may  be  either  a  warranty  deed  or  a  quit- 
claim. The  estate  may  be  taken  for  the  debts  of  the  tenant  in 
tail  in  possession,  either  upon  execution  during  his  life,  or  sale  by 
license  of  court  after  his  death.* 

614.  To  create  an  estate  tail  the  word  "  heirs  "  is  as  essen- 
tial as  it  is  to  create  a  fee  simple.'^     In  general  no  other  word 


1  Andrews  i'.  Spurlin,  35  Ind.  262  ; 
Tipton  c.  La  Rose,  27  lud.  484 ;  Kirk  v. 
Furgerson,  6  Cold.  479 ;  Singletary  v. 
Hill,  43  Tex.  588  ;  Tate  u.  Tally,  3  Call, 
354. 

-  Arkansas:  Dig.  of  Stats.  1884,  §  643. 
Colorado  :  Anuot.  Stats.  1891,  §  432.  Con- 
necticut:  G.  S.  1888,  §2952.  Illinois: 
K.  S.  1889,  eh.  .50,  §  6;  Lehndorf  v.  Cope, 

112  111.  317,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  .505.  Mis- 
souri: R.  S.  1889,  §  8838;  Farrar  v. 
Christy,  24  Mo.  453 ;  Phillips  v.  La  Forge, 
89  Mo.  72;  Reed  r.  Lane,  122  Mo.  311, 
26  S.  W.  Rep.  957  ;  Godman  v.  Simmons, 

113  Mo.  122,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  972 ;  Emmer- 
son  V.  Hughes,  110  Mo.  627,  19  S.  VV. 
Rep.  979;  Bone  v.  Tyrrell,  113  Mo.  175, 
20  S.  W.  Rep.  796 ;  Wood  v.  Rice,  1 03 
Mo.  329,  1 5  S.  W.  Rep.  623 ;  Clarkson  v. 
Clarkson  (Mo.),  28  S.  W.  Rep.  446.  New 
Jersey:  1  R.  S.  1877,  p.  299,  §  11,  re- 
mainder to  children.  Statute  passed  in 
1S20.  Havens  v.  Seashore  Land  Co.  47 
N.  .1  Eq.  365,  368,  20  Atl.  Rep.  497. 
New  Mexico:  Comp.  L.  1884,  §  1423,  re- 
mainder to  chiMren.  Ohio:  R.  S.  1892, 
§  4200,  remainder  to  issne  ;  Pollock  i'. 
Speidel,  17  Ohio  St.  439.  Vermont:  G. 
S.  1880,  §1916;  Thompson  v.  Carl,  51 
Vt.  408. 

3  Delaware:  R.  Code  1893,  p.  631,  ch. 


83,  §  27.  Maine  :  R.  S.  1883,  ch.  73,  §  4  ; 
VVilley  v.  Haley,  60  Me.  176.  Maryland  : 
Pub.  G.  L.  1888,  art.  21,  §  24.  Massa- 
chusetts:  P.  S.  1882,  ch.  120,  §  15,  act  of 
March  8,  1792;  Williams  v.  Hichborn,  4 
Mass.  189;  Whittaker  v.  Whittaker,  99 
Mass.  364.  Rhode  Island:  P.  S.  1882, 
ch.   172,  §  3  ;  Cooper   v.  C-oopcr,  6   R.   I. 

261.  In  Maine  and  Massachusetts,  where 
lands  are  held  by  one  per.-on  for  life,  with 
vested  remainder  in  tail  in  another,  the 
tenant  for  life  and  remainder-man  may 
bar  the  entail  by  a  conveyance  in  fee  sim- 
ple. Mass.  P.  S.  ch.  120,  §  16  ;  Me.  R.  S. 
ch.  73,  §  4. 

^  Coombs  V.  Anderson,  138  Mass.  376; 
Allen  r.  Ashley  School   Fiinrl,  102  Mass. 

262,  265;  Cuffce  v.  Milk,  10  Met.  366; 
Williams  v.  Hichborn,  4  Mass.  189;  Wil- 
ley  V.  Haley,  60  Me.  176. 

^  Co.  Litt.  20  a  ;  Seagooii  r.  Hone,  Cro. 
Car.  366;  Wheeler  v.  Duke,  1  Cr.  &  .M. 
210  ;  Adams  v.  Ross,  30  N.  J.  L.  .505,  82 
Am.  Dec.  237  ;  Sharswood  &  Hudil.  Lead. 
Cas.  in  Real  Prop.  1  ;  Bcecher  v.  Hicks, 
7  Lea,  207;  Mcllhiiiney  v.  Mclihinney, 
137  Ind.  411,37  N.  E.  Rep.  147;  Burns 
V.  Wce.sner,  134  Ind.  442,  34  N.  E.  Rep. 
10;  King  v.  Rea,  56  Ind.  1,  modified; 
Fletcher  v.  Fletcher,  88  Ind.  418,  over- 
ruled ;  Bodine  v.  Arthur,  91  Ky.  .53,  14  S. 

r)Or) 


§  01."). 1     THK  HABENDUM,  OK  THE  ESTATES  CREATED. 

can  take  its  plaeo.^  Thus  a  grant  to  one  and  his  children  or 
oiYspriiiy;,  or  issue  of  his  body,  or  to  a  man  and  liis  seed,  or  to 
a  woman  and  tlie  issue  of  her  body,  or  to  her  and  her  chiKh-eu 
bet'-otten  of  her  present  husband,  creates  an  estate  for  life  only, 
in  the  first  taker,  as  the  proper  word  of  inheritance  is  wanting. 

Tlie  expression  "  issue  of  the  body  "  is  not  synonymous  with 
'•  heirs  of  the  body."  The  former  expression  embraces  all 
descendants,  and  is  ap{)licable  to  them  as  well  in  the  lifetime  of 
the  parent  as  after  his  death  ;  while  "  heirs  of  the  body  "  may 
embrace  only  a  portion  of  the  descendants,  and  does  not  embrace 
even  them  as  long  as  the  parent  is  living.^ 

In  an  instrument  of  entailment,  the  word  "  children  "  is  rarely 
held  synonymous  with  "heirs  of  the  body."^ 

An  equitable  estate  in  fee  tail  arises  where  land  is  granted  to 
a  trustee  for  the  use  of  a  beneficiary  and  the  heirs  of  his  body.* 

A  limitation  to  the  heirs  of  the  body  of  one  to  whom  no  pre- 
ceding estate  is  limited  passes  an  estate  tail  in  such  heirs  as 
donees  ;  and  the  estate  will  descend  as  if  the  limitation  had  been 
to  such  person  and  the  heirs  of  his  body.'^  But  a  deed  to  the  chil- 
dren of  a  person  named,  without  adding  "and  their  heirs,"  cannot 
operate  to  vest  in  them  an  estate  in  fee  simple.^ 

615.  A  deed  to  one  and  "  the  heirs  of  his  body  "  creates  an 
estate  tail  by  force  of  the  technical  words  used,  unless  there 
is  something  to  show  that  "children"  are  meant  by  the  phrase 
"  heirs  of  his  body."  These  technical  words  must  have  their  nat- 
ural and  ordinary  signification,  as  words  of  limitation,  unless 
there  is  something  in  tlie  deed  to  make  it  clear  that  they  are  not 
used  for  the  purpose  of  limitation,  but  to  designate  aclass  as  pur- 
chasers."    The  elfect  of  the  technical  words  "  heirs  of  her  body  " 

W.  Rep  904;  Bradford  v.   Griffin,  40  S.  liep.  623;  Durant  v.   Muller,  88  Ga.  251, 

C   468,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  "6;  May  r.  Ritchie,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  612. 

63  Ala.  602.  ^  Co.  Litt.  26//;  Moore  v.   Simkin,  .31 

1  Except  l>y  force  of  statute,  as  in  Eng-  Ch.  D.  95  ;  Fletcher  v.  Fletcher,  88  Ind. 
land,  where  l)y  the   Law  of   Property  Act  418. 

of  1881,  44  &  45  Vict.   ch.  41,  §  51,  the  '■  Mattocks  v.  Brown,  10.3  Pa.  St.  16. 

estate  may  lie  created  by  a  litnitaiion  ''in  "  Siayton  v.  Blount,  93  Ala.  575,  9  So. 

tail."  Rep.  241.     "  Unless  the  person  named  as 

2  Bradford  v.  Griffin,  40  S.  C.  468,  19  ancestor  is  deceased  at  the  date  of  the  con- 
S.  E.  Rep.  76,  per  Richardson,  J.  veyance,  or  unless  there  are  other  expres- 

3  Cannon  v.  Barry,  59  Miss.  289,  300,  sions  in  the  instrument  descriptive  of  the 
per  Chalmers,  C.  J.  persons  intended  to  be  named  aspjrantees, 

^  Wood  V.  Kice,  103  Mo.  329,  15  S.  W.     the  words  '  heirs  of  the  body  '  are  too  in- 

506 


ESTATES   TAIL.  [§  616. 

cannot  be  controlled  by  evidence  aliunde  that  the  grantor  did  not 
intend  to  create  an  estate  tail,  but  only  a  life  estate  in  the  grantee 
with  remainder  to  her  children.  Evidence  of  his  intention  which 
<loes  not  appear  in  the  deed  itself  cannot  be  considered.  ^ 

The  phrase  "  lawful  heirs  of  her  body  begotten  "  is,  in  legal  ef- 
fect, the  precise  equivalent  of  "  heirs  of  her  body."  That  the  heirs 
are  to  be  "  lawful  "  and  begotten  adds  nothing  to  the  description, 
since  to  be  heirs  they  must  have  both  of  these  attributes.^ 

The  addition  of  the  word  "  assigns  "  to  the  words  which  create 
an  estate  in  fee  tail  does  not  enlarge  the  estate  granted  to  one  in 
fee  simple.^ 

616.  An  estate  tail,  so  far  as  it  depends  upon  the  words 
"  of  his  body,"  may  be  created  by  implication.^  Thus,  a  grant 
to  one  and  his  heirs,  and  if  he  die  without  issue,  or  without  heirs 
of  his  body,  then  over  to  another,  creates  an  estate  tail.  The 
use  of  the  word  "issue  "  limits  the  generality  of  the  term  "  heirs  " 
to  the  heirs  of  the  body  of  the  grantee.  Estates  tail  by  implica- 
tion are  frequent  in  devises.^  So  a  limitation  in  tail  general  may 
be  restricted  by  the  context  to  one  in  tail  male.^ 

The  body  from  which  the  heirs  are  to  come  need  not  be  ex- 
pressly mentioned,  but  it  is  sufficient  to  indicate  it  with  reason- 
able certainty." 

The  word  "heirs"  alone  creates  an  estate  in  fee  simple,  and 
the  words  "  male  heirs  "  in  a  deed  do  not  sufficiently  indicate  the 
definite  and  uncertain  to  be  oi^c-rative  as  ■'  Fahrney  v.  Holsiuger,  65  I'a.  St.  388  ; 
words  of  purchase."     Per  Walker,  J.  Shutt  v.  Rambo,  57  Pa.  St.  149. 

1  Short  ..  Terry  (Ky.),  22   S.  W.    Rep.         «  Den   r.   Hobson,   2   Bl.   695,  5   Burr. 


841 


2609. 


■^  Ewiu.'  V.  Shropshire,  80  Ga.  374,  7  S.  '  Estates  tail  were,  created  in  the  fol- 
j,  j^^  ,-^  lowing  cases:  To  one  "  and  Ins  heirs  law- 
's Pollock'..  Speidel,  17  Ohio  St.  439.  fnliy  be^rotten,"  Barret  v.  Beckford,  1  Ves. 
4  Co.  Litt.  21  a;  Olivant  v.  Wright,  9  521  ;  Har<:rave,  note  121  to  Co.  L.tt. ; 
Oh  I)  646;  Morgan  r.  Morgan,  L.  H.  10  "and  his  lawfully  begotten  hm;  Hall 
Eq.99;  Fi,her  v.  Wigg,  1  P.  Wms.  14;  v.  Vandeg.ift,  3  Binn.  374;  "and  the 
Den  f  Taylor  5  N.  J.  L.  413,  417  ;  Moore  heir  male  of  his  body,"  Manwanng  r.  1  a- 
..  Rake,  26  N.' J.  L.  574.  585  ;  Havens  ..  bor,  1  Root,  79  ;  "  and  his  l'"'^'.; J'^'^^- 
Seashore  Land  Co.  47  N.  J.  Eq.  365.  20  Clarkson  ..  Chvrkson  (Mo.), 28  S  VV  .  Re_p. 
Atl  Rep  497  ;  Farrar  v.  Chris.v,  24  Mo.  446;  Donnell  v.  Mateer,  5  Ired.  Kq.  .  ; 
453'-  Clarkson  ..  Clarkson  (Mo  ),  28  S.  True  r.  NichoUs,  2  Dnv.  (Ky.)  547  ;  and 
W  Rep  446  •  Hollingsworth  v.  McDon-  their  heirs  lawfully  begotten  of  the>r 
aid  2  Hirr  &  J  "30  235,3  Am.  Dec.  bodies,"  Johnson  y.  Johnson,  2  Met  (Kn.) 
.545-  Handv  ,:  McKim,' G4  Md.  560,  571,  331  ;  "and  her  body  heirs,"  McGi...m  v. 
4  Ak  Rep.-  125.  McCinnis  (Ky.),  29  R.  W.  Rep.  333  ;  Pres- 

cott  V.  Prescott,  10  B.  Mon.  56. 

507 


^  ulT.]  llir.    IIAUHXDU.M,    OR    THE    ESIAILS    CKl.ATl.D. 

lu'irs  of  the  body  of  the  grantee,  though  in  a  will  greater  latitude 
is  allowed  in  arriving  at  the  intent  of  the  testator.  Therefore  a 
♦M-ant  to  one  for  life,  and  to  "his  oldest  male  heir  at  the  time  of 
the  decease  "  of  such  life  tenant,  does  not  create  an  estate  tail  in 
the  first  taker,  but  a  life  estate  in  In'm,  with  remainder  in  fee 
simple  to  his  oldest  male  heir  living  at  his  decease. ^ 

In  a  will,  however,  the  words  "  male  heirs  "  may  be  taken  as 
equivalent  to  "  male  heirs  of  the  body  of  the  devisee."  ^  So,  also, 
a  devise  to  a  person  and  his  "children,"  he  having  no  chihhen 
at  the  timi',  will  be  held,  prima  facie,  to  create  in  such  devisee 
an  estate  tail.^  In  a  will  the  word  "issue"  prima  facie  means 
"  heirs  of  the  body,"  and  is  a  word  of  limitation  and  not  of  pur- 
chase, unless  the  intention  as  manifested  by  the  whole  will  is  that 
the  word  shall  have  a  less  extended  meaning.* 

617.  The  term  "heirs  of  the  body"  may,  however,  be  used. 
to  designate  the  children  of  the  grantee,  and  in  such  case  the 
children  will  take  as  purchasers,  either  in  common  with  the 
parent,  or  in  remainder  after  a  life  estate  in  the  parent,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  intention  of  the  grantor.  "  When  it  appears  from 
the  context  that  the  words  'heirs'  or  'heirs  of  the  body'  are 
intended  to  have  a  broader  or  more  popular  meaning  than  is 
accorded  to  them  in  technical  usage,  courts  will  lay  hold  of  any 
expressions  in  the  instrument  indicative  of  such  intention,  and  will 
give  to  the  words  the  meaning  which  it  appears  they  were  intended 
to  convey.  Thus,  where  the  phrases  '  heirs  of  the  body '  and 
'children  '  are  used  as  synonymous,  and  it  is  clear  that  the  tech- 
nical phrase  is  not  used  for  the  purpose  of  limitation,  but  as  a 
description  of  a  class  of  persons,  the  ascertained  intiaition  of  the 
maker  of  the  instrument  will  prevail,  the  two  phrases  will  be 
held  to  mean  the  same  thing,  and  the  words  '  heirs  of  the  hotly  ' 
will   be   given    effect   as   words   of   purchase."  ^     Thus,    where    a 

1  Smith  V.  Collins,  17  K.  I.  432,  22  Atl.     507;  Shalters  v.  Ladd,  141  Pa.  St.  349,  21 
Rep.  1018.  Atl.  TJep.  .596;  Renoehl  v.  Shirk,  119  Pa. 

2  Roddy  V.  Fitzgerald,  6  H.  L.  Cas.  823  ;     St.  108,  113. 

Cooper  V.  Cooper,  6  R.  I.  261 ;  Jillson  v.  ^  Slayton  v.  Blount,  93  Ala.  575,  9  So. 

"Wilcox,  7  R.  I.  515;  Sutton  v.  Miles,  10  Rep.  241.     And  see   Darden  v.  Burns,  6 

R.  I.  348.  Ala.  362;    Williams  v.   Graves,   17   Ala. 

8  Wild's  Ca.se,  6  Rep.  16ft;  Clifford  y.  62;    Warn    v.    Brown,  102  Pa.   St.   347; 

Koe,  5  App.  Cas.  447.  Ware  v.  Richardson,  3  xMd.  505,  56  Am. 

*  Piirkhurst  r.   Hanower,  142   Pa.   St.  Dec.  762. 
432,  21  Atl.  Rep.  826,  24  Am.  St.  Rep. 

.508 


ESTATES   TAIL.  [§  617. 

father,  '•  in  consideration  of  my  affections,  and  the  further  consid- 
eratimi  of  the  support  and  well-being  of  my  daughter  and  her 
children,"  made  a  deed  to  her  "  and  to  her  bodily  heirs,  to  liave 
and  to  hold  to  her  and  her  bodily  lieirs  for  their  use  and  benefit 
forever,"  it  was  held  that  the  deed  vested  the  title  in  common  in 
the  daughter  and  her  children.! 

Where  a  deed  to  the  grantor's  children  "and  the  heirs  of  their 
bodies  "  contained  the  further  statement,  '^Meanino-  and  intend- 
ing  by  this  conveyance  to  convey  to  my  said  children  the  use  and 
control  of  said  real  estate  during  their  natural  lives,  and  at  their 
death  to  go  to  their  childi-en,"  it  was  held  that  this  statement 
clearly  showed  that  the  word  "  heirs  "  was  not  iised  in  its  legal 
sense  as  a  word  of  limitation,  but  as  meaning  cliildren  who  would 
take  the  remainder,  after  the  life  estates,  in  fee.^  "  Whenever  the 
words  '  children '  and  '  heirs  of  the  body  '  are  indiscriminately 
used  to  designate  remainder-men,  they  have  been  regarded  as 
words  of  purchase  designating  a  class  of  persons  who  were  to 
take  on  the  expiration  of  the  jiarticular  estate,  —  not  frum  the 
tenant  of  that  estate,  but  from  the  donor,  —  a  different  intention 
not  being  clearly  indicated."  ^ 

A  conveyance  to  a  woman  for  life,  and  after  her  death  to  be 
equally  divided  between  the  heirs  of  her  body,  does  not  create  an 
estate  tail,  but  a  life  estate  in  the  woman  with  remainder  to 
her  children.     The  language  indicates  a  division,  and   an   equal 

1  Wikle  v.  McGraw,  91  Ala.  631,  8  So.  generations  of  their  descendants,  —  a  jiur- 

Rep.  341.     McClellan,  J.,  deliveriuj,'  tiie  pose  in  no  wise  foreshadowed  in  the  piem- 

judgment,  said  :  "The  consiiierations  for  ises  of  the  instrument."     Citinj;  Fellows 

the  present  deed   are  dedared   to  be  the  v.  Tann,  9  Ala.  999  ;   Powell  v.  Glenn,  21 

{irantor's  '  affections  '  for  and  '  the  support  Ala.  4.58  ;   Williams  v.  McConico,  36  Ala. 

and  well-beinj;:  of  his  daughter  and  her  22;  Kotiertson   v.  Johnston,  36  Ala.  197; 

children.     It  is  not  reasonable  to  suppose  May  v.  Ritchie,  6.5  Ala.  602. 
that  the  grantor,  moved  solely  by  his  af-         -  Gri.swolil  r.  Hicks,  132  111.  494.  24  N. 

fections  fur  his  daughter  and  her  children,  E.  Rep.  63.     See,  also,  Urich's  Appeal,  86 

and  evidencing,  in   his  decbiration  of  the  Pa.  St.  386,  27  Am.  Rep.  707. 
motives  which  actuated   him,  his  jiurpose         ^  May    v.    Ritchie,    65    Ala.    602,    per 

to  provide  for  her  and  their  support  and  Rricknell,  C.  J.,  citing  Dunn  c.  Davis,  12 

weil-being,   and    no  other  purpose   what-  Ala.  135  ;  Sheplierd  r.  Nabor>,  6  Ala.  631  ; 

ever,  should  nevertheless  in   the  body  of  Twelves  v.  Nevill,  39  Ala.   175;    Holjert-. 

the  deed  not  only  have  failed  to  make  pro-  son   v.  Johnston,  36  Ala.   197;   Williams 

vision  for  the  present  support  and  well-  v.  McCouico,  36  Ala.  22;  Warn  v.  Brown, 

being  of  his  grandchildren,  but,  instead,  102  Pa.  St.  347.     See,  also,  Greer  r.  Pate, 

undertook  to  make  provision  for  distant  85  Ga.  552,  11  S.  E.  Rep.  869. 

50'J 


§  61 S.]  THE   HAREXDUM,    OR    THE    ESTATES   CREATED. 

division,  luul  when  tliis  is  made  tlie  operation  of  the  deed  is  ex- 
hausted.     This  is  incompatible  with  an  estate  tail.^ 

618.  In  those  States  where  by  statute  estates  tail  are  de- 
clared to  be  estates  in  fee  simple,  there  is  a  disposition  to 
construe  the  words  of  limitation  as  meaning  children.  Al- 
though tlie  hmguage  appears  to  create  an  estate  tail,  yet,  if  any- 
other  construction  can  be  adopted  without  distorting  the  mean- 
ing of  the  words,  the  grantor  will  not  be  deemed  to  have  intended 
to  create  such  an  estate.^  Thus  a  deed  to  a  married  woman, 
"  and  to  the  heirs  of  her  body  by  "  her  husband  named,  will  be 
held  to  create  either  a  joint  estate  in  the  mother  and  her  children, 
or  a  life  estate  in  the  mother  with  remainder  to  her  children. 

A  voluntary  deed  by  a  husband  of  substantially  all  his  property 
to  his  wife,  having  children  by  himself  and  a  former  husband,  to 
hold  to  her  "  and  the  heirs  of  her  body  by  myself  as  husband," 
especially  excluding  rights  of  inheiitaiice  of  her  heirs  by  any 
other  person,  does  not  create  an  estate  tail,  the  children  of  his 
body  being  purchasers.  The  court  say:  "The  language  in  the 
deed,  'heirs  of  her  body  by  myself  as  husband,'  unrestricted  by 
any  other  terms  of  the  deed,  and  in  the  absence  of  living  chil- 
dren of  the  wife  by  the  grantor,  would  create  an  estate  tail 
special  at  the  common  law,  upon  which  our  statute  would  operate. 
But  it  being  evident  that  the  word  'heirs'  is  used  as  the  equiva- 
lent of  '  children,'  and  there  being  living  children  of  the  grantor 
by  his  wife,  at  the  time  the  deed  was  executed,  the  terms  em- 
ployed in  the  deed  and  quoted  above  must  be  construed,  not  as 
words  of  limitation  and  inheritance,  but  as  a  description  of  a 
class  of  persons  to  take  under  the  deed  as  purchasers,  and  the 
language  is  sufficiently  definite  and  certain  to  be  opei'ative  for 
that  purpose."  ^ 

^   Herriug  v.  Rogers,  30  Ga.  615.  second  part  and  their  heirs,"  was  held  to 

2  Brann  v.  Elzey,  83  Ky.  440 ;  Tucker  create  a  life  estate  only  in  the  woman, 

V.  Tucker,  78  Ky.  503,  where  the  deed  was  with  a  contingent  remainder  to  the  chil- 

to  a  married  woman  and  "the  heirs  of"  dren  desciibed. 

her  husband;  Fletcher  v.  Tyler  (Ky.),  17  '^  Sullivan  v.   McLangblin,  99  Ala.  60, 

S.  W.  Rep.  282,  where  the  word  "heirs"  H   So.   Rep.  447,449,  per  Thornton,  J. 

was  declared  to  be  used  in   the  sense  of  May  v.  Ritchie,   65  Ala.  602 ;  Slayton  v. 

"children;"    Hodges   v.  Fleetwood,   102  Blount,    93    Ala.   575,   9  So.   Rep.   241 

N.  C.  122,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  640,  where  a  deed  Wiklc  v.  McGraw,  91  Ala.  631,  8  So.  Rep, 

to  a  married  woman  for  life,  "then  to  de-  341  ;  Robertson  r.  Johnston,  36  Ala.  197 

scend   to   her  heirs,  the  children  of"   her  Williams   v.   McConico,  36  Ala.  22  ;  Wil- 

hu.sband,  habendum  to  the  "  party  of  the  Hams  v.   Graves,   17  Ala.  62;  Darden  v. 

510  Burns,  6  Ala.  362. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 


I.  How  defined  and  created,  619-627. 
II.  Determinable  or  qualified  fee,  628- 
6.31. 

III.  Condiiions  subsequent  not  favored 

in  law,  632-648. 

IV.  Not  implied  from  the  purpose  of 

the  grant,  649-657. 


V.  Void  conditions,  658-677. 
VI.  Performance  and   forfeiture,  678- 

695. 
VII.  Waiver  of  conditions,  696-707. 
VIII.  Reentry  for  forfeiture,  708-732. 


I.  Hoiv  defined  and  created. 
619.  Conditions  are  either  precedent  or  subsequent.  A  con- 
dition in  a  deed  is  a  qualification  of  the  estate  granted.  The  con- 
dition is  precedent  when  it  must  be  performed  before  the  estate 
can  commence,  and  it  is  subsequent  when  it  is  to  be  performed 
after  the  estate  has  vested  in  the  grantee.  The  former  fixes  tlie 
beginning,  the  latter  the  ending  of  the  estate.^  The  same  tech- 
nical words  of  condition  are  appropriate  to  create  either  a  con- 
dition precedent  or  a  condition  subsequent.  Whether  tlie  condi- 
tion be  one  or  the  other  is  a  question  of  intention  to  be  gathered 
from  the  whole  instrument.^  If  the  thing  required  to  be  done 
does  not  necessarily  precede  the  vesting  of  the  estate  in  the 
grantee,  but  may  accompany  it  or  follow  it,  and  may  as  well  be 
done  after  as  before  the  vesting  of  the  estate  ;  or  if,  from  the 
nature  of  the  act  to  be  performed  and  the  time  required  for  its 
performance,  it  is  evidently  the  intention  of  the  parties  that  the 
estate  shall  vest,  and  the  grantee  perform"  the  act  after  taking 
the  condition  is  subsequent.^ 

smith  V.  Fellows,  7  N.  Y.  401 ;  Osgood  v. 


possession,  — 

1  California:  Civ.  Code,  §§  708,  1110. 
Idaho:  R.  S.  1887,  §  2932.  North  Da- 
kota and  South  Dakota  :  Comp.  Laws  1887, 
§§  2713,  3429. 

2  Finlay  v.  King,  3  Pet.  346;  Van 
Home  r.  Dorrance,  2  Dall.  304,  317; 
Jones  V.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  14  W. 
Va.  514;  Rogan  j;  .  Walker,  1  Wi.'*.  527; 
Martin   v.  Ballou,  13   Barb.   119;  Black- 


AI)l)ott,  58  Me.  73  ;  Brannan  r.  Mesick, 
10  Cal.  95;  Mesick  r.  Sunderland,  6  Cal. 
297  ;  Shinn  v.  Roberts,  20  N.  J.  L.  435, 
43  Am.  Dec.  636;  Chapin  v.  School  Dist. 
35  N.  H.  445  ;  Rnley  v.  Umatilla  Co.  15 
Orcg.  172,  13  Pac.  Rep.  890. 

a  Finlay  v.  King.  3  Pet.  346;    Parker 
V.  Nicbo's,  7  rick.  Ill  ;  Underbill  v.  Sara- 

511 


§  020.] 


CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 


Whether  ;i  condition  is  to  be  construed  to  be  precedent  or  sub- 
sequent is  always  a  question  of  intent,  and  it  is  immaterial  where 
the  clause  creating  the  condition  is  placed  in  the  deed  ;  the  ques- 
tion, without  regard  to  locality,  always  being  whether  the  thing  is 
to  happen  before  or  after  the  estate  is  to  vest.^  As  declared  in 
the  Code  of  Georgia,^  the  law  inclines  to  construe  conditions  to 
be  subsequent  rather  than  ])recedent,  and  to  be  remediable  by 
damages  rather  than  by  forfeiture. 

620.  The  title  under  a  deed  creating  a  condition  subsequent 
vests  in  the  grantee,  and  remains  in  him  until  it  is  divested 
by  the  entry  of  the  grantor;'^  but  in  a  condition  precedent  the 
title  does  not  vest  until  the  act  which  is  made  the  condition  is 
performed.  In  the  one  case  the  title  vests  before  the  condition 
is  performed,  and  in  the  other  it  does  not  vest  at  all  unless  the 
€ondition  is  fii'st  performed.'^ 

Where  a  conveyance  is  made  and  accepted  upon  this  express 
condition,  that  the  grantor  reserves  the  right  to  live  on  the  land 
until  his  death,  and  provides  that  his  minor  children  shall  be  sup- 
ported out  of  the  proceeds  thereof  until  each  shall  have  received 
a  certain  sum,  and  that  the  grantee  shall  pay  to  each  of  th(> 
minor  children  a  certain  sum  on  certain  dates,  and  that,  when  the 
grantee  shall  have  performed  the  conditions  expressed,  the  legal 
title  to  the  land  shall  vest  in  him  absolutely,  a  condition  subse- 
quent is  created. 5 

A  conveyance  of  a  farm  from  parents  to  a  daughter,  "  not  to 
become  absolute  until  the  decease  "  of  both  grantors,  "and  then 
only  on  this  condition,''  that  the  grantee  "  shall  deliver  to  the 


to;?a  &  W.  R.  Co.  20  Barb.  455,  per  Allen, 
J. ;  Tallman  v.  Snow,  .35  Me.  342 ;  Piatt 
V.  Piatt,  42  Conn.  330;  Burnett  v.  Strong, 
26  .Mi>s.  116;  Bell  County  v.  Alexander, 
22  Tex.  350. 

1  Earle  v.  Dawes,  3  Md.  Ch.  230,  per 
Johnson,  Ch. ;  Shinn  v.  Roberts,  20  N.  J. 
L.  435,  43  Am.  Dec.  630. 

2  Code  1882,  §  2295. 

3  Spofford  I'.  True,  33  Me.  283,  54  Am. 
Dec.  621  ;  Shattnck  v.  Hastinjis,  99  Mass. 
23;  Gulf,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Duiiman,  74 
Tex.  26.5,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  10'.)4  ;  Lud- 
low )-.  New  York,  &e.  R.  Co.  12  Barb. 
440;  .Memphis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Neighbors, 
51  Miss.  412  ;  Spect  v.  Gregg,  51  Cal.  198 ; 

512 


Front  Street,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Butler,  50  Cal. 
574. 

*  Finlay  v.  King,  3  Pet.  346  ;  Chute  v. 
Washburn,  44  Minn.  312,  46  N.  W.  Rep. 
555 ;  Jones  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  14 
W.  Va.  514. 

5  Bank  v.  Stark  (Cal.),  33  Pac.  Rep. 
531.  The  court  said:  "In  this  reserv.a- 
tion  we  see  nothing  to  indicate  that  they 
intended  to  retain  the  title  in  themselves 
during  their  lives.  On  the  contrary,  it 
would  seem  from  the  lanj;uage  used  that 
they  intended  to  pass  the  title  at  once  to 
the  grantee,  subject  to  the  conditions 
named."  Citing  Hihn  v.  Peck,  30  Cal. 
280. 


HOW   DEFINED   AND   CREATED.  [§  621. 

grantors  or  either  of  them  annually,  during  their  or  either  of 
their  natural  lives,  one  third  of  the  product"  of  said  land,  is 
a  conveyance  upon  a  condition  subsequent,  for  the  language  im- 
plies that  an  estate  is  to  pass  by  the  conveyance  ;  otherwise  it 
seems  inconsistent  to  say  that  the  conveyance  shall  not  become 
absolute  until  the  condition  shall  be  performed. ^ 

621.  A  grant  upon  a  condition  precedent  passes  the  estate 
only  upon  the  performance  of  the  condition.^  A  condition  that 
the  estate  shall  not  vest,  until  or  unless  the  grantee  shall  pay 
a  specified  sum  before  a  day  named,  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
vesting  of  any  estate,  and  time  is  an  essential  part  of  the  con- 
tract.^ A  deed  recited  that  the  grantor  was  anxious  to  secure  to 
the  grantee  his  undivided  interest  in  certain  land  upon  condition 
that,  during  the  life  of  the  grantor,  he  was  to  retain  and  exercise 
full  and  complete  control  over  the  property  ;  and  in  consideration 
of  the  premises  thus  recited,  and  of  natural  love  and  affection, 
the  grantor  conveyed  the  property  to  the  grantee,  upon  condition, 
nevertheless,  that  he,  the  grantor,  died  before  the  grantee,  and  not 
otherwise,  with  habendum  to  the  grantee  and  his  heirs,  subject 
to  such  condition.  The  grantor  survived  the  grantee.  It  was 
hekl  that  this  was  clearly  a  condition  precedent,  and,  not  being 
fulfilled,  nothing  passed  by  the  deed.* 

Where  one  conditionally  gave  a  tract  of  land  to  his  son  by  an 
instrument  which  reserved  to  the  donor  not  only  the  rents,  issues, 
and  profits  of  the  land  while  he  lived,  but  which  also  reserved  to 
him  the  right  to  dispose  of  the  land  during  his  lifetime,  it  was 
competent  for  him  thereafter  to  bequeath  to  another  the  use  of 
the  land,  and  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  same,  for  a  period  of 

1  Drew  I'.  Baldwin,  48  Wis.  529,  4  N.  conveyance  from  the  grantor  or  liis  suc- 

W.  Rep.  576.  cessors,   for    the  property   diily   acknow- 

-  California:  Civ.  Code,  §  14.36.     Geor-  ledf.^ed  for  record,    li.  S.  1887,  §  2932.    See, 

gia:    Codi;   1882,  §2295.     North  Dakota  also,  Borst  r.  Simpson,  90  Ala.  373,  7  So. 

and  South  Dakota:    Comp.    Law.s    1887,  Rep.  814;  Bennett   v.   Culver,  97  N.  Y. 

§3429.     Oklahoma:    G.  S.  1893,  ch.  82,  250. 

§  10.     In  Idaho,  however,  it  is  provided  ^  Borst  v.  Simpson,  90  Ala.  373,  7  So. 

that   an   instrument  purporting  to  be  a  Rep.  814.     See   Rutland  v.   Chesson,  98 

grant  of  real  property,  to  take  effect  upon  Ala.  435,  13  So.  Rej).  606  ;  Tennessee,  &c. 

condition    precedent,   does   not  pass   the  R.  Co.  v.  East  Alabama  Ry.  Co.  73  Ala. 

estate  upon  the  performance  of  the  con-  426  ;  Winnepi.seo^ee  Paper  Co.  v.  Katon, 

dition.     Such  instrument  is  an  executory  65  N.  H.  13,  18  Atl.  Rep.  171  ;  Wilson  v. 

contract  for  the  conveyance  of  the  prop-  Gait,  18  111.  43. 

erty.     Upon  compliance  with  the  condi-  ■*  Earle  i;.  Dawes,  3  Md.  Ch.  230. 
tion,  the  grantee  i.s  entiiled  to  a  grant  or 

VOL.  I.  513 


^  C)22.]  CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

time  exteutliiig  two  yeurs  after  his  deatli.  The  transfer  to  his 
son  was  not  to  be  ell'eetive  till  the  donor's  death,  and  not  then  if 
lie  made  oilier  disposition  of  the  property  during  his  lifetime.^ 

A  condition  which  prevents  the  full  benefieiary  title  from 
vesting  in  the  grantee  until  its  performance  does  not  necessarily 
render  it  a  condition  precedent.  Thus  a  condition  that  after  the 
grantor's  death  the  grantee  shall  pay  a  third  person  a  certain 
sum  of  money  is  construed  to  be  a  condition  subsequent  and  not 
a  condition  precedent.^ 

622.  A  condition  precedent  must  be  literally  performed  ; 
and  even  in  equity  an  estate  will  not  vest  where,  by  reason  of  a 
condition  precedent  unperformed,  it  will  not  vest  at  law.^ 

Where  the  owner  of  land  which  had  been  used  for  some  years 
for  a  cemetery  conveyed  it  to  a  city  for  a  nominal  consideration, 
provided  the  city  should  obtain  authority  from  the  legislature  and 
remove  the  dead  within  a  certain  time,  and  use  the  land  for  an 
ornamental  square,  or  for  the  erection  of  public  buildings,  it  was 
held  that  the  removal  of  the  bodies  and  the  abandonment  of 
the  land  for  cemetery  purposes  were  conditions  precedent  to  the 
vesting  of  the  title.* 

Where  a  day  is  appointed  for  the  payment  of  money  for  a 
thing  to  be  done,  if  such  day  is  fixed  beyond  the  time  when  the 
act  is  to  be  done,  the  performance  of  the  thing  which  is  the  con- 
sideration for  the  payment  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  payment 
of  the  money .'^ 

Stipulations  to  do  certain  things  within  a  given  time,  in  consid- 
eration of  the  payment  of  money,  will  not  be  construed  as  condi- 
tions precedent  unless  the  express  language  of  the  condition  re- 
quires such  construction.^  A  condition  that,  if  the  purchaser  failed 
to  pay  for  the  property  in  instalmciuts  as  provided,  it  should  be 
delivered  back  and  disposed  of  to  pay  the  price,  was  held  not  to 
be  a  condition  precedent,  but  that  the  property  passed  immedi- 
ately with  a  trust  in  the  nature  of  a  vendor's  lien  for  the  payment 
of  the  price.^ 

1  Pennelly.Felch(Kans.),39Pac.  Rep.  *  Stockton  v.  Weber,  98  Cal.  433,  33 
1023.  Pac.  Kep.  3.32. 

2  Weinreich  r.  Weinreich,  18  Mo.  App.  ^  Houston  v.  Spruance,  4  Har.  (Del.) 
364.  117. 

•*  4    Kent    Com.    12.5  ;    City  Bank    v.         '^  Front  Street,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Butler,  .50 

Smith,    3    G.    &   .7.    20.5,    281;  Earle    v.     Cal.  574  ;  Tipton  i>.  Feitiier,  20  N.  Y.  423, 

Dawes,  3  Md.  Ch.  2.30,  233.  432. 

514  ■?  Cay  ton  v.  Walker,  10  Cal.  450. 


HOW  DEFINED   AND    CREATED. 


u 


623.  "  Divers  words  there  be/'  says  Littleton,  "  which  by 
virtue  of  themselves  make  estates  upon  condition.""  ^  A  con- 
dition is  created  by  the  use  of  appropriate  words,  such  as  "  on 
condition,"  '' provided,"  "so  as,"  "so  that,"'  "if  it  happen,"  or 
the  like,  which  import,  ex  vi  termini^  that  the  vesting  or  continu- 
ance of  the  estate  is  to  depend  upon  the  observance  of  the  provi- 
sion named.^  "  To  every  good  condition  is  required  an  external 
form."  ^  But  apt  words,  even,  do  not  always  create  a  conditional 
orant,  when  the  intent  of  the  grantor,  as  shown  by  the  whole 
deed,  is  otherwise.*  If  the  intention  of  the  grantor  as  manifested 
by  the  whole  deed  was  merely  to  create  a  restriction,  effect  will 
be  given  to  the  provision  in  this  way,  although  it  be  expressed 
to  be  upon  condition.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  intention  as 
gathered  from  the  whole  instrument  was  to  create  a  condition, 
the  instrument  will  be  construed  as  creating  a  condition,  though 
none  of  the  ordinary  words  to  make  a  condition  are  used.^ 


1  Litt.  328  ;  Co.  Litt.  203  a. 

2  Buard  of  Coiu'is  v.  Young,  59  Fed. 
Rep.  96,  105  ;  Stanley  r.  Colt,  5  Wall. 
119;  Hooper  v.  Cumtninns,  45  Me.  359; 
Gray  v.  Blauchani,  8  Pick.  284 ;  Rawson 
V.  School  Dist.  7  Allen,  125,  128,  83  Am. 
Dec.  670;  Wheeler  v.  Walker,  2  Conn. 
196,  7  Am.  Dec.  264  ;  Warner  v.  Bennett. 
31  Conn.  468;  Gibert  v.  Peteler,  38  N. 
Y.  165,  168;  Stihvell  v.  St.  Louis  &  H. 
Ry.  Co.  39  Mo.  App.  221  ;  Hoyt  v.  Kim- 
ball, 49  N.  II.  322,  326 ;  Chiipin  v.  School 
Dist.  35  N.  H.  445  ;  Raley  v.  Umatilla  Co. 
15  Oreg.  172,  13  Pac.  Rep.  890;  Brown 
V.  Caldwell,  23  W.  Va.  187,  48  Am.  Rep. 
376;  Paschall  v.  Passmore,  15  Pa.  St. 
295;  Karchner  v.  Hoy,  151  Pa.  St.  383, 
390,25  At!.  Rep.  20;  Elyton  Land  Co. 
V.  South  &  N.  Ala.  R.  Co.  100  Ala.  396, 
14  So.  Rep.  207.  Sheppard,  Touchstone, 
121,  say.s  :  "  Know  therefore  that,  for  the 
most  part,  conditions  have  conditional 
words  for  their  frontispiece,  and  do  begin 
therewith  ;  and  that  amongst  these  words 
there  are  three  words  that  are  most 
proper,  which  in  and  of  their  own  nature 
and  efficacy,  without  any  addition  of  other 
words  of  reentry  in  the  conclusion  of  the 
condition,  do  make  the  estate  conditional, 
as,  proviso,  itu  r/nod,  and  sith  conditione.  .  .  , 


But  there  are  other  words,  as  si,  si  con- 
tinqat,  and  the  like,  that  will  make  an 
estate  conditional  also ;  but  then  they 
must  have  other  words  joined  with  them, 
and  added  to  them  in  the  close  of  the  con- 
dition ;  as  that  the  grantor  shall  reenter, 
or  that  the  estate  shall  be  void,  or  the 
like."  He  further  says,  p  125:  "If  the 
words  in  the  close  or  conclusion  of  a  con- 
dition be  thus,  That  the  land  shall  return 
to  the  feoffor,  etc.,  or  that  he  s>hall  take 
it  again,  and  turn  it  to  his  own  profit, 
or  that  the  land  shall  revert,  or  that  the 
feoffor  shall  reci/iere  the  land, —  these  are 
either  of  them  good  words  in  a  condiiion 
to  give  a  reentry,  as  good  as  the  word 
'  reenter  ; '  and  by  these  words  the  estate 
will  be  made  conditional." 

»  Shep.  Touch.  126. 

*  Episcopal  City  Mission  v.  Appleton, 
117  Mass.  326  ;  Sohier  v.  Trinity  Church, 
109  Mass.  1  ;  Bray  v.  Hu.ssey,  83  Mc.  329, 
22  Atl.  Rep.  220;  Rawson  t;.  School  Dist. 
7  Allen,  125,  221,  83  Am.  Dec.  670;  Stil- 
well  V.  St.  Louis  &  H.  Ry.  Co.  39  Mo. 
App.  221. 

6  Karchner  v.  Hoy,  151  Pa.  St.  383, 
390,  25  Atl.  Rep.  20;  Elyton  Land  Co.  v. 
South  &  N.  Ala.  R.  Co.  100  Ala.  396,  14 
So.  Rep.  207. 

515 


Jj§  &2-i,  025.]       CONDITIONS   PRECEDKNT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 


624.  It  is  not,  however,  necessary  to  use  any  of  the  usual 
words  of  condition  to  create  an  estate  upon  condition.  If  it 
clearly  appears  fioiu  the  terms  used  that  the  parties  iiitendtul  to 
create  an  estate  upon  condition,  such  intention  will  control.^  "  If, 
from  the  nature  of  the  acts  to  be  performed  by  the  grantee  and  the 
time  required  for  their  performance,  it  is  evidently  the  intention 
of  the  parties  that  the  estate  shall  be  held  and  enjoyed  on  condi- 
tion that  the  grantee  perform  the  acts  specified,  then  the  estate 
is  upon  condition.  This  is  expressly  so  when  the  grantor  has  re- 
served no  other  effectualremedy  for  the  enforcement  of  perform- 
ance on  the  part  of  the  grantee.  In  such  a  case  a  condition 
subsequent  arises  by  clear  implication."  ^ 

625.  The  condition  must  appear  in  the  deed  of  the  lands 
to  which  the  condition  is  annexed,  or  in  a  writing  executed  by 
the  grantee  referring  to  such  deed,  or  in  some  way  made  a  part 
of  it.^  After  an  absolute  deed  the  grantor  cannot  by  subsequent 
deed  impose  conditions,  for  there  is  then  no  estate  in  the  grantor 
upon  which  the  conditions  can  take  effect.* 

The  condition  cannot  be  established  by  parol  evidence  except 
upon  a  proper  allegation  of  fraud,  accident,  or  mistake,  and  upon 
clear  and  satisfactory  evidence.'^    But  the  cii'cumstances  surround- 


1  Hapgood  V.  Houghton,  22  Pick.  480; 
Bacon  v.  Huntington,  14  Conn.  92  ;  Sum- 
ner V.  Darnell,  128  Ind.  38,  27  N.  E.  Rep. 
162;  Richter  v.  Richter,  111  Ind.  4.56,  12 
N.  E.  Rep.  698;  Wilsou  v.  Wilson,  86 
Ind.  472 ;  Stilwel!  v.  Knapper,  69  Ind. 
558,  35  Am.  Rep.  240  ;  Watters  v.  Bredin, 
70  Pa.  St.  235  ;  Stilwell  v.  St.  Louis  &  H. 
Ry.  Co.  39  Mo.  App.  221  ;  Underbill  v. 
Saratoga  &  W.  R.  Co.  20  Barb.  455 ;  Gi- 
bert  V.  Peteler,  38  N.  Y.  165,  97  Am.  Dec. 
785;  Hamilton  v.  Kneeland,  1  Nev.  40; 
Berryman  v.  Schumacher,  67  Tex.  312,  3 
S.W.  Rep.  46  ;  Jeffcry  v.  Graham,  61  Tex. 
481  ;  Kilpatrick  v.  Mayor  (Md.),  31  Atl. 
Rep.  805 ;  Worman  v.  Teagarden,  2  Ohio 
St.  380. 

'-  Richter  v.  Richter,  1 1 1  Ind.  456,  459, 
12  N.  E.  Rep.  698,  per  Mitchell,  J. 

3  Schwalbach  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.  73  Wis.  137,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  579  ; 
Galveston,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pfeuffer,  56  Tex. 
66 ;  Marshall  Co.  High  School  v.  Iowa 
Synod,    28    Iowa,    360;     Thompson   v. 

516 


Thompson,  9  Ind.  323,  68  Am.  Dec.  638  ; 
Scantliu  v.  Garvin,  46  Ind.  262,  277  ;  Gad- 
berry  V.  Sheppard,  27  Miss.  203 ;  Moser 
V.  Miller,  7  Watts,  156.  A  deed  of  gen- 
eral warranty  in  the  usual  form,  convey- 
ing lands  for  the  expressed  consideration 
of  the  sum  of  one  dollar  and  other  good 
and  valuable  considerations,  and  a  written 
contract  executed  at  the  same  time,  by 
which  the  grantee,  in  consideration  of  the 
deed,  agrees  to  do  certain  acts,  and  pro- 
vides that,  in  case  of  failure  to  perform 
such  contract,  the  deed  shall  become  void, 
and  the  lands  conveyed  revert  to  the 
grantor,  both  instruments  being  acknow- 
ledged and  recorded  at  the  same  time,  are 
to  be  treated  as  one,  and  construed  to- 
gether. Ritchie  v.  Kansas,  &c.  Ry.  Co. 
(Kans.)  39  Pac.  Rep.  718. 

*  Alemaiiy  v.  Daly,  36  Cal.  90. 

■>  Rogers  v.  Sebastian  Co.  21  Ark. 
440 ;  East  Line,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Garrett,  52 
Tex.  133;  Moser  v.  Miller,  7  Watts,  156; 
Marshall   Co.  High  School  t".  Iowa  Sy- 


HOW   DEFINED   AND    CREATED.  [§  626. 

ing  the  parties  may  be  shown,  to  aid  the  court  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  condition. 1  As  a  general  rule,  a  condition  cannot  be 
established  by  im])lication,  as,  for  instance,  by  a  declaration  of 
the  jHirpose  for  which  the  conveyance  is  made.-  A  condition 
expressed  is  presumed  to  be  the  only  condition,''^  unless  its  terms 
fairly  imply  a  further  condition.'^ 

626.  A  condition  may  be  created  by  a  deed  which  refers  to 
a  condition  contained  in  another  paper  and  is  made  subject  to 
it.  The  two  instruments  are  read  together,  and  are  of  the  same 
effect  as  if  the  condition  were  incorporated  in  the  deed  itself.^ 
So  if,  in  pursuance  of  the  contract  in  virtue  of  which  the  deed  is 
made,  the  parties  at  the  time  of  executing  the  deed  also  execute 
an  ao-reement  expressing  the  condition  upon  which  the  property 
is  conveyed,  the  conveyance  is  upon  the  condition  so  expressed. 
Thus  where,  at  the  time  of  receiving  a  deed,  the  grantee  exe- 
cuted an  unsealed  instrument,  declaring  that  the  deed  was  made 
on  condition  that  the  grantee  should  support  the  grantor  during 
his  lifetime,  the  deed  and  such  instrument  should  be  read  to- 
gether in  detei-mining  the  grantee's  title  under  the  deed.  In  such 
case,  when  the  grantee  at  the  time  of  receiving  the  deed  exe- 
cuted and  delivered  the  condition,  he  thereby  agreed  with  the 
grantor  that  he  accepted  the  deed  upon  the  condition  written, 
and  that  the  title  to  the  property  described  in  the  deed  should 
not  become  vested  in  him  until  he  had  furnished  the  support 
specified  in  the  condition.*^ 

But  a  condition  contained  in  a  prior  agreement  between  the 
parties,  in  pursuance  of  which  the  deed  is  made,  but  not  expressed 
or  i-eferred  to  in  the  deed,  does  not  bind  the  grantee.^ 

A  condition  when  written  upon  the  back  of  a  deed  poll  is 
effectual,  for,  although  the  grantee  did  not  sign  the  condition,  by 
accepting  the  deed  with  the  condition  upon  it  he  accepted  it  as 
a  deed  made  upon  the  condition  so  declared.^ 

nod,  28  Iowa,  300;  Cliapman  r.  Gordon,  *  Louisville,  &c.  R.   Co.   v.  Covington, 

29  Ga.  250;  Long  v.  McConnell,  158  Pa.  2  Bush,  526 

St.  57.3,  28  Atl.   Rep.   2.3.T  ;  Hammond  y.  ^  Mcrritt    v.    Harria.    102    Mass.    326; 

Port  T^nval,  &c.  Rv.  Co.  15  S.  C.  10.  Boar  >:  Wliisler,  7  Watts,  144. 

1  Railway  Co.  r.  Beeler,  90  Tenn.  548,  ''  Norton  i-.  Perkins  (Vt.),  31  Atl  Rep. 
18  S.  W.  Rep.  391.  J-*^-  P'''"  ^^o^^,  C.  J. 

2  ^  g49  '  Moser  v.  Miller,  7  Watts,  156. 

3  Dunlmr  v.  Stickler,  45  Iowa,  384  ;  "  Whitney  v.  French,  25  Vt.  663 ;  Gra- 
Jennings  v.  O'Brien,  47  Iowa,  392.  ham  ,;.  Stevens,  34  Vt^  166,  80  Am.  Dec. 

517 


§§6-27,1)28.]       CUNDIllONS   PKKCEDENT   AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

627.  The  words  of  condition  should  be  a  part  of  the  ha- 
bendum, qualifying  the  grant,  contrulling  hut  not  coiilriulict- 
iuo-  the  treiu'ralil V  of  the  words  in  the  premises.  Tho  words 
must  not  onlv  he  such  us  of  themselves  import  a  condition,  but 
they  must  he  so  connected  with  the  grant  in  the  deed  as  to  qual- 
ify or  restrain  it.^ 

If  tlie  words  of  condition  do  not  introduce  a  new  clause  qual- 
ifying the  grant  itself,  but  are  used  by  way  of  liuiitation  or 
qualification  of  a  former  clause,  they  do  not  import  a  condition.^ 

It  is  not  absolutely  essential  that  a  strict  condition  should  be  a 
part  of  the  habendum  ;  but  if  it  is  found  in  any  other  part  of  the 
deed,  as  for  instance  in  the  premises,  or  following  the  covenants, 
its  unusual  place  in  the  deed  may  influence  its  construction.^ 

II,  Determinable  or  Qualified  Fee. 

628.  An  estate  which  is  to  continue  till  the  happening  of 
a  certain  event  is  not  upon  a  condition  subsequent,  because  upon 
the  happening  of  that  event  the  estate  ceases  by  its  own  limita- 
tion without  a  reentry  by  the  grantor.  Such  an  estate  is  a  fee, 
because  it  may  last  forever ;  it  is  determinable,  because  it  may 
end  by  the  happening  of  the  event  named.  An  illustration  of  a 
determinable  fee  is,  "  as  long  as  the  Church  of  St.  Paul  shall 
stand,"'*  A  grant  to  a  religious  society  to  hold  so  long  as  the 
society  shall  support  certain  specified  doctrines,  the  deed  reciting 
that  when  the  land  is  devoted  to  other  purposes  "  then  the  title 
of  said  society  or  its  assigns  shall  forever  cease,"  creates  a  de- 
terminable fee.     The  grant  in  such  case  is  not  upon  a  condition 

675.     And  see  Barker  v.  Cobb,  36  N.  H.  any  great  trees,  that  he  shall  be  punished 

344,  wliere  the  condidou  on  the  back  of  in  waste;  but  in  such  case  the  lessor  shall 

the  deed  was  signed  by  the  grantee.  not  reenter,  because  that  proviso  is  not  a 

1  Laberee  v.  Carleton,  53  Me.  211,  per  condition,  but  only  a  declaration  and  ex- 

Danforth,  J. ;  Packard  v.  Ames,  16  Gray,  position  of  the  extent  of  the  grant  of  the 

327,  per  Bigelow,  C.  J. ;  Methodist  Church  lessor  in  that  behalf.'  "     3  Leon.  16. 
V.  Old  Columbia  Co.  103  Pa.  St.  608,614;         3  Graves  v.  Deterling,  120  N.  Y.   447, 

Walters  f.  Bredin,  70  Pa.  St.  235.  24   N.    E.    Rep.    e.*)."),    Vann,    J.,    saying: 

^  Cljapin  V.  Harris,  8  Allen,  594,  per  "  While  tliis  is  by  no  means  controlling. 

Gray,  J. :  "A  good  illustration  of  this  is  it  has  a  significance  not  to  be  overlooked, 

thus  reported   in   Leonard:    'A  made  a  as  the  instrument  was  evidently  drawn  by 

lease  to  B  for  life,  and  further  grants  unto  a   skilful  conveyancer,  who   was  well  ac- 

him  that  it  .shall  be  lawful  for  him  to  take  quainted  with  both  the  forms  and  techni- 

fuel  upon  the  premises  ;  proviso,  that  he  cal  terms  in  common  use  by  experienced 

do  not  cut  any  great  trees.    It  was  holdcn  draughtsmen  of  deeds." 
by  the  court  that,  if    the  lessee  cutteth         *  2  Plow.  557. 

518 


DETERMINABLE   OR    QUALIFIED   FEE.         [§§  629,  630. 

subsequent,  and  no  reentry  is  necessary;  but  by  the  terms  of  the 
grant  tlie  estate  is  to  continue  so  long  as  the  real  estate  shall 
be  devoted  to  the  specified  uses,  and  when  it  shall  no  longer  be 
so  devoted,  then  the  estate  will  cease  and  determine  by  its  own 
limitation.^ 

The  proper  words  for  the  creation  of  such  an  estate  are,  "  un- 
til," "during,"  "so  long  as,"  and  the  like. 

629.  Where  an  estate  is  conveyed  in  fee  for  a  speciJBed 
purpose  and  no  other,  the  fee  is  a  base  fee,  determinable  upon 
the  cessation  of  the  use  of  the  property  for  that  purpose.  A 
grant  of  land  adjoining  a  prison,  to  be  held  for  the  uses  and  pur- 
poses following,  that  is  to  say,  that  it  should  remain  forever 
unbuilt  upon,  in  order  that  prisoners  might  not  be  able  to  escape 
over  the  wall  by  means  of  buildings  which  might  be  erected  con- 
tiguous thereto,  creates  a  qualified  fee  determinable  on  the  re- 
moval of  the  prison  to  another  site,  or  the  cessation  of  its  neces- 
sity by  any  other  means. ^  "  It  is  scarcely  needful,"  say  the 
court,  "  to  add  that  those  decisions  which  relate  to  the  construc- 
tion of  a  deed  as  conveying  an  estate  on  condition  subsequent, 
and  deny  that  effect  to  a  recital  that  the  grant  is  upon  a  certain 
consideration,  or  to  a  collateral  covenant,  are  inapplicable.  The 
purf)0se  heie  is  not  recited  as  part  of  the  consideration,  nor  is  its 
observance  collaterally  covenanted.  Nor  is  the  estate  here  granted 
one  upon  condition.  Although  there  is  some  confusion  in  deci- 
sions and  text-books  concerning  these  two  species  of  estates,  there 
is  a  radical  distinction  between  a  fee  determinable  by  limitation 
and  an  estate  upon  condition  subsequent." 

630.  A  question  or  doubt  has  arisen  whether,  after  all, 
there  is  now  any  such  estate  as  a  qualified  or  determinable  fee, 
or  whether  tiiis  form  of  estate  was  done  away  with  liy  the  statute 
quia  emptores.^     "  We  have  considered  this  question,"  says  Mr. 

'   First  riiiversalist  Society  v.  Bolaiu],  -  Sh'^el    v.  Lancr,  1-lS   ]'a.  St.   2.'56,  32 

15.">  MtLSs.  171,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  .524.    Allen,  At!.  Rei).  996.     And  .see  Kiik  r.  Kiiic,  3 

J.,  cites  the   following  autlioritics  as  il-  Pa.  St.  430  ;  Scheetz  v.  Fitzwater,  5  I'a. 

lusiiatin<^  deterniinahle   fees:    Church   /•.  St.  126. 

Giant,  3  Gray,  142,  147;  Ashley  v.  War-  »  See  Gray,  ]'««rp   §§  31-40,  where  the 

nev,  11    Gray,    43;    Attorney-General    v.  question  is  di.sciisseil   and  authorities  are 

Manufacturing'   Co.    14    Gray,   .'586,   612;  cited.     Mr.    Chailis,  in    hi.s    /.air  o/' licnl' 

Easterhrook.s  ?•.   Tillingliast,  .5  Gray,  17;  Prnpcrlii,  2d  ed.,  A()pcn(lix  iv.  p.  398,  in 

Fift}-  As.sociatcs  f.  Ilowland,  1 1    Met.  99,  answer   to    "the    learned    and    ingeniou.s 

102;  Owen   v.    Field,  102  Mass.  90,  105;  ar;,'umetits  "  of    I'rofi  .ssor    Gray   apainst 

Shep.  Touch.  121,  125.  the  validity  of  determinable  fees,  who  de- 

519 


§  631.]  CONDITIONS   rRECKDENf   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

Justice  .Vllou  of  the  Supi-eme  Court  of  Massacliusi.;tts,^  "and, 
whatever  may  be  the  true  solution  of  it  in  England,  where  the 
doctrine  of  tenure  still  has  some  significance,-  we  think  the  exist- 
ence of  such  an  estate  as  a  qualified  or  determinable  fee  must  be 
recognized  in  this  country,  and  such  is  the  general  consensus  of 
opinion  of  courts  and  text-wi-iters." 

A  conveyance  of  hind  to  a  school  district,  subject  to  a  cove- 
nant that  the  land  should  be  used  for  school  purposes,  and  that 
when  such  use  should  cease  the  property  should  revert  to  the 
grantor,  vests  in  the  grantee  a  qualified  fee.  Until  the  happen- 
ing of  such  event  the  grantor  is  not  vested  with  any  title  or 
interest  in  the  land  or  in  the  reversion,  for  the  contingency  upon 
which  the  land  is  to  revert  may  never  happen.  He  has  nothing 
to  convey,  and  his  deed  in  expectancy  of  a  reverter  vests  no  in- 
terest in  the  grantee,  but  is  wholly  without  legal  force  or  effect.^ 

631.  The  right  or  possibility  of  reverter  after  the  termina- 
tion of  such  an  estate  is  similar  to,  though  not  quite  identical 
with,  the  possibility  of  reverter  which  remains  in  the  grantor  of 
land  upon  a  condition  subsequent.  This  right  represents  what- 
ever is  not  conveyed  by  the  deed,  and  it  is  the  possibility  that 
the  land  may  revert  to  the  grantor  or  his  heirs  when  the  granted 
estate  determines.'^ 

Clares  that  Sanders  was  the  first  author  obvious  truth,  is  not  a  hypothesis  to  be 

to  distinctly  state  that  the  statute  put  au  accepted,  unless  no  other  rational  explana- 

eml  to  qualified  fees,  among  other  things  tion  of  the  language  of  the  statute  can  be 

says :    "  That   a   cardinal   result   of    the  found." 

statute  quia   emptores  should   be    left   to  ^  First  Universalist  Society  v.  Boland, 

be  discovered  by  Sanders,  in  the  nineteenth  1.55  Mass.  171,29  N.  E.  Rep.  524,  citing 

century,  seems  to  me,  I  confess,  what  Chil-  Aqueduct  Co.  v.   Chandler,  9  Allen,  159, 

lingworth   calls    'extremely   improbable,  168;  Leonard  v.  Burr,  18  N.  Y.  96  ;  Gil- 

and   even  cousin-german    to   impossililc'  lespie  v.  Broas,   2.3  Barb.  370;  State  v. 

That  Lord    Coke,   Plowden,    Croke,    Sir  Brown,   27   N.  J.    L.   13;    Henderson   v. 

Henry  Finch,   Lord  Nottingham,  the   au-  Hunter,  59  Pa.   St.  .335;  Wiggins  Ferry 

tbor  of  the   Touchstone,   Sergeant  May-  Co.  r.  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  94  III.   83,  93 ; 

nard,    Vaughan,     Treby,     Powell,     Lord  1  Washl).   Real  Prop.  (3d  ed.)    76-78  ;  4 

Hardwicke,     Preston,     Fearne,     Butler,  Kent    Com.    9,    10,    129.      See,  also,  of 

Watkins  (to  put  together  at  random  the  English   works,  in   addition  to  citations 

names  of  a  few  men  who  have  believed  above,   Shep.   Touch.    101  ;   2    Bl.   Com. 

with  unquestioning  faith  in  the  existence  109,  154,  155;  1  Cruise   Dig.  tit.  4,  §§  72- 

of  determinable   fees  since  the  statute),  76;  2  Flint  Real  Prop.   136-138;  Prest. 

should  have  p.nssed  their  lives  in  intimate  Est.  431,441 ;  Challis,  Real  Prop.  197-208. 

familiarity  with  the  statute  without  any  2  Denver,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  School   Dist. 

one  of  them  lighting  or  stumbling  upon  14  Cole  .327,  23  Pac.  Rep.   978  ;  State  v. 

what,  if  it  were  true,  would   be  a  fairly  Brown,  27  X.  .T.  L.  13. 

520  ^  Fir.-t  Uiiivprsalist  Society  v.  Boland, 


CONDITIONS   SUBSEQUENT   NOT    FAVORED   IN   LAW.        [§  632. 


III.    Conditions  Subsequent  not  favored  in  Laic. 
632.  Conditions  subsequent  are  not  favored  in  law.     When 
the  terms  of    the  grant   will  admit  of  any  other  interpretation 
they  will  not  be  held  to  create   an   estate   on   condition.^     If  no 


155  Mass.  171,  29  N.  E.  Kep.  524,  per 
Allen,  J.,  citinj^  Challis  Keal  Prop.  31, 
63-65,  1.53,  174,  198,  200,  212  ;  Prest.  Est. 
431,  471  ;  2  Plow.  413  ;  Sliep.  Touch.  120  ; 
Smith  V.  Harrington,  4  Allen,  566,  567  ; 
Attorney-General  v.  Manufacturing  Co. 
14  Gray,  586,  612;  Church  v.  Grant,  3 
Gray,  142,147-1.50;  Owen  v.  Field,  102 
Mass.  90,  105,  106  ;  Gillespie  v.  Broas,  23 
Barb.  370 ;  Gray  Perp.  §§  33,  34,  39,  and 
cases  cited. 

1  Stanley  v.  Colt,  5  Wall.  119.  Ala- 
bama: Elytou  Land  Co.  v.  South  &  N. 
Ala.  R.  Co.  100  Ala.  396. 14  So.  Rep.  207. 
California:  Culicn  v.  Sprigg,  83  Cal.  56, 
23  Pac.  Rep.  222.  Connecticut :  ScoviU 
V.  McM^hon,  62  Conn.  378,  26  Atl.  Rep. 
479.  Georgia:  Taylor  v.  Sutton,  15  Ga. 
103,  60  Am.  Dec.  682.  Illinois  :  Boone 
o.  Clark,  129  III.  466,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  850; 
Noyes  v.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  (111.)  21  N. 
E.  Rep.  487  ;  Gallaher  v.  Herbert,  117  111. 
160,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  511  ;  Voris  r.  Renshaw, 
49  111.  425.  Indiana  :  Sumner  v.  Darrell, 
128  Ind.  38,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  162  ;  Thomp- 
son V.  Thomp.son,  9  Ind.  323,  68  Am. 
Dec.  638.  Iowa :  Peden  v.  Chicago,  &c. 
R.  Co  73  Iowa,  328,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  680. 
Kansas  :  Curtis  v.  Topeka,  43  Kaus.  138, 
23  Pile.  Rep.  98  ;  Ruggles  v.  Clare,  45 
K^n'i.  662,  26  Pac.  Rep.  25.  Maine  :  Bray 
V.  Ilussey,  85  Me.  329,  22  At).  Re]).  220  ; 
Laheree  v.  Carleton,  53  Me.  211  ;  Iloojier 
V.  Cummings,  45  Me.  359.  Maryland : 
Glenn  r.  Davi.s,  35  Md.  208.  6  Am.  Rej). 
389:  Kilpatrick  ?>.  Mayor  (Md.),  31  Atl. 
Rep,  805.  Massachusetts :  Ayer  v.  Emery, 
14  Allen,  67  ;  Packard  r.  Ames,  16  Gray, 
327  ;  Merrifield  v.  Cobleigh,  4  Cuah.  178; 
Hadley  v.  Hadley  Mannf.  Co.  4  Gray, 
140;  Chapin  ?•.  Harris,  8  Allen,  594; 
Sohirr  V.  Trinity  Church,  109  Mass.  1 ; 
Stone  V.  Houghton,  1.39  Mass.  175,  31  N. 
E.  Rep.   719.      Michigan:    Blanchard  v. 


Detroit,  &c.  R.  Co.  31  Mich.  43,  18  Am. 
Rep.  142.  Minnesota  :  Chute  v.  Wash- 
burn, 44  Minn.  312,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  555; 
Farnluim  v.  Thompson,  34  Minn.  330,  57 
Am.  Rep.  59,  26  N.  W.  Rep.  9.  Missis- 
sippi :  Gadberry  v.  Sheppard,  27  Miss. 
203.  Missouri:  Stilwell  v.  St.  Louis  & 
H.  Ry.  Co.  39  Mo.  App.  221  ;  Weinreich 
V.  Weinreich,  18  Mo.  App.  364;  Morrill 
V.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  96  Mo.  174,  9  S.  W. 
Rep.  657  ;  Studdard  v.  Wells,  120  Mo.  25, 
25  S.  W.  Rep.  201,  per  Black,  C.  J.; 
Roanoke  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  &  S.  R. 
Co.  108  Mo.  50, 17  S.  W.  Rep.  1000.  New- 
Hampshire:  Page  V.  Palmer,  48  N.  H. 
385  ;  Emerson  v.  Simpson,  43  N.  H.  475, 
82  Am.  Dec.  168  ;  Hoyt  v.  Kimball,  49  N. 
H.  322  ;  Chapin  v.  School  Dist.  35  N.  H. 
445.  New  Jersey :  Woodruff  v.  Wood- 
ruff, 44  N.  J.  Eq.  349,  16  Atl.  Rep.  4; 
Woodruff  V.  Water  Power  Co.  10  N.  J. 
Eq.  489  ;  Southard  )•.  Cent.  R.  Co.  26  N. 
J.  L.  13.  New  York:  Post  v.  Weil,  115 
N.  Y.  361,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  145,  12  Am.  St. 
Rep.  809 ;  Lyon  v.  Kersey,  103  N.  Y.  264, 
8  N.  E.  Rep.  518;  Craig  v.  Wells,  11  N. 
Y.  315;  Dnryee  v.  New  York,  96  N.  Y. 
477  ;  Woodworth  v.  Payne,  74  N.  Y.  196, 
30  Am.  Rep  298;  Jackson  v.  Silvernail, 

15  Johns.  278;  Graves  v.  Detcrl'ing,  120 
N.  Y.  447  ;  Baker  v.  Mott,  78  Hun,  141, 
28  N.  Y.  Supp.  968.  Ohio:  Waiterson  v. 
Ury,  5  Ohio"  C.  C  347.  Oregon  :  Raley  v. 
Umatilla  Co.  15  Greg.  172,  13  Pac.  Rep. 
890;  Coffin  v.  Portland,  16  Greg.  77,  17 
Pac.  Rep.   580;  Portland   v.  Terwilliger, 

16  Greg.  465,  19  Pac.  Rep.  90.  Rhode 
Island:  Greene  v.  O'Connor  (R.  I.),  25 
All.  Rep.  692.  South  Carolina:  Ham- 
mond V.  Port  Royal,  &e.  Ry.  Co.  15  S.  C. 
10,  32.  Texas:  Jeffery  v.  Graham,  61 
Tex.  481.  Vermont:  Waterman  c.  Ciaik, 
58  Vt.  601,2  Atl.  Rep.  578;  Palmer  r. 
Ryan  63  Vt.  227,  22  Atl.  Rep.  574.    Wis- 

521 


§  633.]  CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AND    SUBSl.QUENT. 

WDids  of  condition  are  used,  and  no  words  indicating  an  intention 
that  under  any  fircumstances  the  estate  may  be  forfeited,  or  may 
revert  to  the  grantor  or  his  heirs,  or  that  he  or  they  may  reenter 
and  hold  the  land,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  the  acts 
to  be  done  by  the  grantee  indicating  that  the  estate  is  to  be  held 
upon  condition,  the  deed  will  be  held  to  convey  an  estate  to  the 
grantee  and  his  heirs  forever.  The  deed  will  not  be  held  to 
create  an  estate  upon  condition,  unless  the  language  to  that  effect 
is  so  clear  as  to  leave  no  room  for  any  other  construction.^  Thus, 
where  parents  conveyed  land  to  their  son,  reserving  to  themselves 
a  life  estate,  and  stating  in  the  deed  that  such  son  "  is  to  pay  the 
taxes  on  said  land,  and  has  to  support  the  grantors  during  their 
natural  lifetime,  and  at  their  death  the  son  shall  have  posses- 
sion," the  land  was  not  conveyed  upon  a  condition  subsequent, 
because  no  words  of  condition  were  used,  and  there  was  no  clause 
of  reverter  or  reentry,  and  no  intention  to  create  a  strict  condi- 
tion can  be  gathered  from  tiie  whole  instrument.  "  To  say  the 
stipulation  in  the  deed  to  pay  the  taxes  and  support  the  grantors 
is  a  condition  subsequent,  the  non-performance  of  which  will  de- 
feat the  estate  granted,  is  to  make  a  stipulation  for  the  parties 
which  they  did  not  see  fit  to  make  for  themselves."  ^ 

633.  Whether  the  language  used  constitutes  a  condition 
is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,  with  which  the  jury  have 
nothing  to  do.^  "The  character  of  the  fee  conveyed  must  be 
ascertained  by  a  construction  of  the  words  of  that  deed.  If  the 
conveyance  is  less  than  an  absolute  fee  simple,  it  must  be  be- 
cause the  deed  has  so  limited  and  qualified  the  fee  conveyed  as 
to  make  it  dependent  upon  conditions  either  precedent  or  subse- 
quent.    To  determine  this,  we  may  look  to  the  whole  deed,  and 

coasin:   Wier  v.  Simmons,   55   Wis.  637,  25,25  S.  W.    Rep.   201;  Baker  v.   Mott, 

i.3  X.  \V.   Rop.   873  ;  Mills   f.   Evausville  78   Iliin,  141,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  968  ;   Lyon 

Semiuary,   58   Wis.    135,  15    N.  W.   Rep.  v.  Heiscy,  103  N.   Y.   264,  8  N.   E.    Rep. 

133;  Lawe  r.  Hyde,  39  Wis.  345.  518;  Flajrg  ,;.  Eames,  40  Vt.  16,  94  Am. 

1  Ayer  f.  Emery,  14  Allen,  67  ;   Young  Dec    363;    Blaiicliard  v.   Morey,    56  Vt. 

V.  Clement,  81  Me.  512,  17  Atl.  Rej).  707;  170. 

Glenn  V.  Davis,  35  M(i.208,  6  Am.  Rep.  -^  Studdanl  v.  Wells,  120  Mo.  25,  25  S. 

389;    Curtis  i-.   Board   of    Education,  43  W.  Rep.  201. 

Kans.  138,  23  Pac.   Rep.  98;  Ruggles  «.  3  Laberee    v.   Carleton,   53   Me.    211; 

Clare,  45   Kans.   662,  26   Pac.   Rep.  25;  Hammond  v.  Port  Royal  Ry.  Co.  15  S.  0. 

Cnllen  v.  Sprigjr,  83  Cal.  56,  23  Pac.  Rep.  10;  Cox  v.  Freedley,  33  Pa,  St.  124,  130, 

222  ;  Boone  v.  Clark,  129  111.  466,  21    N.  75  Am.  Dec.  584. 
E.  Rep.  850;  Studdard  i:  Wells,  120  Mo. 


CONDITIONS    SUBSEQUENT    NOT   FAVORED   IN   LAW.       [§§  634,  635. 

search  its  four  corners,  to  ascertain  the  intent  of  the  grantor."  ^ 
Tile  intent  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  instrument  by  follow- 
ing out  the  object  and  spirit  of  the  deed  or  contract.^ 

634.  A  purchaser  by  a  deed  which  imposes  a  duty  upon 
him  by  condition  assumes  the  performance  of  it  by  his  ac- 
ceptance of  the  deed.  Thus,  where  a  lot  of  land  is  sold  sub- 
ject to  the  condition  that  the  grantee  shall  permit  the  proprietor 
of  each  adjoining  lot  who  may  build  to  erect  one  half  of  the 
thickness  of  the  division  wall  on  such  lot,  and  that  the  grantor,  his 
heirs  or  assigns,  shall  pay  to  the  said  proprietor  so  erecting  sucli 
■wall  a  proportionate  part  of  the  cost  thereof  for  such  part  of  the 
wall  as  the  grantee,  his  heirs  or  assigns,  may  use  or  occupy,  the 
grantee  having  the  same  right  to  place  half  the  thickness  of  his 
wall  on  each  adjoining  lot,  the  grantee  or  any  subsequent  pur- 
chaser from  him  becomes  bound  by  the  acceptance  of  his  deed  to 
pay  for  such  part  ol:  a  division  wall  so  built  as  he  may  use  to  the 
owner  of  the  adjoining  lot.  Such  purchaser  is  not  liable  as  for  a 
breach  of  covenant,  becanse  he  did  not  sign  and  seal  the  deed  ; 
but  the  law  implies  a  promise  to  perform  the  condition  or  stipula- 
tion from  his  acceptance  of  the  deed,  on  which  an  action  may  be 
maintained.^ 

635.  When  it  is  doubtful  whether  a  provision  in  a  deed 
should  be  construed  to  be  a  covenant  or  a  condition,  the 
words  used  not  being  in  form  either  the  one  or  the  other,  the 
courts  will  construe  it  to  be  a  covenant,  so  as  to  avoid  a  forfeit- 
ure.* 

1  Board   of   Com'rs  v.  Young,  59  Fed.  v.  Wells,  11  N.  Y.  315;  Parmelee  v.  Rail- 

Eep.  96,  102,  per  Lurton,  J.  road  Co.   6  N.  Y.  74,79;    McKuiglit  v. 

'  St.   Louis  V.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  88  Krcutz,  51  Pa.  St.  232 ;  Tascliall  c.  I'ass- 

Mo.  618  ;   Studdard  v.  Wells,  120  Mo.  25,  more,  15  Pa.  St,  295  ;  Thorn  ion  c.  Tram- 

25  S.  W.  Rep.  201.  niell,  39   Ga.   202;    Kilpatrick    v.   Mayor 

■'Maine    v.   Cumston,   98    Mass.    317.  (Md.),  31  All.  Rep.  805 ;    Earle  r.  Dawes, 

See,  also,  Dyer  v.  Sanford,  9  Met.  395,  43  3   Md.  Ch.    230  ;    Seoville    r.   McMahon, 

Am.  Dec.  399.  62    Conn.  378,    26    Atl.    Re)).    479,    481  ; 

■»  Hovt  V.  Ki!nl)iill,49  N.  II.  322  ;  Cliapiu  Pedcn  v.  Cliicatio,  &c.  K.  Co.  73  Iowa,  328, 

!•.  School  District,  35  N.  H.445,  451  ;  Gal-  35  N.  W.  Rep   424,  5  Am.  Si.  Rep.  680  ; 

laher  v.  Herbert,  117  111.  160,  7  N.  E.  Rep.  Greene  v.  O'Connor  (R.  I.),  25  Atl.  Rep. 

511  ;  Board  of  Education  v.  Trustees,  63  692;  Merrifield  v.  Cobleigh,  4  Cush.  178, 

111.  204  ;   Studdard  i'.  Wells,  120  Mo.  25,  184  ;  l{awson  v.  School  District,  7  Allen, 

25  S.  W.  Rep.  201  ;  St.  Louis  y.  Wiggins  125.     In  the  elaborate  and  able  ojiinion 

Ferry  Co.  88  Mo.  618  ;  Wheeler  v.  Das-  delivered  in  the  last-cited  case  by  Bi«c:ow, 

tomb,  3  Cush.  285;  Graves  v.  Dctcrling,  C.  J.,  the  court  said  :  "  If  it  be  doubtful 

120  N.  Y.  447,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  655;  Craig  whether  a  clause  in  a  deed  be  a  covenant 

roo. 


§  63").]  coNOinoNS  pkeckdhni'  and  suuskquknt. 

The  (.•oiistriiction  must  not,  however,  be  a  strained  or  unreason- 
able one,  or  one  that  was  plainly  not  contemplated  by  the  parties.' 

Where  a  deed  in  fee  contained  these  words,  "  It  being  ex- 
pressly understood  by  the  parties  that  the  said  tract  or  parcel 
of  land  is  not  to  be  put  to  any  other  use  than  that  of  a  depot 
square,"  it  was  held  that  these  were  words  of  covenant,  and  not 
words  of  condition,  and  that  the  remedy  for  a  bre:uh  was  an 
action  for  damages,  and  not  a  forfeiture  of  the  estate  for  condi- 
tion broken.-^ 

Where  a  right  of  way  was  conveyed  to  a  railroad  company, 
"provided,  however,  that  any  other  railroad  running  into  or 
through  the  city  shall  have  the  right  to  run  a  parallel  track  along 
upon  the  same  right  of  way,"  this  provision  was  construed  to  be 
a  covenant  or  limitation,  rather  than  a  condition  subsequent,  no 
right  of  entry  being  reserved  for  a  breach  of  it.  The  court  re- 
garded it  as  more  consonant  with  equity  and  the  general  spirit 
and  purpose  of  the  conve3'ance  to  construe  the  proviso  as  a  cove- 
nant or  limitation  upon  the  use  of  the  way  granted  than  as  a 
strict  condition.^ 

A  proviso  in  a  deed  that  the  grantee  shall  erect  and  maintain 
at  his  own  expense  all  division  fences  is  not  a  condition  subse- 
quent, but  an  implied  covenant.  The  proviso  does  not  suggest 
that  the  parties  intended  or  understood  that  a  failure  to  comply 
with  it  should  work  a  forfeiture  of  the  land.*  In  a  deed  of  a  right 
of  way  to  a  i-ailroad  comj)any,  a  condition  that  it  will  build, 
immediately  after  the  road  is  finished,  two  bridges  across  a  cut 
in  the  grantor's  land,  is  not  a  ccmdition  wliich  will  authorize  a 
forfeiture  of  the  grant  upon  a  failure  to  perform  it.^ 

or  condition,  courts  of   law  will  always  201 ;  Scovill  v.  McMahon,  62  Conn.  378, 

incline    against    the   latter   construction.  26  At!.  Rep.  479 ;  Young   v.   Clement,  81 

Conditions  are  not  to  be  raised  readily  by  Me.  .512,  17  Atl.  Rep.  707. 
inference  or  argument."  In  Scoville  v.  Mc-         i  Smith  y.  Barrie,  .56  Mich.  .314,22  N. 

Mahon,  62  Conn.  378, 26  At).  Rep.  479,481,  W.  Rep.  816,  56  Am.  Rep.  391  ;  Guihl  v. 

Hall,  J.,  said  :  "  Courts  will  always  con-  Richards,  16  Gray,  309  ;   Wilson   v.  Wil- 

strue  clauses  in  deeds  as  covenants,  rather  son,  86  Ind.  472  ;  Taylor  v.  Cedar  Rapids 

than  conditions,  if  they    can   reasonably  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  25  Iowa,  371. 
do  so."     See,  also,  as  illustrating  the  suh-         -  Thornton  v.  Traminell,  .39  Ga.  202. 
ject,  Clark  v.  Martin,  49  Pa.  St.  289,  297  ;         ^  Elyton  Land  Co.  c.  South  &  N.  Aln. 

Stanley  i'.   Colt,  5  Wall.  119;  Country-  R.  Co.  100  Ala.  390,  14  So.  Rep.  207. 
man  v.  Deck,  13  Abb.  N.  C.  110;  Ayling         *  Palmer  v.  Ryan,  63  Vt.  227,  22  Atl. 

V.  Kramer,  133  Mass.  12  ;  Barrie  v.  Smith,  Rep.  574. 

47  Mich.  1.30,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  168  ;  Stud-         »  Roanoke  Inv.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  &  S. 

dard  v.  Wells,  120  Mo.  25,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  R.  Co.  108  Mo.  50,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1000, 
52-i 


CONDITIONS    SUBSEQUENT    NOT    FAVORED   IN   LAW.       [§§  63G,  GoT. 

636.  If  the  parties  themselves  expressly  call  the  provision 
a  covenant  instead  of  a  condition,  their  laiifruase  is  sio-nificaiit  of 
their  intention.  "This  alone,  however,  would  not  make  it  a  cov- 
enant, as  that  which  is  termed  a  'covenant'  may  be  a  condition, 
and  that  which  is  termed  a  '  condition  '  may  be  a  covenant.  But 
it  has  an  important  bearing  upon  the  intention  of  the  parties, 
because  technical  terms  in  a  conveyance  are  presumed  to  have 
been  used  with  their  accustomed  meaning,  unless  the  circum- 
stances and  context  indicate  a  different  intent."  ^ 

The  same  provision  cannot  be  both  a  condition  and  a  covenant. 
The  grantor  cannot  claim  a  forfeiture  and  also  damages  for  a 
breach  of  a  covenant.- 

637.  If  the  technical  words  of  condition  are  not  used,  and 
there  is  no  clause  providing  that  the  grantor  may  reenter,  the 
deed  will  generally  be  construed  as  creating  a  covenant  rather 
than  a  condition.'^ 

Other  words  used  in  connection  with  technical  words  of  condition 
may  serve  to  show  that  no  forfeiture  for  a  breach  of  the  provision 


1  Graves  v.  Deterling,  \20  N.  Y.  447, 
24  N.  E.  Rep.  655,  per  Vann,  J. 

-  Underbill  v.  Saratoga  &  W.  R.  Co. 
20  Barb.  455. 

^  Scovill  i:  McMahon,  62  Conn.  378, 
26  Atl.  Rep.  479;  Packard  v.  Ames,  16 
Gray,  327  ;  CJhapin  v.  School  District,  35 
N.  H.  445;  Hoyt  v.  Kimball,  49  N.  H. 
322;  Galiaher  v.  Herbert,  117  III.  160,  7 
N.  E.  Rep.  511  ;  Gibert  i;.  Peteler,  38  N. 
Y.  165,  97  Am.  Dec.  785;  Graves  v.  De- 
terling,  120  N.  Y.  447,  24  N.  K.  Rep.  655 ; 
Lyon  V.  Hersey,  103  N.  Y.  264,  270,  8 
N.  E.  Rep.  518;  Crai};  v.  Wells,  11  N.  Y 
315,  320;  Strong  v.  Doty,  32  Wis.  381 
Stiiddard  v.  Wells,  120  Mo.  25,  25  S.  W 
Rej).  201  ;  Risley  i-.  McNiecc,  71  Ind.  434 
Riiggles  p.  Clare,  45  Kans.  662,  26  Pac, 
Rep.  25;  Curtis  v.  Board  of  Education, 
43  Kans.  138,  23  Pac.  Rep  98. 

In  tlie  latter  case  the  court  .say,  refer- 
ring to  the  deed  in  that  case :  "  There  are 
no  words  in  the  deed  slating  thai  the 
estate  was  or  should  be  c(jnveycd  upon 
condition,  or  that  it  might  be  forfeited 
under  any  circumstances  whatever,  or  that 
the  estate  mijiht  under  anv  ciicumstaiicos 


revert  to  the  grantors  or  their  heirs,  or 
that  they  might  under  any  circumstances 
ever  have  the  right  to  reenter  the  itremises. 
Nor  was  the  estate  conveyed  or  to  be  con- 
tinued in  existence  upon  any  such  terms 
as  'provided'  or  'if  something  in  the 
future  should  be  done  or  not  done,  or 
happen  or  not  happen.  Indeed,  there  is 
nothing  sufficiently  strong  in  any  jiart  of 
the  deed,  or  in  the  whole  deed,  to  indicate 
that  the  estate  was  conveyed,  or  intended 
to  be  conveyed,  upon  any  condition,  either 
precedent  or  subsecpient ;  but,  taking  the 
whole  deed  together,  it  shows  that  an  ab- 
solute estate  in  fee  simple  was  intended  to 
be  conveyed,  and  was  conveyed,  and  was 
to  continue  in  the  grantees  forever.  The 
authoriti(s  are  uniform  tliat  estates  upon 
condition  subsequent,  which  after  having 
been  fully  vested  may  be  defeated  by  a 
breach  of  the  condition,  arc  never  favored 
in  law,  and  that  no  deed  will  be  construed 
to  create  an  estate  upon  condition  unless 
the  language  to  that  effect  is  so  clear  that 
no  room  is  left  for  any  other  construc- 
tion." 

52r) 


§  638.]  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

was  ink'nded  ;  as,  for  instance,  in  case  some  other  remedy  than 
a  forf^'itmv  is  [)rovided.  Thus,  where  it  was  provided  that  in 
case  ol  a  breach  of  the  condition  the  grantors,  "by  their  agent, 
servant,  or  assigns,  may  enter  ayid  abate  the  same  without  being 
liable  to  any  action  of  trespass  therefor,"  it  was  considered  that 
this  stipulation,  which  would  be  unnecessary  if  it  were  intended 
that  there  should  be  a  forfeiture  by  operation  of  law,  and  which 
is  also  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  forfeiture,  excluded  the  rem- 
ed}''  by  forfeiture.^ 

638.  But  if  the  language  used  imports  a  condition  only, 
and  it  is  moreover  clear  tliat  the  parties  intended  that  the  legal 
consequences  of  a  breach  of  a  condition  should  follow  a  violation 
of  the  terms  of  the  jirovision,  this  cannot  be  treated  as  a  cove- 
nant, but  must  be  treated  as  a  condition. ^  A  condition  is  not  a 
covenant.  The  courts  cannot  disregard  the  distinction  between 
them.  "  Upon  covenants,  the  legal  responsibility  of  their  non- 
fulfilment  is,  that  the  party  violating  them  must  respond  in  dam- 
ages. The  consequence  of  the  non-fulfilment  of  a  condition  is  a 
forfeiture  of  the  estate.  The  grantor  may  reenter  at  his  will  and 
possess  himself  of  his  former  estate."^ 

A  clause  in  a  conveyance  that  it  is  made  "  upon  the  express 
stipulation  that  a  dwelling-house  should  be  moved  or  erected  on  the 
ground  within  three  years,"  at  a  cost  not  less  than  a  certain  sum, 
does  not  constitute  a  condition.*  If,  howevei*,  such  a  clause  is  in- 
serted in  the  form  of  an  express  condition,  or  it  is  declared  that  a 
breach  of  the  stipulation  shall  work  a  forfeiture,  the  conveyance 
will  be  construed  as  creating  a  condition  subsequent.'^  A  condi- 
tion that  the  grantee  shall  erect  upon  the  land  conveyed  a  cotton 

i  Hoyt  V.  Kimball,  49  N.  H.  322.  Atl.  Rep.  606  ;  Underbill  v.  Saratoga  & 

2  Studdard  v.  Well.s,  120  Mo.  25,  25  S.  W.   R.   Co.  20  Barb.  455;    Carpenter  v. 

W.  Rep.  201  ;  Cornelius  r.  Ivins,  26  N.  J.  Graber,  66  Tex.  465,  1   S.  W.  Rep.  178; 

L.  376;  Sbaron  Iron  Co.  v.  Erie,  41  Pa.  Odcll  v.  Cannon,  79  Ga.  515,  4  S.  E.  Rep. 

St.  341  ;  Palairet  v.  Snyder,  106  Pa.  St.  558;  Blanchard  v.  Detroit,  &c.  R.  Co.  31 

227;  Woodruff  v.  Water  Power  Co.  10  Mich.  43,  18  Ann.  Rep.  142;  Hammonds. 

N.  J.  Eq.  489;  Langley  v.   Chapin,  134  Port  Royal,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  15  S.  C.  10  ;  Pepin 

Mass.    82;    Gray   v.   Blanchard,   8  Pick.  Co.  v.  Prindle,  61    Wis.  301,  21    N.   W. 

284 ;  Hammond  v.  Port   Royal,  &c.   Ry.  Rep.  254. 

Co.  15  S.  C.  10,  33;  Jeffery  v.   Graham,  *  Stone  v.  Houghton,  139  Mass.  175,  31 

61  Tex.  481.  N.  E.  Rep.  719. 

^  Woodruff  V.  Water  Power  Co.  10  N.  ^  O'Brien  v.  Wagner,  94  Mo.  93,  7  S. 

J.  Eq.  4S9  ;  Warner  v.  Bennett,  31  Conn.  W.  Rep.  19  ;  Clarke  v.  Brookfield,  81  Mo. 

468;  Hoyt  v.  Kctcham,   54   Conn.   60,   5  503,51  Am.  Rep.  243. 
526 


CONDITIONS   SUBSEQUENT   NOT    FAVORED  IN   LAW.       [§§  639,    6-iO. 

factory,  within   two  years  from  the  date  of  the  conveyance,  is  a 
condition  and  not  a  covenant.' 

639.  A  condition  cannot  be  enforced  as  an  agreement  where 
the  huiguage  used  imports  a  condition  only,  and  there  are  no  words 
importing  an  agreement,  but  the  only  remedy  is  through  a  forfeit- 
ure.2  If  there  are  no  promissory  words,  or  words  which  can  be 
construed  as  such,  the  condition  does  not  create  a  personal  liabil- 
ity.-^ But  the  deed  may  contain  a  condition  upon  breach  of  which 
the  grantor  might  enforce  a  forfeiture,  and  also  a  covenant  on  the 
part  of  the  grantee  upon  a  breach  of  which  the  grantor  may  in 
equity  compel  a  specific  performance  or  maintain  an  action  for 
damages,  and  in  such  case  the  grantor  has  his  election  of  reme- 
dies.^ 

If  the  language  and  intent  of  the  deed  clearly  fix  the  legal 
import  of  the  instrument  as  creating  a  condition,  it  is  of  no  conse- 
quence that  the  provision  is  elsewhere  in  the  deed  referred  to  as 
being  a  covenant.^ 

640.  The  nature  and  purpose  of  the  deed  and  the  circum- 
stances of  the  transaction  may  control  the  use  and  meaning 
of  words  of  condition  so  that  they  will  not  have  the  effect 
of  limiting  the  estate  conveyed.  Thus,  in  the  language  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  "  the  word  '  proviso '  is  an 
appropriate  one  to  constitute  a  common-law  condition  in  a  deed 

1  Langley  v.  Chapin,  134  Mass.  82.  .^  Blanchard  v.  Detroit,  &c.   K.  Co.  31 

-  Woodruff  V.  Trenton  Water  Power  Mich.  43,  18  Am.  Rep.  142,  Graves,  C. 
Co.  10  N.  J.  Eq.  489  ;  Parsons  v.  Miller,  1.5  J.,  sayiuj; :  "  When  an  instrument  or  pro- 
Wend.  561,  .564;  Jackson  i'.  Florence,  16  vision  is  clearly  and  distinctly  so  drawn 
Johns.  47  ;  Palmer  v.  Plank  Road  Co.  11  'and  con.siimmated  that  the  law  at  once 
N.  Y.  376,  389,  where  the  court  say:  "It  attaches,  and  determines  that  it  jjossesses 
by  no  means  follows,  because  a  grantee  a  specific  legal  nature,  and  exclusively  be- 
consents  to  take  an  estate  subject  to  a  longs  to  a  given  class  of  transactions,  the 
condition,  that  he  also  consents  to  obligate  parties  cannot,  by  arbitrarily  assigning  a 
himself  personally  for  the  performance  of  name  to  it  wholly  foreign  to  its  true  cliar- 
the  condition.  Many  cases  might  be  im-  acter,  succeed  in  transforming  it,  and  so 
agined  in  which  one  would  be  willing  to  cause  it  to  stand  and  operate  in  a  manner 
risk  the  forfeiture  of  the  estate,  while  he  wholly  alien  to  it.  .  .  .  In  such  a  case  the 
would  be  altogether  unwilling  to  incur  law  attaches  to  the  act,  and  ascribes  to  it 
the  hazard  of  a  personal  responsibility  in  a  definite  significance,  and  the  parties 
aiMition."  cannot  be  heard  to  say,  where  there  is  no 

^  Blanchard  v.  Detroit,  &c.   R.   Co.  31  imposiiion,  no    fraud,  no   mistake,   that, 

Mich.  43,  18  Am.  Rep.  142;  Parsons  ?•.  although  they  deliberately  made  a  condi- 

Miller,  1.5  Wend.  561,  564.  tion,  and  nothing  but  a  condition,  they  yet 

•*  Stuyvesant  j;.  New  York,  11    Paige,  meant  that  it  should  be  exactly  as  a  cove- 

414.  nant." 

527 


§  040.]  CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

or  will,  but  this  is  not  the  fixed  and  invariable  meaning  attached 
to  it  by  the  law  in  these  instruments.  On  tlu>  (iontrary,  it  gives 
way  to  the  intent  of  the  parties  as  gathered  iiom  an  examination 
of  the  whole  instrument,  and  has  frequently  been  thus  explained 
and  applied  as  expressing  simply  a  covenant  or  limitation  in 
trust."  ^  In  a  case  before  the  House  of  Lords  Lord  Chelmsford 
said  :  "  Very  little  if  any  stress  can  properly  be  laid  upon  the 
words  '  intent  and  purpose '  and  ^  upon  condition '  in  the  will  as 
proof  of  the  testator's  intention  to  create  either  a  trust  or  a  con- 
dition. Cases  are  to  be  found  in  which,  in  gifts  of  this  sort,  a 
condition  has  been  held  to  be  created  by  the  word  'intent,'  and 
it  was  not  unusual  formerly  in  charitable  dispositions  to  impose 
trusts  in  the  form  of  conditions,"^ 

In  a  deed  to  a  railroad  company,  a  condition  that  the  company 
should  erect  a  private  crossing  under  the  railroad  track  may  prop- 
erly be  construed  as  a  reservation  of  a  mere  easement  to  the 
grantor,  if  there  is  nothing  further  in  the  deed  which  indicates 
an  intention  to  make  the  compliance  with  such  provision  a  con- 
dition subsequent.  The  provision  for  the  right  of  way  was 
treated  as  part  of  the  consideration  for  the  conveyance.  It  was 
iiceordingly  held  that  the  grantor  could  maintain  an  action  for 
damages  against  the  railroad  for  closing  the  crossing.^ 

A  deed  "upon  this  further  condition,"  that  the  grantee  should 
permit  the  grantor  to  have  access  through  the  land  to  the  waters 

1  Stanley  v.  Colt,  5  Wall.  119,  166,  per  title  to  the  easement  granted  depend  upon 
Nelson,  J.  In  this  case  the  testator  de-  the  maintenance  of  the  j)riv;\te  road, 
vised  laud  to  a  religious  society  for  its  Such  a  contract  would  have  been  against 
use  or  benefit,  "  Provided  that  said  real  the  interests  of  the  company  ;  and  its  en- 
estate  be  not  hereafter  sold  or  disposed  forcement,  in  case  of  violation,  would  by 
of,"  and  in  connection  and  continuation  no  means  have  restored  to  Ford  his  prop- 
added  numerons  minute  directions  in  the  erty  in  its  original  condition.  The  con- 
nature  of  regulations  for  the  guidance  of  struction  contended  for  by  the  defendant 
trustees  whom  he  appointed  to  manage  is  unreasonable  and  clearly  against  the 
it,  and  with  a  view  to  the  greatest  advan-  evident  intention  of  both  parties,  and  as 
tage  of  the  society.  It  was  held  that  the  deed  by  its  terms  does  not  necessarily 
these  provisions  constituted  a  limitation  create  a  conditional  estate,  and  as  it  does 
in  trust,  and  not  a  common-law  condi-  not  so  appear  by  clear  implication,  we  are 
tion.  of  the  o|)inion  that  no  such  estate  was 

'^  Attorney-General  v.  Wax  Chandlers'  created."     Rombauer,  V.  J.,  dissented  on 

Co.  6  L.  R.  H.  L.  1.  the  ground  that  the  deed  in  express  terms 

■'  Stilwell  V.  St.  Louis  &  H.  Ry.  Co.  .39  created  a  condition,  and  the  court  could 

Mo.  A  pp.  221.     The  court  by  Bigu'S,  J.,  not  say  there  was  no  condi  ion.     He  cited 

say :    "  It   is   quite   evident   that   neither  Hubbard  r.  Kansas  City,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  63 

party  intended  or  expected  to  make  the  Mo.  68,  which  is  in  direct  conflict. 

528 


CONDITIONS   SUBSEQUENT   NOT    FAVORED   IN   LAW.        [§  641. 


of  a  harbor  b}^  a  road  heretofore  used,  was  held  not  to  constitute 
a  condition  subsequent.  There  was  in  the  deed  no  clearly  ex- 
pressed intention  importing  that  tlie  estate  was  to  depend  upon  a 
contingency  provided  for.  The  legal  effect  of  the  condition  was 
to  annex  a  right  of  way  to  the  land  conveyed.  It  was  a  reserva- 
tion in  favor  of  tlie  grantee.^ 

Where  a  devise  was  made  "  upon  the  express  condition  "  that 
the  devisee  should  pay  all  legacies  within  twelve  months,  but 
added, "  and  I  feel  confident  that  he  will  comply  with  my  wish,  it 
being  my  particular  desire  that  all  the  above  legacies  shall  be 
paid,  and  I  do  hereby  charge  and  make  chargeable  all  my  said 
real  and  personal  estate  with  the  payment  of  the  aforesaid  leg- 
acies," it  was  held  that  there  was  no  conditon  for  which  an  entry 
could  be  made,  but  only  a  trust.^ 

641.  Even  the  words  "  upon  condition  "  do  not  of  necessity 
create  an  estate  upon  condition. ^  Thus,  in  a  deed  of  land  to  a 
religious  society  to  use  for  purposes  of  public  worship,  the  words 
*' in  trust  nevertheless  and  upon  condition  always"  were  held  not 
to  create  an  estate  on  condition,  but  merely  a  trust.  Taking  into 
consideration   the   circumstances   of  the   case,   the    words   "  upon 


1  Baker  v.  Mott,  78  Hun,  141,  28  N.  Y. 
Suj)p.  968;  Lyon  v.  Hersey,  103  N.  Y. 
264,  8  N.  E.  Rep.  518. 

2  Wright  V.  Wilkin,  2  Best  &  S.  232. 
Crompton,  J.,  said  :  "  I  think  tliat  the  rule 
is  well  laid  down  by  Lord  St.  Leonards 
with  rei,'ard  to  estates  upon  condition, 
'that  whnt  by  the  old  law  was  deemed  a 
devise  upon  condition  would  now,  pcr- 
haj)S,  in  almoi-t  every  case,  be  construed  a 
devise  in  fee  upon  trust.'  "  See  Attorney- 
General  I'.  Southmolton,  14  Beav.  3.57  ; 
Merchant  Tailors'  Co.  v.  Attorney-Gen- 
eral, L.  R.  U  Kq.  35. 

8  Stanley  v.  Colt,  5  Wall.  119 ;  Avery  i'. 
New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  106  N.  Y. 
142,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  619,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  20 ; 
Post  V.  Weil,  115  N.  Y.  361,  22  N.  E.  Rep. 
145  ;  Graves  v.  Deierlin^s  1'20  N.  Y.  447, 
24  N.  E.  Rep.  655  ;  Episcopal  City  Mi.s- 
sion  V.  Api)leton,  117  Mass.  326;  Sohier 
V.  Trinity  Church,  109  Mass.  1  ;  Paschall 
V.  Passraore,  15  Pa.  St.  295  ;  Biicon  v. 
Huntintrton,  14  Conn.  92;  Wormnn  v. 
Teagarden,  2  Ohio  St.  380;  Walters  v. 
VOL.  I. 


Bredin,  70  Pa.  St.  235  ;  Hoyt  v.  Kimball, 
49  N.  IL  322 ;  Hunt  v.  Wright,  47  N.  II. 
401;  Dunlap  i;.  Mobley,  71  Ala.  102; 
Farnham  v.  Thomjjson,  34  Minn.  330,  26 
N.  W.  Rep.  9,  57  Am.  Rep.  59 ;  Stilwell 
V.  Knapper,  69  Iiid.  558,  35  Am.  Rep.  240  ; 
Wilson  y.  Wilson,  86  Ind.  472;  Laberee 
V.  Carleton,  53  Me.  211;  Neely  r.  IIos- 
kins,  84  Me.  386,  24  Atl.  Rep.  882.  Per 
Peters,  C.  J. :  "  The  term  '  condition  '  does 
not  necessarily  import  it.  'Condition' 
may  mean  '  trust,'  and  '  trust '  mean  '  con- 
dition,' oftentimes.  The  construction 
must  depend  "upon  the  context  and  any 
admissible  evidence  outside  of  the  deed." 
In  Kilpatriek  v.  Mayor  (Md.),  31  Atl. 
Rep.  805,  Page,  J.,  said:  "Technical 
words  are  not  ab.solutely  essential  to  cre- 
ate a  condition,  nor,  on  the  other  hand, 
does  their  use  necessarily  raise  one.  Such 
words  may  l)c  controlled  by  the  context  of 
tlie  instrument  in  which  they  are  used,  so 
that  sometimes  they  work  a  limitation  and 
condition,  and  sometimes  a  covenant  or  a 
trust  only." 

529 


§  li42.]  CONDITION'S   TRECEDENT    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

condition  "  wore  regarded  us  not  having  been  used  in  their  tech- 
nical sense.  The  grantors  who  nsed  these  words  were  merely  a 
committee  who  had  taken  the  title  in  trust  for  the  society  ;  nnd  if 
the  title  were  to  come  back  to  them  or  their  heirs  by  foifeiture, 
it  must  be  held  by  them  in  trust  for  the  society,  and  would  thus 
be  turned  into  a  trust  estate.^ 

Apt  words  of  conditi(m  will  not  create  an  estate  upon  condition 
if  the  intention  of  the  grantor,  as  manifested  by  the  whole  deeil, 
is  otherwise.  Thus,  where  land  was  conveyed  to  a  religious 
society,  its  successors  and  assigns,  "upon  and  sul>ject  to  the  con- 
dition" that  the  society  should  continue  to  hold  and  occupy  and 
improve  the  land  and  chapel  standing  thereon,  for  the  supjiort  of 
religious  worship,  "and  also  upon  the  further  condition"  that 
no  building  should  be  erected  upon  a  certain  portion  of  the  land 
conveyed  until  certain  events  should  occur,  it  was  held,  upon  a 
petition  in  equity  brought  by  the  society  after  the  locality  had 
become  unfit  for  the  purposes  for  which  the  land  was  conveyed, 
that  the  deed  did  not  create  a  condition,  and  that  a  sale  should  be 
decreed.^  The  purpose  of  the  conditional  paragraph  was  declared 
to  be  to  define  and  regulate  the  use  of  the  estate  by  the  grantee, 
not  by  the  grantor  or  his  heirs. 

642,  Mere  words,  though  they  be  the  strongest  words  of 
condition,  will  not  entail  a  forfeiture  of  the  estate,  unless  it 
appears  that  this  was  the  distinct  intention  of  the  grantor, 
and  a  necessary  understanding  of  the  parties  to  the  instrument. 
The  intention  of  the  parties  as  gathered  from  the  whole  deed  and 
from  the  surrounding  circumstances,  rather  than  technical  words  of 
condition,  controls  the  interpretation  of  the  deed.  This  rule  is 
strongly  declared  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  in  a  recent 
decision,  in  which  Mr.  Justice  Gray  says:  "If  the  only  reason 
for  'onstruinsr  a  clause  is  in  the  technical  words  which  have  been 
used,  the  court  may  disregard  them  in  performing  the  office  of 
interpretation.  If  we  can  construe  this  clause  as  an  obligation 
to  abstain  from  doing  the  thing  described,  which,  by  acceptance 
of  the  deed,  became  binding  upon  the  grantee  as  an  agreement, 
enforceable  in  behalf  of  any  interest  entitled  to  invoke  its  protec- 

1  Sohier  v.  Trinity  Church,  109  Mass.  117  Mass.  326.  Gray,  C.  J.,  cited  Sohier 
1,19.  For  a  similar  case,  see  Neely  v.  v.  Trinity  Church,  109  Mass.  1,  19;  At- 
Hoskins,  84  Me.  .386,  24  Atl.  Kep.  882.  torney-Gcncral  v.  Wax  Chandlers'  Co.  L. 

2  Episcopal  City  Mission  v.  Appleton,  R.  6  H.  L.  1. 

530 


CONDITIONS   SUBSEQUENT   NOT    FAVORED   IN   LAW.       [§  642. 

tion,  I  think  we  are  in  conscience  bound  to  give  tliut  constiaiction, 
and  thereby  place  oiuselves  in  accord  with  that  inclination  of 
the  hiw  which  regards  with  disfavor  conditions  involving  forfeit- 
ure of  estates.  In  this  connection  it  may  be  noted  that  there  is 
no  clause  in  the  deed  giving  the  right  to  reenter  for  conditions 
broken.  While  the  presence  of  such  a  clause  is  not  essential  to 
the  creation  of  a  condition  subsequent,  by  which  an  estate  may 
be  defeated  at  the  exercise  of  an  election  by  the  grantor  or  his 
heirs  to  reenter,  yet  its  absence,  to  that  extent,  frees  still  more 
the  case  from  the  difficulty  of  giving  a  more  benignant  construc- 
tion to  the  proviso  clause.  The  presence  of  a  reentry  clause 
niijzht  make  certain  that  which,  in  its  absence,  is  left  open  to  con- 
struction.  The  absence  of  such  a  clause  may  have  its  significance 
in  connection  with  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  tlie  intent 
to  be  fairly  presumed  therefrom."  ^ 

In  this  case  the  owner  of  two  adjoining  estates,  occupied  by 
him  as  farms,  contracted  to  sell  one  of  them  "  upon  special  condi- 
tion that  no  part  of  the  land  or  buildings  thereon  should  be  used  or 
occupied  as  a  tavern."  Some  years  afterwards  the  owner,  being 
financially  embarrassed,  conveyed  both  estates  to  trustees  subject 
to  this  agreement,  and  the  trustees  shortly  afterwards  made  a 
deed  in  fulfilment  of  this  agreement,  with  the  "  express  condition 
that  the  aforesaid  premises  shall  not,  nor  shall  any  part  thereof, 
be  at  any  time  hereafter  used  or  occupied  as  a  tavern,  or  iniblic 
house  of  any  kind."  Subsequently  the  trustees  sold  the  remain- 
ing estate  without  inserting  any  such  condition.  The  former 
owner  then  had  no  interest  in  either  estate  other  than  obtaining 
from  them  all  that  they  would  bring,  and  the  trustees  had  no  other 
interest.  Neither  the  owner  nor  the  trustees  had  any  intei-est 
that  the  restrictive  clause  should  operate  as  a  condition  subse- 
quent. ''  There  was  no  interest,"  say  the  court,  "  which  was  not 
adequately  met  by  the  creation  f)f  a  covenant  or  limitation  in 
trust  that  the  property  should  not  be  used  for  the  one  certain 
purpose  mentioned."  The  two  estates  were  subsequently  united 
in  on('  owner,  and  when,  upon  a  sale  of  a  portion  of  the  estate 
which  was  affected  by  the  provision  under  consideration,  tlio  pur- 
chaser objected  that  it  was  subject  to  a  common-law  forfeiture 
and  declined  to  complete  his  purchase,  it  was  held  that  his  objec- 
tion was  untenable;  that  tlie  provision  was  simply  a  covenant 
1  Post  V.  Weil,  115  N.  Y.  3G1,  371,  22  N.  K.  Rep.  145. 

531 


§643.] 


CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND    SUBSEQUENT. 


running  witli  the  land  for  the  benefit  of  the  adjoining  estate; 
anil  that  it  was  extinguished  by  the  union  of  both  estates  in  the 
same  owner. ^ 

643.  The  consideration  named  for  a  grant  does  not  ordina- 
rily imply  a  condition,  so  that  u{;on  a  faihiie  of  the  considera- 
tion a  forfeiture  may  be  declared.-  Any  exception  there  may  be 
to  this  rule  "is  confined  to  cases  where  the  subject-matter  of  the 
grant  is  in  its  nature  executory,  as  (;f  an  annuity  to  be  paid  for 
services  to  be  rendered  or  a  privilege  to  be  enjoyed.""^  A  grant 
"■'  made  upon  the  consideration  that  "  the  grantee,  his  heirs,  ex- 
ecutors, and  administrators,  should  fulfil  certain  agreements  for 
the  support  of  the  grantor  and  his  wife,  was  held  not  to  be  a 


1  Post  I'.  Weil,  115  N.  Y.  361,  22  N. 
E.  Rep.  145.  The  court  cite  and  rely 
upon  Avery  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &c.  K.  R.  Co. 
106  N.  Y.  142,  where  the  railroad  com- 
pany held  lands  under  a  deed  containing 
an  "express  condition  "  tliat  the  company 
should  at  all  times  maintain  an  opening- 
to  a  hotel  adjacent  to  the  premises.  A 
lessee  of  the  hotel  sought  to  enjoin  the 
company  from  maintaining  a  fence  upon 
the  land,  which  blocked  up  a  passageway 
between  the  railroad  property  and  the 
hotel.  Tiie  company  contended  that  the 
provision  created  a  condition  subsequent, 
which  could  only  be  taken  advantage  of 
by  the  grantors  and  their  heirs.  The 
court,  however,  decided  against  the  con- 
tention of  the  railroad  company,  saying  : 
"  The  fact  that  the  deed  uses  the  language 
'  upon  condition,'  when  referring  to  the 
conveyance  by  the  grantors,  is  not  conclu- 
sive that  the  intention  was  to  create  an 
estate  strictly  upon  condition.  .  .  .  Con- 
struction may  frequently  be  aided  by  ref- 
erence to  all  the  circumstances  surround- 
ing the  parties  at  the  time  of  the  execution 
of  the  deeds,  because  the  court  is  thus  en- 
abled to  be  placed  exactly  in  their  situa- 
tion, and  to  view  the  case  in  the  light  of 
such  surroundings."  After  referring  to 
the  facts,  he  writes :  "  All  these  facts 
would  lead  one  to  the  unhesitating  con- 
clusion that  the  language  used  in  tho.se 
deeds  in  1857  was  for  the  benefit  of   the 

532 


hotel  property,  and  was  not  meant  to  cre- 
ate a  condition  subsequent." 

In  confirmation  of  the  views  given  in 
the  above  decisions,  see  Clement  v.  Bur- 
tis,  121  N.  Y.  708,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  1013, 
affirming  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  364,  where  a 
clause  in  a  deed  of  land,  reciting  that  the 
grant  is  on  the  "  express  condition  "  that 
the  grantee,  his  heirs  or  assigns,  shall  not 
thereafter  maintain  a  nuisance  on  the 
premises,  does  not  create  a  condition  sub- 
sequent, but  is  a  covenant  running  with 
the  laud  ;  and  a  purchaser  at  a  foreclosure 
sale  of  the  granted  premises  cannot  refuse 
to  complete  his  purchase  on  the  ground 
of  a  defect  in  the  title,  as  the  covenant 
does  not  bind  him  any  further  than  he 
would  be  bound  by  law  in  the  absence  of 
any  covenant.  Also,  Countryman  y.  Deck, 
13  Abb.  N.  C.  110;  Iloyt  v.  Kimball,  49 
N.  H.  322 ;  Episcopal  City  Mission  v.  Ap- 
pleton,  117  Mass.  326;  Stanley  ?;.  Colt,  5 
Wall.  119. 

•2  Berkley  v.  Union  Tac.  Ry.  Co.  33 
Fed.  Rep.  794;  Laberee  v.  Carleton,  53 
Me.  211  ;  Ayer  v.  Emery,  14  Allen,  67; 
Martin  v.  Martin,  131  Mass.  547;  Morrill 
V.  Wabash,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  96  Mo.  174,  9 
S.  W.  Rep.  657  ;  Rainey  v.  Chambers,  56 
Tex.  17  ;  Risley  ;•.  McNiece,  71  Ind  4.34; 
Portland  ;;.  Terwilliger,  10  Oreg.  465,  19 
Pac.  Rep.  90. 

3  Rawsou  ?•.  School  Dist.  7  Allen,  125, 
83  Am.  Dec.  670,  per  Bigelow,  C.  J.  See, 
also,  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  86  Ind.  472. 


CONDITIONS    SUBSEQUENT   NOT    FAVORED   IN   LAW.        [§  643. 

grant  upon  a  condition  subsequent.  "  There  are  no  apt  words 
in  the  deed,"  say  the  court,  "  to  create  a  condition ;  there  is  no 
clause  of  reentry  or  forfeitui-e ;  it  is  not  provided  that  the  deed 
shall  be  void  in  a  certain  contingency  ;  nor  was  the  conveyance 
made  solt-ly  in  consideration  of  certain  acts  to  be  done,  or  for  the 
accomplishment  of  a  specific  purpose,  on  the  fulfilment  of  which 
the  estate  granted  is  made  to  depend.  The  grantor  has  not  only 
omitted  to  use  any  words  which  can  be  properly  held  to  create 
an  estate  on  condition  according  to  the  technical  rules  of  law, 
but  he  has  also  failed  to  indicate  any  clear  intent  to  cause  the 
estate  to  be  defeated  by  reason  of  any  act  or  omission  of  the 
grantee."  ^ 

A  warranty  deed  of  an  undivided  half  of  a  tract  of  land  '^  in 
consideration  of  clearing  the  whole  of  all  taxes  now  due,  and  tax 
claims  of  all  kinds  for  which  the  land  has  been  sold,  or  is  now 
subject  to  sale,"  is  an  absolute  conveyance,  and  on  its  delivery 
vests  title  in  the  grantee,  and  is  not  a  deed  upon  condition  prece- 
dent or  subsequent.2  And  so  a  recital  in  a  deed  by  a  father  to 
his  son  that  the  son  had  promised  to  remain  with  the  grantor, 
and  after  the  grantor's  death  to  support  his  widow,  does  not  con- 
stitute a  condition.^ 

Even  where  a  grantee  holding  an  estate  upon  condition  trans- 
ferred it  to  another,  in  consideration  that  the  latter  should  perform 
the  condition,  the  second  grantee  does  not  hold  the  estate  upon 
condition,  but  is  merely  under  a  personal  obligation  to  perform 

the  condition.'* 

Where  land  was  conveyed  upon  consideration  that  a  railroad 
companv  is  to  "  locate,  erect,  and  maintain"  upon  the  land  its 
depot,  and  in  pursuance  of  the  conveyance  the  depot  was  erected 
and  maintained  for  eleven  years  and  then  was  removed,  the  land 
did  not  revert.  "The  erection  and  maintenance  of  the  depot  is 
stated  to  be  a  consideration,  a  consideration  perhaps  in  the  nature 
of  a  condition  subsequent ;  but  the  conveyance  does  not  i-urport 
to  be  one  upon  condition  that  the  grant...  will  perlorm,  but  .t  .s 
a  convevance  in  consideration  of  its  i)rnmise  to  e.-e.^t  and  mam- 
tain.  That  consid(H-ation  it  has  partially  performed.  .  .  .  Under 
those  circumstances,  where  there  is  a  part  performance,  -  a  part 

1  Aycr  ..  Emery,  U  Allen.  67.  ^  Perry  ..  Sc,.,t.  r>l  Pa-  St.    HO.     See. 

^  Reggies  ..  Clare,  45  Kans.  062.  20     also.  Havn.s  ..  S  aw.  I''  J'^^^^^^ 
''^  i  Norris  v.  Laberec,  .-iS  Me.  260. 

rac.  Kep.  2o.  j.^.^ 

J  Ooo 


§^  G44-G-i(;.J       CONDITIONS    ITvKCEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

pavnu'nt,  —  the  title  does  not  revert.  There  may  be  a  cause  of 
aotion  for  (.lamages,  but  the  title  does  not  revert  upon  a  mere  par- 
tial failure  of  the  consideration."  ' 

644.  A  condition  for  the  payment  of  money  to  third  per- 
sons by  the  oiautee  within  a  fixed  time  will  be  construed  to  be 
merely  a  charge  upon  the  land,  unless  a  different  intent  is  ap-  i 
parent,  or  the  language  of  the  condition  is  so  clear  as  to  leave  no 
room  for  construeiion  or  doubt.^  A  conveyance  "subject  to  the 
purchase-money,"  and  to  an  agreement  concerning  the  same, 
creates  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  land  conveyed.^ 

645.  A  provision  in  a  deed  that  the  grantee  shall  assume 
and  pay  a  mortgage  upon  the  land  conveyed  does  not  constitute 
a  condition  upon  the  breach  of  which  the  title  revests  in  the 
grantor.^  But  the  payment  of  a  mortgage  upon  the  land  may 
be  made  an  express  condition,  and  when  so  intended  it  will  be 
enforced  by  forfeiture.^  In  that  case  there  is  a  breach  of  the  con- 
dition in  case  the  grantee  suffers  the  mortgage  to  remain  undis- 
charged for  several  years  after  its  maturity.  Such  a  condition 
requires  the  grantee  to  relieve  the  property  of  the  incumbrance 
within  a  reasonable  time.^' 

646.  A  conveyance  in  consideration  of  support  to  be  fur- 
nished the  grantor  or  another  person  does  not  create  a  condition, 
unless  apt  words  of  condition  are  used,'  and  even  then  it  will  not 
be  held  to  create  a  condition  unless  it  is  apparent  from  the  whole 
instrument  that  a  strict  condition  was  intended.  But  courts  of 
equity,  it   is  declared,  will  freely  rescind  conveyances  by  parents 

1  Berkley  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  33  ment  on  such  a  clause  as  being  a  coudi- 
Fed.  Rep.  794,  795,  per  Brewer,  J.     See,     tion,  is  clearly  had  law. 

however,  Close    v.    Burlington,    &c.    Ry.  °  Ross  v.  Tremain,  2  Met.  49.5;  Fisk 

Co.  64  Iowa,  149,  19  N.  W.  Rep.  886.  v.  Chandler,  30  Me.  79. 

2  Wier  )'.  Sitntnons,  55  Wis.  637,  13  »  Rowell  d.  Jewett,  69  Me.  293;  Ross 
N.  W.  Rep.  873;  Powers  v.   Powers,  28  v.  Tremain,  2  Met.  495. 

Wis.    659;    Bugbec   v.    Sargent,   23  Me.  '  Cook  y.  Trimble,  9  Watts,  15 ;  Ayer 

269.  V.  Emery,    14  Allen,    67  ;    Goodpaster  d. 

3  Xander's  Est.  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  482  ;  Hies-  Leathers,  123  Ind.  121,  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
ter  r.  Green,  48  Pa.  St.  96.  1090;  Risley  v.  McNiece,    71    Ind.   434; 

*  Martin   r.    Splivalo,   69   Cal.   611,   11  Gallaher  y.  Herbert,  117  111.  160,  7  N.  E. 

Pac.  Rep.  484;  Moore's  Appeal,  88  Pa.  Rep.  511:  Pownal   v.   Taylor,   10  Leigh, 

St.  450;  Cook  V.  Trimble,  9  Watts,   15;  172,  34  Am.   Dec.  725.     And  see  Ralph- 

Dunlap  1-.  Mobley,  71  Ala.  102;  Schuyder  snyder  v.   Ralphsnyders,    17  W.  Va.  28; 

V.  Orr,  149  Pa.  St.  320,  24  Atl.  Rep.  306,  Joslyn  v.  Parlin,  54  Vt.  670;  Weeks  v. 

holding  that  the  grantor  may  bring  eject-  Boynton,  37  Vt.  297  ;  Studdard  v.  Wells, 

120  Mo.  25,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  201. 

534 


CONDITIONS   SUBSEQUENT   NOT    FAVORED    IN    LAW.        [§  647. 

to  sons  upon  the  breach  of  agreements  to  support ;  ^  but  they  will 
not  enforce  a  forfeiture  in  such  cases  on  slight  grounds,  and  when 
the  circumstances  are.  such  that  it  would  be  grossly  inequitable 
to  do  so.^ 

If,  however,  it  is  apparent  that  the  parties  intended  to  make 
the  furnishing  of  support  a  condition,  this  will  be  enforced  by 
forfeiture.^  If  the  condition  be  to  furnish  support  or  to  pay  a 
certain  sum  secured  by  mortgage,  the  grantee  may  perform  either 
alternative ;  but  when  he  has  once  made  his  election  he  is  bound 
by  it,  and  cannot  afterwards  choose  the  other  alternative.* 

A  condition  for  support  may  be  performed  by  another  per- 
son than  the  grantee,  unless  the  deed  expressly  provides  that  he 
shall  personally  furnish  it.'^  The  support  need  not  be  given  or 
received  upon  the  granted  premises,  unless  there  is  an  express 
provision  therefor.  It  may  be  demanded  or  given  at  any  rea- 
sonable place. ^ 

647.  A  reservation  or  provision  in  a  deed  poll  that  the 
grantee  shall  perform  a  certain  service  for  the  grantor,  such 
as  to  build  and  maintain  a  certain  fence,  is  made  binding  upon 
the  grantee  by  his  acceptance  of  the  deed.'  "  Where  a  grantee 
accf^pts  a  deed,  and  goes  into  possession  of  the  premises  under  it, 
he  is  bound  by  tlie  conditions  contained  in  the  deed  as  effectually 
as  if  he  had  signed  and  sealed  the  instrument.  Although  not 
executing  the  instrument,  he  should  be  deemed  to  hav(^  entered 
into  an  express  undertaking  to  do  what  the  deed  says  he  is  to  do; 
and  such  undertaking  or  obligation  imposed  upon  and  assumed  by 
the  grantee,  if  not  technically  a  covenant  running  with  the  land, 

1  Blake  I'.  Blake.  56  Wis.  392,  14  N.  Thrall  v.  Spear,  63  Vt.  266,  22  Atl.  Kcp. 
W.  Kep.  173  ;  Delon-  v.  Delong,  56  Wis.  414  ;  Alford  i'.  Alford,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
514,  14  N.  W.   Rep.  591  ;  Bresnahan  v.     245,  21  S.  W.  Kej).  283. 

BrJsnahan,  46   Wis    385,   1    N.  W.   Rep.  '  Bryant  r.  Er.skine,  55  Me.  153. 

39-  Bo.^ie  (•.  Botiie,  41  Wis   209.  -•'  Jo.slyu  ik  Parlin,  54  Vt.  670;   Henry 

2  Sha.ie  V.  Oldroyd,  39  Ivans.  313,  18  v.  Tupper,  29  Vt.  358;  Wilson  i-.  Wilson, 
Pac.  Rei-.  198.  38  Me.  18. 

s  Rowell   r.  Jewett,  69  Me.  293;   Tho-         «  IVttee  r.  Case,  2  Allen,  546;    Wilder 
Record    47  Me.  500;    Walters  v.     v.  Whitteinore,    15   Mass.  262;  Tliaycr  i-. 


mas  V 


Bredin    70  Pa.  St.  235  ;  Berrvman  i-.Schu-  Richards,  19  Pick.  398 

maker'  67    Tex.  312,  3   S.  W.  Rep.  46;  ■   KoI.erts  v.  Coleman,  37  W.  Va.  143. 

Leach  V   Leach.  4  Ind.  628.  58  Am.  Dec.  16  S.  E.  Kep.  482 ;  Newell  r.  Hill.  2  Met. 

642;    Hitchcock    >:    Sin.pkins,    99    Mich.  180;    Rof;ers  v.   Fire  Co.   9   Wend.   611; 

198  58  N   W   Rep.  47  ;  Jackson  v.  Top-  Trotter  i-.  Hujihe.s,  12  N.  Y.  74.  62  Am. 

ping    1    Wend.  388,  19  Am.   Dec.  515;  Dec.  137;   Atlantic  Dock  Co.  v.  Leav.tt, 

Spaulding   V.    Halienback,  39  Barb.  79  ;  54  N.  Y.  35,  13  Am.  Rep.  556. 

635 


§  647.]  CONDITIONS    PRKCKDENr    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

is  nevertheless  ;iu  agroement  of  the  grantee,  evidenced  by  his 
jvceeptance  of  the  deed,  which  might  bind  liini  and  his  personal 
representatives,  and,  by  express  words,  his  heirs  and  assigns."  ^ 
Such  a  provision  is  not  a  reservation  out  of  the  estate  granted, 
nor  is  it  generally  a  condition  upon  which  the  estate  is  to  be  held, 
nor  even  a  covenant  running  with  the  land,  or  otherwise.  It  is 
usually  merely  a  personal  agreement  of  the  grantee,  made  as 
part  of  the  consideration  of  the  grant,  which  binds  him  and  his 
legal  representatives,  and  is  not  an  incumbrance  upon  the  land.'-^ 

Where  a  deed  of  land  contained  a  reservation  of  pasturage  for 
two  cows  during  the  lifetime  of  the  grantor,  or,  in  lieu  thereof, 
the  grantee's  personal  obligation  to  fit  her  yearly  fuel  for  the 
stove,  a  stipulation  in  aid  of  the  reservation,  that  the  grantee  "is 
not "  to  incumber  or  convey  the  land  meantime,  does  not  create 
an  estate  on  condition.^ 

A  clause  in  a  deed  poll,  to  the  effect  that  the  grantee  agrees 
for  himself,  and  for  his  heirs  and  assigns,  that  he  and  they  will 
make  and  forever  maintain  a  fence  all  around  the  granted  premises, 
is  of  the  same  effect  as  an  express  covenant  signed  and  sealed  by 
the  grantee.  It  runs  with  the  land,  and  creates  an  incumbrance 
upon  the  land.  By  implication  it  recognizes  that  a  subsequent 
grantee  would  be  liable  to  the  original  grantor,  in  an  action  of 
assumpsit,  for  non-performance  of  the  stipulation.'^ 

A  provision  in  the  form  of  an  express  condition  in  a  deed  for 
land  within  a  city  to  be  used  as  a  cemetery  that  "  the  grantee,  his 
successors  and  assigns,  shall  at  all  times  maintain  a  good  and 
sufficient  fence  around  the  premises,"  should  be  construed  as  a 
covenant,  and  not  as  creating  a  condition  subsequent,  where  it  is 
evident  that  the  grantor,  who  owned  lands  on  both  sides,  sought 
to  impose  a  duty  on  the  grantee  to  build  all  the  fence  inclosing 
the  cemetery.^ 

1  Hickey  v.  Lake   Shore,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  Atl.  Rep.  479.     The  deed  contained  the 

(Ohio)  .36  N.  E.  Rep.  672.  following  provision  :  "  Provided,  and  this 

-  Parish  v.  Whitney,  3  Gray,  516;  Ply-  deed  is  upon  the  condition,  that  theabove- 

mouth  i;.  Carver,  16  Pick.  183.  described  premises   are   to   be   used  and 

^  Bray  v.  Hussey,  83   Me.  329,  22  Atl.  occupied   for   the  purpose  of   a   burying 

Rep.  220.  ground,  and  no  other  purpose;  and   that 

*  Burbank  v.  Pillsbury,  48  N.  H.  475,  the  grantee,   his  successors   and   assigns, 

97  Am.   Dec.  6.33;  Kellogg  v.  Robinson,  shall   at   all  times   maintain,    build,  and 

6  Vt.  276,  27  Am.  Dec.  550.  keep   a  good   and  sufficient  fence  around 

^  Scovill  V.  McMahon,  62  Conn.  378,  26  snid  premi.<es."     The  court  held,  in  regard 

536 


CONDITIONS   SUBSEQUENT   NOT    FAVORED   IN   LAW.       [§  648. 

A  grantor  in  a  deed  to  a  railroad  company,  in  consideration  of 
a  sura  of  money  and  of  its  building  its  railroad,  conveyed  to  a 
company,  its  successors  or  assigns,  forever,  in  fee  simple,  the  right 
of  way  through  his  land,  and  added  in  the  deed  the  words:  "It 
is  hereby  agreed  and  understood  a  depot  and  station  is  to  be  lo- 
cated and  given  to  said  grantor  on  the  land  or  stiip  above  con- 
veyed, to  be  permanently  located  for  the  benefit  ot"  said  grantor 
and  his  assigns,  and  to  be  used  for  the  general  purposes  of  the 
railroad  company."  It  was  held  that  the  grantee,  by  accepting 
such  deed,  entered  into  a  covenant  to  comply  witli  its  terms,  and 
this  covenant  ran  with  the  land,  and  became  obligatory  upon  any 
second  company  which  became  the  purchaser,  under  proper  legal 
direction,  of  the  rights,  privileges,  franchises,  and  property  of  the 
former.^ 

648.  But  a  service  to  be  performed  by  the  grantee  may  b© 
imposed  as  a  condition,  in  which  case  a  forfeiture  may  follow 
a  breach  of  it.  Whether  the  grantee  alone  is  bound  to  perform 
the  service,  or  whether  his  heirs  and  assigns  are  also  bound, 
depends  upon  the  terms  of  the  condition.  Thus,  where  land  was 
conveyed  to  the  grantee,  his  heirs  and  assigns  forever,  upon  con- 
dition that  the  grantee  should  forever  maintain  at  his  own  ex- 
pense a  fence  on  the  line  of  the  land  conveyed,  it  was  held  that 
the  condition  bound  the  grantee  alone,  and  not  his  heirs  and 
assigns,  because  they  were  not  specially  named  in  the  condition.^ 
The  condition,  therefore,  cannot  be  broken  after  the  death  of  the 
grantee.  His  heirs  are  under  no  obligation  to  do  anything  in 
consequence  of  the  condition. 

to  the  provision  for  the  use  of  the  prop-  the  property  shows  thnt  the  -rantor  owned 

erty  as  a  cemetery,  that,  as  apt  words  for  the  hind  on  two  sides  of  the  lot  conveyed, 

the  creation  of  a  condition  were  employed,  He   evidently  desired    to    relieve    himself 

it  was  a  reasonable  inference,  under  all  from  the  burden  of  maintaining  any  part 

the    circumstances,    that    the   grantor  in-  of  the  fcnc>c,  and  toimjiose  the  duty  upon 

tended  that  the  property  should   revert  if  the   -rantee  of  buildin-  all  the  fence  in- 

the  grantee  failed  to  use  it  for  the  pur-  closing  the  premises.     This,  we  think,  was 

pose  designated.     "  But,  in   the    absence  his  entire  purpose,  and  thnt  this  i)rovisinn 

of  nnv  express  provision   for  reentry  or  should  be  construed  as  a  covenant,  and 

forfeiture  we  think  it  is  not  unreasonable  not  as  creating  a  condition  subsequent.  ' 

to  conclude  that  the  parties  did  not  intend  i  Georgia  So.  R.  Co.  v.  Keeves,  64  Ga. 

that,  while  the  land  was  in  n.^e  as  a  place  492.     See  Countryman    v.  Deck,  13  Abb. 

of   burial,   and   while  it   was  filled   with  N.  C.  110. 

'•raves  and  monuments,  it  should  revert  to  ^  E„,,rson   v.   Simpson,  43   N.   II.  4/^,, 

the  grautor  upon  the  failure  of  the  grantee  82  Am.  Dec.  168 ;  I'age  v.  Palmer,  48  N. 

to  maintain    a  fence.     The  description  of  II.  38.^>. 

637 


§  G48.J  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

A  railway  company  made  a  deed  })oll  of  land  lying  along  its 
riiTJit  of  way,  '"  subject  to  the  condition  that  the  said  grantee,  his 
heirs  and  assigns,  shall  make  and  maintain  good  and  sufficient 
fences  on  each  side  of  the  right  of  way  of  the  railway  as  now 
loi-atcd,  .  .  .  which  condition  and  obligation  shall  be  perpetually 
bindin<T  on  the  owners  of  the  land."  It  was  held  that  the  under- 
taking to  perform  the  condition  ran  with  the  land,  and  bound 
subsequent  purchasers  from  the  grantor  so  long  as  they  remained 
tlie  owners,  but  that  the  railroad  company  would  not  have  any 
right  of  action  against  its  grantee  for  a  non-perfornuince  of  the 
condition  after  he  had  conveyed  the  land  in  fee  to  others. ^  The 
court  said :  "  The  meaning  of  the  condition,  we  think,  was  to 
phice  upon  the  grantee  an  obligation  to  make  and  maintain  the 
fences  only  during  the  time  he  was  the  owner  of  the  land.  At 
his  death  his  heirs,  upon  succeeding  to  the  ownership,  would 
be  held  to  make  and  maintain  the  fences  while  their  ownership 
lasted.  If  he  or  liis  heirs  or  devisees  should  sell  the  land,  the 
assignees  would  likewise  be  held  while  they  continued  to  be 
owners,  the  obligation  thus  running  with  the  land.  Manifestly, 
it  was  not  the  giantee's  intention  to  assume  an  obligation  in per- 
pefuam,  and  after  having  sold  and  conveyed  the  premises  in  fee, 
to  remain  bound  for  life,  and  his  heirs  to  be  bound  after  liis 
death,  to  build  and  keep  up  the  fences  between  the  right  of  way 
and  the  land  sold  ;  and  in  getting  at  the  intention  of  the  railway 
company  the  obvious  inference  would  be  that  the  company  would 
naturally  provide  for  a  recourse  to  tliose  who  might  own  the  land 
at  the  time  the  fences  needed  repairing  or  rebuilding,  rather  than 
to  its  grantee  and  his  heirs,  who  might  perhaps  at  the  time  be 
dead,  or  unable  to  be  found.  We  cannot  but  conclude  that  the 
company  intended,  when  the  land  was  conveyed,  to  trust  to  the 
laiid  and  its  own(M's  for  a  performance  of  tlie  condition  contained 
in  the  de(>d,  and  not  to  its  grantee  after  he  had  ceased  to  be  the 
owner.  The  fact  that  the  companj^  imposed  the  condition  that 
the  grantee  and  "  liis  assigns '  should  make  and  maintain  the 
fences,  and  added  thereto  that  the  condition  or  obligation  should 
be  jserpetually  binding  on  'the  owners  of  the  land,'  would  indi- 
cate an  intention  to  make  ownei-shii)  the  test  as  to  who  should  be 
bound  to  perform  the  condition  in  the  deed." 

1  Hickey  r.  Lake  Shore,  &c.  Ry,  Co.  (Ohio)  36  N.  E.  Rep.  672. 
538 


NOT    IMPLIED    FROM    THE    PURPOSE   OF   THE   GRANT,       [§  649. 


IV.   JVot  implied  from  the  Purpose  of  the  Grant. 

649.  A  declaration  of  the  purpose  for  which  a  conveyance 
is  made,  or  for  which  the  granted  land  is  to  be  used,  does  not 
render  the  grant  conditional.  Thus,  a  grant  of  land  "  for  a 
burying-place  forever  ''  will  not  be  construed  as  a  grant  on  a  con- 
dition subsequent,  where  there  are  no  other  words  indicating  an 
intent  that  the  grant  shall  be  void  if  the  declared  purpose  is  not 
fulfilled.!  As  said  in  the  Duke  of  Norfolk's  Case,  words  eo  inten- 
tione  do  not  make  a  condition,  but  a  confidence  and  trust.^  As 
creating  a  trust  or  covenant  they  may,  if  properly  expressed,  be 

enjoved  ;  in  such  case,  if  the  service  be  not 
performed,  or  the  enjoyment  of  the  right 
or  ]irivilege  be  withheld  which  formed  the 
consideration  of  a  grant,  the  grantor  will 
be  relieved  from  the  further  exccuiion  of 
the  grant,  to  wit,  the  payment  of  the 
annuity.  Shep.  Touch.  124;  Cowper  w. 
Andrews,  Hob.  41  ;  Co.  Litt.  204  a.  But 
ordinarily  the  failure  of  the  consideration 
of  a  grant  of  land,  or  tlie  non-fulfilment 
of  the  purpose  for  which  a  conveyance  by 
deed  is  made,  will  not  of  itself  defeat  an 
estate.  The  reason  for  this  distiuciiou 
between  the  two  classes  of  cases  is,  as 
stated  by  Coke, '  that  the  state  of  the  laud 
is  executed  and  the  annuity  executory.' 
Co.  Litt.  204  a.  .  .  .  We  believe  there  is 
no  authoritative  sanction  for  the  doctrine 
that  a  deed  is  to  be  construed  a  grant  on 
a  condition  subsequent,  solely  for  the  rea- 
son that  it  contains  a  clause  declaring  the 
purpo>e  for  which  it  is  intended  the  granted 
premises  sliall  be  used,  where  .'(ucli  jiur- 
])ose  will  not  inure  specially  to  liie  benifit 
of  the  grantor  and  his  assigns,  but  is  in 
its  nature  for  the  general  pul.lic,  and  where 
there  are  no  other  words  indicating  au 
intent  that  tlie  grant  is  to  be  void  if  the 
declared  purpo.'^e  is  not  fulfilled." 

Contrary  to  the  rule,  and  not  good  law 
now,  see  ihint  v.  Beeson,  18  Ind.  380; 
Indianapolis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hood,  66  Ind. 
580;  Cleveland,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  i-.  Coburn, 
91  Ind.  5.57  ;  Horner  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
r.  Uy.  Co.  38  Wis.  165. 

•i  Dyer,  138  6. 

639 


1  Rawson  v.  School  Dist.  7  Allen,  125, 
83  Am.  Dec.  670.  And  see  Stearns  v. 
Palmer,  10  Met.  32;  Bigelow  v.  Barr,  4 
Ohio,  358 ;  Watierson  v.  Ury,  5  Ohio  C. 
C.  347  ;  ]\Ii'thodist  Prot.  Ch.  v.  Laws,  7 
Ohio  C.  C.  211;  Brown  i'  Caldwell,  23  W. 
Va.  187,  48  Am.  Rep.  376  ;  Noyes  ?;.  St. 
Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.'(Ill.)  21  N.  E.  Rep.  487  ; 
Portland  v.  Terwilliger,  16  Oreg.  465,  19 
Pac.  Rep.  90;  Scoville  v.  McMahon,  62 
Conn.  378,  26  Atl.  Rep.  479  ;  Coffin  v. 
Portland,  16  Oreg.  77;  Kirk  v.  King,  3 
Pa.  St.  436 ;  Scheetz  v.  Fitzwater,  5  Pa. 
St.  126;  First  M.  E.  Church  v.  Old  Co- 
lumbia Public  Ground  Co.  103  Pa.  St. 
609  ;  Cook  v.  Trimble,  9  WaUs,  15  ;  Union 
Canal  Co.  f.  Young,  1  Whart.4l0;  Perry 
i-.  Scott,  51  Pa.  St.  119  ;  Lyon  v.  Hersey, 
103  N.  Y.  264  ;  Olcott  v.  Gabert,  86  Tex. 
121,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  985  ;  Miller  v.  Tunica 
Co.  67  Miss.  651,  7  So.  Rep.  429. 

In  Rawson  v.  School  District,  7  Al- 
len, 125,  83  Am.  Dec.  670,  Chief  Jus- 
tice Bigelow  said :  "  It  is  sometimes 
saiil  that  the  words  causa  and  pro,  when 
used  in  deeds,  create  a  condition  ;  that 
is,  where  a  deed  is  made  in  express 
terms  for  a  specific  purpose,  or  in  con- 
sideration of  an  act  to  be  done  or  ser- 
vice rendered,  it  will  be  interpreted  as 
creating  a  conditional  estate.  But  this  is 
an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  and  is 
confiued  to  cases  where  the  subject-matter 
of  the  grant  is  in  its  nature  executory, 
as  of  an  annuity  to  be  paid  for  service  to 
be  rendered  or  a  right  or  ])rivili'ge  to  be 


§  650.]  CONDITIONS    PRKCEDKNT    AND    SUBSKQUKNT. 

enforced,  but  not  as  creating  a  condition.  Tims,  the  words  ex- 
pressing the  purpose  of  a  grant  to  be  "  for  a  burying-j)]ace  for- 
ever" may  be  sufficient  to  raise  a  trust  for  that  purpose,  but  they 
are  too  equivocal  to  create  a  condition  subsequent.  Such  a  condi- 
tion will  not  be  raised  by  infei'ence  or  implication  merely. ^ 

A  deed  of  land  to  be  used  for  certain  purposes  only,  which  also 
provides  that,  if  it  is  used  for  other  purposes,  a  stipulated  sum 
shall  be  paid  the  grantor  in  addition  to  the  original  (;onsideration, 
creates  a  condition  which  is  discharged  by  ])ayment  or  tender  of 
such  sum.- 

Minuteness  of  direction  concerning  the  administration  of  prop- 
erty conveyed  to  a  public  use  is  insufficient  to  take  the  case  out 
of  the  rule,  that  the  mere  expression  of  a  purpose  or  particular 
use  to  which  property  is  to  be  appropriated  will  not  make  the 
estate  a  conditional  one.^ 

650.  Especially  if  the  purpose  for  which  the  property  is  to 
be  used  is  in  its  nature  public  and  general,  no  condition  will 
be  implied,  and  possibly  not  even  raised,  by  the  use  of  words  of 
condition,  if  the  language  of  the  deed  does  not  indicate  an  intent 
that  the  grant  is  to  be  void  if  the  declared  purpose  is  not  fulfilled, 
but  rather  indicates  a  trust  to  be  enforced.'*     Thus,  a  conveyance 

1  Eawson  v.  School  Dist.  7  Allen,  125,  Ind.  559, 10  N.  E.  Rep.  578  ;  Wilkes  Barre 
83  Am.  Dec.  670 ;  Packard  v.  Ames,  16  v.  Wyoming  Hist.  Soc.  134  Pa.  St.  616, 
Gray,  327;  Wilkes  Barre  v.  Wyoming  19  Atl.  Rep.  809;  Greene  v.  O'Connor 
Hist.  Soc.  134  Pa.  St.  616,  19  Atl.  Rep.  (R.  I.),  25  Atl.  Rep.  692;  Methodist  Pro- 
809  ;  Bigelow  v.  Barr,  4  Ohio,  358;  Kil-  testant  Church  v.  Laws,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  211  ; 
Patrick  v.  Mayor  (Md.),  31  Atl.  Rep.  805  ;  Watterson  v.  Ury,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  355. 
Neely  v.  Hoskins,  84  Me.  386,  24  Atl.  A  grant  of  land  to  a  counti/,  upon  the 
Rep.  882.  sole   consideration    that  the   county  seat 

2  Board  of  Education    v.  Trustees,   63  had  been   establislied  in  the    town  where 
111.  204.  the  land  was  situated,  does   not  create  a 

^  Board   of  Com'rs  v.  Young,  59  Fed.  condition  upon  which  the  land  will  revert 

Rep.  96,  105,  per  Lurton,  J.  to  the  grantor  upon   a  removal    of    the 

*  Sohier  1-.  Trinity  Churcli,   109  Mass.  county  seat.     Sumner  y.  Darnell,  128  Ind. 

1;  Episcopal  City  Mission  v.   Ajjpleton,  38,27  N.  E.  Rep.    162;  Adams  y.  Logan 

117  Mass.  326;   Rawson  u.  School  Dist.  7  Co.   II   111.  336;  Harris  /•.  Shaw,  13  111. 

Allen,    125,    83   Am.  Dec.   670;  Ayer  c  456;  Kerlin  r.  Campbell,  15  Pa.  Sf.  500  ; 

Emery,  14  Allen,  70;  Field  v.  Providence,  Gadberry  v.  Shejjpard,  27  Mi.ss.  203  ;  Mil- 

17  R.  I.  803,  24  Atl.  Rep.  143  ;   Coffin   v.  ler  v.  Tunica  Co.  67  Miss.  651,  7  So.  Rep. 

Portland,  16  Oreg.  77,  17  Pac.  Rep.  580;  429;    Warren    Co.    r.    Patterson,    56  III. 

Horner  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.   Co.  HI  ;   Poitevent  v.  Hancock  Co.  58  Miss. 

38  Wis.   165,  175;  Higbee   v.   Rodeman,  810;  Gilmore  y.  Hayworth,  26  Tex.  89. 
120  Ind.  244,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  442;   School         A  r/rant  for  a  school,  college,  or  a  like  in- 

Township  v.  School  Town  of  Macy,  109  stitution,  and  for  no  other  purpose,  does 

540 


NOT  IMPLIED  FROM  THE  PURPOSE  OF  THE  GRANT.   [§  650. 

of  land  for  a  valuable  consideration,  in  trust  for  the  use  of  the 
inhabitants  of  a  county,  to  accommodate  the  public  service  of  the 
county,  was  held  not  to  be  defeated  on  a  sale  and  conveyance  by 

not  create  a  condition.     Kirk  j;.  King,  3  to  pay  off  a  mortgage  ou  a  lot  thereafter 

Pa.   St.    436;   Raley  v.   Umatilla  Co.   15  acquired    for    a    church    edifice.     //;    re 

Oreg.  172,  13  Pac.  Rep.  890;   Heaston  i'.  United   Presb.    Ch.    (Pa.)    30   Atl.   Rep. 

Randolph    Co.    20    Ind.    398;    Higbee   v.  1012. 

Rodeman,  129  lud.  244,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  Where  a  devise  was  made  to  a  religious 

442 ;  Curtis  v.  Topeka,  43  Kans.  138,  23  society,  "  to  be  and  to  remain  to  the  use 

Pac.  Ri'p.  98;  Wilkes  Barre  c.  Wyoming  and  benefit  of  said  society  and  their  suc- 

Hist.  Soc.  134  Pa.  St  616,  19  Atl.  Rep.  cessors  forever,  .  .  .  provided   that   said 

809  26  W.  N.  C.  247  ;  Newbold  v.  Glenn,  real  estate  be  not  ever  hereafter  sold  or 

67  Md.  489,  1 0  Atl.  Rep.  242  ;  Lawe  v.  disposed  of,  but  the  same  may  be  leased 

Hyde,  39  Wis.  345  ;  Taylor  v.  Binford,  37  or  let,  and  the  annual  rents  or  profits  ap- 

Ohio  St.  262 ;  Chapin  v.  School  Dist.  35  plied  to  the  use  and   benefit  of  the  so- 

N.  H.  445  ;  Barker  v.  Barrows,  138  Mass.  ciety,"  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the 

578.    In  Newpoint  Lodge  v.  Newpoint,  138  estate  was  not  a  conditional  oue,  and  that 

Ind.  141,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  650,  it  was  held  the  supposed   conditions  were   to   be  re- 

that  a  deed  which  "conveys  nnd  warrants"  garded  as  mere   "limitations   in  trust." 

a  parcel  of  land  to  a  town  "  for  the  use  of  Stanley  v.  Colt,  5  Wall.  119. 

the  common  schools  "  passes  the  fee  free  6'o  a  grant  of  land  for  a  public  square,  or 

from  condition.  other  public  purpose,  without  an  express 

A  //rant  of  land  for  relif/ious  purposes,  or  condition.     Thornton    v.    Trammell,    39 

church  purposes  only,  does  not  create  a  Ga.  202  ;  Wilkes  Barre  v.  Wyoming  Soc. 

condition.     Taylor  v.  Binford,  37  Ohio  St.  134  Pa.  St.  616  ;  Scantlin  v.   Garvin,  46 

262;   Packard  v.  Ames,    16   Gray,  327;  Ind.  262  ;  Warren  i-.  Lyons  City,  22  Iowa, 

Carter  v.  Branson,   79  Ind.  14  ;  Cook  v.  351  ;  Wellington  v.  Wellington,  46  Kans. 

Leggett,   88   Ind.    211;    Schipper  v.   St.  213,  26  Pac.  Rep.  415;    Flaten  i-.  Moor- 

Pakis,  .37  Ind.  505  ;  Baldwin  v.  Atwood,  head,  51    Minn.  518,  .53  N.  W.  Rep.  807, 

23  Conn.  367  ;  Erwin  r.  Kurd,   13   Abb.  where  the  provision  was  enforced   as  a 

N.  C.   91  ;    Farnhnm    v.    Thompson,  34  restriction.     A  grant   of  land   to   a  city 

Minn.  330,  26  N.  W.  Rep.  9,  57  Am.  Rep.  "  as  and  for  a  street,  to  be  kept  as  a  pub- 

59  ;  Cushman  v.  Church,  14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  lie  highway,"  does  not  create  a  condition 

26  ;  Griffitts  v.  Cope,  17  Pa.  St.  96  ;  Bren-  subsequent  so  as  to  work  a  forfeiture  in 

dle'i;.  German  Ref.  Cong.  33  Pa.  St.  415  ;  case  the  property  is  not  maintained  as  a 

Strong  r.  Doty,  32  Wis  381.  public  street.    Kilpatiirk  v.  Mayor  (Md.). 

A  deed  to  the  bishop  of  a  Roman  Cath-  31  Atl,  Rep.  805. 

olic  church  for  the  benefit  of  the  church  So  a  r,raut  for  a  railroad  depot  or  sta- 

vests  the  complete  le-al  title  in  the  bishop,  tion,  or  other  specified  purpo.'.e  of  the  road. 

and  thelandisnot  forfeited  to  the  grantor  Noyes  v.  St.  Louis,  &c.   R.  Co.  (HI.)  21 

bv  failure  to  occupv  and  use   it  for  the  N.   E.   Rep.  487 ;  Morrill  r.  Wabash.  &c. 

church.      Gabert    ;.    Olcott    (Tex.    Civ.  Ry.  Co.  96   Mo.  174,  9  S.  W.  Hop.  6.57  ; 

App.),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  286  ;  Olcott  v.  Ga-  Kenney  v.  Wallace.  24  Hun,  ^7H  ;  Thorn- 

bert  86  Tex   121,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  985.  ton  v.  Trammell,  39  Ga.  202. 

A  deed  to  the  tmstces  of  a  church  "  in  7'Ar  followiun  rases  to  the  routrarj,  not 

trust  for  said  church,  and  for  the  s.^le  use  considered  sound  law :  Horner  r.  Chicago, 

and  behoof  of  the  congregation  "  organ-  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  38  Wi...  16.5 ;  Cleve- 

ized  to  build  thereon  and  worship  in  said  land,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Coburn.  91  Ind.  .557  ; 

building,  gives  the   grantor  no  right  to  Indianapolis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hood.  66  Ind. 

obiect  to  a  sale  of  the  lot  by  the  church  580. 

541 


§  G51.]  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

the  veiulees,  wliereb}'  the  use  for  the  public  service  ceased. ^  And 
so  where  a  conveyauce  was  made  to  a  county  in  fee  simple,  for 
the  purpose  of  erecting  thereon  a  court-house,  jail,  and  county 
otlices,  and  the  county  was  subsequent!}'  divided,  the  seat  of 
justice  moved  therefrom,  the  land  sold  and  used  for  other  pur- 
poses, and  the  proceeds  thereof  divided  between  the  two  coun- 
ties, it  was  held  that  the  title  did  not  revert  to  the  heirs  of  the 
original  owners.'-^  A  deed  of  land  for  the  sole  use  ot"  a  water 
company  as  a  reservoir  passes  a  title  in  fee  simple,  not  deter- 
minable on  the  cessation  of  the  use  of  the  land  for  that  ])urpose. 
Chief  Justice  Mercur  said  :  "  No  restraint  was  imposed  on  an 
alienation  of  the  land.  .  .  ,  No  clause  provided  for  a  forfeiture  or 
termination  of  the  estate  in  case  the  land  ceased  to  be  used  as  a 
reservoir.  No  right  of  reentry  was  reserved  by  the  grantor  on  any 
contingenc}'.  No  technical  word  to  create  a  condition  was  used. 
No  other  words  were  used  equivalent  thereto,  or  })roper  to  create 
a  condition.  The  authorities  show  tliat  the  recital  of  the  consid- 
eration, and  a  statement  of  the  purpose  for  which  the  land  is  to 
be  used,  are  wholl}'  insufficient  to  create  a  conditional  estate."  ^ 

651.  When  the  purpose  is  public  and  general,  and  does  not 
inure  specially  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantor,  no  condition  is 
created,  though  such  in  form,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  reser- 
vation of  a  right  to  reenter  on  a  failure  of  the  grantee  to  use  the 
land  in  the  manner  provided.  Thus,  where  land  was  conveyed  to 
a  city  "  on  condition  that  it  shall  be  forever  kept  open  and  used 
as  a  public  highway,  and  for  no  other  purpose,"  it  was  held  that 
this  clause  merely  declared  the  purpose  of  the  conveyance,  and 
was  not  a  condition  subsequent.  "  Such  a  declaration,"  say  the 
court,*  "  does  not  create  an  estate  on  condition,  but  merely  im- 
poses a  confidence  or  trust  on  the  land,  or  raises  an  implied  agree- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  grantee  to  use  the  land  for  the  purpose 
specified.  It  matters  not  that  the  statement  of  the  purpose  for 
which  the  land  was  conveyed  is  in  the  form  of  a  condition.  The 
employment  of  apt  words  to  create  a  condition  does  not  neces- 
sarily and  invariabl}'  have  that   effect,  for   these   may  give  way 

1  Kerlin  v.  Campbell,  15  Pa.  St.  500.  «  First  Methodist  Church  v.  Old   Co- 

2  Seebold   v.  Shitler,  34   Pa.   St.    133.     lumbia   Public    Ground  Co.   103  Pa.  St. 
The  Pennsylvania  court  has  alwaj-s  ad-     608,  614. 

hered  to  the   rule  that  "the  mere  expres-         *  (ircene  v.  O'Connor,    18   K.  I.  49,  25 
BJon  of  a  purpose  will  not,  of  and  by  itself,     Atl.  Hep.  t)'.)2. 
debase  a  fee." 

542 


NOT  IMPLIED  FROM  THE  PURPOSE  OF  THE  GRANT. 


[§  662. 


to  the  intent  of  the  party  us  ascertained  by  a  construction  of  the 
instrument."' 

652.  When  any  conditions  annexed  to  a  grant  or  convey- 
ance of  lands  are  merely  nominal,  and  evince  no  intention  of 
actual  or  substantial  benefit  to  the  party  to  whom  or  in  whose 
favor  they  are  to  be  perfnrmed,  they  may  be  wholly  disregarded, 
and  a  failure  to  perform  tlie  same  shall  in  no  case  operate  as  a 
forfeiture  of  the  lands  conveyed  subject  thereto.  Such  is  the  law 
declared  by  statute  in  Michigan  ^  and  Minnesota.'^ 

A  conveyance  was  made  i>f  a  parcel  of  land  with  a  church  edi- 
fice thereon,  for  a  consideration  not  extremely  inadequate  under 
the  circumstances  for  the  interest  actually  conveyed,  "  upon  the 
condition  that  the  property  shall  be  forever  held  for  the  use  of 
the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  in  Old  Town."  The  clmrch  after 
a  time  abandoned  the  property  and  allowed  it  to  fall  into  decay. 


1  Howells'  Annot.  Stats.  1882,  §  5562; 
Bariie  v.  Smith,  47  Mich.  130,  10  N.  W. 
Rep.  168. 

2  G.  S.  1878,  ch.  45,  §  46  ;  G.  S.  1891, 
§3956;  G.  S.  1894,  §  4407.  See  Sioux 
City  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Singer,  49  Minn. 
301,  51  _N.  W.  Rep.  905.  This  statute 
was  interpreted  by  the  court,  Dickinson, 
.7.,  saying  :  ''It  may  be  apparent,  from 
the  very  nature  of  the  condition,  that  it 
was  not  intended  to  confer  or  reserve  any 
real  benefit  to  the  grantor  or  to  any  other 
person.  Such,  for  instance,  would  be  a 
condition,  annexed  to  the  granting  of  a 
fee,  that  the  grantee  should  yearly  deliver 
an  ear  of  corn  to  the  grantor,  or  render 
any  specified  but  unsubstantial  service. 
To  such  a  case  the  statute  would  apply. 
Again,  a  condition  may  be  such  that 
proof  beyond  the  deed  itself  would  be 
necessary  to  disclose  the  fact  whether  the 
expressed  condition  was  or  was  not  sub- 
stantially beneficial.  We  will  suppose 
that  the  owner  of  a  lot  conveys  it  witli 
the  express  condition  that  no  building 
shall  be  erected  on  it  for  a  period  of  ten 

.  lyears.  It  cannot  be  said  from  its  terms 
that  this  condition  was  not  reasonably  in- 
tended to  be,  or  that  it  was  not,  actually 
beneficial  to  the  grantor.  To  such  a  case, 
no  more  being  shown,  the  statute  is  not 


applicable.  The  court  cannot  declare  the 
condition  to  be  "  merely  nominal,"  atid 
to  "  evince  no  intention  of  actual  or  sub- 
stantial benefit."  It  requires  that  the 
court  be  further  informed  as  to  facts  not 
disclosed  by  the  deed  before  it  can  declare 
the  condition,  to  which  the  parties  have 
solemnly  agreed,  to  be  of  no  legal  effect. 
If  the  grantor  should  be  found  to  own 
adjoining  lands,  which  were  so  improved 
that  the  erection  of  a  building  upon  the 
granted  lot  would  seriously  impair  their 
value  and  usefulness,  the  condition  would, 
without  doubt,  be  valid.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  grantee,  to  def.'at  the  condition, 
might  show  that  the  grantor  had  no  actual 
or  pro.-pective  interest  in  the  adjoining 
premises,  was  in  no  manner  concerned  in 
them  or  in  their  use,  and  tliat  tliey  were 
unimproved."  He  might  thus  show  him- 
self entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  statute, 
if,  indeed,  the  statute  confers  any  benefit 
bevond  what  the  common  law  would  give." 
The  ca.se  holds  that  a  condition  that 
intoxicating  liquor  shall  not  be  mjWI  on 
the  granted  land  cannot  be  declared  to  be 
"  merely  nominal  "  in  the  ab.sence  of  any 
proof  that  the  ])laintiff  had  no  special  in- 
terest in  the  observance  of  the  condition. 
The  court  di<sent  from  the  case  of  Barrie 
1-.  Sniiih.  47  Mich.  130,  10  N.  W.  Kep.  168. 
643 


§  Go3.]  CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

It  was  held  that  the  conveyance  was  not  upon  a  condition  that 
conld  be  the  foundation  for  a  forfeiture  to  the  grantor  or  his  heirs, 
but  merely  created  a  trust  for  the  benefit  of  the  church  and  en- 
forceable in  equity  only  in  its  behalf.^ 

l)ut  where  a  deed,  after  conveying  a  tract  of  land,  described 
a  narrow  strip  of  land  which  was  also  conveyed,  "  for  a  road  to 
jind  from  said  premises  first  above  described,"  the  question  was 
whether,  in  view  of  this  clause,  the  deed  conveyed  an  absohite 
fee,  a  conditional  fee,  or  a  mere  easement,  in  the  strip  of  land 
described.  This  had  to  be  determined  from  the  language  of  the 
deed  itself,  unaided  by  anything  else.  The  deed  in  terms  con- 
veyed, not  an  easement  in  the  land,  but  the  land  itself,  with 
an  attempted  restriction  upon  its  use,  if  it  be  considered  such, 
which  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  passing  of  the  fee.  There 
was  nothing  in  the  deed  reserving  to  the  grantor  any  use  of,  or 
dominion  over,  the  land  ;  and  the  court  held  that  these  words  of 
themselves  were  not  sufficient  either  to  limit  the  grant  of  the 
second  tract  to  an  easement,  or  to  create  a  condition  subsequent.^ 

653.  The  limitation  of  the  use  of  the  property  may  indi- 
cate an  easement  rather  than  a  condition.  Thus  a  conveyance 
to  a  plank-road  company,  "  for  the  use  of  a  plank  road,"  was  held 
to  create  an  easement,  and  the  principal  reasons  assigned  for  so 
holding  were  that  the  land  conveyed  was  a  strip  through  the 
grantor's  entire  farm  ;  that  the  grantee  was  already  in  occupation 
of  the  premises  ;  that  the  only  possible  use  to  which  it  could 
put  the  premises  was  for  its  road  ;  and  that  the  consideration 
expressed  in  tiie  deed  was  grossly  inadequate  for  a  grant  in  fee.'^ 

An  easement  was  clearly  created  where  the  conveyance  ex- 
pressly declared,  not  only  that  the  land  was  deeded  for  use  as  an 
alley,  but  also  that  the  grant  should  be  null  and  void  whenever 
the  premises  ceased  to  be  kept  for  this  purpose.'* 

An  easement  is  created  by  a  conveyance  of  a  right  of  way  to  a 
railroad  company  for  a  nominal  consideration,  althougli  the  grant 
is  expressed  to  be  upon  condition  that  the  land  shall  be  used  for 
railroad  purposes  only,  and  that  if  it  shall  cease  to  be  used  for  such 
purposes  it  shall  revert  to  the  grantor.-^ 

1  Neely  i'.  HoskinB,  84  Me.  386,  24  8  Robinson  v.  Missisquoi  R.  Co.  59  Vt. 
Atl.  Rep.  882.  426,  10  Atl.  Rep.  .522. 

2  Soukup  V.  Topka,  54  Minn.  66,  55  4  Sanborn  v.  Minneapolis,  .35  Minn. 
N.  W.  Rep.  824.  314,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  126. 

544  B  Lake  Erie   &  VV.  R.  Co.   v.  Zicbarth 


NOT   IMPLIED   FROM   THE   PURPOSE   OF   THE   GRANT.       [§§  654,  655. 

Words  describing  the  purpose  for  which  a  conveyance  is  made 
are  frequently  limitations  upon  the  use  that  is  to  be  made  of  the 
property,  and  not  conditions  upon  which  it  is  to  be  held,  unless 
there  are  apt  words  of  condition  or  an  express  provision  for  a 
reverter.^ 

A  provision  in  a  deed,  expressed  as  a  condition,  that  the 
grantee  and  his  heirs  shall  allow  the  grantor  and  his  heirs  free 
access  with  teams  to  and  from  the  waters  of  Hempsteud  harbor 
by  the  road  now  and  heretofore  used  through  his  land,  does  not 
constitute  a  condition  subsequent,  but  annexes  the  right  of  way 
as  an  easement  to  the  land  of  the  grantor,  and  is  an  exception 
or  reservation  in  his  favor.^ 

Where  one,  for  a  nominal  consideration,  conveyed  land  to  a 
city  "  to  be  forever  held  and  used  as  a  public  park,"  it  was  held 
that  the  city  acquired  a  qualified  and  not  an  absolute  fee  in  the 
land,  and  could  be  restrained  from  using  the  land  for  any  other 
purpose.'^ 

654.  A  different  rule  applies  as  to  devises  for  purposes 
declared,  for  it  is  held  that  the  testator's  words  expressing  his 
intention  in  making  the  devise,  or  the  purpose  for  which  he  makes 
it,  may  create  a  conditional  estate.  The  same  words  used  by  a 
grantor  in  a  deed  would  not  make  a  condition  unless  the  grant 
is  purely  voluntary,  and  there  is  no  other  consideration  mqving 
the  grantor  or  donor  besides  the  purpose  for  which  the  estate  is 
declared  to  be  created.* 

655.  If  the  declared  purpose  of  a  conveyance  be  such  that 
it  will  inure  specially  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantor,  the  grant 

(Ind.),  33  N.  E.    Rep.  256,   C  lud.  App.  said  :  "  While  we  do  not  decide  whether 

228.     See,  also,  Injralls  v.  Byers,  04   Ind.  this  conveyed  a  conditional   fee  or  a  mere 

134;  Douglass  ;■.  Thomas,  103  Ind.  187;  easement,  the  controlling  considerations, 

Nichols  V.  N.  E.  Furniture  Co.  100  Mich,  aside   from   the    lanf;;uHf:e   of   the   deed, 

230,  .59  N.  VV.  Rep.  15.');  Soukupy.  Topka,  which  led   us  to   hold  that  it  did  not  con- 

54  Minn.  66,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  824  ;   Robin-  vey  an  absolute  fee,  were  tiint  the  firantce 

son  V.  Missisqiioi  R.  Co.  59  Vt.  426,  10  was    a   municipal    corporation,  atid    the 

Atl.  Rep.  522.  consideration  named    in    the  deed  merely 

'  Curtis  r.   Toi)eka,    43   Kans.  138,  23  nominal." 

Par.  Rep.  98.  ■*   Diikf  of  Norfolk's  Case,  Dyer,  138/).- 

2  Baker  ?;.  Mott,  78  Hun,  141,  28  N.  Y.  Tortinfrton's  Case,    10   Coke,  42m,-   Raw- 

Supp.  968.  son  v.  School  District,  7  Allen,  125,  128, 

8  Flateni).  Moorhead,  51  Minn.  518,  53  83  Am.   Dec.  670;   l.abcree  v.  Carleton, 

N.  W.   Rep.  807.     In  Soukup  v.  Topka.  53  Me.  211  ;  Bray  r.  Ilusscy,  83  Me.  329, 

54    Minn.  66,    69,  55    N.  W.  Rep.    824,  22  Atl.  Rep.  220,  per  Haskell,  J. 
Mitchell,  J.,  commenting  upon   this  case, 

VOL.  I.  545 


§  656.]  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

may  be  void  if  tho  declared  purpose  is  not  fulfilled.  Thus,  where 
a  strip  of  land  adjoining  the  county  jail  was  conveyed  to  a  county 
in  fee,  to  and  for  the  uses  and  purposes  following,  to  be  and 
remain  forever  unbuilt  upon,  in  order  to  prevent  the  escape  of 
prisoners,  the  grantor  reserved  to  himself  "  the  free  use  ot"  the 
premises  so  granted  for  an  open  yard,  garden,  or  grass  plot,  with 
the  rents,  issues,  and  profits."  The  object  was  to  secure  an  open 
space  adjoining  the  prison  walls.  This  object  was  nccomplished  by 
a  conveyance  which,  though  it  vested  the  fee,  yet  was  so  specific  in 
defining  the  purpose  for  which  the  fee  was  conveyed,  and  so  clear 
in  reserving  to  the  grantor  the  use  of  the  premises  subject  to  the 
space  being  kept  open,  that  although  the  deed  contained  no  ex- 
press clause  of  reentry  upon  abandonment  by  the  grantee,  yet  it 
was  clear  that  the  fee  was  a  base  or  determinable  one.  It  was 
accordingly  held  that  the  estate  was  determined  on  the  removal 
of  the  prison  to  another  site  and  the  sale  of  the  land,  so  that  it 
ceased  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  a  county  jail.^ 

656.  But  if  the  purpose  for  which  a  conveyance  is  made, 
or  the  land  conveyed  is  to  be  used,  is  declared  in  the  form  of 
an  express  condition,  especially  if  a  provision  for  a  reverter  in 
case  it  is  not  so  used  is  added,  the  property  will  revert  upon  breach 
of    the  condition,  as  where  the  proviso  was  that  a  schoolhouse 

1  Sle^el  V.  Heibine  (Pa.),  23  Atl.  Rep.  inure  specially  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantor 
99t),  stated  and  approved  by  Lurton,  J.,  in  and  his  assigns,  but  is  in  its  nature  gen- 
Board  of  Com'rs  v.  Young,  .59  Fed.  Rep.  eral  and  public,  and  where  there  are  no 
96,  10-2,  the  learned  justice  saying:  "The  other  words  indicating  an  intent  that  the 
case  is  authority  only  for  the  proposition  grant  is  to  be  void  if  the  declared  ])urpose 
that  technical  words   importing  an  estate  is  not  fulfilled." 

determinable  upon  a  condition  subsequent  To  like  effect  is  Olcott  v.  Gabert,  86 
are  not  always  essential,  if  the  clear  intent  Tex.  121, 12.5,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  985.  Gaines, 
of  the  parties  is  shown  by  the  whole  scope  J.,  delivering  the  opinion,  said  :  "  When 
of  tlie  instrument  to  be  that  the  estate  the  declared  purpose  for  which  the  prop- 
shall  determine  upon  the  cessation  of  the  erfy  shall  be  used  is  a  matter  that  will 
use  <k'fined."  He  also  quotes  Chief  Justice  inure  to  the  special  benefit  of  the  grantor, 
Bigelow,  in  Rawson  v.  School  District,  7  the  courts  are  more  inclined  to  trent  the 
Allen,  125,  83  Am.  Dec.  670,  who  said:  conveyance  as  conditional  than  when,  as 
'■  We  believe  there  is  no  authoritative  sane-  in  this  case,  the  use  is  for  the  benefit  of  a 
tion  for  the  doctrine  that  a  deed  is  to  be  special  class  of  persons,  or  of  the  public 
construed  as  a  grant  on  a  condition  sub-  at  large.  In  this  case  it  does  not  appear 
sequent  solely  for  the  reason  that  it  con-  that  the  maintenance  of  a  church  upon 
tains  a  clause  declaring  the  purpose  for  the  lots  was  a  matter  specially  advan- 
which  it  is  intended  the  granted  premises  tageous  to  the  railway  company,  who 
shall  be  used,  where  such  purpose  will  not  made  the  grant." 

546 


NOT   IMPLIED    FROM    THE   PURPOSE    OF   THE   GRANT.       [§  657. 

should  be  erected  upon  the  land  ;^  or  where  a  giant  was  made  to 
trustees  to  build  a  house  of  worship,  to  hold  as  long  as  they 
should  so  use  it  and  no- longer;  -  or  that  the  land  should  be  used  as 
a  site  for  a  court-house  ;  ^  or  that  the  grantee's  husband  should 
accept  the  conveyance  and  live  upon  the  land  conveyed,  making 
it  a  home  for  his  family  ;  *  or  that  a  railroad  station  should  be 
permanently  located  upon  the  land  ;  ^  or  that  the  land  should  be 
used  as  a  burial  ground  ;  ^  or  that  it  should  be  for  certain  speci- 
fied uses  of  a  religious  societ}^  and  for  no  other  use  whatever ;  ^ 
or  that  a  building  for  municipal  purposes  should  be  erected  within 
a  time  specified.^ 

657.  A  condition  to  abstain  from  doing  an  act  ^v^hich  is 
perfectly  proper  and  legal  in  itself  is  not  for  this  reason  in- 
valid. "  Indeed,  the  acts  against  which  conditions  are  aimed  are 
commonly  legal  acts,  the  performance  of  which  could  not  be  re- 
strained otherwise  than  by  some  form  of  contract ;  and  the  right 
to  stipulate  for  the  purpose  is  limited  only  by  considerations  of 
public  policy."  ^  The  grantor  may  restrict  the  use  of  the  land  as 
it  may  seem  to  be  for  his  advantage.  He  may  make  it  a  condi- 
tion that  the  land  shall  not  be  used  for  a  schoolhouse,  a  distil- 
lery, a  blast  furnace,  a  livery  stable,  a  machine-shop,  a  hospital, 
a  cemetery .^^  "  There  are  many  things  which  may  be  provitUd 
for  as  conditions  in  a  deed,  which,  though  of  small  consideration 
in  the  view  of  a  stranger,  may  be  thought  of  great  importance 
by  tlie  grantor."  ^^ 

A  condition  not  to  sell  or  permit  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  on  the  granted  premises  is  valid  though  the  sale  of  liijuor 

1  Hayden  v.  Stoughton,  5  Pick.  .528;  '^  Cleveland,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  ;;.  Cobuiii,  91 
Wood   V.   Cheshire   Co.   32   N.    H.  421 ;     Ind.  557. 

Mott  V.  Danville  Seminary,  129   Til.  403,  «  Reed  )■.  Stouffer,  56  Md.  236;  Scovill 

21  N.  E.  Rep.  927  ;  Rowe  v.  Minneapolis,  v.  McMahon,  G2  Conu.  378,  26  All.  Rep. 

49  Minn.  148,  51    N.  W.  Rep.  907;  Car-  479. 

penter  v.  Graher,  66   Tex.  465,    1   S.  W.  ''  Second  Universali.st    Soc.   v.  Dugan, 

Rep.   178;   Clarke  r.  Brookfield,  81   Mo.  05  Md.  460,  5  Atl.  Hep.  415. 

503,51  Am.  Rep.  243;   Pepin  Co.  r.  Prin-  "  Clarke  v.   Brookfield,  81    Mo.  503,  51 

die,  61  Wis.  301,  21  N.  W.  Rep.  254.  Am.  Rep.  243. 

2  Henderson  r.  Hunter,  59  Pa.  St.  335 ;  '•*  Smith  v.  Rarrie,  .56  Mich.  314,  56 
Spies  V.  Rome,  &c.  R.  Co.  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  Am.  Rep.  391,  per  Cooley,  C.  J. ;  Owsley 
348,  V.  Ow.slcy,  78  Ky.  257  ;  Spcrry  v.  Pond,  5 

8  Spies  V.   Rome,  &c.  R.  Co.  15  N.  Y.  Ohio.  387,  24  Am.  Dec.  296. 

Supp.  348.  "   I'lumb  V.  Tuhbs,  41   N.  Y.  442,  446; 

«  Odell  V.  Cannon,  79  Ga.  515,  4  S.  E.  Craig  v.  Wells,  11  N.  Y.  315. 

Uep_  558.  "  Gray  v.  Blanchard,  8  Pick.  284. 


47 


§  658.]  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 


is  tolerated  by  the  State ;  at  least  if  the  grantor  has  any  special 
and  substantial  interest  in  the  enforcement  of  the  condition.^ 

V.    Void  Conditions. 

658.  Conditions  in  conflict  with  public  policy,  or  inliibiting 
the  performance  of  acts  which  the  public  has  an  interest  in  hav- 
ing performed,  are  void.^ 

A  condition  in  a  conveyance  to  a  county,  city,  or  town,  that  a 
public  building  shall  be  erected  and  maintained  upon  the  land,  is 
not  contrary  to  public  policy.^  Such  a  condition  is  not  in  the 
nature  of  a  bribe  to  the  voters.  The  location  of  a  public  build- 
ing, such  as  a  court-house,  is  purely  one  of  convenience  and  ma- 
terial advantages,  and  does  not  tend  to  influence  the  courts  or 
officers  in  the  discharge  of  any  public  duty. 

Where  land  is  acquired  by  a  town  upon  the  express  condition 
that  it  shall  erect  a  building  upon  it  within  a  time  limited,  a  fail- 
ure to  fulfil  the  condition  is  not  excused  for  the  reason  that  the 
town  is  not  possessed  of  sufficient  means  with  which  to  build  the 
proposed  structure.^ 


3  Sioux  City  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Singer, 
49  Minn.  301,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  90.5 ;  Collins 
Miinuf.  Co.  V.  Marcy,  25  Conn.  242; 
Smith  V.  Barrie,  56  Mich.  314,  56  Am. 
Rep.  391  ;  Barrie  v.  Smith,  47  Mich.  130, 
10  N.  W.  Rep.  168;  Plumb  v.  Tubbs,  41 
N.  Y.  442;  Post  v.  Weil,  8  Hun,  418; 
Carbon  Block  Coal  Co.  v.  Murphy,  101 
Intl.  115;  O'Brien  v.  Wetherell,  14  Kans. 
616;  Cowell  i'.  Colorado  Springs  Co.  3 
Colo.  82,  100  U.  S.  55  ;  Jeffery  v.  Graham, 
61  Tex.  481. 

-  Patterson  v.  Donner,  48  Cal.  369, 
where  the  condition  was  that  the  grantee 
should  jirocure  two  witnesses  to  testify 
to  a  certain  state  of  facts ;  Wheeler  v. 
Moody,  9  Tex.  372.  where  the  condition 
was  for  the  support  of  a  state  religion, 
where  such  a  religion  had  become  illegal 
through  a  change  in  the  policy  of  the 
law. 

In  California  the  Code  provides  that,  if 
a  condition  precedent  requires  the  per- 
formance of  an  act  wrong  of  itself,  the 
instrument  containing  it  is  so  far  void 
and  the  right  cannot  exist.     If  it  requires 

548 


the  performance  of  an  act  not  wrong  of 
itself,  but  otherwise  unlawful,  the  instru- 
ment takes  effect  and  the  condition  is 
void.  Cal.  Civ.  Code,  §  709.  So  in  same 
terms  in  North  Dakota  and  South  Dakota  : 
Dak.  Comp.  Laws  1887,§  2714.  Georgia  : 
Code  1882,  §  2296,  is  to  like  effect.  Louis- 
iana:  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1889,  §  2031. 

3  Harris  v.  Shaw,  13  III.  456  ;  Adams 
V.  Logan  Co.  11  111.  336  ;  Dishon  r.  Smith, 
10  Iowa,  212;  Twiford  v.  Alaniakee  Co. 
4  Gr.  60  ;  Hall  v.  Marshall,  80  Ky.  552  ; 
State  V.  Elting,  29  Kans.  397  ;  Lucas  Co. 
I'.  Hunt,  5  Oliio  St.  488,  67  Am.  Dec. 
303;  Pepin  Co.  v.  Prindle,  61  Wis.  301, 
21  N.  W.  Rep.  254  ;  State  v.  Purdy,  36 
Wis.  213,  17  Am.  Rep.  485;  State  v.  Su- 
pervisors, 24  Wis.  49. 

*  Clarke  v.  Brookfield,  81  Mo.  503,  513, 
51  Am.  Rep.  243.  "  The  question,  as  to 
whether  municipal  corporations  have  the 
right  to  accept  gifts  or  acquire  property 
burdened  with  conditions  which  require 
them  to  do  reasonable  things  germane  to 
the  objects  of  their  existence,  or  return 
the  gift  or  acquisition  to  the  grantor  or 


VOID   CONDITIONS.  [§  659. 

If,  however,  a  municipal  corporation  be  prohibited  by  statute 
from  taking  a  conveyance  upon  condition,  such  a  condition  would 
be  illegal  and  void.^ 

659.  A  condition  in  general  restraint  of  marriage  is  void,^ 
though  most  courts  hold  that  such  a  condition  will  be  upheld 
when  there  is  a  valid  gift  or  limitation  over ;  ^  and  a  convej^ance 
to  a  person  until  marriage  is  clearly  void,  for  in  such  case  there  is 
nothing  to  carry  the  gift  beyond  the  marriage.*  A  condition  that 
one  shall  not  many  a  particular  person  is  valid. 

A  condition  that  a  daughter  shall  not  marry  until  she  arrives 
at  the  age  of  twenty-one  is  lawful.  This  is  a  proper  and  reason- 
able provision,  and  its  violation  may  well  work  a  forfeiture  of  the 
estate.^  A  condition  that  a  legatee,  if  under  twenty-one  years, 
shall  marry  with  the  consent  of  her  mother  is  valitl.^ 

In  a  deed  of  gift  by  a  father  to  his  daughter,  a  provision  that 
the  gift  should  stand  if  she  remained  single,  otherwise  the  land 
should  be  divided  among  his  three  children,  the  grantee  to  have 
fifty  dollars  more  than  the  others,  is  a  condition  in  restraint 
of  marriage  in  general  and  void ;  and  the  limitation  over  is  void, 
for  the  land  would  go  to  the  heirs  in  case  of  a  forfeiture,  whether 
there  was  a  limitation  or  not.'  A  condition  in  a  gift  to  a  daugh- 
ter, that  if  she  should  marry  the  estate  should  go  to  another,  is 
void.^ 

his  heirs,  is   hardly  to   be  considered  an  Randall  v.  Marble,  69  Me.  310,  31  Am. 

open  que'stion  in  this  country,  where  so  Rep.  281.     "Judtje  Story  gives,  as  a  rea- 

much    property  is    constantly   being   re-  son  why  the  condition  is  treated  as  inef- 

ceived    and   held   in  this  manner."     Per  fectual  in  case  of  not  giving  the  estate 

j^^j.jjjj   Q  over,  that  the  testator  is  deemed  to  use  the 

1  Rogers    v.    Sebastian    Co.    21     Ark.  condition  in  terrorem  only,  or  he  would 

..n  make  some  other  disposition  of  the  be- 

44U.  '  , 

2  California,  North  Dakota,  and  South  q-iest  provided  the  condition  is  not  kept. 
Dakota-  Except  ii].m.  the  marriage  of  a  Other  rea'^ons  are  also  assigned  by  other 
minor  This  provision  does  not  affect  writers.  On&  reason  is  that  courts  cannot 
limitations  where  the  intent  is,  not  to  for-  relieve  against  the  forfeiture  .n  such  case 
bid  marriages,  but  only  to  give  the  use  without  doing  nn  injury  to  the  person  to 
until  marriage.  Civ.  Code,  §  710;  Dak.  whom  the  estate  is  limited  over.'  Per 
Comp.    Laws    1887,   §271.5;    Jenkins   v.  Peters,  J. 

Merritt,  17  Fla.  304  ;  Randall  ..  Marble.         «  Sha.-k-lford  ..  H.all.  19  111.  212. 
69  Me.  310,  31  Am.  Rep.  281.  ^'  S.o,t  ..  Tyler  2  Bro  C.  C^  4..L 

3  Parsons  ..  Winslow,  6  Mass.  169,  181,  ^  Randnll  r.  Marble.  69  Me.  310,  81 
4  Am.  Dec   107.  An..  Rep.  281. 

*  Morley   ..   Rennoldson.  2  Hare,  .570,         «  Williams  ..  Cowden,  13  Mo.  211,  53 
580,  per  Wigram,  V.  C. ;  Pringle  v.  Dunk-     Am.  Dec.  143. 
ley.  14  Sm.  &  M.  16,  53  Am.  Dec.   110; 

649 


§§GGO,  061.]     CONDITIONS    rUKCEDENT    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

660.  A  condition  in  restraint  of  alienation  general  as  to  time 
and  persons  is  void.'  As  Littleton  sins  : '-^  '-It'  ;i  fcoffiiicnt  be 
made  upon  tiiis  condition  tliat  the  feoffee  sliidl  not  idien  the  land 
to  any,  this  condition  is  void,  because,  when  a,  man  is  so  enfeoffed 
of  lands  or  tenements,  he  hath  power  to  alien  them  to  any  per- 
son by  the  law.  For  if  such  a  condition  should  be  good,  then 
the  condition  should  oust  him  of  all  power  which  the  law  gives 
him,  which  should  be  against  reason  and  therefore  such  a  condi- 
tion is  void."  This  is  a  principle  founded  in  natural  law.  Aris- 
totle has  it  that,  "  It  is  the  definition  of  property  to  have  in  one's 
self  the  power  of  alienation."  Grotius  says:  "Since  the  estab- 
lishment of  property,  men  who  are  masters  of  their  own  goods 
have  by  the  law  of  nature  the  power  of  disposing  of  or  of  trans- 
ferring all  or  any  part  of  their  effects  to  other  persons,  for  this 
is  the  very  nature  of  property,  —  I  mean  of  full  and  complete 
property."  ^ 

A  fee-simple  estate  and  a  restraint  upon  its  alienation  cannot  in 
their  nature  coexist.^  Such  a  condition  is  clearly  repugnant  to 
the  grant  in  fee  simple.  A  power  of  alienation  is  an  inseparable 
incident  of  such  an  estate. 

661.  Under  the  feudal  law,  conditions  in  restraint  of  aliena- 


1  Bradley  r  Peixoto,  3  Ves.  Jr.  324; 
Co.  Litt.  436 ;  Stukeley  v.  Butler,  Hob. 
168;  Brandon  v.  Robinson,  18  Ves.  429; 
Ware  v.  Cann,  10  Burn.  &  C.  433  ;  Taylor 
V.  Mason,  9  Wheat.  325.  California : 
Civ.  Code,  §  711;  Murray  v.  Green,  64 
Cal.  363,  28  Pac.  Rep.  118;  Norris  v. 
Hensley,  27  Cal.  439.  Iowa  :  McCleary 
V.  Ellis,  54  Iowa,  311,  37  Am.  Rep.  205, 
6  N.  W.  Rep.  571.  Maryland:  Smith  v. 
Clark,  10  Md.  186.  Massachusetts :  Glea- 
son  V.  Fayerweather,  4  Gray,  348  ;  Hall  v. 
Tufts,  18  Pick.  455  ;  Blackstone  Bank  v. 
Davis,  21  Pick.  42,  32  Am.  Dec.  241  ; 
Hawley  v.  Northamjjton,  8  Mass.  3,  37,  5 
Am.  Dec.  66  ;  Lane  v.  Lane,  8  Allen,  350. 
Michigan:  .Mandelbaum  t;.  McDonell,  29 
Mich.  78,18  Am.  Rep.  61.  New  York : 
Schermerhorn  v.  Negus,  1  Denio,  448  ; 
De  Peyster  v.  Michael,  6  N.  Y.  467,  57 
Am.  Dec.  470 ;  Oxlcy  v.  Lane,  35  N.  Y. 
340.  North  Carolina  :  Dick  v.  Pitchford, 
1  Dcv.  &  B.  Eq.  480  ;  Tvvitty  v.  Camp, 
550 


Phil.  Eq.  61  ;  Munroe  v.  Hall,  97  N.  C. 
206;  Hardy  v.  Galloway,  111  N.  C.  519, 
15  S.  E.  Rep.  890;  Pritchard  v.  Bailey, 
113  N.  C.  521,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  668.  North 
Dakota  :  Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  2716.  Ohio  : 
Anderson  v.  Gary,  36  Ohio  St.  506,  38 
Atii.  Rep  602.  Pennsylvania  :  Reifsn\der 
V.  Hunter,  19  Pa.  St.  41  ;  Walker  v.  Vin- 
cent, 19  Pa.  St.  369;  Yard's  App.  64  Pa. 
St.  95  ;  Doebler's  App.  64  Pa.  St.  9.  South 
Dakota :  Comp.  Laws  1 887,  §  27 1 6.  Texas  : 
Bouldin  v.  Miller  (Tex.),  28  S.  W.  Rep. 
940, 26  S.  W.  Rep.  1 33.  Tennessee  :  Law- 
rence V.  Singleton  (Tenn.),  17  S  W.  Rep. 
265. 

'-  Litt.  360;  Co.  Litt.  222  6. 

8  Grotius,  6  1,  c  6,  §  1.  These  quota- 
tions are  found  in  De  Peyster  v.  Michael, 
6  N.  Y.  467,  57  Am.  Dec.  470. 

*  De  Peyster  v.  Michael,  6  N.  Y.  467, 
57  Am.  Dec.  470;  Murray  v.  Green,  64 
Cal.  363,  28  Pac.  Rep.  118. 


VOID   CONDITIONS. 


[§  661. 


tion  were  good  -wherever  the  grantor  had  the  reversion.     The 

feudal  lord  bud  the  reversion.  Upon  the  death  of  liis  grantee 
without  heirs,  the  kind  reverted  to  the  grantor  or  lord  from  whom 
it  proceeded.  "  The  grantee,  during  the  whole  period  from  the 
Conquest  down  to  the  18  Edward  I.,  when  the  statute  of  quia 
emptores  was  passed,  could  not  alien  his  land  without  the  license 
or  consent  of  the  lord,  who  was  the  owner  of  this  reversionaiy 
interest."  ^  This  statute  provided  that  from  henceforth  it  shall 
be  lawful  for  any  freeman  to  sell  at  his  own  pleasure  his  lands  and 
tenements,  or  part  of  them,  so  that  the  feoffee  shall  hold  the 
same  lands  and  tenements  of  the  chief  lord  of  the  same  fee,  by 
such  service  and  customs  as  the  feoffor  held  before.  The  effect 
of  this  statute  was  to  change  the  tenure  from  the  immediate  to 


1  De  Peyster  v.  Michael,  6  N.  Y.  467, 
497,  499,  57  Am.  Dec.  470.  Chief  Justice 
Iliiggles  in  this  case  fully  and  ably  exam- 
ines the  subject  of  restraints  upon  aliena- 
tion :  "  Kestraints  upon  alienation  of  lands 
held  in  fee  simple  were  of  feudal  origin. 
A  feoffment  in  fee  did  not  originally  pass 
an  estate  in  the  sense  in  which  we  now  un- 
derstand it.  The  purchaser  took  only  an 
usufructuary  interest,  without  the  power 
of  alienation  in  prejudice  of  the  heir,  or  of 
the  lord.  In  default  of  heirs,  the  tenure 
became  extinct,  and  the  land  reverted  to 
the  lord.  The  heir  took  by  purchase  and 
indei)endent  of  the  ancestor,  wlio  could 
not  alien,  nor  could  the  lord  alien  the 
seigniory  without  the  con.sent  of  the  ten- 
ant. This  restraint  on  alienation  was  a 
violent  and  unnatural  state  of  things,  con- 
trary to  the  nature  and  value  of  property, 
and  the  inherent  and  universal  love  of  in- 
dependence. It  arose  jiartly  from  favor 
to  the  heir,  and  partly  from  favor  to  the 
lord  ;  and  tlie  genius  of  the  feudal  system 
was  originally  so  strong  in  favor  of  re- 
straint upon  alienation  that,  by  a  general 
ordinance  mentioned  in  the  book  of  Fiefs, 
the  hand  of  him  who  wrote  a  deed  of 
alienation  was  directed  to  be  struck  oflf. 
...  All  the  land  in  the  kingdom  is  sup- 
posed, says  Blackstone,  to  lie  holden  medi- 
ately or  immediately  of  the  king,  who  is 
styled  the  lord  parainmint,  or  iibove  all. 
Such  tenants  as  hild  inidcr  ili-   kin-  im- 


mediately, when  they  granted  out  portions 
of  their  lands  to  inferior  persons,  became 
also  lords  with  respect  to  those  inferior 
persons,  as  they  were  still  tenants  with 
respect  to  the  king,  and,  thus  partaking  of 
a  middle  nature,  were  called  mesne  or 
middle  lords.  So  that,  if  the  king  granted 
a  manor  to  A,  and  he  granted  a  portion 
of  the  land  to  B,  now  B  was  said  to  hold 
of  A,  and  A  of  the  king  ;  or,  in  other 
words,  B  held  his  lands  innnediately  of 
A,  hut  mediately  of  the  king.  The  king, 
therefore,  was  styled  lord  jjaramouut;  A 
was  both  tenant  and  lord,  or  was  a  mesne 
lord,  and  B  was  called  tenant  paravail,  or 
the  lowest  tenant,  being  he  who  was  sup- 
posed to  make  avail  or  profit  of  the  land. 
Out  of  the  feudal  tenures  or  lioldings 
sprung  certain  rights  and  incidents,  among 
which  were  fealty  and  escheat.  Both 
these  were  incidents  of  socage  tenure,  of 
which  alone  it  is  necessary  to  speak. 
Fealty  was  fhe  obligation  of  lidelity  which 
the  tenant  owed  to  his  lord.  EMheat  wiis 
the  reversion  of  tiie  estate  on  a  grant  in 
fee  simjile  n])on  a  failure  of  tlie  heirs  of 
the  owner.  Fealty  was  annexed  to  and 
attendant  on  the  reversion.  They  were 
insei)arabie.  These  incidents  of  feudal 
tennre  belonged  to  the  lord  of  whom  tlie 
lands  were  immediately  holden  ;  that  is  to 
say,  to  him  of  whom  the  owner  for  the 
time  being  purchased." 


§§  602,  663.]     CONDITIONS  prkcedf.n  r  and  subshquent. 

tlie  superior  lord,  from  the  grantor  to  the  king.  It  deprived  the 
ordinary  grantor  of  all  power  to  impose  any  restraint  on  aliena- 
tion.    The  statute  did  not  apply  to  the  king.' 

662.  The  right  of  alienation  has  been  an  inseparable  inci- 
dent to  an  estate  in  fee  ever  since  the  statute  quia  emptores.^ 
After  an  absolute  conveyance  in  fee  simple,  a  clause  providing 
that  th(^  grantee  shall  not  mortgage  or  dispose  of  the  property  is 
repugnant  and  void  ;  2  or  that  he  shall  not  offer  to  mortgage  or 
suffer  a  fine  or  recovery.^  So  is  a  clause  prohibiting  the  grantee 
from  conveying  without  the  consent  of  tiie  grantor.^  A  condi- 
tion to  alien  only  to  a  particular  person  or  persons  is  void  ;'^  or 
that  land  devised  to  a  number  of  persons  shall  not  be  divided;'^ 
or  not  to  sell  during  the  lifetime  of  the  grantee.*^ 

In  some  courts,  however,  it  is  held  that  a  condition  not  to  alien 
within  a  limited  time  is  objectionable.^ 

The  doctrine  that  a  condition  in  restraint  of  alienatiori  is  void 
has  no  application  when  the  condition  is  contained  in  a  grant  by 
the  United  States  to  certain  Indians,  as  the  purpose  of  the  pro- 
viso in  such  case  is  not  to  prevent  the  alienation  of  the  land,  but 
to  protect  the  Indians  from  an  improvident  disposition  of  the 
land.w 

663.  A  condition  that  land  conveyed  shall  not  be  subject 
to  the  grantee's  debts  is  in  restraint  of  alienation  and  void. 
Notwithstanding  such  condition,  the  land    is  subject  to  levy  on 

1  The  statute  quia  emptores  was  never  overruling  Gill  v.  Pearson,  6  East,  173  ; 

in  force  in  New  York,  and  restraints  upon  Schermerhorn  v.  Negus,  I  Denio,  448. 

alienation   could   be  made  until  July  4,  ''  Smith  v.  Clark,  10  Md.  186. 

1776,  from    which    time    the    statutes    of  »  Pritchard  r.  Bailey,  113  N.  C.  521,  18 

1779  and  1787  took  effect  retrospectively.  S.  E.  Rep.  668;  Hardy  v.   Galloway,  111 

De   Peyster  v.  Michael,  6  N.   Y.  467,  57  N.  C.  519,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  890. 

Am.  Dec.  470.  »  Murray  v.  Green,  64  Cal.  363,  28  Pac. 

'^  Co.  Litt.  436.  Rep.  118,  per   Sharpstein,  J.,  examining 

^  Lawrence  v.  Singleton  (Tenn.),  17  S.  and   declaring   inapplicable    Churchill  ik 

W.  Rep.   265;    Hall  v.   Tufts,    18   Pick.  Marks,  1   Coll.  441,  and  Large's  Case,  2 

455;    Gleason   v.  Fayerweather,  4  Gray,  Leon.  82,  cited  in  support  of  the  propcsi- 

348;   Walker  y.  Vincent,  1 9  Pa.   St.  369;  tion  that   such   a  condition   is  good.     In 

Laval  V.  Staffel,  64  Tex.  370.  Mandlebaum  v.  McDonell,  29   Mich.  78, 

*  Ware  v.  Cann,  10  Barn.  &  C.  433.  18  Am.  Rep.  61,  it  was  declared  that  a 

^  Co.  Litt.  223  «;  Shep.  Touch.   130;  condition  that  would  suspend  all  power  of 

Murray  v.   Green,  64  Cal.  363,  28  Pac.  alieuiition  for  a  single  day  is  void.     To 

Rep.  118  ;  Bassett  v.   Budlong,  77  Mich,  like  effect,  sec  McCleary  v.  Ellis,  54  Iowa, 

338,  43  N.  W.  Rep.  984.  311,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  571. 

6  Attwater  v.  Attwater,  18  Beav.   330,  i'  Pickering  r.  Loinax,  145  U.  S.  310,  12 

Sup.  Ct.  Rej).  860. 

552 


VOID   CONDITIONS. 


[§§  664,  665. 


execution,  and  passes  to  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy.^  Liability 
for  debts  is  an  incident  of  property,  just  as  the  right  to  convey 
it  is.2 

664.  In  a  deed  in  fee  simple  a  condition  that  if  the  grantee 
shall  die  seised  of  the  land,  or  of  any  part  of  it,  such  land  shall 
revert  to  the  grantor  or  bis  lieirs,  is  repugnant  to  the  grant  and 
void;  and  upon  the  death  of  the  grantee  the  land  goes  to  his 
heirs. ^ 

In  estates  for  life  or  for  years,  conditions  in  restraint  of  aliena- 
tion are  lawful.  Such  restraint  is  good  by  re;ison  of  a  reversion 
remaining  in  the  lessor.'* 

QG5.  If  the  deed  does  not  convey  an  estate  in  fee  simple 
absolute,  a  provision  that  it  shall  revert  to  the  grantor  is  not 
repugnant.  Sometimes  a  deed,  which  upon  its  face  seems  to  be 
void  for  repugnancy  by  reason  of  provisions  restraining  alienation, 
may  be  carried  into  effect  if  from  the  whole  instrument  the  in- 
tention of  the  parties  is  manifest  that  the  deed  should  not  convey 
a  fee  simple  absolute  in  the  land ;  for  even  the  strongest  words  of 
conveyance  will   not  pass  an  estate  if,  from  other  parts  of  the 


1  Graves  v.  Dolphin,  1  Sim.  66 ;  Snow- 
don  V.  Dales,  6  Sim.  524;  Blackstone 
Bank  v.  Davis,  21  Pick.  42,  32  Am.  Dec. 
241 ;  McCleary  v.  Ellis,  54  Iowa,  311,  37 
Am.  Eep.  205,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  571 ;  Mebane 
V.  Mebane,  4  Ired.  Eq.  131,  44  Am.  Dec. 
102  ;  Tillinghast  v.  Bradford,  5  R.  I.  205, 
where  Ames,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  Certainly  no 
man  shonld  have  an  estate  to  live  on,  but 
not  an  estate  to  pay  his  debts  with.  Cei"- 
tainiy  property  available  for  the  purposes 
of  pleasure  or  profit  should  be  also  amen- 
able to  the  demands  of  justice." 

■^  Mebane  v.  Mebane,  4  Ired.  Eq.  131, 
44  Am.  Dec.  102,  per  Ruffin,  C.  J. 

3  Attorney  -  General  v.  Hall,  Fitzy. 
314;  Ide  v.  Ide,  5  Mass.  500;  Jackson 
V.  De  Lancy,  13  Johns.  536,  537,  7  Am. 
Dec.  403 ;  Second  Reformed  I'resb. 
Church  V.  Disbrow,  52  Pa.  St.  219;  Bas- 
sett  V.  Budlong,  77  Mich.  338,  43  N.  W. 
Rep.  984 ;  Case  v.  Dwire,  60  Iowa,  442, 
15  N.  W.  Rep.  265 ;  McCleary  v.  Ellis,  54 
Iowa,  311,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  571. 

■*  De  Peyster  v.  Michael,  6  N.  Y.  467, 


57  Am.  Dec.  470,  per  Ruggles,  C.  J. ; 
Nichols  V.  Eaton,  91  U.  S.  716;  Camp  r. 
Cleary,  76  Va.  140;  Braman  v.  Siiles,  2 
Pick.  460,  13  Am.  Dec.  445;  White  v. 
White,  30  Vt.  338  ;  Ilayward  v.  Kinney, 
84  Mich.  591,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  170  ;  Shauk- 
land's  App.  47  Pa.  St.  113;  Fisher  v. 
Taylor,  2  Rawle,  33 ;  Brooke's  Abridg- 
ment, title  "  Condition,"  57  a.  "  If  a  man 
have  lands  for  a  term  of  years  on  condi- 
tion that  he  shall  not  grant  over  his  estate, 
this  is  good  by  reason  of  the  reversion 
remaining  in  the  lessor." 

Some  early  English  cases  held  that 
alienation  is  a  necessary  incident  of  a  life 
estate.  Brandon  v.  Robinson,  18  Ves. 
429;  Rochford  «.  Hacknian,  9  Hare,  480. 
And  this  doctrine  was  adopted  in  .«ouie 
American  cases.  Pace  v.  Pace,  73  N. 
C.  119;  Tillinghast  v.  Bradford,  5  R.  1. 
205.  In  the  later  case  iu  England  of  Wil- 
kinson V.  Wilkinson,  3  Swans.  515,  Sir 
Thomas  Plumer,  M.  R.,  holds  tliat  a  re- 
straint on  the  alienation  of  a  life  estate  is 
valid. 

563 


^§  OGl),  GOT.]       CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT   AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

Jeinl,  the  intention  appears  otherwise.^  Thus,  a  quitclaim  deed 
from  a  husband  to  liis  wife,  with  condition  that  sh(^  should  not 
convey  the  land  during  his  lifetime  without  his  written  consent, 
and  that  in  case  of  her  death  before  his  decease  the  land  should 
revert  to  him,  was  held  not  to  convey  the  land  to  the  grantee  in 
fee  simple  absolute,  but  that  the  effect  of  it  was  that  the  title 
should,  in  the  event  of  the  death  of  either  of  the  parties,  pass  to 
the  survivor.'-^ 

A  conveyance  to  a  trustee  by  a  husband  forever  in  fee  simple 
for  the  use  of  his  wife  and  her  children  by  him,  born  and  to  be 
born,  with  a  condition  in  the  habendum  that  if  he  should  survive 
her  the  whole  property  should  revert  to  him  free  from  the  trust, 
conveyed  to  the  trustee  a  fee  defeasible  upon  the  contingency 
specified ;  and  on  the  happening  of  that  contingency  the  title 
revested  in  the  husband,  and  thenceforth  the  property  was  his 
absolutely.'^ 

666.  The  grantor  may,  by  a  condition,  reserve  the  power 
to  revoke  a  voluntary  conveyance  during  his  lifetime.  Such  a 
condition  is  not  open  to  the  objection  that  it  is  contrary  to  public 
policy,  on  the  ground  that  it  enables  the  parties  to  the  deed  to 
dt'feat  the  rights  of  the  grantee's  creditors,  for  the  deed  is  notice 
to  the  creditors  of  the  power  reserved.'* 

667.  But  a  partial  restraint  upon  alienation,  if  the  restraint 
be  not  unreasonable,  is  valid.^  "  If  the  condition  be  such," 
says  Littleton,*^  "  that  the  feoffee  shall  not  alien  to  such  a  one, 
naming  his  name,  or  to  any  of  his  heirs,  or  of  the  issue  of  such 

1  Williams  c.  Bentley,  27  Pa.   St.  294 ;  *  Ricketts    v.   Louisville,    &c.    Ky.    Co. 

Ogden  V.  Brown,  33  Fa.  St.  247.  (Ky.)   15   S.  W.   Kep.  182.     Per  Holt,  C. 

-  Bassett  v.  Budlong,  77  Mich.  338,  43  J. :  "  Such  a  condition  has  always  been 

N.  W.  Rep.  984.     Chatnplin,  J., said  :  "It  known  to  the  law  of  conveyancing.    Coke 

is  evident  that,  by  executing  the  deed  to  says  that  {grants  may  be  revoked  by  vir- 

his  wife,  the  grantor  did  not  intend   to  tue  of  a  power  expressly  reserved  in  the 

part  with  the  title  to  his  real  estate  unless  deed."     Butler's  Case,  3  Coke,  25. 

the  contingency  sliould  occur  of  his  dyin;,'  ^  Large's  Case,  2  Leon.  82;   Langdou 

before  his  wife  died.  .  .  .  The  condition  r.  Ingram,  28  Ind.  360 ;  Siewart  v.  Bar- 

iu  Che  deed  .  .  .  is  a  clear  indication  that  row,  7  Bush,  368;   Hill  v.   Hill,  4  Barb, 

the  title  sliould  not  pass,  because,  if  it  was  419,  where  the  condition  was  not  to  alien- 

the  intention  that  it  should  pass  and   the  ate  for   fifteen   years,  except  to  certain 

estate  vest  in  his  wife,  the  condition  would  persons.     Cornelius  v.  Ivins,  26  N.  J.  L. 

be  nugatory,  and    no  force  or  effect    be  376. 

given  to  this  part  of  the  instrument."  «  §  361  ;  Co.  Litt.   §  223  a.     And  see 

8  Woods   V.    Woods,    87    Ga.    562,    13  Langdou  v.  Ingram,  28  Ind.  360. 
S.  E.  Rep.  692. 

554 


VOID    CONDITIONS.  [§  668. 

a  one,  oi'  the  like,  which  conditions  do  not  take  away  all  power 
of  alienation  from  the  feoffee,  then  such  condition  is  good." 

A  condition  that  the  grantee  or  devisee  shall  not  sell  the  land 
until  he  arrives  at  a  certain  age,  as  twentj'-five  years  or  thirty-five 
years,  is  valid,  the  restriction  not  being  unreasonable.^  A  condi- 
tion not  to  alien  within  a  limited  time,  or  during  the  lifetime  of 
the  grantor,  is  valid. ^ 

In  a  conveyance  to  several  members  of  an  association  as  ten- 
ants in  common  in  undivided  shares,  a  condition  that  the  grantees 
will  hold  without  partition  or  division  is  valid.  It  is  not  in  re- 
straint of  alienation  because  each  tenant  may  convey  his  share  at 
his  pleasure.^ 

668.  A  condition  not  to  sell  "  out  of  the  family  "  is  valid. 
The  condition  does  not  take  away  all  power  of  alienation,  but 
only  imposes  a  limited  restraint  on  alienation.  The  distinguished 
Master  of  the  Rolls,  Jessell,  delivering  the  opinion,  said:  "  You 
may  restrict  alienation  by  prohibiting  a  particular  class  of  aliena- 
tion, or  you  may  restrict  alienation  by  prohibiting  it  to  a  p:irticular 
class  of  individuals,  or  you  may  restrict  alienation  by  restricting 
it  to  a  particular  time.  In  all  these  ways  you  may  limit  it,  and  it 
appears  to  me  that  in  two  ways,  at  all  events,  this  condition  is 
limited.  First,  it  is  limited  as  to  the  mode  of  alienation,  because 
the  only  prohibition  is  ngainst  selling.  There  are  various  modes 
of  alienation  besides  sale :  a  person  may  lease,  or  he  may  mort- 
gage, or  he  may  settle  ;  therefore  it  is  a  mere  limited  restriction 
on  alienation  in  that  way.  Then,  again,  it  is  limited  as  regards 
class ;  he  is  never  to  sell  it  out  of  the  family,  but  he  may  sell  it 
to  any  one  member  of  the  family.  It  is  not,  therefore,  limited  in 
the  sense  of  there  being  only  one  person  to  buy.  The  will  shows 
there  were  a  great  many  members  of  the  family  when  she  made 
her  will;  a  great  many  are  named  in  it:,  therefore  you  liave  a 
class  which  probably  was  large,  and  was  certainly  not  small."* 

1  Stewart  v.  Brady,  3  V.u^h,  f.23 ;  Dou-  ^  McWilliams  v.  Ni!>ly,  2  S.  &  K.  507,7 

gal  1-.  Fryer,  3  Mo.  40,  22  Am.  Dec.  4.')8.  Am.  Dec.  054.     See,  liowever,  Taylor  v. 

See,  however,  to  the  contrary,  Tvvitiy  i:  Mason,  9  Wlieat.  325,  3.50. 

Cam)),  Pliil.  (N.  C.)  Eq.  61,  and   Houidin  ''  Hunt   v.  Wright,  47   N.   M.    SJMi,    -.3 

V.   Miller    (Tex.),  28    S.    W.    Hop.   940,  Am.  Dee.  451.     Contra,  Lovett  i-.  Gillen- 

where  a  conveyance   to   n.in<.rs,   "  to  be  der,  35  N.  Y.  617  ;  Smiih  r.  Clark,  10  Md. 

held   in   common    and   unsold  "   until  the  186. 

youngest  shall  become  of  age,  is  a  eon-  *  /»   re   Maclcay,   L.    II.  20    K(|.    186. 

veyanceof  a  fee  simple  without  a  condi-  Contra,  McCollough  v.   Gilmore,  11    Ta. 

tion,  the  breach  of  which  would  avoid  the  St.  3/0. 

estate.  ^^^ 


^§  Go'.',  670.]       CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AiND    SUBSEQUENT. 

669.  A  condition  not  to  convey  without  first  giving  the 
grantor  the  privilege  of  repurchasing  is  void.  So  is  a  coiuli- 
tion  requiring  the  payment  of  money  for  the  privilege  of  alienat- 
ing to  a  stranger.! 

A  condition  not  to  alien  the  land  without  first  giving  the 
grantor,  his  heirs  or  assigns,  the  privilege  of  repurchasing,  was 
held  void  in  North  Carolina  because  the  condition  was  indefinite 
as  to  time,  and  might  be  exercised  whenever  the  property  should 
be  sold,  and  indefinite  as  to  the  amount  to  be  paid  upon  repur- 
chase.^ 

A  condition  or  covenant  that  the  grantor  should  "  at  any  time  " 
have  the  right  of  "  preeimption "  of  the  property  conveyed  "at 
and  after  the  same  price  as  the  above-mentioned  consideration," 
gives  the  grantor  the  option  to  purchase  at  that  price  in  prefer- 
ence to  any  other  person,  in  case  the  owner  desired  or  offered  to 
sell  at  the  price  specified.^ 

670.  A  condition  that  is  repugnant  to  the  grant  is  void.* 
"  A  condition  annexed  to  an  estate  given  is  a  divided  clause 
from  the  grant,  and  therefore  cannot  frustrate  the  grant  pre- 
ceding, neither  in  anything  expressed  nor  in  anything  implied 
which  is  of  its  nature  incident  and  inseparable  from  the  thing 
granted."  ^ 

A  condition  that  the  land  conveyed,  or  so  much  of  it  as  the 
grantee  has  not  sold  and  conveyed,  shall  upon  his  decease  revert 

1  Shep.  Touch.  130;  King  v.  Burcliell,  price  when  opened  for  sale,  in   preference 

Arab.  379;  Bassett  v.  Budlong,  77  Mich,  to  any  one  else,  is  called  the  ri;;lit  of  pro- 

338,  347,  43  N.  W.  Rep.  984  ;   De  Peystor  eniption  in  the  practice  of  the  government 

17.   Michael,  6  N.  Y.  467,  57   Am.  Dec.  and  in  the  decisions  of  the  United  States 

470;   Livingston  v.  Stirkles,  7  11111,253.  courts.     The  term  is  used  here  to  express 

The  case  of  Jackson  v.  Schutz,  18  Johns,  the  idea  that  some  one  has  the  first  right 

174,  9  Am.  Dec.  195,  which  is  sometimes  to  purchase  when   the  land  is  offered  for 

cited  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  a  condi-  sale,  or  the  option  of  buying  first." 

tiou  giving  the  grantor  the  option  of  re-  *  Bradley  v.  Peixdto,  3  Ves.  Jr.  324  ; 

purchasing,  was  upon   this  point  the  de-  Brandon  v.   Robinson,  18   Ves.  429,  433, 

cision  of  a  single  judge,  the  other  judges  per  Lord    Ch.  Eldon  ;  Gadberry  v.  Shep- 

basing     their     deci.sion     upon     another  pard,  27  Miss.  203  ;  Littlefield  v.  Mott,  14 

ground.  R.L288;  Pynchon   r.   Stearns,    11    Met. 

2  Hardy  V.  Galloway,  111  N.  C.  519,  15  312,45  Am.  Dec.  210;  Bassett  v.  Bud- 
S.  E.  Rep.  890.            "  long,  77  Mich.  338,  43  N.  W.  Rep.  984, 

3  Garcia  v.  Callender,  125  N.  Y.  307,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  404.  Georgia:  Code 
311,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  28.3.  O'Brien,  J.,  1882,  §  2296;  Taylor  v.  Sutton,  15  Ga. 
said  :  "  The  right  of  a  person  to  purchase  103,  60  Am.  Dec.  682. 

some  part  of  the  public  lands  at  a  specified         ^  Stukeley  v.  Butler,  Hob.  168. 
556 


VOID   CONDITIONS.  [§§  671,  672. 

to  the  grantor,  is  repugnant  to  the  grant,  which  was  in  fee  simple, 
and  is  therefore  void.^ 

But  in  M  conveyance  in  fee  by  a  husband  to  a  trustee  for  tbe 
use  of  bis  wife  and  children,  a  condition  that  if  be  should  survive 
his  wife  the  whole  property  should  revert  to  him  free  from  the 
trust  is  valid,  and  may  be  enforced.^ 

A  condition  that  tbe  conveyance  shall  be  void  upon  the  failure 
of  the  grantee  to  pay  the  purchase-money  is  not  void  as  being 
repugnant  to  tbe  grant.^ 

671.  A  condition  that  intoxicating  liquors  shall  not  be  man- 
ufactured or  sold  upon  the  granted  lands  is  valid,  for  it  is  not 
subversive  of  the  estate  conveyed.'*  It  leaves  the  estate  alienable 
and  inheritable,  and  free  to  be  subjected  to  other  uses.  Such  a 
condition  may  be  enforced  by  forfeiture  if  advantage  be  promptly 
taken  of  any  breach  of  it. 

Such  a  condition  is  not  void  as  being  in  restraint  of  trade,  so 
far  as  the  grantor  has  in  his  own  business  an  interest  in  enforcing 
it.5  Nor  is  the  condition  opposed  to  public  policy  as  tending  to 
establish  a  monopoly  in  the  business  of  selling  intoxicating 
liquors.  "  It  is  not  the  policy  of  the  State  that  every  one  should 
sell  intoxicating  drinks  who  pleases.  On  the  contrary,  heavy 
taxes  are  levied  and  onerous  conditions  imposed  by  the  State  for 
tbe  express  purpose  of  limitbig  the  number  of  those  who  shall 
sell,  and  the  condition  in  question  is  directly  in  tbe  line  of  that 
policy,  instead  of  being  opposed  to  it."  ^ 

672.  This  is  certainly  the  rule  if  the  grantor  has  any 
special  andT  substantial  interest  in  tbe  enforcement  of  the 
condition.       Upon   this   point   of  the  grantor's  interest  the   Su- 

1  Ide  I'.  Ide,  5  Mass.  500  :  Case  v.  De-  7.%  ;  Jenks  v.  Pawlowski,  98  Mich.  110, 
wire,  60  Iowa,  442,  15  N.  W.  Kep.  265;  56  N.  W.  Rep.  1105;  Watrons  r.  Allen, 
Second  Reformed  I'resb.  Church  v.  Dis-  57  Mich.  .362;  24  N.  W.  Rep.  104,  58  Am. 
brow,  52  Pa.  St.  219.  Rep.  .•56.'5  ;  Smith  v.  Barrie,  56  Mich.  314, 

2  Woods  V.  Woods,  87  Ga.  562,  13  S.  22  N.  W.  Rep.  816.  .56  Am.  Dec.  391; 
E.  Rep.  692.  O'Brien  v.  Wetliercll,  14  Kans.  616;  Jef- 

3  Tavlor  v.  Sutton,  15  Ga.  103,  60  Am.  fcry  v.  Graham,  61  Tex.  4S1  ;  Odessa  Im- 
j)qc    682.  provement   Co.   v.  Dawson,    5   Tex.  Civ. 

4  Cowell  c.  Springs  Co.  100  U.  S.  55;  App.  487.  24  S.  W.  Rep.  576. 

Collins  Manuf.   Co.  v.  Marcy,  25  Conn.         ^  Watrous  i;.  Allen,  57   Mich.  362,  24 
242  ;  Plumb  v.  Tubbs,  41  N.  Y.  442  ;   At-     N.  W.  Rep.  104,  58  Am.  Rep.  363. 
lauti'c  Dock  Co.  V.  Leavitt,  54  N.  Y.  35,         «  Watrous  v.  Allen,  57  Mich.  362,  24 
13  Am.  Rep.  556;  Lehigh  (^oal  &  N.  Co.     N.  W.  Rep.   104,  58  Am.  Rep.  363,  per 
V.  Earlv,  34  W.  N.  C.  501,  2^  AM     l!ii'.     Cooley,  C.  J. 

557 


§  673.]  CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

})r(Mne  Court  of  Minnesota  say :  "  Whether  such  a  condition 
would  be  deemed  void,  upon  grounds  of  public  policy,  if  it  should 
appear  that  the  grantor  had  no  such  interest,  we  do  not  decide. 
Upon  the  face  of  the  deed  nothing  appears  which  could  render 
v«tid  the  express  condition  upon  which  the  conveyance  is  made 
anil  accepted.  A  gi  antor  nia)-,  at  least  under  some  circumstances, 
olTectually  impose  such  a  condition  upon  a  conveyance  of  the 
estate ;  and  it  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  make  ^j)nma  facie 
valid  the  condition  expressed  in  the  deed,  that  the  deed  shall 
set  forth  or  recite  tlie  peculiar  facts  which  may  legally  justify 
the  grantor  in  annexing  the  coiidition  to  the  grant.  On  its 
face  the  condition  is  effectual.  It  attends  and  qualifies  the  grant. 
The  estate  is  conveyed  and  accepted  in  terms  subject  to  it.  If 
this  condition  is  to  be  avoided,  because  in  the  particular  case  the 
circumstances  of  tlie  grantor  were  not  such  as  to  authorize  him 
to  thus  restrict  or  qualify  the  conveyance  of  his  estate,  it  can 
be  only  upon  affirmative  proof  of  the  fact  relied  upon  for  that 
purpose.  If  not  thus  avoided,  the  deed  must  have  effect  accord- 
ing to  its  terms,  to  which  the  parties  have  assented."  ^ 

In  Michigan  and  Minnesota  there  is  a  statutory  provision  that 
conditions  annexed  to  a  conveyance  of  land  which  are  merely 
nominal  may  be  disregarded.  But  it  is  held  that  a  condition  that 
intoxicating  liquors  shall  not  be  sold  as  a  beverage  upon  the 
land  conveyed  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  merely  nominal  condition 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.^ 

673.  A  condition  not  to  place  windo"ws  in  a  wall  adjoining 
lands  of  a  neighbor  is  valid.  "  It  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to 
make  a  condition  valid,  that  the  party  creating  it  should  have 
any  beneficial  interest  in  any  other  estate  which  may  be  usefully 
affected  by  the  condition.  He  may  have  conveyed  an  adjoining 
estate  for  the  benefit  of  which  this  condition  was  created.  He 
may  have  received  a  greater  price  for  that  estate  on  account  of 
this  condition,  and  justice  to  others  may  require  that  he  should 
exact  its  performance.  ...  It  seems  to  us  that  there  are  many 
things  which  may  be  provided  for  as  conditions  in  a  deed,  which, 
though  of  small  consideration  in  the  view  of  a  stranger,  may 
be  thought  of  great  importance  by  the  grantor.     A  man  has  a 

1  Sioux  City  &  St.  Paul  R.  Co.  ?•.  -  Sioux  City  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Singer, 
Singer,  49  iMinn.  301,  305,  51  N.  W.  49  Minn.  301,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  905,  32  Am, 
Rep.  905.  St.  Hop.  5.54. 

558 


VOID  CONDITIONS.  [§§  674,  675. 

vacant  lot  in  front  of  bis  dwelling-house  which  somebody  is  desir- 
ous to  buy,  and  he  is  willing  to  sell,  if  thereby  his  light  and  air 
sball  not  be  too  much  obstructed,  ^lay  he  not  sell  it  under  a 
condition  that  no  building  shall  be  erected  beyond  a  certain 
height,  or  within  a  certain  distance  from  his  house,  or  that  the 
land  shall  not  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  a  tavern,  or  for  any  par- 
ticular business  which  is  likely  to  be  noisy  or  troublesome,  at 
lea-st  for  a  limited  number  of  years?  Who  is  prejudiced  by  such 
a  condition  ?  The  purchaser  and  all  who  may  claim  under  him 
have  notice  of  the  restriction,  and,  if  it  diminishes  the  value  of 
the  land,  they  get  their  compensation  in  the  price."  ^ 

674.  Conditions  subsequent  impossible  of  performance  are 
void.2  '■'  If,"  says  Blackstone,  "  they  be  impossible  at  the  time 
of  their  creation,  or  afterwards  become  impossible  by  the  act  of 
God,  or  the  act  of  the  feoffor  himself,  or  if  they  be  contrary  to 
law,  or  repugnant  to  the  nature  of  the  estate,  they  are  void." 
The  estate  in  such  case  becomes  absolute  in  the  grantee  immedi- 
ately upon  the  execution  of  the  deed.  "  For  he  hath  by  the  giant 
the  estate  vested  in  him,  which  shall  not  be  defeated  afterwards 
by  a  condition  either  impossible,  illegal,  or  repugnant."  ^ 

675.  A  forfeiture  is  excused  when  the  breach  of  condition 
was  occasioned  by  the  act  of  the  law.  In  a  leading  English 
case  land  was  demised  to  trustees  for  the  benefit  of  the  poor  of  a 
parish,  the  trustees  covenanting  to  build  a  workhouse  thereon,  and 
to  use,  occupy,  possess,  and  enjoy  the  premises  for  the  sole  use, 

1  Gray  v  Blanchard,  8  Pick.  284,  290,  People  v.  Manning,  8  Cow.  297  ;  Lamb 
per  I'arker,  C.  J.  ^•-  Mi^er,  18  Pa.  St.  448;  Culin's  App. 

2  Shep.  Touch.  132;  Doe  v.  Rugeley,  20  Pa.  St.  248;  Wheeler  v.  Moody,  9 
6  Q.  B.  107,  114;  Davis  v.  Gray,  16  Tex.  .372;  Blauchard  v.  Morcy,  .'iC  Vt. 
Wall.  20.3;  United  States  v.  Arredoudo,  170;  Jones  v.  Chesaj.euke,  &c.  K.  Co.  14 
6  Pet  69l'  74.5;  Hughes  v.  Edwards,  9  W.  Va.  .514;  Biirnhani  v.  Bumliani,  79 
Wheat.  489;  Finlay  v.  King,  3  Pet.  346,  Wis.  557,  567,  48  N.  W.  Hep.  601.  Cali- 
374-  Rogers  v.  Sebastian  Co.  21  Ark.  fornia :  Civ.  Code,  §  1441.  Louisiana: 
440  i  Taylor  v.  Sutton,  15  Ga.  103,  60  Physical  and  moral  impossibilitio>  only 
Am'  Dec.  682;  Jones  v.  Walker,  13  B.  are  intended  by  the  prece.iing  articles.  If 
Mon.  163,  56  Am.  Dec.  557  ;  Randall  v.  the  condition  he  only  relatively  inii)os8i- 
Marble  69  Mc.  310,  31  Am.  Rep.  281  ;  bic,  that  is  to  say,  impracticable  by  the 
Morse  v.  Ilayden,  82  Me.  227  ;  Parker  v.  obligor,  only  from  the  want  of  skill, 
Parker  1 0.3  Mass.  584 ;  Merrill  (^  Emery,  strength,  or  means,  but  practicable  by 
10  Pick  507  •  Weathersby  v.  Wcaihcrsby,  another,  it  is  not  an  impo.ssibio  condition. 
13  Sm   &  M.'685 ;  Barks'dale  v.  Elam,  30  R.  Civ.  Code  1889,  §  20.33. 

Miss.  694  ;  Martin  ..  Ballon,  13  Barb.  «  2  Bl.  Comm.  156  ;  Parker  ..  Parker, 
119;  W^hitney   v.   Spencer,   4   Cow.   39;     123  Mass.  584. 

559 


§  (575.]  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

Huiiiitenanee,  and  sujiport  of  the  poor  of  Rugeley,  and  not  to  con- 
vert the  buikling  or  the  hmd,  or  employ  the  profits  thereof,  to  any 
other  use,  intent,  or  purpose  whatever.  There  was  a  proviso  for 
reentry  on  breach  of  the  covenant.  The  house  was  biiilt,  and  the 
land  was  used  for  many  years  as  required  by  the  deed.  After- 
wards an  act  of  Parliament  was  passed,  and  the  parish  incorpo- 
rated with  others,  and  a  union  poor-liouse  provided,  to  which  the 
act  required  all  paupers  should  be  lemoved.  The  heii's  of  the 
grantor  brought  suit  in  ejectment,  claiming  the  right  of  reentry 
for  breach  of  the  condition.  The  court  held  that,  "  even  if  the 
condition  was  not  performed,  it  appears  to  us  that  the  non-per- 
formance w'ould  in  this  case  be  excused,  as  being  by  act  of  law, 
and  involuntary  on  the  part  of  the  lessees."  ^ 

And  so,  where  land  had  been  conveyed  for  use  as  a  burial 
ground,  with  apt  words  creating  a  condition  subsequent  that  the 
property  should  revert  to  the  grantor  if  the  grantee  failed  to  use 
it  for  that  pvirpose,  and  the  land  was  used  for  such  purpose  until 
it  became  a  public  nuisance,  and  the  State,  by  legislative  act, 
forbade  further  interment  therein,  the  condition  of  the  deed  was 
held  to  be  destroyed,  and  the  title  vested  absolutely  in  the  grantee. 
The  court  said :  "'  It  is  clear  that  the  performance  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  deed  has  been  prevented  by  act  of  law."  ^ 

A  condition  that  the  granted  land  shall  be  used  for  a  place  of 
burial,  and  for  no  other  purpose,  is  destroyed  when  the  State,  in 
the  proper  and  reasonable  exercise  of  its  police  power,  prohibits 
further  interments  in  the  land,  and  the  title  thereupon  vests  abso- 
lutely in  the  grantee.'^ 

1  Doe   dem.    Marquis    of   Anglesea   v.  New  Britain,  55  Conn.  378,  II   Atl.   Rep. 

Rugeley,  6  Q.  B.   107.     The  court  cited  354;  State   v.   Wonlin,  56  Conn.  216,   14 

Bac.  Ahr.  tit.  "  Condition  ;  "  Com.  Dig.  tit.  Atl.  Rep.  801  ;    Woodruff  v.  Railroad  Co. 

"Condition  ;  "  and   the  case  of  Brewster  59  Conn.  63,  20  Atl.  Rep.  17. 
V.  Kitchell,  1  Salk.  198,  1  Ld.  Raym.  317.         »  Scovill  v.    McMahori,  62  Conn.  378, 

See  Doe  dem.  Lord  Grautlcy  v.  Butcher,  390,   26    Atl.    Rep.  479.     Hall,  J.,  said  : 

6  Q.  B.  115,  to   the   same  effect.     The  "If  it  should  be  said  that  the  plaintiffs' 

above  case  is  stated,  in  the  language   of  interests  in  this  property  had  been  taken 

Mr.  Justice  Lurton,  in  Board  of  Coni'rs  from  them  by  the  State  or  by  the  city  of 

V.  Young,  59  Fed.  Rep.  96,  which  case  Waterbnry  by  right  of  eminent  domain, 

supports  the   same  principle.     See,  also,  we  should  reach  the  same  conclusion  upon 

Mitchel  V.  Reynolds,  1  P.  Wms.  181.  the  question  of  whether  the  condition  of 

■^  Scovill  V.  McMahon,  62  Conn.  378,  the  deed  had  been  broken.     If  the  city 

26  Atl.  Rep.  479  ;   Raymond  v.  Fish,  51  of  Waterbury,  by  taking   tliis  land  for  a 

Conn.   80,  50  Am.    Rep.  3 ;    Dunham  v.  public  park,   under  tlie  valid  act  of  the 

560 


VOID  CONDITIONS.  [§§  676,  677. 

Where  a  city  or  town  holds  land  under  a  grant  for  a  burying- 
ground,  and  to  be  appropriated  for  no  other  use  or  purpose  what- 
soever, the  title  reverts"  to  the  grantors  when  the  land  can  no 
longer  be  used  for  such  purpose  by  reason  of  an  ordinance  of  the 
municipality  and  an  act  of  the  legislature  prohibiting  the  use  of 
such  land  for  burial  purposes.^ 

But  the  performance  of  such  a  condition  is  not  excused  or 
dispensed  with  for  the  reason  that  the  person  who  is  bound 
for  its  performance  is  under  a  disability,  such  as  infancy  or 
mai'riage.2 

676.  If  a  condition  precedent  becomes  impossible  the 
grant  fails,  because  no  estate  vests  in  the  grantee  until  the  condi- 
tion is  performed.3  In  a  sale  and  conveyance  by  a  railroad  com- 
pany of  its  right  of  way,  roadbed,  and  property  in  general  to 
another  railroad  company,  conditions  that  the  deed  should  not 
become  operative  until  the  purchasing  corporation  should,  among 
other  things,  complete  the  road  within  a  given  time  and  issue 
paid-up  stock  to  the  selling  company,  are  conditions  precedent, 
and,  if  the  conditions  are  not  complied  with,  upon  the  bankruptcy 
of  the  purchasing  company,  the  conditions  become  impossible 
of  performance,  and  the  title  remains,  and  must  remain,  in  the 
selling  company.^ 

677.  If  the  performance  of  the  condition,  whether  prece- 
dent or  subsequent,  is  rendered  impossible  by  the  grantor's 
own  act,  he  cannot  complain   of  a  breach   of  it,  and   regain  the 

legislature,  has  jirevented  its  use  as  a  passed  an  ordinauce  prohilnting  the  fur- 
burial  place,  it  is  clear  that  the  ])erform-  ther  use  of  it  for  such  purposes.  The 
anceof  the  condition  of  the  deed  has  been  ordinance  was  declared  to  be  a  valid  ex- 
prevented  by  act  of  law;  and  we  know  of  crcise  of  the  police  power,  and  also  to 
no  principle  or  authority  by  which  the  operate  as  a  complete  abandonment  of  the 
taking  of  the  property  under  the  right  of  dedicated  use,  by  which  the  lands  reverted 
eminent  domain  would  work  a  forfeiture  to  the  original  owner, 
which  would  require  pnyment  both  to  the  -'  Barker  i;.  Cobb,  ."56  N.  H.  344 ;  Gar- 
plaintiffs  of  the  value  of  the  land  and  to  rett  v.  Scouten,  3  Dcnio,  334. 
the  defendant  of  the  value  of  the  estate  ^  Stockton  v.  Weber,  98  Cal.  433,  33 
forfeited."  See,  also,  Portland  i\  Terwil-  Pac.  Rep.  332,  335;  Martin  v.  Ballon, 
ligcr,  IG  Oreg.  465,  19  Pac.  Kep.  90.  13  Barb.  119,  Blean  i;.  Messenger,  33 
i  Mayor  i;.  Watson  (N.J. ),  29  Atl.  Rep.  N.  J.  L.  499;  Jones  v.  Bramblet,  2  111. 
487.    So, also,  in  Young  v.  Board.  h\  PYmI.  27C. 

Rep.  .58.5,  the  lands  were  donated  by  the  *  Tennessee    &c.  R.  Co.  v.   East   Ala. 

owner  of  the  fee  to  a  municipnl  iiody  for  a  Ry.  Co.  73  Ala.  42G. 
burying-ground,  and  that  body  afterwards 

661 


§  678.] 


CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 


estate  by  a  reentry. ^  The  condition  is  no  longer  binding,  and 
the  estate  is  discharged  therefrom. 

A  grantiir  who  enters  bcfoi-c  a  breach  of  the  condition,  prima 
facie  prevents  a.  pei-formanee  of  the  condition.'-^ 

A  condition  is  void  if  it  is  stated  so  indefinitely  that  it  is 
impossihlt'  to  determine  with  certainty  the  event  upon  vs^hich 
the  estate  is  to  arise  or  be  defeated.^ 

VI.  Performance  and  Forfeiture. 

678.  A  condition,  when  relied  upon  to  work  a  forfeiture,  is 
construed  with  great  strictness.^  The  grantor  must  stand  on 
his  legal  rights,  and  any  ambiguity  in  his  deed  or  defect  in  the 


1  United  States  v.  Ariedondo,  6  Pet. 
691,  74.5  ;  Gray  v.  Blaiichard,  8  Pick.  284 ; 
Elkhart  Car  Co.  v.  Ellis,  113  Ind.  215,  1.5 
N.  E.  Rep.  249;  Leonard  v.  Smitli,  80 
Iowa,  194,  4.5  N.  W.  Rep.  762;  Jones  v. 
Brnmblet,  2  111.  276 ;  Houghton  v.  Steele, 
58  Cal.  421 ;  Jones  v.  Walker,  13  B.  Mod. 
163,  56  Am.  Dec.  557  ;  Youug  v.  Hunter, 
6  N.  Y.  203 ;  Whitney  v.  Spencer,  4  Cow. 
39;  Jones  v.  Che.sapeake  &  0.  R.  Co.  14 
W.  Va.  514  ;  Mizell  v.  Burnett,  4  Jones  L. 
249,  69  Am.  Dee.  744.  Louisiana  :  The 
condition  is  considered  as  fidfilled  when 
the  fulfilment  of  it  has  been  prevented  by 
the  i)arty  bound  to  perform  it.  R.  Civ. 
Code  18S9,  §  2040. 

2  Elkhart  Car  Works  Co.  v.  Ellis,  113 
Ind.  215,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  249. 

3  Sliep.  Touch.  128 ;  Doe  v.  Cai'ew,  2 
Q.  B.  317 ;  Fillingham  v.  Bromley,  Turn. 
&  Russ.  530. 

4  Radford  v.  WiHis,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  7. 
California:  Civ.  Coile,  §  1442;  Los  An- 
f^eles  CeiTi.  Asso.  v.  Los  Angeles,  95  Cal. 
420,  30  Pac.  Rep.  523.  Florida:  Jenkins 
V.  Merritt,  17  Fla.  304.  Georgia  :  Taylor 
V.  Sutton,  15  Ga.  103,  60  Am.  Dec.  682. 
Illinois :  Voris  v.  Renshaw,  49  111.  425 ; 
Wilson  V.  Gait,  18  III.  431.  Indiana: 
Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323,  68 
Am.  Dec.  638;  Hunt  v.  Bee.son,  18  Ind. 
380.  Maine  :  Hooper  i'.  Cummings,  45 
Me.  359 ;  Laberee  v.  Carlcton,  53  Me. 
211 ;  Osgood  V.  Abbott,  58  Me.  73.    Mary- 

562 


land :  Glenn  v.  Davis,  35  Md.  208,  6  Am. 
Rep.  389.  Massachusetts :  Crane  v.  Hyde 
Park,  135  Mass.  147,  149;  Bradstreet  v. 
Clark,  21  Pick.  389  ;  Hadlcy  v.  Hadiey 
Manuf.  Co.  4  Gray,  140 ;  Mcrrifield  v. 
Cobleigh,  4  Cush.  178.  Michigan:  Bar- 
rie  V.  Smith,  47  Mich.  130,  10  N.  W.  Rep. 
168 ;  Waldron  v.  Toledo,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  55 
Mich.  420,  21  N.  W.  Rep.  870.  Missis- 
sippi :  Gadberry  r.  Sheppard,  27  Miss. 
203.  New  Hampshire  :  Page  v.  Palmer, 
48  N.  H.  385  ;  Emerson  v.  Simpson,  43 
N.  II.  475,  82  Am.  Dec.  68 ;  Hoyt  v. 
Kimball,  49  N.  H.  322  ;  Chapin  v.  School 
Dist.  35  N.  H.  445.  New  Jersey :  McKel- 
way  V.  Seymour,  29  N.  J.  L.  321  ;  South- 
ard ('.  Cent.  R.  Co.  26  N.  J.  L.  13.  New 
York:  Lynde  v.  Hough,  27  Barb.  415; 
Ludlow  V.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  12  Barb. 
440;  AVilliams  v.  Dakin,  22  Wend.  201  ; 
Woodworth  v.  Payne,  74  N.  Y.  196,  30 
Am.  Rep.  298;  Craig  v.  Wells,  11  N.  Y. 
315;  Rose  v.  Hawley,  141  N.  Y.  366,  36 
N.  E.  Rep.  335,  133  N.  Y.  315,  31  N.  E. 
Rep.  236,  118  N.  Y.  502,  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
904.  North  Dakota  and  South  Dakota : 
Dak.  Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  3435.  Penn- 
sylvania :  Sharon  Iron  Co.  v.  Erie,  41 
Pa.  St.  341  ;  Newman  r.  Rutter,  8  Watts, 
51  ;  Lehigh  Coal  &  N.  Co.  v.  Early,  34 
W.  N.  C.  501,  29  Atl.  Rep.  736.  Wis- 
consin :  Mills  V.  Evansville  Seminary,  58 
Wis.  135,  15  N.  W.  Rep.  133. 


PERFORMANCE   AND   FORFEITURE.  [§§  679,  o8u. 

evidence  offered  to  show  a  breach  will  be   taken   most  sti-ongly 
against  him  and  iu  favor  of  the  grantee. 

679.  A  condition  will  not  be  extended  beyond  its  express 
terms  by  construction.  The  grantor  must  bring  himself  within 
these  terms  to  entitle  him  to  a  forfeiture.^  Thus  a  condition  that 
the  grantee  shall  not  convey  the  property  prior  to  a  day  named, 
which  was  about  ten  years  after  the  date  of  the  conveyance,  ex- 
cept by  a  lease  lor  years,  was  not  broken  by  a  lease  for  ninety- 
nine  years,  though  the  grantee  at  the  same  time  gave  the  lessee 
a  bond  for  a  conveyance  in  fee,  to  be  executed  after  the  period 
of  limitation.  Neither  the  bond  nor  the  lease  was  a  conveyance 
of  the  property.  Nor  do  both  instruments  together  constitute  a 
conveyance,  and  therefore  they  cannot  be  made  the  ground  for  a 
forfeiture.^ 

Under  a  conveyance  of  land  to  a  county  for  "  county  purposes," 
a  court-house  and  jail  were  erected  upon  it,  but  subsequently  the 
county  town  was  removed  to  another  place.  There  was  nothing 
in  the  deed  requiring  the  county  to  devote  the  land  to  any  spe- 
cial county  purpose,  and  therefore  it  was  held  that  the  mere 
removal  of  the  county  town  was  no  evidence  of  an  intention  to 
abandon  the  property,  or  to  devote  it  to  any  other  than  county 
purposes.'^ 

680.  It  must  be  shown  that  the  spirit  and  purpose  of  the 
condition  have  been  wilfully  disregarded  by  the  grantee  to 
establish  a  breach  of  it  which  will  authorize  a  reentry  by  the 
grantor.  He  is  required  to  establish  something  more  than  a 
technical  breach  through  the  action  of  a  stranger  without  the 
grantee's  permission.  A  conveyance  was  madc^  to  the  town  of 
Yonkers  "  upon  the  express  condition  that  the  strip  of  land  form- 
ing part  of  the  premises  above  described,  and  being  twelve  feet 
and  six  inches  in  width,  and  extending  all  along  said  Academy 
Street,  shall  forever  hereafter  be' and  remain  a  part  of  said  Acad- 
emy Street,  and  shall  never  be  used  for  any  other  purpose  whatso- 
ever. And  also  that  all  the  residue  of  said  land  liereby  conveyed 
shall  forever  hereafter  be  and  remain  public  and  open  as  a  public 

1  Shep.  Touch.  133  ;  Voris  v.  Renshaw,  road  Co.  40  KanH.  130,  19  Pac.  Rep.  316; 

49  111.  425;  Emerson   v.  Simpson,  43  N.  Gadbeiry  i;.  Shepimrd,  27  Miss.  203. 

H.  473  ;   Iladley  v.  Hadley  Manuf.  Co.  4  ^  Voris  v.  Renshaw,  49  III.  42.5. 

Gray,   140;   Lynde  r.   Hough,   27    Barb.  '  Poitevent    v.    Supervisors,   .58   Miss. 

415;    Ritchie    v.    Kansas,    &c.    Ry.   Co.  810;  Miller  v.  Tunica  Co.  67  Miss.  651, 

(Kans.)  39  Pac.  Rep.  718;  Wier  v.  Rail-  7  So.  K.p.  429. 

(}63 


§  08 1.]  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

liiglnviiy,  and  that  no  house,  building,  or  other  erection  whatsoever, 
except  a  public  monniuent,  shall  ever  be  built  or  ei'ected  or  per- 
niittt'd  upiMi  tlie  said  land,  or  upon  any  part  thereof"  The  owner 
of  adjoining  land  erected  a  building  which  encroached  upon  the 
highway  at  one  end  sixteen  inches,  and  at  the  otiier  two  inches, 
and  he  also  excavated  an  area  under  the  sidew;dk  which  was 
covered  with  gratings.  The  grantor  claimed  a  breach  of  the 
condition  and  a  right  of  reentry.  It  was  held  that  the  town  had 
not  done  or  knowingly  permitted  anything  which  amounted  to  a 
breach  of  the  condition  within  any  fair  and  reasonable  construc- 
tion of  it.  As  to  the  area  under  the  sidewalk  the  court  said  : 
"The  purpose  of  the  condition  was  to  preserve  the  land  conveyed 
for  public  purposes,  and  it  was  not  violated  by  permitting  the  soil 
or  space  imder  the  sidewalk  to  be  used  in  such  a  manner  as  is 
usual  and  common  in  cities  and  villages,  as  such  use  is  in  no  sense 
inconsistent  with  that  of  the  public  for  the  purpose  of  a  sidewalk 
for  persons  passing  along  the  street."  As  to  the  encroachment 
of  the  wall  of  the  building  upon  the  highway  the  court  said  : 
"  If  it  be  admitted  that  this  small  strip  of  land  was  included  in 
the  plaintiff's  grant  to  the  municipality  for  public  purposes,  and 
that  it  has  by  an  honest  mistake  been  appropriated  to  a  private 
purpose  in  the  manner  disclosed  by  the  record,  the  breach  of 
the  condition,  if  any,  would  be  purely  technical,  and  of  such  an 
unsubstantial  chai'acter  as  to  warrant  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
not  within  the  purpose  or  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  convey- 
ance." 1 

681.  A  substantial  performance  of  the  condition  discharges 
it,  and  it  is  for  the  jury  to  say  whether  the  condition  has  been  in 
substance  performed.^  Where  the  condition  was  for  the  payment 
of  a  certain  annuity  by  the  grantee  to  the  grantor  on  a  given  day  in 
each  year  during  the  life  of  the  grantor,  the  condition  was  not 
broken  so  long  as  the  annuity  was  not  in  arrears.  "  The  annuity, 
although  payable  in  money,  could  be  discharged  by  payment  other- 
wise, by  mutual  stipulation  and  consent ;  and  if  the  grantor,  after 
he  had  parted  with  the  pi-operty,  agreed  to  take,  in  lieu  of  the 

1  Rose  V.  Ilawley,  141  N.  Y.  366,  376,  Wilson  v.  Gait,  18  111.  431  ;  Chapin  v. 
378,  36  N.  E.  Rep.  335.  School  Dist.  35  N.  H  445;   Southard  v. 

2  Spaulding  v.  Hallenbeck,  39  Barb.  Central  R.  Co.  26  N.  J.  L.  13;  Plummer 
79,  85  ;  Avery  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  v.  Neile,  6  Watts  &  S.  91. 

R.  Co.  121   N.  Y.  31,  24  N.  E.  Rep.   20 ; 
.5B4 


PERFORMANCE   AND   FORFEITURE.  [§  681. 

annuity  stipulated  iu  the  deed,  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  prem- 
ises produced  by  his  own  management  and  superintendence  of 
the  property,  and  did'  in  fact  take  charge  of  the  property  and 
receive  the  rents  and  profits  in  accordance  with  this  agreement, 
this  was  a  discharge  of  the  annuity  as  to  each  year  in  which  pay- 
ment was  received  in  this  manner."  Parol  evidence  of  such 
agreeuient  is  admissible.^ 

A  condition,  in  a  deed  to  a  railroad  company  of  a  right  of  way, 
that  it  shall  erect  a  station  for  the  convenient  shipment  of  freight, 
the  character  of  which  is  not  specified,  is  complied  with  by  erec- 
tion of  a  board  shed,  without  the  placing  of  an  agent  there,  it 
being  in  structure  and  in  the  mode  of  its  management  like  most 
of  tlie  stations  on  the  road." 

A  grantor  conveyed  to  a  railroad  company  a  strip  of  land  be- 
tween grantor's  hotel  and  the  company's  depot  property,  which 
was  south  of  the  hotel.  The  deed  contained  a  clause  that  the 
conveyance  was  "on  condition  that  the  said  railroad  company  .  .  . 
shall  at  all  times  maintain  an  opening  into  the  premises  hereby 
conveyed,  opposite  the  Exchange  Hotel,  so  called,  adjacent  to 
the  premises  hereby  conveyed,  for  the  convenient  access  of  pas- 
sengers and  their  baggage  to  and  from  said  premises."  At  the 
time  of  the  conveyance,  defendant's  trains  stopped  opposite  to  the 
hotel,  so  that  passengers  would  cross  the  strip  conveyed  in  reach- 
ing the  hotel.  Afterwards  defendant  erected  a  depot  on  the  west 
side  of  the  hotel,  closed  up  the  opening  in  the  strip,  and  opened 
a  gateway  on  the  east  side  of  the  depot,  leading  directly  into 
the  hotel  propertv,  but  not  across  the  strip.  It  was  held  that,  as 
the  purpose  of  tlie  clause  was  to  secure  to  the  hotel  a  direct  com- 
munication with  the  d(>pot,  this  was  a  substantial  and  suflicient 
compliance  with  it.'^ 

A  condition  that  a  manufacturing  company  shall  "transfer"  its 
"  works  "  to  certain  land  does  not  require  tliat  the  identical  build- 
ings and  machinery  be  removed.' 

Whore  a  life  estate  was  reserved  to  the  grantor,  provided  he 
should  at  all  times  keep  the  i)roperty  insured  for  the  benefit  of 

1  Denham    v.    Wallur  (Ga.),  21   S.    K.  121  N.  Y.  31,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  20,  reversing 

Rep.  10'...  2N.Y.Supp.  101. 

-  Calthvell  V.  East  Broa-l   T..p  R-  Co.  '  Hanna    v.   Soutl.    St.  Jo.    Land   Co. 

(Pa.)  32  Atl.  Rep.  85.  (Mo.)  28  S.  W.  Rep.  6.52. 

3  Avery  u.  ]Sew  York  Cent.  &  II.  R.  Co. 

565 


§;^  G8l2,  680.]       CONDI  MONS    rKF.CEr)F:NT    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

thosi>  owning  the  insurable  interest,  and  by  oversiglit  the  policy 
was  written  jiayable.  to  the  grantor  alone,  the  life  estate  was  held 
not  lo  be  foi'feited,  especially  as  tlie  grantee  failed  for  ten  years 
to  c;ill  attention  to  the  form  of  the  policy,  and  did  not  ask  to 
have  a  pi'oper  one  taken  out,  and  as  it  appeared  that  the  grantor 
in  good  faith  attempted  to  comply  with  the  conditions  of  the 
d.-ed.i 

682.  A  condition  must  be  performed  within  a  reasonable 
time  when  no  time  is  specified  within  which  it  is  to  be  per- 
formed.^ Thus  a  condition  to  pay  a  mortgage  upon  the  property 
conveyed  must  be  performed  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the 
mortgage  becomes  due ;  and  a  condition  to  pay  marriage  portions 
to  the  grantor's  daughters  must  be  performed  within  a  reasonable 
time  after  receivinij  notice  of  their  marriage.^ 

A  condition  which  expressly  provides  for  performance  within  a 
reasonable  time  is  construed  in  the  same  manner  as  a  condition 
which  implies  a  performance  within  a  reasonable  time.  Where 
the  condition  was  that  the  grantee  should  within  a  reasonable 
time  build  a  church  upon  the  land,  the  court  took  judicial  notice 
of  the  fact  that  an  unexplained  delay  of  twenty-nine  years  within 
which  to  commence  to  build  a  church  is  unreasonable.* 

A  condition  to  be  performed  at  the  convenience  of  the  grantee 
should  be  performed  within  a  reasonable  time.  What  is  a  rea- 
sonable time  is  a  question  of  law  to  be  determined  according  to 
the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.^ 

683.  If  laud  is  granted  upon  a  condition  for  the  perform- 
ance of  which  no  time  is  limited,  either  in  express  terms  or 
from  the  nature  of  the  condition  itself,  it  is  a  general  rule  that 
the  grantee  has  his  lifetime  for  performance.^  But  if  it  appears 
that  a  prompt  performance  was  contemplated  by  the  parties,  or 
is  necessary  to  give  the  grantor  the  benefits  he  was  reasonably 

1  Ilurto  V.  Graut  (Iowa),  57  N.  W.  Eep.  ^  Ross  v.  Tremair,  2  Met.  495;  Rovvell 

899.  V.  Jowett,  69  Me.  293. 

■■2  Shep.  Touc-h.   134;  Rowell  y.  Jcwelt,  ^  Upington   v.  Corrigan,  69   Hun,  320, 

69  Me.  293,  71  Me.  408;  Fisk  v.  Chand-  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  451. 

ler,  30  Me.  79;  Stuyvesant  v.  Now  York,  ^  Adams   v.   Ore  Knob   Copper   Co.  4 

11    Paige,   414;    Hamilton    v.   Elliott,    5  Hu<rhes,  589. 

S.  &  R.  375;   Dickey  v.  M'Cullough,   2  «  Finlay  v.  King,  3  Pet.  346,  per  Mar- 
Watts  &  S.  88;  Hayden  v.   Stoughtoii,  5  sliall,  C.  J.;  Hamilton  v.  Elliott,  5  Serg. 
Pick.  .528 ;   Allen  v.  Howe,  105  Mass.  241  ;  &  R.  375,  383. 
Reed  v.  Hatch,  55  N.  H.  327. 

r)6G 


PERFORMANCE   AND   FORFEITURE.  [§§  684-686. 

entitled   to   receive   from   the   provision,   the  grantee  has  only  a 
reasonable  time  for  its  peii'ormauce.^ 

684.  If  the  time  for  the  performance  of  the  condition  is 
strictly  limited,  forfeiture  is  incurred  by  non-performance  within 
that  time,  in  all  cases  where  a  time  is  set  for  the  doing  or  per- 
formauct'  of  the  matter  contained  in  the  condition,  be  it  to  pay 
money,  make  an  estate,  or  the  like,  it  must  be  done  at  the  time 
agreed  upon  and  set  down  in  the  condition.  And  in  cases  where 
it  is  to  be  done  before  a  time  certain,  it  must  be  done  before  that 
time,  or  else  the  condition  is  broken.^  If  the  condition  be  that  a 
building  shall  be  erected  on  the  granted  land  within  five  years, 
for  nmnicipal  purposes,  a  failure  to  erect  the  building  within  the 
time  named  is  a  breach  of  the  condition,  for  which  a  forfeiture 
may  be  enforced.^ 

A  condition  that  a  court-house  shall  be  erected  upon  the  granted 
land,  and  maintained  for  a  certain  number  of  years,  is  broken  by 
the  removal  of  the  county  seat  to  another  village  within  that  time. 
The  condition  was  not  satisfied  by  keeping  and  maintaining  the 
building  upon  the  premises  after  the  county  seat  had  been  re- 
moved.'* 

685.  A  condition  to  save  the  grantor  harmless  from  the 
payment  of  a  certain  debt  is  not  broken  till  the  grantor  has 
been  damnified  by  being  compelled  to  pay  it.^ 

686.  Forfeiture  is  not  incurred,  under  a  condition  that  land 
shall  be  used  for  a  particular  purpose,  by  the  use  of  it  also  for 
another  purpose  consistent  with  the  purpose  specified,  in  the 
absence  of  any  positive  restriction  against  such  use.  A  con- 
veyance to  a  county  for  "  court-house  puiposes,"  with  a  condition 

1  Ha.nilton  v.  Ellioit,  5  Serg.  &  R.  375,  grant  of  the  Commonwealth,  nor  does  it 

.383,  per  Gibson,.!.     In  Massachusetts  it  is  o,;eraie  in  any  case  to  defeat  restrictions 

provided  bv  stiitute  thnt  vvlien  the  title  or  for  a  term   of  years  cert.iiu.     Acts  1887, 

use  of  reiil  e^itate  is  :iff'ected  by  conditions  eh.  418. 

or  restrictions  unlimited  a.s  to  time,  such  -  Shep.  Touch.  l.'U. 

conditions  or  restrictions  are  construed  as  •'  Clarke  v.   Brookfield,  81   Mo.  r.03,  51 

hein<;  limited  t"  tiic  term  of  tiiirty  years  Am.  Kep.  243. 

from  the  <l;^te  of  the  deed  or  other  instru-  "   I'epiu  C.  r.  I'rin.lle.  r,l  Wis.  301,  21 

ment,  or  the  date  of  the  probating  of  the  N.  VV.  Rep.  2.''.4. 

will   creating  .si.ch   conditions  or  restric-  '•  Sanborn  r.    Woodman,   5    Cu.sh.  3f, ; 

tions.  except  only  i..  ca.ses  of  gifts  -r  de-  Michigat.  State  Bank  r.  Hastings,  1  Doug, 

vises  for  public,  charitable,    or   religious  (Mich.)  225.41  Am.  Dec.  549;  Mich.gnu 

pnrpo>e3.     This  act  does  not  apply  to  tx-  State  Bauk  v.  Hammond,  1  Doug.  (Mich.) 

istiiig  conditions  or  restrictions,  or  to  st.ch  527. 
as   may    be  contained   in    a   deed,  gift,  or 

567 


§  i>-T.]  CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

that  tli(^  land  shall  revert  if  it  shall  cease  to  be  so  used,  is  not 
broken  by  any  incidental  or  collateral  use,  to  which  the  land  may 
be  temporarily  devoted,  which  does  not  conflict  with  its  continued 
use  for  court-liouse  ]iurposes,  as,  by  failure  to  inclose  it  entirely 
witli  a  fence,  and  allowing  hitcliing-posts  for  public  use  to  be 
ei'ected  on  the  uninclosed  portion,  or  a  temporary  structure  for 
posting  bills. ^ 

Where  land  is  conveyed  upon  condition  that  it  shall  be  used 
for  a  certain  purpose,  it  is  no  ground  of  forfeiture  if  it  is  used 
for  other  purposes,  provided  it  is  also  used  for  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  conveyed.^ 

687.  Whether  a  forfeiture  is  incurred,  by  the  abandonment 
of  the  use  specified  in  a  condition,  depends  upon  the  terms  and 
general  purpose  of  the  condition.  If,  by  a  condition  that  certain 
buildings  or  a  certain  structure  shall  be  permanently  located  upon 
the  granted  land,  it  is  meant  simply  that  this  land  shall  in  good 
faith  be  selected  as  the  site  of  such  buildings  or  structure,  and 
that  the  same  shall  be  erected  upon  the  granted  land,  the  condi- 
tion is  fulfilled  by  the  erection  of  the  buildings  or  structure  upon 
the  land,  and  the  use  of  it  for  a  time  for  the  jjurpose  intended, 
though  the  use  of  it  for  this  purpose  is  subsequently  abandoned.^ 

A  condition  in  a  conveyance  to  trustees  that  they  shall  build 
thereon  a  house  of  worship  when  they  think  fit,  and  permit  cer- 
tain persons  to  preach  in  said  church,  and  that  they  should  per- 
mit the  building  to  be  used  "for  such  other  purposes  as  should 
be  deemed  appropriate  and  necessary  to  further  the  cause  of 
Christ,"  is  fulfilled  by  erecting  a  church  within  a  reasonable  time 
and  using  the  church  as  long  as  it  is  fit  for  use.  The  trustees 
might  then  sell  the  land,  and  invest  the  proceeds  in  a  parsonage 
for  the  same  congregation  in  connection  with  a  new  church  on  a 
different  lot,  there  being  nothing  in  the  deed  in  the  nature  of  a 
covenant  to  rebuild,  or  words  indicating  a  desire  on  the  part  of 

1  Henry  v.  Etowah  Co.  77  Ala.  538  ;  ner  v.  Darnell,  128  Ind.  38,  27  N.  E.  Rep. 
Poitevent  v.  Hancock  Co   58  Miss.  810.  162  ;  Jeffersonville,  &c.  Tl.  Co.  v.  Barbour, 

2  McKelway  v.  Seymour,  29  N.  J.  L.  89  Ind.  375;  Higbce  v.  Rodeman,  129 
321;  Hadley  v.  Hadley  Manuf.  Co.  4  Ind.  244,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  442;  Poitevent 
Gray,  140;  Broadway  v.  State,  8  Blackf.  v.  Hancock  Co.  58  Miss.  810;  Miller  v. 
290  ;  McKissick  v.  Pickle,  16  Pa.  St.  140.  Tunica  Co.  67  Miss.  651,  7  So.  Rep.  429  ; 

•'!  Mead  v.  Ballard,  7  Wall.  290;  Berk-  Union  Canal  Co.  v.  Young,  1  Whart.  410, 
ley  V.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  33  Fed.  Rip.  30  Am.  Dec.  212;  Cushman  v.  Church, 
794;  Hunt  v.  Beeson,  18  Ind.  380;  Sum-     14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  26. 

568 


PERFORMANCE.  AND   FORFEITURE.  [§  688. 

the  grantor  that  the  land  should  revert  upon  a  failure  of  the 
trustees  to  maintain  the  church. ^ 

Wheie  land  with  buildings  was  conveyed  for  a  nominal  sum, 
in  consideration  that  the  grantee,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  would  for 
twenty  years  use  the  same  exclusively  for  hotel  purposes,  and  it 
was  provided  that  the  destruction  of  the  buildings  by  fire  should 
not  in  any  wise  affect  or  weaken  the  force  of  the  condition,  it 
was  held  that,  upon  the  destruction  of  the  buildings  by  fire  within 
that  time,  the  grantee  was  bound  to  rebuild,  and  that,  the  grantee 
having  shown  no  intention  to  rebuild  for  a  year  afterwards,  the 
grantor  was  entitled  to  enter  for  a  breach  of  condition.^ 

688.  Under  a  condition  in  a  deed  of  a  meeting-house  lot 
that  it  should  revert  unless  it  should  be  improved  for  that 
purpose,  no  forfeiture  is  incurred  by  allowing  the  house  to  get 
out  of  repair,  and  by  omitting  to  hold  religious  services  in  it  for 
several  vears,  if  such  services  were  afterwards  resumed.'^ 

A  d' ed  of  land  to  a  church  for  church  purposes  contained  a 
condition  that  if  the  seats  of  the  church  erected  on  the  premises 
shall  be  "  rented  or  sold,"  the  land  should  revert  to  the  grantor. 
It  was  held  that  a  sale  of  the  cliurch  to  an  individual  under 
an  order  of  court,  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  debts  of  the 
church  society,  by  a  deed  containing  the  same  condition,  was 
not  a  breach  of  the  condition.  A  conveyance  of  the  property 
was  not  a  renting  or  sale  of  the  pews  within  the  meaning  of  the 
condition,  as  an  interest  in  a  pew  was  separate  from  the  fee  of 
the  land.'^ 

A  deed  by  way  of  gift  was  made  to  the  trustees  of  a  church 
of  a  lot  of  land  adjoining  the  church  building,  "  to  be  used  as  a 
parsonage  lot  or  church  purpose  and  no  other,  and  when  not 
so  used  to  revert  back  "  to  the  donor.  No  parsonage  was  built. 
The  lot  remained  uninclosed,  but  was  used  by  persons  attending 
the  church  services  to  hitch  their  horses  upon.  This  was  held  to 
be  a  church  purpose,  and  any  cliurch  purpose  will  meet  the  re- 
quirement of  the  gran:.^  And  so  a  conveyance  of  land  to  a  reli- 
gious society,  ''  to  hold  so  long  as  needed  for  meeting  purposes," 

1  Hnrdy  v.  Wiley,  87  Va.  125,  12  S.  E.  ''  f)sKO()(l  v.  Abbott,  58  Me.  73. 

Rep.  2.3.'5.  ■*  Wood  worth  v.  Payne,  74  N.  Y.  196, 

2  Allen  V.  IIowc,  105  Mass.  241.     And     30  Am.  Kcp.  298. 

see  Eeed  v.  Hatch,  55  N.  H.  327.  ^  Bailey  v.  Wells,  82  Iowa,  131,  47  N. 

W.  Hep.  988. 

569 


§§  680,  690.]       CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

and  then  to  ii'vert,  is  not  broken  by  the  removul  of  the  churcli 
buikling  from  the  gi'anteil  land  to  an  adjacent  lot,  it'  the  land  is 
still  used  and  needed  for  any  purposes  connected  with  tlie  meet- 
ings of  the  society.^ 

But  where  a,  grant  of  land  was  made  on  condition  that  it 
should  be  held  for  the  sup})ort  of  any  minister  who  might  be  set- 
tled by  a  certain  religious  society  to  preach  in  a  meeting-house 
standing  or  to  be  built  on  the  granted  land,  and  the  society  after- 
wards took  down  the  meeting-house  and  erected  a  new  one  on  a 
different  site,  it  was  held  that  after  the  lot  had  remained  vacant 
for  three  ant!  a  half  years  there  was  a  breach  of  the  condition, 
and  tliat  the  breach  of  the  condition  was  not  saved  by  a  vote  of 
the  society  that  the  meetii^g-house  lot  should  be  reserved  for  the 
erection  of  a  meeting-house  at  some  future  period  when  they 
might  deem  it  expedient.^ 

A  condition  that  a  church  building  shall  be  erected  upon  the 
land,  and  thereafter  used  as  a  place  of  worship,  is  broken  by  a 
sale  of  the  property  and  its  conversion  to  business  purposes.^ 

689.  There  is  no  implication,  in  a  deed  of  land  to  a  church 
society  of  a  particular  denomination  for  church  purposes,  that 
the  use  of  the  land  is  limited  to  that  particular  denomination.* 

But  a  deed  of  land  to  an  individual  in  trust  for  the  use  of  the 
members  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Churcli  in  a  certain  town,  on 
condition  that  in  no  case  is  the  general  conference  of  that  church 
to  have  any  right  in  the  premises,  or  take  any  conti'ol  or  direction 
of  the  same,  creates  a  condition  which  is  violated  by  a  union  of 
this  church  with  an  annual  conference  subordinate  to  the  general 
conferencH.'^ 

690.  A  condition,  that  a  railroad  company  shall  construct 
its  road  or  use  the  granted  land  for  certain  purposes  within  a 
liniilc'd  time,  will  not  be  enforced  by  forfeituie  unless  there  is  a 
clear  and  absolute  breach  of  the  condition.  If  the  condition  is 
indefinite  in  regard  to  the  use  of  the  land,  the  court  will  regard  the 
use  and  occupation  of  the  land  bj'  the  railroad  company  for  some 
of  the  purj)()ses  demanded  by  the  terms  of  the  deed,  though  slight, 

1  Carter  r.  Branson,  79  Ind.  14.  ^  Woodworih   v.  Payne,  74  N.  Y.  196, 

2  Austin  V.  CambriiJgcport  Parish,  21      30  Am.  Pep.  298. 

Pick.  21.5.  5  Guild    V.    Richards,    16    Gray,    .309. 

'  Scott  V.  Stipe,  12  Ind.  74.  And  see  Congregational  Society  v.  Stark, 

34  Vt.  243. 
570 


PERFORMANCE   AND    FORFEITURE.  [§  691. 

as  a  compliance  witli  the  condition. ^  And  so,  where  land  was  con- 
veyed to  a  railroad  coiDpany  "  for  the  erection  and  maintenance 
thereon  of  freight-houses,  .  ,  .  side-tracks,  tui-nouts,  switches, 
and  buildings,  and  for  such  other  general  railroad  purposes  as 
may  be  necessary  and  expedient,"  and  it  appears  that  a  freight- 
house  was  built,  which  was  afterwards  sold  to  the  grantor,  and 
the  land  has  been  continually  used  for  railroad  purposes,  there 
was  no  breach  of  the  condition. ^ 

Where  a  conveyance  to  a  railroad  company  of  a  right  of  way 
through  the  grantor's  land  was  made  in  consideration  that  the 
company  should  construct  its  road  upon  such  land,  and  on  condi- 
tion that  if  it  did  not  so  construct  its  road  the  conveyance  should 
be  void,  though  it  did  not  construct  the  road  through  this  land 
for  more  than  thirteen  years,  but  during  this  time  it  was  con- 
structing its  road  over  other  parts  of  its  chartered  route,  it  was 
held  that  the  grantor  could  not  declare  a  forfeiture  after  the  road 
was  completed.^ 

A  conveyance  was  nuide  to  a  railroad  corporation  of  land  "  to 
be  used'  by  it  for  railroad  purposes,"  upon  condition  that,  "if 
work  is  not  commenced  on  said  road  in  two  years,  then  said 
property  is  to  revert  to"  the  grantor.  The  name  of  the  grantee 
was  at  the  time  of  the  delivery  of  the  deed  borne  by  a  railway 
company  formed  by  the  consolidation  of  three  different  compa- 
nies, and  also  that  previously  borne  by  one  of  the  companies 
entering  into  such  consolidation.  The  line  of  the  consolidated 
company  extended  from  a  point  in  North  Carolina  to  Atlanta  in 
tlie  State  of  Georgia.  It  was  held  that  the  construction  and 
operating  of  a  portion  of  its  line  of  railway  in  the  State  of  North 
Carolina,  within  the  time  specified  in  the  deed,  was  sufficient  to 
prevent  a  i-(>version  to  the  grantor."* 

691.  A  condition  in  a  conveyance  to  a  railroad  company 
that  the  company  shall  continue  to  maintain  and  operate  their 
railroad,  and  that  the  grant  shall  ''cease  with  the  non-use  of  the 
same  for  such  purpose,"  is  not  a  condition  that  the  road  shall 
be  built  over  the  entire  charter  route  of  the  company.     No  such 

1  Chute  V.  Washburn,  44  Minn.  312,  46  (Ala.)  13  So.  Kep.  311.  See,  also.  Knight 
N.  W.  Rep.  5.55.  v-   Alabama  Mid.    Hy.   Co.  (A hi.)  13   So. 

2  Noves  I'.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  (111.)      Rep.  200. 

21  N.  E.  Rep.  487.  *  Lester  v.  Georgia,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  9P  Ga. 

3  Yancey  v.   Savannah  &   W.    R.  Co.     802,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  113. 

671 


^  1)92.]  CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AND    SUBSK(iUENT. 

condition  is  expressotl  or  implied,  but  only  that  the  property  con- 
vevod  shall  be  usetl  for  the  construction  and  operation  of  the  rail- 
road tluM'con.^ 

A  condition  in  a  conveyance  to  a  railroad  company  that  the 
land  should  be  used  only  for  a  passenger  and  freight  depot  is  not 
violated  by  the  company's  extending  its  road  beyond  the  point 
of  its  terminus,  which,  when  the  deed  was  given,  was  upon  the 
granted  land,  and  thereby  making  it  a  place  of  transit  and  not 
merely  a  depot.  There  was  no  such  restriction  within  the  terms 
of  the  deed  or  in  the  contemplation  of  the  parties.^ 

But  a  condition  in  a  deed  to  a  railroad  company  that  the  com- 
pany will  erect  a  station  on  the  land  conveyed,  and  forever  main- 
tain it  as  a  regular  stopping-place  for  two  trains  daily  in  each 
direction,  is  not  complied  with  by  erecting  a  station  upon  other 
land,  distant  about  a  thousand  feet  from  such  land,  at  which  many 
more  trains  stop.^ 

Where  a  conveyance  was  made  to  a  railroad  company  in  con- 
sideration that  the  land  should  be  used  for  a  depot  and  other 
railroad  purposes,  with  a  condition  that  if  the  company  should 
discontinue  to  use  the  same  for  a  depot  the  grantor  might  resume 
possession,  it  was  held  that  the  railroad  company  could  not  re- 
move its  depot  and  retain  possession  of  the  land  for  other  rail- 
road purposes.* 

692.  A  condition  that  the  land  shall  be  devoted  to  the  pur- 
poses of  an  academy  or  public  school,  and  that  it  shall  revert 
when  it  ceases  for  two  years  together  to  be  used  for  such  purposes, 
does  not  mean  that  there  shall  be  a  forfeiture  when  two  years 
have  passed  without  a  school,  no  other  use  being  made  of  the 
property.  There  having  been  no  abandonment  of  the  property 
for  the  use  prescribed,  the  mere  non-use  of  it  for  such  time  would 
not  defeat  the  grant.^  And  so,  where  a  conveyance  of  land  was 
made  "for  the  purpose  of  building  a  schoolhouse  thereon,  and  to 
be  improved  for  the  benefit  of  schools,  and  for  no  other  purpose," 
with  a  provision  that,  if  the  grantee  shall  cease  for  two  years  in 

1  Morrill  v.  Wabash,  vSt.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  381.  And  see  Louisville,  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Co.  96  Mo.  174,9  S.  W.  Rep.  6.57.     And     Covington,  2  Bush,  526. 

see  St.  Louis  v.   Wiggins  Ferry  Co.    15  ^  Owen.sboro  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.   Griffeth 

Mo.  App.  227.  (Ky.),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  277. 

2  Southard  v.  Cent.  R.  Co.  26  N.  J.  L.  5  Qage  v.  School  Dist.  64  N.  H.  2.32,  9 
13.  ,\tl.  Rep.  387.     And  sec  Rowc  v.  Minne- 

3  Howell  V.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  37  Hun,  apolis,  49  Minn.  148,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  907. 

572 


PERFORMANCE   AND   FORFEITURE.  [§  693. 

succession  to  improve  tlie  land  for  such  purpose,  the  estate  shall 
be  forfeited,  and  it  appeared  that  a  sclioolhouse  was  built  on  the 
land  and  maintained  for  many  years,  when  the  school  was  dison- 
tinued,  and  no  school  had  been  kept  there  for  nearly  ten  years, 
when  the  grantor's  heirs  brought  their  writ  of  entry,  but  the 
town  had  not  abandoned  the  property  or  used  it  for  any  other 
purpose,  it  was  held  that  there  had  been  no  forfeiture  of  the 
estate.^  And  so  where  the  condition  was  that  the  land  should  be 
used  as  a  site  for  a  seminary,  and  it  was  so  used  for  several  years, 
and  then  for  several  years  was  not  so  used,  and  during  this  time 
the  acts  and  declarations  of  the  trustees  managing  the  seminar}^ 
evinced  an  intention  to  abandon  the  property  for  seminary  pur- 
poses, but  the  school  was  again  reopened,  it  was  held  that  there 
had  been  no  breach  of  the  condition  which  worked  a  forfeiture. 
In  neither  of  these  cases  was  there  a  complete  abandonment  of 
the  property  by  the  grantee.^ 

A  condition  that  the  premises  shall  be  used  only  for  school 
purposes  is  not  broken  by  an  occasional  use  of  the  building  for 
religious  or  temperance  meetings.^ 

693.  A  condition  that  is  personal  to  the  grantee,  as  where 
it  is  in  terms  confined  to  him  without  mentioning  his  heirs  or 
assigns,  must  be  performed  in  his  lifetime.  Upon  his  death  the 
condition  is  discharged,  and  the  estate  becomes  absolute  in  his 
heirs  or  devisees.^  A  provision  that  the  grantee  is  to  do  the 
thing,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  condition,  '^  forever,"  does  not 
necessarily  make  the  performance  of  it  binding  upon  his  heirs.'' 
On  the  other  hand,  a  condition  is  not  personal  merely  because 
the  grantee  bears  a  personal  relation  to  the  grantor,  as  where  the 
condition  is  for  the  support  of  a  parent  or  othei-  near  relative,  for 
such  a  condition  may  be  performed  by  another,  unless  tiie  per- 
sonal service  of  the  grantee  is  expressly  stipulated  for.*^  A  condi- 
tion for  the  support  of  the  grantor  has,  however,  sometimes  been 
considered  a  personal  condition.' 

1  Cr.ine  v.  Hviie  Park,  1^5  Mnss.  147.  "  Emerson   r.   Simpson,  43   N.   II.  475, 

2  Mills  V.  Evansvilh-  Seminary,  ."58  Wis.     82  Am.  Dec.  lf.8. 

13.5,  15  N.  W.  Rep.  133.     See,  also,  llowc  «  Wilson  r.  Wilson,  38  Me.  18,  61  Am. 

V.  Minneapolis,  49  Minn.  148,  51   N.  W.  Dec.  227;  .lo.slyn  v.  Parlin,  54  Vt.  670; 

Rep.  907.  Ilenry  v.  Tuppcr,  29  Vt.  358. 

3  Broadway  v.  State,  8  Blackf.  290.  "  Barker  v.  Cobb,  36  N.  11.  344 ;  Rol- 
*  Emerson  v.  Simpson,  43  N.  II.   475,  Hns  v.  Riley,  44  N.  II.  9. 

82  Am.  Dec.  168  ;  Page  v.  Palmer,  48  N. 

li.  385.  573 


§  694.]  CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

In  a  deed  of  a  right  of  way  to  a  railroad  company,  a  condition 
tliat  the  grantor  and  his  family  shall  have  free  passage  over  the 
road  ''  so  long  as  the  land  and  appurtenances  hereinbefore  de- 
scribed shall  be  used  as  a  railroad,  or  for  railroad  purposes,  under 
the  charter  of  said  corporation,"  was  but  a  limitation  of  the 
grant,  and  did  not  perpetuate  the  right  to  the  descendants  of  the 
grantor.  By  the  charter  of  the  company  the  State  reserved  the 
riglit  at  any  time  within  tw^enty  years  to  purchase  its  property  and 
franchises.  "  The  words  '  under  the  charter  of  the  corporation' 
were  therefore  necessary  to  limit  the  agreement  to  carry  to  the 
time  the  corporation  might  have  the  power  to  use  the  land  for 
railroad  purposes.  So,  too,  the  words  '  used  for  railroad  purposes  ' 
were  a  necessary  and  proper  limitation  of  the  contract  to  carry. 
If  the  location  of  the  road  were  changed,  and  the  land  conveyed  by 
the  grantor  should  revert  to  him,  the  parties  would  naturally 
provide  that  the  contract  to  carry  should  be  at  an  end.  Other 
contingencies  might  also  happen.  The  charter  of  the  corporation 
could  be  repealed  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature ;  its  franchise 
might  be  forfeited  for  misuser  or  non-user,  or  it  might  be  surren- 
dered. All  these  considerations  show  that  the  words  in  question 
were  words  of  limitation,  and  did  not  extend  the  word  'family' 
so  as  to  include  the  descendants  of  the  grantor  to  the  remotest 
generation."  ^ 

694.  But  where  the  condition  applies  to  the  property  itself, 
and  not  in  terms  to  the  grantee,  the  condition  is  not  personal, 
though  it  does  not  include  the  heirs  and  assigns  of  the  grantee. 
Thus  in  a  grant  of  land  a  condition  inserted,  that  the  property 
shall  not  be  used  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  may  be  en- 
forced by  forfeiture  for  a  breach  of  the  condition  against  a  subse- 
quent purchaser  of  the  land,  although  the  condition  does  not  in 
terms  include  tlie  heirs  and  assigns  of  the  grantee.  The  condi- 
tion applies  to  the  use  of  the  property.  It  runs  with  the  land.^ 
And  so  where  the  condition  was  that  the  land  should  be  used  for 
the  purpose  of  a  street  only,  the  condition  was  held  to  apply  to 
the  purchaser  from  the  grantee.^ 

1  Dodjre  v.  Boston  &  P.  R.  Co.  154  r.  WetherdI,  14  Kans.  616.  And  see 
Mass.  299,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  243,  per  La-  Hayes  v.  Waveily  &  P.  R.  Co.  51  N.  J. 
throp,  J.  Eq.  345,  27  Atl.   Rep.   648  ;  Verplanck  v. 

2  Odessa  Imp.   Co.  v.  Dawson,  5  Tex.  Wright,  23  Wend.  50G. 

Civ.  App.  487,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  576  ;  O'Brien         ^  Carpenter  v.  Graber,  66  Tex.  465,  1 

r)74 


WAIVER   OF  CONDITIONS.  [§§  695,  696. 

And  so  where  the  condition  was  to  build  a  church  within  a 
reasonable  time,  it  was  held  thiit  the  condition  was  annexed  to 
the  estate,  and  would  follow  it  after  the  death  of  the  grantee, 
into  the  hands  of  any  person  to  whom  it  might  come.^  A  con- 
dition to  "erect  upon  the  said  premises  a  cotton  factory  within 
two  years  "  is  a  condition  annexed  to  the  estate  conveyed,  and 
not  a  personal  covenant  of  tlie  grantee.^ 

When  the  condition  applies  to  the  property,  and  is  not  per- 
sonal to  the  grantee,  it  may  be  performed  by  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser from  the  grantee,  or  by  any  one  interested  in  the  land  or 
in  the  performance  of  the  condition.-^ 

695.  An  easement  in  fee  must  strictly  be  appurtenant  to 
land,  and  therefore  an  easement  in  gross  is  not  strictly  an 
easement  in  fee.  But  an  easement  in  gross  granted  to  a  city, 
"  its  successors  and  assigns,"  is  capable  of  assignment,  and  is  in 
perpetuity,  though  not  technically  in  fee.* 

VII.    Waiver  of  Conditions. 

696.  A  condition  is  released  by  a  conveyance  by  the 
grantor  of  all  his  interest  in  the  property  to  the  person  hold- 
ing the  title.'^  His  conveyance  of  such  interest  to  a  stranger 
also  operates  to  discharge  the  condition,  for  such  conveyance 
deprives  him  of  the  right  to  enter  for  a  breach,  and  it  does  not 
pass  such  right  to  the  stranger,  it  being  merely  a  right  of  action 
which  is  not  assignable.^  Though  such  conveyance  be  to  a  son  of 
the  grantor,  who  upon  his  father's  death  becomes  his  heir,  and  in 
the  absence  of  the  conveyance  would  have  a  right  of  entry,  the 

S.  W.  Rep.  178.    See,  also,  Pugh  v.  Mavs,  2  Langley  v.  Cliapin,  1.34  Muss.  82. 

60  Tex.    191  ;  Berryman   v.   Schumakcr,  «  I'fople  v.  Society  for  I'lopapntion  of 

67  Tex.  312,  .3    S.   W.   Kep.   46  ;  Collins  llic  (Jospcl,  2  I'ainc,    54.5;  LoiiiMille,  &c. 

Manuf.  Co.  'v.  Marcy,  2.5  Conn.  239,  where  K   Co.  v.  CoVington,  2  Bush,  526. 

the    condition   was    enforce.l    apainst   a  '  I'inkum  v.   Ivni  Claire,  81  Wis.  301. 

lessee  of  the  prantee.  althonph  the  point  51  N.  W.  Rep.  550;  Poull  .-.  Mockky,  33 

was  not  directly  raised  in  the  case.     See  Wis.  482. 

Eddv  V.  Ilinnant,  82  Tex.  354,  18  S.  W.  '  Hoyt  •:  Ketcham,  54  Conn.  60.  5  Atl. 

Rep.' 562,  as  to  liability  of  the  purchaser  Rep.   606.     And   see  Cleveland,  &c.   Ry. 

of  a  railroad  under  a  condition  in  a  deed  Co.  v.  Colmrn,  91  Ind.  557. 

to  the  original  .'ompany    to  furnish   the  '■  See  S  728;  Uice  v.  Boston  &  W.  R. 

grantor  a  free  passa^^eover  the  railroad  at  Co.  12  Allen,  141  ;   Hooper  ..  Cum.nmgs, 

^],  ji^gj,  45  Me.  359  ;  IVople  v.  Society  for  Prop- 

1  UpinKton  v.   Corrigan,  69  IIuu,  320,  a-alion    of   the    Go.spel,  2   Paine,    545 ; 

23  N.  Y.  Supp.  451.  Tinkl.un  ..  Krie  Ry.  Co.  53  Barb.  393. 

575 


§§  697,  698.]       CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

coiulition  is  extinguislied  by  the  conveyance.^  But  where  one 
granted  hind  upon  a  condition  subsequent,  taking  back  a  mort- 
gage for  the  purchase-price,  his  assignment  of  the  mortgage  to  a 
stranger  in  the  usual  form  passed  to  the  assignee  oidy  the  mort- 
gage title,  subject  to  be  defeated  by  a  breach  of  the  condition  in 
the  original  deed.^  Under  a  condition  that  so  much  of  the  prem- 
ises conveyed  as  should  not  be  used  for  a  purpose  specified,  a 
subsequent  conveyance  to  a  third  person  by  the  grantor  of  the 
part  not  used  for  such  purpose,  bounding  the  land  by  a  line  run- 
ning along  certain  improvements  made  by  the  gi-antee,  is  an 
admission  by  the  grantor  that  the  land  beyond  such  line  was  used 
or  needed  for  use  by  the  grantee  for  the  purpose  specified.^ 

697.  A  condition  which  is  personal  to  the  grantor,  or  for 
the  benefit  of  the  residue  of  bis  estate,  is  waived  by  a  convey- 
ance of  such  residue  to  the  purchaser  of  the  part  to  which  tlie 
condition  was  attached.  Thus,  where  the  owner  of  a  tract  of 
land  conveyed  a  small  parcel  of  it  with  a  condition  that  the 
grantee  should  support  a  fence  around  the  land  conveyed,  and 
subsequently  conveyed  the  residue  to  one  who  had  become  the 
owner  of  the  small  parcel,  and  this  owner  removed  the  fence,  it 
was  held  that  his  removal  of  the  fence  was  an  extinguishment  or 
waiver  of  the  condition.  The  residue  or  part  last  conveyed  was 
afterwards  reconveyed  to  the  original  grantor,  who  entered  upon 
the  small  parcel,  claiming  a  forfeiture.  But  it  was  held  that  the 
condition,  once  having  been  waived  or  extinguished,  was  not  re- 
vived by  the  reconveyance.'* 

698.  A  third  person  who  is  beneficially  interested  in  the 
condition  has  no  power  to  waive  or  release  it,  if  the  condition 
is  such  that  the  grantor  may  be  supposed  to  have  an  interest  in 
its  performance,  though  such  person  in  whose  favor  the  condition 
is  made  is  willing  to  waive  its  performance.^  Only  the  grantor,  or 
his  heirs  having  the  legal  estate,  can  dispense  with  such  a  condi- 
tion. A  grantor,  who  has  conveyed  land  on  condition  that  he 
and  his  wife  should  be  allowed  to  reside  thereon  during  their 
respective  lives  and  receive  support  from  the  grantee,  may  waive  a 

1  Rice  V.  Boston  &  \V.  R.  Co.  12  Allen,         *  Merrifield  r.  Cohleigh,  4  Cush.  178. 
141.  5  Kowell  r.  Jewett,  69   Me.   293;  Gray 

2  Merritt  v.  Harris,  102  Mass.  326.  v.  Blanchard,  8  Picii.  284,  292.     See,  con- 
'  McKelway  v.   Sevmour,  29  N.  J.  L.     tra,  Jones  v.  Bramhlet,  2  111.  276  ;  Boone 

321.  V.  Tipton,  15  lud.  270. 

576 


WAIVER   OF   CONDITIONS.  [§§  699,  700. 

breach  of  the  condition  both  as  to  himself  and  as  to  his  wife,  and 
his  waiver  is  sufficient  without  any  waiver  by  his  wife,  she  hav- 
ing joined  in  the  deed  merely  to  release  dower ;  i  but  it  has  been 
held  that  after  the  death  of  the  grantor  his  widow  may  make 
a  valid  release  to  the  grantor  of  such  condition.^ 

699.  A  condition  may  be  waived  by  acts  as  well  as  by  ex- 
press release.3  If  the  grantor  permits  the  property  to  be  used  in 
violation  of  the  condition,  and  especially  if  he  stands  bv  and 
allows  valuable  improvements  to  be  made  thereon,  he  will  not  be 
allowed  to  insist  upon  a  forfeiture,  and  thus  acquire  the  improve- 
ments made  upon  the  strength  of  his  acquiescence.'*  Thus,  where 
the  condition  was  tliat  no  liquor  should  be  sold  on  the  property, 
but  the  grantee  made  such  use  of  the  land  for  eleven  years,  with 
the  grantor's  knowledge  and  without  objection  by  him,  and  made 
improvements  adapted  to  sucli  use,  equity  will  not  permit  a  for- 
feiture of  the  estate,  but  will  leave  the  grantor  to  his  other  reme- 
dies.^ Thus,  also,  where  land  was  granted  to  a  railroad  company 
upon  condition  that  the  road  should  be  completed  b}^  a  certain 
time,  and,  after  the  company's  failure  to  do  this,  the  grantor  suf- 
fered the  compau}'  to  go  on  and  incur  furtlier  expense  in  con- 
sti'ucting  the  road  without  making  objection,  it  was  held  that  he 
bad  waived  the  condition  and  forfeiture.^  Any  acts  on  the  part 
of  the  orrantor  which  are  inconsistent  with  a  claim  of  forfeiture 
are  evidence  of  his  waiver  of  the  condition," 

700.  A  condition  for  the  payment  of  money  at  a  certain 
time  is  waived  by  the  acceptance  of  the  money  after  a  breach.*^ 
If  the  condition  is  one  for  the  payment  of  money  at  stated  times, 
and  preceding  payments  have  been  made  without  much  regard  to 

1  Hubbard   v.   Hubbard,  97  Mass.  188,  •"'  Ludlow  v.  N.  Y.  &  H.  R.  Co.  12  Barb. 

93  Am.  Dec.  75.  440.     And  see  Sharon  Iron  Co.   v.   Erie, 

•^  Tanner  v.  Van  Bibber,  2  Duv.  .550.  41  Pa.  St.  341  ;  Joues  i-.   Brainbkt,  2  111. 

3  Guibl    V.    Richards,    16    Gray,    309;  276. 

Sharon  Iron  Co.  v.  Erie,  41  Pa.  St.  341  ;  •   Andrews  u.  Senter,  32  Me.  394;  Frost 

Carbon  Block  Coal  Co.  v.  Murphy,  101  i-.  Butler,  7  Me.  225,  22   Am.  Dec.  199; 

Ind.  115;  Barrie  v.  Smith,  47  Mich.  130,  Ilabbard   v.   Hubbard,   97    Mas.x.    188,93 

ION.  W.  Rep.  168.  Am.   Dec.  75;  Spauldinj,'   v.    Ilallenbcck, 

*  Barrie  v.  Smith,  47  Mich.   130,  10  N.  39  Barb.  79. 

W.  Rep.   168;  Hammond  v.  Port  Royal  ^  Chalker    v.    Chalkor,    1    Conn.   79,   6 

Ry.  Co.  15S.  C.  10,35;  Kennery.Amer-  Am.  Dec.   206;  Dougal  v.   Fryer,  3  Mo 

lean  Contract  Co.  9  Bu-h,  202.  40,  22  Am.  Dec.  458. 

5  LehiKh  Coal  Co.  v.  Early,  162  Pa.  St. 
338,  29  All.  Rep.  736. 

VOL,  I,  677 


§§  701-703.]       CONDITIONS    PRECKDENT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

the  precise  time  of  their  maturity,  equity  will  not  allow  a  for- 
feiture for  a  payment  not  niade  on  the  precise  day  it  was  due,  but 
tendered  a  few  days  afterwards,  when  under  the  circumstances  it 
woultl  be  gnxssly  inequitable  to  allow  a  forfeiture.^ 

701.  A  breach  of  a  condition  to  furnish  support  to  the 
grantor  is  waived  by  his  returning  to  the  grantee  after  an 
absence  and  accepting-  supj)()rt  from  him.  "The  pei'son  to  whom 
such  support  is  due  always  has  the  right  to  elect  whether  he  will 
waive  or  insist  upon  a  partial  or  full  failure,  for  a  brief  time,  to 
perform  such  a  condition,  as  putting  an  end  to  the  contract,  and 
his  right  to  support.  The  failure  to  perform,  which  will  defeat 
the  vesting  of  the  title,  should  be  a  failure  in  substance,  rather 
than  of  the  letter  of  the  contract.  Otherwise,  after  years  of 
faithful  performance,  one  might  lose  or  be  divested  of  his  estate 
by  a  technical  or  partial  failure.  Where  both  parties  are  living 
on  the  estate,  and  in  some  sense  in  possession,  so  that  a  reentry  is 
not  required  to  terminate  the  conditional  estate,  it  is  more  impera- 
tive that  the  grantor  should  by  some  unmistakable  act  indicate 
his  intention  to  put  an  end  to  the  contract  for  the  vesting  of  the 
estate  upon  a  failure  to  perform  the  condition.  Exacting,  or 
acquiescing  thereafter  in  the  performance  of  the  condition  is 
evidence  for  the  jury,  from  which  they  would  be  warranted  in 
inferring  and  finding  that  he  did  not  insist  upon  ending  of  the 
contract  for  such  non-performance,  but  that  he  still  treated  it  as 
subsisting."  ^ 

702.  Exacting  or  acquiescing  in  the  further  performance  of 
a  condition  is  a  legal  waiver  of  any  acts  then  known  to  the 
grantor  which  otherwise  might  work  a  forfeiture.  Even  treating 
the  condition  as  still  subsisting  and  obligatory  after  an  alleged 
breach  of  it  is  a  sufficient  waiver.^  A  breach  of  a  condition  to 
support  is  waived  by  continuing  to  accept  it  for  a  time  after- 
wards.^ 

703.  A  waiver  of  a  condition,  whether  precedent  or  subse- 
quent, is  implied  if  the  grantor  prevents  its  fulfilment,  or 
absolutely  refuses  performance  on  his  part.     But  such  refusal,  to 

1  Shade  v.   Oldroyd,  39  Kans.  313,  18         ^  Hubbard  v.  Tlnhhard,  97  :\Ta'iR.   1  8S, 
Pac.    l?ep.    198;    National    Land   Co.   v.     93  Am.  Dec.  7.5. 
Perrv.  23  Kans.  140.  *  Hubbard  v.  Hubbard,  97  Mass.  188. 

-  Norton  v.  Perkins,  67  Vt.  203.  213,  31 
Atl.  Rep,  148,  per  Ross,  C.  J. 
578 


WAIVER   OF   CONDITIONS.  [§§  704,  705. 

amount  to  a  waiver,  must  be  absolute,  and  must  be  acted  uj)on 
as  such  by  the  grantee.  If  the  grantor,  in  a  conveyance  under 
which  the  vesting  of  "the  title  is  made  to  depend  u|)Oii  the 
grantee's  paying  a  specified  sum  on  or  before  a  day  named,  notifies 
the  gi-antee  that  he  considers  the  deed  as  conferring  an  option 
only,  and  that  he  withdraws  the  option,  this  does  not  justify  the 
grantee  in  failing  to  make  or  tender  payment  as  provided,  if  he 
wishes  to  assert  any  right  under  the  deed.^ 

704.  A  waiver  of  a  breach  of  a  condition  may  be  presumed 
after  a  reasonable  lapse  of  time  has  occurred  without  any 
assertion  of  right  by  the  grantor  under  the  condition  ;  but  it  is 
incumbent  upon  the  grantee  to  allege  and  prove  such  a  lapse  of 
time.^  Waiver  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  and  any  evi- 
dence which  shows  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  grantor  to 
waive  his  riglit  to  claim  a  forfeiture  is  admissible  upon  this  ques- 
tion. Whether  in  any  particular  case  there  is  a  waiver  is  a  nuit- 
ter  of  intention  on  the  part  of  the  grantor,  to  be  ascertained  from 
his  acts  and  all  the  attendant  circumstances  of  the  case.^ 

Where  the  condition  was  that  the  grantee  should  fence  the 
land  and  keep  the  fence  in  repair,  and  the  land  remained  unfenced 
for  fifty  years,  with  the  grantor's  full  knowledge  of  the  breacli  of 
the  condition,  and  without  any  complaint  or  entry  by  him,  it  was 
held  that  he  had  waived  the  condition.'^ 

705.  But  a  mere  silent  acquiescence  in  an  act  which  consti- 
tutes a  breach  of  a  condition  does  not  alone  amount  to  a 
waiver  of  the  right  to  claim  a  foift'iture.^  Thus,  where  tlie 
condition  was  that  intoxicating  liquor  should  not  be  sold  on  tlie 

1  Borst  V.  Simpson,  90  Ala.  373,  7  So.  15  S.  C.  10,  3.-) ;  riunib  v.  Tul.bs,  41  N.  Y. 
Rep.  814  ;  Brooklyn  Life  lus.  Co.  r.  Bled-  442,  449  ;  Merrifield  /■.  CoMdgli,  4  Gush, 
soe,  52  Ala.  .WS.  I"**- 

2  Hooper  v.  Cummint:s,  45  Me.  3.59;  *  Hooper  >:  Cumniiutrs,  45  Me.  359; 
Andrews  ;;.  Scnter,  32  Me.  394 ;  Willard  Scovill  v.  McMahon,  (12  Conn.  378,  26 
V.  Henry,  2  N.  H.  120;  Ludlow  v.  New  Atl.  Hep.  479. 

York  &  II.  R.  Co.  12  Biirb.  440;  Kinney  "■'  Adams   v.  Ore   Knol)  Copper   Co.  4 

r.  Shell.yville  (Ky.),  1   S.  W.  Rep.  472;  Huf,rbcs,  589;  Gray  v.  Blanchard.  8  Pick. 

Kenner  v.  American  Contract  Co.  9  Bii.sli,  284  ;   Carbon   Block  Coal  Co.  v.  Murpby, 

202;  Barrie    v.   Smith,  47   Mich.   130,  10  101  Ind.  115;  Lindsey  v.  Lindscy,  45  Ind. 

N.  W.  Rep.  168  ;  Berry  man  v.  Scbnmakcr.  552,  507  ;  Rowcll  v.  Jewett,  69  Me.  293  ; 

67  Tex.  312,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  46;  Hnrto  v.  Frost  v.  Butler,  7  Me.  225,  22   Am.    Dec. 

Grant  (Iowa).  57  N.  W.  Rep.  809  ;  Lehigh  199;   Jackson   r.  Cry.sler,  1   Johns.   Cas. 

Coal   &   N.  Co.   V.  Earlv,  34  W.  N.  Cas.  125;   Ho.se  v.  Hawlcy,   118   N.  Y.  502.  23 

501,  29  Atl.  Rep.  736.  "  N-  1'-  liep.  904;  Clark  ,;.  Martin,  49   Pa. 

8  Hammond  v.  Port  Royal,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  St.  289. 

579 


§  70C).]  CONDITIONS    PKECKDENT    AND    SUBSEQUKNT. 

preniidos,  tlie  mere  sale  of  a  glass  of  liquor  to  a  third  person 
in  the  presence  of  the  grantor  does  not  necessarily  constitute  a 
breach  of  the  condition.  The  bodily  presence  of  the  grantor 
mi'T'ht  under  some  circumstances  be  evidence  of  his  assent  to  the 
sale,  and  under  other  eircunistanees  it  would  not.  At  most  it 
wonld  be  evidence  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury  on  the  question  of 
Ins  assent.^  An  unauthorized  sale  by  a  third  person,  without  the 
knowledge  or  fault  of  the  grantee,  would  not  work  a  forfeiture.- 
But  open  and  public  sales  on  the  premises  by  the  grantee's  ten- 
ant, with  the  assent  or  with  the  knowledge  of  the  grantee,  and 
without  reasonable  diligence  on  his  part  to  prevent  it,  will  work 
a  forfeiture.^  If  the  grantee,  as  soon  as  he  discovers  that  his 
tenant  is  selling  spirituous  liquors  on  the  premises,  procures  his 
removal,  he  will  save  a  forfeiture.  It  is  not  negligence  on 
his  part  to  make  a  lease  without  a  condition  that  it  should  be  void 
in  case  the  lessee  should  sell  intoxicating  liquor,  especially  if 
the  lease  contains  an  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  that 
he  would  not  sell  any  article  the  sale  of  which  would  injure  the 
grantee's  title.^ 

But  if  the  grantor  stands  by  and  allows  the  grantee  to  incur 
expense  and  make  improvements  with  a  view  to  conducting  a 
business  or  doing  acts  which  are  a  breach  of  the  condition,  the 
grantor's  inaction  may  have  the  effect  of  a  waiver  of  the  condi- 
tion.^ 

706.  Where  a  condition  is  altered  by  a  verbal  agreement, 
but  the  grantee  fails  to  perform  the  condition,  either  as  originally 
expressed  or  as  altered,  the  grantor  is  not  precluded  from  claim- 
ing a  forfeiture,  as  his  consent  to  the  change  was  conditional  upon 
a  compliance  with  the  altered  condition.  The  parol  agreement  for 
a  change  in  the  condition  was  not  obligatoi-y  ;  but  the  grantor 
would  be  estopped  to  insist  upon  a  forfeiture  for  a  breach  of  a 
condition  he  had  agreed  to  dispense  with.  His  agreement,  how- 
ever, for  a  change  of  the  condition,  is  not  inconsistent  with  his 

1  Plumb  V.  Tubba,  41  N.  Y.  442,  449.  ^  Hooper   v.  Cummings,  45    Me.  S.'Sg ; 

-  Collins    Manuf.    Co.    v.    Marcy,    25  Barrie  v.  Smith,  47  Mich.  130,   10  N.  W. 

Conn.  242.  Rep.  168;   Kenncr  );.  American  Contract 

3  Collins  Manuf.  Co.  ?•.  Marcy,  25  Conn.  Co.   9   Bush,  202;  Ludlow  ?;.  New  York, 

242;  Lehigh  Coal  &  N.  Co.  v.  Karly,  162  &c.  R   Co.  12  Biirh.  440;   Lehigh   Coal  & 

Pa.  St.  3.38.  N.  Co.  V.  Early,  162  Pa.  St.  338. 

■*  Collins  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Marcy,  25  Conn. 
242. 

580 


REENTRY    FOR    FORFEITURE.  [^§  707,  708. 

right  to  insist  upon  a  forfeiture  when  the  grantee  failed  to  com- 
ply with  the  condition  in  either  form.  Whether  there  was  a 
waiver  is  a  question  of  intention,  and  it  was  clear  that  the  grantee 
did  not  intend  to  waive  the  original  condition,  except  in  case  he 
should  comply  with  the  changed  condition.^ 

But  where  a  city  made  a  deed  to  a  corporation  for  a  nominal 
consideration  upon  condition  that  the  corporation  should  do  tw^o 
things,  one  of  which  it  performed  but  failed  to  perform  the  other, 
the  city  agreed  that  the  corporation  might  do  something  else 
instead,  and  extended  the  time  for  performance.  Upon  its  failure 
to  perfoi'm  the  substituted  service,  the  city  brought  ejectment.  It 
was  held  that  the  city  could  not  recover,  because  the  original 
condition  had  been  waived  and  was  gone  forever,  as  a  condition, 
and  as  if  it  had  never  been  made  a  part  of  the  deed.^ 

707.  A  condition  once  waived  is  wholly  gone.  The  estate 
becomes  absolute  in  the  grantee,  and  cannot  be  divested  by  any 
future  breach.^  A  release  of  condition  in  part  may  operate  as  a 
waiver  in  whole.*  But  such  a  release  does  not  have  this  effect  in 
equity,  where  a  specific  performance  of  the  unreleased  part  of 
the  condition  is  sought.'^ 

But  the  waiver  of  one  breach  of  a  continuing  condition,  such  as 
a  condition  for  the  payment  of  rent,  or  for  making  repairs,  does 
not  destroy  the  condition,  but  it  may  be  enforced  for  a  subse- 
quent breach.^ 

VIII.  Reentry  for  Forfeiture. 

708.  The  title  to  land  conveyed  upon  a  condition  subse- 
quent vests  in  the  grantee,  and  his  failure  to  perform  tlu-  condi- 
tion does  not  divest  the  title.  The  title  is  divested  only  upon  tlie 
entry  of  the  grantor  or  his  heirs  for  tlu-  condition  broken,  or  by 
a  suit  for  the  recovery  of  possession,  or  other  act  equivalent  to  an 

1  Ragsdale  v.  Vicksbiirg  &  M.  K.  Co.  47  Mich.  130,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  168;  Ham- 
go  Miss.  480.  monrl  v  Port   Royal  Ry.  Co.  15  S.  C.  10, 

-   Sliaron    lion  Co.  v.  Eric,  +1    Pa.  St.  .35;  Sharon  Iron  Co.  r.  Erie.  41    Pa.   St. 

341.  .341  ;  Dickey  i;.    M'Cullough,  2  Watts  & 

■'  Dunipor's  Ca-sc,  4  Coke  Rep.   119,  1  S.  88. 

Smith's  Lead.    Cas.    9.5;    GuiM    r.    Rich-  <  Dakin  c  Williams.  17  Wcml.447. 

arcls,  16  Gray,  .309  ;    Rice   v.  Poston  &  W.  ^  Clark  v.  Martin,  49  Pa.  St.  289. 

R.  Co.  12  Allen,  141  ;  Merrifiehl  r.  Cob-  •"'  I)iim|)or'.s  Case,  1  Smith's  Lead.  Cas. 

lei^'h,  4  Cu.sh.   178;   Wiliiams  v.  Dakin.  95,  98,  note  ;  McKildoe  v.   Darracott,    13 

22   Wend.   201  ;  Ludlow  v.  New  York  &  Gratt.  278. 


H.  R.  Co.  12  Barb.  440;   Barrie  v.  Smith, 


581 


§  708.] 


CONDI  I  IONS    I'RECKDKNT   AND    SUBSEQUENT. 


tMitiy.  TIk'  possibility  of  voverter  merely  is  not  an  estate  in 
laiul,  tuul  until  the  contingency  of  the  condition  happens  the 
whole  title  is  in  the  grantee,  and  the  grantor  has  nothing  he  can 
convey.^ 

Non-performance  of  the  condition,  or  a  breacli  of  it,  does  not 
of  itself  determine  the  grantee's  estate,  though  it  is  provided 
that  upon  breach  the  estate  shall  be  void,  or  shall  revert  to  the 
o-rantor.2 


1  Ruch  V.  Rock  Inland,  97  U.  S.  693 ; 
Davis  V.  Gray,  16  Wall.  203;  Schulen- 
berg  V.  Haniinaii,  21  Wall.  44.  Arkan- 
sas :  Worthen  i\  Ratcliffe,  42  Ark.  330  ; 
Skipwith  1-.  Martin,  r^0  Ark.  141,  6  S.  W. 
Rep.  514.  California:  Where  a  grant  i.s 
inaiie  upon  condition  subsequent,  aud  i.s 
subsequently  defeated  by  the  non-perform- 
ance of  the  condition,  the  person  other- 
wise entitled  to  hold  under  the  grant  must 
reconvey  the  property  to  the  grantor  or 
his  successors,  by  grant  duly  acknow- 
ledged, for  record.  Civ.  Code,  §  1109. 
Colorado:  Denver,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  School 
Dist.  14  Colo.  327,  23  Pac.  Rep.  978. 
Georgia :  Norris  v.  Milner,  20  Ga.  563 ; 
Taylor  v.  Sutton,  15  Ga.  103,  60  Am. 
Dec.  682.  Upon  breach  of  condition  sub- 
sequent, working  a  forfeiture,  the  person 
to  whom  the  estate  is  limited  may  enter 
immediately.  Code  1882,  §  2299.  Idaho: 
Same  statutory  provision  as  in  California. 
R.  S.  1887,  §  2931.  Indiana:  Cory  v. 
Cory,  86  Ind.  567,  573 ;  Elkhart  Car 
Works  V.  Ellis,  113  Ind.  215,  15  N.  E. 
Rep.  249;  Lindsey  v.  Lindsey,  45  Ind. 
552;  Throp  v.  Johnson,  3  Ind.  343; 
Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323,  68 
Am.  Dec.  63S  ;  Cross  v.  Carson,  8  Blackf. 
138,  44  Am.  Dec.  742.  Kentucky  :  Rick- 
etts  V.  Louisville,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  91  Ky.  221, 

15  S.  W.  Rep.  182;  Myers  v.  Daviess,  10 
B.  Mou.  394  ;  Kenner  v.  American  Con- 
tract Co.  9  Bush,  202.  Maine:  O.sgood  v. 
Abbott,  58  Me.  73  ;  Tallman  v.  Snow,  35 
Me.  342  ;  Chapman  v.  Pingree,  67  Me. 
198.     Massachusetts:  Guild  v.  Richards, 

16  Gray,  300;  Hubbard  v.  Hubbard,  97 
Mass.  188,  93  Am.  Dec.  75;  Shattuck  v. 

582 


Hastings,  99  Mass.  23.  Michigan  :  Hay- 
ward  V.  Kinney,  84  Mich.  591,  599,  48 
X.  W.  Rep.  170.  Minnesota:  Chute  v. 
Washburn,  44  Minn.  312,  46  N.  W.  Rep. 
555.  Mississippi :  Memphis,  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Neighbors,  51  Miss.  412.  Missouri: 
Adams  v.  Liudell,  5  Mo.  App.  197; 
O'Brien  v.  Wagner,  94  Mo.  93,  7  S.  W. 
Rep.  19.  Nevada:  Hamilton  v.  Kneeland, 
1  Nev.  40.  New  Hampshire :  Coon  v. 
Brickett,  2  N.  H.  163;  Barker  v.  Cobb, 
36  N.  H.  344.  New  Jersey:  State  i;. 
Brown,  27  N.  J.  L.  13  ;  New  Jersey  Zinc 
&  Iron  Co.  V.  Morris  Canal,  &c.  Co.  44 
N.  J.  Eq.  398,  15  Atl.  Rep.  227.  New 
York  :  Vail  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  106 
N.  Y.  283,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  607  ;  Duryee 
r.  New  York,  96  N.  Y.  477  ;  NicoU  v.  New 
York  &  E.  R.  Co.  12  N.  Y.  121  ;  Under- 
bill V.  Saratoga  R.  Co.  20  Barb.  455; 
Ludlow  V.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  12 
Barb.  440;  Fonda  v.  Sage,  46  Barb.  109. 
North  Carolina:  Phelps  v.  Chesson,  12 
Ired.  1 94.  Oklahoma  :  Same  provision  as 
in  California.  G.  S.  1893,  ch.  82,  §  10. 
Texas  :  Berryman  v.  Schumaker,  67  Tex. 
312,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  46;  Gulf,  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Dunman,  74  Tex.  205,  11  S.  W.  Rep. 
1094. 

2  Adams  v.  Ore  Knob  Copper  Co.  4 
Hughes,  589  ;  Osgood  v.  Abbott,  58  Me. 
73;  Adams  v.  Liudell,  5  Mo.  App.  197  ; 
Towie  V.  Smith,  2  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  489  ;  Stuy- 
vesant  r.  Davis,  9  Pai<re,  427  ;  Phelps  r. 
Chesson,  12  Led.  194  ;  O'Brien  u.  Wagner, 
94  Mo.  93,  7  S.  W.  Rep.  19. 

See  Thrall  v.  Spear,  63  Vt.  266,  22 
Atl.  Rep.  414. 


REENTRY    FOR   FORFEITURE.  [§§  709-711. 

Where  tliere  is  no  gi-ant  of  the  fee  there  can  be  no  forfeiture.^ 
If  the  condition  is  one  that  the  htw  will  not  enforce,  the  estate 
vests  absolutely  in  the  grantee  upon  the  conveyance.^ 

709.  If  the  grantor  reserves  to  himself  some  special  rem- 
edy for  a  breach  of  the  condition,  other  than  a  forfeiture  of  the 
estate,  he  may  be  limited  to  that  remedy.'^ 

710.  The  grantor  may  prefer  some  other  remedy  than  a 
forfeiture  for  a  breach  of  condition.  He  may  prefer,  by  a  pro- 
ceeding in  equity,  to  enjoin  the  grantee  from  doing  something  in 
violation  of  the  terms  of  the  condition.*  He  may  maintain  a  bill 
for  the  specific  performance  of  the  terms  of  a  condition ;  or  he 
may  maintain  an  action  for  damages  sustained  by  reason  of  a 
breach  of  the  condition.^ 

711.  Until  forfeiture  is  enforced,  the  grantee  may  convey  or 
devise  the  estate,  and  upon  his  death  it  descends  like  an  estate 
not  subject  to  condition.  The  condition  may  be  enforced  against 
the  property,  whoever  may  be  the  owner  of  it.  "  The  condition 
doth  always  attend  and  wait  upon  the  estate  or  thing  whereunto 
it  is  annexed;  so  that  although  the  same  do  pass  through  the 
hands  of  an  hundred  men,  yet  it  is  subject  to  the  condition  still." '^ 
Such  a  condition,  however,  defeats  the  estate  to  which  it  is  an- 
nexed only  at  the  election  of  him  who  has  a  right  to  enforce  it. 
The  grantee  may  mortgage  his  interest,  and  until  liis  estate  is 
defeated  by  the  peison  entitled  to  defeat  it,  the  mortgagee  has 
the  right  to  enforce  his  security  to  the  same  extent  as  if  the  con- 
dition were  not  contained  in  the  deed.' 

Unless  the  condition  is  personal  it  may  be  performed  by  any 
one  to  whom  the  title  may  have  passed  by  conveyance,  devise,  or 
descent,  or  liy  any  one  who  has  an  interest  in  it.*^ 

The  mere   sale  and   conveyance    by   the   grantee   of  the    land, 

1  Lake   Krie   &  W.  R.  Co.   v.   Ziebarth  pin;:,    1    Wend.   388,    19   Am.    Deo.  .515; 

(Ind.),  .33  N.  E.  Rep.  256.  Wilson  v.   Wilson,  38    Me,    18.    CI    Am. 

i  Tiirkor    v.    Parker,    123    Mass.    .584;  Dec.  227  ;    Loui-ville,  &c.   H.   Co.  t;.  Cov- 

Philadelphia   '■.  Girard,   45    Pa.  St.  9,  84  inRton,  2  Bnsh,  520  ;  Tin  lor  r.  Sutton,  15 

Am.   Dec.  470  ;  Reifsnvder  /•.  Hunter,  19  Ga.  103,  f.O  Am.  Dec.  f.S2. 

Pa    St.  41  ;    Walker  r.  Vineent,  19  Pa.  St.  "   IlMvwanl   r.   Kinney,    84    Midi.    591, 

369  •  P.arksdale  v.  Elam.  :H)  Miss.  694.  48  N.  W.  Rep.  170. 

8  H„yi  r   Kimball,  49  N.  II.  322.  ^  Marks  ,-.   Marks,  Ki  Mo.l.  419  ;  Wil- 

^  St."  Paul,   &e.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Paul    U.  son  v.   Wilson.  38   Me.    18,  61    Am.  Dee. 

D   Co   44  Minn   325*46  N.  E.  Rep.  566.  227  ;  People  v  Society  for  Propn-ation  of 

5  Sinvves.int  ..  Mnvor,  11  Pai-e,  414.  tlie  Go.spel,  2   Paine,  .545  ;   Louisville,  &e. 

6  Shei.    T..n.li.    119  ;  .Jackson   r.   Top-  K.  Co   »'•  Covington,  2  Hush,  526. 

'  '  583 


§§  712,  713.]       CONDIllONS    PKKCEDENT    AND   SUBSKQUKNT. 

wliich  is  subject  to  a  condition  that  the  same  shall  be  used  for 
certain  purposes  only,  is  not  a  breach  of  the  condition,  in  the 
absence  of  a  showing  that  the  grantee  has  diverted  the  land  to 
other  purposes.^ 

712.  Upon  a  reentry  by  the  grantor  the  estate  revests  in 
him  as  a  matter  of  legal  right,  with  the  same  estate  he  had 
before  the  grant,  and  with  all  the  improvements  the  grantee  may 
have  made  upon  the  land.-  But  without  some  act  on  the  part  of 
the  grantor  or  his  heirs,  by  wliich  to  take  advantage  of  the  con- 
dition and  its  forfeiture,  the  estate  remains  in  the  grantee,  even 
thouo-h  the  words  of  the  condition  are  that  "  the  estate  shall 
thereupon  be  void  and  of  no  effect."  ^ 

After  the  grantor  has  entered  upon  the  land  for  a  breach  of 
the  condition,  the  land  is  not  subject  to  attachment  for  the  debts 
of  the  grantee  contracted  while  he  was  in  possession  ;  •*  and  any 
lien  or  incumbrance  obtained  upon  the  land  by  a  third  person 
after  the  creation  of  the  condition  is  destroyed.^ 

713.  In  case  of  a  conditional  limitation,  no  right  of  re- 
entry remains  in  the  grantor.  If  a  condition  subsequent  be 
follow^ed  by  a  limitation  over,  in  case  the  condition  is  not  com- 
plied with,  it  is  termed  a  conditional  limitation,  and  takes  effect 
without  any  entrj?  or  claim,  and  no  act  is  necessary  to  vest  the 
estate  in  the  party  to  whom  it  is  limited.^  If  an  estate  be 
granted  to  one  on  condition  that  within  two  years  he  return  from 
Rome,  and  on  failure  thereof  then  to  another  and  his  heirs,  this 
is  a  limitation  and  not  a  condition." 

There  are  important  distinctions  between  an  estate  upon  condi- 
tion and  an  estate  on  a  conditional  limitation,  the  most  important 
of  which  is  that  in  case  of  the  former  the  grantor  has  remaining 
a  right  of  reverter  and  reentry,  while  in  the  case  of  the  latter  he 

1  Taylor  v.  Binford,  37  Ohio  St.  262.  *  Schlesinger  v.    Kansas  City,    &c.    R. 

2  Barker  v.  Cobb,  36  N.  H.  .344 ;   Brat-     Co.  1.52  U.  S.  444,  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  647. 
tie  Square  Church  v.  Grant,  3  Gray,  142,         ^  Thomas  v.   Record,  47  Me.    500,    74 

63  Am.  Dec.  725;  Rowell  v.  Jewett,  71  Am.  Dec.  500;  Moore  v.  Pitts,  53  N.  Y. 
Me.  40S ;  Thomas  v.  Record,  47  Me.  500,  85. 

64  Am.  Dec.  500;  Bartlett  v.  Jones,  60  ^  Stearns r.  Godfrey,  16  Me.  158  ;  Biat- 
Me.  246;  Dolan  w.  Baltimore,  4  Gill,  394  ;  tie  Square  Church  v.  Grant,  3  Gray,  142, 
Scott  V.  Stipe,  12  Ind.  74;  Hershman  v.  63  Am.  Dec.  725;  Attorney-General  v. 
Hershman,  63  Ind.  451.  See,  however,  Merrimack  Manuf.  Co.  14  Gray,  586; 
De  Peyster  v.  Michael,  6  N.  Y.  467.  Ashley  ;'.  Warner,  11  Gray,  43  ;  Miller  v. 

3  Phelps  V.  Chesson,  12  Ired.  194.  Levi.  44  N.  Y.  489. 

■7  2  Black.  Com.  155. 
584 


REENTRY   FOR    F0J?FE1TURE.  [§  714. 

has  no  such  right.  "  Where  an  estate  hi  fee  is  created  on  condi- 
tion, the  entire  interest  does  not  pass  out  of  the  grantor  by  the 
same  instrument  or  conveyance.  All  that  remains,  after  the  gift 
or  grant  takes  effect,  continues  in  the  grantor  and  goes  to  his 
heirs.  This  is  the  right  of  entry,  as  we  have  ah-eady  seen,  which, 
from  the  nature  of  the  grant,  is  reserved  to  the  grantor  and  his 
heirs  only,  and  which  gives  them  the  right  to  enter,  as  of  their  old 
estate,  upon  breach  of  the  condition.  This  possibility  of  reverter, 
as  it  is  termed,  arises  in  the  grantor  or  devisor  immediately  on 
the  creation  of  the  conditional  estate.  It  is  otherwise  where  the 
estate  in  fee  is  limited  over  to  a  third  person  in  case  of  a  breach 
of  the  condition.  Then  the  entire  estate  by  the  same  instrument 
passes  out  of  the  grantor  or  devisor.  .  .  .  The  right  or  possibility 
of  reverter,  which,  on  the  creation  of  an  estate  in  fee  on  condi- 
tion merely,  w'ould  remain  in  him,  is  given  over  by  the  limita- 
tion, which  is  to  take  effect  on  the  breach  of  the  condition."  ^ 

714.  The  right  or  possibility  of  reverter  upon  a  breach  of  a 
condition  subsequent  is  not  within  the  rule  against  perpetu- 
ities.- '•'•  The  [lossibility  of  reverter,  being  a  vested  interest  in 
real  property,  is  capable  at  all  times  of  being  released  to  the 
person  holding  the  estate  on  condition,  or  his  grantee,  and,  if  so 
released,  vests  an  absolute  and  indefeasible  title  thereto.  The 
grant  or  devise  of  a  fee  on  condition  does  not,  therefore,  fetter  and 
tie  up  estates  so  as  to  prevent  their  alienation,  and  thus  contra- 
vene the  policy  of  the  law,  which  aims  to  secure  the  free  and 
unembarrassed  disposition  of  real  property.  It  is  otherwise  with 
gifts  of  estates  in  fee,  with  limitations  over  upon  a  condition  or 
event  of  an  uncertain  or  indeterminate  nature.  Tlie  limitation 
over,  being  executory  and  depending  upon  a  condition,  or  an 
event  which  may  never  happen,  passes  no  vested  interest  or 
estate.  It  is  impossible  to  ascertain  in  whom  the  ultimate  right 
to  the  estate  may  vest,  or  wliethor  it  will  ever  vest  at  all,  and 
therefore  no  conveyance  or  mode  of  alienation  can  pass  an  abso- 
solute  title,  because  it  is  wholly  uncertain  in  w'lom  the  estate 
will  vest  on  the  happening  of  the  event  or  breach  of  the  condi- 
tion upon  which  th(^  ulterior  gift  is  to  take  effect."' 

1  Brattle  Squ.ire  Church  >:  Grnnt,  3  ^  Brattle  Square  Church  r.  Grant,  .3 
Cray,   142.  63  Am.  Dec.  72.5,  i)er  Bigc-     Oray,  142,  63  Am.  Dec.  725,  per  Biuc- 

i„w,'.'r.  i"w,  J. 

-  Tobpy    r.    Moore,    130    Mn.ss.    448  ; 
French  i\  Old  South  Soc.  106  Mass.  479.  585 


§  715.]  CONDITIONS    TKECEDENT    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 

The  rig'lit  or  possibility  of  reverter  upon  the  determination  of 
a  qualilied  fee  is  governed  by  the  same  rule  in  regard  to  remote- 
ness as  the  right  of  revertei-  upon  a  condition  subsequent,  and  is 
not  void  on  that  account.^ 

Whether  estates  upon  condition  are  subject  to  the  rule  against 
perpetuities,  so  that  if  the  condition  is  perpetual  and  the  condi- 
tional estate  may  not  arise  or  vest  until  after  the  period  limited 
by  that  rule,  it  is  void,  or  whether  it  woidd  then  vest  in  the 
grantor,  his  heir  or  devisee,  is  a  question  which  must  be  consid- 
ered as  unsettled.^ 

715.  The  common-law  remedy  for  enforcing  the  forfeiture 
of  a  condition  is  an  entry.  Actual  entry,  or,  if  that  was  impos- 
sible, a  claim,  was  the  original  mode  of  enforcing  forfeiture. 
"  Regularly,  when  any  man  will  take  advantage  of  a  condition,  if 
he  may  enter  he  must  enter,  and  when  he  cannot  enter  he  must 
make  a  claim ;  and  the  reason  is,  for  that  a  freehold  and  inherit- 
ance shall  not  cease  without  entry  or  claim."  ^  The  claim  applied 
to  things  that  did  not  lie  in  livery,  and  of  which  there  could  be 
no  possession,  such  as  a  reversion  or  remainder.  The  bringing 
of  an  action  of  disseisin  was  not  a  claim  within  the  meaning  of 
tlu^  law,  nor  a  substitute  for  an  actual  entry.  Claim  was  what  was 
in  the  books  called  "  continued  claim."  '^  As  by  the  old  common 
law  a  freehold  could  be  created  only  by  the  ceremony  of  livery  of 
seisin,  the  corresponding  ceremony  of  reentry  was  necessary  in 
order  to  determine  it,  or,  as  Coke  has  it,  "  an  estate  of  freehold 
cannot  begin  nor  end  without  ceremony."  ^  But  no  actual  entry 
w^as  required  upon  the  breach  of  a  condition  subsequent  in  an 
estate  for  years  or  an  incorporeal  hereditament,  for  such  an  estate 
was  not  created  by  a  livery  of  seisin.*^     The  grantor  parted  with 

'  Fiirit  Uuivcrsali-st  Soc  v.  BulanU,  3  ^q,  LJtt  2I8 «  ;  Shep.  Touch.  153. 
lo'i  Mass.  171,  29  N.  E.  IJep.  524,  Allen,  *  It  is  explained  by  Littleton,  §  414. 
J.,  saying  :  "The  very  many  cases  cited  °  Co.  Litt.  214 /;.  But  a  lease  for  years 
in  Gray,  Prop.  §§  305-312,  show  conclu-  mij,fht  bej;in  without  ceremony,  and  so 
sively  that  the  f,fencrnl  understanding:;  of  might  end  without  ceremony.  A  condi- 
courts  and  of  the  jirofession  iu  Atnerica  tioii  annexed  to  a  lease  for  years  did  not 
has  beeu  thai  the  rule  as  to  remoteness  therefore  require  an  actual  entry  to  en- 
does  not  apply,  though  tiie  learned  author  force  it,  unless  an  entry  is  stipulated, 
thinks  this  view  erroneous  in  principle."  Ejectment  may  be  maintained  without  an 

2  1  Am.  Law  Kev.  265,  article  by  F.  C.  actual  entry.     Liddy  v.  Kennedy,  L.  R.  5 

Loring,  Esc\.;   Brattle  Square  Church  v.  H.  L.  134. 

Grant,  3  Gray,  142,  63  Am.  Dec.  725,  a  "  4    Kent,    128;    Kenner   v.  American 

case  of  conditional  limitation.  Contract  Co.  9  Bush,  202. 

586 


REENTRY   FOR    FOKFEITURE.  [§  716. 

liis  seisin  when  he  made  his  conveyanL-e  upon  condition,  and  ho 
could  regain  this  only  by  a  reentry.  No  action  for  the  lecoverv 
of  the  land  could  be  brought  by  the  grantor  until  he  had  made 
entry  upon  the  land  after  condition  broken,  or  made  claim  if 
entry  was  impossible.  This  was  the  early  rule  in  some  of  the 
States,!  and  in  North  Carolina  and  South  Carolina  it  remains  the 
rule  to  the  present  time.^ 

If  several  detached  parcels  of  land  are  conveyed  by  the  same 
deed,  and  are  subject  to  the  same  condition,  an  entry  upon  one 
lot  in  the  name  of  all  the  lots  situated  in  the  same  county  is 
sufficient.-^ 

716.  An  entry  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  must  be  made  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  advantage  of  the  breach  of  condition.  If 
it  is  made  for  some  other  purpose,  it  is  not  effective  to  divest  the 
grantee  of  his  estate  by  reason  of  his  breach  of  the  condition, 
and  does  not  lay  the  foundation  for  a  recovery  in  ejectment  by 
the  grantor.^  The  entry,  moreover,  in  the  language  of  the  Touch- 
stone,^ should  be  "an  open  and  notorious  act,  equivalent  to  inves- 
titui'e  of  land  by  livery  of  seisin,  that  notoriety  might  be  given 
to  the  change  of  title."     It  is  not  necessary,  however,  that  the 


1  Chalker  v.  Chalker,  1  Conn.  79,  6 
Am.  Dec.  206  ;  Bowen  v.  Bowen,  18  Conn. 
535 ;  Wnrner  v.  Bennett,  31  Conn.  468, 
478  ;  Kenner  v.  American  Contract  Co.  9 
Bush,  202;  Willard  v.  Henry,  2  N.  H. 
120;  Spear  v.  Fuller,  8  N.  H.  174,  28 
Am.  Dec.  391  ;  Jewett  v.  Berry,  20  N.  H. 
36  ;  Kollins  v.  Riley,  44  N.  H.  9  ;  Tallman 
V.  Snow,  3.')  Me.  342  ;  Frost  v.  Butler,  7 
Me.  225,  22  Am.  Dec.  199;  Marwick  r. 
Andrews,  25  Me.  525  ;  Bangor  ik  Warren, 
34  Me.  324,  56  Am.  Dec.  657  ;  Osgood  v. 
Abbott,  58  Me.  73  ;  Throp  v.  Johnson,  3 
Ind.  343;  Boone  v.  Tipton,  15  Ind.  270; 
Voris  t\  Kcnshaw,  49  III.  425  ;  Board  of 
Ednention  v.  Trii.'^tces,  63  111.  204  ;  Phelps 
V.  Chesson,  12  Ircd.  194  ;  Hammond  r.  Port 
Royal,  &c.  R.  Co.  15  S.  (;.  10;  Mcmi)iii.s, 
&c.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Ncislihors,  51  Miss.  412. 
In  Massachusetts  an  entry  was  necessary 
before  the  Revised  Statutes  of  1836,  which 
provided  that  the  demandant  in  a  real 
action  shall  not  be  required  to  prove  an 
actual  entry,  and  that  ])roof  of  the;   right 


to  enter  shall  he  deemed  sufficient  proof 
of  seisin.  This  applies  to  an  action 
founded  on  a  breach  of  condition.  Austin 
V.  Canibridgeport  Parisli,  21  I'iik.  215. 
See  Stearns  v.  Harris,  8  Allen,  597.  It 
has  been  suggested,  however,  that  Stone 
V.  Ellis,  9  Cush.  95 ;  Sanborn  i\  Wood- 
man, 5  Cush.  36,  and  Attorney-General  v. 
Merrimack  Manuf.  Co.  14  Cray,  586, 
612,  are  inconsistent.  1  Am.  Law  Hev. 
265,  269;  article  by  F.  ( '.  Loriiii:,  Esq. 
Hubbard  v.  Ihibbani,  97  Mass.  188,  de- 
cides that  an  action  is  ciiiiivalcnt  to  an 
entry. 

2  Adams  v.  Ore  Knub  Ci!p])cr  Co.  4 
Hnirhes,  589,  593;  Hammond  r.  Port 
Royal  \\y.  Co.  15  S.  C.  10. 

•'  Litt.  §  417;  Cn.  Litt.  252/. ;  Creen 
('.  Pettingill,  47  N.  H.  375,  93  Am.  Dec. 
444. 

'  Bowen  r.  Bowen,  18  Conn.  535  ;  Stono 
V.  Ellis,  9  Cush.  95. 

5  Shep.  Touch.  153. 

587 


717,  718.]       CONDITIONS    I'KKCKDKN  r    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 


party  outcriny,-  should  declare  at  the  time  for   what  purpose  he 
enters.      'IMu'  act  speaks  for  itself.^ 

The  reentry  must  he  made  after  a  breach  of  the  condition;  if 
made  before  a  breach  it  may  excuse  the  breach,  because  it  may 
render  performance  impossible.-  It  must  be  made  upon  the  land 
of  wliicli  forfeiture  is  claimed.''^ 

717.  It  would  seem  that  the  ceremony  of  reentry  for  the 
breach  of  a  condition  ought  to  be  dispensed  with,  inasmuch 
as  under  the  Statute  of  Uses  the  ceremony  of  livery  of  seisin  is 
dispensed  with  in  the  creation  of  freehold  estates.  Accordingly, 
at  the  present  day,  this  ceremony  is  not  generally  necessary  be- 
fore the  prosecution  of  an  action  for  the  recovery  of  possession. 
"  Whatever  necessity  there  may  have  anciently  been  for  such  a 
proceeding,  the  reason  for  it  ceased  with  the  disappearance  of  the 
fictions  and  devices  resorted  to,  upon  which  to  found  the  action  of 
ejectment."  * 

718.  It  is  a  general  rule  that  a  writ  of  ejectment,  a  writ  of 
entry,  or  a  suit  for  the  possession  of  the  land,  is  equivalent 
to  a  reentry.^     So  any  act  equivalent  to  an  entry  by  the  grantor 


1  Jones  V.  Williams,  5  B.  &  Ad.  783, 
per  Lord  Deuiiian;  Bowen  v.  Boweu,  18 
Conn.  53.5;  Diiyan  v.  Thomas,  79  Me. 
221,  9  Atl.  Rep.  354. 

2  Elkhart  Car  Works  Co.  v.  Ellis,  113 
Ind.  215,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  249. 

3  Missouri  Hist.  Soc.  v.  Academy  of 
Sciences,  94  Mo.  459,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  346. 

*  Sioux  City  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Singer, 
49  Minn.  301,  307,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  905, 
per  Dickinson,  .1. ;  Clark  v.  Ilolton,  57 
Ind.  504  ;  Hamilton  v.  Kneeland,  1  Nov. 
40  ;  Ritchie  v.  Kansas,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  (Kans.) 
39  Pac.  Rep.  718. 

*  Goodriglit  V.  Cator,  Doug.  485,  per 
Lord  Mansfield  ;  Ruch  r.  Rock  Island,  97 
U.  S.  693.  Colorado  :  Cowell  v.  Springs 
Co.  3  Colo.  82,  100  V.  S.  55.  Illinois: 
Boone  r.  Clark,  129  III.  466,  498,21  N.  E. 
Rep.  850.  Indiana:  Richter  v.  Richter, 
111  Ind.  456,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  698;  Indian- 
apolis, &c.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Hood,  66  Ind.  580; 
Wilson  W.Wilson,  86  Ind.  472  ;  Cleveland, 
&«.Ry.  Co.  V.  Coburn,  91  Ind.  557  ;  Clark 
r.  Tlolfon,  57  Ind.  564;  Scott  v.  Stipe,  12 
Ind.  74     Kansas:   Ritchie  v.  Kansas,  &c. 

588 


Ry.  Co.  (Kans.)  39  Pac.  Rep.  718  ;  O'Brien 
V.  Wetherell,  14  Kans.  616.  Kentucky: 
Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  Co.  u.  Covington, 
2  Bush,  526 ;  Owensboro  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Griffeth  (Ky.),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  277.  Massa- 
chusetts: K.  S.  1836,  ch.  101,  §§  4,  8;  Aus- 
tin V.  Caml>rid;;eport  Parish,  21  Pick. 
215;  Hubhard  v.  Hubbard,  97  Ma.ss.  188, 
93  Am.  Dec.  75.  Minnesota :  Sioux  City 
&  St.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Singer,  49  Minn.  301, 
51  N.  W.  Rep.  905.  Missouri  :  Clarke  v. 
Biooklield,  81  Mo.  503,  51  Am.  Rep.  243; 
(TBricn  v.  Wagner,  94  Mo.  93,  7  S.  W. 
Rep.  19;  Ellis  v.  Kyger,  90  Mo.  606; 
Missouri  Ilist.  Soc.  v.  Academy,  94  Mo. 
459,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  346 ;  Towne  v.  Bowers, 
81  Mo.  491  ;  Weinreich  v.  Weinreich,  18 
Mo.  App.  364.  New  Jersey  :  Cornelius 
V.  Ivins,  26  N.  J.  L.  376.  New  York : 
Jackson  v.  Cryslcr,  1  Johns.  Cas.  125; 
Plumb  V.  Tubbs,  41  N.  Y.  442,  450  ;  IIos- 
ford  I'.  Ballard,  39  N.  Y.  147  ;  Palmer  v. 
Plank  Road  Co.  11  N.  Y.  376;  Cruger 
V.  McLaury,  41  N.  Y.  219;  Upington  r. 
Corrigan,  69  Hun,  320,  23  N.  Y.  Supp. 
451.     Oregon :  Coffin  v.  Portland,  16  Oreg, 


REENTRY  FOR  FORFEITURE.       [§§  719,  720. 

showing  u  purpose  to  take  advantage  of  the  breach  of  condition 
subsequent,  and  to  reclaim  the  estate  forfeited  by  such,  is  all  that 
is  required.  The  trustees  of  a  railroad  company  had  conveyed 
the  road  to  a  construction  company  upon  condition  that  the  road 
should  be  completed  within  a  certain  time,  and  upon  failure  of  the 
construction  company  to  fulfil  the  condition,  the  trustees  entered 
into  a  contract  with  a  railway  company  already  in  possession  of 
the  property,  reciting  the  condition  and  declaring  a  forfeiture 
under  it.  It  was  held  that,  the  trustees  having  elected  to  treat 
the  property  as  reverted  to  them,  and  their  action  being  equiva- 
lent, without  judicial  proceedings,  to  a  reentry,  the  interest  of 
the  construction  company  in  the  property  was  divested  at  the 
expiration  of  the  time  limited  for  performance  of  the  condi- 
tions, and  the  property  could  not  be  subjected,  by  a  suit  brought 
after  that  time,  to  a  judgment  against  the  construction  company 
recovered  by  complainants  on  the  contract  for  the  rails. ^ 

719.  Where  a  corporation  holding  land  upon  a  condition 
subsequent  is  dissolved  for  acts  or  omissions  which  are  also 
breaches  of  the  condition,  the  title  reverts  to  the  original 
grantor  without  any  entry  by  him  or  other  act  equivalent  thereto. 
The  dissolution  of  the  corporation  by  judicial  decree  supersedes 
the  necessity  of  a  reentry .^ 

720.  The  action  of  ejectment  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  of  a 
condition  may  be  maintained  against  subsequent  purchasers 
from  the  original  grantee  upon  condition.  "-  It  cannot  be  urged 
that  it  is  even  a  liard  case  against  such  defendant,  for  he  pur- 
chased with  full  knowledge  of  the  condition  ;  or,  if  not,  it  be- 
hooved him  to  inquire  and  examine  the  title  before  lie  pur- 
cliased."  ^ 

77,  17   Par.  Kep.   580  ;   Kalev  v.  Umatilla  (M.io  K.  Co.  37  W.  Va.  349,  If.  S.  K.  Rep. 

Co.    15    Orej,'.    172,     13    Phc.  Rep.    890.  589,590.     At)   action   of   unlawful  entry 

Pennsylvania":  Bear  v.  Wlii.slcr,  7  Watts,  and  detainer   is   not   .sullieient.     Bowker 

144;    Cook    V.    Trimble,    9     Watts,    15;  r.  Seymour,  13  W.   Va.    12.     Wisconsin: 

Sheafer  r.  Sheafer,  37  Pa.  St.  .525  ;  Brown  I'epin    Co.    r.    IVindle,    61    W>.s.  301     21 

r.  Bennett.  75  Pa.  St.  420;    Sharon  Iron  N.  W.  Rep.  2:54  ;   llurner   r.   Railway  Co. 

Co   V    Erie  41  Pa.  St.  341.     South  Caro  38  Wis.  1C5. 

Una:    Rn^e   v.   Ellis,  1    Bay,  107,  111.         '  Schlesinfrcr  r.  Kansas  City,  &c.  R.  Co. 

Texas  :  Jefferv  v.  Graham,  61    Tex.  481  ;  152  U.  S.  444,  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  647. 
Gulf,  &c.  Ry.'  Co.  V.  Dunman,  74  Tex.         ■=  Mott  r.  Danville  Semi.iary,  129  111. 

265  11  S.  W.  Rep.  1094.    West  Virginia  :  403,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  927. 
Bv  statute,  ejectn.ent  serves  in  lieu  of  re-         "  Jackson  v.  Topping,  1  Wend.  388,  19 

-ntrv      Code    ch    93    §    16;    Martin   v.  Am.  Dec.  515 ;  Martin  v.  Ohio  R.  Co.  o7 

589 


§§  721-723.]       CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 

721.  The  parties  themselves  may  by  a  stipulation  in  the 
deed  provide  what  shall  constitute  a  reentry  t'oi'  a  foifi-ituie, 
or  what  shall  be  the  evidence  ol"  such  i-eentry.  Thus  they  may 
stipulato  that  the  grantor  shall  post  a  notice  of  reentry  upon  tlie 
land,  and  that  witliin  a  specified  time  thereafter  the  land  shall  be 
considered  as  revested  in  the  grantor,  and  such  act  will  constitute 
a  reijntry,  and  after  the  expiration  of  such  time  will  defeat  the 
purchaser's  title. ^ 

722.  If  the  grantor  is  himself  in  possession  when  the  con- 
dition is  broken,  the  estate  revests  in  him  at  once,  and  his  pos- 
session is  presumed  to  be  for  the  purpose  of  holding  under  the 
forfeiture.^  If  he  is  already  in  possession,  it  is,  however,  in  some 
cases  declared  that  the  grantor  must  manifest  an  intention  ol 
holding  by  reason  of  the  breach  of  condition  ;  ^  and  facts  show- 
ing that  the  grantee  in  possession,  after  breach  of  the  condition, 
exercised  acts  of  ownership,  or  that  the  grantor  residing  witli 
ilie  grantee  acknowled":ed  the  title  of  the  latter  and  disclaimed 
any  title  in  himself,  are  admissible  in  evidence  to  show  that  the 
grantor  was  not  in  possession  for  a  forfeiture.*  He  may  there- 
after maintain  an  action  to  quiet  the  title,  but  to  do  this  he  must 
allege  a  breach  of  the  condition,  and  a  reentry  because  of  such 
breach.  Such  an  action  could  not  be  sustained  upon  an  allegation 
of  a  reentry  before  breach.'^ 

723.  Only  the  grantor  or  his  heirs  can  enforce  a  condition. 
He  or  they  alone  can  enter  for  a  breach  of  the  condition.  A 
condition  and  a  right  of  reentry  for  a  forfeiture  cannot  be  re- 
served to  a  stranger.  "  No  entry  nor  reentry  (which  is  all  one) 
may  be  reserved  or  given  to  any  person,  but  only  to  the  feoffor,  or 
to  the  donor,  or  to  the  lessor,  or  to  their  heirs,  and  such   reentry 

W.  Va.  349,  16  vS.  E.  Rep.   .589;   Guffy  S.    W.  Rep.    10:  Hamilton  r.   Elliott.  .5 

V.  Hukill,34  W.   Va.  49,   11    S.   E.   Rep.  S.  &  R.  375:  T;ivlor  »;.  Cedar  Rai)ifls  & 

754.  St.  P.  R.  Co.  2.5  Iowa,  371. 

1  Swell  V.  Oliver,  61  Ga.  248.  •'  Willarrl  v.  Henry,  2  N.  H.  120;   Hub- 

2  Adiims  V.  Ore  Knob  Copper  Co.  4  liard  i:  Hubbard,  97  I\Tass.  188  93  Am. 
Hughes,  589  ;  Willard  v.  Henry.  2  N.  H.  Dec.  75.  And  see  Lincoln  &  K.  Rank  v. 
120;  Rollins  v.   Riley,  44   N.   H.  9  ;  An-  Drummond,  5  Mass.  321. 

drews   i-.   Senter,   32    Me.   394  ;    Frost   v.  *  Drew  v.    Baldwin,    48    Wis.    529,    4 

Butler,  7  Me.  225,  22  Am.  Dec.  199  ;  Rich-  N.  W.  Rep.  576. 

ter  V.  Richter,  111  Ind.  456,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  ^  Elkhart  Car  Co.  v.  Ellis,  113lnd.215, 

698;  Clark  V.  Ilolton,  57  Ind.  564;  Thomp-  15  N.  E.  Rep.   249;  Riehter   v.  Richter, 

Bon  V.  Thomp.son,  9  Ind.  323,  68  Am.  Dec.  1 1 1  In'd.  456,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  698. 
638;   O'Brien  i-.  Wapner,  94    Mo.  93,  7 
590 


REENTRY   FOR    FORFEITURE. 


[§  723. 


cannot  be  given  to  any  other  person."  ^  A  condition  expressly 
made  in  favor  of  a  stranger  to  the  deed  is  void.^  But  it  is  no 
objection  to  a  condition  that  the  benefit  of  it  is  in  favor  of  a 
stranger,  the  condition  itself  being  in  favor  of  the  grantor.^  A 
condition  in  express  terms,  that  the  grantee  shall  not  build  upon  a 
certain  part  of  the  land  conveyed,  cannot  be  enforced  by  the 
owner  of  the  adjacent  property  who  derived  his  title  from  the  same 
grantor.     The  grantor  or  his  heirs  must  enforce  the  condition.'* 


1  Littleton,  §  347  ;  Co.  Litt.  §  214  a  ; 
Shep.  Touch.  127.  "  And  therefore,  if  an 
estate  be  made  upon  condition  that  upon 
such  a  contingent  a  stranger  shall  enter, 
or  the  estate  shall  cease,  and  another 
shall  have  it ;  however  this  may  be  so 
drawn  as  it  maj  be  a  good  condition  to 
give  him,  his  heirs,  etc.,  that  doth  make 
the  estate,  an  entiy,  yet  it  cannot  be  good 
to  give  the  estate,  or  the  entry,  to  a  stran- 
ger." Mr.  Justice  Field,  in  Schulenberg 
r.  Harriman,  21  Wall.  44,  63,  said  :  "It 
is  settled  law  that  no  one  can  take  advan- 
tage of  the  non-peiformance  of  a  condi- 
tion subsequent,  annexed  to  an  estate  in 
fee,  but  the  grantor  or  his  heirs,  or  the 
successors  of  the  grantor  if  tlie  grant  pro- 
ceed from  an  ariificial  person ;  and  if 
they  do  not  s;'e  tit  ti>  a.ssert  their  right  to 
enforce  a  forfeiture  on  that  ground,  the 
title  remains  unimpaired  in  the  grantee. 
The  authorities  on  this  point,  with  hardly 
an  exception,  are  all  one  way,  from  the 
Year  Books  down.  And  the  same  doc- 
trine obtains  where  the  grant  upon  con- 
dition proceeds  from  the  government;  no 
individual  can  assail  the  title  it  has  con 
veyed  on  the  ground  that  the  grantee  has 
failed  to  perform  the  conditions  annexed." 
Ruch  i;.  Rock  Island,  97  U.  S.  693  ;  Schu- 
lenberg j;.  Ilarriman,  21  Wall.  44  ;  I'co- 
ple  V.  Society  for  Propagation  of  tlie  fios- 
pel,  2  Paine,  .545.  California:  Sniitli  /•. 
Brannan,  13  Cal.  107  ;  iJncUclew  »•.  Psicll, 
5  Cal.  108.  Georgia  :  Norris  »-.  Milncr,  20 
Ga.  .563.  Illinois  :  Board  of  Educnfiim  r. 
Trustees,  63  111.  204  ;  Neimeycr  r.  Kni;:ht, 
98  111.  222;  Boone  r.  Clark,  129  III.  406. 
21  N.  E.  Rep.  8.50.  Indiana:  Cross  v. 
Carson,  8  Blackf.  138,  44  Am.  Dec.  742  ; 


Copeland  v.  Copeland,  89  Ind.  29  ;  Thomp- 
son V.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323,68  Am.  Dec. 
638  ;  Higbee  u.  Rodeman,  129  Ind.  244.28 
N.  E.  Rep.  442.  Arkansas  :  jMartin  v.  Skip- 
wirth,  .50  Kans.  141,  6  S.  W.  Rep.  514. 
Kansas:  Piper  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  14 
Kans.  568  ;  McElroy  v.  Morley,  40  Kans. 
76,  19  Pac.  Rep.  341.  Kentucky  :  Owsley 
'■.  Owsley,  78  Ky.  257.  Maine  :  Hoopers. 
Cunmiings,  45  Me.  359  ;  Bangor  v.  War- 
ren, 34  Me.  324,  56  Am.  Dec.  657.  Mary- 
land :  Dolan  V.  Baltimore,  4  Gill,  394. 
Massachusetts:  Guild  i*.  Richards,  16 
Gray,  .'iOg,  317;  Parker  ?•.  Nichols,  7  Pick. 
Ill  ;  King's  Chapel  v.  Pelham,  9  Mass. 
501.  Michigan:  Hayward  y.  Kinney,  84 
Mich.  591,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  170.  Missis- 
sippi :  Winn  r.  Cole,  Walk.  119.  Mis- 
souri :  Towne  v.  Bowers,  81  Mo.  491  ; 
Jones  ;;.  St.  Louis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  79  Mo.  92. 
New  Hampshire  :  Dewej'  r.  Willinnis,  40 
N.  H.  222,  77  Am.  Dec.  708.  New  York  : 
Van  Rensselaer  y.  Ball,  19  N.  Y.  KiO; 
Fonda  v.  Sage,  46  Barb.  109;  Underbill 
V.  Saratoga,  &c.  H.  Co.  20  Barb.  4.55; 
Post  !'.  Weil,  8  Iliin,  418;  NicoU  v.  New 
Yo:k,  &c.  R.  Co.  12  N.  Y.  121,  12  Barb. 
460.  New  Jersey :  Southard  v.  Central 
R.  Co.  26  N.  J.  L.  13.  Pennsylvania: 
Cu-bman  v.  Church,  14  Pa   Co.  Ct.  26. 

2  r,.,ijr  r.  Wells,  11  N.  Y.  315;  Nicholl 
V.  New  York  &  E.  R.  Co.  12  N.  Y.  121  ; 
Liitlefi.ld  '•.  Mott,  14  H.  I.  288;  Gray 
V.  Blanch  ird,  8  Pick.  2S4.  To  contrary, 
see  M.Ki-ick  r  Pickle,  16  Pa.  St.  140; 
Hamilton  v.  Kneebind,  1  Nev.  40. 

3  Gibert  v.  Pctcler,  38  N.  Y.  165. 

*  McElroy  i-.  Morley,  40  Kans.  76,  19 
Pac.  Rep.  341. 

591 


§;^  7-4,  7-5.]     coxDiTioNS  i'hecedent  axd  subsequent. 

Where  a  liusbaiul  and  wife  joined  in  a  conveyance  of  land  of 
which  the  husband  was  seised  in  fee,  on  condition  tliat  the  grantee 
sliould  support  eacli  of  them  for  life,  and  the  i^iantors  were  after- 
wards divorced,  it  was  held  that  the  husband  only  could  enforce 
the  condition.  The  wife's  inchoate  and  contino-ent  interest  in  the 
land  did  not  entitle  her  to  claim  a  forfeiture.^ 

A  condition  in  a  deed  conveying  land  to  one  for  life,  with  re- 
mainder to  his  heirs,  prohibiting  a  conveyance  of  the  land  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  tenant  for  life,  can  be  enforced  only  by  the 
grantor  and  his  heirs  ;  and  hence  strangers  in  possession  of  the 
land  cannot  resist  the  foreclosure  of  a  morti^aofe  executed  bv 
the  life  tenant  on  the  ground  that  it  violated  the  condition  in  the 
d^e<1.2 

724.  The  grantor's  heirs,  though  not  mentioned  in  the 
deed,  may  take  advantage  of  a  breach  of  condition  by  entry 
after  the  grantor's  death  ;  and  it  does  not  matter  that  no  estate 
descended  to  the  heirs  from  the  grantor."^ 

When  the  deed  is  by  a  corporation,  its  successor  may  take  ad- 
vantage of  a  forfeiture.^ 

725.  The  State  must  enforce  a  condition  by  proceedings 
equivalent  to  an  inquest  of  oflQce.  At  common  law,  in  a  grant 
by  the  crown,  as  the  sovei-eign  could  not  make  an  entry  for  a 
breach  of  condition  in  person,  it  was  necessary  to  assert  the 
right  by  an  inquest  of  ofl&ce,  or  office-found.^  But  now  the  state 
or  government  may  provide  by  legislation  the  mode  of  asserting 
this  right.  Mr.  Justice  Field,  in  a  case  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  said :  ^  "If  the  grant  be  a  public  one 
it  must  be  asserted  by  judicial  proceedings  authorized  by  law, 
the  equivalent  of  an  inquest  of  office  at  common  law,  finding  the 
fact  of  forfeiture  and  adjudging  the  restoration  of  the  estate  on 
that  ground,  or  there  must  be  some  legislative  assertion  of  owner- 
ship of  the  property  for  breach  of  the  condition,  such  as  an  act 
directing  the  possession  and  appropriation  of  tlie  property',  or  that 

1  Copeland  V.  Copeland,  89  Ind.  29.  +  Cross    v.  Ci)r.«on,   8  Blackf.  138,  44 

2  Hay  ward  w.  Kinney,  84  Mich.  591,  48  Am.  Dec.  742;  Southard  i'.  Central  R. 
N.  W.  Rep.  170.  Co.  26  N.  J.  L.  13,  21. 

^  Shep.  Touch. ;      Osgood   r.   Abbott,         ^  People  v.  Brown,  1  Caines,  416. 
58  Me.  73;  Thomas  (•.  Record,  47  Me.         ^  Schulenberg  v.    Harriman,  21    WalL 
500,  74  Am.  Dec.  .lOO  ;  Jackson   r.  Top-     44,  63. 
ping,   1    Wend.  388,   19   Am.   Die.   515; 
Warner  v.  Bennett,  31  Conn.  468. 

692 


REENTRY  FOR  FORFEITURE.       [§§  726-728. 

it  be  offered  for  sale  or  settlement.  At  common  law  the  sovereign 
could  not  make  an  entry  in  person,  and  therefore  an  office-found  was 
necessary  to  determinethe  estate:  but,  as  said  by  this  court  in  a 
late  case,i  '  the  mode  of  asserting  or  of  resuming  the  forfeited  grant 
is  subject  to  the  legislative  authority  of  the  government.  It  may 
be  after  judicial  investigation,  or  by  taking  possession  directly 
under  the  authority  of  the  government  without  these  preliminary 
proceedings.'  "  So,  also,  any  public  assertion  by  legislative  act 
of  the  ownership  of  the  estate  after  default  of  the  grantee  — 
such  as  an  act  resuming  control  and  appropriating  the  property 
to  particular  uses,  or  granting  it  to  others  to  carry  out  the  original 
object  —  will  revest  the  property  in  the  state.^ 

726.  If  the  condition  be  for  the  payment  of  money  to  a 
third  person,  Avhile  at  common  law  this  does  not  create  a  privity 
between  the  grantee  and  such  third  person,  yet  there  is  a  tend- 
ency in  modern  adjudications  to  treat  such  a  condition  as  rais- 
ing a  trust  in  favor  of  the  beneficiary,  which  he  may  enforce. ^ 

727.  It  is  a  settled  common-la-w  principle  that  a  condition 
can  be  reserved  only  to  the  grantor  and  his  heirs,  and  not  to  a 
stranger,  and  the  reason  of  the  rule  is  that  the  (>state  is  not  de- 
feated, though  the  condition  be  broken,  until  entry  by  the  grantor 
or  his  heirs,  and  until  such  entry  there  is  nothing  to  assign  save 
a  mere  right  of  entry,  which  at  common  law  is  not  assignable.'* 

But  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  a  subsequent  purchaser  in  fee 
of  land  burdened  with  an  easement  granted  upon  condition. 
Such  purchaser  may  enforce  the  performance  of  the  condition 
upon  which  his  grantor  had  conveyed  to  another  an  easement  in 
the  Innd.^ 

728.  The  right  to  enforce  a  condition  does  not  pass  by  a 
deed  of  the  reversion,  or  by  conveyance  of  the  land  which  is 
subject  to  the  condition.     After  such  a  conveyance  there  is  no 

1  United  States  i;.  Repentigny,  5  Wall.  Jcwett,  40  N.  II.  .WO  ;  Sherman  i:  Dodgo, 
211,268.  28   Vt.   26;    HojiCiH   v.   (iosnell,    f)!    Mo. 

2  Farrisworth  v.  Minn.  &  P.  R.  Co.  92  466;  Kaljilisnyder  r.  KaliilisnjdiT.s,  17 
U.  R.  49,66;  New  Orleans  Pac.  R.  Co.  W.  Va.  28;  OwhIcv  v.  Owsley,  78  Ky. 
V.  United  States,  124  U.  S.  124,  130,  8  257.  Conlni,  Kclhim  /•.  Kcllani,  2  I'at. 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  417  ;  SchlesinTer  v.  Kansas  &  II.  357. 

City,  &c.  R.  Co.  152  U.  S.  444,  453,  14  ^  Nicoll  u.  N.  Y.  &  E.  H.  Co.  12    Barb. 

Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  647.  460,  12  N.  Y.  121. 

3  Weinreich  v.  Weinrcidi,  18  Mo.  .Ajjp.  '•  Pinkuin  v.  Kau  Claire,  81  Wis.  301, 
364,  per  Thomppon,  .J.,  citin'^   Smlili   '.  51  N.  W.  Rep.  550. 

VOL.  I.  693 


•29.] 


CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT    AND    SUBSEQUENT. 


person  capable  of  nniking  an  entry  or  claim  ;  the  grantor  cannot, 
for  he  has  parted  with  his  interest ;  the  grantee  cannot,  becanse  he 
is  a  stranger  to  the  condition.  The  right  of  entry  for  condition 
broken  is  not  assignable  at  common  law.^ 

729.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  nothing  that  lies  in  action, 
entry  or  reentry,  can  be  granted  over.  To  allow  such  an  as- 
sio-nmiMit  would  be  to  encourag(3  maintenance.^  The  rule  is  tlie 
same  Avhether  the  bi'each  was  before  or  after  the  assignment. 
By  a  general  assignment  made  by  the  grantor  to  a  third  person  of 
all  his  property,  the  condition  is  gone,  and  the  grantee's  estate 
becomes  absolute,  discharged  from  the  condition.^     And  so,  if  the 

'  Ruch  V.  Kock  Island,  97  U.  S.   693;     point,  for  it  was  held  in  Hayden  t;.  Stough- 

ton,  5  Pick.  528,  and  Brigham  v.  Sliat- 
tuck,  10  Pick.  305,  that  a  testator,  after 
creating  an  estate  in  fee  upon  conditiou,  re- 
tained a  "  reversionary  contingent  estate  " 
which  would  vest  in  the  residuary  devisee. 
And  in  Austin  v.  Cambridgcport  Parish, 
21  Pick.  215,  where  land  had  been  con- 
veyed by  deed  upon  a  condition,  upou  a 
breach  after  the  grantor's  decease  the  re- 
siduary devisee  brought  an  action  for  the 
land  and  recovered.  The  point  was  taken 
that  the  grantor's  interest  was  a  mere 
possibility  which  could  not  be  assigned  or 
devised,  and  upon  his  death  would  de- 
scend in  strict  privity  to  the  heir;  but  it 
was  held  that  it  was  a  "  contingent  possi- 
ble estate,"  and  therefore  capable  of  be- 
ing devised.  1  Am.  Law.  Rev.  265,  268, 
article  by  F.  C.  Loring,  Esq. 

New  Jersey:  Southard  v.  Central  R. 
Co.  26  N.  .T.  L.  13  ;  Cornelius  v.  Ivins,  26 
N.  J.  L.  376.  Now  assignable  by  Stat,  of 
1851. 

2  Co.  Litt.  214a,-  Nicoll  ?>.  New  York  & 
E.  R.  Co.  12  N.  Y.  121  ;  Williams  i;.  .Tack- 
son,  5  Johns.  489  ;  Tinkhain  v.  Erie  R. 
Co.  53  Barb.  393  ;  Underbill  v.  Saratoga 
&  W.  R.  Co.  20  Barb.  455 ;  Rice  i:  Bos- 


People  V.  Society  for  Propagation  of 
the  Gospel,  2  Paine,  545 ;  Guild  v.  Rich- 
ards, 16  Gray,  309;  Rice  v.  Boston  &  W. 
R.  12  Allen,  141  ;  Underliill  v.  Saratoga 
&  W.  R.  Co.  20  Barb.  455;  Parsons  v. 
Miller,  15  Wend.  561  ;  Jackson  v.  Top- 
ping, I  Wend.  388,  19  Am.  Dec.  515; 
Nicoll  V.  New  York  &  E.  R.  Co.  12  N.  Y. 
121  ;  Stevens  r.  Pillsl)ury,  57  Vt.  205,  52 
.\ra.  Rep.  121  ;  Hooper  v.  Cummings,  45 
Me.  359  ;  Bangor  v.  Warren,  34  Me.  324, 
56  Am.  Dec.  657;  Martin  v.  Ohio  R.  Co. 
37  W.  Va.  349,  1 6  S.  E.  Rep.  589 ;  Hoyt 
V.  Ketcham,  54  Conn.  60,  5  Atl.  Rep.  606  ; 
Warner  v.  Bennett,  31  Conn.  468;  Paul 
V.  Connersville,  &c.  R.  Co.  51  Ind.  527; 
Hiy:bee  v.  Rodeman,  129  Ind.  244,  28  N. 
E.  Rep.  442.  In  California  the  right  of 
reentry  can  he  transferred.  Civ.  Code, 
§  1046.  In  England  it  was  made  assign- 
able by  8  &  9  Vict.  ch.  106,  §  6. 

In  Connecticut  it  is  now  provided  by 
statute  that  when,  after  an  estate  has  been 
created  by  grant  upon  express  condition, 
the  reversion  shall,  before  breach  of  such 
condition,  become  vested  in  any  person 
other  than  the  grantor  or  his  heirs,  such 
person  shall,  on  breach  of  such  condition, 


have  the  same  right  of  entry  upon  such  ton  &  W.  R.  Co.  12  Allen,  141  ;  Guild  v. 

real  estate,  and  the  same  remedy  for  such  Richards,  16  Gray,  309,  318;  Bangor  v. 

breach,  by  entry,  suit,  or  otherwi.se,  as  the  Warren,  34  Me.  324,  56  Am.  Dec.  657; 

original  grantor,  or  those  who  legally  rep-  Hooper  v.  Cummings,  45  Me.  359. 

resent  him,  would  have   if   still  owning  «  Underbill  v.   Saratoga  &  W.  R.  Co. 

such  reversion.     G.  S.  1888,  §  1053.  20  Barb.  455;  Guild  «;.  Richards,  16  Gray, 

In  Massachusetts  there  seems  to  be  a  309. 
departure  from  the  common  law  on  this 

594 


REENTRY    FOR   FORFEITURE.  [§  730. 

grantor's  estate  is  assigned  under  bankrupt  or  insolvent  laws, 
he  cannot  afterwards  maintain  ejectment  or  a  writ  of  entry  to 
recover  possession  for  a  breach  of  a  condition  subsequent.^ 

The  grantor's  right  of  entry  for  a  breach  of  condition  cannot 
be  taken  in  execution  by  his  creditor.^ 

But  it  is  held  that  the  grantee  in  fee  of  land  burdened  with  an 
easement  granted  upon  condition  may  maintain  an  action  to  take 
advantage  of  a  breach,  or  to  enforce  the  performance  of  a  condi- 
tion upon  which  his  grantor  had  conveyed  the  easement  to  a 
third  person.'^ 

730.  There  is  ordinarily  no  necessity  for  a  demand  upon 
the  grantee  prior  to  the  entiy,  or  for  a  notice  to  him  subse- 
quently.* But  the  condition  may  be  such  that  a  demand  or  no- 
tice for  its  performance  will  be  necessary.  Thus,  where  the 
condition  was  that  if  the  grantee  should  neglect  or  refuse  to 
support  a  fence  around  the  granted  land  the  deed  should  be  void, 
it  was  held  that  there  was  no  forfeiture  until  the  grantee  had 
"  neglected "  or  "  refused "  to  support  a  fence,  after  notice  or 
request,  and  had  failed  to  do  so  after  a  reasonable  time  aHowed 
for  that  purpose.'^  And  where  the  condition  was  to  pay  certain 
legacies,  and  one  of  the  legatees  was  absent  from  the  State,  be- 
fore there  could  be  a  forfeiture  by  reason  of  the  non-payment  of 
the  legacy  to  him  a  demand  of  payment  was  necessary.^ 

In  Indiana  a  demand  for  performance  is  equivalent  to  an  entry," 
and  a  forfeiture  cannot  be  claimed  without  such  demand.  If  the 
grantee  under  a  deed  subject  to  a  condition  abandons  the  land 
without  sufficient  excuse,  and  without  any  offer  to  perform  a  con- 
tinuous service  imposed  by  the  condition,  no  demand  for  perform- 
ance is  necessary  to  entitle  the  grantor  to  reenter.     His  abandon- 

1  Stearns  v.  Harris,  8  Allen,  597.  *  I-anglcy   v.    Chapin,   134    Mass.  82  ; 

2  Banpor  v.  Warren,  34  Me.  324,  56  Sanborn  v.  Woodman,  5  Cush.  30;  How- 
Am.  Dec.  657;  Leach  v.  Leach,  10  Ind.  ell  i;.  Jewett,  69  Me.  293;  Tallman  .-. 
27i_  Snow,  35  Me.  342;   Whitton  r.  Whiiton, 

s'pinknm  v.  Eau  Claire,  81  Wis.  .301,  .38  N.  H.  127;  Licbrand  v.  Otto,  56  Cal. 

309,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  550.     Winslow.  J.,  242.     Georgia:  Code  1882,  §2297. 

said:    "It  wonld   be   a  singular  rule  of  ''  Merrifield  c.  CobleiRh,  4  Cush.  178. 

law   which   would    forever    prevent    the  «  Brudstreet  v.  Clark,  21  Pick.  389. 

owner  in  fee  of  lands  from  questioning  '  Ellis  v.  Elkhart  Car  Co.  97  Ind.  247, 

the  right  of  another  to  maintain  an  case-  249 ;  Cory  v.  Cory,  86  Ind.  567  ;  Clark  v. 

mcnt  upon  his  land  when  there  existed  a  Ilolton,  57  Ind.  564  ;  Indianapolis,  &c.  R. 

violation   of    he  express  condition  upon  W.  Co.  v.  Hood,  66  lud.  580;  Kisley  v. 

which  the  easement  was  granted."  McXiece,  71  Ind.  434. 

595 


§731.] 


CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT    AND   SUBSEQUENT. 


iin'  the  laiul  is  ocjuivalent  to  a  renunciation  of  his  riglits  under 
the  deeil,  and  is  authority  to  the  j^rantor  to  enter. ^ 

But  if  the  condition  is  one  that  (h^pends  upon  the  jiou-use  of 
the  property  for  a  specified  purpose  for  a  time  mentioned,  there 
can  be  no  demand  for  performance ;  for  when  the  time  lias  elapsed 
the  breach  of  the  condition  is  complete,  and  there  is  no  breach 
until  such  time  has  ehipsed.^ 

731.  A  court  of  equity  will  not  declare  a  forfeiture  ;  nor 
■will  it  lend  its  aid  in  any  way  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  ;^  nor  will  a 
court  of  equity  enforce  specific  performance  of  that,  in  a  deed, 
the  non-performance  of  which  works  a  forfeiture  of  the  estate.'* 

But  a  court  of  equity,  when  merely  asked  to  enforce  a  condi- 
tion as  a  ovenaut  or  agreement,  may  lend  its  aid  to  compel  the 
party  to  abide  by  the  covenant,  and  to  this  end  may  restrain  a 
breach  of  a  reasonable  and  legal  condition  by  injunction,  A 
court  of  equity  will  so  interfere  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
forfeiture  is  presented  as  the  penalty  of  the  breach.  Thus,  where 
a  conveyance  was  made  upon  tlie  express  condition  that  intoxi- 
cating li(|ui)rs  sliould  not  be  sold  upon  the  granted  land,  with  a 
provision  that  the  property  should  revert  to  the  grantor  upon  a 
breach  of  the  condition,  the  condition  was  enforced  by  issuing 
a  perpetual  injunction  against  the  carrying  on  of  the  business  of 
dealing  in  intoxicating  drinks  on  the  land  conveyed.^ 


1  Kichter  v.  Richter,  111  Ind.  456,  12 
N.  E.  Kep.  698  ;  Ellis  v.  Elkhart  Car  Co. 
97  Ind.  247  ;  Lindaey  v.  Lindsey,  4.5  Ind. 
552 ;  Cory  v.  Cory,  86  Ind.  567 ;  Schuff 
V.  Kaiisom,  79  lud.  458;  Ilisley  v.  Mc- 
Niece,  71  Ind.  434. 

2  Ellis  V.  Elkhart  Car  Co.  97  Ind.  247. 

3  2  Story's  Eq.  Jur.  §  1.319;  Horsburg 
V.  Baker,  1  Pet.  232;  Warners.  Bennett, 
31  Conn.  468  ;  Smith  v.  Jewett,  40  N.  H. 
530;  l)ou<ilas  v.  Union  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co. 
127  111.  101,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  51  ;  Coffin  v. 
Portland,  16  Oreg.  77,  17  Pac.  Rep.  580; 
Raley  v.  Umatilla  Co.  15  Oreg.  172,13 
Pac.  Rep.  890 ;  Stevens  v.  Pillsbury,  57 
"Vt.  205,  52  Am.  Rep.  121  ;  Erwin  v. 
Hurd,  13  Abb.  N.  C.  91  ;  Spaulding  v. 
Hallenbeck,  39  Barb.  79;  Livingston  v. 
Stickles,  8  Paige,  398,  402 ;  Livingston 
V.  Tonipkin.s,  4  Johns.  Ch.  415,  per  Chan- 
cellor  Kent;    Memphis  &  C.  R.   Co.  v. 

596 


Neighbors,  51  Miss.  412,  418;  Towner. 
Bowers,  81  Mo.  491,  497  ;  Messersmith  v. 
Mes^ersmith,  22  Mo.  369  ;  Michigan  State 
Bank  v.  Hastings,  1  Doug.  225,  41  Am. 
Dec.  549  ;  Michigan  State  Bank  v.  Ham- 
mond, 1  Doug.  (Mich.)  527  ;  Crane  v. 
Dwyer,  9  Mich.  350,  80  Am.  Dec.  87  ; 
White  V.  Port  Huron,  &c.  R.  Co.  13  Mich. 
356;  Wing  v.  Railey,  14  Mich.  83;  Wat- 
rous  V.  Allen,  57  Mich.  362,  24  N.  VV.  Rep. 
104,  58  Am.  Rep.  363;  Chute  v.  Wash- 
burn, 44  Minn.  312,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  555. 

•»  Woodruff  V.  Woodruff,  44  N.  J.  Eq. 
349,  16  Atl.  Rep.  4;  Woodruff  v.  Tren- 
ton Water  Power  Co.  10  N.  J.  Eq.  489  ; 
Sharon  Iron  Co.  v.  Erie,  41  Pa.  St.  341 ; 
Erwin  v.  Hurd,  13  Abb.  N.  C.  91  ;  Close 
r.  Biiiliiigton,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  (54  Iowa,  149, 
19  N.  W.  Rep   886. 

5  Wntrous  v.  Allen,  57  Mich.  362,  24 
N.  W.  Rep.  104,  58  Am.  Rep.  363.     See, 


REENTRY   FOR  FORFEITURE.  [§  732. 

732.  A  court  of  equity  will  grant  relief  against  a  forfeiture 
of  Itind  for  a  condition  broken  when  the  breach  is  not  gross  and 
wilful,  and  the  condition  is  for  the  payment  of  money  or  for 
doing-  something,  the  failure  to  do  which  is  susceptible  of  a  defi- 
nite compensation  in  damages.^ 

But  the  jurisdiction  in  equity  to  grant  relief  against  forfeiture 
is  confined  to  cases  which  admit  of  compensation  in  damages.  As 
said  in  an  early  case:^  "The  true  ground  of  relief  against  penal- 
ties is  from  the  original  intent  of  the  case,  and  the  court  gives 
the  party  all  that  he  expected  or  desired ;  it  is  the  recompense 
that  gives  the  court  a  handle  to  grant  relief."  Where  a  mother 
conveyed  land  to  her  son  upon  an  express  condition  that  he  should 
provide  for  her  maintenance  during  her  natural  life,  and  the  son, 
having  maintained  his  mother  many  years,  died  without  making 
any  express  provision  for  her  by  will  or  otherwise,  but  leaving 
ample  means  for  her  maintenance,  which  his  representatives 
offered  to  apply  to  that  purpose,  it  was  held  that  if  there  was 
any  breach  of  the  condition  it  was  a  proper  case  for  equitable 
relief  against  a  forfeiture.^ 

Where  land  was  conveyed  to  a  railway  company  in  considera- 
tion that  it  should  erect  and  forever  maintain  on  such  tract  a 
passenger  depot  and  a  freight  depot,  of  a  size  and  character 
suitable  and  sufficient  for  the  transaction  of  its  business  and  the 
accommodation  of  the  public  at  that  point,  and  to  cause  all 
passenger  and  freight  trains  to  stop  at  such  depots,  respectively, 
so  as  to  transact  and  perform  all  business  that  may  be  there 
offered,  and  it  was  expressly  provided  that  upon  a  breach  of  the 
condition  the  land  should  revert  to  the  grantors,  it  appeared  that 

also,  Clark  v.  Martin,  49    Pa.    St.   289;  (Kans.)  39   Pac.  Rep.  718.  724,  Allen,  J., 
Whitney  V.  Union  Ry.  Co.  11   Gr.ay,  .3.59,  cay  in- :    "While   the    law   enforces   the 
71  Am.Dec.  71.5.  lawful  contracts  of  parties,  and  even  gives 
1  Story's  Eq.  Jnr.  §§  1.31.3-1.32.3;  Pom.  effect    to    forfeitures,   C(|uiiy   gives   relief 
Eq.  Jur.  §  .381  ;  Rowell  v.  Jewett,  69  Me.  ac;i>inst   the   hardshi))s   incident   to   such 
293 ;   Marwick  v.  Andrews,  25  5Ie.   525  ;  forfeitures  in  very  many  cn.«cs." 
Spaulding  V.  Ilallenheck,  39  Barb.  79,  86 ;  In  some  Kn>:lish  cases  relief  in  equity 
Bethlehem  v.  Annis,  40  N.  H.  34,  77  Am.  has  hern  given  only  upon  the  ground  of 
Dec   700;  Henry  v.  Tupper,  29  Vt.  358;  accident,  fraud,  or  surprise.     Hill  v.  Bar- 
Carpenter  1-.  Westcott,  4  R.  I.  225  ;  Han-  clay,  18  Ves.  56,  16  Ves.  402  ;  Reynolds 
cock  V.  Carlton,  6   Gray,  39;  Sanborn  v.  v.  Pitt,  19  Ves.  134. 
Woodm.in,  5  Gush.  36;  Stevens  v.  Pills-  -^  Peachy  v.  Somerset,  1  Strange,  447. 
bury,  57   Vt.  205 ;  Rogan  v.  Walker,  1  '  Mcs-sersmith  i-.  Messersmith,  22  Mo. 
Wis.  527  ;   Ritchie  i-.  Kansas,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  309. 

597 


§  73±] 


CONDITIONS    PRECEDENT   AND   SUBSEQUENT. 


tliere  was  a  substantial  breach  of  the  condition,  for  which  a  for- 
feiture was  adjiulgeil.  It  appeared  also  that  the  railway  company 
took  possession  of  the  land  conveyed,  constructed  a  line  of  rail- 
road across  it,  built  side-tiacks,  depot  buildings,  roundhouse, 
stock-yards,  water-tank,  and  other  structures  and  conveniences  for 
its  accommodation  thereon.  The  court  therefore  said  that  if  the 
railway  company  elect  to  retain  the  land  and  improvements,  they 
should  be  permitted  to  do  so  on  payment  of  the  value  of  the  land, 
exclusive  of  improvements  placed  thereon  by  the  company,  meas- 
ured as  of  the  date  of  the  commencement  of  this  action,  with 
interest  from  that  date.^ 


1  Ritchie  i'.  Kansas,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  (Kans.) 
39  Pac.  Rep.  718,  724.  "The  estate 
grauted  wa.s  the  bare  land,  and  that  estate, 
we  think,  reverts  to  the  heirs  of  the 
grantor.  The  railroad  tracks,  roundlionse, 
depot  buildings,  etc.,  were  not  granted  by 
the  deed,  but  have  been  constructed  by 
the  grantee.  The  values  of  the  various  im- 
provements made  by  the  railroad  company 
are  not  stated  in  the  findings.  The  de- 
fendant, being  a  railway  corporation,  has 
a  right  to  condemn  these  lands,  or  so 
much  thereof  as  is  necessary  for  its  use, 

598 


but,  in  case  of  such  condemnation,  vi'ould 
be  required  to  make  full  i)ayment  there- 
for. In  this  case  the  defendants  have  not 
filed  any  pleading  praying  relief  from  the 
effects  of  the  forfeiture ;  but  as  the  plain- 
tiffs allege  an  equitable  estate,  and  as  the 
rules  of  pleading  in  actions  of  this  kind 
under  the  Code  are  extremely  liberal,  we 
do  not  feel  at  liberty  to  direct  a  judgment 
to  be  entered  on  the  special  findings,  which 
would  be  inequitable."  Per  Allen,  J.  See, 
also,  Cohen  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  34  Kans. 
158,  8  Pac.  Rep.  138,  55  Am.  Rep.  242. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 


RESTRICTIONS    AS  TO   THE  USE   OF   LAND. 


I.  Restrictive  conditions  and  covenants 
in  general,  §§  733-749. 
II.  Particular  restrictions  and  their  con- 
struction, 7.50-770. 
III.  Who  have  the  burden  and  benefit  of 
restrictions,  771-783. 


IV.  When  restrictive  covenants  run  with 

the  land,  784-801. 
V.  Waiver  and  release   of  restrictions, 

802-813. 
VI.  Enforcement  of  restrictions,  814-824. 


I.  Restrictive  Conditions  and  Covenants  in  Greneral. 

733.  The  o-wner  of  land,  desiring  to  protect  and  improve 
the  neighborhood  for  any  special  purpose,  may  impose  such 
restrictions  as  he  sees  fit  in  making  sales  of  his  land,  provided 
such  restrictions  are  not  against  public  policy,  and  a  court  of 
equity  will  generally  enforce  them.^  He  may  determine  for  him- 
self what  kinds  of  business  are  undesirable  in  the  vicinity  of 
residences,  and  covenants  restraining  them  can  be  enforced  witli- 
out  any  proof  whatever  that  they  are  "injurious  or  offensive."  ^ 


1  Rowland  v.  Miller,  139  N.  Y.  93,  34 
N.  E.  Rep.  765,  I.t  N.  Y.  Supp.  701  ; 
Trustee.^  v.  Lynch,  70  N.  Y.  440;  Trus- 
tees V.  Thacher,  87  N.  Y.  311  ;  Hodge  v. 
Sloan,  107  N.  Y.  244,  17  N.  E.  Rep.  33.5; 
Thomp.son's  App.  101  Pa.  St.  225 ;  San- 
born r.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387,  396 ;  Whit- 
ney V.  Union  Ry.  Co.  11  Gray,  359,  71 
Am.  Dec.  715;  Pcabody  Heijrhts  Co.  v. 
Willsou  (Md.),  32  Atl.  Rej).  386  ;  New- 
bold  V.  Peal)ody  Heijibts  Co.  70  Md.  493, 
17  Atl.  Rep.  372;  Winnipesaukee  Canip- 
Mceting  Asso.  v.  Gordon,  63  N.  U.  505, 
3  Atl.  Rep.  426  ;  Webb  r.  Robbins,  77 
Ala.  176;  Moms  v.  Tuskaloosa  Manuf. 
Co.  83  Ala.  565,  3  So.  Ri?p.  689. 

2  Rowland  v.  Miller,  139  N.  Y.  93,  34 
N.  E.  Rep.  765,  per  Earl,  J. ;  Coudert  v. 
Sayre,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  386,  19  Atl.  Rep. 
190. 


In  Whitney  v.  Railway  Co.  11  Gray, 
359-363,  Mr.  Justice  Bigelow  said : 
"  Every  owner  of  real  property  has  tho 
right  so  to  deal  witli  it  as  to  restrain  its 
use  by  his  grantees  within  such  limits  as 
to  prevent  its  ajipropriation  to  i)urj)0sca 
which  will  in)i)air  the  value,  or  diminish 
the  pleasure  of  the  enjoyment,  of  the 
land  wliich  he  retains.  The  only  restric- 
tion on  this  right  is  that  it  sball  be  exer- 
cised reasontibly,  with  a  due  regard  to 
public  policy,  and  without  creating  any 
unlawful  restraint  of  trade."  To  like 
effect  in  Coudert  v.  Sayre,  46  N.  J.  Eq. 
380,  19  Atl.  Rep.  190,  Van  Fleet,  V.  C, 
siiiii  :  "There  cnn  be  no  doubt  that  the 
dominion  which  the  law  gives  every  land- 
owner over  his  land,  who  owns  it  in  fee, 
invests  him  with  good  right  and  full  power, 
when  he  convevs  a  part,  to  impose  such 

599 


§  734.]  IIKSTIJICIIONS   AS    TO    THE    USE   OF    LAND. 

A  covenant  that  a  certain  pioce  of  land  sliouUl  not  be  built 
upon  is  not  contrary  to  pul)li(!  policy.^ 

734.  Restrictions  in  the  use  of  land  conveyed  in  fee  are 
not  favored,  but  the  courts  will  enforce  theui  where  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  in  their  creation  was  clear.  "In  this  country 
real  estate  is  an  article  of  commerce.  The  uses  to  which  it 
should  be  devoted  are  constantly  clianging  as  the  business  of  the 
country  increases,  and  as  its  new  wants  are  developed.  Hence  it 
is  contrary  to  the  well-recognized  business  policy  of  the  country 
to  tie  up  real  estate  where  the  fee  is  conveyed  with  restrictions 
and  prohibitions  as  to  its  use ;  and  hence,  in  the  construction  of 
deeds  containing  restrictions  and  prohibitions  as  to  the  use  of 
property  by  a  grantee,  all  doubts  should,  as  a  general  rule,  be 
resolved  in  favor  of  a  free  use  of  property  and  against  restric- 
tions." ^ 

By  indenture  between  adjoining  owners,  one  of  them  —  who  was 
the  owner  of  two  estates,  on  the  first  of  which  was  a  brick  house, 
and  on  the  second,  which  was  in  the  rear  of  the  first,  was  a 
wooden  house  —  covenanted  that  he  would  permanently  close  up  a 
door  opening  on  the  land  of  the  other  from  the  brick  house,  and 
put  a  window  in  its  place,  and  further  covenanted  that  he  would 
permanently  blind  the  lower  part  of  the  windows  in  the  wooden 
house,  which  overlooked  the  adjoining  owner's  land.  It  was 
held  that  the  covenantor  or  his  grantees  could  not  be  restrained 

limitations  upon  its  use  as  will  prevent  property  unsuitable  for  the  purposes  to 

his  grantee,  and  those  claiming  under  him,  which  it  conld   be   most  advantageously 

from  making  such  use  of   the  part  con-  devoted,  have   been   sustained,  and   have 

veyed  as  may  impair  or  diminish  the  value  never  been  regarded  as  impolitic.     They 

of  the   part  which  he  retains.  .  .  .  Cove-  have  been  enforced  at   law  and  in  equity 

nants  of  this   kind,  which  add  either  to  without   question.     The   restrictions   are 

the  value  or  desirability  of  the  land  re-  deemed  wise   by  the  ovi^ners,  who   alone 

tained  or  conveyed,  and  which  do   not  in  are   interested,  and   they  rest  upon  and 

any  way  impose  an  unreasonable  restraint  withdraw  from  general  and  unrestricted 

upon  trade  or  industry,  have,  as  I  think  use  but  a  small  portion  of  territory  within 

an  examination  of  the  authorities  clearly  the  corporate  limits  of  any  city  or  mu- 

shows,  uniformly  been    upheld   and    en-  nicipality,  and  neither  public  or  private 

forced."  interest  can  suffer." 

In  Trustees  v.  Lynch,  70  N.  Y.  440,  446,  i  Coles  v.  Sims,  5  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  1  ; 

Allen,  J.,  said:  "Covenants,  conditions,  Rankin  v.  Huskisson,  4  Sim.  13. 

and    reservations    imposing     restrictions  2  Hutchinson  v.  Ulrich,  145  111.  336,  34 

upon  urban  property,  for  the  benefit  of  N.  E.    Rep.    .5.56.     And   see   Eckhart   v. 

adjacent  lands,  having   respect  to   light,  Irons,   128  111.  568,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  687; 

air,  ornamentation,   or  the   exclusion    of  Peabody  Heights  Co.  y.  VVillson  (Md.), 32 

occupations  which  would  render  the  entire  At).  Rep.  386. 

600 


RESTRICTIVE  CONDITIONS  AND  COVENANTS  IN  GENERAL.      [§§  735,  736. 

from  opening  windows  in  the  wall  of  the  brick  house,  towards 
the  land  of  the  adjoining  owner,  by  implication  from  the  cove- 
nants of  the  indentui-e  concerning  the  windows  of  the  wooden 
house.i 

735.  Restrictions  are  to  be  fairly  and  reasonably  inter- 
preted  according  to  their  apparent  purpose.  On  the  one  hand 
they  are  not  to  be  construed  narrowly,  and  on  the  other  hand  they 
are  not  to  be  unduly  enlarged.'^  "Tlify  'i^'e  to  be  interpreted  accord- 
ing to  the  apparent  purpose  of  protection  or  advantage  intended 
by  the  parties.  The  primary  rule  of  interpretation  is  to  gather 
the  intention  of  the  parties  from  their  words  by  reading,  not 
simply  a  single  clause  of  the  agreement,  but  the  entire  context, 
and,  where  the  meaning  is  doubtful,  by  considering  such  surround- 
ino-  circumstances  as  they  are  presumed  to  have  considered  when 
their  minds  met.^ 

A  restriction  will  not  be  extended  by  implication  to  some  other 
matter  not  within  the  words  of  the  provision.  In  a  conveyance 
of  land  with  a  water-power,  a  restriction  that  it  shall  be  used 
"  for  milling  and  manufacturing  purposes  only  "  does  not  require 
the  Lnantee  to  erect  a  mill  of  any  kind,  or  to  use  the  water- 
power;  nor  does  it  prevent  his  erecting  a  steam-mill  with  build- 
ino-s  that  are  necessary  incidents  of  a  mill,  such  as  a  store  and 
dwelling.* 

The  construction  of  a  restriction  is  for  the  court,  and  evidence 
showino-  the  meaning  of  the  words  used  is  not  admissible  unless 
the  words  are  terms  of  art,  or,  by  custom  or  usage  at  the  place 
where  the  land  is  situated,  the  words  have  a  local  meaning.^  • 

736.  A  restriction  which  amounts  to  a  prohibition  of  the 
use  of  the  land  granted  is  void.  The  use  of  the  land  may  be  re- 
stricted by  a  covenant  or  condition  creating  a  general  scheme  of  im- 
provement,  or  by  a  covenant,  condition,  exception,  or  reservation 
creating  an  easement  in  favor  of  the  grantor.     I5ut  a  mere  proliibi- 

1  Christ  Church  v.  Lavczzolo,  15G  Mass.  N.  Y.  S.ipp.  132,  an.l  ritiiiR  Qnaekcnboss 

89  .30  N   E  Rep  471.  r.  Lansing,  G  .Johns.  4'J  ;  Durycn  r.  Mayor, 

2'smiJh  V.  Bradley,  154  Mass.  227,  28  62  N.  Y.  .W2,  .",97  ;  Wostcrn  N.  Y.  L.  Ins. 

N.  K.  Hep.  14,  citing  Jeffries  .;.  .Jeffries,  Co.  v.  Clinton,  00  N.  Y.  .320  ;  I'h.tt,  Cov. 

1 1 7  Mass.  184  ;  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  Mass.  136. 

387  ;  Whitney  v.  Union  Railway,  1 1  Gray,  "  Madore's  App.  129  Pa.  St.  15,  17  Atl. 

359.'  I'ci'-  ^"*- 

3  rinrk  ('.  Dcvoe,  124  N.  Y.  120,  20  •'  Ilutcliinson  v.  Ulrich,  145  111.  336, 
N  E   Rep.  275,  per  Vann,  J.,  affirming  1     34  X.  K.  Rep.  556. 

601 


§  737. j  RESTRICTIONS    AS  TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND, 

tion  ill  an  absolute  conveyance,  which  saves  no  rights  to  the  g'rantor 
or  to  purchasers  from  him,  is  void.  In  a  conveyance  of  kind  on 
both  sides  of  a  stream  with  a  mill,  there  was  a  clause  "  excepting 
and  prohibiting  the  right  of  using  the  waters  of  the  stream  for 
turning  any  wheel  not  used  or  useful  in  fulling,  dyeing,  or  dress- 
ing cloth."  No  right  to  the  use  of  the  water  was  saved  to  the 
grantor.  This  clause  did  not  create  a  condition,  because  there 
were  no  words  which,  ex  vi  termini,  imported  that  the  vesting  or 
continuance  of  the  estate  was  to  depend  upon  the  observance  of 
the  stipulation.  It  is  clear  that  the  clause  could  not  be  construed 
as  a  covenant ;  for  there  were  no  words  which,  upon  any  construc- 
tion, could  be  held  to  import  a  covenant.  The  restriction  was  in 
effect  a  prohibition  of  the  use  of  the  thing  granted,  and  was 
therefore  void.^ 

737.  Where  a  restriction  is  confined  "within  reasonable 
bounds,  and  the  pai'ty  in  whose  favor  it  is  made  has  an  interest 
in  the  subject-matter  of  the  restriction,  or  others  in  privity  with 
him  have  such  an  interest,  it  will  be  sustained.^  "  It  must  not, 
therefore,  be  supposed  that  incidents  of  a  novel  kind  can  be 
devised  and  attached  to  property  at  the  fancy  or  caprice  of  any 
owner.  It  is  clearly  inconvenient  both  to  the  science  of  the  law 
and  to  the  public  weal  that  such  a  latitude  should  be  given. 
There  can  be  no  harm  in  allowing  the  fullest  latitude  to  men  in 
binding  themselves  and  their  representatives,  that  is,  their  assets 
real  and  personal,  to  answer  in  damages  for  breach  of  their  obli- 
gations. This  tends  to  no  mischief,  and  is  a  reasonable  liberty  to 
bestow  ;  but  great  detriment  would  arise,  and  much  confusion  of 
rights,  if  parties  were  allowed  to  invent  new  modes  of  holding 
and  enjoying  real  property,  and  to  impress  upon  their  lands  and 
tenements  a  peculiar  character  which  should  follow  them  into  all 
lands,  however  remote.  Every  close,  every  messuage,  might 
thus  be  held  in  a  several  fashion  ;  and  it  would  hardly  be  possi- 
ble to  know  what  rights  the  acquisition  of  any  parcel  conferred, 
or  what  obligations  it  imposed,"'^ 

A  covenant  by  a  grantor,  that  neither  he  nor  his  assigns  will 
sell  any  marl  from  his  land  adjoining  the  land  conveyed,  will  not 
be  enforced  against  a  purchaser  from  him  of  the  land   intended 

1  Craig  V.  Wells,  11  N.  Y.  315.  3  Keppell  v.  Bailey,  2   Myl.  &  K.  517, 

-  Gript;  V.  Landis,  21    N.  J.   Eq.  494,      535,  per  Brougham,  L.  C. 
502,  per  Scudder,  J. 

602 


RESTRICTIVE  CONDITIONS  AND  COVENANTS  IN   GENERAL.       [§  738. 

to  be  burdened  b}^  such  covenant.  If  such  a  covenant  could  be 
enforced,  the  courts  could  not  refuse  to  execute  any  covenant 
which  has  for  its  purpose  anj'  conceivable  restriction  upon  the  free 
use  and  enjoyment  of  lands.  Such  a  covenant  is  also  void  as 
being  in  general  restraint  of  trade.^ 

Restrictive  covenants,  though  unlimited  as  to  time,  are  not 
void  as  transgressing  the  doctrine  of  perpetuity,  any  more  than 
an  unlimited  right  of  way  or  other  easement  is  void  for  that  reason. 
Restrictions  are  not  estates  in  land,  or  even  an  equitable  interest 
in  land.2  But  a  covenant  that  is  not  really  restrictive,  but  is  one 
to  do  an  act  which  creates  such  an  interest,  may  be  void  as  tend- 
ing to  create  a  perpetuity.^ 

738.  A  covenant  not  to  engage  in  a  particular  business 
upon  the  land  conveyed  or  retained  is  valid  if  limited  to  a 
reasonable  time.  A  restriction  in  a  conveyance,  that  the  property 
shall  not  be  used  for  hotel  purposes  for  two  years,  is  not  invalid  as 
imposing  an  unreasonable  restraint  of  trade.*  A  covenant  not  to 
carry  on  a  particular  trade  or  business  is  binding  upon  an  assignee 
with  notice.^ 

A  person  doing  business  as  a  private  banker  commenced  the 
erection  of  a  banking-house  on  land  he  owned  in  the  town  where 
he  conducted  his  business.  Before  the  building  was  finished, 
he  agreed  to  sell  the  building  and  lot  by  a  contract  which  stated 
that  the  purchaser's  object  in  making  the  purchase  was  to  form  a 
banking  corporation,  and  then  convey  to  it  such  property.  The 
vendor  agreed  that  when  the  corporation  commenced  business  he 
would  withdraw  from  business,  and  not  reengage  in  business  as  a 
private  banker  in  the  borough  at  any  time  within  ten  years  there- 
after. He  also  agreed  that  his  covenant  to  withdraw  and  abstain 
from  business  should  run  with  the  land  he  had  agreed  to  convey, 
and  that  in  case  he  broke  it  the  owner  of  the  land  at  the  time 
the  breach  was  committed  should  have  a  right  to  maintain  an 
action  at  law  against  him  for  its  breach.  After  the  proi)erty  had 
been  ctmveyed  to  the  bank  the  vendor  violated  his  covenant,  and 
the  bank  sued   him.     T\w,   v(mdor  demurred   to   the  declaration 

1  Brewer  v.  Marshall,  1'..  N.  J.  Kq-537.  "  London  &  S.  W.   Ky.  Co.  v.  Gonun. 
97  Am.  Dec.  679.  20  Ch.  I).  502. 

2  Keppell  r  Bailev,  2  Mylne  &  K.517;  *  Mollyneaux  v.   Witteubcrg,   39  N.h. 
Catt  i;.  Tourle,  L.  li!  4  Ch.  654.  547,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  205. 

!>  Tarker  v.  Whyto,  1  II.  &  M.  167. 

603 


§v^   ToO-741.]       KKSIKICTIONS    AS    TO    THE    USE    OF    LAND. 

tili'il  in  the  case,  and  the  question  thus  presented  wiis,  whether 
the  covenant  was  so  annexiul  to  the  hxnd  as  to  pass  with  its  title, 
and  confer  upon  the  holder  of  the  title  a  right  to  maintain  an 
action  at  law  for  its  breach  ;  and  it  was  held  that  the  covenant 
ran  witli  the  laiid.^ 

739.  It  is  competent  for  the  grantee  to  covenant  to  recon- 
vey  the  land  for  a  specified  sum  within  a  period  named.^  But 
a  covenant  by  the  grantee  of  land  that  the  grantor  ''■shall  at  any 
time  have  the  right  of  preemption  of  the  premises  conveyed,"  at 
a  price  named,  does  not  entitle  the  grantor  to  a  reconveyance  at 
any  time  on  tendering  that  sum,  but  merely  gives  him  the  right 
to  buy  it  in  preference  to  any  one  else,  whenever  the  grantee  is 
willing  to  sell  at  that  price.^ 

740.  A  provision  that  the  grantee  shall  not  convey  without 
the  consent  of  the  grantor  is  repugnant  to  the  grant  and  void.^ 
A  covenant  in  a  deed  not  to  convey  or  lease  land  to  a  Chinaman 
is  void,  as  contrary  to  the  public  policy  of  the  government,  in 
contravention  of  its  treaty  with  China,  and  in  violation  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  and  is  not  enforce- 
able in  equity.'^ 

741.  Restrictions  in  regard  to  the  use  and  enjoyment  of 
the  land  conveyed  are  not  usually  conditions.  Thus,  in  a  deed 
of  a  lot  of  land,  an  express  stipulation  that  a  dwelling-house 
should  be  erected  on  the  premises  within  a  specified  time  and  at 
a  specified  cost  does  not  constitute  a  condition  for  the  breach  of 
which  the  estate  would  be  forfeited.*^  Nor  does  a  covenant  that 
the  land  conveyed  shall  be  used  only  for  a  specified  purpose 
create  a  condition." 

In  a  deed  of  a  lot  of  land  in  a  block,  a  provision  that  the  house 
to  be  built  upon  it  shall  be  set  back  a  certain  distance,  for  the 
benefit  of  the  other  lots,  not  in  the  form  of  a  condition  and  with- 
out  any  provision  for  forfeiture,  is  not  a  condition,  but  simply  a 

1  NatioiialRankf.  Scgui-,.30X.J.  L.  173.  «  Stone  v.  Houfrliton,  i;59  Mass  17.5,  .31 

-See   §  669;    Randall    v.    Sanders,  87  i\.    E.    Rep.    719.     See,  also,  Rawson  v. 

N.  Y.  578.  Seliool  Di.st.  7  Allen,  125  ;  Ayer  c.  Emery, 

3  Gareia  v.  Callcnder,  125  N.  Y.  307,  20  14  Allen,  67  ;    Sohier  v.  Trinity  Church, 

N.  E.  Rep.  283,  affirming  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  109  Mass.  1  ;  Epi.scopal  City  Mission   v. 

934,  23  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  1002.  Appleton,  117  Mass.  326  ;  Barker  v.  ]5ar- 

■♦  §  662.     Murray  ;;.  Green,  64  Cal.  363,  rows,  138  Mass.  578. 

28  Pac.  Rep.  118.  '  Graves  v.   Dcterling,  120  N.  Y.  447, 

''  Gandolfo  v.  Hartman,  49  Fed.  Rep.  24    N.  E.   Rep.    655,   affirming  41    Hun, 

181.  64.3. 

604 


RESTRICTIVE  CUXDITIOXS  AND  COVENANTS  IN  GENERAL.       [§§  742,  74o. 

limitation  upon  the  use  of  the  property.  Althougli  tiie  grantor 
calls  the  limitation  a  reservation  it  is  not  strictly  sucli,  because  it 
is  not  an  easement  created  for  his  own  use  out  of  the  property 
granted.^ 

742.  Restrictions  as  to  the  use  of  the  land  or  the  mode  of 
its  enjoyment,  though  expressed  to  be  "  conditions,"  will  not  be 
construed  to  be  technical  conditions  unless  it  appears  that  the 
parties  so  intended  or  understood  them  to  be  "  conditions,"  a 
breach  of  which  would  work  a  forfeiture  of  the  estate.^  Thus 
"  conditions  "  that '*  no  dwelling-house  or  other  building,  except 
necessary  outbuildings,  shall  be  erected  or  placed  on  the  rear  of  the 
said  lot,"  and  that  ''  no  buildings  which  may  be  erected  on  the  said 
lot  shall  be  less  than  three  stories  in  height,  exclusive  of  the  base- 
ment and  attic,  nor  have  exterior  walls  of  any  other  materials 
than  brick,  stone,  or  iron,  nor  be  used  or  occupied  for  any  other 
puipose  or  in  any  other  way  than  as  a  dwelling-liouse  for  the 
term  of  tw^enty  years  "  from  a  certain  day,  are  to  be  construed 
as  restrictions  imposed  as  a  part  of  the  general  scheme  of  im- 
provement, and  not  as  "conditions."'  ^ 

A  proviso  in  a  deed  by  one  owning  adjoining  lots,  that  tlie  roof 
of  a  stable  shall  never  be  raised  higher  than  a  certain  number  of 
feet  above  the  street,  is  a  restriction  for  the  benefit  of  the  otlier 
lots,  and  not  a  condition.  That  the  restriction  was  introduced 
by  the  technical  word  "  provided"  did  not  make  it  a  condition.'* 

743.  A  restriction  in  the  form  of  a  common-law  condition 
may  be  enforced  by  forfeiture  if  there  is  nothing  in  the  context 
of  the  deed  which  warrants  any  other  than  the  ordinary  mean- 
ing of  the  technical  words  of  condition  employed,  and  nothing  in 
the  attending  circumstances  showing  that  the  parties  did  not 
intend  that  the  w^ords  employed  should  have  their  ordinary 
meaning."'      Wherever  the  terms  of  the  instrument  iiro  ])lain   and 

1  Eckhart  v.  Irons,  128  111.  5G8,  20  N.  I'rirsf,   131   1ml.  413,  31  N.   K.  Hep.  77; 

E.  Hep.  687.  youthard   v.  (Viitral    H.  Co.   '26  N.  J.  L. 

-  Aylin^'   v.    Kramer,   13.3    Mass.    12;  13;  Clark  i-.  Marlin,  49  Pa.  St.  289,   10 

Skinner  v.  Shepiird,  130  Mass.  180;  Ken-  Am.  L.  Hep.  479. 

nedv?'.  Owen,  136  Mass.  199,201  ;  Parker  ''  Ayling  v.  Kramer,  1.33  Mass.  12. 

V.  Nightingale,  6  Allen,  .341  ;  Jeffries  v.  *  Jeffries   v.   Jeffries,    117    Mass.    184. 

Jeffries,  117   Mass.   184;  Ei)iseopal  City  And  see  Fuller  r.  Ames,  4.'>  Vt.  400. 

Missioni'.Appleton,  117  Mass.  326;  Toliey  t^  Adams   v.   Valentine,  33  Fed.    Rep. 

V.  Moore,  130  Mass.  448;  Fuller  v.  Arms,  1  ;  Dana  v.  Wentworlli,  HI   Mass.   291 ; 

45  Vt  400-  Lake  Erie  &  W.  H.  Co.  i;.  Allen  v.  Howe,  lo.-i   Mass.  241  ;    Gray  v. 

G05 


§  744.]  RESTRICTIONS    AS   TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

unanil)igiious,  there  is  no  hesitation  in  enforcing  the  actual  con- 
tract UKule  I)}'  the  parties.^ 

Tliere  is  jurisdiction  in  equity  to  enforce  a  restriction  though 
it  be  in  the  form  of  a  strict  condition.  A  violation  of  the  re- 
striction may  be  enjoined.^ 

A  condition  as  to  the  use  to  be  made  of  land  is  not  a  common- 
law  condition  when  the  deed  expressly  provides  that  a  breach  of 
such  condition  shall  not  work  a  forfeiture  of  the  estate,  but  shall 
only  give  the  grantor,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  the  right  to  enter  and 
abate  the  nuisance  provided  against. ^ 

744.  An  agreement  restricting  the  use  of  the  land  con- 
veyed may  be  proved  by  parol.  The  office  of  a  deed  is  not  to 
express  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  sale,  but  to  pass  the  title 
pursuant  to  the  contract.  An  agreement  wiiich  was  a  part  of  the 
consideration  ft)r  the  sale,  restricting  the  use  of  the  property,  is 
not  merged  in  the  deed,  and  does  not  qualify  or  in  any  way  affect 
the  title  to  the  land ;  and  the  admission  of  parol  evidence  to 
prove  such  an  agreement  is  no  infringement  of  the  rule  that  parol 
evidence  is  not  admissible  to  contradict,  vary,  or  explain  a  writ- 
ten instrument.  Thus  evidence  is  admissible  of  a  parol  agree- 
ment that  no  part  of  the  property  should  be  used  for  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors,  and  upon  proof  of  the  agreement  the  grantee 
may  be  restrained  from  using  the  property  for  such  purpose.* 

An  agreement  not  to  use  certain  land  conveyed,  for  a  particu- 
lar purpose,  is  not  an  agreement  for  the  sale  of  an  interest  in  or 
concerning  such  land,  which  is  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds  if 
not  in  writing.^ 

Blanchard,   8    Pick.  283;    McKissick    v.  8  Tobey  r.  Moore,  130  Mass.  448. 

Pickle,  16  Pa.  St.  140;  McKelway  y.  Sey-  *  Hall  v.   Holomou,   61    Conn.  476,  23 

mour,  29  N.J.  L.  321  ;  Sperry  v.  Pond,  5  Atl.  Rep.  876,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  218.    The 

Ohio,  387,  24  Am.  Dec.   296 ;  Dolan  v.  language  of  Carpenter,  J.,  is  used  in  part 

Baltimore,  4  Gill,  394 ;  Gibert  v.  Peteler,  in  the  above  statement.     Collins  v.  Til- 

38  N.  Y.  165  ;  Doorley  i'.  McConnell,   78  lou,  26   Conn.  368;  Pierce  v.  Woodward, 

Hun,  580,  29  N,  Y.  Supp.  500;  Rose  v.  6  Pick.  206;  Willis  v.  Hulbert,  117  Mass. 

Hawley,   118  N.  Y.  502,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  151;  Tallmadge  v.  East  River  Bank,  26 

904.  N.  Y.  105  ;  Knapp  v.  Hall,  20  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1  Mills  V.    Seattle   &  M.    Ry.   Co.   10  42,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  437. 

Wash.   520,  39  Pac.  Rep.  246.  ^  Hall  v.   Solomon,  61    Conn.  476,  23 

-Barrett    v.   Blagrave,    5    Ves.    555;  Atl.  Rep.  876,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  218;  Bost- 

Coles  V.  Sims,  Kay,  56;  Hubbell  v.  War-  wick  v.  Leach,  3  Day,  476,  followed.     In 

ren,  8  Allen,  173;  Watrous  r.   Allen,  57  that  case,  decided  in  1809,  the  court  said  : 

Mich.  362,  24   N.  W.  Rep.    104,  58  Am.  "The  agreement  not  to  use  his  mill  after 

Rep.  363  ;  Clark  v.  Martin,  49  Pa.  St.  289.  a  certain  day  is  not  within  the  statute  of 

60i) 


RESTRICTIVE  CONDITIONS  AND  COVENANTS  IN  GENERAL.     [§§  745-747. 

745.  A  parol  restriction  is  not  binding  upon  a  subsequent 
purchaser  unless  he  has  notice  of  the  agreement,  but  it  will 
bind  a  subsequent  purchaser  who  has  actual  or  constructive 
notice  of  it.^  Thus,  where  the  owner  of  lots  on  both  sides  of  a 
street  in  a  city  made  a  plan  which  showed  the  street  as  widened 
eight  feet  on  each  side,  and  exhibited  this  to  purchasers  of  lots, 
who  were  told  that  buildings  to  be  erected  on  the  lots  should 
stand  back  eight  feet  from  the  street  line,  it  was  held  that  subse- 
quent purchasers  of  lots  with  constructive  notice  of  the  restric- 
tion were  bound  by  it.  "  It  is  to  be  presumed  that,  relying  upon 
this  assurance,  they  paid  a  larger  price  for  the  lots  than  otherwise 
they  would  have  paid."  ^ 

746.  A  grantor's  parol  promise  to  one  purchaser  to  impose 
restrictions  is  not  binding  upon  another  purchaser  "who  had  no 
knowledge  of  such  promise  when  he  took  his  title.  Thus,  where 
a  plat-owner  sells  lots  to  sundry  grantees  on  oral  representations 
that  all  the  lots  in  the  plat  will  be  sold  subject  to  restrictions  that 
no  building  shall  be  erected  within  fifteen  feet  of  the  street  line, 
and  the  deed  for  each  lot  sold  restricts  such  limitation  to  the  lot 
therein  conveyed,  and  afterwards  the  plat-owner  sells  the  only  re- 
maining two  lots  without  restrictions  to  a  grantee  who  has  no  no- 
tice of  the  oral  agreement  with  the  other  grantees,  such  grantee 
cannot  be  enjoined  from  building  within  fifteen  feet  of  the  street 
line  by  a  lot-owner  whose  complaint  fails  to  show  that  plaintiff 
was  influenced  in  purchasing  his  lot  by  his  grantor's  parol  promise 
to  him.^ 

747.  A  restrictive  covenant  will  not  be  implied  unless  such 
appears  to  be  the  presumed  intention  of  the  parties,  or  it  ap- 

frauds  and  perjuries  ;  for  this  statute  con-  Miller,  26  N.  Y.  Siipp.  1091,  6  IMisc.  Rep. 

templates  only  a    transfer  of   lands,    or  254. 

some  interest  in  them."  -  TallmadKC   i-.   East   Kiver  Bank,  26 

Nor  is  it  an  agreement  not  to  be  per-  N.  Y.  lO."),  10'),  per  Sutiicrland,  J. 
formed  within  one  year,  under  another  '^  Knapp  i;.  Hall.  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  437. 
clause  of  the  statute.  It  has  been  pretty  In  the  case  of  Tallmadfre  v.  Bank.  26 
uniformly  held  that  contracts  which  may  N.  Y.  105,  which  rocs  as  far  if  not  far- 
be  performed  within  one  year  are  not  ther  than  any  other  case  to  sustain  the 
within  the  statute.  Teters  y.We.stborou^'h,  respondent's  contention,  the  grantee  had 
19  Pick.  364;  Roberts  i'.  Rockbottom  Co.  ainiilc  notice,  when  he  took  title,  of  the 
7  Mete.  46  ;  Lyou  v.  Kin;,',  U  Mete.  411  ;  restrictions  upon  his  premises,  and  the 
Doyle  V.  Dixon,  97  Mass.  208.  j.laintiff  took    his   title   upon  a-ssurances 

1  Tallmad-e   v.  East  River  Bank,  26  that  the  restrictions  were  imposed  upon 

N  Y.  105-   Hayward  Homestead  Asso.  u.  the  defendant's  land. 

607 


§  747.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

pears  that  the  grantor  intended  to  impose  such  restriction  for  the 
benefit  of  his  own   land  or   the  hind  conveyed,  though   not  em- 
braced within   the   words  of  his  deed,  and  that  the  grantee  ac- 
cepted tlie  deed  with  the  intention  of  taking  the  benefit,  and  the 
burden  as  well,  of  the   implied  restriction,     A  dved  of  a  portion 
of  a  large  estate  lef erred  to  a  map  of  it  of  a  certain  date,  as  filed 
in  the  register's  office.     No  map  of  that  date  was  ever  filed  ;  but 
after  the   execution   of  the   deed  a  map  was   made  and  filed,  by 
which  the  land  composing  that  estate  was  entirely  changed  in  its 
arrangement  and  division  from  the  arrangement  and  division  origi- 
nally made  and  appearing  on  the  map  referred  to.     These  changes 
consisted  in  laying  out  new  roads  where  none  appeared  on  that 
map,  and  also  in  subdividing  the  tracts  laid   down   on   the   map, 
and  thus  reducing  their  size.     The  purchaser  complained  that  iti 
consequence  of  these  changes,  and  subsequent  conveyances  made  in 
conformity  to  them,  the  character  of  the  whole  neighborhood  had 
been  completely  changed,  and  that  then,  after  a  lapse  of  more  than 
twenty  years,  instead  of  the  estate  being  divided  into  tracts  or 
plats  suitable  for  gentlemen's  country  residences,  it  was  divided 
into  small  lots,  upon  many  of  which  dwellings  had  been  erected, 
and  also  that,  instead  of  the  land  being  an   open   country,  with 
here  and  there   a   large  and  handsome   dwelling,  surrounded  by 
beautiful  grounds,  as  it  was  hiid  out  on  the  map  referred  to,  it 
had  become  a  populous  village.     These  alterations  in  the  arrange- 
ment and  division   of    the   land   composing  the    estate,   and  the 
changes   which    in    consequence    had    taken   place,   both    in    the 
manner  in  which  the  land  was  used  and    in  the  character  of  its 
occupants,  the  purchaser  claimed  had  absolved  him  from  all  duty 
to  keep  his  covenant  to  erect  no  more  than  one  dwelling  on  the 
four  acres  purchased  by  him,  and  that  he  was  consequently  enti- 
tled to  a  judicial  declaration  that  such  restriction  is  without  force. 
The  purchaser  claimed  that  his  grantor,  by  referring  in  the  deed 
of  the  four  acres  to  the  map  then  existing,  made  the  map  a  part 
of  the  deed,  and  that  when  the  deed  and  map  were  read  together 
it  must  be  seen  that  one  of  the  promises  made  by  implication  to 
the  purchaser  was  that  the  arrangement  and  division  of  the  estate 
should  remain  unchanged.      "It  cannot   be   disputed,"   say   the 
court,  "that  where  the  owner  of  a  tract  of  land  cuts  it  up  or 
divides  it  in  such  manner  as  to  give  one  part  an  additional  value 
because  of  rights  which,  under  the  division,  are  given  to  it  in  the 
608 


EESTRICTIVE    COXDITIOXS   AND   COVENANTS   IN   GENERAL.       [§  748. 

other  part,  and  then  causes  a  map  or  plan  of  his  division  show- 
ing such  rights  to  be  made,  and  afterwards  makes  sale,  by  the 
map  or  plan,  of  the  part  increased  in  value  by  rights  given  to  it 
in  the  other  part,  and  the  part  sold  is  subsequently  conveyed  by 
a  deed  which  describes  the  land  by  reference  to  the  map  or  plan, 
that  such  rights  will  pass  to  the  grantee  although  no  express  grant 
is  made."  It  was  accordingly  held  that  the  purchaser  had  no 
right  to  understand  that  the  grantor  would  adhere  to  the  plan  and 
division  of  the  estate  indicated  by  the  map  referred  to,  because 
the  very  land  the  grantee  was  purchasing  was  a  part  of  a  larger 
tract  of  seven  acres  laid  down  on  that  map,  so  that  the  map,  in- 
stead of  indicating  an  intention  on  the  part  of  his  grantor  to 
abide  by  the  scheme  of  division  laid  down  on  that  map,  evinced, 
on  the  contrary,  a  purpose  to  depart  so  radically  from  it  as  to 
give  the  complainant  notice  that  he  would  not  in  his  future  con- 
veyances regard  it.  The  purchaser  had  no  right  to  understand 
or  believe  that  his  grantor  would  in  his  future  conveyances  abide 
by  a  plan  of  division  which  he  had  utterly  disregarded  in  his 
conveyance  to  him.^ 

748.  A  plan  showing  a  building  scheme  is  binding  as  a 
representation  of  the  scheme  upon  the  grantor  who  sells 
according  to  it.  A  building  estate  was  oifered  for  sale  by  auc- 
tion in  lots  as  a  residential  property,  according  to  a  plan  and 
particulars  of  sale.  This  plan  showed  a  private  road  terminat- 
ing in  a  public  road,  where  there  was  a  gate.  On  one  side  of 
the  private  road  were  shown  large  residential  lots ;  and  on  the 
other  side  smaller  lots,  called  "stable  lots,"  to  go  with  the  resi- 
dential lots.  At  the  gate  was  shown  a  piece  of  land  with  a  lodge 
on  it,  marked  "  lodge  "  on  the  plan.  Each  purchaser  of  a  resi- 
dential lot  and  a  stable  plat  covenanted  to  build  one  dwelling- 
house  only  of  a  certain  value  on  such  lot.  Afterwards  the  piece 
of  land  marked  "  lodge  "  was  sold  to  a  purchaser  who  commenced 
building  cottages  on  it.  In  a  suit  by  a  purchaser  of  a  residential 
lot  to  enjoin  the  use  of  the  land  for  any  other  purpose  than  a 
lodge  and  garden,  it  was  held  that  an  injunction  should  be 
granted.  North,  Justice,  delivering  judgment,  said:  "The  lodge 
and  its  garden  were  devoted,  hy  the  existing  scheme,  to  the  pur- 
pose of  a  lodge  and  garden.  And  thougli  I  quitch  agree  in  the 
suggestion  made  that  the  marquis  [the  grantor]  never  entered  intt) 
1  Coudert  );.  Sayre,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  380,  19  At!.  Hep.  190. 

VOL.  I.  609 


§§  74!>,  750.]       RESTKICTIONS   AS   TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

any  covenant  to  keep  tliem  up,  or  to  have  them  used  in  that  way, 
—  tluit  is  to  say,  he  never  agreed  to  have  a  lodge-keeper  there  to 
open  the  gate, — yet,  in  my  opinion,  it  would  have  been  impossi- 
ble for  him,  having  regard  to  the  general  scheme  held  out  by 
the  plans,  to  have  pulled  down  the  lodge  and  covered  the  ground 
with  cottages,  or  to  have  done  anything  of  that  sort."  ^ 

An  intending  purchaser,  who  is  shown  a  plan  of  a  building 
estate  upon  which  lots  are  laid  out,  of  even  size,  on  each  of  which 
the  ground-plan  of  the  house  without  any  other  building  is  delin- 
eated, is  not  entitled  to  assume  that  the  whole  estate  is  governed 
by  a  building  scheme  that  each  lot,  without  variation,  shall  be 
built  on  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  plan,  and  therefore  he  has 
no  remedy  against  one  of  the  grantors  who  afterwards  built  a 
house  upon  one  of  the  lots,  and  also  a  conservatory  and  stable  as 
adjuncts  to  his  house.^ 

749.  A  mere  reference  to  a  pL%n  in  describing  a  lot  of  land 
does  not  import  a  stipulation  that  the  plan  shall  not  be 
changed,  and  the  lots  used  for  purposes  other  than  those  indi- 
cated upon  the  plan,  in  the  absence  of  any  stipulation  that  the 
plan  shall  not  be  changed.  Thus  the  fact  that  a  portion  of  the 
land  on  a  plan  is  designated  as  a  public  square  does  not  give  the 
purchaser  of  another  portion  of  the  land  any  easement  or  other 
interest  in  the  square.^  Thus,  too,  the  fact  that  part  of  the  land 
is  marked  upon  the  plan  as  a  church  lot  does  not  give  the  pur- 
chasers of  other  lots  an  easement  by  virtue  of  which  they  can 
prevent  the  use  of  such  lot  for  any  other  purpose.'* 

II.  Particular  Restrictions  and  their  Construction. 

750.  A  restriction  against  the  erection  of  any  buildings 
other  than  dwellings  with  necessary  outbuildings,  such  dwell- 
ings to  cost  not  less  than  a  certain  sum,  is  violated  by  placing  a 
tent  on  the  lot,  costing  less  than  that  sura,  and  used  by  the 
grantee  and  his  family  as  a  dwelling  in  the  summer  time,  though 
they  did  not  sleep  in  it.^  Such  a  covenant  is  clearly  violated  by 
the  erection  of  a  church.^ 

1  Tindall  v.  Castle,  62  L.  J.  Ch.  555.  33  N.  E.  Rep.  689.     As  to  a  limitation  of 

2  Tucker  v.  Vowlcs  (1893),  1  Ch.  195.        time 'in  .such  a  restriction,  see  Keeuing  v. 
'  Coolidge  V.  Dexter,  129  Mass.  167.  Ayling,  126  Ma.ss.  404. 

*  Chapman  v.  Gordon,  29  Ga.  2.50.  «  St.  Andrew's  Churcli's  App.   67  Pa. 

5  Blakemore  v.   Stanley,  159  Mass.  6,      St.  512. 
610 


PARTICULAR   RESTRICTIONS   AND    THEIR    CONSTRUCTION.       [§  751. 

A  provision  that  no  buildings  should  be  erected  on  the  land 
except  dwelling-houses  is  violated  by  the  conversion  of  a  dwell- 
ing-house erected  in  compliance  with  the  provision  into  a  public 
eating-house. 1 

A  stable  is  not  a  necessary  outbuilding  upon  a  lot  having  no 
dwelling-house,  under  a  restriction  against  buildings  other  than 
dwellings  with  necessary  outbuildings.^ 

A  covenant  that  any  building  upon  the  land  shall  be  used  only 
as  a  dwelling-house,  and  shall  be  of  a  certain  height  and  have  a 
stuccoed  front  iind  slated  roof,  does  not  prohibit  an  advertisement 
hoarding  or  bill-board.  The  meaning  of  the  covenant  seems  to 
be  this,  that  if  you  erect  a  building,  such  as  a  house,  it  must  be 
a  house  of  a  certain  character.  It  does  not  relate  to  anything 
which  cannot  have  a  front  or  a  roof.  The  structure  referred  to  is 
not  a  building  within  the  meaning  of  the  covenant.^ 

751.  A  covenant  to  erect  only  a  single  dwelling  on  a  lot  in 
a  city  block  does  ni)t  prohibit  the  erection  thereon  of  an  apart- 
ment house  designed  for  the  use  of  several  families.*  The  court, 
by  Mr.  Justice  Craig,  said :  "  We  think  the  parties  intended  by 
the  use  of  the  words  in  the  deed  the  same  as  if  they  liad  said  in 
the  deed  only  one  dwelling-house  should  be  erected  on  each  fifty- 
foot  lot.  No  doubt  the  grantor  had  in  mind,  and  desired  to  pro- 
hibit, the  erection  of  several  small  dwellings  on  each  fift^-foot 
lot;  the  intention  being  to  require  the  erection  of  large  struc- 
tures on  the  property.  It  was  also  no  doubt  the  intention  of  the 
grantor  to  require  the  property  to  be  used  for  residence  purposes. 
Under  the  clause  in  the  deed,  stores,  livery  stables,  warehouses, 
houses  for  manufacturing  purposes,  could  not  be  erected ;  nothing 
but  dwelling-houses.  At  the  time  this  deed  was  executed,  flats 
or  apartment  houses  where  several  families  could  reside  were 
common;  such  buildings  had  been  erected,  and  were  then  in 
use,  within  a  short  distance  of  these  lots.  If,  therefore,  it  was 
the  intention  to  prohibit  the  erection  of  a  flat  on  the  property, 
why  did  not  the  parties  say  so  in  the  dee<l?  or,  if  they  intended 
that  only  a  building  such  as  is  usually  built  for  a  i)rivate  resi- 
dence of  a  family  should  be  erected,  why  not  say  that  in  the 
deed?" 

1  Parker  v    Nightingale,  6  Allen,  341,         "  Foster  v.  Fraser  (189.3),  3  Ch.  158. 
83  Am.  Dec.  632.  '  Hutchinson  r.  Ulrich,  145  111.  336,  343. 

2  Blakemore  v.  Stanley,  1.59  Mass.  r,,     34  N.  E.  Hep.  556. 

33  N.  E.  R<M..  6S9.  611 


§§  752,  753.]       RESTRICTIONS   AS    TO    THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

Where,  however,  a  deed  containing  a  provision  tliat  only  a 
simple  house  should  be  erected  on  each  lot,  contained  also  a  recital 
which  tended  to  show  that  only  a  residence  for  a  single  family 
was  contemplated  by  the  restriction,  tliis  was  accordingly  con- 
strued as  prohibiting  the  erection  of  a  building  for  more  than  one 
family,  though  it  would  not  prevent  the  covering  of  the  whole 
lot  with  a  building  for  that  purpose.^ 

752.  A  covenant  by  a  grantor  that  he  will  not  build  on  a 
certain  portion  of  his  remaining  land,  the  object  of  the  cove- 
nant being  to  secure  to  the  grantee  an  unobstructed  view  of  the 
ocean  from  his  land,  is  violated  by  raising  bath-houses  and  pavil- 
ions on  the  land  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  higher  than  they 
were  at  that  time.^  In  a  similar  covenant  by  a  grantee,  in  a  deed 
of  land  bordering  on  a  bluff  of  the  ocean,  there  was  a  proviso 
that  the  grantee  might  nevertheless  erect  any  bough-house  on 
the  margin  of  the  ocean  bank  of  the  lot,  or  any  bath-house  at  the 
foot  of  the  bank.  It  was  held  that  the  construction  of  a  pavilion 
along  the  entire  ocean  front  of  the  lot,  though  of  no  greater 
height  than  a  bough-house,  was  a  violation  of  the  covenant,  both 
from  its  extent  and  its  obstruction  of  the  view.^ 

A  covenant  that  an  open  space  or  garden  shall  be  kept  unbuilt 
upon  was  held  not  to  be  violated  by  excavating  the  ground  and 
building  a  covered  urinal,  the  roof  of  which  projected  very 
slightly,  if  at  all,  above  the  surface  of  the  garden.  The  object 
of  the  covenant  was  declared  to  be  to  keep  the  space  open  for  the 
free  access  of  light  and  air,  and  this  object  Avas  not  interfered 
with  by  the  proposed  structure  beneath  the  surface.* 

753.  An  agreement  among  adjacent  lot-owners  to  reserve 
an  open  space  in  front  of  their  lots  is  a  conveyance,  and  must 
be  executed  and  acknowledged  as  such  to  entitle  it  to  be  recorded. 
When  executed  by  a  married  woman  it  must  be  acknowledged 
by  her  in  the  manner  provided  by  statute  for  acknowledgments 
of  conveyances  by  married  women  ;  and  a  defective  acknowledg- 
ment of  a  married  woman  of  such  agreement  prevents  its  record- 
ing being  considered  as  notice  to  her  subsequent  grantee,  though 
his  attorney  found  such  agreement  in  searching  the  title.^ 

1  Gillis  V.  Bailey,  21  N.  H.  149.  »  Gawtry  v.  Ldand,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  385. 

2  Buck  V.  Adams,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  552,  17  ^  Graham  v.  Newcastle-upon-Tyne,  67 
Atl.  Rep.  961  ;  Buck  v.  Backarack,  45  N.     L.  T.  Rep.  N.  S.  790. 

J.  Eq.  557,  17  Atl.  Rep.  548.  •'  Bradley  v.  Walker,  138  N.  Y.  291,  33 

r,12  N.  E.  Rej..  1079. 


PARTICULAR  RESTRICTIONS  AND  THEIR  CONSTRUCTION.       [§§  754-756. 

754.  A  covenant  not  to  erect  any  building  on  land  con- 
veyed as  a  public  square  is  not  violated  by  erecting  a  statue 
upon  a  pedestal.  In  a  sale  of  land  to  a  city  for  a  public  square, 
a  restriction  that  no  part  of  it  shall  be  used  for  any  sort  of  build- 
ings thereon  is  not  violated  by  the  erection  of  a  monument  con- 
sisting of  a  statue  upon  a  pedestal.  "  A  monument  may  take  the 
shape  of  a  memorial  hall  or  other  building,  but  that  is  not  the 
general  sense  of  the  word,  and  will  not  be  presumed.  A  statue 
upon  a  pedestal,  even  though  the  latter  be  large,  is  not  a  building 
in  the  popular  meaning  of  the  term,  and  in  no  proper  sense  can  it 
be  said  to  interfere  with  the  devotion  of  the  ground  to  public  use 
as  an  open  green  and  walk.  On  the  contrary,  the  consensus  of 
art  and  taste  over  the  civilized  world  is  that  the  green  of  public 
parks  is  the  most  appropriate  place  for  national  monuments  of  this 
kind."  1 

755.  A  covenant  not  to  erect  any  building  "  without  the 
consent  in  writing  of  the  grantor,  his  heirs  or  assigns,"  re- 
quires only  the  consent  of  the  grantor,  or  of  the  owner  for  the 
time  being  of  his  estate,  and  not  the  consent  of  all  the  purchasers 
and  lessees  who  may  have  acquired  any  part  of  the  grantor's 
estate  after  the  date  of  the  conveyance  containing  such  covenant. 
"  At  the  date  of  the  conveyance  in  question  a  considerable  part 
of  the  estate  had  been  built  over  and  numerous  houses  erected, 
and  leases  or  conveyances  of  those  houses  executed  by  the  owner 
of  the  estate.  It  could  not  have  been  intended  that  the  word 
'  assigns '  should  refer  to  or  include  these  lessees  or  purchasers ; 
and,  indeed,  I  do  not  understand  that  that  is  contended  for.  It 
is  said,  however,  that  any  subsequent  lessee  or  purchaser  of  a  plat 
is  an  assign,  within  the  meaning  of  the  term  as  used  in  the  cove- 
nant, and  that  his  consent  in  writing  is  necessary.  But  it  would 
be  very  curious  if  this  were  so,  —  that  the  consent  of  every  subse- 
quent lessee  or  purchaser  of  a  plat  would  have  to  be  obtained, 
though  the  previous  lessees  or  purchasers  of  plats  need  not  be  con- 
sulted at  all."  '-^ 

756.  A  restriction  that  the  front  line  of  a  building  shall  be 
set  back  from  the  street  a  certain  distance  is  a  valid  restriction."^ 

1  Society  of  Cincinnati's  Appeal,   154         2  Everett  v.  Remington  (1892),  3  Cli. 
Pa.  St.  621,  6.3.5,   26    Atl.  Rep.   647,  per     148,  1.58,  per  Roinor,  J. 
Mitchell  J.  "  Ilamlen  v.  Werner.  144  Mafls.  396,  11 

()18 


§  757.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO   THE   USE    OF   LAND. 

Such  a  restriction  is  violated  by  building  a  i-ectangular  addition 
to  the  front,  eight  or  nine  feet  wide,  and  projecting  three  feet  or 
more  over  such  space,  though  such  addition  does  not  begin  at  the 
ground,  but  four  feet  above  it,  and  thence  extends  to  the  top  of 
the  building.^ 

Under  such  a  restriction  the  purchaser  built  a  house  on  his 
land,  the  front  wall  of  which  was  set  back  the  proper  distance 
from  the  street,  and  in  front  of  the  house  built  a  structure  three 
and  one  half  feet  high,  extending  from  the  wall  of  the  house  to 
the  line  of  the  street,  the  top  of  which  was  covered  by  turf,  and 
the  interior  used  for  coal-bins.  All  the  reserved  spaces  in  front 
of  the  other  houses  on  the  street  were  filled  to  a  height  of  three 
or  four  inches  from  the  line  of  the  sidewalk,  and  sloped  upward 
to  a  line  at  the  house  of  nine  to  twelve  inches,  to  prevent  water 
from  running  towards  the  building.  It  was  held  that  the  struc- 
ture built  by  the  defendant  upon  his  lot  was  a  violation  of  the 
restrictions  in  the  deed.^ 

A  covenant  not  to  erect  any  building  within  a  certain  dis- 
tance from  a  street  is  violated  by  the  erection  of  a  wall  fifteen 
feet  high  at  right  angles  to  the  street  and  extending  quite  up 
to  it.3 

A  restriction  that  no  building  shall  be  erected  within  ten  feet 
of  the  street  is  not  violated  by  the  erection  of  a  brick  wall  six 
feet  in  height,  with  a  coping  one  foot  in  height,  to  be  used  as  a 
fence  or  wall  on  the  line  of  the  street.^ 

757.  A  restriction  requiring  the  setting  back  of  a  building 
a  certain  distance  from  the  street  prohibits  a  basement  story 
surmounted  by  a  balcony  within  that  distance,  especially  if  the 
restriction  in  terms  prohibits  any  "projection  in  the  nature  of  a 
bay  window,  circular  or  octagon  front,  with  the  foundation  wall 

N.  E.  Rep.  684  ;  Payson  v.  Burnham,  141  The  addition  is  iu  substance  and  effect  a 

Mass.  547,  6  N.  E.  Rep.  708 ;  Bagnall  v.  removal  of  the  front  line  of  the   house 

Davies,  140  Mass.  76,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  786;  three  feet  and  three  inches  nearer  to   the 

Teck  V.Conway,  119  Mass.  546;  Linzee  street  than  the  deed  permits."    Per  Soule, 

V.  Mixer,  101  Mass.  512.  J.     See,  also,  Linzee  v.  Mixer,  101   Mass. 

1  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387.   "We  512;   Payson  ';.  Burnham,  141  Mass.  547, 

cannot  regard  this  addition  as  an  ordinary  6  N.  E.  Rep.  708. 

projection,  or  variation  of  detail  in   the  '^  Attorney  -  General   v.    Gardiner,    117 

arrangement  and   ornamentation   of   the  Mass.  492. 

front  of  the  house,  which  the  parties  to  ^  Child  v.  Douglas,  Kay,  560. 

the  deed  may  have  contemplated  as  being  *  Nowcll  v,  Boston  Academy,  130  Mass. 

proper  under  the  provisions  of  the  deed.  209. 

614 


PARTICULAR  RESTRICTIONS  AND  THEIR  CONSTRUCTION.       [§§  758,  759. 

sustaining  the  same,"  although  within  this  reserved  space  "  steps, 
windows,  porticoes,  and  other  usual  projections  appurtenant  to 
said  front  wall  are  to  be  allowed,"  subject  to  certain  limitations. 
Such  a  basement  projection  is  not  to  be  deemed  a  usual  projection, 
within  tlie  meaning  of  such  provision,  when  it  is  found  that  such 
a  projection  has  never  been  usual  in  this  countr)^  though  usual  in 
European  architecture,  and  well  known  to  cultivated  architects, 
and  a  natural  incident,  but  not  a  necessary  feature,  of  a  build- 
ing of  the  class  to  which  the  building  in  question  belongs.^ 

But  under  such  a  restriction  a  stone  porch  added  to  a  front 
corner  of  a  building  erected  on  the  land  and  set  back  as  required, 
fifteen  feet  high,  with  a  steep  slate  roof  seven  feet  high,  and 
with  solid  side  walls  projecting  at  right  angles  to  the  front  wall, 
and  not  extending  more  than  five  feet  into  and  upon  such  reserved 
space,  its  walls  and  foundations  being  distinct  from  the  front 
wall  and  its  foundation,  is  a  "  portico  "  or  "  other  projection," 
within  the  meaning  of  such  deed,  and  not  a  "  projection  in  the 
nature  of  a  bay  window,  circular  front,  or  octagon  front."  - 

758.  Bay  windows  are  part  of  a  house,  and  cannot  be  ex- 
tended over  reatricted  ground.'^  "  When  you  find  that  parts  of 
the  main  structure  of  the  house,  that  is,  the  portions  of  the  house 
forming  the  bays,  are  carried  up  from  the  foundation,  it  appears 
to  me  clear  that  such  parts  are  buildings  within  the  meaning  of 
the  covenant."  * 

759.  A  projection  in  the  nature  of  a  bay  window,  circular 
or  octagon  front,  with  the  foundation  walls,  was  prohibited  in  a 

1  Attorney-General  v.  Algonquin  Club,  the  permission  extends  to  more  serious 
153  Mass.  447,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  2.  And  see  structures,  with  closed  sides,  and  there- 
Linzee  v.  Mixer,  101  Mass.  512.  fore   there   is   no    reason    for  excluding 

2  Attorney-General  v.  Aycr,  148  Mass.  porches.  Indeed,  a  portico  projecting  not 
584,587,20  N.  E.  Kep.  451.  Holmes,  J.,  more  than  five  feet  would,  or  at  least 
said  :  "  The  parties  to  this  deed  did  not  might,  ol.struct  the  view  of  a  n.ighi)oriiig 
mean  by  portico  '  a  walk  covered  with  a  house  with  its  pillars  almost  as  conijdetely 
roof,  supported  by  columns  at  least  on  one  as  if  its  sides  were  closed." 

side.'     They  meant  the  shelter  ;o  the  door  »  Attorney-General    v.    Williams,    140 

of  a  building,  familiar  to  Massachusetts  Mass.  .329.  2  N.  E.  Kep.  80,  3   N.  E.  Rep. 

and  to  Boston.     We  are  of  opinion  that  214 ;  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  .Mass.  387,395  ; 

they  used  it  as  a  generic  word,  including  Payson  v.  Burnham,  141  Mass.  547,  6  N. 

a  shelter  with  closed  sides,  as  well  as  one  E.  Rep.  708;  Manners  i;.  Johnson,  1   Ch. 

with  pillars.     We  agree  that  in  deterrain-  l)iv.  C73. 

inir  the  scope  of  the  word  we  must  look  at  '  Manners  v.  Johnson,  1  Ch.  Div.  073, 

the  object  of  the  restrictions   and   of  the  678,  per  Ilall,  V.  C. 
excejitions  to  it.     But,  as  we   have  said, 

615 


§  7ti0.]  RKSTRICTIONS   AS    TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

deed  requiring  the  setting  back  of  any  building  twenty  feet  from 
the  street,  unless  any  horizontal  section  of  sucii  projection  would 
fall  within  the  external  lines  of  a  trapezoid,  whose  base  along 
the  building  should  not  exceed  seven  tenths  of  the  length  of  the 
building,  and  whose  side  lines  should  make  an  angle  of  forty -five 
degrees  with  the  base.  It  was  held  that  the  deed  did  not  war- 
rant the  building  of  two  or  more  bay  windows  close  together,  so 
that  the  bases  of  their  respective  trapezoids  would  interlap,  and 
the  length  of  the  base  of  each,  taken  togethei-,  would  be  greater, 
while  the  part  of  the  bases  of  each  which  did  not  overlap  would 
be  less,  than  the  distance  limited  in  the  deed.  The  general  pur- 
pose of  the  provision  was  to  secure  a  space  of  twenty  feet  from 
the  street  which  should  be  substantially  free  from  buildings. 
"  Certain  projections  into  this  space  were  allowed,  but  great  pains 
were  taken  to  limit  the  amount  and  character  of  them.  If  the 
front  of  the  building  is  so  wide  as  to  admit  of  the  erection  of 
more  than  one  such  bay  window,  to  allow  the  bases  of  the  trape- 
zoids of  the  several  bay  windows  to  overlap  each  other  would  be 
to  allow  the  reserved  space  to  be  substantially  occupied,  instead 
of  keeping  it  substantially  clear.  The  privilege  which  is  given 
by  the  deed  of  occupying  a  moderate  portion  of  the  reserved 
space  with  projections  is  not  to  be  exercised  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  defeat  the  main  purpose  of  the  provision." 

But  under  the  same  deed  which  expressly  allowed  "porticoes 
and  other  usual  projections  "  without  restriction,  inasmuch  as  for 
a  long  time  all  parties  have  assumed  that  it  was  not  intended  to 
prohibit  the  building  of  porticoes  close  to  bay  windows,  and  octa- 
gon and  circular  fronts,  it  was  held  that  such  projections  may  be 
built  without  regard  to  whether  the  base  of  their  trapezoids  over- 
lap the  porticoes  and  other  usual  projections.^ 

A  decree  ordering  the  Algonquin  Club  to  remove  certain  pro- 
jections of  its  house,  "  with  the  foundation  walls  sustaining  the 
same,"  "  so  that  the  entire  space  .  .  .  shall  be  on  the  same  face 
as  the  main  front  wall,"  was  held  not  to  require  the  foundations 
under  ground  to  be  removed.^ 

760.  A  piazza  or  porch  is  ordinarily  a  constituent  part  of 
a  building,  and  is  within  the  terms  of  a  restriction  which  prohib- 
its the  placing  of  a  building  less   than   a  certain    number  of  feet 

'  Attorney-General  v.  Algonquin  Club,  2  Attorney-General  v.  Algonquin  Club, 
153  Mass.  447,  451,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  2.  155  Mass.  128,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  209. 

616 


PARTICULAR   RESTRICTIONS   AND   THEIR    CONSTRUCTION.      [§§  761,  762. 

from  the  line  of  a  street.  Thus  a  piazza  eight  feet  wide,  within 
the  prohibited  distance,  encircled  by  a  railing,  and  having  a  roof 
supported  by  posts,  attached- to  a  house,  and  extending  along  its 
entire  front,  is  within  such  a  prohibition.^  In  another  case  a 
piazza,  covered  by  a  continuation  of  the  roof  of  the  building,  ex- 
tended within  the  prohibited  distance.  The  posts  which  sup- 
ported the  projecting  portion  of  the  second  story  were  six  inches 
in  diameter,  and  supported  by  brick  piers  resting  on  the  ground. 
In  the  roof  was  a  projecting  dormer  window,  by  means  of  which  a 
portion  of  a  room  in  the  second  story  was  also  carried  within  the 
prohibited  distance  from  the  street.  It  was  held  that  these  pro- 
jections were  a  violation  of  the  restriction.^ 

An  open  porch  may  be  a  constituent  part  of  a  dwelling,  if  it  is 
built  on  brick  or  stone  foundations  and  is  permanently  attached  to 
a  building.  It  is  a  violation  of  a  restriction  against  the  erection  of 
any  building  within  a  certain  distance  from  the  line  of  a  street.^ 

761.  Uniform  front  line.  —  A  restriction  that  the  front  line 
of  all  buildings  shall  be  placed  equidistant  from,  and  not  less 
than  eight  feet  back  from,  the  street  does  not  require  the  pur- 
chaser to  put  Lhe  front  of  his  building  back  to  the  uniform  line 
of  the  fronts  of  the  adjoining  houses  already  erected,  which  are 
more  than  eight  feet  from  the  street.  If  the  buildings  already 
erected  are  not  upon  a  uniform  line,  there  would  be  no  means  of 
fixing  any  other  line  than  a  line  eight  feet  from  the  street.'^ 

A  restriction,  that  any  building  on  the  land  conveyed  should  be 
set  back  from  the  street  the  same  distance  as  a  house  tlu;n  stand- 
ing on  an  adjoining  lot,  only  requires  that  the  front  wall  of  each 
building  erected  on  the  land  shall  conform,  in  respect  to  distance 
from  the  street,  with  the  front  wall  of  the  house  then  standing 
on  the  lot  referred  to,  and  was  not  intended  to  forbid  the  erec- 
tion, or  prescribe  the  shape  or  dimension,  pf  any  porch,  stoop,  or 
platform  the  respective  owners  might  choose  to  budd.^^ 

762.  A  restriction  that  a  grantee  shall  not  erect  any  build- 
ing nearer  to  the   grantor's   other  land  than   a   certain   pre- 

1  Reardon  ..   Murphy,  163  Mass.  501,  vcrsiuK  14  Pn.  Co.  Ct    80  ;  Buck  t-   Ad-, 

.„  ^    V    lion    854  'l"i«,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  552.  17  Atl.  Kcp-  961. 

"-  Ba;nair..'  Davies,  140  Mass.  76,  2         *  Smith  ..  Bradley.  154  Mass.  227.  28 

N.E.  Rep.  786.  N.  E.  Rep.  14. 

3  Ofrontz  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Johnson,         ^  Graham  i;.  Hue,  9.3  Ky.  4<4. 
16S  I'l    St.   178,  31    Atl.   Rep.   1008,   re- 

617 


§§  763,  7G4.]       RKSTKICTIONS    AS   TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

scribed  limit  does  not  prevent  the  grantee  from  building  a  new 
buililino-  higher  than  a  building  previously  standing  upon  the  land, 
though  by  so  doing  he  may  lessen  the  amount  of  light  and  air 
coming  to  tlie  grantor's  building.^ 

763.  A  restKiction  that  no  building  shall  be  erected  on  the 
rear  of  a  lot,  the  front  of  which  is  already  covered  by  a  dwelling- 
house,  means  that  no  part  of  the  lot  lying  behind  the  house  shall 
be  built  upon.  There  is  no  ambiguity  as  to  what  was  meant  by 
the  rear  of  the  lot.  Accordingly,  it  was  held  that  the  erection  of 
an  L  in  the  rear  of  the  house,  of  the  same  height  as  the  house 
itself,  was  a  violation  of  the  restriction .^ 

Under  a  condition  as  to  building  upon  the  "  rear  of  a  lot," 
there  is  no  ambiguity  as  to  what  is  to  be  deemed  the  rear  of  the 
lot,  when  at  the  time  the  deed  was  executed  there  were  buildings 
upon  the  land  which  the  deed  declared  conformed  with  the  con- 
dition."^ 

A  restriction  that  any  dwelling-house  erected  on  the  lot 
granted  shall  not  have  an  L  more  than  two  stories  in  height  is  not 
violated  by  erecting  a  building  four  stories  in  height  covering  the 
whole  lot.* 

764.  Restrictions  as  to  height.  —  A  condition  in  a  deed  pro- 
hibiting the  grantor  from  "  erecting  any  building  more  than  one 
story  high  "  on  his  adjoining  lot,  so  that  the  grantee  "  should  not 
be  incommoded  in  regard  to  light  and  air  by  any  high  building," 
does  not  confine  the  grantor  to  the  precise  height  of  a  one-story 
building  standing  on  the  premises  when  the  deed  was  executed  ; 
and  hence  the  condition  is  not  violated  by  the  grantor  in  increas- 
ing the  height  of  such  one-story  building  by  two  feet,  so  as  to 
make  it  uniform  in  height  with  the  first  floor  of  a  building  in 
front  of  it.^ 

1  Atkins  V.  Bordman,  2  Met.  457,  37  an  L,  as  they  choose.  .  .  .  Parties  are 
Am.  Dec.  100.  also  left  to  build  over  their  entire  lots,  if 

2  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387.  they  choose,  .  .  .  and  the  only  restriction 
■^  Keening  v.  Ayling,  126  Mass.  404.  as  to  the  height  to  which  a  building  may 
*  Smith  V.  Bradley,  154  Mass.  227,  230,     be  carried  is  that  which  relates  to  an  L." 

28  N.  E.  Rep.  14.  Morton,  J.,  said  :  "  But  ^  Hobson  v.  Cartwriglit,  93  Ky.  368,  20 
we  do  not  think  that  this  restriction  means  S.  W.  Rep.  281.  "It  therefore  should 
that  no  building  shall  he  erected  unless  it  never  be  assumed,  in  absence  of  plain  and 
has  an  L,  or  without  an  L;  but  that,  if  unambiguous  words  to  such  effect,  that 
any  building  is  erected  with  an  L,  that  parties  contract  in  relation  to  sale  or  ex- 
shall  not  exceed  two  stories  in  height,  change  of  real  projierty  with  sole  regard 
Parties  are  left  to  build  with  or  without  to  its  present  condition,  and  without  at 
G18 


PARTICULAR    RESTRICTIONS   AND   THEIR   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  765. 

In  a  condition  that  "no  buildings  which  may  be  erected  on 
said  lot  shall  be  less  than  three  stories  in  height,  exclusive  of  the 
basement  and  attic,  nor  have  exterior  walls  of  any  other  material 
than  brick,  stone,  or  iron,  nor  be  used  or  occupied  for  any  other  pur- 
pose or  in  any  other  way  than  as  a  dwelling-house  for  the  term  of 
twenty  years"  from  a  certain  day,  the  limitation  of  time  applies 
only  to  the  mode  of  use  and  occupation,  and  not  to  the  height  of 
the  buildlncrs  or  to  the  materials  of  the  outer  walls.^ 

In  a  conveyance  of  a  house  and  lot  upon  which  there  was  a 
stable  in  the  rear  upon  another  street,  a  restriction  that  the  roof 
of  the  stable  shall  never  be  raised  more  than  thirteen  feet  above 
the  street  applies  to  a  building  of  any  description  on  the  land 
after  it  has  ceased  to  be  occupied  for  the  purpose  of  a  stable.^ 

765.  Offensive  trade  or  business.  —  A  restriction  that  build- 
ings erected  upon  the  land  conveyed  shall  not  be  used  for  any 
trade  or  business  "  injurious  or  offensive  to  the  neighboring  in- 
habitants," in  addition  to  prohibiting  their  use  for  several  speci- 
fied purposes,  must  be  given  a  reasonable  construction.  It  is  a 
too  narrow  construction  to  hold  that  it  prohibits  only  trades  or 
kinds  of  business  which  are  nuisances  per  se.  "  Any  kind  of 
business  may  become  a  nuisance  by  the  manner  in  which  it  is 
carried  on  from  its  location,  and  a  business  may  be  offensive  to 
neighboring  inhabitants,  and  yet  fall  far  short  of  being  a  legal 
nuisance,  which  a  court  of  equity  will  abate  as  such.  This  clause 
in  the  agreement  must  have  a  reasonable  construction.  We  can- 
not suppose  that  the  parties  had  in  mind  any  business  which  might 
be  offensive  to  a  person  of  a  supersensitive  organization,  or  to 
one  of  a  peculiar  and  abnormal  temperament,  or  to  the  small 
class  of  persons  who  are  generally  annoyed  by  sights,  sounds,  and 
objects  not  offensive  to  other  people.  They  undoubtedly  had  in 
mind  ordinary,  normal  people,  and  meant  to  prohibit  trades  and 
business  which  would  be  offensive  to  people  generally,  and  would 
thus  render  the  neighborhood,  to  such  people,  undesirable  as  a 
place  of  residence."  3  Accordingly,  whore  the  i)urchascr  of  one 
of  the  lots  subject  to  such  restriction  sought  to  enforce  it  against 
the  lessee  of  a  house  next  door,  built  upon  another  one  of  the 

all  contemplating  or  providing  for  fntnre         ^  Jeffries  v.  Jeffries.  117  Ma8S^184. 
changes  and  improvements  that  may  take         «  Kowland  i-.  Miller.  139  N.  Y.  93,  34 
place  in  or  around  it."     Per  LewJH,  J.  N.  E.  Kep.  7G5,  per  Earl,  J. 

1  Keening  v.  Ayling.  126  Mass.  404. 

619 


§  766.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS    TO   THE    USE    OF   LAND. 

lots,  to  prevent  his  using  it  for  carr^nng  on  tlie  business  of  an 
umlortaker,  it  was  held  that  the  premises  could  not  be  used  for 
holding  autopsies,  or  other  post-mortem  examinations,  dissecting, 
receiving,  and  storing  of  dead  bodies,  and  for  the  business  of 
holding  funerals ;  but  that,  on  proof  that  said  uses  had  been 
abandoned,  the  office  and  parlors  of  the  house  could  be  used  to 
solicit  orders  and  sell  coffins  by  sample,  and  that  the  room  called  a 
"  chapel "  might  be  used  for  a  place  of  worship,  within  the  limit 
of  the  spirit  and  purpose  of  the  covenant. 

A  restriction  that  no  building  except  a  dwelling-house  should 
be  erected  on  the  land,  and  that  such  building,  when  erected, 
should  not  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  any  offensive 
trade,  is  violated  by  the  use  of  the  lower  story  of  the  dwelling- 
house  as  a  grocery.!  The  restriction  prescribes  the  kind  of  build- 
ing that  may  be  erected  and  the  use  that  may  be  made  of  it. 

A  restriction  against  a  trade  or  business  which  might  be  offen- 
sive to  the  neighborhood  is  violated  by  using  the  land  for  a  coal- 
yard  ;2  or  by  establishing  upon  it  a  planing-mill;^  or  by  the  use 
of  the  premises  for  an  undertaker's  business  ;  ^  or  for  an  exhibi- 
tion of  wild  beasts.^ 

Whether  keeping  a  stable  is  a  "  nauseous  and  offensive  business," 
within  the  meaning  of  a  restrictive  covenant,  is  mainly  a  question 
of  fact,  depending  in  some  measure  on  the  extent  and  mode  of  use 
of  the  premises  for  the  purposes  of  a  stable.^ 

The  term  "  nuisance,"  when  used  in  a  covenant,  must  be  taken 
strictly,  and  therefore  is  not  broken  by  permitting  the  erection 
upon  the  land  of  a  national  school." 

766.  A  restriction  against  any  "trade  or  business"  is  vio- 
lated by  the  occupation  of  a  part  of  the  premises  by  a  "  real 
estate  and  insurance  agent  or  broker,"  or  by  "  sign  or  fresco 
painters."  Such  use  of  the  property  is  a  violation  not  only  of 
the  spirit  but  also  of  the  letter  of  the  provision.^  Such  a  restric- 
tion is  violated  by  using  the  premises  for  a  hospital,  where  poor 
patients  made  payments  according  to  their  means.^ 

1  Dorr  V.  Harrahan,  101  Mass.  531.  &  Hall  v.  Ewin,  37  Ch.  D.  74. 

2  Barrow  v.  Richard,  8  Paige,  351,  35  ^  Whitney  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  11  Gray, 
Am.  Dec.  713.  359,  71  Am.  Dec.  715. 

3  Brouwer  v.  Jones,  23  Barb.  153.  "^  Harrison  v.  Good,  L.  R.  II  Eq.  338. 
*  Rowland  v.   Miller,   15  N.  Y.   Supp.         »  Trustees  v.  Thacher,  87  N.  Y.  311. 

701.  9  Bramwell  v.  Lacy,  10  Ch.  D.  691. 

620 


PARTICULAR   RESTRICTIOXS   AND   THEIR   CONSTRUCTION.       [§  767. 

A  charitable  institution  called  a  "  Home  for  Working  Girls," 
where  the  inmates  are  provided  with  board  and  lodging,  whether 
any  payment  is  taken  or  not,  is  a  business  within  such  a  restric- 
tion.i  Upon  the  appeal,  Cotton,  L.  J.,  said :  "  I  cannot  read  the 
two  words 'trade' and  '  business' as  synonymous.  There  may 
be  a  great  many  businesses  which  are  not  trades,  and  although, 
in  my  opinion,  receiving  payment  for  what  is  done,  using  what 
you  are  doing  as  a  means  of  getting  payment  with  a  view  to 
profit  —  whether  profit  is  actually  obtained  or  not  must  of  coui'se 
be  immaterial  —  is  certainly  material  in  considering  whether 
what  was  being  done  is  or  is  not  a  business,  yet  in  my  opinion 
it  is  not  essential  that  there  should  be  payment  in  order  to  con- 
stitute a  business.  And  the  mere  fact  that  there  is  payment 
under  certain  circumstances  does  not  necessarily  make  a  thing  a 
business  which  if  there  was  no  payment  would  not  be  a  busi- 
ness." 

A  charitable  institution  for  the  education  of  the  daughters  of 
missionaries  is  within  the  prohibition  of  a  covenant  that  the 
premises  shall  not  be  used  "  otherwise  than  as  and  for  a  private 
residence  only,  and  not  for  any  purpose  of  trade."  ^ 

In  a  covenant  not  to  put  upon  the  premises  "  any  buildings, 
timbers,  trees,  or  other  nuisances,"  the  words  "  other  nuisances  " 
include  only  things  similar  in  character  to  those  particularly 
named,  and  therefore  do  not  include  excavations  or  a  lowering  of 
the  surface  of  the  ground.^ 

767.  Restrictions  against  the  erection  or  use  of  buildings 
for  business  purposes  or  stables,  hotels  or  boarding-houses,  are 
valid.4 

Where  a  grantor  in  conveying  lots  of  land  for  dwelling-houses 
inserted  a  restriction  that  any  building  erected  upon  the  land 
"  shall  not  in  any  event  be  used  as  a  stable,"  but  in  tlie  deeds  of 
several  lots  added  to  this  restriction  the  words  "except  a  private 
stable,"  and  the  lots  in  question  were  sold  by  public  auction,  and 
were  described  in  a  catalogue,  whicli  stated  tliat  the  restriction 
in  regard  to  stables  should  not  be  enforced  so  as  to  prevent  the 

1  Rolls  V.  Miller,  25  Ch.  D.  206,  27  Ch.  Wiiiiii|iesHukec  Cnnip  Meeting  Asso.  v. 
D  7]    85  Gordon,  03  N.  II.  505  ;  Morris  v.  Tuska- 

2  German  v.  Chapman,  7  Ch.  D.  271.        loosa  Mannf.  Co.  8.3  Aln.  565,  3  So.  Hep. 
8  Cross  V.  Frost,  04  Vt.  179.  089. 


*  Gannett  v.   Albree,  10.3    Mass.   372; 


G21 


§§  7G8,  769.]       KESTRICTIONS   AS    TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

erection  ami  use  of  private  stables,  though  this  statement  was 
not  made  in  the  deeds  of  these  lots,  it  was  held  that  the  restric- 
tion could  not  be  enforced  against  the  use  of  private  stables,  and 
tliat  there  Avas  no  intention  to  annex  to  the  lots  sold  the  right  to 
prevent  the  erection  and  use  of  private  stables  upon  any  of  the 
lots.i 

768.  A  covenant  that  "  the  trade  of  an  innkeeper,  victual- 
ler, or  retailer  of  wine,  spirits,  or  beer,"  should  not  be  car- 
ried on  was  contained  in  a  deed  of  a  piece  of  land  adjoining  a 
theatre.  The  purchaser  was  the  lessee  of  the  theatre.  He 
erected  on  this  piece  of  ground  a  building,  the  object  of  which 
was  to  furnish  convenient  egress  from  the  theatre ;  but  on  each 
floor  he  set  up  a  counter  for  selling  wine,  spirits,  and  beer,  which 
could  not  be  approached  directly  from  the  outside,  but  at  which 
any  person  who  paid  for  admittance  to  the  theatre,  when  open 
for  theatrical  performances,  could  purchase  refreshments.  It  was 
held  that  the  pui-chaser  was  bound  by  the  covenant.  He  carried 
on  this  trade  only  as  ancillary  to  his  other  business,  but  never- 
theless he  carried  on  the  trade  in  violation  of  the  covenant.^ 

But  where  a  grantee  covenanted  not  to  use  the  land  "  as  a  site 
for  any  hotel,  tavern,  public  house,  or  beer-house,"  or  for  the  trade 
of  a  "  seller  by  retail  of  wine,  beer,  spirits,  or  spirituous  liquors," 
a  grocer  by  an  alteration  of  the  excise  laws  became  entitled  to  sell 
wine  in  bottles  ;  and  it  was  held  that  in  making  such  sales  upon 
the  premises  he  did  not  violate  the  restrictive  covenant  entered 
into  under  a  different  state  of  the  law.  The  trade  of  a  retailer 
of  wine  is  a  business  quite  different  in  character  from  the  business 
of  selling  wine  in  bottles,  which  grocers  were  authorized  to  carry 
on  under  the  new  excise  law.^  A  covenant  prohibiting  the  use 
of  the  premises  "  for  the  sale  of  spiritous  liquors  "  was  held  not 
to  prevent  the  sale  of  wine  in  bottles,  but  only  of  spirits.* 

769.  The  purpose  for  which  a  way  is  to  be  kept  open 
largely  determines  the  extent  of  the  restriction.  Thus,  where 
deeds  of  lots  in  a  block  provided  that  "  fifteen  feet  in  width 
across  the  rear  of  the  lots  shall  be  subject  to  the  right  of  passage 

1  Beals  w.  Case,  138  Mass.  138.  3  jones  r.  Bone,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  674.    And 

2  Buckle  V.  Fredericks,  44  Ch.  Div.  see  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Garnett, 
244.  See,  also,  Bishop  of  St.  Albans  v.  L.  R.  9  Eq.  26 ;  Pease  v.  Coats,  L,  R. 
Battersby,  3  Q.  B.  D.  359 ;  Nicoll  v.  Fen-  2  Eq.  688. 

ning,  19  Ch.  D.  258.  ■»  Feildeu  v.  Slater,  L,  R.  7  Eq.  523. 

622 


WHO  HAVE  THE  BURDEN  AND  BENEFIT  OF  RESTRICTIONS.     [§§  770,  771. 

for  horses,  carriages,  and  carts  for  the  private  convenience "  of 
the  lot-owners,  and  the  passage  "  kept  open  "  for  the  "  use  and 
purpose  aforesaid  and  no  other,"  it  was  held  that  the  deeds  did 
not  restrict  the  owners  from  building  over  the  passage,  so  long  as 
the  fifteen  feet  space,  of  reasonable  height,  was  left  for  access  to 
the  lots.i  Mr.  Justice  Andrews,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the 
Court  of  Appeals,  said :  "  It  is  claimed  that  the  clause  in  the 
deed-poll,  that  the  passage  was  to  be  '  kept  open,'  can  only  be 
satisfied  by  permitting  it  to  remain  open  to  the  sky,  and  that 
light  and  air  for  the  benefit  of  the  several  lots  was  one  of  the 
objects  intended  by  the  reservation  of  the  passageways.  But 
the  deed-poll  makes  no  reference  to  this  purpose.  It  does  not 
reserve  an  open  way  for  general  use,  but  expressly  limits  and 
defines  the  uses  for  which  the  ways  are  intended,  and  to  which 
they  were  to  be  appropriated." 

770.  A  stipulation  for  a  passageway  in  the  rear  of  a  block 
of  buildings,  for  the  benefit  of  the  abutters,  implies  a  passage- 
way open  to  the  sky  for  light,  air,  and  prospect,  as  well  as  for 
passing.  An  abuttor  upon  such  passageway  may  be  enjoined 
from  building  bay-windows  from  a  point  eight  feet  above  the  side- 
walk, and  extending  three  or  four  feet  into  the  passageway, 
to  the  top  of  the  building.  If  this  might  be  done,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  place  any  practical  limit  to  the  building  over  and  fill- 
ing up  the  passageway.^ 

III.    Who  have  the  Burden  and  Benefit  of  Restrictions. 

771.  Where  the  owner  of  a  tract  of  land  adopts  a  general 
scheme  for  its  improvement,  dividing  it  into  lots,  and  conveying 
these  with  uniform  restrictions  as  to  the  purposes  for  which  the 
land  may  be  used,  such  restrictions  create  equitable  easements  in 
favor  of  the  owners  of  the  several  lots,  which  may  be  enforced  in 
equity  by  any  one  of  such  owners.  Such  restiictions  are  not  for 
the  benefit  of  the  grantor  only,  but  for  the  benefit  of  all  pur- 
chasers.    The  owner  oi  each  lot  has  as  appurtenant  to  his  lot  a 

1  Hollins  V.  Demorest,  129  N.  Y.  676,  obstruction  was  a  bridf^e  across  a  court. 

29  N.  E.  Rep.  1093,  amrming  10  N.  Y.  Brooks  v.  Heynolda,  IOC  Mass.  31  ;  Schwoe- 

Supp.  384.  rer  v.  Boylstoii   Market  Asso.  99  Mass. 

-  Attorney-General    v.    Williams,    140  285.     In  this  case  the  obstruction  was  a 

Mass.  329,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  80,  3  N.  E.  Rep.  buildin},'    acro.ss    the   passageway  at   the 

214,  .54   Am.  Rep.  408;  Salisbury);.  An-  height   of   about  sixteen   feet   above  the 

drews,  128  Mass.  330.     In  this  case  the  ground. 

623 


§  TTl.] 


RESTKICTIONS   AS    TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND, 


riolit  in  the  nature  of  an  easement  upon  the  other  lots,  wliich  he 
may  enforce  in  equity .^ 

Whether  such  a  restriction  creates  a  right  which  inures  to  the 
benefit  of  purchasers  is  a  question  of  intention,  and  to  create 
such  a  right  it  must  appear  from  the  terms  of  the  grant,  or  from 
the  surrounding  circumstances,  that  the  grantor  intended  to  create 
an  easement  in  favor  of  the  purchasers.^ 

The  fact  that  like  restrictions  have  been  inserted  in  all  the 
deeds  of  the  grantor  conveying  adjacent  land  is  a  circumstance  to 
be  considered  as  tending  to  show  that  the  restrictions  were  for  the 
benefit  of  all  the  lots  conveyed,  as  well  as  those  retained  by  the 


1  Collins  V.  Castle,  36  Ch.  D.  243 ; 
Hopkins  V.  Smitli,  162  Mass.  444,  38  N.  E. 
Eep.  1122;  Hauo  j;.  Bigelow,  155  Mass. 
341,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  628  ;  Ladd  v.  Boston, 
151  Mass.  585,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  858,  21  Am. 
St.  Rep.  481  ;  Jackson  v.  Stevenson,  156 
Mass.  496,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  691,  32  Am.  St. 
Eep.  476;  Jeffries  v.  Jeffries,  117  Mass. 
184;  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387; 
Payson  v.  Burnham,  141  Mass.  547,  6 
N.  E.  Rep.  708 ;  Beals  v.  Case,  138"  Mass. 
138;  Peck  v.  Conway,  119  Mass.  546; 
Ayling  v.  Kramer,  133  Mass.  12;  Tobey 
V.  Moore,  130  Mass.  448 ;  Linzee  v. 
Mixer,  101  Mass.  512;  Parker  v.  Nightin- 
gale, 6  Allen,  341,  83  Am.  Dec.  632; 
Whitney  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  1 1  Gray,  359  ; 
Peabody  Heights  Co.  v.  Willson  (Md.), 
32  Atl.  Rep.  386 ;  Newbold  v.  Peabody 
Heights  Co.  70  Md.  493,  17  Atl.  Rep.  372  ; 
Trustees  v.  Lynch,  70  N.  Y.  440 ;  Gibert 
V.  Peteler,  38  N.  Y.  165,  168,  per  Clarke, 
J. ;  Barrow  v.  Richard,  8  Paige,  351  ; 
Brouwer  v.  Jones,  23  Barb.  153;  Ilodge  v. 
Sloan,  107  N.  Y.  244;  Burbank  v.  Pills- 
bury,  48  N.  H.  475  ;  Clark  v.  Martin,  49 
Pa.  St.  289 ;  St.  Andrew's  Church's  App. 
67  Pa.  St.  512;  Muzzarelli  v.  Hulshizer, 
(Pa.  St.)  30  Atl.  Rep.  291  ;  Morris  v. 
Tuskaloosa  Manuf.  Co.  83  Ala.  565,  3  So. 
Rep.  689. 

2  Whitney  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  11  Gray, 
359.  Bigelow,  J.,  said  :  "  When  it  ap- 
pears by  a  fair  interpretation  of  the  words 
of  a  grant  that  it  was  the  intent  of  the 
parties  to  create  or  reserve  a  right,  in  the 

624 


nature  of  a  servitude  or  easement,  in  the 
property  granted,  for  the  benefit  of  other 
land  owned  by  the  grantor,  and  originally 
forming  with  the  laud  conveyed  one  par- 
eel,  such  right  will  be  deemed  appurte- 
nant to  the  land  of  the  grantor,  and  bind- 
ing on  that  conveyed  to  the  grantee,  and 
the  right  and  burden  thus  created  will  re- 
spectively pass  to  and  be  binding  on  all 
subsequent  grantees  of  the  respective  lots 
of  land."  Again,  in  Parker  v.  Nightin- 
gale, 6  Allen,  341,  344,  Bigelow,  C.  J,, 
said  :  "  A  court  of  chancery  will  recognize 
and  enforce  agreements  concerning  the 
occupation  and  mode  of  use  of  real  es- 
tate, although  they  are  not  expressed 
with  technical  accuracy  as  exceptions  or 
reservations  out  of  a  grant  nor  binding 
as  covenants  real  running  with  the  land. 
.  .  .  Restrictions  and  limitations  which 
may  be  put  on  property  by  means  of  such 
stipulations  derive  their  validity  from  the 
right  which  every  owner  of  the  fee  has  to 
di.'ipose  of  bis  estate  either  absolutely  or 
by  a  qualified  grant,  or  to  regulate  the 
manner  in  which  it  shall  be  used  and 
occupied.  So  long  as  he  retains  the  title 
in  himself,  his  covenants  and  agreements 
respecting  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  his 
estate  will  be  binding  on  liim  i)ersonally, 
and  be  specifically  enforced  in  equity. 
When  he  disposes  of  it  by  grant  or  other- 
wise, those  who  take  under  him  cannot 
equitably  refuse  to  fulfil  stipulations  con- 
cerning the  premises  of  which  they  had 
notice." 


WHO  HAVE  THE  BURDEN  AND  BENEFIT  OF  RESTRICTIONS.   [§  772. 

grantor.  If,  however,  the  grantor  has  conveyed  some  of  the 
adjacent  land  by  deeds  contahiing  no  restrictions,  the  inference  of 
a  general  plan  of  restrictions  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  lots  is 
negatived,^ 

The  purpose  had  in  view  by  the  grantor  who  arranged  the 
general  plan  of  restrictions  is  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in 
determining  whether  such  restrictions  are  for  the  benefit  of  all 
purchasers  of  any  part  of  the  land  to  which  they  are  made  ap- 
plicable.2 

772.  The  right  of  one  owner  of  a  lot  to  enforce  restrictions 
upon  other  lots  rests  upon  the  ground  that  the  restrictions 
were  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  lots  subject  to  the  same  restrictions. 
"  Where  there  is  a  general  scheme  or  plan  adopted  and  made 
public  by  the  owner  of  a  tract  for  the  development  and  improve- 
ment of  the  property,  by  which  it  is  divided  into  streets,  avenues, 
and  lots,  and  contemplating  a  restriction  as  to  the  uses  to  which  the 
buildings  or  lots  may  be  put,  to  be  secured  by  a  covenant  embody- 
ing the  restriction,  to  be  inserted  in  each  deed  to  a  purchaser  ;  and 
it  appears,  by  writings  or  by  the  circumstances,  that  such  cove- 
nants are  intended  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  hinds,  and  that  each 
purchaser  is  to  be  subject  to  and  to  have  the  benefit  thereof;  and 
the  covenants  are  actually  inserted  in  all  deeds  for  lots  sold  in 
pursuance  of  the  plan,  —  one  purchaser  and  his  assigns  may 
enforce  the  covenant  against  any  other  purchaser  and  his  assigns, 
if  he  has  bought  with  knowledge  of  the  scheme,  and  the  covenant 
has  been  made  part  of  the  subject-matter  of  his  purchase."'  ^ 

Land  was  sold  to  a  purchaser  who  entered  into  restrictive  cov- 
enants for  himself,  his  heirs  and  assigns  as  to  the  buildings  to  be 
erected  upon  it,  but  the  grantor  did  not  enter  into  any  covenants 
as  to  the  land  retained.  The  grantor  sold  to  other  persons  various 
lots  of  the  piirt  retained,  without  requiring  any  similar  covenants 
from  them,  and  they  appear  to  hav(!  had  no  notice  of  tlu^  first 
purchasers'  covenants.  Later  still,  the  grantor  ix.iiglit  back  the 
land  he  had  sold   to  the  first  purchaser.     Jt  was   held  that   the 

1  Coughlin  V.  Barker,  4G  Mo.  App.  54.  Devoe,  124  N.  Y.  120,  26  N.  K.  Rep.  275  ; 

2  De  Gray  v.  Monmouth  Beach  Cliih-  Ucnals  v.  Cowli«haw,  9  Ch.  D.  125,  af- 
house  Co.  50  N.  J.  Eq.  329,  24  Atl.  Itep.  firmed  1 1  Ch.  D.  8f,fi  ;  Marken/.ic  i-.  Chil- 
3g8  (lers,  43  Cli.  1).  21)5;  S|)icer  v.  Martin,  14 

3  De  Gray  v.  Monmouth  Beach  Cliil)-  App.  Cas.  12,  25;  Hislop  v.  Leckic,  6 
house  Co.  50  N.  J.   Eq.  329,  24  Atl.  Hep.  App.  Cas.  560. 


388,    Syllabus    by   the   court;    Clark    v. 
VOL.  I. 


625 


§773.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

benefits  of  the  covenants  of  the  first  purchaser  did  not  pass  to 
the  subsequent  purchasers,  and  that  they  could  not  enforce  them 
against  the  grantor  after  the  repurchase.^  The  ground  of  the 
decision  seems  to  be  that  the  subsequent  purchasers,  having  no 
notice  of  the  covenants  in  the  first  deed,  did  not  purchase  with 
any  intention  on  their  part,  or  with  any  agreement  on  the  part 
of  their  grantor,  that  they  should  have  the  benefit  of  such  cove- 
nants. 

A  grantor  divided  a  parcel  of  land  into  thirteen  city  lots,  and 
conveyed  twelve  of  them  by  contemporaneous  deeds,  each  of 
which  restricted  buildings  thereon  to  first-class  dwelling-houses 
only,  except  that  the  deed  of  one  lot,  which  was  an  irregular 
coi'ner  lot  and  unfit  for  a  dwelling,  permitted  the  erection  of  "  a 
store "  on  it.  The  remaining  lot,  which  was  also  an  irregular 
corner  and  unfit  for  a  dwelling,  was  afterwards  conveyed  without 
restriction.  The  grantor  owned  no  other  land  in  the  vicinity. 
It  was  held  that  the  restriction  was  imposed  on  each  lot  for 
the  benefit  of  all  the  others,  and  was  enforcible  by  each  owner 
against  all  the  others.  Mr.  Justice  Knowlton,  delivering  the 
judgment  of  the  court,  said:  "In  cases  of  this  kind  it  is  impor- 
tant to  ascertain  the  purpose  of  the  grantor  in  imposing  the 
restrictions,  —  whether  they  are  intended  for  his  personal  benefit 
or  for  the  benefit  of  the  lot-owners  generally.  His  intention  is 
to  be  gathered  from  his  acts  and  the  circumstances.  Tlie  fact 
that  the  grantor  of  this  land  had  conveyed  two  lots  without  re- 
strictions, one  of  them  nearly  two  years  before  the  plan  was 
drawn  cutting  up  the  tract  into  lots,  and  the  other  to  the  same 
grantee  in  the  same  month  that  the  plan  was  made,  and  appar- 
ently before  he  had  perfected  his  scheme  in  regard  to  the  sale  of 
the  remainder,  is  not  very  significant.  .  .  .  As  the  grantor  owned 
no  other  land  in  the  vicinity,  it  seems  clear  that  the  restriction  was 
imposed  on  each  lot  for  the  benefit  of  the  owners  of  all  the 
others,  and  that  it  was  a  part  of  a  general  scheme  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  entire  property.'  ^ 

773.  The  restrictive  covenants  'which  equity  enforces  be- 
tween purchasers  inter  sese  are  those  that  have  been  im- 
posed by  a  common  vendor  or  the  original  owners  of  a  tract 
of  land,  in  pursuance  of  a  general  plan  for  the  development  and 

^  Keates  v.  Lyon,  4  Ch.  App.  218.  ^  pjano  v.  Bigelow,  155  Mass.  341,  343, 

29  N.  E.  Rep.  628. 

626 


WHO   HAVE    THE   BURDEN   AND    BENEFIT    OF   RESTRICTIONS.       [§  773. 


improvement  of  the  property  by  laying  it  out  in  streets,  avenues, 
and  lots,  adopting  some  uniform  or  settled  building  scheme.  The 
restrictions  generally  relate  to  number,  location,  size,  or  style  of 
buildings  to  be  erected,  or  the  uses  to  which  such  buildings  or 
the  land  may  be  put.^  In  case  of  a  breach  of  such  covenant,  "  the 
action  is  held  not  to  be  maintainable  between  purchasers  not 
parties  to  the  original  covenant,  in  cases  in  which :  —  (1)  it 
does  not  appear  that  the  covenant  was  entered  into  to  carry 
out  some  general  scheme  or  plan  for  the  improvement  or  de- 
velopment of  the  property  which  the  act  of  defendant  disregards 
in  some  particular  ;2  (2)  it  does  not  appear  that  the  covenant  was 
entered  into  for  the  benefit  of  the  land  of  which  complainant  has 
become  the  owner ;  ^  (3)  it  appears  that  the  covenant  was  not 
entered  into  for  the  benefit  of  subsequent  purchasers,  but  only 
for  the  benefit  of  the  original  covenantee  and  his  next  of  kin  ;  * 
(4)  it  appears  that  the  covenant  has  not  entered  into  the  consid- 
eration of  the  complainant's  purchase ;  ^  (5)  it  appears  that  the 
original  plan  has  been  abandoned  without  dissent,  or  the  charac- 
ter of  the  neighborhood  has  so  changed  as  to  defeat  the  purpose  of 
the  covenant,  and  to  thus  render  its  enforcement  unreasonable."'^ 
Wheie  an  original  purchaser  covenanted  not  to  do  or  suffer 
anything  which  would  be  a  nuisance  to  the  grantor's  adjoining 
property,  and  such  purchaser  sold  in  lots  to  others  who  entered 


1  De  Gray  v.  Monmouth  Beach  Club- 
house Co.  50  N.  J.  Eq.  329,  24  Atl.  Hep. 
388,  per  Green,  V.  C,  citing  Whatman  v. 
Gibson,  9  Sim.  196;  Coles  r.  Sims,  Kay, 
56.  5  De  Gex,  M.  &  G.  I  ;  Western  v. 
Macdcrmot,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  499,  2  Ch.  App 
72 ;  Richards  v.  Kevitt,  7  Ch.  Div.  224 , 
Nottinrrham  Brick,  &c.  Co.  v.  Butler,  15  Q 
,B.  Div.  261,  16  Q.  B.  Div.  778;  Martin  v 
Spicer,  34  Ch.  Div.  1,14  App.  Cas  12 
Collins  V.  Castle,  36  Ch.  Div.  243 ;  Mac 
kenzie  v.  Chiidcrs,  43  Ch.  Div.  265 ;  Parker 
V.  Nightingale,  6  Allen,  341  ;  Linzec  v. 
Mixer,  101  Mass.  512;  Jeffries  r.  Jeffries, 
117  Mass.  184;  Ilamien  v.  Werner,  144 
Mass.  396,  11  N.  E.  Ucp.  684. 

-  Shcp|)ar(l  v.  Gilmore,  57  L.  J.  Ch.  6; 
Dana  i-.  Wentworth,  1 1 1  .Mass.  291  ;  Bcals 
V.  Case,  138  Mass.  138. 

3  Sharp  V.  Ropes,  110  Mass.  381  ;  Keates 
V.  Lyon,  4  Ch.  App.  218;  Jewell  v.  Lee, 


14  Allen,  145;  Renals  v.  Cowlishaw,  11 
Ch.  Div.  866. 

*  Master  v.  Hansard,   4  Ch.  Div.  718. 
See  Nottingham  Brick,  &c.  Co  i-.  Butler, 

15  Q.  B.  Div.  261  ;  Collins  v.  Castle,  36 
Ch.  Div.  243  ;  Renals  v.  Cowlishaw,  9  Ch. 
Div.  125. 

6  Richards  v.  Revitt,  7  Ch.  Div.  224 
Renals  v.  Cowlishaw,  11  Ch.  Div.  866 
Master  v.  Hansard,  4  Ch.  Div.  718 
Keates  v.  Lyon,  4  Ch.  Ajip.  21S. 

0  Bedford  v.  British  Museum,  2  Mylne 
&  K.  552  ;  Sayers  v.  Collyer,  28  Ch.  Div. 
103;  Trustees  v.  Thacher,  87  N.  Y.  311 
Amcrman  v.  Deano,  132  N.  Y.  355,  30  N 
K.  Rep.  741  ;  I'age  v.  Murray,  46  N.  J 
Eq.  325,  19  All.  Rep.  11  ;  Roper  i;.  Wil 
limns,  Turn.  &  R.  18  ;  Peek  v.  Matthews 
L.  R.  3  Eq.  515.  See  German  v.  Chap 
man,  7  Ch.  Div.  271. 

627 


§  774.]  RESTRICTIONS   xVS   TO    THE    USE    OF   LAND. 

into  similar  covenants,  it  was  held  that  these  covenants  operated 
to  protect  not  only  the  adjoininu;  hmd  of  the  oiii;iual  grantor,  but 
also  the  diti'ereiit  lots  ot'  the  sub-purchasers,  who  were  entitled  to 
enforce  the  covenants.^ 

774.  One  grantee,  to  enforce  a  restriction  against  another 
grantee  of  a  common  grantor,  must  show  that  he  is  entitled,  to 
the  benefit  of  the  covenant,  and  as  well  that  the  other  grantee  is 
subject  to  the  burden  of  it.  The  fact  that  the  same  covenant  has 
been  incorporated  in  the  deeds  of  both  grantees,  and  in  all  deeds 
made  by  the  grantor  of  any  portion  of  the  same  land,  is  not  suffi- 
cient evidence  that  the  covenant  has  been  entered  into  for  the  ben- 
efit of  all  the  land  so  conveyed.^  "  The  right  of  an  owner  of  a  lot 
to  enforce  a  covenant  to  which  he  is  not  a  party  or  an  assign,  re- 
strictive of  the  use  of  other  lands,  is  dependent  on  the  covenant 
having  been  made  for  the  benefit  of  this  lot.  Obviously,  while  a 
subsequent  purchaser  might,  by  the  operation  of  this  rule,  acquire 
a  right  of  action  against  a  prior  purchaser,  the  prior  purchaser 
would  acquire  no  rights  from  a  covenant  entered  into  by  a  subse- 
quent purchaser,  unless  there  exists  some  condition  which  will 
entitle  him  to  the  benefit  of  such  covenant.  The  right  of 
grantees  from  the  common  grantor  to  enforce.  Inter  sese,  cove- 
nants entered  into  by  each  with  said  grantor,  is  confined  to  cases 
where  there  has  been  proof  of  a  general  plan  or  scheme  for  the 
improvement  of  the  property,  and  its  consequent  benefit,  and  the 
covenant  has  been  entered  into  as  part  of  a  general  plan  to  be 
exacted  from  all  purchasers,  and  to  be  for  the  benefit  of  each 
purchaser,  and  the  party  has  bought  with  reference  to  such  gen- 
eral plan  or  scheme,  and  the  covenant  has  entered  into  the  con- 
sideration of  his  purchase."^ 

The  burden  is  upon  the  plaintiff,  in  a  suit  to  enforce  a  restric- 
tion, that  this  was  intended  to  create  a  servitude  upon  the  defend- 

1  Harrison  v.  Good,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  338;  v.  Ropes,  110  Mass.  381  ;  Beals  v.  Case 
McLean  v.  McKay,  L.  R.  5  P.  C.  327;  138  Mass.  138;  Graham  v.  Hite,  93  Ky, 
Eastwood  V.  Lever,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  114.  474,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  506  ;  Mulligan  v.  Jor 

2  Keates  v.  Lyon,  4  Ch.  App.  218 ;  Re-  dan,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  363,  24  Atl.  Rep.  543 
nals  V.  Cowlishaw,  11  Ch.  Div.  866  ;  Not-  De  Gray  v.  Monmouth  Beach  Clubhouse 
tingham  Patent  Brick  Co.  v.  Butler,  15  Co.  50  N.  J.  Eq.  329,  24  Atl.  Rep.  388 
Q.  B.  D.  261,  affirmed  16  Q.  B.  D.  778;  Coughlin  v.  Barker,  46  Mo.  App.  54. 

In  re  Birmingham,  &c.  Land  Co.  (1893)         ^  Mulligan  v.  Jordan,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  363, 
1  Ch.  342  ;  Dana  v.  Wentworth,  11 1  Mass.     24  Atl.  Rep.  543,  per  Green,  V.  C. 
291 ;  .Tewell  v.  Lee,  14  Allen,  145;  Sharp 

628 


WHO  HAVE  THE  BUKDEN  AND  BENEFIT  OF  RESTRICTIONS.     [§§  775,  776. 

ant's  land,  which  by  implication  is  annexed  and  made  appurte- 
nant  to  the  plaintiff's  land.^ 

A  grantor  inserting  in  a  deed  a  restriction  for  the  benefit  of  his 
other  land  retained  or  conveyed  may  state  the  purpose  of  it,  and 
not  leave  this  wholly  to  inference.^  If  the  purpose  is  not  stated, 
it  must  be  proved  before  the  grantor,  or  any  one  claiming  under 
him,  can  claim  the  benefit  of  the  restriction. 

The  owner  of  a  parcel  of  land  bounding  on  a  street  conveyed 
it  by  a  deed  containing  a  condition  that  the  grantee,  or  his  heirs 
or  assigns,  should  not  build  on  the  land  within  eight  feet  of  the 
street.  The  grantee  conveyed  the  land  in  several  lots.  It  Avas 
held  that  the  grantor  could  not  maintain  a  bill  in  equity,  for  the 
benefit  of  the  owners  of  some  of  these  lots,  to  restrain  the  owner 
of  another  from  violating  the  condition,  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence that  the  condition  was  imposed  as  part  of  a  general  plan 
for  the  benefit  of  the  land  granted  and  of  other  land  on  the 
street.'^ 

775.  But  it  is  not  essential  that  the  grantor  should  state  in 
his  deed  that  a  restriction  therein  is  intended  for  the  benefit 
of  his  other  land  when  this  is  the  fact.  This  will  usually  be  in- 
ferred if  the  situation  of  the  grantor's  other  land,  with  reference 
to  that  conveyed,  is  such  that  the  restriction  is  clearly  for  the 
benefit  of  the  land  retained  ;  for  in  most  cases  there  could  be  no 
object  in  the  restriction  except  to  benefit  the  land  retained.* 

776.  The  absence  of  mutuality  of  restriction  is  a  circum- 
stance tending  to  the  conclusion  that  the  restriction  was  per- 
sonal to  the  grantor ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  where  such  mutu- 
ality appears,  it  is  clear  that  the  restriction  was  a  part  of  a  general 

1  Beals  V.  Case,  138  Mass.  138;  Jewell  "There  could  be  no  object  in  8tii)iibitinK 
V.  Lee,  U  Allen,  145,  92  Am.  Dec.  744;  that  the  lund  .nhouM  be  left  open  f<ir  tlio 
Badper  (,-.  Boardmnn,  16  Gray,  559.  benefit  of   both  parties,  unless    it   meant 

2  Patebiiig  v.  Dubbins,  Kay,  1  ;  Skinner  for  the  benelit  of  both  parlies  as  ownerB 
r.  Shepani,  130  Mas.s.  180;  Coughliu  v.  of  the  lands  whieh  adjoin  tiie  plot.  Thire- 
Barker,  46  Mo.  App.  54.  fore  the  implieaiiou  is  natural  and  irrc- 

8  Dana  u.  Wcntwortb,  1 1 1    Mass.   201.  .sistible  tliat.   when    the  parties   cpcak   of 

Gray,  J.,  declared  the  judgment  of   the  leaving  this  piece  open  for  the   common 

chancellor  of  New  Jersey,  in  Winfield  ;;.  benelit  of  both,  lliey  mean  for  the  coin- 

Henning,  21   N.  J.  Eq.  188,  inconsistent  mon  benelit  of  i)oih  as  hohlers  of  adjoin- 

with  the  decisions  in  Massachusetts  and  ing  lands."     See,  also,  Mann  i>.  Stephens, 

in  EiK-^land.  '•''  ^'m-  3^7  ;  Coughlin  v.  Barker,  46  Mo. 

*  McLean  v.  McKay,  L.  K.  5  P.  C.  .•!27,  App.  54  ;   St.  Andrew's  Cliurch's  App.  C7 

835,  21  Weekly  Rep.  7'JH,  where  it  is  said  :  I'n.  St.  512. 

629 


§  777.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO    THE   USE   OF    LAND. 

scheme,  and  was  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  land.  "  Thus,  where 
the  owner  of  a  particular  piece  of  land,  on  which  a  row  of  houses 
is  intended  to  be  built,  executes  a  deed  reciting  that  it  has  been 
laid  out  and  is  intended  to  be  dealt  with  in  a  particular  manner, 
and  declares  that  it  shall  be  a  general  and  indispensable  condi- 
tion of  the  sale  of  all  or  of  any  part  of  the  land  that  the  several 
proprietors  for  the  time  being  shall  observe  and  abide  by  the  sev- 
eral restrictions  and  stipulations  therein  contained,  and  that  he 
himself  will  at  all  times  observe  the  like  restrictions  and  stipula- 
tions, and  these  restrictions  and  stipulations  are  also  enforced  by 
mutual  covenants,  although  the  question  may  afterwards  arise 
between  subsequent  purchasers  of  different  portions  of  the  land, 
one  of  the  subsequent  lot-owners  will  be  bound  and  another  will 
be  entitled  to  enforce  the  covenant."  ^ 

But  there  may  be  mutuality  without  any  express  covenant  by 
the  grantor  that  iiis  remaining  land  shall  be  bound  by  restric- 
tions similar  to  those  imposed  upon  the  land  sold.  Such  a 
restrictive  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  grantor  may  be  implied 
from  tlie  expressions  of  intention  contained  in  his  deed,  or  from 
the  intent  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  instrument  and  the 
attending  circumstances  of  the  transaction.  In  this  way  a  cove- 
nant by  the  grantor  with  every  purchaser  by  deed  having  restric- 
tive covenants,  that  the  grantor's  remaining  land  shall  not  be  used 
in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  covenants  imposed  in  his  deeds, 
may  be  implied.^ 

777.  It  is  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  determined  from  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  whether  restrictive  covenants  are 
for  the  benefit  of  the  vendor  alone,  or  are  for  the  common  ben- 
efit of  all  the  purchasers.  Mr.  Justice  Wills  makes  the  following 
statement  of  the  law :  "  The  principle  which  appears  to  me  to  be 
deducible  from  the  cases  is,  that  where  the  same  vendor,  selling  to 
several  persons  plots  of  land,  parts  of  a  larger  property,  exacts 
from  each  of  them  covenants  imposing  restrictions  on  the  use  of 
the  plots  sold,  without  putting  himself  under  any  corresponding 
obhgation,  it  is  a  question  of  fact  whether  the  restrictions  are 
merely  matters  of  agreement  between  the  vendor  himself  and  his 
vendees,  imposed  for  his  own  benefit  and  protection,  or  are  meant 

1  Coughlin  V.  Barker,  46  Mo.  App.  54,         -  Mackenzie    v.   Childers,    43    Ch.    T>. 
67,  per  Thompson,  J.     See  Whatman  v.     265. 
Gibson,  9  Sim.  196. 

630 


WHO   HAVE   THE   BURDEN   AND   BENEFIT    OF   RESTRICTIONS.       [§  778. 

by  him  and  understood  b}'  tlie  buyers  to  be  for  the  common  ad- 
vantage of  the  several  purchasers.  If  the  restrictive  covenants 
are  simply  for  the  benefit  of  the  vendor,  purchasers  of  other  plots 
of  land  from  the  vendor  cannot  claim  to  take  advantage  of  them. 
If  tbey  are  meant  for  the  common  advantage  of  a  set  of  pur- 
chasers, such  purchasers  and  their  assigns  may  enforce  them  inter 
se  for  their  own  benefit."  ^  Upon  appeal,  the  Master  of  the  Rolls, 
Lord  Esher,  declared  Mr,  Justice  Wills'  view  of  the  law  to  be 
perfectly  correct,  and,  in  further  elucidation  of  the  principle,  said: 
*'  There  are  two  lines  of  cases  to  be  found  in  the  books.  The 
first  is  where  there  has  been  a  sale  of  part  of  a  property,  with 
no  then  existing  intention  of  selling  the  rest,  and  subsequently 
there  is  a  sale  of  another  part ;  then,  as  regards  the  later  sale, 
you  cannot  look  at  the  conditions  of  the  former  sale,  you  must 
look  only  at  the  conditions  relating  to  the  later  sale.  The  other 
line  of  cases  is  where  the  whole  of  a  property  is  put  up  for  sale 
(not  necessarily  under  a  building  scheme),  but  is  put  up  for  sale 
in  lots,  subject  to  certain  restrictive  covenants ;  then  it  is  a  ques- 
tion of  fact  whether  it  was  or  was  not  the  intention  that  the 
restrictive  covenants  should  be  entered  into  for  the  benefit  of 
each  of  the  purchasers  as  against  all  the  others,  and  it  is  a  most 
material  circumstance  whether  the  vendor  reserves  any  part  of 
the  property  for  himself.  If  he  does  not  reserve  any  part,  that 
is  almost  if  not  quite  conclusive  (unless  there  is  something  con- 
tradictory) that  the  covenants  wliich  he  takes  from  the  pur- 
chasers are  intended  for  the  benefit  of  each  purchaser  as  against 
the  others."  ^ 

778.  Conditions  of  sale  under  which  building  lots  are  put 
up  at  auction  may  apply  to  lots  remaining  unsold  as  well  as 
to  those  sold  at  the  auction.     "  It  appears  to  me,"  says  Mr.  Jus- 

1  Nottinfrham  Patent  Brick  Co.  v.  But-  sard,  4  Ch.  1).-718.     In  Peck  v.  Conway, 

ler,  15  Q.  B.   D.  i26I,  268,  affirmed  16  Q.  119   Mass.    540,    540,    Morton,    J.,    snid  : 

B.D.  778,  Lord  Esher,  M.  K.,  and  Lord  "  The  question  whether  such  an  casement 

Justice    Lindley,   approvin-  Mr.   .Justice  is  a  personal  ri;,'iit,  or  is  to  he  construe.l 

Wills'  view  of  the  law.     See,  also,  Spicer  to  be  appurtenant  to  some  other  est.ite, 

V.  Martin,  14  App.  Cas.  12 ;  Ilenals  v.  Cow-  must  be  determined  l)y  the  fair  interpro- 

lishaw,  9  Ch.  D.    125,  II    Ch.   D.    86G;  tation  of  the  };rant  or  reservation  creating 

Western  v.    Macderniot,  2  Ch.  App.  72;  the  casement,  aided,  if  necessary,  by  the 

Mauni;.  Stephens,  15  Sim.  377.     For  ex-  situation    of   the   property  and    the   .sur- 

amples   of   restrictive  covenants   for    the  rounding' civcumstnnrcs." 

benefit  of  the  grantor  alone,  see  Keatcs  v.  -  Noiiinfrhnm  Patent  Brick  Co.  i;.  But- 

Lvon,  4  Ch.  Ai)i).  218;   Ma.ster  v.  Man-  ler,  16  Q.  B.  D.  77H,  785. 

631 


§  778. J  KKSTincrioxs  as  to  the  use  of  land. 

tice  Wills,  "  that  where  laud  is  put  up  to  auctiou  in  lots,  and  two 
or  more  persons  purchase  according  to  conditions  of  sale  contain- 
ino-  restrictions  of  the  character  of  those  under  consideration  in 
the  present  case,  it  is  very  difficult  to  resist   the  inference  that 
tliev  were  intended  for  the  common  benefit  of  such  purchasers, 
especially   where    the   vendor  purposes  to  sell  the  whole   of  his 
piofierty.     Where  he  retains  none,  how  can  the  covenants  be  for 
his  benefit?  and  for  what  purpose  can  they  be  proposed  except 
that  each  purchaser,  expecting  the  benefit  of  them  as  against  his 
neio-hbors,  may  be  willing  on  that  account  to  pay  a  higher  price 
for  his  land  than  if  he  bought  at  the  risk  of  whatever  use  his 
neighbor  might  choose  to  put  his  property  to?    Where,  therefore, 
the  vendor  desires  to  sell  at  the  auction  the  whole  of  his  property, 
the  inference  is  strong  that  such  covenants  are  for  the  common 
benefit  of  the  purchasers ;  and  it  seems  to  me  that  the  strength 
of  this  evidence  is  not  diminished  by  the  fact  that  at  the  sale  a 
considerable   number  of  the  lots  may  fail  to  find  purchasers."  ^ 
The  judgment  in  this  case  and  the  opinion  quoted  are  approved 
in  a  later  case,  in  which  Mr.  Justice  Stirling  said  :  "  Though  the 
retainer  by  the  vendor  of  some  part  of  the  property  is  a  highly 
important  element,  it  is  after  all  only  an  element  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  along  with  other  circumstances  in  ascertaining  the 
intention.     It  appears  to  me  that,  although   the  vendor  may  not 
part   with  his  whole  estate,  there  may  be  circumstances  which 
show  that  the  intention  was  that  each  purchaser  should  be  enti- 
tled to  enforce  building  restrictions  against  the  vendor  and  every 
other  purchaser."     After  stating  the  subject  of    the   restrictive 

1  Nottini;ham  Patent  Brick  Co.  v.  But-  covenants,  to  each  of  the  other  purchas- 
er 15  Q.  B.  D.  261,  269,  affirmed  on  ap-  ers,  is  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  determined 
peal,  16  Q.  B.  D.  778,  784,  Lord  Esher,  by  the  intention  of  the  vendor  and  of  the 
Master  of  the  Rolls,  saying  :  "  But  I  think  purchasers,  and  that  question  must  be 
that  Wills',  J.'s,  view  of  the  law  on  this  determined  upon  the  .same  rules  of  evi- 
suhject  is  perfectly  correct.  In  my  view,  dence  as  every  other  question  of  intention, 
he  is  right  in  saying  that,  when  an  estate  And,  if  it  is  found  that  it  was  the  inten- 
is  put  up  for  sale  in  lots,  subject  to  a  con-  tion  that  the  purchasers  should  be  bound 
dition  that  restrictive  covenants  are  to  be  by  the  covenants  inter  se,  a  court  of  equity 
entered  into  by  each  of  the  purchasers  will,  in  favor  of  any  one  of  the  purchasers, 
with  the  vendor,  and  the  vendor  is  intend-  insist  upon  the  performance  of  the  cove- 
ing  at  this  sale  to  sell  the  whole  of  the  nants  by  any  other  of  them,  and  will  do  so 
property,  the  question  whether  it  is  in-  under  such  circumstances  without  intro- 
tended  that  each  of  the  purchasers  shall  duciug  the  vendor  into  the  matter." 
be  liable,  in   respect   of  those   restrictive 

f;32 


WHO    HAVE    THE    BURDEN    AND    BENEFIT    OF    RESTRICTIONS.       [§  779. 

conditions,  he  further  says  :  "  It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that 
these  particulars  and  conditions  constituted  ^  an  invitation  to  the 
public  to  come  in  and"  purchase  on  the  footing  that  the  whole  of 
the  property  offered  for  sale  was  to  be  bound  by  one  general  law 
affecting  the  chtiracter  of  the  buildings  to  be  erected  thereon, 
and  that  the  vendors  ought  not  to  be  allowed,  to  destroy  the  value 
of  that  which  was  sold  by  authorizing  the  use  of  a  part  of  the 
property  for  a  purpose  inconsistent  with  the  law  by  which  they 
purported  to  bind  the  whole."  ^ 

779.  The  decisions  are  not  in  accord  as  to  the  logical  prin- 
ciple upon  which  they  rest,  though  they  agree  in  the  result 
that  restrictive  covenants,  made  for  the  benefit  of  subsequent 
purchasers  of  the  land  to  which  the  restrictions  apply,  may  be 
enforced  by  any  one  purchaser  against  another.  The  theory  that 
such  covenants  create  easements  upon  the  lands  of  each  pur- 
chaser, for  the  benefit  of  all  the  lands  subject  to  the  same  restric- 
tions, has  the  support  of  the  courts  of  many  leading  States;^  but 
the  courts  of  England,  as  well  as  those  of  some  of  the  States,  repu- 
diate the  idea  that  the  courts  interfere  on  the  ground  of  protect- 
ing an  easement.^  "  The  equity  would  seem  to  spring  from  the 
presumption  that  each  purchaser  has  paid  an  enhanced  price  for 
his  property,  relying  on  the  general  plan  by  which  all  the  prop- 

1  In  the  lan<rua<re  of  Lord  Macnaghten  Coufrhlin  v.  Barker,  46  Mo.  App.  54. 
in  Spicer  v.  Maiiiu,  14  App.  Cas.  12.  New  York :  TnusUos  r.  Lynch,  70  N.  Y. 

2  In  re  Birmingham,  &c.  Laud  Co.  440 ;  I^uitable  Life  Soc.  v.  Bremiau,  74 
[1893]  1  Ch.  .342,  349,  351.  See,  also,  Hun,  576,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  600,  30  Abb.  N. 
Peacock  v.  Peusou.  11  Beav.  .355,  359;  C.  260;  Barrow  r.  Kichard,  8  I'ai^iC,  .351  ; 
Collins  V.  Castle,  36  Ch.  D.  243.  It  is  Hnyuor  y.  Lyon,  46  Ilun,  227  ;  Amennnn 
the  practice  of  vendors  to  reserve  by  ex-  v.  Dcane,  132  N.  Y.  355.  Khode  Island: 
press  conditions,  power  to  make  future  Greene  y.  Creij;litou,  7  K.  I.  1,'J;  Middle- 
sales  discharged  from  restrictive  condi-  town  r.  Newport  Hospitiil,  16  1{.  I.  319. 
tions.  An  example  is  to  be  found  in  the  ■*  In  Tiilk  v.  Moxhay,  2  I'liil.  774,  777, 
ca.se  of  Sidney  y.  Clarkson,  35  Beav.  118.  Lord  Cottenhani  says:  "It   is  said    that, 

3  Alabama:  Webb  v.  Bobbins,  77  Ala.  the  covenant  iieing  one  which  does  not 
176.  Illinois:  Tinker  v.  Foriies  1.36  111.  run  with  the  land,  this  court  cannot  en- 
221,  26  N.  K.  Rep.  503.  Massachusetts:  force  it;  but  tiic  (|nesiion  is  not  whether 
Parker  v.  Nightingale,  6  Allen,  341  ;  the  coventuit  runs  witii  the  land,  but 
Beais  V.  Case,  138  Mass.  138  ;  Wliitney  v.  wlicthcr  a  party  siiall  be  permitted  to  use 
Union  Ry.  11  Gray,  359,  71  Am.  Dec.  the  land  in  a  manner  inconsistent  witli 
715;  Ladd  v.  Boston,  151  Mass.  585,24  the  contract  entered  into  by  his  vendor 
N.  E.  Rep.  858,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  481,  and  and  with  notice  of  which  he  j)urchascd." 
cases  cited  in  §771-  Minnesota:  Kettle  New  Jersey :  De  Gray  r.  Monmouth  Beach 
River  R.  Co.  v.  E.i.stern  Ry.  Co  41  Mi.in.  ni,hh..iisc  Co.  .50  N.  J.  Eq.  329,  363,  24 
461    174   43  N   W.   Kip.  469.     Missouri:  Ail.  K'ej).  388. 

633 


§  780.]  KLSTHICTIONS   AS   TO   THE    USE   OF   LAND. 

evtv  is  to  be  subjected  to  the  restricted  use  being  carried  out, 
and  that,  while  he  is  bound  by  and  observes  the  covenant,  it 
would  be  inequitable  to  him  to  allow  any  other  owner  of  lands 
subject  to  the  same  restriction  to  violate  it."  ^ 

A  restriction  in  a  conveyance,  when  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  the 
grantor's  adjoining  land,  may  be  regarded  as  a  reservation  in  the 
nature  of  an  equitable  easement.  This  was  the  view  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  in  a  case  where  the  restrictions  were 
that  any  building  to  be  erected  on  the  land  conveyed  should  be 
one  which  would  not  materially  increase  the  fire  exposure  of  the 
grantor's  buildings  on  either  side,  and  that  no  building  which 
would  darken  any  light  should  be  placed  within  three  feet  of  the 
west  line  of  the  lot  conveyed.^ 

A  covenant  by  the  owner  of  a  block  of  several  lots,  in  a  deed 
of  one  of  them,  that  he  would  sell  the  remaining  lots  to  parties 
who  would  "  cause  to  be  erected  single  dwellings  only  on  each 
lot,"  inures  to  the  benefit  of  all  subsequent  purchasers  of  the 
remaining  lots,  and  creates  an  easement  in  their  favor.^ 

780.  One  who  takes  land  with  notice  of  a  restrictive  agree- 
ment affecting  it  cannot  equitably  refuse  to  perform  it,  though 
the  agreement  may  not  be  a  covenant  which  runs  with  the  land, 
or  creates  a  technical  qualification  of  the  estate  conveyed.*    This 

1  De  Gray  v.  Monmouth  Beach  Club-  De  Gex,  M.  &  G.  1 ;  Wilsou  v.  Hart,  1 
house  Co.  50  N.  J.  Eq.  329,  24  Atl.  Rep.  Ch.  App.  463  ;  Feilden  v.  Slater,  L.  R.  7 
388,  per  Green,  V.  C,  who  also  says :  Eq.  .523 ;  Richards  v.  Revitt,  7  Ch.  Div. 
"  While  cases  involving  lif^ht,  air,  or  view  224;  Patman  v.  Ilarland,  17  Ch.  Div. 
might,  in  some  respects,  be  based  on  the  35.3  ;  De  Mattos  v.  Gibson,  4  De  Gex  «Sb 
doctrine  of  easements,  it  is  not  satisfactory  J.  276  ;  Piggott  v.  Stratton,  1  De  Gex,  F. 
when  it  comes  to  be  Mj)plied  to  covenants  &  J.  33  ;  Renals  v.  Cowlishaw,  9  Ch.  D. 
as  to  uses  to  which  buildings  are  to  be  125,  11  Ch.  D.  866;  Keates  v.  Lyon,  4 
put,  nor  could  the  covenant,  if  it  created  Ch.  App.  218;  Spicer  v.  Martin,  14  App. 
an  easement,  be  suspended  because  a  sub-  Cas.  12;  Mackenzie  v.  Childers,  43  Ch. 
sequent  purchaser  did  not  buy  with  the  Div.  265 ;  Clegg  v.  Hands,  44  Ch.  Div. 
restrictions  of  the  covenant  in  view."  503  ;  Bedford  v.  British  Mnsetim,  2  Mylne 

2  Tinker  y.  Forbes,  136  111.  221,241,  26  &  K.  .552;  Whatman  v.  Gibson,  9  Sim. 
N.  E.  Rep.  503.  196  (1838),  the  first  case  in  which  equity 

3  Hutchinson  v.  Ulrich,  145  111.  336,  34  enforced  a  covenant  against  an  n.ssignee 
N.  E.  Rep.  556.  with  notice;  Schreiber  v.  Creed,  10  Sim. 

*  Tulk   V.   Moxhay,    2   Phil.   Ch.    774  9   (1839);    Child   v.  Douglas,  Kay,  560; 

(said  by  Brett,  L.  J.,  in  Haywood  v.   So-  Western  v.  McDermot,  L.    R.  1  Eq.  499, 

ciety,  8  Q.  B.   Div.  403,  407,  to  be   the  2    Ch.   App.    72 ;    Patching  v.   Dubbins, 

leading  case   on   the   subject);   Mann   v.  Kay,  1.     Alabama:  IMorris  v.  Tuskaloosa 

Stephens,  15  Sim.  377;  Bristow  v.  Wood,  Mauuf.  Co.  83  Ala.  565,  3  So.  Rep.  689; 

1  Colby,  480;  Coles  v.  Sims,   Kay,  56,  5  Webb  v.  Robbins,  77  Ala.  176.     Illinois: 

634 


WHO   HAVE    THE   BURDEN   AND   BENEFIT    OF   RESTRICTIONS.       [§  780. 

is  a  doctrine  of  equity,  and  is  undoubtedly  an  encroachment  on 
the  general  doctrine  of  the  common  law,  which  does  not  favor 
covenants  running  with  the  land.  Lord  Cottenham  states  the 
principle  governing  courts  of  equity:  "  That  this  court  has  juris- 
diction to  enforce  a  contract,  between  the  owner  of  land  and  his 
neighbor  purchasing  a  part  of  it,  that  the  latter  shall  either  use  or 
abstain  from  using  the  land  purchased  in  a  particular  way,  is  what 
I  never  knew  disputed.  Here  there  is  no  question  about  the  con- 
tract ;  the  owner  of  certain  houses  in  the  square  sells  the  land 
adjoining,  with  a  covenant  from  the  purchaser  not  to  use  it  for 
any  other  purpose  than  as  a  square  garden  ;  and  it  is  now  con- 
tended, not  that  the  vendee  could  violate  that  contract,  but  that 
he  might  sell  the  piece  of  land,  and  that  the  purchaser  from  him 
may  violate  it  without  this  court  having  any  power  to  interfere. 
If  that  were  so,  it  would  be  impossible  for  an  owner  of  land  to  sell 
part  of  it  without  incurring  the  risk  of  rendering  what  he  retains 
worthless.  It  is  said  that,  the  covenant  being  one  which  does  not 
run  with  the  land,  this  court  cannot  enforce  it ;  but  the  question 
is  not  whether  the  covenant  runs  with  the  land,  but  whether  a 
party  shall  be  permitted  to  use  the  land  in  a  manner  inconsistent 
with  the  contract  entered  into  by  his  vendor,  and  with  notice  of 
which  he  purchased.  Of  course,  the  price  would  be  affected  by 
the  covenant ;  and  nothing  could  be  more  inequitable  than  that 

Frye  ?;.  Partridge,  82  111.  267.  Indiana:  Wiufield  v.  Henning,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  188; 
Williamson  v.  Tingling,  80  Ind.  379.  Kirkpatrick  v.  Peshine,  24  N.  J.  P^q.  206  ; 
Maryland:  Newbold  v.  Peabody  Heights  Coudert  v.  Sayre,  46  N.  J.  Eq.386,  19  Atl. 
Co.  70  Md.  493,  17  Atl.  Rep.  372;  Pea-  Rep.  190;  Hayes  v.  Waverly,  &c.  R.  Co. 
body  Heights  Co.  v.  Willsou  (Md.),  32  51  N.  J.  Eq.  345,  27  Atl.  Rep.  648.  New 
Atl.  Rep.  386.  Massachusetts:  Whitney  York:  Hod5;e  v.  Sloan,  107  N.  Y.  244, 
I'.  Union  Rv.  Co.  11  Gray,  359,  71  Am.  17  N.  E.  IJcp.  335;  Barrow  i;.  Richard, 
Dec.  715;  Parker  i;.  Nightingale,  6  Allen,  8  Paige,  351,  35  vVm.  Dec.  713;  Hills 
341  ;  Badger  y.  Boardman,  16  Gray.  559;  v.  Miller,  3  Paige,  254,  24  Am.  Dec. 
Peck  D.  Conway,  1 1 9  Mass.  546  ;  Hamlen  218;  Brouwer  v.  Jones,  23  Barb.  1.53; 
V.  Werner,  144  Mass.  396,  11  N.  E.  Rep.  Trustees  v.  Lynch,  70  N.  Y.  440;  Tall- 
684.  Michigan:  Watrous  v.  Allen,  57  madge  r.  East  River  Bank,  26  N.  Y. 
Mich.  362,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  104,58  Am.  105;  Gibert  v.  Pcteler,  38  N.  Y.  165, 
Rep.  363.  Minnesota:  Kettle  River  R.  97  Am.  Dec.  785,  38  Barb.  513;  Stew- 
Co.  j;.  Eastern  Ily.  Co.  41  Minn.  461,  474,  ard  v.  Winters.  4  Sandf.  Ch.  587;  At- 
43  N.  W.  Rep.  469.  Missouri:  Coughlin  lantic  Dock  Co.  v.  Leavitt,  54  N.  Y. 
V.  Barker,  46  Mo.  App.  54,  61,  per  Thoinp-  35  ;  Hayward  Homestead  Asso.  v.  Miller, 
son, . J.,  in  an  able  opinion.  New  Jersey:  26  N.  Y.  Snpp.  1091,6  Mi^^c.  Rep.  254. 
De  Gray  I'.  Monmouth  Beach  ClubliMiisc  Pennsylvania:  Clark  v.  Martin,  49  Pa. 
Co.  50  k.  J.  Eq.  329,  24  Atl.  Rep.  384  ;  St.  289;  St.  Andrew's  Church's  App.  67 
Brewer  r.   Marshall,   19   N.  J.  Eq.   .537;  Pa.  St.  512. 

635 


§  781.]  RESTKICTIONS   AS    TO    THE    USE   OF   LAND. 

the  oiigiiuil  pui-cluiser  slioukl  be  able  to  sell  the  property  the  next 
day  for  a  greater  price,  in  consideration  of  the  assignee  being 
allowed  to  escape  from  the  liability  which  he  had  himself  under- 
taken." ^ 

In  a  leading  American  case  the  same  doctrine  is  declared: 
"  The  precise  form  or  nature  of  the  covenant  or  agreement  is 
quite  immaterial.  It  is  not  essential  that  it  should  run  with  the 
land.  A  personal  covenant  or  agreement  will  be  held  valid  and 
binding  in  equity  on  a  purchaser  taking  the  estate  with  notice. 
It  is  not  binding  on  him  merely  because  he  stands  as  an  assignee 
of  the  party  who  made  the  agreement,  but  because  he  has  taken 
the  estate  with  notice  of  a  valid  agreement  concerning  it,  which 
be  cannot  equitably  refuse  to  perform."^ 

The  doctrine  on  this  subject  is  strictly  limited  to  restrictive 
stipulations,  and  does  not  extend  to  covenants  to  expend  money, 
to  make  repairs,  or  the  like,  or  to  perform  any  act  in  regard  to 
land,  unless  such  covenants  run  with  the  land  at  law,  although  a 
purchaser  takes  with  notice  of  tliem.-^ 

781.  A  court  of  equity  will  enforce  any  agreement  aflfect- 
ing  land  against  a  purchaser  with  notice  of  it.  Lord  Cotten- 
ham,  about  halt"  a  century  ago,  upon  this  point  said :  "  That  the 
question  does  not  depend  upon  whether  the  covenant  runs  with 
the  land  is  evident  from  this,  that,  if  there  was  a  mere  agree- 
ment and  no  covenant,  this  court  would  enforce  it  against  a  party 
purchasing  with  notice  of  it ;  for  if  an  equity  is  attached  to  the 
property  by  the  owner,  no  one  purchasing  with  notice  of  that 
equity  can  stand  in  a  different  situation  from  the  party  from 
whom  he  purchased."  ^  In  a  recent  leading  case  Vice-Chancellor 
Hall  to  like  effect  says :   "  It  is  now  well  settled  that  the  burden 

1  Talk  V.  Moxliay,  2  Phillips,  774,  777.     which  carry  the  limitation  of  the  doctrine 

2  Whitney  )j.  Union   Ry.  Co.  11  Gray,     still  furtlier. 

359,  3G4,  71  Am.  Dec.  715,  per  Bi<relow,  J.  *  Tulk  v.  Moxhay,  2  Phil.  774,  778,  11 

3  Au.-;terberry  v.  Oldliam,  29  Ch.  D.  Beav.  571.  This  case  is  ciied  and  fol- 
750,  where  the  covenant  was  to  keep  a  lowed  as  to  restrictive  covenants  in  many 
road  in  repair ;  Haywood  v.  Brunswick  cases.  Brown  v.  Great  East.  R.  Co.  L. 
Building  Soc.  8  Q.  B.  D.  403,  408,  where  R.  2  Q.  B.  Div.  406 ;  London,  &c.  Ry.  Co. 
the  covenant  was  to  build  and  repair,  v.  Gomm,  20  Ch.  Div.  562,  57C ;  Hodge  v. 
These  cases  practically  overrule  Cooke  v.  Sloan,  107  N.  Y.  244,  251  ;  Kirk])atrick  v. 
Chilcott,  3  Ch.  D.  694.  See,  also,  London  Peshine,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  206-213  ;  Brewer  v. 
&  S.  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Gomm,  20  Ch.  D.  562,  Marshall,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  537-.543  ;  Coudert 
and  Andrew  v.  Aitken,  22  Ch.  D.  218,  v.  Sayre,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  386,  19  Atl.  Rep. 

190. 

636 


WHO   HAVE   THE   BURDEN   AND   BENEFIT    OF   RESTRICTIONS.       [§  781. 

of  a  covenant  entered  into  by  a  grantee  in  fee  for  himself,  his 
heirs  and  assigns,  although  not  running  with  the  land  at  law,  so 
as  to  give  a  legal  remedy  against  the  owner  thereof  for  the  time 
being,  is  binding  upon  the  owner  of  it  for  the  time  being,  in 
equity,  having  notice  thereof.  Who,  then  (other  than  the  origi- 
nal covenantee),  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  covenant  ?  .  .  . 
It  niiiy,  I  think,  be  considered  as  determined  that  any  one  who 
has  acquired  land,  being  one  of  several  lots  laid  out  for  sale  as 
building  lots,  where  the  court  is  satisfied  that  it  was  the  inten- 
tion that  each  one  of  the  several  purchasers  should  be  bound  by, 
and  should,  as  against  the  others,  have  the  benefit  of,  the  cove- 
nants entered  into  by  each  of  the  purchasers,  is  entitled  to  the 
benefit  of  the  covenant ;  and  that  this  right,  that  is,  the  benefit 
of  the  covenant,  inures  to  the  assigns  of  the  first  purchaser,  — 
in  other  words,  runs  with  the  lands  of  such  purchaser.  This 
right  exists  not  only  where  the  several  parties  execute  a  mutual 
deed  of  covenant,  but  wherever  a  mutual  contract  can  be  sufl&- 
ciently  established."  ^ 


1  Reuals  v.  Cowlishaw,  9  Ch.  Div.  125, 
128,  citing  Mann  v.  Stephens,  15  Sim. 
377 ;  Western  v.  Macdermott,  2  Ch.  App. 
72 ;  and  Coles  v.  Sims,  5  De  Gex,  M.  & 
G.  1. 

The  opinion  in  Renals  v.  Cowlishaw  is 
adopteil  in  the  same  case  on  appeal,  11 
Ch.  Div.  866,  and  approved  in  Spicer  v. 
Martin,  14  App.  Cas.  12. 

In  I'eabody  Heights  Co.  i-.  Willson 
(Md.),.32  All.  Rep.  386,  Robinson,  C.  J., 
said :  "  It  may  be  considered  as  settled, 
since  the  cases  of  Mann  v.  Stephens,  15 
Sim.  377,  Western  ?-.  Macdermott,  2  Ch. 
App.  72,  and  Renals  v.  Cowlishaw,  9 
Ch.  Div.  125,  that  all  persons  coming  in 
with  notice  are  bound  by  the  covenants. 
In  Keates  r.  Lyon,  4  Ch.  App.  218,  the 
court  held  that  the  sub-purchasers  were 
not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  cove- 
nants, because  it  did  not  appear  that  they 
had  knowledge  of  the  covenants  when 
they  became  purchasers.  In  his  judg- 
ment the  lord  justice  refers  with  approval 
to  the  case  of  Whatman  v.  Gibson,  9  Sim. 
196,  in  which  the  vice-chancellor  said  :  '  I 
see   no  reason   whv   such   an   agreement 


should  not  be  binding  in  equity  on  the 
parties  so  coming  in  with  notice.  Each 
proprietor  is  manifestly  interested  in  hav- 
ing all  the  neighboring  houses  used  in 
such  a  way  as  to  preseive  the  general  uni- 
formity and  respectability  of  the  row.'  In 
Master  v.  Hansard,  4  Ch.  Div.  718,  it  was 
held  that  the  restrictive  covenant  was 
made  for  the  benefit  of  the  lessors,  to  en- 
able them  to  make  the  most  of  the  prop- 
erty retained  by  them,  and  for  the  further 
reason,  says  Bramwell,  J.,  'it  appears 
monstrous  to  hold  that  this  covenant,  the 
existence  of  which  was  never  communi- 
cated to  the  .plaintiffs'  predecessors  in  title 
when  they  took  their  lease,  is  to  be  con- 
strued as  inuring  for  their  benefit.'  So 
these  cases  cannot  be  said  to  qualify  in 
any  manner  the  principle  laid  down  in 
Mann  v.  Stephens,  and  in  other  cases  to 
which  we  have  referred,  —  that  a  pur- 
chaser taking  an  estate  with  notice  of  a 
covenant  or  agreement  respecting  it  is 
bound  by  the  terms  of  the  covenant,  even 
though  it  does  not,  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  term,  '  run  with  the  land.'  " 

637 


§§  782,  783.]       RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO    THE   USE    OF   LAND. 

782.  Constructive  notice  to  an  assignee  is  sulBBcient  to 
make  the  covenant  binding  upon  him.  Subsequent  purchasers 
of  the  land  cUiiming  through  a  deed  which  sets  out  the  restric- 
tions are  charged  with  notice  of  them,  and  occupy  the  same 
position  as  the  grantee  in  that  deed  did.^  Purchasers  are  conclu- 
sively presumed  to  have  examined  every  recorded  deed  in  the  line 
of  title  and  to  know  its  contents.^  Other  forms  of  notice  which 
put  purchasers  upon  inquiry  may  be  sufficient  to  charge  them 
with  notice  of  restrictive  covenants  affecting  the  land."^ 

If  the  restrictive  covenant  is  contained  in  a  separate  instru- 
ment, and  not  in  a  deed  in  the  line  of  title,  and  not  referred  to 
in  such  a  deed,  a  purchaser  may  have  no  constructive  notice  of  it.* 

783.  The  fact  that  a  purchaser  of  a  house  in  a  block  found 
all  the  houses  set  back  eight  feet  from  the  street  does  not 
charge  him  with  notice  of  an  agreement  between  the  owners  of 
the  liouses  in  the  block  to  set  back  the  houses  that  distance.  He 
was  not  bound  to  know  from  that  circumstance  that  there  was 
any  binding  agreement  in  reference  to  the  open  space,  and  it 
could  not  be  assumed  that  there  was.^ 

The  fact  that  the  attorney  of  the  purchaser  of  such  house  searched 
the  title  and  found  such  an  agreement  of  record  is  not  actual  notice 
of  it  to  the  purchaser,  the  record  itself  not  being  notice  by  reason 
of  a  defective  acknowledgment.  "  It  would  be  going  a  great  way 
to  hold  that  we  must  presume  that,  in  searching  the  records,  coun- 
sel found  such  an  agreement,  and  then  presume  further  that  he 
communicated  the  information  to  his  client.  But  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption that  any  one  has  notice  of  a  paper  which  is  not  prop- 

1  London,  Chatham,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bull,  Hall  v.  Solomon,  61    Conn.  476,  23  Atl. 

47  L.  T.  413 ;  Coles  v.  Sims,  5  De  G.,  M.  Rep.   876,  where  the  restriction  was  by 

&  G.  1 ;  Peck  v.  Conway,  119  Mass.  546  ;  parol  agreement. 

•  AVhitney  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  11  Gray,  359,  2  Acer  v.  Westcott,  46  N.  Y.  384  ;  Mc- 

71  Am.  Dec.  715 ;  Duncan  v.  Central  Pas-  Pherson  v.  Rollins,  107  N.  Y.  316,  322,  14 

seuger  Ry.  Co.  85  Ky.  52.5,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  N.  E.  Rep.  41 1  ;  Gibert  v.  Peteler,  38  N.  Y. 

228;  Morris  v.  Tuskaloosa  Manuf.  Co.  83  165 ;  Trustees  v.  Thacher,  87  N.  Y.  311. 

Ala.  565,  3  So.  Rep.  689 ;  Webb  v.  Rob-  3  Morland  v.  Cook.  L.  R.  6  Eq.  252  ; 

bins,  77  Ala.  176,  18;} ;  Bradley  v.  "Walker,  Bank  of  Ireland  v.  Brookfield  Linen  Co. 

17  N.  Y.  Supp.  383,  14  N.   Y.  Supp.  315  ;  15  L.  R.  Ir.  37. 

Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  v.  Brennan,  74  ■*  Carter  v.  Williams,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  678. 

Hun,  576,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  600,  30  Abb.  N.  ^  Bradley  v.  Walker,  138  N.  Y.  291,  33 

C.  260;  Brewer  r.  Marshall,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  N.  E.  Rep.    1079,  overruling   dictum   of 

537  ;  Hayes  v.  Waverly,  &c.  R.  Co.  51  N.  Sutherland,  J.,  to  the  contrary  in  Tall- 

J.  Eq.  345,  27  Atl.  Rep.  648 ;  Middletown  madge  v.  East  River  Bank,  26  N.  Y.  105, 

V.Newport  Hospital,  16  R.  L  319.     See  111. 

638 


WHEN  RESTBICTIVE  COVENANTS  RUN  WITH  THE  LAND.         [§  784. 

erly  recorded,  and  here,  if  the  defendant's  attorney  had  found  this 
record,  he  would  have  seen  that  the  agreement  did  not  bind  a 
married  woman,  the  owner  of  the  house,  who  executed  the  agree- 
ment under  a  defective  acknowledgment,  and  therefore  did  not 
affect  this  lot,  as  the  record  did  not  furnish  any  evidence  that  she 
had  ever  executed  the  agreement."  ^ 

IV.    When  Restrictive  Covenants  run  with  the  Land. 

784.  A  restrictive  covenant  runs  "with  the  land  if  created 
for  the  benefit  of  the  land  conveyed,  or  of  that  of  which  the 
grantor  remains  the  owner,  and  intended  to  be  annexed  to 
such  land.  In  such  case  it  would  become  an  easement  appur- 
tenant thereto,  and  would  pass  to  a  grantee.  "  The  question 
whether  such  an  easement  is  a  personal  right,  or  is  to  be  con- 
strued to  be  appurtenant  to  some  other  estate,  must  be  deter- 
mined by  the  fair  interpretation  of  the  grant  or  reservation 
creating  the  easement,  aided,  if  necessary,  by  the  situation  of  the 
property  and  the  surrounding  circumstances."  ^  When,  by  the 
construction  of  a  grant,  it  appears  that  it  was  the  intention  of 
the  parties  to  create  or  reserve  a  right  in  the  nature  of  a  servi- 
tude in  the  land  granted,  for  the  benefit  of  other  land  owned  by 
the  grantor,  no  matter  in  what  form  such  intention  may  be  ex- 
pressed, such  right,  if  not  against  public  policy,  will  be  held  to 
be  appurtenant  to  the  land  of  the  grantor,  and  binding  on  that 
conveyed  to  the  grantee,  and  the  right  and  burden  thus  created 
and  imposed  will  pass,  with  the  lands,  to  all  subsequent  grantees.^ 
The  right  of  a  grantee  to  the  benefit  of  such  a  covenant  does  not 
depend  upon  his  ability  to  maintain  an  action  of  law  for  its 
breach,  but  will  be  enforced  in  equity.  "  Any  grantee  of  the 
land  to  which  such  right  is  appurtenant  acquires  by  his  grant  a 
riglit  to  have  th(!  servitude  or  easement,  or 'right  of  amenity,' 
as  it  is  sometimes  called,  protected  in  equity,  notwithstanding  that 
his  right  may  not  rest  on  a  covenant  which,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
runs  with  the  title  to  his  land,  and  notwithstanding  that  it  may 

1  Bradley  U.Walker,  138  N.Y.  291,299,  400;  Hobson  v.  Cartwright,  93  Ky.  368, 
33  N.  E.  Rep.  1079,  per  Earl,  J.  20  S.  W.  Hep.  281. 

2  ]'eck  V.  Conway,  119  Mass.  546,  548,  »  Coudert  v.  Say  re,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  386, 
per  Morton,  J. ;  Fuller  v.  Arms,  45  Vt.  19  Atl.  Rep.  190,  .syllabus  by  court. 

639 


§  785.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO    THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

also  be  true  that  lie  may  not  be  able  to  maintain  an  action  at  law 
for  the  vindication  of  his  right."  ^ 

785.  A  grantor  may  impose  restrictions  for  the  benefit  of 
land  already  sold  as  well  as  that  remaining  in  his  hands  which 
he  proposes  to  sell.^  Although  the  owner  of  a  lot  previously  sold 
could  not  at  law  in  his  own  name  sue  a  subsequent  purchaser  for 
a  violation  of  a  covenant  in  the  grantor's  deed  to  such  subsequent 
purchaser,  a  court  of  equity  might,  in  a  suit  in  his  own  name, 
afford  him  protection  by  injunction.^ 

Where  a  grantor  in  selling  a  riparian  estate  obligated  himself 
to  leave  free  for  the  common  use  of  the  purchasers  a  certain  space 
in  front  thereof  between  designated  limits,  without  any  qualifica- 
tion as  to  the  duration  of  such  obligation,  it  was  held  that  the  privi- 
lege or  grant  was  in  perpetuity,  and  that  the  contract  was  a  cove- 
nant which  ran  with  the  lands  absolutely  conveyed,  and  in  favor 
of  the  lots  sold,  whoever  the  owners  might  be,  to  no  end  of  time.* 

A  proviso,  in  a  deed  of  land  to  a  railroad  company  for  a  right 
of  way,  that  the  grantee  shall  maintain  a  fence  on  each  side  of 
said  right  of  way  is  a  covenant  running  with  the  land,  and  is 
binding  on  the  grantee,  and  on  a  purchaser  of  the  railroad  under 
foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  executed  before  the  land  was  conveyed, 
since  in  taking  title  to  the  land  it  must  assume  the  burdens  run- 
ning with  it.^  But  in  California  it  was  held  that  a  covenant  in  a 
deed  of  a  right  of  way  to  a  railroad  company,  that  the  company 
should  maintain  a  depot  and  run  daily  trains,  did  not  run  with 
the  land,  because  it  was  not  "  made  for  the  direct  benefit  of  the 
property,  or  some  part  of  it,"  as  required  by  Civil  Code.^ 

1  Coudert  v.  Sayre,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  Spicer  v.  Martin,  14  App.  Cas.  12;  Not- 
386,  19  Atl.  Rep.  190,  per  Van  Fleet,  tingham  Brick  Works  v.  Butler,  16  Q.  B. 
V.  C. ;  citing  Brewer  v.  Marshall,  19  D.  778;  Payson  d.  Burn  ham,  141  Mass. 
N.  J.  Eq.  537,  97  Am.  Dec.  679 ;  Kirk-  547,  6  N.  E.  Rep.  708  ;  Barrow  i;.  Rich- 
patrick  v.   Peshine,   24   N.   J.   Eq.  206;  ards,  8  Paige,  351. 

Gawtry   v.   Leland,   31    N.   J.  Eq.    385;  3  Barrow  «.  Richard,  8  Paige,  351,  360, 

Whitney  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  11   Gray,  359,  per  Chancellor  Walworth. 

71  Am.  Dec.  715  ;  Parker  v.  Nightingale,  *  Delogny  v.  Mercer,  43  La.  Ann.   205, 

6  Allen,  341,  83  Am.  Dec.  632;  Schwoerer  8  So.  Rep.  903. 

V.  Boylston  Market  A.sso.  99  Mass.  285;  ^  La^g  y^viq  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Priest,  131 

Hills  V.  Miller,  3  Paige,  254,  24  Am.  Dec.  Ind.  413,  31   N.  E.  Rep.  77 ;  Toledo,  St, 

218 ;  Cole.s  v.  Sims,  5  De  Gex,  M.  &  G.  1  ;  L.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cosand,  6  Ind.  App.  222, 

Western  v.  Macdermot,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  499,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  251. 

on  appeal,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  72.  «  Lyford   v.  North  Pac.  C.  R.  Co.  92 

2  Collins    V.   Castle,   36   Ch.    D.  243 ;  Cal.  93,  28  Pac.  Rep.  103. 

640 


WHEN   RESTRICTIVE   COVENANTS   RUN   WITH   THE   LAND.       [§  786. 


A  covenant  in  a  deed  of  certain  land  with  a  right  of  way  over 
an  adjoining  lane,  which  is  "  not  to  be  incumbered  or  built  upon 
by  either  party,"  is  a  covenant  running  with  the  land  ;  and  such 
covenant  is  not  restricted,  by  the  use  of  the  words  "  either  party," 
to  the  actual  parties  to  the  deed,  but  applies  equally  to  subsequent 
grantees. 1 

786.  A  covenant  that  is  incident  to  the  property  conveyed 
and  affects  its  value  runs  with  the  land  and  binds  a  subsequent 
purchaser.  Thus,  where  the  owner  of  a  dam  and  water-power 
granted  a  certain  amount  of  the  water  to  one  who  covenanted  to 
pay  his  ratable  share  of  the  expense  of  keej)ing  in  repair  the  dam 
and  race-way  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  square  inches  of 
water  conveyed  to  him,  it  was  held  that  such  covenant  ran  with 
the  estate  gi;inted,  and  was  binding  upon  subsequent  owners.^ 

A  covenant  by  a  landowner  to  render  to  the  covenantees  one 
eighth  of  the  lead  ore  raised  by  him  on  the  land,  in  consideration 
of  their  constructing  a  "  level  "  to  drain  off  the  water  so  that  the 
ore  might  be  reached,  is  a  covenant  that  runs  with  the  land.^ 

A  covenant  to  keep  a  dam  in  repair,  in  a  conveyance  by  the 
covenantor   of  land  and   dam   for  a   new  water   })rivilege  to  be 


1  Dexter  v.  Beard,  130  N.  Y.  549,  29 
N.  E.  Rep.  983,  affirmiii-  7  N.  Y.  Supp. 
11.  For  other  instances  of  covenants  to 
repair  or  maintain  fences  wliich  have  been 
adjudj;ed  to  run  with  the  land,  see  Kettle 
River  II.  Co.  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  41  Minn. 
461,  43  N.  W.  Rep.  469  ;  Blain  v.  Taylor, 
19  Abb.  Pr.  228;  Easter  v.  Little  Miami 
R.  Co.  14  Ohio   St.  48;    Hazlett   v.   Sin- 


are  tenants  in  common  of  all  the  mineral 
in  the  land.  The  covenantees  own  one 
undivided  eighth  of  it,  and  the  covenantor 
reserved  and  owns  seven  eiglitlis  of  it, 
and  covenants  to  raise,  separate,  and  de- 
liver the  one  eighth.  The  possession  of 
the  uiidivideti  mineral  in  the  land,  by  the 
covenant,  remains  in  the  covenantor  until 
it  is  raised,  divided,  and  delivered.     The 


clair,  76  Ind.  488,  40  Am.  Rep.  254 ;  grant  without  the  covenant  would  make 
Maxon  v.  Lane,  102  Ind.  364;  Kellogg  each  party  liable  to  contribute  a  propor- 
V.  Robinson,  6  Vt.  276  ;  Bronson  v.  Coffin,     tionate  share  of  the  labor  and  expense  of 


108  Mass.  175,  118  Mass.  156;  Kentucky 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Kenney.  82  Ky.  1 54  ;  Nor- 
fleet  t;.  Cromwell,  64  N.  C.  1,  70  N.  C. 
634. 

2  Wooli.scroft  V.  Norton,  15  Wis.  198. 

^  Crawford  v.  Witiierbee,  77  Wis.  419, 
46  N.  W.  Rep.  .545.  Orton,  J.,  said: 
"  While  the  mineral  is  in  the  earth,  un- 
discovered and  unrniueii,  it  has  but  little 
or  no  value.  The  covenant  requiring  the 
grantor  to  raise  or  mine,  and  dclivcir  it 
to  the  grantees,  gives  it  value.  There  is 
not  only  privity  of  estate,  but  the  ])arties 

VOL.  I. 


raising  or  mining  it.  The  covenant  im- 
poses this  burden  wholly  upon  the  grantor. 
...  It  appears  to  us  that  the  covenant 
to  render  one  eighth  of  the  mineral  to  the 
covenantees,  read  in  connection  with  the 
dependent  covenant  to  construct  the  level 
for  the  purpose  of  making  the  lead  ore  in 
the  land  available,  and  the  grant  of  one 
eiglith  of  such  ore  in  tlie  land,  comes 
within  every  essential  element  of  one  that 
runs  with  the  land,  and  binds  the  present 
parties." 

641 


§  787.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS  TO   THE   USE    OF   LAND. 

owned  by  him  and  others,  runs  with  the  land,  as  it  is  connected 
with  the  subject  of  the  grant  and  enters  into  its  value.  "As  an 
interest  in  the  land  to  which  the  covenants  were  annexed  was 
transferred,  there  was  privity  of  estate  between  the  covenanting 
parties.  Although  the  interest  transferred  was  less  than  the 
entire  title,  and  the  residue  was  reserved  by  the  grantor,  the  cov- 
enants were  in  support  of  the  grant,  and  related  to  the  beneficial 
enjoyment  of  the  thing  granted.  The  benefit  of  the  covenants, 
therefore,  passed  with  the  interest  transferred  to  the  covenantee, 
while  the  burden  rested  upon  the  part  reserved  by  the  covenantor, 
and  became  binding  upon  whomsoever  should  at  any  time  own  the 
same.    ^ 

787.  A  covenant  to  run  with  the  land  must  in  its  nature 
inure  in  the  land,  or  grant  a  right  or  easement  therein.  A 
covenant  by  a  landowner  with  a  railroad  company,  that  he  will 
transport  the  products  of  his  stone  quarry  over  the  company's 
road,  is  not  a  covenant  real  and  does  not  run  with  the  land.  It  is 
merely  a  traffic  agreement.^  Lord  Brougham,  speaking  of  a  cov- 
enant to  take  limestone  from  a  particular  quarry  and  to  transport 
it  over  a  particular  railroad,  said :  "  If  one  man  may  bind  his 
messuage  and  land  to  take  lime  from  a  particular  kiln,  another 
may  l)ind  his  to  take  coals  from  a  certain  pit,  while  a  thii-d  may  load 
his  property  with  further  obligations  to  employ  one  blacksmith's 
forge,  or  the  members  of  one  corporate  body  in  various  opera- 
tions upon  the  premises,  besides  many  other  restraints  as  infinite 
in  variety  as  the  imagination  can  conceive,  for  there  can  be  no 
reason  whatever  in  support  of  the  covenant  in  question  which 
would  not  extend  to  every  covenant  that  can  be  devised."  ^ 

1  Nye  V.  Hoyle,   120  N.  Y.  195,  24  N.  ^  Kettle  River  R.  Co.  v.  Eastern  Ry, 
E.  Rep.  1,  per  Vann,  J.,  citing  Norman  y.  Co.  41    Minn.  461,  4.3  N.  W.  Rep.  469. 
Wells,  17  Wend.  136,  146  ;  Hart  v.  Lyon,  And  see  Keppell  v.  Bailey,  2  My  hie  &  K. 
90  N.  Y.  663;  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Con-  517,   535;  West  Virginia  Transp.  Co.  w. 
tinental    Ins.    Co.    87   N.    Y.  400,   408  ;  Ohio  River  Pipe-Line  Co.  22  W.  Va.  600, 
Trustees  v.  Lynch,  70  N.  Y.  440,  450,  26  626,  46  Am.  Rep.  527 ;  Brewer  v.  Mar- 
Am.    Rep.    615  ;    Wilbur    v.    Brown,    3  shall,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  337,  97  Am.  Dec.  679; 
Denio,  356;  Fitch  v.   Johnson,    104    111.  20  N.J.  Eq.  537;  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v. 
Ill  ;    Manderbach  v.    Bethany    Orphans'  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  94  111.  83. 
Home,  109  Pa.   St.  231,  2  Atl.  Rep.  422  ;  See,    however,   Norman    v.    Wells,    17 
Spencer's  Case,  1    Smith  Lead.  Cas.  174,  Wend.  136  ;  National  Union  Bank  v.  Se- 
212;    Morse    v.    Aldrich,    19    Pick.    449;  gur,  39  N.  J.  L.  173. 
Bronson  v.  Coffin,  108  Mass.  175,  11  Am.  ^  Keppell  v.  Bailey,  2  Mylne  &  K.  517, 
Rep.  335.  536. 
642 


WHEN   RESTRICTIVE    COVENANTS   RUN   WITH   THE   LAND.       [§  788. 

A  covenant  by  the  grantor  of  a  quarry  adjoining  liis  other 
land  that  he  would  not  open  or  work  any  quarry  on  such  other 
land,  though  made  for  himself,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  with  his 
grantee  and  his  heirs  and  assigns,  was  held  not  to  be  of  a  kind 
that  could  be  attached  to  the  grantee's  land  so  as  to  restrict  the 
use  of  the  grantor's  other  land  in  all  hands  for  the  benefit  of  who- 
ever might  become  the  owner  of  it.  "  Equity  will  no  more  en- 
force every  restriction  that  can  be  devised,"  said  Mr.  Justice 
Holmes,  delivering  the  judgment  to  this  effect,  "than  the  com- 
mon law"  will  recognize  as  creating  an  easement  every  grant  pur- 
porting to  limit  the  use  of  land  in  favor  of  other  land.  The 
principle  of  policy  applied  to  affirmative  covenants  applies  also 
to  negative  ones.  They  must  'touch  or  concern,'  or  'extend  to 
the  support  of  the  thing'  conveyed.^  They  must  be  'for  the 
benefit  of  the  estate.'  ^  Or,  as  it  is  said  more  broadlj^,  new  and 
unusual  incidents  cannot  be  attached  to  land,  by  way  either  of 
benefit  or  of  burden.^  The  covenant  under  consideration,  as  it 
stands  on  the  report,  falls  outside  the  limits  of  this  rule,  even  in 
the  narrower  form.  In  what  way  does  it  extend  to  the  suj^port 
of  the  plaintiff's  quarry  ?  It  does  not  make  the  use  or  occupation 
of  it  more  convenient.  It  does  not  in  any  way  affect  the  use  or 
occupation ;  it  simply  tends  indirectly  to  increase  its  value  by 
excluding  a  comjoetitor  from  the  market  for  its  products.  If  it 
be  asked  what  is  the  difference  in  principle  between  an  easement 
to  have  land  unbuilt  upon  and  an  easement  to  have  a  quarry  left 
unopened,  the  answer  is,  that,  whether  a  difference  of  degree  or 
of  kind,  the  distinction  is  plain  between  a  grant  or  covenant  that 
looks  to  direct  physical  advantage  in  the  occupation  of  the  domi- 
nant estate,  sucli  as  light  and  air,  and  one  which  only  concerns  it 
in  the  indirect  way  which  we  have  mentioned.  The  scope  of  the 
covenant  and  tiie  circumstances  show  that  it  is  not  directed  to  the 
quiet  enjoyment  of  the  dominant  land."  •* 

788.  Though  a  covenant  be  made  by  one  for  himself  and 
hie  assigns,  yet,  if  it  does  not  concern  the  land,  his  assignee 
is  not  bound  by  it.     The  covenant  in  such  case  is  merely  collat- 

1  Spencer's  Case,  5  Rpp.  16  rt,  24?).  535;   Ackrovd    v.    Smith,   10  C.   B.   164; 

2  Cockson  V.  Cock,  Cro.  Jac.  125.  Ilill ;;.  Tupper,  2  H.  &  C.  121. 

3  Keppell  V.  Bailey,  2  Myl.  &  K.  517,         ■•  Norcross  v.   James,    140   Mass.    188, 

192,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  946,  per  Holmes,  J. 

643 


§§  789,  TOO.]       RESTRICTIONS    AS    TO   THE    USE   OF   LAND. 

eral.^  Tliiis  a  covenant  witli  a  lessee  for  liimself  and  assigns,  not 
to  liire  persons  to  work  in  the  mill  demised  who  were  settled  in 
other  parishes,  was  held  not  to  lain  with  the  land  or  bind  liis 
assijjjnee.^  Lord  Ellenborouo'h,  in  givino-  judgment,  said  :  "This 
is  a  covenant  in  which  the  assignee  is  specifically  named  ;  and 
though  it  were  for  a  thing  not  in  f-s-xg  at  the  time,  yet,  being  spe- 
cifically named,  it  would  bind  him,  if  it  affected  the  nature, 
quality,  or  value  of  the  thing  demised,  independently  of  collat- 
eral circumstances,  or  if  it  affected  the  mode  of  enjoying  it.  But 
this  covenant  does  not  affect  the  thing  demised  in  one  way  or  the 
other.  .  .  .  How,  then,  does  it  affect  the  mode  of  occupation? 
The  carrying  on  of  a  particular  trade  on  the  premises  may  be 
said  to  do  that ;  but  where  the  work  to  be  done  is  at  all  events 
the  saine,  whether  it  be  done  by  workmen  from  one  parish  or 
another  cannot  affect  the  modes  of  occupation.  The  covenant, 
therefore,  not  directly  affecting  the  nature,  quality,  or  value  of 
the  thing  demised,  nor  the  mode  of  occupying  it,  is  a  collateral 
covenant,  which  will  not  bind  the  assignee  of  the  term,  though 
named." 

789.  It  is  not  essential  that  the  assignees  of  the  cove- 
nantor should  be  named  or  referred  to  in  order  to  make  the 
covenant  one  that  will  run  with  the  land,  provided  the  intention 
is  clear  that  future  owners  of  the  land  should  be  bound. ^  One 
having  covenanted  to  leave  certain  land  for  pasturage  absque  cul- 
tura,  granted  his  estate  to  another,  his  executors  and  administra- 
tors, who  ploughed  the  land.  In  a  suit  upon  the  covenant  against 
the  assignee,  it  was  demurred  that,  the  assignee  not  being  named, 
the  covenant  did  not  bind  him,  it  being  collateral.  "  But  all  the 
court  held  that  this  covenant  is  to  be  performed  by  the  assignee 
although  he  be  not  named,  because  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  the 
estate,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  soil ;  but  to  build  de  novo, 
or  such  like,  shall  not  bind  him  unless  named."  * 

790.  On  the  other  hand,  a  covenant  to  do  something  quite 
unconnected  with  the  land  does  not  bind  the  assigns  though 
expressly  mentioned.-^     Whether  it   binds  his   assigns  depends 

1  Kettle  River  R.  Co.  v.  Eastern  Ry.  ^  Wilkinson  v.  Rogers,  lOJiir.  N.  S.  .5; 

Co.  41    Minn.    461,  476,  43  N.  W.  Rep.  Morland  i\  Cook,  L.  R.  G  Eq.  2.52  ;  Hodge 

469;   Norcross   v.  James,  140  Mass.  188,  v.  Sloan,  107  N.  Y.  244,  251. 

2  N.  E.  Rep.  946.  '  Cockson  v.  Cock,  Cro.  .Jac.  12.5. 

"  Congleton  v.  Pattison,  10  East,  130,  ^  Sjiencer's  Case,  5  Coke,  16  a,  1  Smith's 

135,  136.  Lead.  Cas.  9  Am.  ed.  174. 
644 


WHEN    RESTRICTIVE    COVENANTS    RUN    WITH    THE    LAND.       [§  790. 

much  mo!-e  upon  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  covenant  than 
upon  its  form  and  the  use  of  any  particular  word.  The  owner  of 
two  adjacent  city  lots'  conveyed  one  of  them  by  a  deed  which 
contained  this  clause :  "  The  said  grantor,  being  also  the  owner  of 
the  adjoining  lot,  for  himself,  his  heirs,  executors,  administrators, 
and  assigns,  does  hereb}'  covenant  that  he  will  not  erect  or  cause 
to  be  erected  on  said  adjoining  lot  any  building  which  shall  be 
regarded  as  a  nuisance."  ^  It  was  held  that  the  covenant  was 
against  such  erection  by  the  grantor  alone,  and  that  he  is  not  liable 
under  it  for  a  nuisance  erected  by  his  grantee  of  the  adjoining 
lot,  whose  conveyance  contained  no  restrictions  as  to  use.^  "  This 
covenant,"  say  the  court,  "is  purely  negative  in  character,  and 
has  no  relation  to  the  land  conveyed,  but  relates  wholly  to  other 
premises  owned  by  the  covenantor,  and  in  which  the  covenantee 
had  no  interest.  There  was  no  agreement  that  the  premises 
should  not  be  used  for  certain  purposes,  or  that  they  should  be 
free  from  nuisances  forever.  There  was  no  corresponding  cove- 
nant by  the  grantee  restricting  the  use  that  he  might  make  of 
the  premises  conveyed  to  him,  so  that  the  restrictions  might  be 
mutual,  and  uniformity  of  use  thus  secured.  No  special  object 
to  be  attained  by  the  covenant  is  apparent,  because  both  parcels 
of  land  were  tenement-house  property,  situated  on  a  back  street, 
and  surrounded  by  buildings  of  an  inferior  character.  In  con- 
struing the  covenant,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  grantor, 
although  speaking  for  himself  and  his  successors,  to  the  grantee 
and  his  successors,  confined  the  restriction  to  himself  alone  by 
agreeing  that  he  (the  grantor)  would  neither  erect  nor  cause  to 
be  erected  any  building  that  should  be  regarded  as  a  nuisance. 
...  A  personal  covenant  binds  the  heirs,  executors,  and  admin- 
istrators in  respect  to  assets,  so  that  the  word  'assigns'  only  need 
be  rejected,  as  surplusage  in  order  to  relieve  the  case  of  ail  diffi- 
cultv.  A  strained  construction  tliat  hns  no  foundation  to  rest 
upon  except  the  single  word  'assigns,'  used  in  the  descriptive  and 
unsubstantial  way  already  mentioned,  should  not  be  resorted  to 
when  it  involves  a,  serious  result  to  the  grantor,  with  but  slight 
benefit  to  the  grantee,  because  it  is  improbable  that  under  such 
circumstances   such   a  result   was   intended.     Hence,  only  by  the 

1  Renals  v.  Cowlishaw,  9   Cli.   D.  125,     N.    E.    IJep.  275,  jiidyjment   by  Mr.  Jus- 
affirmeil  11  Cti.  D.  866.  tice  Vanu,  ulHrming  1  i^.  Y.  Supp.  132. 

2  Clarke  v.  Devoe,   124  N.  Y.  120,  26 

645 


§  791.]  HKSTRICTIONS    AS   TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

use  of  plain  and  direct  language  by  the  grantor  should  it  be  held 
that  he  created  a  right  in  the  nature  of  an  easement,  and  attached 
it  to  one  parcel  as  the  dominant  estate,  and  made  the  other  servi- 
ent thereto  for  all  time  to  come.  We  think  that  the  language 
used  by  the  parties  permits  no  such  result." 

791.  The  naming  of  the  covenantee's  heirs  and  assigns  is 
of  importance  as  showing  an  intention  that  the  covenant 
should  run  with  the  land.  It  shows  an  intention  that  the  cove- 
nant should  protect  not  only  the  grantee,  but  also  those  who  should 
come  after  him  by  succession  to  the  ownership  of  the  same  land. 
"  The  significance  of  those  words,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Finch,  "  will 
better  appear  if  we  refer  back  to  the  early  history  of  these  cove- 
nants. Originally  the  common  law  did  not  permit  the  assign- 
ment of  things  in  action,  and  it  followed  that  a  covenant,  re- 
garded from  the  direction  of  a  contract,  could  not  pass  beyond 
the  covenantee.  But  the  old  warranty  seems  to  have  been 
viewed  rather  as  an  incident  of,  and  as  belonging  to,  the  estate 
conveyed,  and  so  attached  to  that  estate  as  to  go  with  it  when 
transmitted.  It  could  not  pass  to  assigns,  as  an  independent  con- 
tract, but,  by  its  connection  with  an  estate  in  land,  became  trans- 
missible with  it.  Out  of  that  peculiarity  sprang  the  necessity  of 
privity  of  estate  to  enable  the  subsequent  assignee  to  vouch,  or 
call  on  his  predecessor  for  protection ;  but  it  was  an  element  of 
the  doctrine  that  neither  the  heir  nor  the  assign  of  the  grantee 
could  take  advantage  of  the  warranty  unless  expressly  named.^  As 
was  said,  if  one  '  warrant  land  to  a  man  and  his  heirs  without 
naming  assigns,  his  assignee  shall  not  vouch.'  ^  That  rule  was 
not  applied  when  the  warrantor,  instead  of  substituting  other 
lands,  became  bound  only  to  respond  in  damages  ;  but,  while  the 
necessity  has  disappeared,  the  actual  use  of  the  words  continues 
to  indicate  the  purpose  and  intent  of  the  warrantor  that  his  cove- 
nant shall  not  stop  with  the  covenantee,  but  operate  for  the  bene- 
fit of  his  grantees  ;  and  though  the  use  of  the  words,  possibly, 
may  not  dispense  with  some  privity  of  estate,  they  show  that  the 
warrantor  regarded  himself  as  making,  and  intending  to  make,  a 
covenant  running  with  the  land,  and  that,  in  holding  him  to  that 
responsibility,  we  do  not  put  upon  him  a  liability  which  he  did 
not  contemplate."  ^ 

1  Rawle,  Gov.  §  203.  ''  Mygatt  v.  Coe,  142  N.  Y.  78, 36  N.  E. 

2  Co.  Litt.  384  !>.  Rep.  870.     The  learned  judge  further  re- 

646 


WHEN   RESTRICTIVE    COVENANTS   RUN   WITH   THE   LAND.     [§§  792,  793. 

792.  By  express  stipulation  of  the  parties,  a  covenant  which 
of  itself  would  not  run  with  the  land  may  be  made  binding 
as  a  lien.  Thus,  although  the  Code  of  California  provides  that 
a  covenant  cannot  be  made  to  run  with  the  land  except  where 
such  covenant  is  made  in  connection  with  and  as  a  part  of  the 
conveyance  or  transfer  of  the  land  itself,  an  express  agreement  that 
such  a  covenant  shall  run  with  and  bind  the  land  is  efTectual.  The 
contract  in  question  related  to  the  furnishing  of  water  to  irrigate 
land  by  means  of  a  ditch,  and  it  was  provided  that  the  right  to 
the  water  to  be  furnished  should  be  and  become  appurtenant 
to  the  land,  and  this  was  followed  by  an  express  agreement  that 
the  contract  to  pay  the  money  therefor  should  bind  the  land. 
This  created  a  lien  upon  the  land  for  the  enforcement  of  the  cov- 
enant, and,  when  recorded,  was  notice  to  subsequent  purchasers.^ 
The  subsequent  purchaser  held  the  land  subject  to  the  lien,  but 
was  not  personally  liable  to  pay  the  debt. 

A  declaration  by  the  parties  that  the  covenants  of  a  deed  shall 
run  with  the  land  is  not  necessarily  controlling  on  the  question 
whether  or  not  they  do.  If  the  covenant  is  not  one  of  a  nature 
to  run  with  the  land,  or  if  it  is  not  one  created  in  a  grant  of  the 
estate,  the  declaration  of  the  parties  does  not  make  it  a  covenant 
running  with  the  land.^ 

793.  To  create  a  covenant  running  with  the  land,  it  is  es- 
sential that  with  the  making  of  the  covenant  there  be  a  trans- 
fer of  title  from  one  party  to  the  otlier,'^  unless  there  is  the  equiv- 
marks  that,  while  these  words  are  more  ^  Spencer's  Case,  5  Coke,  16  a  ;  Bally  y. 
importaut,  and  hear  more  heavily  upon  Wells,  3  Wils.  29  ;  Webb  v.  Russell,  3  T. 
the  theory  that  a  covenantor  having  no  R.  393  ;  Vyvyan  v.  Arthur,  1  Barn.  &  C. 
estate  may,  by  his  own  special  and  in-  410  ;  Keppell  i;.  Bailey,  2  Mylne  &  K.  517  ; 
tended  contract,  attach  his  covenant  of  Fresno  Canal,  &c.  Co.  v.  Rowell,  80  Cal. 
warranty  to  the  estate  of  another  so  as  to  114,  22  Pac.  Rep.  53  ;  Dexter  v.  Beard,  130 
rnn  with  that  estate,  yet  they  are  entitled  N.  Y.  549,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  983,  affirming 
to  weight  and  consideration,  also,  u])on  7  N.  Y.  Siipp.  II;  Indianapolis  Water 
the  narrower  inquiry  whetiier  the  defend-  Co.  v.  Nulte,  126  Ind.  373,  26  N.  E.  Rep. 
ant  in  tlie  case  in  hand  is  or  is  not  to  be  72  ;  Conduitt  v.  Ross,  102  Ind.  166  ;  Wells 
deemed  an  entire  stranger  to  the  title,  r.  Benton,  108  Ind.  585,  8  N.  E.  Rep.  444, 
And  see  Nye  v.  Iloyle,  120  N.  Y.  195,  203,  9  N.  E.  Rep.  601  ;  Ilurd  v.  Curtis,  19  Pick. 
24  N.  E.  Rep.  I;  Coleman  v.  Bresnahan,  459;  Morse  v.  Aldrich,  19  Pick.  449,  1 
54  Ilun,  619,  8  N.  Y.  Snjjp.  158;  Hart  v.  Met.  544  ;  Wheelock  v.  Thayer,  16  Pick. 
Lyon,  90  N.  Y.  663.  68;    Eastern.    Little   Miami    R.  Co.    14 

1  Fresno  Canal,  &c.  Co.  v.  Dunbar,  80  Oliio  St.  48;  Wheeler  i-.  Schad,  7  Nev. 
Cal.  530,  22  Pac.  Rep.  275.  204. 

2  Fresno  Canal,  &c.  Co.  r.  Rowell,  80  See  further,  as  to  covenants  running 
Cal.  114  22  Pac.  Rep.  53  with  the  land,  CH.  x.xiii. 

647 


§  703.]  RESTHICTIONS   AS   TO   THK   USE   OF   LAND. 

alent  of  a  grant  of  an  caiienient  or  servitude,  wliicli  may  attach 
to  the  posseysion  of  the  hind  and  run  with  it,  regardless  of  any 
change  of  ownership.^  "  Wliert;  one  {'arty  covenants  with  an- 
other in  respect  of  huul,  and  at  tlu;  same  time,  with  and  as  a  part 
of  mailing  the  covenant,  neither  parts  with  or  receives  any  title 
or  interest  in  the  hind,  nor  creat(^s  an  easement,  or  a  right  in  tlie 
nature  of  an  easement,  for  the  benefit  of  the  land,  such  a  cove- 
nant is  at  best  but  a  mere  personal  contract."  ^  Thus,  where  a 
contract  in  no  way  connected  with  the  title  was  made  between 
two  persons,  whereby  one  of  them  agreed  that  no  one  should  be 
allowed  to  erect  a  grist-mill  on  a  water-privilege  belonging  to 
him,  inasmuch  as  no  interest  in  the  land  was  transferred,  the  cove- 
nant was  merely  a  personal  contract,  which  did  not  burden  the  land 
in  the  hands  of  a  subsequent  grantee.^  In  another  case,  the 
owner  of  two  adjoining  lots,  in  the  deed  conveying  one  of  them, 
covenanted  for  himself,  his  heirs,  executors,  administrators,  and 
assigns,  that  he  would  not  erect  on  the  lot  remaining  unsold  any 
buildinof  which  should  be  reo-arded  as  a  nuisance.  The  covenant 
had  no  relation  to  the  land  C(Miveyed,  but  referred  wholly  to 
premises  with  reference  to  which  neither  party  parted  with  or 
received  any  title  or  interest  at  the  time  of,  and  as  a  part  of  mak- 
ing the  covenant.  It  was,  then,  a  mere  personal  covenant,  not 
binding  on  a  subsequent  grantee  of  such  premises.  The  question 
presented,  therefore,  was  whether  this  personal  covenant  rendered 
the  covenantor  liable  to  respond  for  the  acts  of  subsequent 
grantors,  as  well  as  his  own,  or  only  for  his  own ;  and  the  court 
held  that  the  gi-antor  only  intended  to  contract  against  his  own 
acts,  and  the  covenant  should  not  be  read  distributively,  as  if  the 
grantor  had  covenanted  that  he  would  not  erect  a  structure  which 
should  be  regarded  as  a  nuisance,  nor  would  his  executors,  admin- 
istrators, or  assigns.^ 

In  another  case  in  New  York,^  Chief  Justice  Follett,  rendering 

1  Bronson  v.  Coffin,  108  Mass.  175,  11  108  Mass.    175,  11   Am.    Rep.  3.35,     118 

Am.   Kep.  335;  Weyman   v.  Rin^^okl,  I  Mass.  156  ;  Norcross  r.  James,  140  Mass. 

Bradf.  Sur.  40,  54 ;  Kettle  River  R.  Co.  v.  190,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  946. 

Eastern  Ry.  Co.  41    Minn.  461,  43  N.  W.  3  Harsha  v.  Reid,  45  N.  Y.  415. 

Rep.  469.  4  Clark  r.  Devoe,  124  N.  Y.  120,  26  N. 

-  Kin;,'  V.  Wight,  155  Mass.  444,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  275. 

E.  Rep.  644,  per  Morton,  ,J.,  citing  Sav-  5  Mygatt  v.  Coe,  124  N.  Y.  212,  26  N. 

age  V.  Mason,  3  Cush.  500;  Morse  v.  Al-  E.  Rep.   611.     Upon  a  second  appeal  of 

diich,  19    Pick.  449;  Bronson  v.  Coffin,  this  case,  new  facts  appeared,  so  that  the 

648 


WHEN   RESTRICTIVE    COVENANTS   RUN   WITH    THE   LAND.       [§  793. 

the  judgment  of  the  Second  Division  of  the  Court  of  Appeal?:, 
examined  at  length  the  doctrine  that  privity  of  estate  is  not  essen- 
tial to  the  making  of  a  covenant  that  will  run  with  the  land. 
"  This  opinion  has  been  founded  almost  exclusively  upon  the  au- 
thority of  an  ancient  case  known  as  the  '  Prior's  Case,'  ^  cited  by 
Lord  Coke.  In  controverting  this  view.  Sir  Edward  Sugden, 
now  Lord  St.  Leonards,  has  subjected  the  Prior's  Case  to  a  most 
searching  criticism,  which  results  in  its  complete  overthrow  as 
authority  on  this  question,  showing  that  the  portions  of  it  par- 
ticularly relied  on  were  not  judicial  resolutions,  but  an  addition 
by  the  reporter ;  that  the  case  does  not  contain  tlie  doctrine 
usually  extracted  from  it ;  and  that  it  has  received  no  cnnfiima- 
tion,  but  the  contrary',  from  subsequent  adjudications.  It  may  be 
safely  laid  down  that,  if  the  doctrine  that  the  covenants  for  title 
will  run  with  the  land,  even  when  entered  into  by  a  stranger  to 
the  land,  has  no  better  foundation  than  the  authorit}''  of  this 
case,  it  cannot  be  sustained  ;  and  it  would  seem  to  be  the  better 
opinion  that,  in  order  for  a  covenantor's  covenants  to  run  with 
the  land,  he  must  also  be  a  grantor  of  the  land  which  they  affect. 
No  modern  case  decides  that  a  stranger's  covenants  may  run  with 
the  land  ;  but  in  a  dictum  of  Moncure,  J.,  in  the  recent  case  of 
Dickinson  v.  JToomes,^  this  doctrine  is  broadly  enunciated.  .  .  . 
In  the  American  Law  Review  ^  Judge  Hare's  note  is  discussed, 
and  the  writer,  in  conclusion,  says :  '  But  the  authoi'ity  of  Pa- 
kenham's  Case  seems  to  be  overthrown  by  the  investigations  of 
Sugden  and  Washburn,  who  produce  unquestionable  proof  that 
the  case  was  not  decided  by  the  court  as  reported  by  Lord  Coke, 
but  that  Lord  Coke's  report  was  the  expi'ession  of  a  mere  dictum 
by  Finchden.'  .  .  .  The  editor  of  the  ninth  American  edition  of 
Smith's  Leading  Cases  (vol.  i.  p.  211)  takes  a  different  view 
of  this  question  from  the  one  taken  in  the  earlier  editions.  He 
says  :  '  It  seems  that  there  must  be  between  covenantor  and  cove- 
nantee the  relation  of  grantor  and  grantee,  which  is  all  that  there 
is  between  the  grantee  and  his  assignee.  It  is  not  thought  that  a 
covenant  of  warranty  made  by  a  stranger  to  the  land  would  run 

First  Division  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  re-  Mygatt  i'.  Coo,   142  N.  Y.  78,36  N.  E. 

versed  the  decision  above  referred  to  on  Rep.  870. 

other  points.    The  doctrine  that  a. stranger         '  Y.  B.  42  Edw.  III. 

to  the  title  cannot  make  a  covenant  that         ^  g  Grjitt.  .'553,400. 

will  run  with   the  land  was  recognized.         *  Vol.  20,  p.  404. 

649 


§  794.]  RKS TUICTIONS   AS    TO   THE   USK   OF   LAND. 

with  it,  aiul  perhaps  the  rehition  necessary  to  exist  is  that  which 
would  have  constituted  privity  of  estate  at  common  hiw  before 
the  statute  of  quia  ejnptores,  although  the  rent  or  services  re- 
served, which  were  perhaps  an  incident  of  the  old  privity,  are 
not  now'  usual.'  " 

794.  There  are  two  classes  of  covenants  that  are  annexed 
to  the  land  and  follow  it  into  the  hands  of  heirs  and  as- 
signees. The  one  class,  represented  by  tlie  usual  covenants  for 
title,  runs  only  with  the  estate  in  the  land.  The  other  class, 
represented  by  equitable  covenants,  is  attached  to  the  land  itself 
and  follows  the  possession  of  the  land.  Lord  Coke  thus  stated 
the  distinction  :  "  So  note  a  diversity  between  a  use  or  warranty, 
and  the  like  things  annexed  to  the  estate  of  the  land  in  priv- 
ity, and  commons,  advowsons,  and  other  hereditaments  annexed 
to  the  possession  of  the  land."  ^  Mr.  Justice  Holmes,  stating 
this  distinction,  says  :  "  Rights  of  the  class  represented  by  the 
ancient  warranty,  and  now  by  the  usual  covenants  for  title,  are 
pure  matters  of  contract,  and,  from  a  very  early  date  down  to 
comparatively  modern  times,  lawyers  have  been  perplexed  with 
the  question  how  an  assignee  could  sue  upon  a  contract  to  which 
he  WHS  not  a  party.  But  an  heir  could  sue  upon  a  warranty  to 
his  ancestor,  because  for  that  purpose  he  was  eadem  j^ersona  cuin 
antecessore.  And  this  conception  was  gradually  extended  in  a 
qualified  way  to  assigns,  where  they  were  mentioned  in  the  deed. 
But  in  order  tliat  an  assignee  should  be  so  far  identified  in  law 
with  the  original  covenantee,  he  must  have  the  same  estate,  that 
is,  the  same  status  or  inheritance,  and  thus  the  same  persona, 
quoad  the  contract.  The  privity  of  estate  which  is  thus  required 
is  privity  of  estate  with  the  original  covenantee,  not  with  the 
original  covenantor ;  and  this  is  the  only  privity  of  which  thei'e 
is  anything  said  in  the  ancient  books.  .  .  .  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  rights  in  question  were  of  the  class  to  which  commons 
belonged,  and  of  which  easements  are  the  most  conspicuous  t3'pe, 
these  rights,  whether  created  by  prescription,  grant,  or  covenant, 
when  once  acquired,  were  attached  to  the  land,  and  went  with  it, 
irrespective  of  privity,  into  all  hands,  even  those  of  a  disseisor. 
'  So  a  disseisor,  abator,  intruder,  or  the  lord  by  escheat,  etc.,  shall 
have  them  as  things  annexed  to  the  land.'  ^  In  like  manner, 
when,   as   was  usual,  although   not  invariable,  the   duty  was   i-e- 

1  Chudleigh's  Case,  1  Hep.  120  a,  122  6.  -  Chudleigh's  Case,  1  Hep.  12()«,  122  6. 
650 


WHEN    RESTRICTIVE    COVENANTS    RUN    WITH    THE    LAND.        [§  795. 

garded  as  falling  upon  land,  the  burden  of  the  covenant  or 
grant  went  with  the  servient  land  into  all  hands,  and  of  course 
there  was  no  need  to  "mention  assigns.  .  .  .  When  it  is  said  that 
in  this  class  of  cases  there  must  be  a  privity  of  estate  between 
the  covenantor  and  the  covenantee,  it  only  means  that  the  cove- 
nant must  impose  such  a  burden  on  the  land  of  the  covenantor 
as  to  be  in  substance,  or  to  carry  with  it,  a  grant  of  an  easement 
or  quasi  easement,  or  must  be  in  aid  of  such  a  grant ;  ^  which  is 
generally  true,  although,  as  has  been  shown,  not  invariably,^ 
and  although  not  quite  reconcilable  with  all  the  old  cases  except 
by  somewhat  hypothetical  historical  explanation.  But  the  expres- 
sion '  privitv  of  estate  '  in  this  sense  is  of  modern  use,  and  has 
been  carried  over  from  the  cases  of  warranty,  where  it  was  used 
with  a  wholly  different  meaning."  ^ 

795.  Restrictions  in  the  nature  of  easements  may  be  cre- 
ated by  agreement  or  indenture  between  owners  who  have 
already  acquired  their  lands.  "  In  order  to  attach  the  easement 
to  the  dominant  estate,  it  is  not  necessar-y  that  it  should  be  cre- 
ated at  the  moment  when  either  the  dominant  or  the  servient 
estate  is  conveyed,  if  the  purport  of  the  deed  is  to  create  an  ease- 
ment for  the  benefit  of  the  dominant  estate."  * 

On  this  ground  was  sustained  a  covenant  by  a  railroad  company 
with  the  owner  of  adjoining  land  to  maintain  a  side  track  and 
depot  at  a  particular  point.'^ 

"  The  character  of  a  covenant  of  this  kind  must  depend  upon 
the  effect  of  the  entire  agreement  of  which  it  is  a  part,  and, 
where  the  benefit  and  the  burden  are  so  inseparably  connected 
that  each  is  necessary  to  the  existence  of  the  other,  both  must 
go  together.  The  liability  to  the  burden  wall  be  a  necessary  inci- 
dent to  the  right  to  the  benefit."  ^  Therefore  an  agreement  under 
seal  between  riparian  owners  adjusting  their  respective  rights  to 

1  Bronson  v.  Coffin,  108  Mass.  175,  Pennsylvauia  R.  Co.  54  N.  J.  L.  233,23 
185,  118  Mass.  156.  Atl.  Hep.  810. 

2  Pakenham's  Case,  Y.  B.  42  Edw.  III.  ^  Pitkin  v.  Long  Island  K.  Co.  2  Barb. 
3  PI.  14.  Cli.    221,   47   Am.   Dec.  320;    Gilmer  v. 

3  Norcros.s  v.  James,  140  Mass.  188,  Mobile  &  M.  Ky.  Co.  79  Ala.  569,58  Am. 
189,  191,  2  N.  E.  Kep.  946.  Kep.  623. 

*  Ladd  V.  Boston,  151  Mass.  585,  24  N.  ''  Ilorni;.  Miller,  136  Pa.  St.  640,655,  20 

E.  Rep.  858,21    Am.   St.   Rep.  481,  per  All.   Rep.  706,  per    Clark,   J.     And    see 

Holmes,  J.,  citin<;  Lonisville  &  N.  11.  Co.  Colemau  v.  Coleman,  19  Pa.  St.    100,  57 

V.  Koelle,  104  111.  455  ;  Wetherell  v.  BroKst,  Am.  Dec.  641  ;  Carr  v.  Lowry,  27  Pa.  St, 

23  Iowa,  586,  591.     And   see  Costigan  v.  257. 

651 


§  T'Jtl.]  RF.STRlCriONS    AS    TO    TIIK    USE    OF    LAND. 

the  waters  of  the  stream,  and  entered  into  for  the  mutual  benefit 
of  their  respective  heirs  or  grantees,  runs  witli  the  lands  of  the 
respective  proprietors,  and  it  is  of  no  consequence  that  in  subse- 
quent deeds  of  the  lands  no  mention  of  tiie  agreement  is  made.^ 

Where  a  landowner,  desiring  to  build  a  dam  and  raise  the 
water  of  a  stream  over  which  there  was  a  bridge  and  highway, 
covenanted  with  the  town  to  keep  in  repair  a  new  bridge  and  its 
appioaclies,  being  part  of  a  highway,  such  covenant  may  run  with 
the  land  so  as  to  bind  the  covenantor's  successors  in  title.^ 

796.  A  restriction  which  is  merely  a  personal  covenant 
with  the  grantor  can  be  enforced  by  him  only.  In  a  deed  of 
land  bounded  on  a  street  tliere  was  a  restriction  that  no  building 
shoukl  be  placed  within  a  certain  distance  from  the  street;  but 
there  was  nothing  in  the  deed  to  show  that  the  parties  intended 
that  the  restriction  should  create  a  servitude  or  easement  on  the 
granted  land,  which  should  attach  to  and  be  an  appurtenance  to 
any  neigliboring  land.  The  court  lield  tliat  the  restriction  was 
merely  a  personal  covenant  with  the  grantor  which  his  heirs  could 
not  enforce  after  his  death.  The  mere  fact  that  the  grantor  owned 
other  land  separated  only  by  a  railroad  from  the  land  conveyed 
does  not  show  that  the  object  of  the  restriction  was  to  benefit  this 
land.  "  In  the  absence  of  any  words  in  the  deed  to  this  effect, 
or  any  reference  to  a  plan  showing  a  geneial  sclieme  of  improve- 
ment, the  grantees  took  their  estate  without  any  notice,  express 
or  constructive,  that  the  restriction  vv^as  intended  for  the  benefit 
of  the  adjoining  estate.  For  anything  that  appears,  it  may  have 
been  intended  only  for  the  benefit  of  the  grantor  and  for  his  per- 
sonal convenience."'  '^ 

An  agreement  whether  oral  or  in  writing  between  the  owners 
of  adjoining  lots  of  land  simply  to  erect  buildings  in  a  uniform 
manner  and  at  a  certain  distance  from  the  street  does  not  create 

1  Horn  V.  Miller,  13G  Pa.   St.    640,  20  oblitration  to  repair  fences  ;uid  highways." 

Atl.  Rep.  706.  Per  Holmes,  J. 

-  Miildlefield  r.  Church  Mills  Kuiitinj,'         -  Skinner   v.   Shepard,    130  Mass.  180, 

Co.  160  Mass.   267,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  780*.  181,  per  Morton,  J.     For  other  instances 

"It  is  true  that,  in  general,  active  duties  of  restrictions  which  were  construed  as 

cannot  be  attached  to  land,  and  that  af-  personal   covenants   only,  see  Badj;er  v. 

firmative  covenants  only  bind    the  cove-  Boardman,  16  Gray,  559 ;  Jewell  v.  Lee, 

nantor,  his  heirs,  executors,  and  adminis-  14  Allen,  145,  92  Am.  Uec.   744;  Lowell 

trators.     But  there  are  some  exceptions,  Tnst.  Sav.  ;,'.  LowtP,  153  Mass.  530,  27  N. 

and  most  conspicuous  amon<(  them  is  the  E.  Rep.  518  ;  Mitchell  v.  Leavitt,  30  Conn. 

587. 

652 


WHEN    RESTRICTIVE    COVENANTS    RUN    WITH    THE    LAND.      [§  797. 

any  perpetual  restraint  on  the  use  of  the  land  by  either  of  tliem. 
It  is  completely  satisfied  when  the  buildings  are  erected  in  accord- 
ance with  the  agreement,  and  there  is  no  implication  that  they 
shall  thereafter  remain  in  the  same  position  or  of  the  same  size  or 
shape. ^ 

797.  A  permanent  restriction  as  to  the  use  of  land  will  not 
be  implied  from  an  independent  agreement  between  adjoining 
owners.  While  such  an  agreement  may  create  a  right  in  the 
nature  of  a  servitude  or  easement  which  can  be  enforced  in  equity, 
although  it  does  not  run  with  the  land  by  virtue  of  a  privity  of 
estate  between  the  parties,  yet  it  must  appear  by  express  stipula- 
tion or  unavoidable  implication  that  the  parties  intended  to  impose 
a  permanent  restriction  on  the  use  of  their  respective  estates.  "If 
such  restrictions  should  be  incorporated  into  a  grant  in  the  form 
of  a  condition  or  reservation,  or  appended  to  it  as  a  covenant  real, 
or  so  inserted  as  to  cai-ry  with  it  a  notice  to  all  persons  claiming 
title  in  the  premises  that  the  free  use  and  enjoyment  of  them  is 
to  a  certain  extent  qualified  or  limited,  the  intent  to  create  a  ser- 
vitude or  privilege  in  its  nature  perpetual  would  be  clearly  mani- 
fested. But  where  the  agreement  for  such  a  right  or  interest  in 
real  property  rests  wholly  in  parol,  or  is  in  the  form  of  a  covenant 
in  gross,  or  is  entered  into  by  a  written  contract  separate  and  dis- 
tinct from  the  deed  or  instrument  by  which  the  title  is  passed,  it 
must  contain  a  stipulation  which  in  express  terms  provides  that 
the  right  or  privilege  is  to  be  a  permanent  resti'iction  on  the  land 
to  which  it  relates,  or  it  must  be  so  framed  as  to  lead  to  the  un- 
avoidable conclusion  that  such  was  the  intention  of  the  parties; 
otherwise  it  would  be  destitute  of  the  essential  element  of  a  ser- 
vitude or  easement  designed  as  a  perpetual  burden  on  one  estate 
for  the  use  and  benefit  of  another,  and  would  be  nothing  more 
than  an  agreement  for  the  immediate  and  present  mode  of  enjoy- 
ing or  using  the  property,  having  relation  to  its  situation  and  con- 

i  Ihibljc'll  /•.  Warren,  8  Allen,  173, 179.  fjive  greater  permanence  to  the  prescribed 

Bi<;elow,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  Neither  in  law  nor  mode  of  occupying  their  land  tlian  might 

in  equity  could  any  desifrn  or  purpose  be  be  secured  by  the  nature  of  the  structures 

imputed  to  the  parties  beyond  that  which  which  were  about  to  be  erected  on   the 

was  clearly  expressed   or  necessarily  ini-  j)remiaes  ;  and,  if  they  were  of  a  solid  and 

plied  from  the  agreement  into  which  they  durable  character,  that  the  owners  would 

had  entered.     The  jiresuniption  of  law  as  not  be  likely  to  change  them  essentially 

well  as  of  sound  rea.son  would  be  in  such  for  a  long  period  of  years." 
case  that  the  parties  did  not   intend   to 

653 


§  798.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

ilition,  and  the  ^^npose  to  which  it  was  to  be  appropriated  at  the 
time  when  tho  agreement  was  niade.''^ 

798.  Whether  the  covenant  is  personal,  or  is  for  the  benefit 
of  the  adjacent  land,  is  a  question  of  intention,  to  be  deter- 
mined from  the  words  of  the  deed,  from  the  circumstances  of  the 
conveyance,  and  from  the  situation  of  the  property  at  the  time. 
It  will  be  regarded  as  personal  merely  unless  an  intention  to  the 
contrary  appears  or  may  be  presumed.  If  the  adjoining  land  be- 
longs to  tlie  covenantee,  and  is  manifestly  benefited  by  the  restric- 
tion, there  may  be  a  presumption  that  it  was  intended  for  the 
benefit  of  that  land.-  But  the  restriction  will  be  regarded  as  per- 
sonal to  the  covenantee,  and  will  not  pass  by  transfer  of  the  land 
unless  there  is  something  to  indicate  an  intention  that  the  re- 
striction be  attached  to  the  land.  Thus,  where  a  deed  contains  a 
condition  that  no  building  shall  ever  be  erected  on  the  land,  and 
there  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  condition  is  intended  to 
be  attached  to  the  adjoining  land  and  to  pass  with  it,  a  purchaser 
of  such  land  cannot  enforce  it.  "  An  easement  or  servitude  of 
this  description,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Allen,  "  ought  not  to  be  held 
to  be  imposed  for  the  benefit  of  an  adjacent  lot  of  land,  in  the 
absence  of  any  words  in  the  grant  itself  implying  it,  unless  the 
circumstances  and  situation  at  the  time  of  the  grant  were  such  as 
to  make  it  manifest  that  the  condition  or  restriction  or  reservation 
was  intended  to  be  for  the  benefit  of  such  adjacent  lot  and  to  be 
annexed  to  it  as  an  appurtenance."  ^ 

A  stijDulation  in  a  deed  poll,  that  the  grantee,  his  heirs  and  as- 
signs,  shall  make  and  maintain  a  fence  between  the  granted  land 
and  that  of  the  grantor,  is  not  a  covenant  that  runs  with  the  land, 
but  only  a  personal  obligation  of  the  grantee  implied  from  his 
acceptance  of  the  deed.  Such  a  stipulation  will  not  sustain  an 
action  by  a  subsequent  purchaser  from  the  grantor  of  his  adjoin- 
ing land  against  a  purchaser  from  the  grantee  in  the  deed  poll.* 

1   Hubbcll  V.  Wan-en,  8  Allen,  17.3,  178,  724,  per  Bramwell,  J.;  Keatcs  v.  Lyon,  4 

per  Bigelow,  C.  J.  Ch.  App.  218. 

-  Renal.s   v.  Cowli.shaw,  9  Ch.   D.    12.5;  ■>   Kennedy    v.    Owen,    1.36    Mass.    199. 

Peck  V.  Conway,  119  Ma.ss.  546;  Tobey  Allen,  J.,  said  :  "  It  i.s  plain  that  an  agree- 

V.  Moore,  130  Mass.  448.  ment  nor  under  seal   cannot,  technically 

^  Lowell  Inst,  for  Savings  v.  Lowell,  speaking,  run   with  the  land,"  following 

1.53  Mass.  5.30,  533,  27  N.   E.  Rep.  518.  Parish  v.  Whitney,  3  Gray,  516,  and  Mar- 

And  see  Master  u.  Hansard,  4  Ch.  D.  718,  tin  v.  Drinan,  128  Mass.  515.  In  Bur- 
bank  V.  Pillsbury,  48  N.  H.  475,  97  Am. 

654 


WHEN   RESTRICTIVE   COVENANTS   RUN   WITH  THE   LAND.      [§  799. 

799.  A  party-wall  agreement  in  the  usual  form  between 
adjoining  land-owners  runs  with  the  land.  Thus,  an  agree- 
ment under  seal  between  adjoining  lot-owners,  for  themselves, 
their  heirs  and  assigns,  acknowledged  and  recorded,  and  providing 
that  either  pai't}^  may  build  a  party-wall,  one  half  on  the  land 
of  each,  and  that  whenever  the  other  party  uses  the  wall  so  built 
he  or  she  shall  pay  one  half  the  cost  of  its  erection,  is  a  covenant 
running  with  each  lot.  Such  an  agreement  creates  an  easement 
of  use  and  support  in  favor  of  each  lot-owner  and  his  successors 
in  title  in  the  half  of  the  wall  which  stood  on  the  other  lot,  and 
in  the  land  under  the  same.  Each  lot  of  land  becomes  entitled, 
therefore,  to  the  benefits  and  subject  to  the  burdens  arising  from 
the  covenants  contained  in  the  agreement,  and  relating  to  the 
erection  and  maintenance  of  the  wall.  The}'  inhere  in  and  belong 
to  it.^  If  the  original  owner  and  party  to  the  covenant  does  not 
use  the  wall,  but  conveys  his  land  to  one  who  does  use  it,  the  ori- 
ginal owner  is  not  liable  on  the  covenant,  but  his  grantee  is  the 
party  liable  upon  it.^  The  burden  as  well  as  the  benefit  of  the 
covenant  passes  with  the  land.^  The  grantee  of  the  covenantor 
is  personally  liable  on  such  covenant  running  with  the  land,  if  he 
is  the  first  to  use  the  wall.^     A  grantee  not  using  the  wall  is  not 

Dec.  633,  and  Kellogg  v.  Robinson,  6  Vt.  (Minn.),  63  N.  W.  Rep.  264 ;  Warner  v. 
276,  27  Am.  Dec.  550,  such  an  agreement  Rogers,  23  Minn.  34 ;  Mackey  v.  Harmon, 
was  held  to  run  with  the  land.  In  Bron-  34  Minn.  168,  24  N.  \V.  Rep.  702  ;  Sharp 
son  V.  Coffin,  108  Mass.  175,  11  Am.  Rep.  v.  Cheatham,  88  Mo.  498,  57  Am.  Rep. 
335,  a  covenant  by  the  grantor  that  he  433  ;  Hagerty  v.  Lee,  54  N.  J.  L.  580,  25 
would  maintain  a  fence  between  the  land  Atl.  Rep.  319,  26  Atl.  Rep.  537  ;  Conduitt 
granted  and  his  remaining  land,  with  a  v.  Ross,  102  Ind.  166;  Thomson  v.  Cur- 
provision  that  the  covenant  should  be  per-  tis,  28  Iowa,  229  ;  Weill  v.  Baldwin,  64 
petual  and  obligatory  upon  subsequent  Cal.  476 ;  Piatt  v.  Eggleston,  20  Ohio  St. 
owners,  was  held  to  run  with  the  land.  414.  In  New  York,  however,  the  cove- 
See  Hodge  V.  Sloan,  107  N.  Y.  244;  nant  is  considered  a  i)ersonal  one,  and 
Bowen  v.  Beck,  94  N.  Y.  86;  Atlantic  docs  not  run  with  the  laud.  Hart  ij.  Lyon, 
Dock  Co.  V.  Leavitt,  54  N.  Y.  35  ;  Georgia  90  N.  Y.  663  ;  Scott  v.  McMillan,  76  N. 

So.  R.  Co.  V.  Reeves,  64  Ga.  492;  May-  Y.  141  ;  Cole  v.  Hughes,  54  N.  Y.  444. 

nard  v.  Moore,  76  N.  C.  158;  Norfleet  v.  -  .Jordan  v.  Kraft,  33  Neb.  844,  51   N. 

Cromwell,  64  N.  C.  1.  W.  Rep.  286. 

1  King  !;.  Wight,  155  Mass.  444,  29  N.  »  Fir.-'t    Nat.  Bank   v.    Security    Bank 

E.  Rep.  644,  per  IMorton,  J.;  Richardson  (Minn.),  63   N.  W.  Rep.  264;  Shaber  v. 

V.  Tobey,  121  Mass.  437,  459,  23  Am.  Rep.  St.  Paul  Water  Co.  30  Minn.  179,  14   N. 

283;    S'avage    v.   Mason,   3   Cush.   500;  W.  Rcp.874  ;  Miickey  r.  Harmou,34  Minn. 

Maine  v.  Cum.ston,  98  Mass.  317  ;  Stand-  168,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  702. 

ish  j;.  Lawrence,  HI    Mass.  Ill;  .Jordan  *  First    Nat.    Bank   v.   Security   Bank 

V.  Kraft,  33   Neb.  844,  51    N.  W.   Rep.  (Minn.),  63  N.   W.  Rep.  264.     And  see 

286;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Security  Bank 

655 


§^  800,  801.]       RESTRICTIONS   AS    TO   THE   USE    OF   LAND. 

liuble  to  a  personal  judgment  on  tlie  covenant,  but  this  creates 
nil  equitable  lien  or  charge  upon  the  land,  and  the  only  remedy, 
aside  from  the  personal  liability  of  tlie  jiarty  using  the  wall,  is  a 
judgment  to  enforce  such  lien. 

The  term  "  using  the  wall "  in  the  ordinary  party-wall  agree- 
ment means  making  use  of  it  in  the  process  of  constructing  a 
building  on  the  adjoining  lot;  and  the  owner  who  constructs  such 
building  is  the  person  who  uses  the  wall.  Neither  his  grantee 
nor  mortgagee  is  personally  liable,  as  assign(>e  of  the  covenant, 
for  a  use  of  the  wall  made  by  his  grantor  or  mortgagor.^ 

800,  A  party-wall  covenant  between  adjoining  owners  does 
not  run  with  the  land  when  there  is  no  privity  of  estate  between 
them  ;  as  where  one  such  owner  covenants  with  the  other  that 
■whenever  he  or  his  heirs  or  assigns  should  use  the  wall  he  or  they 
would  pay  the  other  who  should  build  the  wall,  or  his  assigns,  the 
value  of  the  part  of  such  wall  which  he  or  they  might  use.  After 
the  land  has  passed  to  another  who  has  used  the  wall,  he  is  not 
liable  to  an  action  brought  by  the  grantee  of  the  part}^  who  built 
the  wall ;  but  an  assignee  of  the  contract  might  recover  upon  it. 
There  was  only  a  privity  of  contract  between  the  original  cove- 
nantors without  any  privity  of  estate  ;  and  therefore  neither  the 
benefit  nor  the  burden  of  the  covenant  ran  with  the  land  to  which 
it  related.^ 

801.  Covenants  running  with  the  land  inure  to  the  cove- 
nantee's mortgagee  and  grantees,  both,  in  proportion  to  their 
rights ;  and  a  purchaser  at  the  foreclosure  sale  can  sue  the  cove- 
nantor as  a  privy  in  estate.  To  whom  the  covenants  run,  as  be- 
tweeii  the  mortgagee  on  the  one  hand  and  the  grantee  of  the 
mortgagor  on  the  other,  has  been  sometimes  a  difficult  and  trou- 
blesome question,  and  logically  is  so  yet,  although  now  substan- 
tially settled,  "•  Under  the  old  system,  which  regarded  the  mort- 
gage as  transferring  to  the  mortgagee  the  entire  legal  estate, 
leaving  in  the  mortgagor  only  an  equity  which  courts  of  law  could 
not  recognize,  it  was  necessary  to  say,  and  was  said,  that  the  cove- 
nants running  with  the  land  followed  the  legal   estate  into  the 

Fresno  Canal,  &c.  Co.  v.  Rowell,  80  Cal.  Rep.  611  ;    Scott  v.  McMillan,  76  N.   Y. 

114,  2-2  Pac.  Rep.  53.  144  ;  Nye  v.  Hoyle,  120  N.  Y.   195,  24  N. 

1  Pfeiffei-  (•.  Matthews,  161  Mass.  487,  E.  Rep.  1.  See  Weld  v.  Nichols,  17  Pick. 
37  N.  E.  Rep.  571.  538. 

2  Cole  V.  Hughes,  54  N.  Y.  444, 13  Am. 

656 


WAIVER   AND   RELEASE   OF   RESTRICTIONS.  [§  802. 

hands  of  the  movtgagee,  where  they  remained  entire  and  com- 
plete ;  and  tlie  grantees  of  the  equity,  having  no  legal  estate,  could 
have  no  right  to  the  covenants,  which  already  belonged  to  an- 
other.i  But  the  injustice  of  the  doctrine  drew  upon  the  ingenuity 
of  equity  to  supply  a  remedy;  and  where  the  grantee  holding 
covenants  had  executed  a  mortgage,  and  thereafter,  having  been 
evicted  from  the  premises  by  a  paramount  title,  his  grantor  and 
covenantor  settled  with  the  mortgagee  by  paying  the  mortgage,  in 
full  discharge  of  the  covenants,  and  so  assuming  to  cancel  them, 
the  grantee  was  allowed  by  a  decree  in  equity  to  sue  the  cove- 
nantor at  law,  and  the  latter  was  restrained  fiom  setting  up  as  a 
defence  in  any  manner  the  deed  or  deeds  of  mortgage  which  had 
diverted  the  covenants  from  the  main  line  of  succession.^  By 
this  circuitous  route  the  just  result  was  reached  of  dividing  the 
benefit  of  the  covenants  between  mortgagee  and  owner  of  the 
equity  of  redemption  according  to  their  respective  rights,  and 
the  same  just  distribution  is  effected  under  our  system  by  a  dif- 
ferent process.  We  regard  the  mortgagor  as  retaining  the  legal 
estate,  and  the  mortgagee  as  having  a  lien  upon  it  for  his  security. 
The  covenants  therefore  run  to  both  mortgagee  and  grantee  of 
mortgagor  in  proportion  to  their  respective  rights,  and  the  cove- 
nant is  divisible  accordingly."  ^ 

V.    Waiver  and  Release  of  Restrictions. 

802,  A  waiver  or  abandonment  of  a  restriction  may  be 
shown  by  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  grantor  with  refer- 
ence to  the  adjoining  property  for  the  benefit  of  which  the  restric- 
tion was  imposed.  Tiius,  where  the  owner  of  land  laid  it  out  in 
lots  intended  for  residences  only,  and  sold  a  lot  with  the  restric- 
tion that  it  should  not  be  used  for  any  purpose  other  than  that  of 
erecting  a  dwelling-house  upon  it,  but  afterwards  sold  the  other 
lots  without  any  restriction  whatever,  it  was  held  that  he  had  put 
it  out  of  his  power  to  carry  out  his  plan  of  using  the  jiroperty  for 

1  It  was  so  held  in  Carlisle  v  Blamire,  clear  exposition   of  this  doctrine  will  be 
8  East,  487.  found  in  White  i\  Whitney,  3  Mete.  81, 

2  Thoroton  v.   Court,  3  De  Gcx,  M.  &  87,  and  it  has  been  asserted  in  Town  v. 
G.  293.  Needham,   3    Paige,    546,    24  Am.    Dec. 

8  Mygatt  V.  Coe,  142  N.  Y.  78,  88,  36     246,   and  Andrews  v.  Wolcott,   16  Barb. 
N,  E.  Rep.  870,  per  Finch,  J.     A   very     21,  25. 

VOL.  I.  657 


§  803.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO    THE   USE    OF   LAND. 

residences  only,  and  a  court  of  equity  will  not  aid  him  in  enforcing 
the  restriction.^ 

A  grantor  who  has  sold  a  lot  of  land  with  a  restriction  against 
the  usL'  of  the  land  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  and  has 
afterwards  sold  an  adjoining  lot  without  such  restriction,  will  not 
be  allowed  to  insist  upon  the  restriction  in  the  first  deed  ;  for  by 
selling  such  adjoining  lot  without  the  restriction  he  diminishes 
the  value  of  his  former  grantee's  property.  There  should  also  be 
some  mutuality  in  such  a  provision.^  If  a  grantor,  after  making 
such  a  restriction,  consents  to  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  by 
another  in  the  same  village,  such  consent  may  be  considered  as  a 
waiver  of  the  condition  for  its  non-sale  attached  to  other  lands  in 
the  village.'^ 

The  grantor's  failure  to  perform  a  covenant  may  excuse  a  failure 
of  his  grantee  to  perform  a  covenant;  as,  where  a  grantor  cove- 
nanted to  pave  the  streets  adjoining  the  land  conveyed,  his  failure 
to  keep  the  covenant  was  held  to  excuse  the  purchaser  fiom  com- 
pliance with  his  covenant  to  build  on  the  land  within  a  specified 
time.'* 

803.  Where  two  persons  are  bound  to  each  other  by  differ- 
ent covenants  made  at  the  same  time,  a  breach  by  one  party  of  his 
covenant  does  not  necessarily  extinguish  the  covenant  of  the  other. 
Much  depends  upon  the  form  of  the  action.  Where  a  purchaser 
is  before  the  court  resisting  an  attempt  by  his  grantor  to  compel 
him  to  abide  by  the  strict  letter  of  his  covenant,  it  is  undoubtedly 
"  the  right  of  the  court,  as  well  as  its  duty,  to  look  at  the  conduct 
of  the  pai'ties  to  the  litigation,  and  also  at  the  conduct  of  their 
predecessors  in  right  and  duty,  to  see  how  they  had  dealt  with 
each  other  in  respect  to  the  covenant,  and  also  to  contrast  the 
condition  of  the  property  when  the  litigation  arose  with  its  con- 
dition when  the  covenant  was  made,  and  then  either  decree  or 
deny  specific  performance,  as  should  appear  to  be  most  in  accord- 
ance with  justice  and  right  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
case."  But  the  case  is  quite  different  where  a  purchaser  is  before 
the  court  in  advance  of  a  breach  asking  to  be  relieved  from  the 
obligation  of  his  covenant.     Even  if  reasons  existed  which  might 

1  Duucan  v.  Central  Ry.  Co.  85  Ky.  ^  Chippewa  Lumber   Co.   v.  Tremper, 

525,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  228.  75  Mich.  36,  42  N.  W.  Kcp.  532. 

■^  Jcnks  V.  Pawlowski,  98  Mich.  110,  56  <  McCoiinj^hy  v.  Pemberton,  168  Pa.  St. 

N.  W.  Rep.  1105.  121,  31  At!.  Rep.  996. 
658 


WAIVER   AND   RELEASE   OF   RESTRICTIONS.  [§  804. 

induce  a  court  of  equity  to  decline  to  specifically  enforce  a  cove- 
nant, it  does  not  follow  that  the  court  would,  in  advance  of  a 
breach  of  the  covenant,  declare  it  to  be  a  nullity  in  a  suit  insti- 
tuted b}^  the  covenantor. 1 

804.  If  the  grantor  releases  one  purchaser  from  a  restric- 
tion he  cannot  himself  come  into  equity  to  enforce  the  same 
restriction  against  other  purchasers,  though  one  purchaser 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  it  may  enforce  it  against  another  who  is 
bound  by  it.  He  cannot  take  away  the  benefit  of  his  general 
plan  from  one  purchaser  and  enjoin  a  breach  of  it  by  another, 
though  he  may  have  a  claim  for  damages  at  law  for  such  breach 
by  another.  "  It  is  not  a  question  of  mere  acquiescence,"  said 
Lord  Eldon,  "  but  in  every  instance  in  which  the  grantor  suffers 
grantees  to  deviate  from  a  general  plan,  intended  for  the  benefit 
of  all,  he  deprives  others  of  the  right  which  he  had  given  them 
to  have  the  general  plan  enforced  for  the  benefit  of  all.  In  such 
cases  I  have  always  understood  this  court  will  leave  the  parties 
to  their  remedy  at  law."  ^  So,  if  a  grantor  permits  material 
breaches  of  a  covenant  to  be  committed  by  some  purchasei's, 
he  cannot  obtain  an  injunction  to  compel  another  purchaser  to 
observe  the  same  covenant.  If  the  grantor  is  entitled  to  any 
remedy  it  can  only  be  the  damages  which  he  may  obtain  in  an 
action  at  law."^  The  grantor  is  equally  barred  of  his  remedy- 
though  the  purchaser  against  whom  he  seeks  to  enforce  the  cove- 
nant bouglit  his  land  and  made  his  covenant  after  the  breaches 
by  the  other  purchasers  had  been  committed.^ 

The  Duke  of  Bedford,  being  the  owner  of  all  the  property  in 
the  neighborhood  of  the  Rritisli  Museum,  for  the  protection  of 
his  other  property  took  covenants  from  the  purchasers  and  les- 
sees of  any  part  of  this  property  restricting  them  from  building 
otherwise  than  in  a  particular  way.  But  he  afterwards  himself 
built  upon  a  large  part  of  the  property,  which  was  originally 
intended  not  to  be  built  upon,  and,  having  so  built,  he  asked  the 
court  of  equity  to  restrain  persons  from  building  contrary  to 
their  covenants.     But  the  court  refused  to  grant  an  injunction,  on 

'  Coudcrt  V.  Say  re,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  386,         "  Peek  i;.  Matthews,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  515. 
399,  19   Atl.    Kep.    190,   per  Van    Fleet,     See  Child  y.  Douglas,  Kay,  560,  572. 
V.  C.  «  Peek  v.  Matthews,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  515. 

2  Roper  V.  Williams,  Turn.  &  R.  18,  22, 
a  case  of  landlord  and  tenant. 

659 


§§  805,  806.]       RESTRICTIONS    AS    TO    THE    USE    OE    LAND. 

the  gvouiul  tluit  the  gnuitor  had  so  altered  I  he  property  since 
requiriiii;-  these  covenants,  by  building  houses  contrary  to  the 
provisions  of  the  covenants,  that  it  would  be  inequitable  to  give 
him  the  benefit  of  covenants  which  he  himself  had  treated  as 
absolutely  void.     He  was  left  to  his  i-emedy  at  law.' 

805.  It  may  be  shown  that  a  covenant  has  become  obso- 
lete and  inoperative  by  reason  of  non-observance  and  ac- 
quiescence by  the  covenantee  entitled  to  enforce  it.^  He  will 
not  lose  his  rights,  however,  unless  the  breach  is  patent  and  has 
-continued  for  a  considerable  time.  A  delay  to  bring  action  for  a 
lew  months  will  not  ordinarily  bar  one  of  his  rights.^ 

But  acquiescence  in  a  breach  of  the  restrictive  covenant  is  not 
shown  by  failure  to  take  proceedings  against  the  first  purchaser 
who  has  built  upon  his  land  in  violation  of  the  restriction.^ 

Tlie  extent  of  the  breach  is  to  be  considered  in  determining 
whether  there  has  been  an  acquiescence  which  will  bar  a  cove- 
nantee.^ Breaches  that  are  immaterial  in  extent,  though  com- 
mitted by  the  covenantor  himself,  will  not  bar  him  from  enforcing 
the  covenant.^ 

806.  A  person  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  restrictions  may 
enforce  one  of  them  and  not  another,  or  may  enforce  them 
against  one  violator  and  not  against  another.  Where  a  restric- 
tion has  been  imposed  upon  several  lots  of  land,  the  fact  that  it 
is  violated  by  the  owners  of  some  of  the  lots  is  no  defence  in  favor 
of  any  one  violator  agt^inst  his  immediate  neighbor  who  has  ob- 
served the  covenant,  and  who  objects  to  his  manner  of  breaking 
it.     Thus,  where  the  restriction  was  for  the  purpose  of  protect- 

1  Bedford  v.  British  Museum,  2  Myl.     E.  Rep.  905 ;  Page  v.  Murray,  46  N.  J. 
&  K.  552.     See,  also,  Sayers  v.  Collyer,  24     Eq.  325,  19  Atl.  Rep.  11. 

Ch.  D.  180.  3  Mitchell  v.  Steward,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  541  ; 

2  Bedford  v.  British    Museum,  2  Myl.     Coles  v.  Sims,  5  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  1. 

&  K.  552;  Sayers  v.  Collyer,  24  Ch.  D.  *  Child   v.  Douglas,   Kay,    560;  Lloyd 

180,    28    Ch.   D.    103,    where    there   had  v.  London,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  2  De  G.,  J.  &  S. 

been  a  patent  and  continuous  hreach  for  578;  German  v.  Chapman,  7  Ch.  D.  271  ; 

three  years  before  action  brought;  Rev-  Jackson  v.  Winnifrith,  47  L.  T.  243. 

nolds  V.  Cleary,  61   Hun,  590,  16   N.  Y.  ^  Bedford  v.  British  Museum,  2  Myl. 

^upp.  421;  Trustees  v.  Thacher,  87    N.  &  K.  552;  Kemp  v.  Sober,  1  Sim.  N.  R. 

Y.  311,  41    Am.  Rep.  365;  Wetmore  v.  517;    Roper  v.    Williams,    T.  &    R.  18; 

Bruce,  118  N.  Y.  319,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  303  ;  Richards  v.  Revitt,  7   Ch.  D.  224.     And 

Shriver  v.  Shriver,  86  N.  Y.  575,  584,  585;  see  Lloyd   v.  London,   &c.   Ry.  Co.  2  De 

Aldrich  v.   Bailey,  8  N.    Y.  Supp.  435  ;  G.,  J.  &  S.  580. 

rieming  v.  Burnham,  100  N.  Y.  1,  2  N.  s  Western  v.   Macdermot,  L.  R.  2  Ch. 

72. 

660 


WAIVER    AND    RELEASE    OF    RESTRICTIONS.  [§  807. 

ing  and  preserving  the  neighborhood  for  residences,  a  purcliaser 
of  a  lot  who  is  using  it  as  a  residence  and  has  never  violated  the 
agreement  himself,  or  consented  to,  or  authorized  or  encouraged 
its  violation  by  others,  in  order  to  have  tlie  benefit  of  the  agree- 
ment is  not  obliged  to  sue  all  its  violators  at  once.  He  may 
proceed  against  them  seriatim^  or  he  may  take  no  notice  of  tlie 
viohitions  of  the  agreement  by  business  carried  on  remotely  from 
his  residence,  and  enforce  it  against  a  business  specially  offensive 
to  him  b}'  its  proximity.^ 

In  an  action  by  a  grantor  to  restrain  a  grantee  from  using  the 
property  for  a  saloon  or  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  under 
a  parol  agreement,  which  was  a  part  of  the  consideration  for  the 
grant,  that  no  part  of  the  premises  should  be  used  for  such  pur- 
poses, the  fact  that  the  grantor  had  permitted  a  druggist  who 
occupied  a  store  on  the  premises,  and  had  a  package  license,  to 
sell  intoxicants  in  packages,  but  not  to  be  drunk  on  the  premises, 
would  not  prevent  the  grantor  from  obtaining  relief.^ 

807.  The  original  owner  who  imposed  restrictions  for  the 
benefit  of  subsequent  purchasers  cannot  release  them  as 
against  purchasers  of  lots  entitled  to  the  advantages  of  the  re- 
strictions.3  Thus,  whei'e  a  conveyance  to  a  land  company  of  a 
tract  of  land  to  be  divided  and  sold  for  building  purposes  provided 
that  no  land  should  be  sold  or  leased  by  the  company  without  a 
pledge  from  the  grantee  or  lessee  that  the  design  of  the  buildings 
to  be  erected  should  be  approved  by  the  directors,  it  was  held 
that  the  restriction  was  for  the  benefit  of  all  who  might  become 
grantees  of  the  company,  even  iifter  the  company  had  subse- 
quently obtained  a  release  of  the  restrictions  as  to  a  lot  reserved 
by  the  grantor.  But  a  condition  in  the  conveyance  that  no  land 
should  be  conveyed  without  a  pledge  by  the  grantee  "  to  build 
speedily  "  is  for  the  benefit  of  the  grantor  and  the  company  only  ; 
and  when  the  grantor  subsequently  releases  such  condition  as  to 

1  Rowliiiul  r.   Mill(!r,  139  N.  Y.  03,  34         ^  Western  v.  Macdermot,  L.  K.  1   Eq. 

N.  E.  Rep.  765,  jjer   Earl,  J.  ;  Payson  v.  499  ;  Condert  r.  Sayie,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  386, 

Burrihani,  141   Mass.  547,  6  N.  E.  Hep.  19  All.  Rep.  190.     "One  person  is  with- 

708;    Jackson    v.    Stevenson,    156    Mass.  out  the  least  power  or  capacity,  in  the  ab- 

496,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  691,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  sence  of  a  dele}.falion  of  power,  to  release 

476.  or  clKin^e  the  ri};ht.'<  of  another  in  laud." 

-  Hull  V.  Solomon,  61  Conn.  76,  23  All.  Per  Van  Fleet,  V.  C. 
Rep.  876. 

661 


§§  808,  809.]       KKSTRICTIOXS   AS   TO   THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

the  lot  lescrvod  by  liini,  the  company  could  extend  to  purchasers 
the  time  for  building.' 

808.  A  restriction  imposed  alike  upon  all  the  lots  of  a 
block  or  tract  of  land  cannot  be  released  to  one  purchaser 
or  his  grantee  without  the  assent  of  the  other  purchasers,  or  their 
grantees,  for  whose  benefit  it  was  imposed.  It  can  be  released 
only  by  the  assent  of  all  the  purchasers  or  owners  of  lots  for 
whose  benefit  it  was  imposed.^ 

A  part  of  the  abuttors  upon  a  common  passageway  cannot 
release  an  infringi^ment  of  a  stipulation,  the  legal  effect  of  which 
was  to  provide  for  a  passageway  to  be  kept  open  to  the  sky.^ 
Doubtless  such  an  infringement  might  be  released  by  a  release 
executed  by  all  the  persons  entitled  to  the  use  of  the  passageway, 
but  it  might  be  a  question  whether  the  rights  of  the  jDublic,  in  a 
passageway  opening  at  both  ends  into  public  streets  and  intended 
for  general  and  public  use,  could  be  ignored.* 

809.  Where  a  restriction  provides  that  changes  may  be 
made  with  "  the  consent  in  writing  of  the  grantor,  his  heirs 
or  assigns,"'  the  consent  required  is  that  of  the  grantor  or  his  suc- 
cessors in  title  while  he  or  they  remain  owners  of  the  original 
estate  or  any  considerable  part  of  it,  and  the  consent  of  all  pur- 
chasers and  lessees  of  the  grantor  is  not  required.  The  estate  in 
this  case  was  a  large  one,  called  the  Branksome  Estate.  At  the 
time  of  the  conveyance  in  which  this  restriction  was  made,  a 
considerable  part  of  the  estate  had  been  conveyed  and  built  over. 
It  was  not  contended  that  the  word  "  assigns  "  referred  to  prior 
purchasers.  "  It  is  said,  however,  that  any  subsequent  lessee  or 
purchaser  of  a  plot  is  an  assign,  within  the  meaning  of  the  term 
as  used  in  the  covenant,  and  that  his  consent  in  writing  is  neces- 
sary'. But  it  would  be  very  curious  if  this  were  so,  —  that  the 
consent  of  every  subsequent  lessee  or  purchaser  of  a  plot  would 
have  to  be  obtained,  though  the  previous  lessees  or  purchasers  of 
plots  need  not  be  consulted  at  all."  ^ 

1  Peal)ody  Heights  Co.  y.Willson  (M(l.),         *  Attorney-General    v.   Williams,    140 
32  Atl.  Kep.  386.  Mass.  329,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  80,  3  N.  E.  Rep. 

2  Hopkins  v.  Smith,  102  Mass.  444,  38     214,  .54  Am.  Rep.  468. 

N.  E.  Rep.  1122.  ■'  Everett  v.   Remington,  3  Ch.  [1892] 

^  Hopkins  i;.  Smith,  162  Ma.ss.  444,  38  148,    159.     "Cases    of    difficulty,"    said 

N.  E.  Rep.  1122  ;  Rice  v.  Boston  &  W  R.  Romer,  .1.,  "were  suggested  on  behalf  of 

Co.  12  Allen,  141  ;  Trask  v.  Wheeler,  7  Al-  the  plaintiff,  —  as,  for  instance,  whose  con- 

len,  109 ;  Guild  f.  Richard.s,  16  Gray,  309.  sent  would   be  necessary  if  the  Durrant 

G62 


WAIVER   AND   RELEASE   OF   RESTRICTIONS.       [§§  810,  811. 

810.  A  covenant  may  be  discharged  through  the  taking  of 
the  land  for  a  public  use  by  right  of  eminent  domain.  Thus, 
Avhere  a  railway  company,  under  its  compulsory  powers,  took 
land  which  was  subject  to  a  covenant  not  to  build  thereon,  and 
built  a  station  upon  it,  it  was  held  that  the  covenantor  was  dis- 
charged from  his  covenant  by  the  act  of  Parliament  which  com- 
pelled him  to  part  with  his  land,  and  so  deprived  him  of  his 
power  to  perform  the  covenant.  It  was  immaterial  whether  the 
railway  company  was  compelled  to  build  its  station  upon  the  land, 
or  was  only  empowered  to  do  so.^ 

811.  There  may  be  such  a  change  in  the  condition  of  adja- 
cent property  and  the  character  of  its  use  that  a  court  of 
equity  will  not  enforce  a  restriction  of  its  use  for  dwelling- 
houses  only  and  prohibiting  ever}'  kind  of  trade  or  business.  Thus, 
where,  after  the  restriction  was  imposed,  it  appeared  that  an  ele- 
vated railroad  was  constructed  through  the  street  in  which  the  re- 
stricted land  was  situate,  that  a  station  of  such  railroad  covered 
a  portion  of  the  street,  its  platform  occupied  half  the  width  of 
the  sidewalk  in  front  of  defendant's  premises,  and  from  it  persons 
could  look  directly  into  the  windows,  and  that  this,  with  the 
noise  of  the  trains,  rendered  privacy  and  quiet  impossible,  so 
that  large  depreciations  in  rents  and  frequent  vacancies  followed 
the  construction  of  said  road,  —  it  was  held  that,  a  contingency 
having  happened  not  within  the  contemplation  of  the  parties,  which 
imposed  upon  the  property  a  condition  frustrating  the  scheme 
devised  by  tliem,  and  defeating  the  object  of  the  covenant,  thus 
rendering  its  enforcement  oppressive  and  inequitable,  a  court  of 
equity  would  not  decree  such  enforcement.^  *•  It  is  true,"  say  the 
court,  "the  covenant  is  without  exception  or  limitation,  but  I 
think  this  contingency  which  has  happened  was  not  within  the 
contemplation  of  the  parties.     The  road  was  authorized  by  the 

f;iinily  Iiad  cDiivcyed  away  the  larger  por-  leased  or  suld  l)y  the  family  in  coinpara- 

tiuii  of  the  estate  to  one  jierson,  or  had  tively    small    plots.     It   follows  that  the 

conveyed  away  in  plots  all  the  estate  ;  but  action  must  i)e  dismissed,  and,  as  it  wholly 

I  need  not  now  settle  these  puzzles  (which  fails,  I  must  dismiss  it  witli  costs." 
would  probably  have  to  be  decided  by  eon-  '    Baily  v.  De  CresjULmy,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B. 

sideiing  who,    if   any   one,  could    be    re-  180. 

gardfd  as  substantially  the  owner  of  the         -  Trustees  v.   Thaelier,   87  N.   Y.  311, 

Branksome   estate),  for,  undoubtedly,   at  320,41  Am.  Hep.  365,  reversing  46  N.  Y. 

present    the    Durraiit   family  still    retain  Sup.  Ct.  305,  14   Jones  &   S.  305.     See, 

the  estate,  portions  of  it  only  being  built  al.so,  Page  v.  Murray,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  325, 

over,  and  those  portions  having  been  only  19  Atl.  Hep.  11. 

663 


§  812.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS    TO   THE    USE   OF   LAND. 

legislature,  and  by  reason  of  it  tliere  has  been  imposed  upon  the 
property  a  contlitioii  of  things  which  frustrates  the  scheme  de- 
vised by  the  parties,  and  deprives  the  property  of  the  benefit 
which  might  otherwise  accrue  fiom  its  observance.  This  new 
condition  has  already  affected,  in  various  ways  and  degrees,  the 
uses  of  property  in  its  neighborhood  and  property  values.  It 
has  made  the  defendant's  property  unsuitable  for  the  use  to  which, 
by  the  covenant  of  the  grantor,  it  was  appropriated,  and  if,  in 
face  of  its  enactment  and  the  contiugencies  flowing  from  it,  the 
covenant  can  stand  anywhere,  it  surely  cannot  in  a  court  of 
equity." 

812.  But  a  breach  of  a  restriction  by  one  purchaser  must 
be  such  as  to  substantially  defeat  the  object  of  the  general 
scheme,  in  order  to  make  consent  to  the  breach,  or  acquiescence 
in  it,  amount  to  a  release  of  the  restriction  as  against  other  pur- 
chasers. Thus,  where  a  tract  of  land  was  laid  out  for  building 
purposes,  and  lots  were  sold  with  the  restriction  that  no  house  or 
building  should  be  used  or  occupied  otherwise  than  as  a  pi-ivate 
residence,  and  the  vendor  gave  permission  to  one  of  the  pur- 
chasers in  a  remote  part  of  the  tract  to  open  a  school  in  his  house, 
it  was  held  that  the  vendor  did  not  thereby  waive  the  restriction 
as  to  another  purchaser  whose  house  was  at  some  distance  from 
the  school.^  In  delivering  judgment  James,  L.  J.,  said  :  "  If  there 
is  a  general  scheme  for  the  benefit  of  a  great  number  of  persons, 
and  then,  either  by  permission  or  acquiescence,  or  by  a  long  chain 
of  things,  the  property  has  been  either  entirely  or  so  substantially 
changed  as  that  the  whole  character  of  the  place  or  neighbor- 
hood has  been  altered  so  that  the  whole  object  for  whicii  the 
covenant  was  originally  entered  into  must  be  considered  to  be  at  an 
end,  then  the  covenantee  is  not  allowed  to  come  into  the  court  for 
the  purpose  merely  of  harassing  and  annoying  some  particular 
man  where  the  court  could  see  he  was  not  doing  it  bona  fide  for 
the  purpose  of  effecting  the  object  for  which  the  covenant  was 
originally  entei^ed  into.  That  is  very  different  from  the  case 
we  have  before  us,  where  the  plaintiff  says  that  in  one  particular 
spot  far  away  from  this  place,  and  not  interfering  at  all  with  the 
general  scheme,  he  has,  under  particular  circumstances,  allowed  a 
waiver  of  the  covenant.     I  think  it  would  be  a  monstrous  thing 

1  German  v.   Chapman,  7  Ch.  I).  271,  277,   279.     And  see  Macher  v.  Foundling 
Hosp.  1  Ves.  &  B.  1 88. 
664 


WAIVER    AND   RELEASE    OF   RESTRICTIONS.  [§  813. 

to  say  that  nobody  could  do  an  act  of  kindness,  or  that  any  ven- 
dor of  an  estate  who  had  taken  covenants  of  this  kind  from 
several  persons  could  not  do  an  act  of  kindness,  or,  from  any 
motive  whatever,  relax  in  any  single  instance  any  of  these  cove- 
nants, without  destroying  the  whole  effect  of  tlie  stipulations 
which  other  people  had  entered  into  with  him." 

813.  If  the  purpose  for  which  restrictions  were  imposed 
can  no  longer  be  accomplished,  equity  will  not  enjoin  their 
violation.  Thus,  if  the  purpose  of  restrictions  was  to  make  and 
preserve  the  locality  for  residences  only,  and  the  condition  of  the 
locality  has  greatly  changed  through  the  growth  of  the  city,  and 
that  part  of  the  city  has  come  to  be  used  chiefly  for  business 
purposes  instead  of  residences,  and  it  would  be  impossible  to 
restore  the  residential  character  of  the  neighborhood  by  the  en- 
forcement of  the  restrictions  upon  the  land  to  which  they  apply, 
it  would  be  inequitable  and  oppressive  to  give  effect  to  the  restric- 
tions.i  In  such  case  a  court  of  equity  will  not  enforce  the  restric- 
tions, but  will  leave  the  parties  to  their  remedy  at  law. 

The  principle  of  the  British  Museum  Case  was  applied  in  a 
case  involving  similar  covenants  for  the  protection  of  the  neigh- 
borhood as  residential  property.  There  was  evidence  that  the 
phiintiff  had  acquiesced  for  a  long  time  in  violations  of  these 
covenants,  so  that  the  character  of  the  property  had  so  changed 
that  the  original  purpose  of  keeping  it  for  residences  only  had 
failed,  and  the  court  refused  to  grant  an  injunction  to  restrain 
further  violations  of  the  covenants.  In  giving  judgment  Pearson, 
J.,  said  :  "  Does  the  covenant  exist  now  for  the  purposes  for 
which  it  was  originally  entered  into  ?  Shall  I  be  doing  justice  or 
injustice  if  I  grant  the  injunction  asked  for?  Shall  I  be  enfor- 
cing the  covenant  in  order  to  keep  the  property  in  the  state  in 
which  it  was  intended  to  be  kept  when  these  stipulations  were 
first  made,  or  shall  I  be  only  stopping  the  use  of  one  house  as  a 
shop  with  no  chance  whatever  (except  by  a  series  of  actions 
which  may  succeed  or  which  may  fail)  of  restoring  the  property 
to  that  which  it  was  originally  intended  to  be,  —  a  residential 

1  Bc.lfnrd  r.  British  :Museum,  2   Myl.  Murrny,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  325,  19  Afl.  Rep. 

&    K.  552,  ]<er  Lord  EUIon ;    German  v.  11  ;  .lackson  r.  Stevenson,  156  .Mass.  496, 

Cliapman,'  7   Ch.  Div.   271,   279;   Sayers  31  N.  E.  Rep.  691,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  476; 

V.  Cullycr,  24  Cli.   Div.   180,  187;  Davis  Starkie  v.   Richmoud,  1'55  Mass.  188,29 

V.  Hone,  2    Sehoales  &  L.  340;  Page  v.  N.  E.  Rep.  770. 

665 


§  814.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS    TO   THE   USE    OF   LAND. 

property  '*  I  come  to  the  conclusion  that  I  must  answer  all  these 
questions  in  tlie  negative;  T  must  say  that  the  contract  can  no 
lon<Ter  be  performed  for  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  entered 
into,  iind  that  under  these  circumstances  I  ought  not  to  grant 
the  injunction."  ' 

A  tract  of  hind  was  sold  in  lots  with  a  provision  that  "  between 
tlie  lots  there  shall  be  a  railway  fourteen  feet  wide  "  to  be  used 
for  the  common  benefit  of  the  lots  and  for  no  other  purpose,  and 
that  ''  no  building  is  ever  to  be  built  over  it."  The  land  was  con- 
veyed on  either  side  to  the  nnddle  of  this  strip.  Railway  tracks 
were  laid  on  this  strip,  but  the  use  of  it  for  a  railway  was  after- 
wards abandoned.  More  than  twenty  years  after  such  abandonment 
the  owner  of  one  of  the  lots  brought  a  bill  in  equity  to  compel  the 
owner  of  another  lot  to  remove  a  structure  erected  on  this  re- 
served strip,  claiming  that,  the  purpose  for  which  the  restriction 
was  made  having  been  abandoned,  he  could  use  his  lands  for  such 
purposes  as  he  might  choose,  and  the  court  supported  his  claim. 
'•  The  deeds  conveyed  the  fee  in  the  whole  of  each  lot,  but,  in 
connection  with  the  '  terms  of  sale,'  imposed  a  servitude  on  a  strip 
seven  feet  wide  on  the  rear  of  each  lot,  and  made  appurtenant  to 
each  lot  an  easement  in  a  similar  strip  on  each  of  the  other  lots. 
But  these  servitudes  and  easements  were  expressly  limited  to  a 
railway ;  and,  though  it  would  be  a  benefit  to  each  lot  to  receive 
liglit  and  air  tlu'ough  the  space  which  was  to  be  kept  open  for  the 
railway,  tlie  benefits  of  light  and  air  ai-e  incidents  which  result 
from  the  piovisions  for  a  railway,  and  are  not  provided  for  inde- 
pendently of  the  railwaj^and  no  servitude  is  imposed  or  easement 
granted  for  any  purpose  but  the  railway  ;  and  when  the  railway 
was  abandoned,  all  servitudes  and  easements  terminated,  and  each 
owner  had  the  right  to  use  the  whole  of  his  lot  for  any  purpose  he 
pleased,  without  restraint  by  the  '  terms  of  sale '  or  provisions  in 
the  deeds."  ^ 

VI.  Enforcement  of  Restrictiotis. 

814.  Restrictions  must  be  seasonably  enforced,  before  the 
persons  against  whom  it  is  sought  to  enforce  the  restrictions  have 
expend'^d  money  or  incurred  liabilities  in  erecting  buildings  or 
other  structures  upon  the  restricted  land.     "It  would  be  contrary 

1  Sayers  v.  Collyer,  24  Ch.  I).  180,  188      per  Colbiirn,  J.     See,  also,  Central  Wharf 

2  Bangs  V.  Potter,  1.35  Mass.  245,  247,     v.  India  Wharf,  123  Mass.  567. 

666 


ENFORCEMENT    OF   RESTRICTIONS.  [§  815. 

to  equity  and  good  conscience  to  suffer  a  party  to  Kg  by  and  see 
acts  done  involving  risk  and  expense  by  others,  and  then  permit 
him  to  enforce  his  rights  and  thereby  inflict  loss  and  damage  on 
parties  acting  in  good  faith.  In  such  cases  a  prompt  assertion  of 
rights  is  essential  to  a  just  claim  for  relief  in  equity." ^ 

A  delay  of  two  years  after  the  erection  of  buildings  claimed 
to  be  in  violation  of  a  restriction,  before  taking  any  steps  looking 
toveards  their  removal,  is  such  laches  by  complainants  as  will  jus- 
tify a  court  of  equity  in  refusing  a  mandatory  injunction  for  their 
removal.^ 

But  if  the  person  entitled  to  enforce  a  restriction  has  given  due 
notice  of  its  violation,  he  is  entitled  to  his  remedy,  though  the 
person  violating  the  restriction  has  proceeded  to  complete  the 
structure  in  violation  of  the  restriction.'^ 

The  violation  of  a  restriction  may  be  enjoined  when  such  vio- 
lation has  only  commenced  or  is  merely  threatened.  If  the  viola- 
tion of  it  consists  in  the  erection  of  some  structure,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  wait  until  the  objectionable  structure  is  completed 
before  filing  a  bill  to  enjoin  it.^  But  the  complainant  may  wait  for 
the  completion  of  the  structure  erected  in  violation  of  the  restric- 
tion and  he  will  not  be  held  to  have  lost  his  equitable  remedy, 
especially  if  he  has  remonstrated  against  the  structure  during  the 
building  of  it.^ 

815.  A  restrictive  covenant  can  be  enforced  only  by  the 
owner  of  some  part  of  the  dominant  land  for  the  benefit  of 
which  the  covenant  was  made.  It  cannot  be  enforced  by  the 
grantor  who  created  the  covenant,  nor  by  his  heirs,  after  he  or 
they  have  parted  with  all  interest  in  any  land  benefited  by  the 
covenant.  A  tract  of  land  had  been  conveyed  in  lots  to  various 
purchasers,  except  one  central  block,  which  the  owner  conveyed 

'  Whitney  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.    II  Gray,  147  Pa.  St.  31,"3,  23  Atl.  Rep.  452.     And 

359,  367,  71  Am.   Dec.  715,  per  Bij.'el(jw,  see  Gillis  r.  Railey,  21  N.  II.  149. 

J.;  Jewdl  V.  Lee,  14  Allen,  145,  150,  92  ■'  Linzce  r.  .Mixer,  101   Mass.  512;  At- 

Am.  Dec.  744,  per  Bif^eiow,  C.  J. ;  Sliep-  torney-Genoral   v.  Al^^onquin    Club,    153 

pard  V.  Allen,  3  Taunt.  78;  Mitchell  v.  Mass.  447,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  2. 

Leavitt,  30  Conn.  587;  Water  Lot  Co.  v.  *  Peck  v.  Matthews,  L.  R.  3  Ecj.  515; 

Rucks,  5  Ga.  315;  Bo.scawen   v.   Bliss,  4  Jackson  v.  Stevenson,  156  Mass.  496,31 

Taunt.  735.     See  Rose  i\  I  law  ley,  118  N.  N.  E.   Rep.   691,32  Am.   St.   Rep.   476; 

Y.   502,   517,   23   N.   E.    Rep.   904,   a.s  to  Attorney-General  t;.  Al<;onqiiin  Club,  153 

■whether  a  question  of  law  is  rai.sed  by  the  Mass.  447,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  2. 

delay.  5  Attorney-General  v.  Algonquin  Club, 

■^  Gatzmer  v.  St.  Vincent  School    Soe.  153  Mass.  447,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  2. 

667 


§  S\C^.]  RKSIKICTIONS    AS    TO    THE    USE    OK    LAND. 

to  trustees  as  a  park  for  the  benefit  of  the  adjoining  lots.  The 
conveyance  recited  that  it  was  made  by  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  owners  of  the  dominant  lots.  After  the  usual  covenants  of 
title  was  a  clause  wherein  it  was  covenanted  and  agreed  by  the 
trustees  and  their  survivors  that  they  would  not  permit  noxious 
trades,  nor  use  the  premises  for  any  other  purpose  than  as  an  orna- 
mental park.  Afterwards  the  park  was  mortgaged  for  improve- 
ments and  sold  nnder  foreclosure,  passing  by  various  conveyances 
into  the  hands  of  purchasers  in  good  faith  and  for  value.  On  a 
bill  by  the  grantor's  heirs  to  divest  the  title,  it  was  held  that 
they  had  no  right  to  relief,  not  being  the  owners  of  any  of  the 
dominant  lots.^ 

The  vendor  or  original  covenantor,  after  having  parted  with  all 
his  interest  in  the  property,  is  neither  a  necessary  nor  a  proper 
party  to  an  action  by  one  purchaser  against  another  to  enforce 
the  covenant.2  Xhe  vendor  may  bring  the  action  to  enforce  the 
covenant  so  long  as  he  has  an  interest  in  the  property  benefited 
by  it,^  even  thougli  he  does  this  in  the  interest  of  a  purchaser. 

816.  A  covenant  that  runs  with  the  land  must  be  enforced, 
by  the  owner  of  the  land  benefited  against  the  owner  of  the 
land  burdened  by  the  covenant.  Thus,  where  a  deed  of  a  right 
of  way  to  a  railroad  company  provided  that  the  grantee  should 
fence  the  road  and  forever  maintain  the  fence,  a  successor  of  the 
coinpanv  by  purcliase  at  a  foreclosure  sale  claimed  that  the 
grantor,  who  at  the  time  the  deed  was  made  owned  only  an  un- 
divided eighth  pai't  of  the  land  but  had  afterwards  acquired  the 
whole  interest,  could  recover  at  most  only  one  eighth  of  the  dam- 
ages for  a  breach  of  such  covenant.     But  the  court  held  this  posi- 

1  Graves  v.  Deterlinj^,  120  N.  Y.  447,  ent   question   would   be   presented.     The 

24  N.  E.  Rep.  655,  afliirmiiig  41  Ilun,  643.  plaintiffs,  howevev,  are  not  in  a  situation 

Tlie  court  by  "Vann,  .J.,  say  :   "But  the  to  ask  that  tlie  park  should  be  maintained, 

plaintiffs  claim  that,  even  if  the  provision  or  its  desecration  jtrevented.     The  whole 

is  a  covenant,  they  are  still  entitled   to  title  to  the  park  and  the  contiguous  lots 

some  relief,  because,  as  it  is  insisted,  the  passed  from  their  father  in  his  lifetime, 

easements  Iiave  been  abandoned  and   the  and  they  inherited  no  right  to  cither.     As 

covenant  violated.     The  weakness  of  this  they  have  title  neither  to  the  park    nor  to 

position   is   that   the   covenant   was   not  any  land  for  the  I)ene(it  of  which  the  park 

made  for  their  benefit,  or  for  the  benefit  was  created,  they  have  no  foundation  upon 

of  their   ancestor.      If  the   owner   of  a  which  to  base  an  action." 

domiuant  lot,  who  had  not  abandoned  his  ^  Clements  v.  Wells,  L.  R.  1   Eq.  200; 

right  to  the  park,  were  here  asking  the  Bowes  v.  Law,  L.  11.  9  Eq.  636. 

preventive  remedies  of  the  court,  a  differ-  ^  Manners  v.  Johnson,  1  Ch.  D.  673. 

668 


ENFORCEMENT    OF   RESTRICTIONS.  [§§  817,  818. 

tion  to  be  untenable,  saying :  "  The  covenant  embraced  in  the 
deed  is  one  tliat  runs  with  the  land.  It  casts  upon  the  immediate 
and  subsequent  grantees  of  the  easement  the  burden  of  maintain- 
ing the  fences  and  crossings,  while  the  subsequent  grantees  of  the 
fee  simple,  who  take  it  with  tlie  burden  of  the  easement,  acquire 
iJl  the  rights  and  benefits  that  would  have  inured  to  the  original 
grantor  out  of  the  easement  by  I'eason  of  the  conveyance  to  the 
first  compan}^  The  covenant  passes  by  assignment,  not  only  to 
the  subsequent  grantees  of  the  easement,  but  also  to  those  of  the 
fee  simple ;  and  each  set  of  grantees,  when  they  accept  the  con- 
veyance, take  it  with  all  the  burdens  and  benefits  annexed  to  it. 
The  remote  grantee  of  the  easement  can  enjoy  the  benefits  thereof 
only  by  assuming  also  the  corresponding  burdens  growing  out  of 
the  grant ;  and  the  owner,  who  succeeded  to  the  whole  of  the 
fee  in  the  land,  acquiied  with  it,  as  the  owner  of  the  servient 
estate,  not  only  the  burden  created  by  the  conveyance  of  the  ease- 
ment, l>ut  also  the  benefits  intermixed  with  it.""  ^ 

817.  Joinder  of  parties  to  suit.  —  It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
plaintiff  should  join  as  parties  defendant  all  persons  who  have 
violated  the  same  restrictions ;  ^  nor  is  it  necessary  that  he  should 
join  with  himself  as  parties  all  other  persons  entitled  to  the  bene- 
fit of  the  covenant,  or  undertake  to  prosecute  the  suit  in  their 
behalf.3 

818.  A  restriction  imposed  to  preserve  the  grantor's  other 
land  for  residences  will  be  enforced  only  for  the  purpose  for 
■which  it  was  made.  Thus,  a  provision  that  no  oil-well  should 
be  drilled  in  the  land  conveyed  will  be  enforced  by  injunction  ; 
but  the  grantee  will  not  be  held  to  an  accounting  for  the  oil 
already  pumped,  when  it  appears  that  this  restriction  was  not  to 


1  Toledo,  St.  L.  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Cosand,  6  milly,  M.  R.,  said  :  "  I  am  of  opinion  that 

Ind.  App.  222,  33  N.  E.  Kep.  251  ;  Laive  one  alone  is  entitled   to  ask  for  redress 

Erie  &  W.  R.  Co  v.  Priest,  131    Ind.  413,  although   others  .should  decline  to  do  so, 

31   N.  E.  Rep.  77 ;  Scott  v.  Stetlcr,  128  or  should  disre<,'ard   the  act  complained 

Ind.   38.%  27    N.    E.    Rep.  721  ;  Midland  of      It  may  also  well  be  that  the  injury 

Rv.  Co.  V.  Fisher,  I2.'j   Ind.   19,  24  N.  K.  is  principally,  or  almost  entirely,  felt  by 

Rep.  7.56.  oi"i  01"  two  of  the  owners,  and  that  those 

-  Linzce  v.  Mi.xer,  101  Mass.  512,531  ;  who   are  further   off    sustain    no    ineon- 

Piiyson   V.  Burnham,  141   Mass.  .547,  556,  venience,  in  which  case  they  could  not  be 

6  N.  E.  Rep.  708.  required  to  join  in  or  support  the  applica- 

■5  Western  v,  Macdermot,  L.  R.  1   Eq.  tion." 
499,  509,  affirmed  2  Ch.   App.  72.     Ko- 

669 


§§  819-821.]       RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO    THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

prevent  the  drainage  of  his  remaining  lands,  but  to  preserve  other 
land  for  rosidence  purposes.^ 

819.  A  stipulation  for  keeping  open  a  common  passageway 
may  be  enforced  in  equity  by  the  grantor,  or  by  abutters  who  are 
entitled  to  use  it,  although  the  grantor  reserved  to  himself  the 
riglit  to  enter  upon  the  premises  by  his  agents,  and  at  the  expense 
of  the  party  in  fault,  to  remove  or  alter,  in  conformity  with  the 
stipulation,  any  building  or  portion  thereof  which  might  be  erected 
on  the  premises  in  a  manner  or  to  a  use  contrary  to  the  stipula- 
tion.- 

820.  A  mandatory  injunction  will  not  be  issued  where 
complainant's  rights  are  not  clear.'^  Whether  a  restriction  in 
the  deed  prohibiting  the  construction  on  the  granted  premises  of 
any  manufactory,  workshop,  etc.,  or  "  building  of  any  kind  to  be 
used  for  any  purpose  other  than  one  used  for  a  genteel  cottage  or 
dwelling-house,"  is  violated  by  the  erection  of  a  boat-house,  club- 
house, and  another  building  used  merely  for  repairing  the  boats 
belonging  to  the  club,  and  occasionally  the  construction  of  a  new 
one,  is  a  question  not  so  clear  as  to  warrant  a  court  of  equity  in 
granting  a  mandatory  injunction  for  the  removal  of  the  buildings, 
but  complainants  will  be  remitted  to  their  remedy  at  law.* 

821.  Equity  has  jurisdiction  of  the  enforcement  of  restric- 
tions, for  restrictions  are  negative  covenants  or  agreements  not 
to  do  certain  acts ;  and  a  threatened  violation  may  he  restrained 
by  injunction,  or,  after  the  forbidden  act  has  been  done,  a  man- 
datory injunction  maybe  issued  to  undo  it.  "Equit3'will  not 
decree  specific  performance  of  affirmative  contracts  that  call  for 
the  exercise  of  skill,  discretion,  or  good  faith  ;  but  when  the  re- 
quired acts  are  of  a  simple  nature,  it  seems  that  the  court  will 
take  jurisdiction.  It  has  enforced  contracts  to  keep  in  repair  the 
stop-gate  of  a  canal,''  to  construct  an  archway,*"'  to  lay  a  railway 
track  over  certain  land,'  and  to  maintain  a  switch."^ 

1  Acheson  r.  Stevenson,  146  Pa.  St.  *  Gatzmer  v.  St.  Vincent  School  See. 
228,  23  Atl.  Rep.  331.     See,  also,  Bangs     147  Pa.  St.  313,  23  Atl.  Eep.  452. 

V.  Potter,  13.')  Mass.  245.  ^  Lane  v.  Newdigatc,  10  Ves.  192. 

2  Attorncy-GcntTal  v.  Williams,  140  «  Storcr  v.  G.  W.  Hy.  Co.  2  Y.  &  C.  C. 
Mass.  329,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  80,  3  N.  E.  Rep.     48. 

214,  .54  Am.  Rep.  468.  ^  Wilson   v.  Fiirness   Ry.    Co.   L.  R,  9 

•''  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  Eq.  28. 

S.  Y.  Co.  45  N.  J.  Eq.  50,  17  Atl.   Rep.  «  Lydick  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  17  W.  Va. 

146;  Mayer's  Appeal,  73  Pa.  St.  164.  427.     "In  Cooke  v.  Chilcott,  3  Ch.  D. 
670 


ENFORCEMENT   OF   RESTRICTIONS.  [§§  822,  823. 

822.  A  court  of  equity  ■will  not  enforce  restrictions  where 
there  are  circumstances  that  render  their  enforcement  inequi- 
table, altliough  it  clearly  appears  that  there  has  been  such  a  vio- 
lation of  them  as  would  ordinarily  induce  the  court  to  interfere. 
"•  If,  for  instance,  it  was  shown  that  one  or  two  owners  of  estates 
were  insisting  on  the  observance  of  restrictions  and  limitations 
contrary  to  the  interest  and  wishes  of  a  large  number  of  proprie- 
tors having  similar  rights  and  interests,  by  which  great  pecuniary 
loss  would  be  inflicted  on  them,  or  a  public  improvement  be  pre- 
vented, a  court  of  equity  might  well  hesitate  to  use  its  powers  to 
enforce  a  specific  performance,  or  restrain  a  breach  of  the  restric- 
tion." ^ 

823.  The  violation  of  a  restriction  may  be  enjoined  with- 
out showing  actual  damage.-  *•  I  take  it  now  to  be  the  law," 
says  Yice-Chancellor  Hall,  "that  if  a  covenant  of  this  character 
is  entered  into  with  reference  to  the  position  of  buildings  upon  a 
particular  plot  of  ground  as  part  of  a  scheme  for  building  upon 
property,  then  the  party  who  stipulates  for  and  obtains  that  cove- 
nant does  so  free  from  being  embarl*assed  by  the  question  whether 
any,  and,  if  any,  what  injury  or  damage  is  consequent  on  the 
breach  of  the  covenant,  and  that  an  assign  of  the  benefit  of  the 
covenant  is  in  as  good  a  position  as  the  original  covenantee."^ 


694,  a  covenant  to  supply  adjacent  land 
with  water  was  enforced  although  it  ne- 
cessitated laying  pipes  and  erecting  ma- 
chinery. This  undoubtedly  goes  too  far, 
£nd  has  since  been  overruled."  Charles 
I.  Giddings  on  Restrictions  Upon  the  Use 
of  Land,  5  Harv.  L.  Rev.  279.  See,  as  to 
enforcement  of  affirmative  covenants,  2 
Story  Eq.  Jur.  44,  45. 

1  Parker  v.  Nightingale,  6  Allen,  341, 
349,  per  Bigelow,  C.  J. 

2  Collins  V.  Castle,  36  Ch.  D.  243  ;  Ger- 
man V.  Chapman,  7  Ch.  D.  271  ;  Dicken- 
son V.  Grand  June.  Canal  Co.  15  Beav. 
260 ;  Richards  v.  Revitt,  7  Ch.  D.  224  ; 
Manners  v.  Johnson,  1  Ch.  D.  673;  T\\>- 
ping  V.  Eckersley,  2  Kay  &  J.  264,  270; 
Leech  v.  Schweder,  9  Ch.  Ajip.  463,  465; 
Peck  V.  ("Conway,  119  Mass.  546  ;  Hall  v. 
Wesster,  7  Mo.  A])]).  56. 

"  Manners  v.  Johnson,  1  Ch.  D.  673, 
679,  citing  Kemp  v-  Sober,  1   Sim.  N.  S. 


517;  Tipping  v.  Eckersley,  2  K.  &  J. 
264,  270  ;  Dickinson  v.  Grand  June.  Canal 
Co.  15  Beav.  260  ;  Leech  r.  Schweder,  9 
Ch.  D.  463.  See  Johnstone  v.  Hall,  2 
Kay  &  J.  420,  where  relief  was  refused  to 
a  reversioner  and  the  damage  to  his  inter- 
est was  remote  and  trivial. 

The  cases  cited  in  this  section  sul)stan- 
tially  overrule  Western  v.  Macdcrmot,  L. 
R.  1  Eq.  499,  where  Romilly,  M.  R.,said 
that  a  court  of  equity  would  not  interfere 
by  injunction  unless  it  were  shown  that 
substantial  injury  would  result  from  the 
breach  of  the  covenant.  "  I  use  the  wonls 
'  substantial  injury  '  because  it  is,  I  think, 
clear  that  a  mere  nominal  breach  of  cove- 
nant, which  inflicted  no  injury  at  all, 
would  not  justify  this  court  in  interfer- 
ing; but  the  court  would  in  that  case 
leave  the  parties  to  their  remedy  at  law 
to  olitain  such  compensation  as  they  might 
be  entitled  to."     Upon  the  appeal  of  this 

671 


§  824.]  RESTRICTIONS   AS   TO  THE   USE   OF   LAND. 

A  comphiinant  who  is  entitled  to  a  perpetual  injunction  against 
the  breach  of  restriction  cannot  be  compelled  to  accept  damages 
in  lieu  of  an  injunction.  A  person  cannot  be  compelled  to  sub- 
mit to  a  wrong  and  an  injury  to  his  ])ro})erty  at  a  price  to  be  fixed 
by  a  court  of  equity.^ 

The  question  of  the  character  and  degree  of  annoyance  caused 
by  the  breach  of  a  covenant  will  not  be  considered  in  granting  an 
injunction  to  restrain  a  breach  of  the  covenant  not  to  use  the 
property  for  certain  purposes.  It  is  not  competent  to  inquire  into 
the  reasonableness  of  the  condition  which  totally  prohibits  a  par- 
ticular use  of  the  property.  There  is  no  question  of  degrees  of 
violation  in  such  case.  Such  a  question  arises,  however,  where 
the  condition  is  merely  against  nuisances,  or  noxious  or  annoying 
trades.^ 

824.  In  an  action  to  recover  damages  by  one  lot-owner 
against  another  for  a  breach  of  a  restriction  imposed  upon  all 
the  lots,  evidence  of  the  damage  caused  by  such  breach  should  be 
given  in  order  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover.  Without  such 
evidence  it  is  error  to  charge  that  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover 
as  damages  the  difference  in  value  of  the  land  as  it  was  affected 
by  the  breach  of  the  restriction  and  the  value  it  would  have  pos- 
sessed if  the  restriction  had  been  observed.'^ 

For  a  breach  of  a  covenant  by  a  purchaser  to  build  houses  on 
the  land  conveyed,  the  grantor  cannot  recover  as  damages  the 
amount  required  to  carry  on  his  building  operations  upon  his  re- 
maining land,  on  the  theory  that  when  the  covenant  was  made 
the  parties  had  in  contemplation  the  benefits  to  accrue  to  the  re- 
mainder of  the  grantor's  lots  by  the  building  of   houses  on  those 

case,   Lord    Chelmsford    repudiated   the  to  wait  until  '  substantial  injury'  (to  use 

projiosicion  that  equity  would  not  inter-  the  words  of  the  Master  of  the  Rolls)  were 

fere  unless  the  complainant  has  sustained  sustained,  that  period  might  never  arrive, 

or  is  likely  to  sustain  actual  damage.     In  althoufrh  violations  of  the  covenant  might 

the  case   before  the  court,  "  the  object  of  be  continually  occurring,  and  the  owners 

the  covenant  was  to  prevent,  for  all  future  of  the  houses  would  never  be  in  a  situa- 

time,  any  obstruction  to  the  view  from  the  tion    to   invoke   the   interposition  of   this 

backs  of   the  houses  on  the  south   side  of  court  to  prevent  the  breach  of  a  covenant 

Brock  Street  by  buildings  or  trees  above  intended  solely  for  their  benefit."     2  Ch. 

a  certain  height.     Any  building  erected,  App.  72,  75. 

or  any  tree  permitted   to  grow  above  this  i  Krehl  v.  Burrell,  11  Ch.  D.  146. 

height,  would  be  a  breach  of  the  covenant ;  -  Hall  r.  Wesster,  7  Mo.  App.  56. 

and  yet   the  damage  to  any  one  of   the  ^  Amerman  v.  Deane,  15  N.  Y.  Supp. 

owners  of  the  houses  might  be  scarcely  327,  reversing  C  N.  Y.  Supp.  542. 
appreciable.     If,  then,  it  were  necessary 

672 


ENFORCEMENT    OF   RESTRICTIONS.  [§  824. 

sold  to  the  grantee,  and  that,  on  account  of  the  latter's  breach, 
the  grantor  was  unable  to  sell  the  houses  erected  by  him  in  reli- 
ance upon  the  grantee's  covenant.^ 

If  a  restriction  expires  by  limitation  before  the  determination 
of  a  suit  to  enjoin  a  violation  of  it,  a  decree  should  be  rendered 
merely  for  damages  for  the  violation  of  the  restriction  vehile  it 
continued  in  force.^ 

1  McConaghy   v.   Pembertoa,  168  Pa.         2  Langraaid  v.  Reed,  159  Mass.  409,  34 
St.  121,  31  Atl.  Rep.  996.  N.  E.  Rep.  593. 

673 


CHAPTER    XXIII. 


COVENANTS  FOR   TITLE. 


I.  In  general,  825-832. 
II.  Implied  covenants,  833-841. 

III.  Covenants  for  seisin  and   right  to 

convey,  842-851. 

IV.  Covenant    against     incumbrances, 

852-891. 
V.  Covenant  for  warranty  and  quiet 

enjoyment,  892-927. 
VI.  Covenants  that  run  with  the  land, 
928-942. 


VII.  Measure  of  damages  on  covenant 
for  seisin,  943-956. 
VIII.  Measure  of  damages  on  covenants 
against  incumbrances,  957-967. 
IX.  Measure  of  damages  on  covenants 

of  warranty,  968-989. 
X.  After-acquired    title    of     grantor, 
990-999. 


I.  In  General. 

825.  A  covenant  is  an  agreement  under  seal.^  It  may  be 
made  by  a  deed  poll  as  well  as  by  indenture.^  It  may  be  created 
by  any  words  which  show  the  intention  of  the  parties.^  Thus 
the  word  "  agree  "  has  the  same  effect  as  the  word  "  covenant." 
The  covenant  itself  need  not  be  in  the  usual  form,  or  in  any  par- 
ticular words.  Whatever  be  the  words  used,  the  effect  of  the 
covenant  is  to  be  ascertained  from  the  legal  interpretation  of  the 
language  in  which  it  is  expressed.^  A  single  promise  expressed 
in  a  single  sentence  may  be  so  comprehensive  as  to  include  all 
the  usual  covenants. 

826.  The  covenants  in  modern  deeds  have  their  origin  in 
the  feudal  ■warranty,  which  was  an  incident  of  the  tenure  by 
which  the  vassal  held  his  lands  of  his  lord.  While  the  vassal  was 
bound  to  render  homage  to  his  lord,  the  lord  was  bound  to  pro- 
tect his  vassal  in  the  enjoyment  of  his  lands.  If  the  title  to  the 
land  was  disputed  and  the  lord  failed  to  protect  it,  he  was   bound 


1  Shep.  Touch.  160  ;  De  Bolle  v.  Penn- 
sylvania Ins.  Co.  4  Whart.  68,  33  Am. 
Dec.  38. 

2  Green  v.  Home,  1  Salk.  197;  Green- 
leaf  V.  Allen,  127  Macs.  248;  Ilagerty  v. 
Lee,  54  N.  J.  L.  580,  25  All.  Rep.  319,  26 
Atl.  Rep.  537. 

674 


3  Kirkendall  v.  Mitchell,  3  McLean, 
144  ;  Hallett  v.  Wylie,  3  Johns.  44 ;  Jack- 
son V.  Swart,  20  Johns.  85  ;  Bull  v.  Fol- 
lett,  5  Cow.  170 ;  Taylor  v.  Preston,  79  Pa. 
St.  436  ;   Kerngood  v.  Davis,  21  S.  C.  183. 

^  Johnson  v.  Hollensworth,  48  Mich. 
140,  11  N.  W.  Rep.  843. 


IN  GENERAL.  [§  827. 

to  furnish  other  land  of  equal  value.  Originally  there  was  no 
contract  to  this  effect,  but  the  right  to  this  protection  rested  upon 
the  feudal  relation  and  custom.  When  transfers  of  land  came 
to  be  authenticated  by  charters  or  deeds,  a  warranty  was  implied 
from  the  word  dedi,  and  was  expressed  by  the  word  warrantizo. 
"  And  no  other  verb  in  our  law,"  says  Coke,  "  doth  make  a  war- 
ranty." Mr.  Rawle,  in  his  admirable  work  on  Covenants  for 
Title,  sketches  an  outline  of  the  ancient  law  of  warranty,  and  of 
the  origin  of  modern  covenants  for  title,  and  in  conclusion  says : 
"  So  long  as  livery  of  seisin  was  necessary  to  the  validity  of  "the 
transfer  of  land,  so  long  did  warranty,  which  was  essentially  a 
covenant  real,  accompany  the  deed  of  feoffment.  A  personal 
covenant  would  have  been  an  inappropriate  element  of  such  a 
form  of  conveyance.  But  the  passage  of  the  Statute  of  Uses, 
toward  the  latter  part  of  the  reign  of  Henry  the  Eighth,  intro- 
duced the  conveyances  familiar  at  the  present  day,  which,  tak- 
ing their  effect  under  that  statute,  passed  the  freehold  without 
livery  of  seisin  ;  and  in  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale,  or  lease  and 
release,  a  warranty,  in  its  proper  sense,  would  have  been  just  as 
inappropriate  as  would  have  been  a  personal  covenant  in  a  deed 
of  feoffment,  while  the  covenant  was  eminently  fitting.  And 
hence  it  may  be  that  we  find,  all  through  the  reports  of  the  time 

of  Elizabeth,  cases  in  which  some  of  the  covenants  for  title 

generally,  a   covenant  for  seisin  or  of   good  right  to  convey 

ai-e  used  in  conveyances  taking  effect  by  virtue  of  the  Statute 
of  Uses.  They  are,  however,  generally  couched  in  the  briefest 
terms,  and  unaccompanied  by  other  covenants.  And  by  com- 
mon consent  it  is  considered  that  it  was  not  until  the  time 
of  the  restoration  of  Charles  the  Second  that  the  modern  cove- 
nants for  title  were,  in  their  present  form,  introduced  into  general 
practice." 

827.  The  usual  covenants  in  ordinary  deeds  in  fee  simple 
in  this  country  are :  I.  That  the  grantor  is  lawfully  seised  ;  II. 
That  he  has  good  right  to  convey;  III.  That  the  land  is  free 
from  incumbrances ;  IV.  That  the  grantee  shall  quietly  enjoy ; 
V.  That  the  grantor  will  warrant  and  defend  the  title  against  all 
lawful  claims. 1  Tlie  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment  is  now  chiefly 
confined  to  leases  ;  and  the  covenant  for  further  assurance,  though 
sometimes  of  importance,  is  not  in  use  in  the  common  forms  of 

^  4  KeiJt  Com.  471. 

675 


§§  828,  829.] 


COVENANTS   FOR    TITLE. 


deeds.     The  covenants  for  seisin,  against  incumbrances,  and  of 
warranty  are  therefore  practically  the  usual  covenants. 

828.  An  agreement  to  convey  land  requires  in  most  of  the 
States  a  conveyance  with  the  usual  covenants  for  title,^ 
though,  in  a  few  States  at  least,  a  contract  to  convey  a  good  title 
is  satisfied  by  a  conveyance  of  such  a  title  by  a  quitclaim  deed.^ 
'•'•If  a  grantor  has  in  fact  a  good  title,  his  deed  of  quitclaim  con- 
veys his  title  and  estate  as  effectually  as  a  deed  of  warranty. 
An  agreement  or  covenant  to  convey  a  title,  therefore,  does  not 
necessarily  entitle  the  covenantee  to  a  warranty  deed  ;  the  right 
of  property  and  of  exclusive  possession,  which  constitutes  a 
good  title,  being  effectually  vested  in  him  by  a  deed  of  quit- 
claim." ^ 

829.  An  agreement  to  convey  by  a  good  and  sufficient  war- 
ranty deed  requires  a  good  and  perfect  title,  as  well  as  a  gijod 
and  sufficient  warranty  deed."^  A  contract  to  convey  "by  deed  in 
fee  simple  and  free  from  all  incumbrances  "  is  not  fulfilled  by  the 
delivery  and  acceptance  of  a  deed  with  full  covenants  of  war- 


1  Alabama :  Cullum  v.  Branch  Bank,  4 
Ala.  21.  Arkansas:  Riidd  v.  Savelli,  44 
Ark.  14.5  ;  Witter  i'.  Biscoe,  13  Ark.  422. 
California :  Rogers  u.  Borchard,  82  Cal. 
347,  22  Pac.  Rep.  907.  Illinois  :  Clark  v. 
Lyons,  25  111.  105.  Indiana:  Bethell  v. 
Bethell,  92  Ind.  318 ;  Gibson  v.  Richart, 
83  Ind.  313  ;  Linn  v.  Barkey,  7  Ind.  69 ; 
Clark  V.  Redman,  1  Blackf.  379.  Iowa  : 
Shreck  v.  Pierce,  3  Iowa,  350.  Kentucky  : 
Andrews  v.  Word,  17  B,  Mon.  518  ;  Hedges 
V.  Kerr,  4  B.  Mon.  526.  Maryland  :  Bry- 
ant V.  Wilson,  71  Md.  440.  Michigan: 
Dikeman  v.  Arnold,  71  Mich.  656;  Allen 
V.  Hazen,  26  Mich.  142;  Dwight  v.  Cut- 
ler, 3  Mich.  566,  64  Am.  Dec.  105  ;  John- 
son V.  Hollensworth,  48  Mich.  140,  11  N. 
W.  Rep.  843  ;  xMlen  v.  Atkinson,  21  Mich. 
351.  Minnesota:  Johnston  i\  Piper,  4 
Minn.  192.  Missouri:  Ilerryford  u.  Tur- 
ner, 67  Mo.  296.  North  Carolina :  Fair- 
cloth  V.  Isler,  75  N.  C.  551.  Ohio  :  Tre- 
main  v.  Liming,  Wright,  644.  Rhode 
Island  :  Point  Street  Iron  Works  v.  Sim- 
mons, 11  R.  I.  496.  Texas  :  T:iul  v.  Brad- 
ford, 20  Tex.  261  ;  Rhode  v.  Alley,  27 
Tex.  443.  Vermont :  Bowen  v.  Thrall,  28 
Vt.  382.  Virginia  :  Hoback  v.  Kilgore,  26 
676 


Gratt.  442,  21  Am.  Rep.  317;  Goddin  v. 
Vaughn,  14  Gratt.  102,  117;  Dickinson 
V.  Hoomes,  8  Gratt.  353,  394.  West  Vir- 
ginia: Tavenner  v.  Barrett,  21  W.  Va. 
656 ;  Allen  v.  Yeater,  17  W.  Va.  128. 

-  Connecticut :  Potter  v.  Tuttle,  22 
Conn.  512;  Dodd  v.  Seymour,  21  Conn. 
476.  Maine :  Hill  v.  Hobart,  16  Me.  164. 
Massachusetts:  Kyle  v.  Kavanagh,  103 
Mass.  356,  359,  4  Am.  Rep.  560;  Mans- 
field V.  Dyer,  131  Mass.  200,  201.  New 
York:  Gazley  v.  Price,  16  Johns.  267; 
Ketchum  v.  Evcrtson,  13  Johns.  359;  Van 
Eps  t>.  Schenectady,  12  Johns.  436.  Penn- 
sylvania :  Cadwalader  v.  Tryon,  37  Pa. 
St.  318;  Espy  v.  Anderson,  14  Pa.  St. 
308. 

■'  Kyle  V.  Kavanagh,  103  Mass.  356,  per 
Morton,  J. 

*  Mead  v.  Fox,  6  Cush.  199,  202; 
Bur  well  v.  Jackson,  9  N.  Y.  535 ;  Little 
V.  Paddleford,  13  N.  H.  167;  Hill  v.  Ho- 
bart, 16  Me.  164;  Carter  v.  Alexander, 
71  Mo.  585;  Wilson  v.  Getty,  57  Pa.  St 
266;  Christian  v.  Cabell,  22  Gratt.  82; 
Davis  V.  Henderson,  17  Wis.  105  ;  Varde> 
man  v.  Lawson,  17  Tex.  10,  16. 


IN   GENERAL.  [§§  830-b32. 

raiity,  when  there  is  at  the  time  an  outstanding  mortgage  of  the 
land.i 

830.  A  person  holding  land  in  a  fiduciary  character  can 
make  good  and  sufficient  conveyance  without  using  the  gen- 
eral covenants  for  title.  It  is  sufficient  that  he  covenants 
against  his  own  acts ;  ^  and  a  trustee's  deed  is,  in  some  parts  of  the 
country,  always  made  without  any  covenant  at  alL  The  persons 
beneficially  interested  under  the  trust  may,  however,  properly  be 
required  to  make  covenants  for  title. 

The  covenants  of  a  pei'son  executing  a  deed  in  a  representative 
capacity  do  not  bind  the  estate  he  represents.^ 

831.  A  person  executing  a  conveyance  in  a  representative 
capacity,  such  as  administrator,  guardian,  or  trustee,  with  the 
covenants  for  title  usual  in  other  deeds,  is  personally  bound  by 
them,  though  he  was  under  no  obligation  to  make  any  of  them, 
and  had  no  authority  to  bind  the  estate  he  represented  by  such 
covenants.*  Such  is  the  case,  also,  where  the  covenants  are 
implied  from  the  use  of  the  words  "  grant,  bargain,  and  sell."  ^ 

832.  An  agent  of  a  State  who  purchases  land  and  conveys 
it  to  the  State  by  warranty  deed  is  bound  by  his  warranty  if 
the  purchase  by  the  State  was  not  a  mere  ratification  of  the  act  of 
its  agent,  so  as  to  thereby  render  the  agent's  covenant  void  for  want 
of  consideration.  Such  a  covenant  was  held  to  be  binding  upon 
one  who,  being  desirous  of  acquiring  the  contract  for  a  wall 
around  the  state  penitentiary,  at  tlie  request  of  the  officials  bought 
land  which  they  desired  for  penitentiary  purposes,  but  which  they 
were  themselves  unable  to  purchase  lor  the  State,  owing  to  their 

1  Moody  V.  Spokane,  &c.  K.  Co.  5  ner  v.  Williams,  8  Mass.  162,  5  Am.  Dec. 
Wash.  699,  32  Pac.  Kep.  751.  S3;  Heard  v.  Hall,  16  Pick.  468  ;  Whiting 

2  Dow  V.  Lewis,  4  Gray,  468,  473  ;  Sum-  v.  Dewey,  15  Pick.  428;  Donahoe  v. 
ner  v.  Williams,  8  Mass.  201  ;  Hodge.s  v.  Emery,  9  Mete.  63;  Mitchell  v.  Huzen,  4 
Saunders,  17  Pick.  470;  Dwiuel  I'.  Veazie,  Conn.  49.5,  10  Am.  Dec.  169;  Helden  v. 
36  Me.  509;  Shontz  v.  Brown,  27  Pa.  St.  Seymour,  8  Coun.  19;  Foster  v.  Young, 
123,  134.  35  Iowa,  27  ;   Bloom  (;.  Wolfe,  50  Iowa, 

3  Sumner  v.  Williams,  8  Mass.  162;  280;  Magee  v.  Mellon,  23  Miss.  585; 
Mason  v.  Ham,  36  Me.  573;  Shontz  v.  Holyoke  u.  Clark,  .54  N.  H.  578  ;  Graves 
Brown,  27  Pa.  St.  134;  Lockwood  v.  Gil-  v.  Maltindy,  6  Bush,  361  ;  Barnett  r. 
son,  12  Ohio  St.  526  ;  Klopp  v.  Moore,  6  Hnuhey,  54  Ark.  195,  15  S.  W.  Hep.  404  ; 
Kans.  27  ;  Maliic  v.  Matteson,  17  Wis.  I  ;  Miiri)hy  v.  Price,  48  Mo.  247  ;  Taylor  u. 
Osborne    i-.    McMillan,  5    .Tones  L.    109;  Harrison,  47  Tex.  454. 

Shacklett  v.    Hinuson,   54   Ga.3.50;  Clark         ''  Foote  v.  Clark,  102  Mo.  394,  14  S.  W. 
V.  Whitehead,  47  Ga.  510.  521.  Bcp.  981  ;  Murphy  ;;.  Price,  48  Mo.  247  ; 

*  Taylor  i;.  Davi.s,  110  U.  S.  330  ;  Sum-     I'ratt  v.  Eaton,  65  Mo.  157. 

G77 


§  833.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

want  of  authority,  on  the  promise  by  such  officials  to  use  their 
influence  to  induce  the  State  to  repurchase  it,  and  was  awarded 
the  contract  to  erect  the  wall,  and  afterwards  conveyed  the  land  to 
the  State,  with  covenants  of  warranty,  for  the  same  price  he  had 
paid  for  it.^ 

II.   Implied  Covenants. 

833.  There  are  implied  covenants  as  -well  as  express.  Ex- 
press covenants  are  those  in  which  the  intent  to  covenant  is 
declared  in  words,  and  implied  are  those  inferred  by  legal  con- 
struction from  the  use  of  certain  words  of  conveyance.  It  has 
sometimes  been  said  that  a  covenant  may  be  implied  from  a 
recital,^  but  this  doctrine  has  been  declared  by  high  authority  to 
be  a  dangerous  one,  and  it  has  been  decisively  repudiated.'^  A 
covenant  other  than  for  title  may  undoubtedly  be  implied  from  a 
recital,  but  not  a  covenant  for  title.  A  recital  of  seisin,  when 
modified  and  explained  by  other  parts  of  the  instrument,  does 
not  amount  to  a  covenant.*  The  true  rule  is  to  view  the  recital 
in  the  light  cast  on  it  by  the  rest  of  the  deed,  and  give  effect 
to  the  intention  as  a  consistent  whole.^  Where  the  terms  of  a 
deed  of  conveyance,  taking  the  whole  together,  show  that  the 
instrument  is  in  its  essence  a  quitclaim  title,  and  that  the  makers 
intended  no  warranty  except  as  against  themselves  and  their  own 
acts,  no  covenant  will  be  raised  out  of  a  recital  of  facts,  or  out  of 
a  use  of  words  of  conveyance.^ 

1  Whatley  v.  Patten  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  in  equity.  Dorsey  v.  Jackman,  1  Serg.  & 
31  S.  W.  Rep.  60.  R.  42,  7  Am.  Dec.  611  ;  Earle  v.  De  Witt, 

2  Severn's  Case,  Leon.  122;  Christine  G  Allen,  520;  Soper  v.  Stevens,  14  Me. 
i;.  Whitehill,  16  Serg.  &  R.  98,  Gibson,  C.  133;  Bates  v.  Delavan,  .5  Paige,  299. 
J.,  dissenting.  And  .see  Commonwealth  v.  M'Clanachan, 

8  Rawle,  Cov.  §  280 ;  Ferguson  i>.  Dent,  4   Rand.   482.     Equity  will    not    relieve 

8  Mo.  667.  against  i)ayment  of  the  puichasemoney. 

*  Delmer  v.  M'Cabe,  14  Ir.  C.  L.  377.  1    Fonbl.    Eq.   373,   note ;    Rawle,    Con. 

5  McDonouijh  v.    Martin,  88   Ga.  675,  §   321 ;  Barkhamsted   v.    Case,    5    Conn. 

16  S.  E.  Rep.  .59,  per  Bleckly,  C.  J.;  Piatt,  528,  13  Am.  Dec.  92,  2  Sugd.  Vend.  552. 

Cov.  3.3  ;  Severn's  Case,  Leon.  122.  Nor   can    the   purchaser  have   rescission. 

*>  McDonough  I'.  Martin,  88  Ga.  675, 16  Maney   v.   Porter,  3    Humph.  347,  363; 

S.  E.  Rep.  59.      Bleckley,   C.   J.,   said :  Middlekauff  v.  Barrick,  4  Gill,  290 ;  But- 

"  The  law  is  clear  that,  where  the  buyer  man  v.  Hussey,  30  Me.  263.     Nor  can  he 

takes  a  quitclaim  deed,  —  that  is,  a  deed  set  up  the  failure  of  title  in  defence  to  an 

without  any  warranty,  —  the  maxim   of  action  for  the  ])urchase-money.     Bnckner 

caveat  emptor  A^y'pWGS.    He  is  without  rem-  v.  Street,    15   Fed.   Rep.   365;    Wright  v. 

edy  if  the  title  fails.     He  cannot  recover  Shorter,  56  Ga.  72." 
back  the  purchase-money,  either  at  law  or 

678 


IMPLIED   COVENANTS. 


[§§  834,  835. 


834.  At  common  law  the  only  word  that  necessarily  im- 
ported a  covenant  of  title  was  the  word  "give."i  The  word 
"grant"  did  not  imply  a  covenant,  nor  the  words  "bargain  "  and 
"sell." 2  But  since  the  Statute  of  Uses  there  have  been  no  cove- 
nants by  implication.  The  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  then  came 
into  use,  and  this  is  the  deed  in  common  use  at  the  present  time. 
Except  as  declared  by  statute,  there  are  in  this  country  no  implied 
covenants.^  A  covenant  of  seisin  is  not  implied  at  common  law 
from  the  use  of  the  operative  words,  "  grant,  bargain,  sell,  convey, 
and  warrant."  *  . 

835,  By  statute  in  many  States,  certain  words  used  in  a 
deed  of  conveyance  themselves  import  covenants  for  title  as 
effectually  as  though  such  covenants  had  been  expressly  contained 
in  the  deed.  These  statutes  have  for  their  foundation  the  statute 
of  Anne,  passed  in  1707.^  The  first  statute  of  this  kind  in  this 
country  was  an  act  of  the  colony  of  Pennsylvania,  passed  in  1715. 
Similar  acts  have  since  been  enacted  in  many  of  the  States.^    They 


1  Frost  V.  Raymond,  2  Caines,  188,  2 
Am.  Dec.  228.  But  this  word  does  not 
raise  a  covenant  in  a  conveyance  merely 
of  the  grantor's  rights  in  the  land.  Dea- 
kinsy.  Hollis,  7  Gill  &  J.  311. 

2  Piatt,  Gov.  47,  48 ;  Rickets  v.  Dickens, 
1  Murph.  343,  4  Am.  Dec.  555;  Frost 
V.  Raymond,  2  Caines,  188,  2  Am.  Dec. 
228 ;  Wheeler  v.  Wayne  Co.  132  111.  599, 
24  N.  E.  Rep.  625 ;  Gee  v.  Pharr,  5  Ala. 
586,  39  Am.  Dec.  339. 

3  Allen  V.  S.iyward,  5  Me.  227,  17  Am. 
Dec.  221  ;  Bates  v.  Foster,  59  Me.  157, 
160,  8  Am.  Rep.  406  ;  Wheeler  v.  Wayne 
Co.  132  111.  599,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  625  ;  Sum- 
ner V.  Williams,  8  Mass.  1G2,  201  ;  Dow 
V.  Lewis,  4  Gray,  468,  473. 

*  Frost  V.  Raymond,  2  Caines,  188,  2 
Am.  Dec.  228,  where  Chancellor  Kent 
expressly  repudiates,  as  opposed  to  the 
entire  stream  of  authorities,  a  statement 
to  the  contrary  by  Lord  Eldon  in  Brown- 
ing V.  Wright,  2  Bos.  &  P.  13,  21  ;  Aiken 
V.  Franklin,  42  Minn.  91,  43  N.  W.  Rep. 
839. 

6  6  Anne,  ch.  35. 

•5  Alabama:  The  words  "grant,  bar- 
gain, sell,"  or  either  of  them,  imply  cove- 
nants of  Kcisiu,  against  incumbrances  by 


the  grantor,  and  for  quiet  enjoyment. 
Code  1886,  §  1839.  Arizona  T. :  Words 
"grant  or  convey  "  import  covenants  of 
seisin  and  against  incumbrances.  R.  S. 
1887,  §§  222,  223.  Arkansas :  Words 
"grant,  bargain,  and  sell"  import  cove- 
nants of  seisin,  against  incumbrances  by 
the  grantor  and  for  quiet  enjoyment. 
Dig.  of  Stats.  1894,  §  696.  California. 
Idaho,  Montana,  Nevada,  North  Dakota 
and  South  Dakota,  Texas;  The  word 
"grant"  implies  a  covenant  that  tlie 
grantor  has  not  conveyed  the  same  estate, 
or  any  right,  title,  or  interest  therein,  to 
any  person  other  than  the  grantee ;  and 
against  incumbrances  by  the  grantor. 
Cal.  Civ.  Code,  §  1113;  Ida.  R.  S.  1887, 
§  2935  ;  Mont.  Civ.  Code,  §  1519 ;  Nev.  G. 
S.  188.5,  §  2618;  North  Dak.  R.  Codes 
1895,  §  3539  ;  South  Dak.  Comp.  Laws 
of  Dakota  1887,  §§  3247,  3449;  Tex.  R. 
S.  1879,  arts.  553,  557.  Delaware:  The 
words  "grant,  bargain,  and  sell "  imply 
a  special  warranty  against  a  grantor  and 
his  heirs.  R.  Code  1893,  p.  625,  §  2. 
Illinois  :  The  words  "  grant,  baigain,  and 
8eil"inii)ort  covenants  of  seisin,  against 
incumbrances  by  the  grantor,  and  for  quiet 
enjoyment    against    the   grantor.     R.   S. 

p.-o 


§  835.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

have  for  their  object  the  raising  of  certain  covenants  by  the  use 
of  the  word  "  grant,"  or  the  words  "  grant,  bargain,  and  sell," 
against  the  grantor,  and  in  some  cases  against  his  heirs  also,  in 
favor  of  the  grantee,  his  heirs  and  assigns.^  The  Pennsylvania 
statute,  from  which  the  other  statutes  have  generally  been  mod- 
elled, is  in  the  words  following  :  "  In  all  deeds  to  be  recorded  in 
pursuance  of  this  act,  whereby  any  estate  of  inheritance  in  fee 
simple  shall  hereafter  be  limited  to  the  grantee  and  his  heirs,  the 
words  '  grant,  bargain,  sell '  shall  be  adjudged  an  express  covenant 
to  the  grantee,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  to  wit,  that  the  grantor  was 
seised  of  an  indefeasible  estate  in  fee  simple,  freed  from  incum- 
brance done  or  suffered  from  the  grantor  (excepting  the  rents  and 
services  due  to  the  lord  of  the  fee),  as  also  for  quiet  enjoyment 
against  the  grantor,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  unless  limited  by 
express  words  contained  in  such  deed ;  and  that  the  grantee,  his 
heirs,  executors,  administrators,  and  assigns,  may  in  any  action 
assign  breaches,  as  if  such  covenants  were  expressly  inserted." 

In  several  States  all  the  usual  covenants  of  warranty  —  namely, 
for  seisin,  good  right  to  convey,  against  incumbrances,  for  quiet 
enjoyment,  and  warranty  against  all  persons  —  are  expressed  by 
the  use  of  the  words  "  warrants  "  or  "  with  warranty  ;  "  ^  or  by 
the  use  of  the  words  "  generally  warrants,"  or  "  with  general 
warranty."  ^  In  most  of  these  same  States  a  special  warranty 
against  the  claims  of  the  grantor,  and  of  all  persons  claiming 
through  him,  is  expressed  by  the  use  of  the  words  "  warrant 
specially,"  or  "  with  special  warranty." 

1889,  cb.  30,  §8.     Mississippi :  The  words  grantor.     Brightly's  Purdon's  Dig.  1894, 

"grant,  bargain,  and  sell"  import  cove-  p.  646,  §  100. 

nants  of  seisin,  against  incumbrances  by  ^  Dun  v.  Dietrich,  3  N.  D.  3,  53  N.  W. 

the  grantor,  and  quiet  enjoyment  against  Eep.  81. 

the  grantor.     Annot.  Code  1892,   §2440.  ^luinois:    R.     S.    1889,    ch.    30,    §    9. 

Missouri:  The  words  "grant,  bargain,  and  Indiana:  R.  S.  1888,  §  2927.     Kansas: 

sell"  import  covenants  of  seisin,  against  G.  S.    1889,   §    1110.      Kentucky:   G.  S. 

incumbrances  by  the  grantor,  and  for  fur-  1894,    §   493.      Michigan:   G.    S.    1882, 

ther   assurances.     R.    S.    1889,    §    2402.  §  5728.     Mississippi:  Annot.  Code  1892, 

New  Mexico  T.  :  The  words  "bargained  §   2480.      Washington:    Laws     1885-86, 

and  sold  "  import  covenants  of  seisin  and  p.  177.     Wisconsin:   Annot.   Stats.  1889, 

against    incumbrances    by    the    grantor.  §2208.     Oklahoma  T. :  Comp.  Stats.  1890, 

Comp.    Laws     1884,    §     2570.     Pennsyl-  §§1698,1697.     Utah:  Laws  1890,  ch.  57, 

vania:   The   words  "  grant,  bargain,  and  §6. 

sell  "  constitute  express  covenants  of  sei-  ^  Maryland  :  Pub.   G.  L.  1888,  art.  21, 

sin  against  incumbrances  by  the  grantor,  §§  69-76.    Virginia  :  Code  1887,  §§  2437- 

and    for    quiet    enjoyment    against    the  2452.     West  Virginia :  Code  1887,  ch.  72, 


680 


12-19. 


IMPLIED    COVENANTS.  [§§  836,  837. 

In  several  States  it  is  expressly  provided  that  no  covenant  shall 
be  implied  in  any  conveyance,  whether  it  contains  special  cove- 
nants or  not.^ 

836.  All  the  words  specified  by  the  statute  must  be  used, 
unless  the  statute  provides  that  the  use  of  either  of  them 
shall  be  suflacient.  Thus,  under  a  statute  creating  a  covenant 
from  the  use  uf  the  words  "  grant,  bargain,  and  sell,"  a  covenant 
will  be  implied  only  when  all  the  words  of  the  statute  are  used, 
A  covenant  is  not  implied  from  the  use  of  the  word  "grant" 
alone. 2 

837.  In  these  statutes  the  first  covenant  mentioned,  the 
covenant  of  seisin,  which  standing  by  itself  is  unlimited,  is 
held  to  be  limited  to  the  acts  of  the  grantor,  by  reason  of  the 
limitation  to  that  effect  in  the  subsequent  covenant  against 
incumbrances,  so  that  none  of  the  covenants  implied  extend 
beyond  the  acts  of  the  covenantor.-^ 

Under  a  statute  whereby  the  words  "  grant,  bargain,  and  sell  " 
are  declared  to  import  an  express  covenant  that  the  grantor  is 
seised  of  an  estate  in  fee  simple,  freed  from  incumbrances  done  or 
suffered  from  the  grantor,  as  also  for  quiet  enjoyment  against  the 
grantor,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  no  general  covenant  against  incum- 
brances and  for  quiet  enjoyment  is  created,  but  only  a  covenant 
against  acts  done  or  suffered  by  the  grantor  and  his  heirs.'* 

It  is  held  in  Texas,  however,  that  under  a  statute  which  pro- 
vides that  the  usual  covenants  shall  be  implied  in  a  deed  from 
the  use  of  the  word  "grant,"  the  force  of  the  word,  as  a  warranty 
against  a  prior  incumbrance  by  the  grantor,  is  not  taken  away 
by  the  use  of  the  words  "  release  and  quitclaim  "  in  the  conclud- 
ing  clause   of  the   deed,  and   the  restriction  of  the  warranty  to 

^  Michigan  :   G.  S.  1882,  §  5655.     Min-  ute,  when  perhaps  it  was  never  thoujrht  of 

nesota:  G.  S.  1894,  eh.  40,  §  4165.     New  by  either  party."     Per  Wilkin,  J. ;  Frank 

York:  4    K.    S.  1889,    p.  2452.     Oregon:  v.  Darst,  14  III.   304.     Sec,  also,  White- 

Annot.  Laws  1887,  §  3003.     Wisconsin:  hill  v.  Gotwalt,  3  Pen.  &  W.  313,  323. 

Annot.  Stats.  1889,  §  2206.  "  Gratz  v.  Ewalt,  2  Binn.  95  ;  Funk  v. 

2  Gee  u.  Pharr,  5  Ala.  586,  39  Am.  Dec.  Voneida,  11    S.  &  R.   109;  Seitzinger  v. 

339 ;  Wheeler  v.  Wayne  Co.  132  111.  599,  Weaver,  1  Rawie,  377  ;  Roebuck  v.  Diipuy, 

24   N.   E.    Rep.   625.     "If   one  of  these  2  Ala.  535  ;  Stewart  y.  Anderson,  10  Ala. 

words  may  be  dispensed  with  in  the  crea-  504 ;  Brodie  v.    Watkins,   31   Ark.    319; 

tion  of  the  covenants  named  in  the  act,  so  Winston  v.  Vaiighan,  22  Ark.  72. 

might   others;    and  the   introduction  of  *  Ileflin  v.  Phillips  (Ala.),  11  So.  Rep. 

either  of  them  into  a  deed  mijrht  be  made  729;    Griffin    v.   Reynolds,  17  Ala.    198; 

to  operate  as  a  covenant  under  the  stat-  Roebuck  v.  Duprey,  2  Ala.  535. 

681 


§§  838-840.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

flaiins  through  oi"  under  the  grantor,  "  Subsequent  words  in  a 
deed  should  be  very  exphcit  to  have  the  eliect  of  withdrawing 
from  the  scope  of  the  grantmg  clause  an  incumbrance  of  the 
grantor's  own  creation."  ^ 

838.  Covenants  created  by  statute  from  the  use  of  certain 
words  in  a  deed  are  strictly  construed  if  the  statute  is  in  dero- 
gation of  the  common  law.^ 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  the  words  "  grant,  bargain,  sell " 
in  a  deed  shall  operate  as  an  express  covenant  that  the  grantor 
was  seised  of  "  an  estate,"  there  is  no  implied  covenant  that  he 
was  seised  in  fee,  though  the  habendum  is,  to  have  and  to  hold 
"  in  fee  simple,"^  or  "  to  have  and  to  hold  the  said  land  .  .  .  for- 
ever as  a  good  and  indefeasible  estate  in  fee  simple."^ 

A  statutory  warranty  implied  from  the  use  of  certain  words 
may  be  limited  to  a  part  of  the  lands  conveyed  by  a  subsequent 
clause  declaring  that  the  grantor's  intention  is  to  convey  all  his 
right,  title,  and  interest  in  a  part  of  the  lands  particularly  desig- 
nated.'^ 

839.  A  statutory  covenant  is  not  implied  when  a  general 
covenant  of  warranty  is  inserted  in  a  deed.*'  "  The  covenants 
raised  by  law  from  the  use  of  particular  words  are  only  intended 
to  be  operative  where  the  parties  themselves  have  omitted  to 
insert  covenants.  But  where  the  party  declares  how  far  he  will 
be  bound  to  warranty,  that  is  the  extent  of  his  covenant." '' 

840.  A  special  covenant  controls  a  general  covenant, 
whether  express  or  implied,  on  the  same  subject,  where  the 
two  are  inconsistent ;  ^  but  a  special  covenant  does  not  restrict 
the  scope  of  the  general  covenants  any  farther  than  the  special 
clause  is  in  conflict  or  covers  the  same  ground.  Thus  a  special 
covenant  "  against  all  taxes  against  us,  or  against  our  own  acts  in 
the  premises,"  in    a    deed  expressing  or  implying  all  the  usual 

1  Tarish  y.  White,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  71,  ^  Douglass  v.  Lewi.s,  1.31  U.  S.  75,  9 
24  S.  W.  Rep.  572.  Sup.   Ct.    Rep.  63-t ;   Leckly   v.   Enos,  6 

2  Douglass  V.  Lewis,  1.31  U.  S.  75,  9  S.  Wash.  247,  33  Tac.  Rep.  508,  34  Pac. 
Ct.  Rep.  634 ;  Gratz  y.  Ewalt,  2  Binn.  95  ;  Rep.  665 ;  Fialey  ;'.  Steele,  23  111.  56; 
Finley  v.  Steele,  23  III.  56.  Weems  v.  McCaughati,  7  Sm.  &  M.  422, 

2  Cunningham  v.  Dillard,  71  Mis.s.  61,  45  Am.  Dec.  314. 

13  So.  Rep.  882.  '  Weems  v.  McCaughan,   7   Sm.  &  M. 

*  Wheeler  v.  Wayne  Co.  132  111.  599,  24  422,  427,  45  Am.  Dec.  314. 

N.  W.  Rep.  625.  **  Alexander  v.  Schreiber,  10  Mo.  460; 

5  Kyle  i;.  McKenzie,  94  Ala.  236,  10  Shelton  ;;.  Pease,  10  Mo.  473,  482  ;  Collier 

So.  Rep.  654.  v.  Gnmble,  10  Mo.  467. 
682 


IMPLIED  COVENANTS.  [§  841. 

covenants  for  title,  limits  the  general  covenants  against  incum- 
brances and  for  quiet  enjoyment,  but  not  the  general  covenant  of 
seisin.i  The  different  covenants  will  be  construed  together  and 
harmonized,  if  this  can  reasonably  be  done.^ 

Covenants  of  seisin  and  for  quiet  enjoyment,  created  by  statute 
from  the  use  of  certain  words  in  a  deed,  are  operative  to  their 
full  extent  only  when  the  parties  have  failed  to  insert  covenants 
in  these  respects  in  the  deed,  and  may  be  controlled  and  limited 
in  their  operation  by  express  covenants  in  that  regard.^  Accord- 
ingly, where  a  deed  contains  statutory  words  which  imply  a  cove- 
nant that  the  grantor  "  is  seised  of  an  indefeasible  estate  in  fee 
simple,"  which  is  a  covenant  for  a  perfect  title,  and  this  is 
coupled  in  the  deed  with  an  express  covenant  that  the  land  is 
free  from  incumbrances  "  made  or  suffered  to  be  made  by  the 
grantor,  or  by  any  person  claiming  the  same  under  him,"  the 
statutory  covenant  and  the  express  covenant  are  incongruous  and 
repugnant,  and  the  express  covenant  must  prevail.* 

841.  An  implied  covenant  against  incumbrances  raised  by 
the  use  of  the  word  "  grant  "  is  restrained  by  an  express 
covenant  against  incumbrances  limited  by  its  terms  to  the  heirs, 
executors,  and  administrators  of  the  grantor,  unto  the  grantee, 
his  heirs  and  assigns.  "Under  the  rule  that  covenants  should 
be  construed  most  strongly  against  the  covenantor,  courts  have 
generally  given  effect  to  these  implied  covenants,  even  in  cases 
where  tliere  were  limited  express  covenants,  where  the  two  were 
not  inconsistent  or  were  independent  of  each  other,  limiting  the 
implied  covenant  against  incumbrances  to  the  personal  act  or 
sufferance  of  the  grantor."  ^ 

But  implied  covenants  do  not  arise  when  they  are  inconsistent 

1  Jarkson   v.  Green,  112  Ind.  341,    14     Weems  c.  McCaiighau,  7   Sni.  &  M.  422, 
N.  E.  l?ep.  89;  Rowc  v.  Heath,   23   Tex.     45  Am.  Dec.  314. 

614;    James  v.   Adams,    64    Tex.    193;  *  Douglass  v.  Lewis,  131  U.  S.  75,  9  S. 

Tracy    v.    Greffet,    54    Mo.    App.    562 ;  Ct.  Kcp.  634. 

Brown   V.  Tomlinson,  2   Greene    (Iowa),  6  Diin  v.  Dietrich,  3  N.  D.  3,  .53  N.  W. 

525.  llcp.    81,     per    Bnrtholomew,    J.,    citing 

2  James  v.  Adams,  64  Tex.  193,  198.  Gratz  v.  Kwalt,  2  Binn.  95  ;  Seitzinger  v. 
8  Douglfiss  r.  Lewis,  131  U.  S.  75,  9  S.  Weaver,  1  Rawle,  377  ;  Funk  v.  Voncida, 

Ct.  Rep.  6.34;  Gratz '-.Ewalt,  2  Binn.  95;  II  Serg.  &  R.  109,  14  Am.  Dec.  617; 
Stewart  v.  Anderson,  10  Ala.  504;  Win-  Shaffer  v.  Greer,  87  Pa.  St.  370;  Finlcy 
ston  r.  Vaughan,  22  Ark.  72,  76  Am.  v.  Steele,  23  111.  56 ;  Alexander  v.  Sclirei- 
Dec.   418;   Finley  v.  Steele,  23   111.  56;     her,    10  Mo.  460;  Shelton  v.  Pease,   10 

Mo.  473. 

683 


§  842.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

with  the  express  covenants,  or  when  it  appears  from  the  language 
used  by  tlie  parties  that  it  was  not  intended  that  any  such  cove- 
nimt  as  that  implied  by  the  statute  should  take  effect.^ 

III.  Covenants  for  Seisin  and  Right  to  Convey. 

842.  A  covenant  of  seisin  is  defined  to  be  "  an  assurance  to 
the  purchaser  that  the  grantor  has  the  very  estate  in  quantity 
and  quality  which  he  purports  to  convey,"  and  extends  not  only 
to  the  land  itself,  but  also  to  whatever  is  properly  appurtenant  to 
and  passes  by  the  conveyance  of  the  land.^  It  is  an  assurance 
that  the  grantor  has  substantially  the  very  estate,  both  in  quan- 
tity and  quality,  which  he  professes  to  convey.  It  is  broken  if 
there  is  a  material  deficiency  in  the  quantity  of  land  called  for  by 
the  deed.  It  is  broken,  also,  if  the  grantor  has  not  substantially 
the  very  estate  he  undertakes  to  convey.  If  he  undertakes  to 
convey  the  whole  estate  in  fee  absolutely,  the  covenant  of  seisin 
is  of  course  bi'oken  if  he  has  no  estate ;  and  it  is  broken  if  there 
is  an  outstanding  estate  in  another,  such  as  the  estate  of  a  life 
tenant.^ 

This  covenant  is  in  legal  effect  a  covenant  of  title  as  well  as  a 
covenant  of  possession,  and  is  broken  unless  the  grantor's  deed 
vests  in  the  grantee  an  indefeasible  estate  in  the  land  conveyed.^ 
The  grantee  need  not  prove  an  ouster  or  eviction  ;  it  is  sufficient 
to  negative  the  covenant  and  prove  that  the  grantor  did  not  have 
title  to  the  land  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance.^ 

The  covenant  of  right  to  convey  is  practically  synonymous 
with  the  covenant  of  seisin.^ 

1  Douglass  V.  Lewis,  131    U.  S.  75,  9  Johnston,  87  Ala.  220;  Parker  u.  Brown, 

Sup.   Ct.  Rep.  634;  Finley  v.   Steele,  23  15  N.  II.  176;  Mills  v.  Catlin,  22  Vt.  98 

III.    56  ;  Weems  v.  McCaughan,    7    Sm.  Catlin   v.    Hurlhurt,  .3  Vt.  403 ;  Zent   v. 

&  M.   422,   45   Am.    Dec.    314;    Dun   v.  Picken,  54  Iowa,  535,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  750 

Dietiich,  3  N.  D.  3,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  81.  Baker  v.  Hunt,  40  111.  264,  89  Am.  Dec 

-  Wetzel  u.  Richcreek  (Ohio),  40  N.  E.  346;   M'Carty   v.   Lcf^Lrett,  3    Hill,   134 

Rep.  1004 ;  Real  v.  Hollister,  20  Neb.  112,  Fitch  v.  Baldwin,  17  Johns.  161  ;  Recohs 

29  N.  W.  Rep.  189.  r.  Youn^love,  8  Box.  385;  Trice  v.  Kay- 

3  Moore  v.  Johnston,  87  Ala.  220,  6  So.  ton,  84  Va.  217,  4  S.  E.  Rep.  377. 
Kep.  50.  5  Riekert  v.  Snyder,  9  Wend.  416. 

■*  Clapp  V.  Herdman,  25  111.  App.  509  ;         «  Slater  v.  Rawson,  1   Met.  4.50 ;  Ray. 

Fitzhugh  V.  Crotjhan,  2   J.  J.  Marsh.  429,  mond   v.  Raymond,  10  Ciish.  134  ;  Griffin 

19  Am.  Dec.  139;   Resser  v.  Carney,  52  v.   Fairbrother,    10    Me.    91  ;    Rickert  v. 

Minn.  397,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  89  ;  Lockwood  Snyder,    9   Wend.   416,  421  ;    Brandt  v. 

V.  Sturdevant,  fiConn.  373,  385 ;  Comstock  Foster,  5  Iowa,  287,  294. 
V.  Comstock,    23   Conn.   349 ;    Moore   v. 

684 


COVENANTS   FOR   SEISIN   AND   RIGHT    TO   CONVEY.       [§§  843-845. 

843.  In  Massachusetts,  Maine,  and  Ohio  the  covenant  of 
seisin  does  not  require  an  indefeasible  title  in  the  grantor, 
but  only  possession  under  color  of  title. ^  "  If,  at  the  time  be 
executed  the  deed,  be  had  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  prem- 
ises, claiming  the  same  in  fee  simple  by  a  title  adverse  to  tbe 
owner,  he  was  seised  in  fee,  and  had  a  right  to  convey."  ^ 

844.  An  easement  which  does  not  interfere  with  the  tech- 
nical seisin  of  the  purchaser  does  not  constitute  a  breach  of 
the  covenant.3  The  existence  of  a  public  easement  in  the  land 
or  other  equitable  incumbrance  is  not  a  breach  of  this  covenant, 
provided  it  does  not  interfere  with  the  technical  seisin  of  the 
grantee.  A  public  right  of  way,  for  instance,  is  not  inconsistent 
with  the  vesting  of  the  freehold  in  the  purchaser.*  The  occupa- 
tion of  the  land  by  a  railroad  track  under  condemnation  proceed- 
ings is  only  an  easement,  and  cannot  be  relied  upon  as  a  breach 
of  the  covenant.^ 

The  covenant  is  not  broken  by  the  existence  of  a  subsequent 
written  contract  by  the  grantor  to  convey  the  land  to  another 
person ;  and  it  cannot  be  shown  in  support  of  such  contract  that 
it  was  made  in  pursuance  of  a  previous  oral  agreement.^ 

845.  A  covenant  of  seisin  in  a  warranty  deed,  wherein  the 
grantor  covenants  "  for  his  heirs,  executors,  and  administra- 
tors," creates  no  liability  on  tbe  part  of  the  grantor  for  a  breach 
of  such  covenant.^ 


1  Maine :  Montgomery  v.  Reed,  69  Me.  3  Ohio,  525  ;  Backus  v.  McCoy,  3  Ohio, 

510  ;  Wilson   v.  Widenham,  51   Me.  566  ;  211,  17  Am.  Dec.  585. 

Boothby  v.  Hathaway,  20  Me.  251  ;  Bax-  ^  Marston  v.  Hobbs,  2  Mass.  433,  439, 

ter  V.  Bnidbury,  20  Me.  260,  37  Am.  Dec.  3  Am.  Dec.  61,  per  Parsons,  C.  J. 

49 ;    Griffin   v.   Fairbrothcr,    10   Me.   91 ;  ^  Blondcau  v.  Sheridan,  81  Mo.  545. 

Wheeler  i;.  Hatch,  12  Me.  389  ;  Cushman  *'  Moore  r.  Johnston,  87  Ala.  220,  6  So. 

?'.  Blanchard,  2  Me.  266,  11  Am.  Dec.  76.  Rep.  50;  Lamb  v.  Danforth,  59  Me.  322, 

Massachusetts:  Slater  y.  Rawson,  1  Met.  8  Am.  Rep.  426. 

4.50  ;  Raymond    v.   Raymond,    10    Cush.  ''  Kellofj<,' y.  Malin,  .50  Mo.  496,  11  Am. 

134;  Cornell    v.  Jackson,  3    Cush.    506;  Rep.  426. 

Follctt  ?•.  Grant,   5  Allen,   174;  Wait  v.  «  Scckler  v.  Fox,  51   Mich.  92,   16  N. 

Maxwell,  5  Pick.  217,  16  Am.  Dec.  391  ;  W.  Rep.  246. 

Chapel  w.  Bull,  17  Mass.  219;  Twambly  ^  Rufncr   v.   McConnel,    14    111.    168;. 

V.  Henley,  4  Mass.  441.    Ohio:  Stambauf;h  Tr.aynor  v.  Palmer,  86  III.  477  ;  Bowne  v. 

V.  Smith,  23  Ohio  St.  584  ;  Great  Western  Wolcott,  1  N.  Dak.  497,  48   N.  W.  Rep. 

Stock  Co.  V.  Saas,  24  Ohio  St.  542 ;  De-  426,  per  Bartholomew,  J.  :  "  Courts  can- 

vore  V.  Sunderland,  17  Ohio,  52,  49  Am.  not  make  contracts  for  parties,  but  must 

Dec.  442;  Foote  y.  Burnet,  10  Ohio,  317,  take  them  as  they  find  them.     If  these 

327,36  Am.  Dec.  90 ;  Robinson  r.  Neil,  covenants    differ  from    usual   covenants 

685 


§§  840-846.J  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

OtluT  decisions,  however,  hold  that  such  a  covenant  imports 
the  personal  obligation  of  the  covenantor.^ 

846.  The  covenant  of  seisin  means,  ex  vi  termini,  the 
■whole  legal  title,  and  nothing  short  oF  it  will  answer.  A  cove- 
nant of  seisin  is  broken  if  the  covenantor  has  not  the  possession, 
the  riglit  of  possession,  and  the  complete  legal  title.^ 

The  covenant  of  seisin  is  not  broken  in  case  the  title  and  pos- 
session of  the  land  as  described  by  metes  and  bomids  passes  by 
the  deed,  though  the  building  thereon  encroaches  upon  the  adjoin- 
ing land.  The  building  in  such  case,  so  far  as  it  encroaches  upon 
other  land,  was  not  conveyed  by  the  deed.'^ 

847.  There  is  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  seisin  if  there  is 
no  land  in  existence  such  as  the  deed  purports  to  convey.'' 
But  there  is  no  breach  in  case  the  land  exists  and  the  grantor 
was  seised  of  it  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance,  and  it  can  be 
identified  by  the  description  in  the  deed,  though  it  i^  erroneously 
described  as  being  in  a  certain  city,  when  in  fact,  by  reason  of  a 
change  of  the  city  limits,  it  was  in  another  town.^ 

There  is  a  breach  of  the  covenant  if  the  grantor  does  not  own 
things  affixed  to  the  freehold,  such  as  would  pass  to  the  grantee 
by  a  conveyance  of  the  land  itself.''  A  conveyance  of  land 
includes  not  only  the  naked  earth,  but  everything  within  it,  and 
the  buildings,  trees,  fixtures,  and  fences  upon  itJ 

848.  A  tax  sale,  so  long  as  the  right  of  redemption  remains, 
is  not  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  seisin.  It  is  only  an  incum- 
brance.^    But  a  covenant  of  seisin  in  a  deed  of  vacant  and  unoc- 

under   the   same    circumstances,    we   are  19  Am.  Dec.  139  ;  Allen  r.  Allen,  48  Minn. 

bound  to  presume  that  parties  intend  they  462,  51  N.  W.  Eep.  473. 

should  so  differ.     We  are  bound  to  pre-  *  Stearn    v.   Hesdorfer,   9    Misc.   Rep. 

sume  that  the  grantee  accepted  this  cove-  134,   29  N.  Y.  Supp.    281 ;  Sasserath   v. 

nant  because  he  could  get  no  better.     It  Metzgar,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  959;  Burke  v. 

may  well  be  that  the  grantor  was  willing  Nichols,  1  Abb.  Dec.  260. 

to  bind  his  heirs  and  rejjresentatives  to  *  Bacon   v.    Lincoln,   4    Cush.   210,    1 

the  extent  of  the  estate  that   they  might  Am.   Dec.    765 ;    Basford   v.   Pearson,   9 

receive  from  him,   but  was   unwilling  to  Allen,  387,  85  Am.  Dec.  764. 

bind  himself.     The  condition  of  the  title  ^  Perry  v.    Clark,    157    Mass.  330,    32 

in  these  cases  makes  thai  view  all  the  more  N.  E.  Rep.  226. 

probable."  g  Mott  r:.  Palmer,  1  N.  Y.  564 ;  West 

1  Smith  V.  Lloyd,  29    Mich.  382  ;   Judd  v.  Stewart,  7  Pa.  St.  122. 

V.  Randall,  36   Minn.   12,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  ''  Powers  r.  Dennison,  30  Vt.  752. 

589  ;  Hilmert  v.  Christian,  29  Wis.  104.  ^  Semple  v.  Whorton,  68  Wis.  626,  32 

-  Lockwood  f.  Sturdevant,  6  Conn.  373;  N.  W.  Rep.    690;    Baldwin   v.   Ely,   66 

Fitzhugh  V.  Croghan,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  429,  Wis.  171,  181,  28  N.  W.  Rep.  392. 

em 


COVENANTS   FUK   SEISIN   AND   RIGHT    TO   CONVEY.       [^§  849-851. 

cupied  land  is  broken  by  the  recording  of  a  tax  deed  issued  to  a 
third  person  on  a  tax-sale  certificate  outstanding  when  the  war- 
ranty deed  was  executed,  as  the  recording  of  a  tax  deed  on  vacant 
land  vests  the  grantee  with  the  constructive  possession.^  The 
grantor  may,  however,  contest  the  validity  of  such  tax  deed.^ 

849.  The  burden  of  proving  a  breach  is  on  the  plaintiff, 
who  must  set  forth  facts  sufiicient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action.'^ 
"Where  parties  contract  concerning  lands  on  the  presumption 
that  one  of  them  is  the  owner,  it  is  a  reasonable  presumption  that 
they  have  first  satisfied  themselves  by  inquiry  what  the  title  is ; 
and,  if  a  defect  comes  to  their  knowledge  afterwards,  the  party 
complaining  of  it  should  point  it  out.  The  law  cannot  assume 
that  defects  exist  when  the  parties  concerned,  who  may  fairly  be 
supposed  to  have  inquired  into  the  facts,  assume  the  contrary."  * 

But  it  is  held  when  the  plaintiff  has  alleged  that  the  defend- 
ant was  not  seised  of  the  land,  and  the  defendant  puts  this 
allegation  in  issue  by  denial,  the  burden  is  upon  him  to  show  his 
seisin,  and  not  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  the  defendant  was 
not  seised.'^ 

850.  If  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  the  grantee  finds 
the  land  in  the  possession  of  one  claiming  paramount  title, 
the  covenant  of  seisin  is  broken,  and  it  is  not  necessary  for  the 
grantee,  in  order  to  recover  for  the  breach,  to  prove  actual 
eviction.^ 

In  case  the  grantor  has  undertaken  to  convey  unoccupied  lands 
to  which  he  has  no  title,  there  is  at  once  a  constructive  eviction 
of  the  grantee.' 

851.  A  covenantee  may  maintain  a  suit  upon  the  covenant 

1  Daggett  V.  Reas,  79  Wis.  60,  48  N.  ^  jerald  r.  EUy,  51  Iowa,  321,  1  N.  W. 
W.  Rep.  127.  Rep.  639;  Blackshire  r.  Iowa  Homestead 

2  Mclnnis  v.  Lyman,  62  AVis.  191,  22  Co.  39  Iowa,  624;  Barker  v.  Kuhn,  38 
N.  W.  Rep.  405.  Iowa,  392  ;  Schofield  v.  Iowa  Homestead 

8  Laudt  V.  Major  (Colo.),  31  Pac.  Rep.  Co.  32  Iowa,  317. 

524 ;  Stearn  v.   Hesdorfer,  9  Misc.  Rep.  ^  Murphy  v.  Price,  48  Mo.  247  ;  Adkius 

134,    29    N.  Y.    Supp.    281  ;    Woolley  v.  v.  Tomlinson,  121  Mo.  487,26  S.  W.  Rep. 

Newcombe,  87  N.  Y.  605,  612,  overruling  573  ;   Mitchell   v.  Hazen,  4  Conn.  495,  10 

earlier  New  York  cases;  Clapp  v.  Herd-  Am.     Dec.    169;     Wetzel    v.    Richcreek 

man,  25  111.  App.  509.  (Ohio  St.),  40  N.  E.  Rep.  1004 ;  Matteson 

*  Ingalls   V.   ll-jXon,  25  Mich.    32,   per  v.  Vauglm,  38  Mich.  373. 

Cooley,  J.     Also,    Peck    r.  Iloughtiiling,  "  Mclnnis  v.    Lymun,  62   Wis.    191,22 

35  Mich.  127  ;  Woolley  v.  Newcombe,  87  N.  W.  Rep.  405  ;  Nichol  t;.  Alexander,  28 

N.  Y.  605  ;  Jerald  v.  Elly,  51   Iowa,  321,  Wis.  118. 


1  N.  W.  Rep.  639. 


681 


§§  85'2,  853.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

of  seisin,  although  at  the  time  of  bringing  it  he  had  parted 
with  his  title  to  the  land.  The  covenant,  it  broken  at  all,  was 
broken  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance.  The  covenantee  is  the 
only  person  who  can  maintain  an  action  for  a  breach  of  the  cove- 
nant, wliicli  is  a  non-assignable  chose  in  action.  If  the  covenantee 
discharges  the  liability  which  constituted  a  breach  of  the  cove- 
nant, or  in  effect  takes  up  the  covenant  for  his  own  benefit,  so 
that  he  is  in  a  position  to  recover  the  money  he  has  paid  out  to 
perfect  his  title,  it  does  not  matter  that  he  has  parted  with  the 
title  to  the  property .^ 

IV.   Covenant  against  Incumbrances. 

852.  An  incumbrance  within  the  meaning  of  the  covenant 
is  any  interest  in  a  third  person  consistent  with  a  title  in  fee 
in  the  grantee,  if  such  outstanding  interest  injuriously  affects 
the  value  of  the  property.  It  is  not  necessarily  a  lien,  specific  or 
determinable  in  amount.^ 

A  covenant  against  incumbrances  need  not  be  expressed  in  any 
particular  words.  Thus  a  covenant  "  against  all  persons  whom- 
soever, and  all  claims  whatsoever,"  except  a  certain  sum  of  money, 
is  a  covenant  against  incumbrances  as  well  as  a  covenant  of  war- 
ranty. The  word  "  claims,"  to  the  common  understanding,  would 
embrace  all  demands  of  a  pecuniary  nature  existing  against  the 
land,  with  the  exception  mentioned  ;  or,  in  other  words,  it  means 
the  incumbrances  upon  the  land.^ 

853.  Under  a  covenant  that  the  grantor  had  "  not  done,  or 
sufifered  to  be  done,  anything  w^hereby  the  said  premises  "  are 
or  may  be  in  any  manner  incumbered,  the  grajitor  is  liable  only 
for  his  own  act,  or  for  an  act  within  his  control.*  An  incum- 
brance already  upon  the  property  when  the  grantor  acquired  title 

1  Clement  u.  Bank,  61  Vt.  298,  17  Atl.  399;  Stambangh  v.  Smith,  23  Ohio  St. 
Rep.  717;  Cornell  v.  Jackson,  3  Cush.  584;  Huyck  v.  Andrews,  113  N.  Y.  81, 
506.  8^,  20  N.  E.   Rep.  581  ;  Fritz  v.  Pusey,  31 

2  Rawle,  Cov.  §§  75,  76,  191  ;  Prescott  Minn.  368,  8  N.  W.  Rep.  94;  Warner  v. 
V.  Trueman,  4  Mass.  627,3  Am.  Dec.  249 ;  Rogers,  23  Minn.  34  ;  Post  v.  Campau,  42 
Clark  V.  Fisher,   54  Kans.  403,  38  Pac.  Mich.  90,  3  N.  W.  Rep.  272. 

Rep.  493;  Lafferty  v.  Milligan,  165  Pa.  3  Johnson   v.  Hollensworth,  48    Mich. 

St.  534,   30  Atl.  Rep.    1030;   Barlow  w.  140, 11  N.  W.  Rep.  843.     And  see  Leddy 

McKinley,  24  Iowa,  69  ;  Harrison  v.  Des  v.  Enos,  6  Wash.  247,  33  Pac.  Rep.  508. 

Moines  &  Ft.  D.  R.  Co.  (Iowa)  58  N.   W.  *  Hobson  v.  Middleton,  6  Barn.  &  C. 

Rep.  1081  ;  Carter  v.  Denman,  23  N.  J.  295  ;  Townson  v.  Green,  2  Car.  &  P.  110; 

L.  260 ;    Chapman    ;;.    Kimball,   7   Neb.  Stannard  v.  Forbes,  6  Adol.  &  E.  572, 
688 


COVENANT  AGAINST  INCUMBRANCES.   [^^  8o-i,  855. 

is  not  within  such  covenant.^  In  an  action  by  a  purchaser  under 
such  a  covenant  to  recover  taxes  for  the  jeav  in  which  the  con- 
veyance was  made,  he  must  allege  and  prove  that  the  grantor 
was  the  owner  on  the  day  when  the  lien  for  the  taxes  attached 
to  the  property.^ 

854.  This  covenant  is  a  protection  only  against  incum- 
brances existing  when  the  covenant  was  made.  Thus  where 
a  purchaser  assumed  and  agreed  to  pay  a  mortgage  upon  the  land, 
and  afterwards  conveyed  it  by  a  deed  in  which  he  covenanted 
that  it  was  free  from  all  incumbrances  made  or  suffered  by  him, 
but,  this  deed  not  having  been  recorded,  he  subsequently  made  a 
new  mortgage  to  the  holder  of  the  mortgage  he  had  assumed,  for 
a  similar  amount,  and  the  old  mortgage  was  thereupon  discharged, 
it  was  held  that  the  new  mortgage  was  not  a  breach  of  the  cove- 
nant made  in  the  mortgagor's  deed.  There  was  no  incumbrance 
made  or  suffered  by  him  at  the  time  of  his  conveyance.^ 

855.  A  mortgage  is  of  course  an  incumbrance  within  the 
meaning  of  this  covenant.  Any  debt  which  by  contract  or 
statute  is  made  a  lien  upon  the  land  is  an  incumbrance,  as,  for 
instance,  a  judgment,  an  attachment.  A  lien  at  common  law  or 
in  equity  is  an  incumbrance.  It  is  seldom  that  any  controversy 
arises  in  regard  to  such  an  incumbrance,  except  in  cases  in  which 
the  covenant  against  incumbrances  is  in  some  way  qualified  with 
reference  to  a  particular  mortgage  or  other  incumbrance  named. 

A  general  exception  of  a  mortgage  or  other  incumbrance  from 
the  operation  of  a  deed  qualifies  all  the  covenants.^  Thus  where, 
immediately  following  the  description,  the  land  was  declared  to 
be  subject  to  a  mortgage  described,  and  it  was  contended  that, 
the  mortgage  not  being  excepted  from  the  covenant  against 
incumbrances,  there  was  a  breach  of  the  covenant,  it  was  held 
that  the  covenant  did  not  apply  to  that  incumbrance,  which  by 
the  terms  of  the  deed  was  excepted.^     The  words  "  subject  to  a 

1  Parker  v.  Parker,  93  Ala.  80,  9  So.         »  Foster  v.  Woodward,   141  Mass.  160, 
Rep.  426  ;  Brown  v.  Young,  69  Iowa,  625,     6  N.  E.  Kep.  8.5.3. 

29  N.  W.  Rep.  941  ;  Cole  v.  Lee,  30  Me.  *  Sweet  i-.  Brown,  12  Met.  17.'>,  177,  45 

392;  Comstock  v.  Smith,  13  I'ick.  116,23  Am.   Dec.  243;  Sandwich  Manuf.  Co.  v. 

Am.  Dec.  670 ;  Parish  v.  White,  5  Tex.  Zelimer,  48   Minn.   408,  51    N.  W.  Rep. 

Civ.  App.    71,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  572;  Mc-  379;  .Jackson   v.   Hoffman,   9  Cow.   271; 

Intyre  n.  De  Long,  71  Tex.  86,  8  S.  W.  Gerdine  v.  Menage,  41   Miun.  417,  43   N. 

Rep.  622  ;  Rhode  v.  Alley,  27  Tex.  442.  W.  Rep.  91. 

2  Smith  V.  Eigerman  (lud.),  31  N.  E.  ''  Freeman  v.  Foster,  55  Me.  508;  Kin- 
Eep.  862.  near  v.  Lowell,  34  Me.  299. 

689 


§§  856,  857.]  COVENANTS    FOR    TITLE. 

mortgage "  were  used  as  a  part  of  the  description  of  tlie  estate 
granted,  and  to  that  estate,  thus  qualified,  the  covenants  apply .^ 
Of  course  the  same  rule  applies  when  the  grant  is  made  subject 
to  certain  easements ;  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  applies, 
not  to  an  estate  in  fee,  but  to  the  fee  diminished  by  the  existing 
easements,  which  are  excepted  out  of  the  grant.^ 

856.  The  exception  of  a  mortgage  of  a  certain  amount, 
described  also  by  the  names  of  the  parties  and  the  record,  is 
an  exception  of  both  the  principal  and  interest  of  the  incum- 
brance, and  the  purchaser,  having  been  obliged  to  pay  the  interest 
as  well  as  the  principal  to  prevent  a  foreclosure,  cannot  maintain 
an  action  on  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  on  the  ground 
that  the  principal  only  of  the  mortgage  was  excepted.  The  prin- 
cipal and  interest  constitute  a  single  incumbrance."^ 

The  costs  of  a  foreclosure  suit  follow  the  mortgage  incum- 
brance. Where  a  mortgage  was  excepted  from  all  the  covenants 
of  a  deed  which  was  made  in  pursuance  of  a  contract  of  sale, 
but  before  the  delivery  of  the  deed  the  holder  of  the  mortgage 
commenced  proceedings  to  foreclose  it,  and  filed  a  notice  of  the 
pendency  of  the  action,  the  payment  by  the  grantee  of  accrued 
costs  to  procure  a  discontinuance  of  the  suit  was  held  not  to  be 
sufficient  to  support  an  action  on  the  covenant.  The  proceedings 
to  foreclose  the  mortgage  were  merely  an  incident  to  the  mortgage 
incumbrance.'* 

857.  A  covenant  against  incumbrances  may  be  qualified  by 
a  mortgage  given  by  the  purchaser  to  his  grantor  as  a  part  of 
the  same  transaction.  Thus,  if  the  deed  contains  such  a  cove- 
nant, and  a  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust  given  by  the  grantee 
at  the  same  time  of  the  same  land  contains  a  special  covenant 
that  the  mortgagor  will  pay  all  the  taxes  then  existing  on  the 
land  conveyed,  the  general  covenant  of  the  deed  is  qualified  by 
the  special  covenant,  so  that  the  general  covenant  cannot  be 
enforced.^ 

A  general  covenant  is  also  qualified  and  limited  by  the  terms 

1  Brown  v.   South  Boston  Sav.  Bank,  3  Shanahan  v.  Perry,  130  Mass.  460. 
148  Mass.  300,  19  N.  E.  Rep.  382;  Hoxie  ■*  Monel!  v.  Douglass,  17   N.  Y.  Supp. 
V.  Finney,  16  Gray,  332  ;  Sweet  w.  Brown,  178  ;  Bradshaw  v.  Crosby,  151  Mass.  237, 
12  Met.  175,  45  Am.  Dec.  243.  24  N.  E.  Rep.  47. 

2  Wood  V.  Boyd,  145  Mass.  176,  13  ^  Geer  v.  Redman,  92  Mo.  375,  4  S.  W. 
N.  E.'Rep.  476.  Rep.  745. 

690 


COVENANT   AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.       [§§  858,  859. 

of  the  grant,  and,  this  being  only  of  the  grantor's  right,  title,  and 
interest,  the  covenant  is  restricted  to  such  right. ^ 

858.  As  a  general  rule,  a  restricted  covenant  does  not  affect 
the  operation  of  a  succeeding  covenant  not  connected  with  it, 
or  not  of  the  same  import  with  it.^  Thus  the  fact  that  in  the 
covenant  against  incumbrances  a  mortgage  is  excepted  does  not 
imjDly  that  the  covenant  of  general  warranty  is  to  be  restricted 
and  made  subject  to  such  incumbrance.  The  two  covenants  are 
not  connected,  and  are  not  of  the  same  nature  or  import.-^  The 
exception  in  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  exempts  the 
grantor  from  an  action  upon  that  particular  covenant,  and  it  can 
have  no  further  effect.  It  is  perfectly  consistent  for  the  grantor 
to  warrant  the  title  by  a  general  covenant,  though  he  has  made 
the  covenant  against  incumbrances  subject  to  a  mortgage.*  "  A 
prudent  grantor  may  desire  that  the  deed  shall  state  the  truth, 
and  he  is  obliged  to  give  the  grantee  notice  of  an  incumbrance ; 
and  he  may  know  or  believe  that  the  incumbrance  will  be 
removed  before  it  ripens  into  a  title  which  would  be  ground  for 
an  eviction,  so  that  he  might  risk  a  warranty  against  an  eviction, 
when  he  might  be  unwilling  to  take  the  risk  of  a  present  lia- 
bility for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  against  incumbrances."  ^ 

859.  An  exception  of  a  mortgage  following  all  the  cove- 
nants is  held  to  limit  and  restrain  all  the  preceding  covenants.^ 

1  Allen  V.  Holton,  20  Pick.  458  ;  Sweet  v.  Richards,  11  East,  633 ;  Norman  v.  Fos- 
i;.  Brown,  12  Met.  17.5,  45  Am.  Dec.  243 ;  ter,  1  Mod.  101  ;  Smith  v.  Compton,  3  B. 
Blanchard  v.  Brooks,  12  Pick.  47,  66  ;  &  Ad.  189  ;  Duvall  v.  Crai<,s  2  Wheat.  45, 
Hoxie  V.  Finney,  16  Gray,  332;  Brown  58;  King  v.  Kilbride,  58  Conn.  109,  19 
V.  South  Boston  Sav.  Bank,  148  Ma.S8.  Atl.  Kep.  519 ;  Linton  y.  Allen,  154  Mass. 
300,  19  N.  E.  Rep.  382.  432,  437,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  780;  Estabrook 

2  Howell  V.  Richards,  11  East,  633;  v.  Smith,  6  Gray,  570,  572,  577,  66  Am. 
Sandwich  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Zellmer,  48  Dec.  445;  Sumner  v.  Williams,  8  Mass. 
Minn.  408,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  379;  Bennett  162,202,  214,5  Am.  Dec.  83  ;  Donahoe 
t'.  Keehn,  67  Wis.  154,  162,  29  N.  W.  «.  Etaery,  9  Met.  63 ;  Cornell  v.  Jackson, 
Rep.  207,  and  30  N.  W.  Rej).  112  ;  Rowe  *  3  Cush.  506;  Peters  i;.  Grubb,  21  Pa.  St. 
V.  Heath,  23  Tex.  614.  4G0  ;  Bennett  v.   Kcehn,  67  Wis.  1.54,  29 

Contra,  Bricker  V.  Bricker,  1 1  Ohio  St.  N.    W.    Rep.    207,  30  N.  W.   Rep.    112; 

240.  Dickinson  v.  Iloomes,  1  Gratt.  302,  8  Gratt. 

3  Estabrook  v.  Smith,  6  Gray,  570,  572 ;  353  ;  Rowe  v.  Heath,  23  Tex.  614. 
Ogden  V.  Ball,  40  Minn.  94,  41   N.  W.  *"'  Sandwich     Maniif.   Co.    v.    Zellmer, 
Rep  453.  48   Minn.  408,    51    N.  W.  Rep.  379,  per 

*  Sandwich  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Zellmer,  48     Vanderburgh,  .J. 
Minn.  408,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  379  ;  Merritt  v.         <!  Morri.son  v.  Morrison,  38  Iowa,  73; 
Byers,  46  Minn.  74,48  N.  W.  Rep.  417;     Bennett  o.   Keehn,  67  Wis.    154,   29   N. 
Calkins  v.  Copley,  29  Minn.  471  ;  Howell     W.  Rep.  207,  30  N.  W.  Rep.  112. 

691 


§  8G0.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

''  The  rule  is,  however,  that  when  the  limitation  is  in  a  precedent 
covenant,  it  does  not  limit  or  restrict  the  subsequent  covenlmts, 
unless  it  clearly  appears  from  the  whole  deed  that  such  was  the 
intention  of  the  parties."  ^ 

When  the  mortgage  is  not  only  excepted  from  the  covenant 
against  incumbrances,  but  the  grantee  expressly  assumes  and 
agrees  to  pay  the  mortgage,  the  mortgage  is  in  effect  excepted 
from  the  covenant  of  warranty ;  for  the  existence  of  the  pro- 
vision for  the  assumption  of  the  mortgage  shows  that  it  was  the 
intention  of  the  parties  that  the  grantee  should  pay  it,  and  that 
the  grantor  was  not  to  be  called  upon  to  warrant  or  indemnify 
the  grantee  agaiust  such  mortgage.^ 

860.  But  if  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  is  qualified 
by  the  exception  of  a  mortgage,  and  the  subsequent  cove- 
nant of  "warranty  is  qualified  by  a  different  specific  exception, 
such  as  the  taxes  for  a  certain  year,  there  is  a  still  stronger  reason 
for  holding  that  the  qualification  in  respect  to  the  incumbrance 
does  not  extend  to  the  covenant  of  warranty. ^  "The  mere  fact 
that  the  mortgages  were  excepted  from  the  covenant  as  to 
incumbrances  had  not  the  effect  to  subject  the  land  in  the  hands 
of  the  grantees  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  mortgages.  Such  excep- 
tion, considered  alone,  merely  limited  the  operation  of  the  cove- 
nant as  to  incumbrances  by  excluding  the  mortgages  therefrom.* 
AVe  do  not  decide  whether,  if  the  covenants  of  warranty  were 
in  general  terms,  without  being  expressly  restricted  b}^  the  one 
specified  exception  of  taxes,  it  should  be  construed  to  have  been 
the  intention  of  the  parties  that  the  express  qualification  of  the 
covenant  as  to  incumbrances  should  also  be  applicable  to  and 
limit  the  subsequent  covenant  of  warranty.^  But,  whatever  may 
be  the  proper  construction  of  the  covenants  in  such  a  case,  that 
now  before   us  is  controlled  by  the  fact  that  the   covenant  of 

1  Bennett  r.  Keehn,  67  Wis.  154,  167,  that  the  latter  covenant  should  be  thus 
per  Taylor,  J.  qualified  by  intendment.     Opposed  to  this 

2  Lively  V.  Rice,  150  Mass.  171,  22  N.  are  Estabrook  v.  Smith,  6  Gray,  570; 
E.  Rep.  888  ;  Keller  v.  Ashford,  133  U.  S.  King  v.  Kilbride,  58  Conn.  109,  19  Atl. 
610,  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  494.  Rep.   519.     See,  also,  Bennett  v.   Keehn, 

3  Merritt  v.  Byers,  46  Minn.  74,  48  67  Wis.  154,  30  N.  W.  Rep.  112  ;  Sumner 
N.  W.  Rep.  417.  V.   Williams,   8   Mass.    162,  202;  Dnvall 

*  Calkins  v.  Copley,  29  Minn.  471,  13  v.  Craip,  2  Wheat.  45;  Rowe  v.  Heath, 

N.  W.  Rep.  904.  23  Tex.   614;  Norman    v.  Foster,  1  Mod. 

6  Bricker  v.  Bricker,  11    Ohio  St.  240,  101  ;  Howell  i:  Richards,  11  East,  633,3 

may  be  referred  to  as  supporting  the  view  Washb.  Real  Prop.  672. 

692 


COVENANT    AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.  [§  861. 

warranty  is  qualified  by  one  express  exception,  no  allusion  being 
there  made  to  the  mortgages.  These  covenants  were  formally  made 
and  accepted  for  the  purpose  of  expressing  the  obligations  and 
rights  of  the  parties.  Their  attention  being  directed  to  the  neces- 
sity of  stating  the  conditions  or  qualifications  which  were  to  restrict 
the  general  language  and  effect  of  this  important  covenant,  they 
made  one  specific  exception.  This  forbids  that  another  excep- 
tion be  added  to  that  by  mere  uncertain  implication.  From 
the  fact  that  the  covenantor  was  unwilling  to  covenant  that  the 
land  was  not  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  incumbered  by  these 
mortgages,  the  inference  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  he  did 
not  intend  to  warrant  and  defend  the  title  even  as  against  such 
mortgages."  ^ 

And  so,  where  a  second  mortgage  of  land  recited  that  the  land 
was  "  conveyed  subject  to  "  a  certain  right  of  drainage,  a  certain 
easement,  "  and  the  moitgage  hereinafter  named,"  and  the 
grantor  covenanted  that  he  was  seised  in  fee  of  the  "  aforegranted 
premises  ; "  that  they  were  free  from  all  incumbrances  "  except  a 
certain  mortgage,"  describing  it,  "  the  right  of  drainage,  and  the 
easement  aforesaid ;  "  that  he  had  good  right  to  sell  and  convey 
the  same ;  and  that  lie  would  warrant  and  defend  the  same  "  against 
the  lawful  claims  and  demands  of  all  persons,  except  the  right 
of  drainage  and  the  easement  aforesaid,"  —  it  was  held  that  the 
covenant  of  warranty  included  the  first  mortgage.^ 

861.  Parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  contradict  or 
control  a  covenant  against  incumbrances  by  showing  that 
the  parties  agreed  that  a  particular  incumbrance,  not  expressly 
excepted  in   the  deed,  was  orally  excepted,  or  that  the  grantee 

1  Merritt  v.  Ryers,  46  Minn.  74,  48  N.  otlier  hand,  if  the  <;rantiuf,^  part  simply 
W.  Rep.  417,  per  Dickinson,  J.  dfsciibcd    tlie    land,  not   mciilioning  the 

2  Ayer  v.  Philadelphia,  &c.  Face  Brick  mortgage,  arid  the  covenants  were  in  their 
Co.  1.57  Mass.  57,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  717.  present  form,  the  warranty  would  extend 
Holmes,  J.,  said  :  "  If  the  granting  part  to  the  mortgage,  and  the  demandants 
of  the  deed  stood  as  now,  and  was  fol-  would  be  entitled  to  prevail."  Estal)n)ok 
lowed  by  general  covenants  with  no  ex-  v.  Smith,  6  Gray,  572,  G6  Am.  Dec.  445. 
captions,  the  warranty  would  be  held  to  But  when  the  grantor  says  that  he  will 
be  limited  to  what  purported  to  he  con-  warrant  and  defend  "  against  the  lawful 
veyed,  —  that  is,  to  the  land  subject  to  claims  and  demands  of  all  persons,  ex- 
the  mortgage,  etc., — and  would  not  ex-  ccpt  the  right  of  drainage  and  the  ease- 
tend  to  the  mortgage.  Brown  v.  Bank,  ment  aforesaid,  a  ma  joiity  of  the  court  feel 
148  Mass.  300,  .304,  19  N.  K.  Rep.  382;  l)ound  to  take  his  words  as  binding  him 
Freeman  v.  Foster,  55  Me.  ."iOS ;  Ja'-kson  to  warrant  against  the  prior  mortgage." 
V.  Hoffman,  9  Cow.   271,  273.     On   the 

693 


§  862.] 


COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 


orally  agreed  to  assume  such  incumbrance.  Such  evidence  would 
have  the  eiYect  of  varying  and  contradicting  tho  written  deed, 
unless  it  appeared  that  the  exception  was  omitted  through  fraud 
or  accident,  which  would  be  ground  for  reforming  the  deed.^ 

The  leo-al  effect  of  a  covenant  against  incumbrances  cannot 
be  cut  down  or  varied  by  proof  of  an  oral  agreement  by  the 
grantee  to  pay  an  assessment  then  existing  upon  the  land.'^ 

862.  An  attempt  has  been  made  to  establish  an  exception 
to  this  general  rule  of  law.  In  Indiana  it  has  been  held  in  some 
cases  that  proof  is  admissible  to  show  that  an  existing  incum- 
brance was  agreed  by  the  parties  not  to  be  embi-aced  within  the 
covenant  against  incumbrances,  and  that  the  price  paid  was  what 
the  parties  agreed  upon  as  the  purchase-price  subject  to  the 
incumbrance.  Thus,  if  one  buys  land  incumbered  by  a  railroad 
right  of  way,  and  takes  a  deed  of  general  warranty  therefor 
without  excepting  the  incumbrance,  it  may  be  proven  that  the 
price  paid  was  what  the  parties  agreed  upon  as  the  purchase- 
price  subject  to  the  incumbrance.  It  may  be  proved  that  the 
grantee  agreed,  as  a  part  of  the  consideration,  to  pay  an  existing 
incumbrance.^ 


1  Illinois :  Sidders  v.  Riley,  22  111.  109  ; 
Wadhams  v.  Innis,  4  111.  App.  642.  In- 
diana :  Bever  v.  North,  107  Ind.  544,  8 
N.  E.  Rep.  576  ;  Morehou.se  v.  Heath,  99 
Ind.  .509;  Rinehart  v.  Rinehart,  91  Ind. 
,89.  See  the  following  section.  Iowa : 
Evans  v.  Duncau,  82  Iowa,  401,  48  N.  W. 
Rep.  922 ;  Johnson  v.  Walter,  60  Iowa, 
315,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  325  ;  Gerald  v.  Elley, 
45  Iowa,  322  ;  Van  Wagner  v.  Van  Nos- 
trand,  19  Iowa,  422.  Maine:  Dounell  v. 
Thom])son,  10  Me.  170,  177,  25  Am.  Dec. 
216  ;  Porter  v.  Noyes,  2  Me.  22,  11  Am. 
Dec.  30.  Massachusetts :  Flynn  v.  Bour- 
neuf,  143  Mass.  277,  9  N.  E.  Rep.  6.50; 
Howe  V.  Walker,  4  Gray,  318  ;  Estabrook 
V.  Smith,  6  Gray,  570,  578,  66  Am.  Dee. 
445 ;  Spurr  v.  Andrew,  6  Allen,  420 ; 
Batchelder  v.  Sturgis,  3  Gush.  201  ;  Ray- 
mond V.  Raymond,  10  Gush.  134;  Harlow 
V.  Thomas,  15  Pick.  66,  69;  Leland  v. 
Stone,  10  Mass.  459;  Townsend  v.  Weld, 
8  Mass.  146.  The  cases  of  Carr  v.  Dooley, 
119  Mass.  294,  and  McCormick  v.  Chee- 
rers,  124  Mass.  262,  do  not  decide  other- 

694 


wise,  but  deal  with  attempts  to  add  a  fur- 
ther obligation  to  those  assumed  by  the 
covenant,  and  not  with  an  attempt  to  cut 
down  the  covenant.  Minnesota :  Bruns 
?;.  Schreiber,  43  Minn.  468,  45  N.  W.  Rep. 
861.  Missouri:  McLeod  r.  Skiles, 81  Mo. 
595  ;  Patterson  v.  Yancy,  81  Mo.  379  ; 
Landman  v.  Ingram,  49  Mo.  212.  New 
York:  Suydam  v.  Jones.  10  Wend.  180, 
185,  25  Am.  Dec.  552;  Duncan  v.  Blair, 
5  Denio,  196.  Ohio:  Long  v.  Moler,  5 
Ohio  St.  271.  Pennsylvania  ;  Collingwood 
V.  Irwin,  3  Watts,  306.  Texas  :  Bigham 
V.  Bigham,  57  Tex.  238.  Vermont :  Beach 
V.  Packard,  10  Vt.  96,  33  Am.  Dec.  185. 

2  Simanovich  v.  Wood,  145  Mass.  180, 
13  N.  E.  Rep.  391 ;  Flynn  v.  Bourneuf, 
143  Mass.  277,  9  N.  E.  Rep.  650. 

3  Maris  v.  lies  (Ind.  App.),  30  N.  E. 
Rep.  152.  The  court  say:  "In  this  view 
it  is  quite  immaterial  whetherthere  was  a 
mistake  or  not  in  omitting  to  except  the 
right  of  way  from  the  conveyance.  It 
affects  the  consideration  only,  and  this  may 
always  be  incjuired  into,  except  to  the  ex- 


COVENANT   AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.  [§  863. 

These  decisions  proceed  upon  the  ground  that  they  constitute 
an  exception  to  the  well-recognized  rule  that  a  grantor  cannot 
contradict  the  terms  of  a  deed  by  parol  evidence  ;  that  the  deed 
as  executed  is  the  contract  of  the  parties.  The  exception  is  that 
parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  prove  the  true  consideration  paid, 
except  where  the  deed  itself  fully  and  specifically  states  the 
consideration.! 

863.  The  scope  and  application  of  covenants  in  a  deed 
cannot  be  varied  or  restricted  by  parol  evidence.  Thus,  where 
land  was  conveyed  with  a  covenant  against  incumbrances  for  one 
entire  pecuniary  consideration  expressed  in  the  deed  and  actually 
paid,  evidence  is  not  admissible,  in  defence  to  an  action  on  such 
covenant,  of  a  prior  parol  agreement  to  the  effect  that,  as  to  a 
part  of  the  granted  land  upon  which  an  incumbrance  rested,  the 
consideration  was  not  applicable,  but  that  the  conveyance  was 
gratuitous.  The  purpose  of  such  evidence  is  not  to  show  the  real 
consideration  paid,  but  to  show  that  the  consideration  was  in  fact 
paid  wholly  for  a  part  of  the  land,  and  that  another  part  of  the 
land  conveyed  as  an  entirety,  and  designated  only  by  this  parol 
evidence,  was  conveyed  gratuitously,  none  of  the  price  paid  being 
applicable  to  that,  and  hence  that  the  covenantor  was  not  legally 
liable  to  respond  in  substantial  damages  for  any  defect  of  title, 
or  for  any  incumbrance  in  respect  thereto.^ 

A  grantor  is  not  allowed  to  contradict  his  covenants  by  sliow- 
ing  by  parol  that  a  third  person  who  was  the  real  purchaser  agreed 
to  pay  the  incumbrances  for  a  breach  of  which  the  grantor  is 
sued.  He  cannot  show  that  the  agreement  of  sale  was  made 
with  another  person,  and  that  plaintiff's  name  was  inserted  as 

tent  to  which  it  affects  the  vah'dity  of  the  Fitzer,  29  Ind.  468 ;  Pitman  v.  Conner,  27 

conveyance.     If  the  grant  to  the  railroad  Ind.  337  ;  Allen  v.  Lee,  1  Ind.  58, 48  Am. 

had  been  for  the  fee,  the  covenants  of  title  Dec.  352. 

and  seisin  would  liave  been  involved,  and  '  This  attempted  distinction  has  given 

parol  evidence  would  not  have  been  ad-  risen  to  a  vast  amount  of  litigation  in  In- 

missible  to  show  that  the  land  was  actu-  diana,  and  this  fact  alone  is  suflicient  to 

ally  excepted  by    the    conveyance.     But  indicate  that  the  distinction  is  shadowy. 

another  rule   applies    to   incumbrances."  It  seems  clear  timt  the  exception  to  the 

And  see  Bever  v.  North,  107  Ind.  544,  8  general  rule  of  law  on  this  subject  should 

N.  E.  Tiep.  576;  Hays  v.  Teck,  107  Ind.  never  have  been  entertained. 

389,  8  N.  E.  Rep.  274  ;  McDill   v.   Gunn,  -  Bruns  v.  Rchreibcr,  43  Minn.  408,  45 

43  Ind.  315  ;  Carver  v.  Louthain,  38  Ind.  N.  W.  Uep.  861. 
530;  Pea  v.  Pea,  35  Ind.  387;  Fitzer  t;. 

695 


§^  8G4,  865.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

grantee  simply  as  security  to  him  for  money  advanced  to  the  third 
person  with  which  to  make  the  purchase.^ 

864.  A  covenant  cannot  be  extended  or  enlarged  any  more 
than  it  can  be  restricted  by  a  parol  agreement  made  at  the 
time  of  the  execution  of  the  deed.  Thus,  where  one  conveys 
land  by  a  quitclaim  deed,  wherein  he  covenants  only  against  the 
demands  of  all  persons  claiming  under  himself,  the  grantee  cannot 
show  an  oral  promise  by  the  grantor  made  at  the  same  time  and 
for  the  same  consideration  as  the  deed,  to  discharge  an  incum- 
brance not  made  by  him.^ 

865.  A  covenant  by  a  grantee  of  land,  as  part  of  the  con- 
sideration of  the  deed,  to  pay  the  incumbrances  on  the  land, 
cannot  be  enforced  by  a  stranger  to  the  covenant.  Only  a  per- 
son for  whose  benefit  the  covenant  was  made,  or  whose  benefit 
was  within  the  contemplation  of  the  parties,  can  enforce  it. 
Moreover,  the  grantor  must  have  a  legal  interest  that  the  cove- 
nant be  performed  in  favor  of  the  party  claiming  performance.^ 

Such  a  covenant  is  not  a  promise  for  the  benefit  of  the 
grantor's  widow  who  did  not  join  in  the  deed,  but  whose  dower 
right  was  expressly  reserved,  although  the  incumbrance  which 
the  purchaser  covenanted  to  pay  is  a  mortgage  in  which  she  had 
released  her  inchoate  right  of  dower,  and  therefore  had  an  inter- 
est that  the  mortgage  should  be  paid  without  resort  to  the  land, 
so  that  her  inchoate  right  of  dower  might  be  freed  therefrom. 
The  husband,  however,  owed  her  no  duty  enforcible  in  law  or 
equity  to  pay  the  mortgages  to  relieve  her  dower."^ 

1  Evans  v.  Duncan,  82  Iowa,  401,  48  lard  v.  Clyde,  122  N.  Y.  498,  25  N.  E. 
N.  W.  Rep.  922.  Rep.  917. 

2  Howe  V.  Walker,  4  Gray,  318.  A  *  Durnherr  v.  Ran,  135  N.  Y.  219,  32 
dictum  by  Wilde,  J.,  in  Preble  v.  Baldwin,  N.  E.  Rep.  49,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  344.  The 
6  Cush.  549,  that  an  agreement  by  the  plaintiff  sought  to  sustain  her  right  of 
purchaser  to  pay  certain  taxes  that  might  recovery  here,  upon  the  principle  laid 
be  thereafter  assessed  upon  the  land  might  down  in  the  case  of  Lawrence  v.  Fox,  20 
be  proved,  did  not  vary  the  covenant  N.  Y.  2G8,  which  may  be  stated  to  be  that, 
against  incumbrances,  is  of  no  weight,  if  one  person  upon  good  consiileration 
because  the  effect  of  the  covenant  was  not  make  a  promise  to  another  for  the  benefit 
under  consideration.  See  comment  of  of  a  third  person,  tliat  third  person  may 
Holmes,  J.,  in  regard  to  it  in  Flynu  v.  maintain  an  action  upon  the  promise.  In 
Bourneuf,  143  Mass.  277,  9  N.  E.  Rep.  the  lower  court  Rumsey,  J.,  said  on  this 
650.  point :  "  The  courts,  however,  have  become 

2  Grarnsey  v.  Rogers,   47    N.   Y.   233  ;     somewhat  afraid  of  the  principle  of  Law- 
Vrooman  v.  Turner,  69  N.  Y.  280 ;  Loril-     rence  v.  Fox,  and  have  very  decidedly  de- 
clared that  it  should  not  be  extended  to 

696 


COVENANT   AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.        [§§  866-868. 

Where  the  grantee  has  covenanted  to  pay  an  existing  incum- 
brance, if  the  grantor  and  grantee  afterwards  unite  in  a  quitclaim 
deed  of  the  premises  to  a  third  person,  the  covenant  of  the  first 
grantee  to  pay  the  incumbrances  is  thereby  revoked  as  between 
the  parties,  and  as  to  all  persons  not  having  acquired  vested  rights 
under  the  covenant. ^ 

866.  A  covenant  against  incumbrances  cannot  be  enforced 
after  the  covenantor  has  himself  removed  the  incumbrance. 
Thus,  where  the  land  conveyed  with  such  a  covenant  was  subject 
to  a  mortgage,  which,  in  accordance  with  an  agreement  between 
the  parties  at  the  time,  was  subsequently  paid  by  the  conveyance 
of  other  land  by  the  grantor  to  the  grantee,  as  between  the 
parties,  and  so  far  as  the  covenant  is  concerned,  such  conveyance 
was  a  payment  of  the  mortgage.^ 

867.  A  right  of  dower,  -whether  inchoate  or  consummate, 
is  an  incumbrance  within  the  covenant  against  incumbrances.'^ 

868.  A  lease  outstanding  is  an  incumbrance.  The  grantee's 
interest  in  the  property  purchased  is  diminished  to  the  extent  of 
the  rights  given  by  the  lease,  and  it  is  consequently  a  breach 
of  the  covenant  against  incumbrances.^ 

If  the  tenant  attorns  to  the  purchaser,  there  is  no  longer  a 
breach  of  the  covenant  by  reason  of  the  tenancy.  The  same 
result  follows  under  a  statute  which  establishes  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant  between  the  purchaser  and  tenant.'^     Where 

new  cases ;  indeed,  the  tendency  has  been  v.  Webber,   59   Me.   488 ;    Blanchard  v. 

for  some  time  to  limit  the  application  of  Blanchard,  48  Me.  174  ;  Smith  v.  Caunell, 

the  rule  with  great  strictnes.s.     Pardee  t\  32  Me.   123;  Ward  r.  As-hbrook,  78  Mo. 

Treat,  82  N.  Y.  385,  392;  Wheat  v.  Rice,  515  ;  Durrett  v.  Piper,  58  Mo.  551  ;  Rnss 

97  N.  Y.  296,  302.     It  is  now  well  .settled  v.  Perry,  49  N.  H.  547  ;  HiuLson  v.  Steerc, 

that  no  action  can   be    maintained  under  9  R.  I.   106;  McAlpiu   v.    Woodruff,  11 

the  principle  of  the  Lawrence  case  unless  Ohio  St.  120;  Hatchery.  Andrews,  5  Bush, 

there  was  a  debt  or  duty  owing  by  the  561  ;   Lessly-y.  Bowie,  27   S.  C.   19.3,  3  S. 

promisee  to  the  party  claiming  to  sue  upon  E.  Rep.  199. 

the    promi.se.     Vrooman    v.    Turner,   69         *  Clark  v.  Fisher,  54  Kans.  403, 38  Pac. 

N.  Y.  280,  285."  Re]).  493;  Smith  v.  Davis,  44  Kans.  362, 

1  Durnherr  v.  Rau,  135  N.  Y.  219,  32  24  Pac.  Rep.  428;  Fritz  y.  Pu.H('y,31  Minn. 
N.  E.  Rep.  49,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  .344.  368,    18  N.  W.   Rep.  94;    Hatchelder  v. 

2  Johnston  v.  Markle  Paper  Co.  153  Sturgis,  3  Cush.  201;  Porter  o.  Bradley, 
Pa.  St.  189,  25  Atl.  Pvcp.  560.  7    K.    I.   538;    Gricc  y.  Scarborough,    2 

3  Harrington  v.  Murphy,  109  Mass.  Spear  (S.  C),  649,  42  Am.  Dec.  391  ; 
299;  Bigelow  /;.  Hubbard,  97  Mass.  195;  Smith  v.  Scribner,  59  Vt.  96,  7  Atl.  Rep. 
Shearer  y.  Ranger,  22  Pick.  447;  Mars-  711. 

ton  V.  Ilobbs,  2  Mass.  433,  3  Am.  Dec.  61  ;         ^  Kelluni  v.  Berkshire  L.  Ins.  Co.  101 
Bickford  v.  Page,  2  Mass.  455 ;  Runnells     lud.  455. 

697 


§  869.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

the  fact  of  the  tenancy  was  known  to  the  purchaser  at  the  time  of 
the  purchase,  there  is  no  breach  of  the  covenant  in  States  where 
the  rule  is  recognized  that  the  purchaser's  knowledge  of  an  incum- 
brance takes  it  out  of  the  operation  of  the  covenant.^ 

Where  the  purchaser  has  relied  upon  the  grantor's  representa- 
tion, which  was  false,  that  the  tenant  had  agreed  to  give  imme- 
diate possession,  he  may  maintain  an  action  upon  this  extraneous 
contract,  which  is  separate  and  distinct  from  the  covenant  in  the 
deed.- 

869.  Taxes  are  an  incumbrance  within  the  covenant  from 
the  time  they  become  a  lien  upon  tlie  land,  whether  this  be  from 
the  date  of  the  assessment  or  from  a  time  fixed  by  statute,  though 
they  have  not  become  due  and  payable  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
veyance.2  The  grantee  may  pay  such  taxes  before  any  attempt 
is  made  to  collect  them  by  a  sale  of  the  land,  and  recover  the 
amount  from  his  grantor  under  the  covenant.'*  But  in  that  case  the 
grantee  must  be  able  to  show  that  the  taxes  were  properly  assessed 
and  are  a  lien  upon  the  property.  He  takes  the  burden,  in  a  suit 
for  a  breach  of  this  covenant,  of  showing  the  validity  of  the  incum- 
brance. This  rule  applies  even  after  a  tax  sale  and  a  purchase 
under  it;  for  if  the  tax  sale  was  illegal,  it  operates  to  discharge 
the  taxes  without  conferring  any  rights  upon  the  purchaser  at  the 
tax  sale.  Thus  it  was  held  that  there  was  no  breach  of  the  cove- 
nant where  the  grantee  voluntarily  paid  to  the  purchaser  at  the 
tax  sale  the  amount  of  his  bid  and  interest,  and  so  extinguished 
any  right  which  the  purchaser  might  have  had  to  recover  back 
from  the  collector  or  town  the  money  paid  by  him  on  his  bid,  in 
case  the  sale  proved  inoperative  to  convey  title  to  the  land  bid 
off,  and  also  extinguished  any  right  which  by  possibility  might 

1  Lindley  v.  Dakiu,  13  Ind.  388;  Page  L.  549,  4  Atl.  Rop.  323;  Long;  v.  Moler, 
V.  Lashley,  15  Ind.  152.  5  Oliio  St.  271  ;  Plowman  v.  Williams,  6 

2  Williams  v.  Frybarger  (Ind.),  37  N.  Ix-a,  268;  Richard  v.  Bent,  59  III.  38,  14 
E.  Rep.  302.  Am.  Rep.  1  ;  Mitchell  v.  Pillsbury,  5  Wis. 

3  Fuller  V.  Jillette,  9  Biss.  296;  Camp-  407. 

bell  V.  McClure  (Neb.),  63  N.  W.  Rep.  ■*  Leddy   v.    Enos,    6    Wash.    247,    33 

920;  McClure  v.  Campbell,  25  Neb.   57,  Pac.  Rep.  508,  dissenting  opinion,  34  Pac. 

40  N.  W.  Rep.  595  ;  Lindsay  r.  Eastwood,  Rep.  665;  Campbell  v.   McClure  (Neb.), 

72  Mich.  336,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  455 ;  Hill  v.  63  N.  W.  Rep.  920  ;  Hutchins  v.  Moody, 

Bacon,  110  Mass.  387  ;  Coburn  v.  Litch-  34  Vt.  433;  Turner  v.  Goodrich,  26  Vt. 

field,  132  Mass.  449;  Cochran  v.   Guild,  707. 
106  Mass.  29 ;  Cadmus  v.  Fagan,  47  N.  J. 

698 


COVENANT   AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.        [§§  870,  871. 

have  arisen  to  the  collector  to  proceed  anew  agamst  the  land  for 
the  payment  of  the  taxes. ^ 

870.  By  statute  in  some  States,  taxes  do  not  become  a  lien 
upon  the  land  until  a  fixed  time  after  the  assessment.  Under 
such  a  statute  the  assessment  does  not  make  the  taxes  an  incum- 
brance. Prior  to  the  date  fixed  by  statute,  there  exists  nothing 
but  a  liability  of  the  land  to  a  future  lien,  though  the  taxes  have 
been  assessed.  An  assessment  is  not  sen  incumbrance,  prior  to 
such  date,  within  the  import  of  a  covenant  against  incumbrances 
in  a  conveyance.^ 

Taxes  assessed  after  the  sale  of  land  under  a  contract  are  not 
an  incumbrance  suffered  by  the  grantor.^  Taxes  which  were  not 
payable  at  the  date  of  the  conveyance,  though  the}-  were  then  a 
lien  upon  the  realty,  have  been  held  not  to  be  an  incumbrance 
within  the  scope  of  such  a  covenant.* 

A  covenant  of  warranty  against  acts  done  or  suffered  by  the 
grantor  protects  the  purchaser  from  taxes  lawfully  levied  on  the 
property,  and  existing  as  a  lien  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance.'^ 

Where  the  incumbrance  is  in  the  form  of  taxes  upon  the  prop- 
erty for  which  it  is  sold,  the  grantor  cannot  set  up  in  defence  to 
an  action  upon  the  covenant  that  the  land  had  been  already  lost 
to  the  grantee  by  a  sale  under  his  own  mortgage,  before  it  was 
sold  for  the  taxes  which  the  grantor  had  left  delinquent,  if  the 
decree  foreclosing  the  mortgage  provides  for  redemption,  and 
the  grantee  shows  a  satisfaction  of  the  mortgage  entered  pending 
the  trial.^ 

871.  Assessments  for  street  improvements  which  have  not 
been  laid  at  the  time  of  a  conveyance,  though  the  improve- 
ments liave  already  been  made,  are  not  within  a  covenant  against 
incumbrances.  Until  the  amount  of  a  tabc  is  ascertained  in  the 
manner  prescribed  by  law,  no  lien  or  incumbrance  exists  by  reason 
thereof.'^ 

1  Cummings  v.  Holt,  56  Vt.  384,  387,  *  Smith  v.  Eigerman,  5  Tud.  App.   269, 
per  Ross.  J.  31  N.  K.  Kep.  862. 

2  Bradley  v.  Dike  (N.  .1.),  32  Atl.  I?ep.  •'  Milot  i-.  Reed,  11  Mont.  568,  29  I'ac. 
132.     In   New  Jersey   the   assessment  is  Rep.  343. 

made  on  the  20th  of  May,  and  the  taxes  "  Alexander  i-.  Bridgford,  59  Ark.  195, 

become  a  lien  on  the  20th  of  December.  27  S.  W.  Rep.  69. 

Atchison,  T.  &  Santa  Fe  R.  Co.r.  Jaques,  ^  Lathers  v.  Keogh,  109   N.   Y.  583,  17 

20  Kans.  639.  N.  E.  Rep.  131  ;  Gotthelf  v.  Stranahan,  138 

3  Gheen  v.  Harris  (Pa.  St.),  32  Atl.  N.  Y.  345,  34  N.  E,  Rep.  286  ;  McLaugh- 
Rep  1094  lin  v.  Miller,  124  N.  Y.  510,  26  N.  E.  Rep. 

699 


§  872.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

A  municipal  claim  for  laying  water-pipes,  not  entered  of  record 
so  as  to  preserve  its  lien,  is  not  an  incumbrance  upon  the  land  in 
the  hands  of  a  subsequent  purchaser.^ 

872.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  such  assessments  are  an 
incumbrance  from  the  time  the  improvements  were  made, 
according  to  the  decisions  in  some  States.  The  burden  or  in- 
cumbrance was  then  imposed  upon  the  land,  to  be  a  specific  lien 
in  amount  so  soon  as  the  proceedings  to  ascertain  the  amount 
should  be  completed.  It  is  immaterial  that  the  exact  amount  of 
the  incumbrance  was  not  ascertained  at  the  time  of  the  sale  and 
execution  of  the  deed.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania 
say :  ^  "  The  right  of  the  city  to  assess  the  lot  for  the  improve- 
ment already  made,  and  to  thereby  diminish  its  value,  was  known  : 
the  exact  weight  of  the  burden  it  might  impose  was  not  precisely 
known ;  so  far  as  concerned  the  city,  that  could  only  be  deter- 
mined by  the  statutory  proceeding  before  the  board  of  viewers. 
But  that,  when  the  proceeding  was  had,  the  event  would  be  a  lien 
for  a  greater  or  less  amount  on  this  lot  was  plain  from  its  relation 
to  the  costly  improvement.  A  mechanic  who  has  expended  his 
labor  on  a  house  has  his  right  to  a  lien  for  the  value  of  the  labor. 
The  value,  if  there  be  no  contract  price,  cannot  be  determined 
until  the  lien  be  filed,  and  then  perhaps  not  definitely  until  judg- 
ment on  scire  facias ;  but  if  the  lien  be  not  filed  until  the  last  day 
of  the  six  months,  that  fact  does  not  affect  the  right,  during  the 
interval,  to  impose  the  burden  :  the  incumbrance  is  there,  indefi- 
nite as  to  amount,  because  of  indefiniteness  of  opinion  as  to  the 
value  of  the  labor ;  but  there  is  absolute  certainty  of  opinion  as 
to  the  labor  having  some  value,  for  there  stands  the  house,  the 
product  of  the  mechanic's  labor.  Here  the  improvement  of  the 
street  on  which  this  lot  fronted  had  been  completed.     The  event 

1104,  affirminsr  57   Hun,  430;  Harper  v.  v.  Beebe,   24  Kans.  343.     In  Lathers   v. 

Dowdney,  113  N.  Y.   644,21  N.  E.  Rep.  Keogh,   109   N.  Y.  .583,   17    N.  E.   Rep. 

63,47  Hun,  227  ;   Dowdney  r.  Mayor,   54  131,   the  court,  by   Gray,   J.,   distinguish 

N.   Y.    186;  De    Peyster  v.   Murphy,   66  the  cases  De  Peyster  r.  Murphy  and  Bar- 

N.  Y.  622;  People  v.  Gilon,  24  Abb.  N.  low  v.   St.    Nicholas    Nat.   Bank,   supra, 

C.  125,  18  Civ.  Pro.    112,   9  N.  Y.    Supp.  limiting   also  the  decision   in    the  latter. 

563  ;  Barlow  v.  St.  Nicholas  Nat.   Bank,  Rumlell  v.  Lakey,  40  N.  Y.  513,  is  also 

63  N.  Y.  399,  20  Am.  Rep.  547  ;  Fisher  v.  reviewed. 

Mayor,  67  N.  Y.  73  ;  Association  of  Col-  i  Stutt  v.  Building  Asso.  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

ored  Orphans  v.  Mayor,  104  N.  Y.  581,  344. 

12   N.   E.    Rep.  279;    TuU    v.   Roystou,  ^  Lafferty  y.  Milligan,  165  Pa.  St.  534, 

30   Kans.    617,  2   Pac.  Rep.  866;    Sloan  538. 
700 


COVENANT    AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.        [§§  873,  874. 

demonstrated  that  the  burden  imposed  by  the  act  was  a  very 
heavy  one:  but  whether,  at  the  date  of  the  deed,  it  appeared 
light  or  heavy,  it  was"  obvious  it  could  not  escape  assessment ; 
therefore  there  was  upon  it  an  incumbrance."  ^ 

873.  It  seems  that  every  easement  except  that  of  a  public 
highway,  in  some  States,  is  an  incumbrance  within  the  cove- 
nant against  incumbrances.  "  An  easement  is  an  interest  in  land 
created  by  grant  or  agreement,  express  or  implied,  which  confers 
a  right  upon  the  owner  thereof  to  some  profit,  benefit,  dominion, 
or  lawful  use  of  or  over  the  estate  of  another."  This  is  an  inter- 
est in  a  third  person  which  injuriously  affects  the  value  of  the 
land,  within  the  terms  of  the  definition  of  an  incumbrance.^ 

874.  The  right  to  flow  water  back  upon  the  land  of  another 
is  an  incumbrance  on  the  land  flowed,  or  subject  to  be  flowed, 
if  the  right  has  been  acquired  by  an  agreement  or  settlement 
of  damages  for  the  flowage  binding  upon  all  subsequent  owners.^ 
If  the  right  to  damages  under  a  mill  act  passes  to  each  successive 
owner  of  the  land  as  an  incident,  the  right  of  flow^age  may  not 
be  an  incumbrance  upon  the  land ;  ^  but  if  a  proprietor  deprives 
his  estate  of  this  incident,  as  he  may  do  by  a  grant  of  the  right 
perpetually,  he  thereby  incumbers  his  estate  by  his  own  act. 
But  an  unsealed  receipt  given  by  the  owner  of  the  land  subject 
to  flowage  under  the  mill  act,  acknowledging  full  payment  for 
damages,  and  a  full  discharge  from  liability  for  any  flowage,  does 
not  bind  a  subsequent  owner,  and  there  is  not  in  such  case  any 
incumbrance  upon  the  land  in  the  hands  of  a  subsequent  purchaser 
by  reason  of  such  flowage.^ 

^Pennsylvania:     The    liability    arises  Mass.  461  ;  Coburn  d.  Litchfield,  132  Mass. 

from  the  time  the  improvement  was  made.  449. 

Lafferty  v.  Milligan,  165  Pa.  St.  534,  538,  ^  Huyck  v.  Andrews,  113  N.  Y.  81,  20 

30  Atl.  Rep.  1030,  35  W.  N.  C.  551,  per  N.   E.  Rep.  581  ;   Quick  v.   Taylor,    113 

Dean,  J. ;  Devine  v.  Rawle,  148  Pa.  St.  Ind.  540,  16  N.  E.  Rep.  588  ;  Prescott  v. 

208,  23  Atl.  Rep.  1119.    New  Jersey:  The  Trueman,  4  Mass.  627,  3  Am.  Dec.  249, 

same  rule  applies.     Hartshorn   r.  Cleve-  per  Parsons,  C.  J. ;  Edmunds' App.  (Pa.) 

land,  52  N.  J.  L.  473,  19  Atl.  Rep.  974;  8    Atl.   Rep.    31  ;    Post    r.   Campau,   42 

Fagan  v.  Cadmus,  46  N.  J.  L.  441  ;  Cad-  Mich.  90,  3  N.  W.  Rep.  272. 

mus  V.  Fagan,  47  X.  J.  L.   549,  4  Atl.  ■'  Isele   v.  Arlington    Five   Cents   Sav. 

Rep.  323.     Massachusetts:    The   liability  Bank,  135  Mass.  142;  Isele  v.  Schwamb, 

arises  from  the  date  of  the  order  for  the  131  Mass.  337. 

improvement,  or  for  laying  out  the  street.  ■•  Fitch  f.  Seymour,  9   Met.  462;   Sey- 

Carr  v.  Dooley,  119   Mass.  294;    Blackie  mour  v.  Carter,  2  Met.  520. 

V.  Hudson,  117  Mass.  181  ;  Prince  v.  Bo.s-  ''  Craig  v.  Lewis,  110  Mass.  377. 
ton,  HI  Mass.  226  ;  Jones  v.  Boston,  104 

701 


§  875.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

A  right  in  another  to  dam  up  and  use  the  waters  of  a  stream 
upon  the  lands  conveyed  is  an  incumbrance,  for  which  an  action 
may  be  maintained  on  the  covenant.^ 

The  right  to  take  water,  by  means  of  a  pipe  laid  beneath  the 
ground,  from  a  spring  on  the  granted  land,  is  an  incumbrance 
embraced  within  the  covenant.^  But  if  the  right  to  take  water 
and  maintain  pipes  is  a  mere  license,  revocable  at  any  time,  it  is 
not  an  incumbrance  within  the  covenant.^ 

An  easement  to  maintain  a  stairway  is  an  incumbrance.'^ 

A  beam  right  in  favor  of  adjoining  premises,  created  by  an 
agreement  in  writing  under  seal,  and  to  continue  until  the  wall  is 
destroyed  in  any  manner  or  torn  down  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
building, is  an  easement  in  favor  of  the  adjoining  property  and 
constitutes  an  incumbrance.^ 

875.  A  restriction  as  to  the  kind  of  building  that  may  be 
erected  upon  the  land  is  an  incumbrance  that  diminishes  its 
value.^  "  It  is  not  a  mere  technical  incumbrance,  which  does  not 
interfere  with  the  present  enjoyment  of  the  land,  like  a  right  of 
dower,  which  may  never  have  any  operative  force  by  reason  of 
depending  upon  a  contingency  that  may  never  occur.  The  weight 
of  it  is  as  oppressive  now  as  it  ever  can  be.  It  is  a  present  and 
continuing  impairment  of  the  free  enjoyment  of  the  land,  and 
a  legal  obstruction  to  the  exercise  of  that  dominion  over  it  to 
which  the  plaintiff,  as  the  lawful  owner,  is  entitled.  The  re- 
striction may  not  interfere  with  the  use  of  the  land  for  many 
purposes,  but  it  is  an  absolute  prohibition  of  its  use  for  others, 
for  which  the  plaintiff  might  otherwise  lawfully  use  it.  As  the 
owner,  he  would  have  the  right  to  use  it  for  any  lawful  purpose ; 
but,  by  reason  of  this  incumbrance,  its  use  in  the  prohibited  mode 
would  work  a  forfeiture  of  the  entire  title.  The  damages  can 
be  estimated  as  well  now  as  at  the  end  of  twenty  years.  They 
may  be  inconsiderable  or  merely  nominal,  and  they  may  be  sub- 

1  Iluyck  V.  Andrews,  113  N.  Y.  81,  20  *  McGowen  v.  Myers,  60  Iowa,  256,  14 
N.  E.  Rep.  581  ;   Scriver  v.   Smith,   100     N.  E.  Rep.  788. 

N.  Y.  471,  53  Am.  Rep.  224.  ^  Schaeffler  v.  Miehling,  13  Misc.  520, 

2  McMullin    V.  Wooley,  2  Lans.  394.     34  N.  Y.  Supp.  693. 

And  see  Morgan  v.  Smith,   11  111.   194;  6  Wetraore  v.  Bruce,  118  N.  Y.  319,  23 

Mitchell  V.  "Warner,  5  Conn.  497.  N.  E.  Rep.  303 ;    Trustees  v.  Lynch,  70 

3  Johnson  v.  Knapp,  150  Mass.  267,  23  N.  Y.  440,  26  Am.  Rep.  615 ;  Doctor  v. 
N.  E.  Rep.  40,  146  Mass.  70,  15  X.  E.  Darling,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  594 ;  Prescott  v. 
Rep.  134.  Trueman,  4  Mass.  627,  3  Am.  Dec.  249. 

702 


COVENANT    AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.         [§§  876-878. 

stantial,  but  it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  the  amount  of  damages 
which  the  plaintiff  ought  to  receive."  ^ 

Evidence  that  the  restrictions  would  not  be  enforced  in  equity, 
by  reason  of  the  change  that  had  taken  place  in  the  neighbor- 
hood as  to  the  use  of  property,  is  not  admissible  when  offered  as  a 
defence  to  the  action,  and  not  as  bearing  upon  the  amount  of 
damages.^ 

A  restriction,  requii-ing  the  setting  back  of  all  buildings  that 
may  be  erected  a  specified  distance  from  the  street,  is  a  breach 
of  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  the  instant  the  deed  is 
executed.'^ 

876.  A  restriction  against  the  use  of  the  property  for  any 
special  business  is  an  incumbrance,  and  should  be  excepted 
from  the  covenants  of  the  deed  unless  the  grantor  is  willing  to 
covenant  against  it.*  But  a  general  restriction  against  nuisances 
is  not  an  incumbrance  within  the  covenant,  although  the  restric- 
tion is  so  vague  as  possibly  to  invite  unfounded  litigation.  Such 
a  restriction  does  not  increase  the  purchaser's  liability.''' 

877.  A  party-wall  agreement  in  the  usual  form  is  an  in- 
cumbrance until  the  wall  has  been  wholly  paid  for.^  After  a 
party-wall  has  been  built,  half  on  the  land  of  each  adjoining 
owner  and  wholly  paid  for  by  each,  the  mutual  and  reciprocal 
easement  of  each  owner  that  his  wall  shall  receive  support  from 
the  part  of  the  wall  on  the  adjoining  land  is  not  an  incum- 
brance." 

A  party-wall  wholly  on  one  of  two  contiguous  lots  of  land,  yet 
subject  to  appropriation  and  use  for  all  purposes  of  a  party-wall 
by  the  owner  of  the  other  lot,  is  an  incumbrance  upon  the  land.*^ 

878.  A  natural  easement  is  not  an  incumbrance  within  the 
meaning  of  the  covenant,  nor  is  a  further  easement  incidental 
to  such  natural  easement.     Thus  the  owner  of  land  on  a  stream 

1  Foster  v.  Foster,  G2  N.  H.  46,  56,  per  v.  Mason,  3  Cush.  500.  Otherwise  where 
Clark,  J.  a  statute   gives   the   right,    as   in   Iowa : 

2  Doctor  V.  Darling,  22  N,  Y.  Supp.  Bertram  v.  Curtis,  31  Iowa,  40.  So  when 
594.  the  wall  is  hiiilt  entirely  upon  the  land  of 

3  Roberts  v.  Levy,  3  Ahh.  Pr.  N.  S.  one  owner.  Mohr  y.  rarmclec,  II  Jones 
311.  &S.  320. 

4  Floyd  V.  Clark,  7  Abb.  N.  C.  136.  '  Hendricks  v.  Starks,  37  N.  Y.  100. 

8  Floyd  V.  Clark,  7  Abb.  N.  C.  136.  »  Cecooni  o.  Hodden,  147  Mass.  164,  16 

6  Burr  V.  Lamaster,  30  Neb.  688,   46  N.  E.  Hep.  749;  Mohr  v.   Pnrmelee,  11 

N.  W.  Rep.   1015;  Mackey  v.  Harmon,  Jones  &  S.  320. 

34  Minn.  168,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  702  ;  Ravnjrc 

703 


§§  879-881.]  COVENANTS    FOK   TITLE. 

has  a  natural  easement  in  the  land  below  for  the  flow  of  the 
water  in  its  natural  channel.  Where,  therefore,  the  land  con- 
veyed was  described  as  land  through  which  the  water  from  a 
mill  passed,  it  was  held  that  the  right  of  the  mill-owner  to  enter 
upon  the  land  and  cleanse  the  channel  of  the  stream  was  implied, 
and  would  not  constitute  a  breach  of  the  covenant  against  incum- 
brances. This  secondary  easement  was  essential  to  the  enjoy-' 
ment  of  the  natural  easement.^ 

879.  The  existence  of  a  private  right  of  way  is  a  breach  of 
the  covenant.^  A  grantor,  after  having  convej'ed  land  with  a 
covenant  against  incumbrances,  is  estopped  to  maintain  an  action 
against  his  grantee  for  obstructing  a  way  across  the  land  which 
he  has  not  excepted  or  reserved  in  the  deed,  but  has  covenanted 
not  to  exist.^ 

880.  A  right  of  way  for  a  railroad,  which  is  in  possession  of 
such  right,  may  constitute  a  breach  both  of  the  covenant  for 
quiet  enjoyment  and  of  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  ;  and, 
upon  such  a  case  being  shown,  the  plaintiff  is  not  required  to 
elect  upon  which  covenant  he  will  seek  a  recovery.*  It  is  a  breach 
of  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  for  which  the  grantee  is 
entitled  to  immediate  action.^ 

881.  That  a  public  high w^ ay  is  an  incumbrance  is  declared 
in  numerous  decisions.*^  "  It  is  a  legal  obstruction  to  the  pur- 
chaser to  exercise  that  dominion  over  the  land  to  which  the  lawful 

1  Prescott  V.  Williams,  5  Met.  429,  39  Am.  Rep.  731  ;  Maris  v.  lies  (Ind.),  30 
Am.  Dec.  688.  N.  E.  Kep.  152;  Barlow  v.  McKiuley,  24 

2  Rea  ?•.  Minkler,  5  Lans.  196;  Blake  Iowa,  69;  Quick  v.  Taylor,  113  Ind.  540, 
V.  Everett,   1  Allen,   248;    Wetherbee  v.  16  N.  E.  Rep.  588. 

Bennett,  2  Allen,  428  ;  Harlow  v.  Thomas,         «  Prichard  v.  Atkinson,  3  N.  H.  335  ; 

15  Pick.  66;  Leonard  y.  Adams,  119  Mass.  Butler  v.   Gale,  27   Vt.  739;  Kellogg  v. 

366 ;  Mitchell  v.   Warner,  5   Conn.  497 ;  Ingersoll,  2  Mass.  97  ;  Haynes  v.  Young, 

Wilson  V.  Cochran,  48  Pa.    St.  107,   86  36  Me.  557  ;  Burk  v.  Hill,  48  Ind.  52, 17 

Am.  Dec.  574;    Russ    v.   Steel,    40    Vt.  Am.  Rep.  731  ;  Wadham  y.  Swan,  109  111. 

310;  De  Rochemont  u.  Boston  &  M.  R.  46;  Beach  i'.  Miller,  51  111.  206,2  Am.  Rep. 

Co.    64   N.    H.   500,   15   Atl.    Rep.   131;  290.     It  is  provided  by  statute  in  Illinois 

Haynes  v.  Stevens,    UN.  H.  28;  Prich-  that  "no  covenant  of  warranty  shall   be 

ard  V.  Atkinson,  3  N.  H.  335.  considered  as  broken  by  the  existence  of 

*  De  Rochemont  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.  a  highway  upon  the  land  conveyed  unless 
64  N.  H.  500,  15  Atl.  Rep.  131.  otherwise   particularly    specified    in    the 

*  Bruns  v.  Schreiber,  48  Minn.  366,  51  deed."  R.  S.  ch.  30,  §  10.  This  statute 
N.  W.  Rep.  120.  does  not  include  a  private  way  which  is  an 

^  Farrington  v.  Tourtelott,  39  Fed.  Rep.  incumbrance  within  the  meaning  of  an 
738;  Beach  r.  Miller,  51  111.206,2  Am.  implied  covenant  against  incumbrances. 
Rep.  290;  Burk  v.   Hill,  48  Ind.  52,  17     Schmisseur  v.  Penn,  47  111.  App.  278. 

704 


COVENANT  AGAINST  INCUMBKANCES. 


[§  882. 


owner  is  entitled.  An  incumbrance  of  this  nature  may  be  a 
great  damage  to  the  purchaser,  or  the  damage  may  be  very  in- 
considerable or  merely  nominal.  The  amount  of  damages  is  a 
proper  subject  of  consideration  for  the  jury  who  may  assess 
them,  but  it  cannot  affect  the  question  whether  a  public  town 
road  is,  in  legal  contemplation,  an  incumbrance  of  the  land  over 
which  it  is  laid."  ^ 

882.  The  vendee's  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  an  incum- 
brance, such  as  a  highway  or  other  visible  easement,  does  not 
take  such  incumbrance  out  of  the  operation  of  the  covenant.^ 
This  is  the  general  rule,  to  which  exceptions  are  to  be  noted  in 
several  States. 

In  a  few  States  a  public  highway,  open  and  in  use,  is  the  only 
exception  to  the  rule.^ 

A  vendee  is  not  estopped  to  claim  the  benefits  of  the  covenants 


1  Kellogg  V.  Ingersoll,  2  Mass.  97.  In 
Harrison  v.  Des  Moines  &  E.  D.  R.  Co. 
(Iowa)  58  N.  W.  liep.  1081,  the  broad 
ground  is  taken  that  a  highway  is  not  an 
incunibrauce.  Granger,  C.  J.,  saying : 
"  The  fact  seems  demonstrable  that  the 
mere  fact  of  a  public  highway  is  not  an 
incumbrance  to  land.  It  is  probably  true 
that  such  highways  might  be  made  an 
incumbrance,  l)ut  that  is  not  the  question 
with  which  we  are  to  deal.  To  our  minds, 
the  known  conditions,  of  which  judicial 
notice  is  taken,  lead  to  the  conclusion 
that  public  highways  are  so  far  essential 
to  the  usual  and  ordinary  use  and  occu- 
pancy of  land,  and  so  far  constitute  an 
inducement  for  the  purcha.se  of  the  same, 
that  they  are  not  incumbrances,  so  as  to 
constitute  a  breach  of  the  usual  covenants 
of  warranty."  See,  also,  Jordan  v.  Eve, 
31  Graft.  1. 

-  Farrington  v.  Tourtelott,  39  Fed. 
Rep.  738  ;  liarlow  v.  Dclancy,  40  Fed. 
Kep.  97.  Connecticut :  Hubbard  ?'.  Nor- 
ton, 10  Conn.  422.  Georgia:  Miller  v. 
Desverges,  75  Ga.  407,  di.sapproviny;  Skin- 
ner y.  Moye,  69  Ga.  47t>  ;  Smith  v.  Kason, 
46  Ga.  316.  Illinois  :  Beach  v.  Miller,  51 
111.  206,  2  Am.  liep.  290.  Indiana  :  Quick 
V.Taylor,  113  Ind.  540,  10  N.  K.  Hep. 
588;  Watts  v.  Fletcher,    107  Ind.  391,  8 


N.  E.  Rep.  Ill  ;  Burk  v.  Hill,  48  Ind. 
52,  17  Am.  Rep.  731.  Iowa:  McGowen 
V.  Myers,  60  Iowa,  256,  14  N.  W.  Rep. 
788;  Van  Wagner  y.  Van  Nostrand,  19 
Iowa,  422;  Barlow  v.  Mc  Kin  ley,  24  Iowa, 
69  ;  Gerald  v.  Elley,  45  Iowa,  322.  Ken- 
tucky :  Butt  V.  Riffe,  78  Ky.  352.  Maine  : 
Lamb  v.  Danforth,  59  Me.  322,  8  Am. 
Rep.  426 ;  Haynes  v.  Young,  36  Me.  557  ; 
Ilerrick  v.  Moore,  19  Me.  313.  Massa- 
chusetts :  Ladd  v.  Noyes,  137  Ma.ss.  151  ; 
Kellogg  V.  Ingersoll,  2  Mass.  97  ;  Sprague 
V.  Baker,  17  Mass.  586  ;  Harlow  v.  Thom- 
as, 15  Pick.  60;  Parish  r.  Whitney,  3 
Gray,  516.  Missouri:  Kellogg  i».  Malin, 
50  Mo.  496,  11  Am.  Rep.  426.  Nebraska: 
Burr  V.  Lamastcr,  30  Nel).  088,  40  N.  W. 
Rep.  1015.  New  Hampshire:  Foster  v. 
Foster,  62  N.  11.  532 ;  Fletcher  v.  Cham- 
berlin,  61  N.  II.  438,  447;  Prichard  v. 
Atkinson,  3  N.  H.  335.  New  York: 
Huyck  V.  Andrews,  113  N.  V.  81,  20  N. 
E.  Rep.  581  ;  Doctor  v.  Darling,  22  N. 
Y.  Sujip.  594.  Ohio:  Long  v.  Moler,  5 
Ohio  St.  271.  Vermont :  Clark  v.  Con  roe, 
38  Vt.  469  ;  Butler  v.  Gale,  27  Vt.  739. 

3  Bennett  v.  Keehn,  67  Wis.  154,  29 
N.  W.  Rep.  207,  30  N.  W.  Rep.  112; 
Hymes  v.  E>tey,  1 10  N.  Y.  501,  22  N.  E. 
Rep.  1087  ;  Huyck  v.  Andrews,  113  N.  Y, 
81,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  581. 

705 


§§  883,  884.]  COVENANTS  FOR   TITLE. 

of  warranty  in  his  deed  by  reason  of  having  required  and  ob- 
tained the  opinion  of  counsel  as  to  the  title  before  completing 
the  salc.i 

883.  Parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  show  that  a  pur- 
chaser knew  of  the  existence  of  an  incumbrance  or  adverse 
right  not  referred  to  in  the  deed,  and  took  the  conveyance  subject 
to  '\t?  "  Uncertain  would  be  the  titles  of  real  estate,  and  useless 
the  registration  of  deeds,  if  their  contents  and  effects  were  to  be 
determined  by  the  testimony  of  witnesses."  ^ 

It  is  competent  to  covenant  against  known  incumbrances. 
The  purcliaser  might  know  of  the  existence  of  an  incumbrance, 
and  yet  expect  that  the  grantor  would  remove  it.  But,  however 
this  might  be,  to  show  by  parol  evidence  that  he  knew  of  the 
existence  of  the  incumbrance  and  bought  subject  to  it,  is  inad- 
missible either  to  control  the  meaning  of  the  covenant  or  to  miti- 
gate the  damaojes  for  a  breach  of  it."* 

884.  A  distinction  is  made  in  some  cases  between  incum- 
brances which  affect  the  title  and  those  that  simply  affect  the 
physical  condition  of  the  land,  as  regards  the  effect  of  notice  to 
tlie  grantee  of  the  incumbrance,  or  knowledge  of  it  on  his  part. 
'•  Where  incumbrances  of  the  former  class  exist,  the  covenant 
referred  to,  under  all  authorities,  is  broken  tlie  instant  it  is  made, 
and  it  is  of  no  importance  that  the  grantee  had  notice  of  them 
when  he  took  the  title.'^  Such  incumbrances  are  usually  of  a 
temporary  character  and  capable  of  removal  ;  the  very  object  of 
the  covenant  is  to  protect  the  vendee  against  them  ;  hence  know- 
ledge, actual  or  constructive,  of  their  existence,  is  no  answer  to 
an  action  for  breach  of  such  covenant.  Where,  however,  there 
is  a  servitude  imposed  upon  the  land,  which  is  visible  to  the  eye 

1  Eaton  V.  Chcsebrough,  82  Mich.  214,  v.  Spangenberg,  70  Iowa,  488,  30  N.  W. 

40  N.  W.  Rep.  .36.5.  Rep.  875 ;  Van  Wagner  v.  Van  Nostrand, 

-  Towusend  r.  Weld,  8  Mass.  146;  Har-  19   Iowa,   422  ;  Budd   v.  United  Carriage 

low  ?;.  Thomas,  1 .5  Pick.  66  ;   Edwards   v.  Co.    2.5   Oreg.    314,    35    Pac.    Rep.    660; 

Clark,  83   Mich.  246,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  112;  Medler  v.    Hiatt,  8  Ind.   171  ;  Snyder   v. 

Smith  V.  Lloyd,  29    Mich.  382,  388  ;   Bal-  Lane,  10  Ind.  424. 

lard  V.   Burrows  (Iowa),  50  N.  W.  Rep.  3  Harlow  v.  Thomas,  15   Pick.  66,  per 

74;  Yancey  v.  Tatlock   (Iowa),  61  N.  W.  Morton,  J. 

Rep.  997  ;  Flynn  v.  Mining  Co.  72  Iowa,  *  Harlow  v.  Thomas,  15  Pick.  66. 

738,  32  N.   W.  Rep.  471  ;   McGowen  v.  6  Cathcart  v.  Bowman,  5  Pa.  St.  317; 

Myers,  60  Iowa,  256,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  788  ;  Funk  v.  Voneida,  11  S.  &  R.  109,  14  Am. 

Billingham  y.  Bryan,  lOlowa,  317  ;  Specht  Dec.  617. 

'  706 


COVENANT   AGAINST  INCUMBRANCES.  [§  885. 

and  which  affects  not  the  title,  but  the  physical  condition  of  the 
property,  a  different  rule  prevails."  i 

885.  Accordingly  a  visible  servitude  not  affecting  the  title, 
but  only  the  physical  condition  of  the  property,  is  not  within 
the  covenant,  according  to  these  decisions.^  Therefore  a  public 
highway  in  use  upon  the  property  conveyed,  although  admittedly 
an  incumbrance  and  possibly  an  injury  to  the  |)roperty,  is  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  known  to  the  pui  cliaser.  He  is  presumed  not 
only  to  have  seen  the  highway,  but  to  have  purchased  with  ref- 
erence to  it,  whether  it  is  an  injury  to  the  land  or  a  benefit.  If 
it  is  in  fact  an  injury  to  the  land,  it  is  presumed  that  this  fact 
was  taken  into  account  in  fixing  the  price,  and  that  the  pur- 
chaser has  obtained  all  that  he  paid  for.  He  is  not,  therefore, 
allowed  to  complain  of  the  servitude  as  a  breach  of  the  grantor's 
covenant  against  incumbrances.^ 

A  purchaser  of  real  estate,  under  a  deed  containing  a  covenant 
that  the  premises  are  free  from  incumbrances,  given  under  a 
contract  calling  for  a  general  warranty  deed,  cannot  be  heard  to 
complain,  in  an  action  brought  by  him  against  the  grantor  to 
recover  damages  for  an  alleged  breach  of  the  covenant  against 
incumbrances,  that  he  did  not  get  the  easements  that  he  expected 
to,  because  of  the  existence,  in  front  of  the  premises,  of  an  ele- 
vated railroad,  in  case  the  plaintiff  knew,  at  the  time  of  making 
his  contract  and  taking  his  deed,  that  the  easement  was  in  the 
actual  use  and  occupation  of  the  railroad  company,  and  tlius  had 
notice  that  the  railroad  company  had  some  claim  of  right  to  the 
easement,  and  that  it  was  partially  extinguished.* 

This  rule  does  not  apply  in  case  of  a  highway  which  is  not 

1  Memmert  v.  McKeen,  112  Pa.  St.  Hun,  533,  26  N.  Y.  Sapp.  842 ;  Whitbeck 
315,  320,  4  Atl.  Rep.  542.  And  see  Kutz  v.  Cook,  15  Johns.  483,  8  Am.  Dec.  272  ; 
V.  McCune,  22  Wis.  628,  99  Am.  Dec.  Hiiyck  v.  Andrews,  113  N.  Y.  85,  20  N. 
85.  E.  Rep.  581  ;  Desvergcs  v.  Willis,  56  Ga. 

2  Memmert  v.  McKeen,  112  Pa.  St.  515,  21  Am.  Rep.  289;  Jordan  v.  Eve, 
315,  4  Atl.  Rep.  .542.  .31   Cxratt.  1;  Kutz  v.   McCune,   22    Wis. 

8  Memmert  v.  McKeen,  112  Pa.  St.  315.  G28,  99  Am.  Dec.  85;  Smith  v.  Hughes, 

4  Atl.  Rep.  542  ;  Patterson   v.  Arthurs,  9  50  Wis.  620,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  653;  Lallaude 

Watts,  152;  Wilson  v.   Cochran,  46  Pa.  y.  Wentz,  18  La.  Ann.  289  ;  Barre  i.  Elem- 

St.  229  ;  Harrison  t\  Des  Moines  &  Ft.  D.  ing,  29   W.   Va.  314,   326,   1    S.   E.   Rep. 

R.  Co.  (Iowa)  58  N.  W.  Rep.  1081  ;  Hymes  731  ;  Patton  i;.  Quarrier,  18  W.  Va.  447. 

0.  Estey,  116  N.  Y.  501,  22  N.  E.  Rop.  <  Ratliarach  v.  Von  Eiff,  74  Hun,  533, 

1087,  133  N.  Y.  342,  31    N.  E.  Rep.  105,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  842. 
36  Hun,  147;  Bachnracli  v.  Von  Eiff,  74 

707 


§§  886,  887.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

open,  visible,  and  in  iictual  use  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance. 
If  there  is  nothing  upon  the  hind  to  indicate  the  existenc  '  of  a 
public  highway  over  any  part  of  it,  and  it  is  afterwards  adjudged 
that  some  part  of  it  has  been  dedicated  as  a  street,  and  the 
grantee  is  enjoined  from  interfering  witli  the  use  of  such  part  as 
a  street,  there  is  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  quiet  enjoyment.^ 

886.  The  distinction  between  incumbrances  which  affect 
the  physical  condition  of  the  property  and  those  that  affect 
the  title  is  not,  however,  generally  recognized.  Tlie  authorities 
sustaining  this  distinction  are  criticised  in  a  recent  decision  of 
the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York.  "  We  do  not  yield  assent  to 
these  authorities,"  say  the  court.  "  They  have  no  sanction  in  any 
of  the  cnses  decided  in  this  State,  and  have  no  adequate  founda- 
tion in  principle  or  reason.  They  open  to  litigation,  upon  parol 
evidence,  in  every,  action  for  the  breach  of  the  covenant  against 
incumbrances  caused  by  the  e.Kistence  of  an  easement,  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  grantee  knew  of  its  existence  ;  and  in  every  such 
case  the  protection  of  written  covenants  can  be  absolutely  taken 
away  by  disputed  oral  evidence.  We  think  the  safer  lule  is  to 
hold  that  the  covenants  in  a  deed  protect  the  grantee  against 
every  adverse  right,  interest,  or  dominion  over  the  land,  and  that 
he  may  rely  upon  them  for  his  security.  If  open,  visible,  and 
notorious  easements  are  to  be  excepted  from  the  operation  of  cove- 
nants, it  should  be  the  duty  of  the  grantor  to  except  them,  and 
the  bui'den  should  not  be  cast  upon  the  grantee  to  show  that  he 
was  not  aware  of  them.  The  security  of  titles  demands  that 
a  grant  made  without  fraud  or  mutual  mistake  shall  bind  the 
grantor  according  to  its  written  terms.  It  should  not  be  incum- 
bent upon  the  grantee  to  take  special  and  particular  covenants 
against  visible  and  apparent  defects  in  the  title,  or  incumbrances 
upon  the  land  ;  but  it  should  be  incumbent  upon  the  grantor,  if 
he  does  not  intend  to  covenant  against  such  defects  and  incum- 
brances, to  except  them  from  the  operation  of  his  covenants. 
The  distinction  which  is  attempted  to  be  made,  between  incum- 
brances which  affect  the  title  and  those  which  affect  merely  the 
physical  condition  of  the  land  conveyed,  is  quite  illusory  and 
unsatisfactory."  '^ 

887.  If  there  is  anything  in  the  deed  to  show  that  the  par- 

1  Hymes  v.  Esty,  116  N.  Y.  501,  22  -  Huyck  v.  Andrews,  113  N.  Y.  81,  90, 
N.  E.  Rep.  1087.  20  N.  E.  Rep.  581,  per  Earl,  J. 

708 


COVENANT    AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.  [\ 

ties  did  not  intend  that  a  known  incumbrance  should  be 
within  the  covenant,  the  purchaser  takes  it  cum  07iere,  and  can- 
not comphiin  that  the  incumbrance  is  a  breach  of  the  covenant. 
But  his  mere  knowledge  of  the  incumbrance  is  not  sufficient  to 
exclude  it  from  the  oi^eration  of  the  covenant.  The  intention  to 
exclude  the  incumbrance  should  be  manifested  in  some  way  by 
the  deed  itself,  for  a  resort  to  oral  or  other  extraneous  evidence 
would  violate  a  settled  principle  of  law  in  regard  to  deeds.  A 
slight  reference  in  the  deed,  or  even  a  single  word,  may  indicate 
that  the  property  conveyed  is  subject  to  some  right  or  easement 
to  which  it  was  not  intended  the  covenant  against  incumbrances 
should  appl}'. 

Thus  a  highway  described  in  the  deed  itself  as  a  boundary  of 
the  land,  or  as  crossing  the  land,  is  not  within  the  covenants  of 
the  deed.  In  such  case,  knowledge  of  the  fact  of  the  existence 
of  a  public  right  of  way  upon  the  land  is  brought  home  to  the 
purchaser  by  the  deed  itself,  without  a  resort  to  oral  or  other 
extraneous  evidence ;  and  the  rule  that  such  evidence  is  not  ad- 
missible to  conti'ol  tlie  covenants  is  not  violated.^ 

888.  The  covenants  of  a  deed  are  limited  by  the  peculiar 
nature  of  the  property  described.  Thus,  where  a  deed  described 
the  land  as  "  flats,"  this  term  alone  was  held  to  imply  that  the 
public  had  a  right  to  use  the  land  for  the  purposes  of  navigation, 
and  the  existence  of  this  public  easement  was  declared  not  to  be 
a  breach  of  the  covenant.^ 

The  same  rule  applies  in  regard  to  an  easement  of  the  public 
in  that  portion  of  the  land  between  high  and  low  water  mark  on 
a  navigable  stream  ;  and  a  covenant  of  warranty  of  such  land  is 
not  broken  by  the  existence  of  such  an  easement,  because  the 
grantee  is  presumed  to  have  known  of  its  existence,  and  to  have 
contracted  with  reference  to  it.-^ 

The  covenant  is  limited  in  its  effect  to  the  particular  incum- 
brance described.  Under  a  covenant  in  a  quitclaim  deed  by  an 
heir  to  save  the  grantee  harmless  from  liens  arising  out  of  claims 
against  tlie  estate  of  liis  ancestor,  the  gmntee  cannot  recover  for 

1  Holmes  v.  Danfortli,  83   Me.  139,  21  covenant    agiiinst    incunibrances,  saying, 

Atl.  Rei).  845.     Walton,  .!.,  refers  to  the  "  We  do  not  jjo  so  far  as  that." 

case  of  Memmert  v.  McKeen,  112  Pa.  St.  -  Mont^romcry  r.  Reed,  69  Me.  510. 

315,  4  Atl.  Rep.  542,  where  the  fact  of  ■'  Barre  v.  Fleming,  29  W.  Va.  314,  I 

notice    alone   was  held   to    be    sufficient  S.  E.  Rep.  731. 
ground  for  excluding  the  operation  of  the 

709 


§§  889-891.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

a  breach  of  such  covenant  on  the  ground  that,  at  the  time  of  the 
execution  of  the  deed,  a  right  of  way  across  the  farm  was  vested 
in  another.^ 

889.  A  coveaant  is  extinguished  by  a  reconveyance  by  the 
grantee  to  his  grantor  with  like  covenants  as  those  in  the 
deed  to  the  grantee ;  as,  for  instance,  where  the  same  incum- 
brance of  record  existed  at  the  time  of  each  conveyance,  and  each 
contained  a  covenant  against  incumbrances,  to  avoid  circuity  of 
action,  the  covenant  in  the  one  deed  will  be  lield  to  cancel  the 
covenant  in  the  other,  so  that  no  action  on  the  covenant  can  be 
maintained  by  eitlier  party,  or  by  the  assignees  of  either .^ 

A  special  covenant  to  release  the  granted  premises  from  an 
incumbrance  named  by  the  holder  of  the  equitable  title  is  not 
impaired  by  the  attestation  clause  which  recites  that  such  cove- 
nantor '■'■  joins  to  i-elease  any  equitable  interest  in  said  premises ; " 
for  this  is  not  declared  to  be  the  only  purpose  of  the  covenantor 
in  joining  in  the  deed."^ 

890.  A  covenant  against  incumbrances  is  broken  on  the 
delivery  of  the  deed,  if  an  incumbrance  on  the  land  then  exists. 
Accordingly  an  eviction  is  not  necessary  to  the  right  of  action 
on  this  covenant.  There  is  a  distinction  in  this  respect  between 
a  covenant  against  incumbrances  and  a  covenant  of  warranty 
against  incumbrances.^  When  the  covenant  is  in  the  usual 
form,  "  that  the  premises  are  free  of  all  incumbrance,"  it  is  a 
covenant  in  prcese7iti,  and  is  broken  as  soon  as  made.  When, 
however,  instead  of  standing  by  itself  it  is  coupled  to  the  cove- 
nant for  quiet  enjoyment,  immediately  following  it  and  connected 
with  it  by  the  word  awe?,  it  may  be  a  covenant  in  futuro,  and 
will  then  run  with  the  land  until  broken.^ 

891.  The  right  of  action  accrues  to  the  covenantee  imme- 
diately. When,  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance,  there  is  an  out- 
standing lien  or  incumbrance,  the  grantee  need  not  wait  until  he 
is  evicted.  If  the  grantee  extinguishes  the  incumbrance  he  may 
recover  the  amount  so  paid.  If  he  has  not  extinguished  it  he 
can  recover  only  nominal  damages.*^ 

1  Marsh  v.  Fisb,  06  Vt.  213,  28  Atl.  *  Fisk  v.  Cathcart,  3   Colo.  App.  374, 
Rep.  987.  33    Pac.   Rep.  1004 ;    Streeper  ;;.   Abeln, 

2  Silverman  v.   Loomis,   104   III.    137;  59  Mo.  App.  48.5;  Maibury  i'.  Thornton, 
Brown  v.  Metz,  33   111.   339 ;  Goodel   v.  82  Va.  702,  1   S.  E.  Rep.  909. 
Bennett,  22  AVis.  56^.  ^  Rawle  on  Covenants,  §§  70-73. 

3  Palmer  v.  Wall,  128  Mass.  475.  «  Bradshaw  v.  Crosby,  151   Mass.  237, 

710 


COVENANT    FOR   WARRANTY   AND   QUIET   ENJOYMENT.       [§§  892,  893. 

V.    Covenant  for  Warranty  and  Quiet  Enjoyment. 

892.  A  general  covenant  of  warranty  is  tantamount  to  the 
covenant  of  quiet  enjoyment,  and  what  amounts  to  a  breach 
of  the  one  is  a  breach  of  the  other.^  The  covenant  of  warranty 
is  generally  regarded  as  being  no  broader  in  its  scope  than  the 
covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment.^ 

In  a  few  States,  however,  the  covenant  of  warranty,  in  accord- 
ance with  long-settled  usage,  is  considered  as  equivalent  to  the 
several  covenants  in  use  under  the  common  law ;  "  as  that  one 
is  seised  of  the  land  sold,  that  he  has  good  and  perfect  right  to 
convey,  that  the  land  is  free  from  incumbrances,  that  the  grantee 
shall  quietly  enjoy  possession,  and  that  the  grantor  will  warrant 
and  defend  the  title  against  all  claims  of  all  persons."  ^ 

The  covenant  of  non-claim  sometimes  used  is  the  same  in  effect 
as  a  qualified  covenant  of  warranty.^  It  is  broken  in  the  same 
way,  the  damages  for  a  breach  are  the  same,  and  it  equally  runs 
with  the  land. 

893.  The  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment  is  intended  to  se- 
cure undisturbed  possession  for  the  purchaser.^  It  protects 
the  purchaser  from  a  wrongful  disturbance  by  the  covenantor, 
his  heirs  or  executors,  or  other  person  specially  named  in  the 
covenant ;  but  not  a  wrongful  disturbance  by  any  other  person, 
for  the  law  gives  a  direct  remedy  upon  such  a  disturbance.*^ 

24  N.  K.  Rep.  47 ;   Ilarwood  v.   Lee,  85  Ky.  352 ;  Piyse  v.  McGuire,  81   Ky.  608  ; 

Iowa,  622,   52  N.  W.  Kep.  521  ;  Fuuk  v.  Lessly    v.   Bowie,   27   S.  C.    193,  3  S.  K. 

Creswell,  5  Iowa,  62;  Knadlcr  v.  Sharp,  Rep.  199;  Jeter  i'.   Glenn,  9   Rich.  374; 

36  Iowa,  232  ;  Eversole  v.  Early,  80  Iowa,  Evans  v.  McLiicas,  12  S.  C.  56  ;   Welsh  ;;. 

604,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  897.  Kibler,  5  S.  C.  405 ;  Funk  i>.  Creswell,  5 

1  Cheney   o.  Straube,   35  Neb.   521,53  Iowa,  62,  93. 

N.   W.  Rep.  479 ;    Real  v.   IloUister,  20         *  Gibbs  r.  Thayer,  6  Cash.  30 ;  Porter 

Neb.  112,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  189;  Mescrvcy  v.  Sullivan,  7   Gray,  441  ;  Trull  v.  East- 

v.  Snell  (Iowa),  62  N.  W.  Rep.  767  ;  Burk  man,  3  Met.   121;  Lothrop  v.   Snell,  11 

V.  Bnrk,  64   Ga.  632  ;    Butt   /•.    Riffe,   78  Cash.  4.53  ;   Newcomb  v.  Presbrcy,  8  Met. 

Ky.  352,  355.  406;  Kimball   v.  Blaisdcll,  5   N.   II.   533; 

2  Reed  v.  Hatch,  55  N.  II.  327,  .336 ;  Ilolln-ook  r.  Debo.  99  111.372;  Boatwick 
Peck  V.  Hougbtalin;:.  35  Mich.  127,  131  ;  v.  Willinms,  36  111.  65,  70;  Gee  y.  Moore, 
Bostwick  I,'.  Williams,  36  111.  65,  69  ;  Rca  14  Cal.  472. 

V.   Minklcr,   5   Lans.    196;   Grcenvault  r.  See,  however,  as  reganls  estoppel,  Par- 
Davis,  4  Hill,  643;  Clarke  i-.  M'Aiiulty,  tridf,'e    v.    Patten.    33    Me.    483;    Pike  v. 
3  Serg.  &  R.  364;  Emerson  r.  Proprie-  Galvin,  29  Me.  183. 
tors,  1  Mass.  464,  per  Sedt,'wick,  J.  ^  Ludwell  v.  Newman,  6  T.  R.  458. 

3  Smith  v.  Jones  (Ky.),  31  S.  W.  Rep.  »  Foster  v.  Mapes,  Cro.  VXxz.  212; 
475  476  per  Grace  J.;   Butt  r.  Riffe,  78  Dudley  v.  Folliott.   3    T.   R.   584;  Nash 

'      '  711 


§  894.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

Even  as  against*  the  covenantor,  the  covenant  extends  only  to 
any  distui'bance  made  by  him  under  a  chiim  of  title,  and  not  to 
anything  done  by  way  of  trespass  merely.' 

Neither  the  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment  nor  that  of  warranty 
protects  the  grantee  against  adverse  claims  or  suits  for  which 
the  grantor  is  not  responsible,  but  only  against  claiuis  and  suits 
based  upon  a  legal  foundation.^ 

A  covenant  which  recites  that  the  grantor  covenants,  grants, 
and  agrees  that  he,  "against  all  and  every  person  and  persims 
whomsoever  lawfully  claiming  or  to  claim  the  same,  or  any  part 
thereof,  shall  and  will  warrant  and  forever  defend,"  is  a  covenant 
for  quiet  enjoj'ment,  and  not  one  against  incumbrances.^ 

"  A  covenant  that  the  party  of  the  first  ])art,  in  the  quiet  and 
peaceable  possession  of  the  said  party  of  the  second  part,  his  heirs 
and  assigns,  against  the  said  party  of  the  first  part,  his  heirs  and 
assigns,  and  against  all  and  every  person  and  persons  whomsoever 
lawfully  claiming  or  to  claim  the  same,  shall  and  will  warrant 
and  by  these  presents  forever  defend,"  is  a  warranty  of  peaceable 
possession,  and  is  broken  by  an  eviction  under  a  paramount 
title.-* 

894.  The  covenant  of  warranty  applies  to  the  estate  con- 
veyed, and  cannot  enlarge  that  estate.^     If  the  deed  conveys 

V.  Palmer,  5   Mau.  &  Sel.  374;  Fowle  u  v.  Masson,  67  Cal.  169,  7  Pac.  Rep.  452; 

Welsh,  1   B.  &C.  29;  Jeffryes .  i;.  Evans,  Playter  v.   Cunningham,    21    Cal.    229; 

19  C.  B.  N.   S.  246;   Sanderson  v.  Ber-  Branger  v.  Manciet,  30  Cal.  624;  Kelly 

wick-upon-Tweed,  13  Q.  B.  D.  547 ;  An-  v.  Dutch  Church,  2  Hill,  105  ;  Greenby  v. 

drus  V.  St.  Louis  Smelting  Co.  130  U.  S.  Wilcocks,  2  Johns.  1  ;  Moore  v.  Weber, 

643,    9    Sup.    Ct.    Eep.    645;    Norton    v.  71    Pa.    St.    429;    Schuylkill    R.    Co.    v. 

Schmucker  (Tex.),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  720.  Schmoele,  57  Pa.  St.  273. 
,  1  Penu  V.  Glover,  Cro.  Eliz.  421  ;  Lloyd         ^  Leddy  v.  Enos,  6  Wash.  247,  33  Pac. 

V.  Tomkies,  1   T.  R.  671 ;   Seddon  v.  Sen-  Rep.  508. 

ate,  13  East,  63  ;    Sherman  v.  Williams,         ^  McLean  v.  Webster,  45  Ivans.  644,  26 

113   Mass.  481  ;  O'Keefe  v.   Kennedy,  3  Pac.  Rep.  10. 

Cush.    325;    Sedgwick   v.   Hollenbeck,  7         ^  Sweet   v.   Brown,    12   Mete.    17.5,  45 

Johns.  376  ;  Curtis  i:  Deering,  12  Me.  499  ;  Am.  Dec.  243  ;  Allen  v.  Holton,  20  Pick. 

Avery  v.  Dougherty,  102  Ind.  443;  Wade  458;  Ballard  v.  Child,  46  Me.   152;  Mc- 

V.  Comstock,  11  Ohio  St.  71.  Near  v.  McCombcr,  18  Iowa,  12;  Kimball 

2  Hayes  v.  Bickersraff,  Vaughan,  118;  v.    Semple,   25    Cal.   440;    Blauchard    v. 

Noonan   v.  Lee,  2   Black,  499;  Kimball  Brooks,  12  Pick.  47;  White  v.  Brocaw, 

V.  Grand  Lodge,   131    Mass.  59;  Bartlett  14  Ohio  St.  339  ;  Adams  v.  Ross,  30  N.  J. 

».  Farriiigton,  120  Mass.  284;  Akerly  v.  L.  505,  510,  82   Am.  Dec.  237  ;  Lamb  v. 

Vilas,  23  Wis.  207,  99   Am.  Dec.   165;  Wakefield,  1   Sawy.  251 ;  Hope  v.  Stone, 

Gleason  v.  Smith,  41  Vt.  293;  Underwood  10  Minn.  141 ;   Hull  v.  Hull,  35  W.  Va. 

V.    Birchard,    47  Vt.   305;    Meaervey   v.  155,13  S.  E.  Rep.  49. 
Snell  (Iowa),  62  N.  W.  Rep.  767;   West 
712 


COVENANT   FOR   WARRANTY   AND    QUIET   ENJOYMENT.       [§§  895,  896. 

merely  the  grantor's  interest  in  the  land,  a  covenant  of  general 
warranty  in  it  is  limited  and  restricted  to  such  interest,  and  does 
not  warrant  the  land  against  a  superior  title  in  another.^ 

It  is  limited  as  well  to  the  particular  parcel  of  ground  intended 
to  be  conveyed  according  to  the  description  in  the  deed.^ 

This  covenant  does  not  estop  the  grantor  from  claiming  a 
breach  of  explicit  conditions,  incorporated  in  the  granting  part  of 
the  deed,  restricting  the  future  use  of  the  granted  property. 
"  That  which  the  covenantor  in  such  a  deed  undertakes  to  war- 
rant and  defend  against  all  lawful  claims  is  not  the  land,  or  an 
absolute  and  unqualified  estate  in  it,  but  '  the  premises  ; '  that  is, 
the  defeasible  estate  conveyed  by  the  preceding  grant,  upon  con- 
ditions expressed  in  the  same  deed."  ^ 

895.  A  covenant  of  warranty  is  not  qualified  by  a  phrase 
at  the  end  of  the  description  of  the  land,  "  being  the  same 
premises  by  a  person  named  conveyed  to  me,"  even  if  through 
that  deed  an  incumbrance  was  discoverable.  The  reference  was 
designed  to  help  identify  the  premises  conveyed,  and  not  to  deter- 
mine the  quantity  or  quality  of  title.  If  the  rule  were  otherwise 
it  would  be  hazardous  to  accept  deeds  containing  such  references. 
Grantees  would  be  too  easily  deceived  by  them.* 

The  force  and  effect  of  a  formal  and  complete  covenant  of 
warranty  will  not  be  cut  down  by  words  of  doubtful  import  in 
the  deed,^  nor  by  a  written  contract,  contemporaneous  with  the 
deed,  whereby  it  is  agreed  that  the  general  covenant  of  warranty 
shall  apply  only  to  conveyances,  incumbrances,  and  acts  done  or 
suffered  by  the  grantor.^ 

896.  A  conveyance  in  terms  of  the  grantor's  right,  title, 
and  interest  is  not  enlarged  in  scope  by  a  general  covenant, 
but  such  covenant  must  be  limited  to  fit  the  estate  and  interest 
of  the  grantor.'^ 

1  Hull  V.  Hull,  .35  W.  Va.  155, 13  S.  E.  «  Rinchart  v.  Rinchart,  91  Ind.  89. 
Rep.  49.  '   Haiirick  y.raliick,  119  U.S.  1.56, 175, 

2  Allen  V.  Kersey,  104  Ind.  1,  3  N.  E.  7  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  147  ;  Allen  v.  Holton,  20 
Rep.  557.  V\ek.  453  ;  Sweet  v.  Hrown,  12  Mete.  175, 

3  Linton  v.  Allen,  154  Mass.  432,  438,  45  Am.  Dec.  243;  Hlancliard  v.  Brooks, 
28  N.  E.  Rep.  780,  per  Barker,  J.  12  Pick.  47  ;   MeNear  v.   McComber,   18 

*  Shaw  /'.  Bisbee,  83  Me.  400,  22  Atl.  Iowa,  12 ;  Gee  v.  Moore,  14  Cal.  472  ;  Kim- 
Rep.  361,  per  Peters,  C.  J. ;  Hathoru  v.  ball  v.  Somple,  25  Cal.  440;  Bates  v.  Fos- 
Hinds,  69  Me.  326.  ter,  59  Me.  157,  8  Am.  Rep.  406;  Gib-on 

6  Cornish  v.  Capron,  136  N.  Y.  232,  32  v.  Chouteau,  39  Mo.  536 ;  Young  v.  Clip- 

N  E  Rep  773  pinger,  14  Kans.  148 ;  Stockwell  v.  Couil- 

713 


§§  897,  898.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

Even  if  the  grant  is  of  certain  land  described,  with  an  expla- 
nation that  the  grantor  means  to  convey  only  his  right,  title,  and 
interest  in  it,  a  general  warranty  of  title  is  restricted  to  the 
grantor's  interest.-^ 

But  if  it  is  evident  from  the  deed  itself  that  the  grantor  intended 
to  convey  an  estate  of  a  particular  description  or  quality,  the 
o-rantor  is  bound  by  his  covenants,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  being 
estopped  to  say  that  he  was  not  seised  of  such  estate  at  the  time 
of  the  conveyance.'-^ 

897.  Covenants  of  warranty  do  not  cover  a  title  or  incum- 
brance held  by  the  covenantee  himself.  They  extend  only  to  a 
title  or  incumbrance  existing  in  a  third  person  which  may  defeat 
the  estate  granted  by  the  covenantor.^  The  grantee  cannot  set 
up,  as  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  his  deed,  an  outstanding  title 
in  himself,  or  an  incumbrance  held  by  him.  ''  It  never  can  be  per- 
mitted to  a  person  to  accept  a  deed  with  covenants  of  seisin,  and 
then  turn  round  upon  his  grantor  and  allege  that  his  covenant  is 
broken,  for  that,  at  the  time  he  accepted  the  deed,  he  himself  was 
seised  of  the  premises."  ^ 

898.  The  covenant  of  warranty  is  not  a  warranty  of  quan- 
tity in  a  deed  which  describes  the  land  by  metes  and  bounds,  and 
as  containing  a  certain  number  of  acres,  "  more  or  less,"  though 
in  fact  the  quantity  is  greatly  less  than  it  is  represented  to  be  in 
such  description.^     The  description  of  quantity  is  a  part  of  the 

lard,  129  Mass.  231  ;   Reynolds  v.  Shaver,  479,485;  Hannon   y.  Christoplier,   34  N. 

59  Ark.  299,  27  S.  W.   Rep.  78 ;  McDon-  J.  Eq.  459. 

ough  V.  Martin,  88  Ga.  675,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  3  Smiley  v.  Fries,  104  111.  416  ;  Furuess 
59,  per  Blickley,  C.  J.;  Cummings  v.  r.  Williams,  11  111.229;  Beebe  y.  Swart- 
Dearborn,  56  Vt.  441 ;  Bowen  v.  Thrall,  wout,  8  111.  162;  Carson  v.  Cabeen,  45  111. 
28  Vt.  382  ;  Marsh  «.  Fish,  66  Vt.  213,  28  App.  262  ;  Horrigan  v.  Rice,  39  Minn.  49, 
Atl.  Rep.  987  ;   Habig  v.  Dodge,  127  Ind.  38  N.  W.  Rep.  765. 

31,  40,  25  N.E.  Rep.  182;  Locker.  White,  *  Fitch    v.    Baldwin,    17    Johns.    161, 

89  Ind.   492;    Bryan   r.  Uland,  101    Ind.  166. 

477.  The  statutory  covenant  will  be  re-  ^  Rogers  v.  Peebles,  72  Ala.  529  ;  Win- 
strained  where  the  conveyance  is  of  the  ston  v.  Browning,  61  Ala.  80;  Carter  v. 
grantor's  interest  only.  Gibson  v.  Chou-  Beck,  40  Ala.  599  ;  Wright  v.  Wright,  34 
teau,  39  Mo.  536  ;  Koenig  r.  Branson,  73  Ala.  194;  Erskine  v.  Wilson,  41  S.  C. 
Mo.  634.  198,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  489  ;   Commissioner  v. 

1  Bates  V.  Foster,  59  Me.  157,  8  Am.  Thompson,  4  McCord,  434;  Bauskett  v. 
Rep.  406.  .Jones,  2  Speer,  68  ;   Douthit  v.  Hipp,  23 

Contra,  McNear  V.  McComber,  18  Iowa,  S.  C.  205  ;  Pickman  D.Trinity  Church, 
12.  123  Mass.  1;    Powell   v.  Clark,  5  Mass 

2  Habig  V.  Dodge,  127  Ind.  31,  25  N.  E.     3.55. 

Rep.   182;  Nicholson  v.   Caress,  45  Ind.         But  relief  in  equity  may  be  had  by  the 

714 


COVENANT   FOR   WARRANTY   AND    QUIET    ENJOYMENT.       [§§  899-901. 

general  description  of  the  land,  and  not  a  special  warranty  o£ 
quantity. 

A  covenant  of  title  is  only  applicable  to  the  lands  conveyed.^ 
The  grantee  cannot  recover  upon  his  warranty  on  the  giound 
that  he  supposed  certain  land  was  included  in  the  description, 
when  in  fact  it  was  not.^ 

899.  When  by  mistake  the  deed  describes  land  other  than 
that  intended,  it  should  be  reformed  before  any  action  is  had 
upon  the  covenants.-^  The  grantee's  cause  of  action  to  reform 
the  deed  is  personal  to  him,  and  not  a  covenant  running  with  the 
land,  and  will  not  therefore,  without  apt  words  of  assignment, 
pass  to  a  purchaser  from  the  grantee  under  a  deed  which  describes 
the  same  land  described  in  the  deed  to  his  grantor.^ 

900.  A  covenant  that,  in  case  of  a  deficiency  in  quantity, 
the  grantor  will  convey  sufficient  additional  land  adjoining  the 
granted  land  to  make  up  the  required  quantity  on  demand  of  the 
purchaser  within  a  time  named,  is  restricted  to  land  owned  by 
the  grantor,  and  the  provision  that  the  purchaser  shall  make 
demand  within  the  time  limited  is  an  express  condition  precedent 
to  an  action  upon  the  covenant.'^ 

901.  A  parol  warranty,  or  a  parol  promise  by  the  grantor 
to  warrant  and  defend  his  title  to  the  grantee,  is  within  the 
statute  of  frauds,  and  therefore  void.*^  Such  an  undertaking  is 
an  interest  in  land  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.  Under 
the  old  common  law  a  warranty  meant  an  undertaking  by  tlie 
feoffor  or  donor  of  land  to  defend  the  feoffee  or  donee  in  posses- 
sion, and  to  give  land  of  equal  value  in  case  the  latter  should  be 
evicted.  Under  the  later  common  law,  an  action  of  covenant  was 
allowed  for  the  breach  of  a  prouiise  in  writing  under  seal.     This 

purchaser    for   a    material   deficiency  in  lou^jliby  ?;.  Jliddlesex    Co.  8  Met.  296 ; 

quantity  where  he  was  influenced  to  pay  Lawrence   c.    Mont;^oniery,  37  Cal.  183; 

the  price  upon  the  grantor's  niisrcpreseu-  Davis  ('.  CIari<,  33  X.  J.  Eq.  .579  ;  Cham- 

tation  of  liie  quantity.     Sine  v.  Fox,  33  bliss  v.  Miller,  1.5  La.  Ann.  713. 

W.  Va.  521,    II   S.   E.  Rep.  218;    Kelly  "^  Winneitiseogee  I'aper  Co.   v.   Eaton, 

V.  Riley,  22  W.  Va.  247.  65  N.  II.  13,  18  Atl.  Rep.  171. 

1  Hall  V.  Scott  Co.  2  McCrary,  356.  ''   Hayniond  r.  Kayniund,  10  Cush.  134; 

2  McCreary  v.  Douglass,  5  Tex.  Civ.  Walterliouse  i'.  Garrard,  70  Ind.  400 ;  Mc- 
App.  492,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  367.  Donald  v.  Elfes,  61   Ind.   279;  Kelly  v. 

3  Axtel  f.  Chase,  83  Ind.  546.  I'almer   (Neb.),    60    N.   W.    Rep.   924; 
*  Norris  v.  Colorado  Turkey  Honcstone     Bi.shop   v.   Little,    5   Me.   362.     And  see 

Co.  (Colo.)  43  Pac.  Rep.  1024,  citing  Col-     Buckner    v.   Street,    15   Fed.    Rep.    363; 
lins  V.  Suau,  7   Rob.  (N.  Y.)  G23  ;  Wil-     Kerr  i;.  Shaw,  13  Johns.  236. 

716 


§§  00-2,  903. J  COVENANTS   FOR    TITLE. 

proposition  seoius  to  have  been  questioned  only  in  the  early  cases 
in  Pennsylvania,  before  the  fourth  section  of  the  statute  of 
frauds  had  been  enacted. ^ 

902.  According  to  the  decisions  in  a  few  States,  however, 
a  parol  warranty  of  the  quality  of  land  is  not  merged  in  an 
ordinary  warranty  deed  of  it,  but  the  grantor  is  liable  to  the 
purchaser  for  a  breach  of  such  parol  warranty.^  While  it  is 
admitted  that  a  bill  of  sale  of  personal  property  cannot  be  varied 
by  a  prior  or  contemporaneous  parol  warranty,  because  the  writ- 
ing is  supposed  to  contain  all  of  the  contract  between  the  parties, 
this  rule  is  said  not  to  apply  to  an  ordinary  conveyance  of  real 
property,  for  the  deed  is  regarded  as  the  mere  transfer  of  the 
title  or  delivery  of  the  land.  "  The  deed  is  evidence  of  the  final 
consummation  of  some  contract  previously  made,  but  is  not  evi- 
dence of  the  contract."  ^ 

903.  The  covenant  of  warranty  or  for  quiet  enjoyment  is 
broken  only  by  an  eviction  under  a  paramount  title.*  It  is 
not  broken  by  the  mere  claim  or  existence  of  a  title  paramount 
in  another,  so  long  as  this  is  not  asserted.^ 

To  constitute  a  breach  of  these  covenants,  the  grantee  must 
show  an  actual  disturbance  of  his  possession  by  the  grantor,  his 

1  Bell  y.  Andrews,  4  Dall.  152  ;  George  Stevens,  13  Mo.  App.  240.  Nebraska: 
V.  Bartoner,  7  Watts,  530.  Cheney  v.   Straube,  35   Neb.  521,  53  N. 

2  Saville  I'.  Chalmers,  76  lovvii,  325,  41  W.  Hep.  479;  Latham  r.  McCann,  2 
N.  W.  Rep.  30  ;  Green  v.  Batson,  71  Wis.  Neb.  276.  New  Jersey:  Stewart  v.  Drake, 
54,36  N.  W.  Rep.  849.  9  N.  J.  L.   139.     New  York:   Boreel  v. 

8  Thayer  v.  Reeder,  45  Iowa,  272,  quoted  Lawtou,  90  N.  Y.  293  ;  Mead  v.  Staekpole, 

and  approved  in   Saville  i-.  Chambers,  76  40  Hun,  473 ;  Kidder  v.  Bork,  12   Mi.sc. 

Iowa,  325,  41  N.  W.  Rep.  30.  519,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  663.     Ohio  :  Smith  t>. 

*  Peters  y.  Bowman,  98  U.  S.  56.   Illi-  Dixon,    27    Ohio    St.    471.     Tennessee: 

nois:    Smith    v.    Newton,    38    111.    230;  Hayes   >:  Ferr^uson,  15  Lea,   1,  54    Am. 

Weaver   y.  Wilson,  48   111.125;   Barry  y.  Rep.    398.     Vermont:  Clement  v.    Bank, 

Guild,  126  111.  439,  18  N.  E.    Rep.    759,  61  Vt.  298,  17  Atl.  Rep.  717. 

28111.  App.  39.     Kentucky:    Tryse  y.  Mc-  ^  Allis    v.    Nininper,    25    Minn.    525; 

Guire,  81  Ky.  608.     Maine  :  Montcomery  Claflin    r.   Case,  53  Kans.    560,  36    Pac. 

V.   Reed,   69    Me.   510.      Massachusetts:  Rep.   1062;    Washinj,'ton    Sav.  Bank    v. 

Kramer  v.   Carter,   136  Mass.   504,  507;  Tliornton,  83  Va.  157,  2  S.  E.   Rep.  193; 

Funas  y.  Durgin,  119  Mass.  500,  20  Am.  Marbury  y.  Thornton,   82  Va.  702,    1   S. 

Rep.  341 ;  White  v.  Whitney,  3  Met.  81  ;  E.    Rep.  909  ;  Jones  v.  Richmond,  88  Va. 

Tufts  y.  Adams,  8  Pick.  547  ;  Sprague  v.  231,   13    S.   E.    Rep.   414;   Dickinson   v. 

Baker,  17  Mass.  586.     Michigan:  Matte-  Hoomes,    8   Gratt.   353,  396;   Yancey  v. 

Sony.  Vaughn,  38  Mich.  373.  Mississippi:  Lewis,  4  Hen.  &   M.  390  ;  Smith  y.  Par- 

Watkins  y.  Gregory,  69  Miss.  469,  13  So.  .sons,   33  W.  Va.  644,    11    S.   E.   Rep.  68; 

Rep.  696.     Missouri :  Barlow  y.  Dclaney,  Rex  v.  Creel,  22  W.  Va.  373. 
40  Fed.  Rep.  97,  86  Mo.  583 ;  White  v. 
716 


COVENANT    FOR    WARRANTY   AND   QUIET   ENJOYMENT.       [§§  904-906. 

heirs  or  assigns,  or  a  necessary  yielding  to  a  paramouiit   title  ;  or, 
in  other  words,  either  an  actual  or  constructive  eviction. ^ 

904.  These  covenants  are  broken  by  the  very  commence- 
ment of  an  action  on  the  better  title.  Any  entry  and  dispos- 
session adversely  and  lawfully  made  under  paramount  title  will 
be  an  eviction  ;  and  whenever  such  a  right  is  exercised,  it  is  con- 
sidered to  have  all  the  force  and  effect  of  a  dispossession  under 
legal  process.^ 

To  establish  a  prima  facie  breach  of  the  covenant,  the  grantee 
is  required  merely  to  prove  that  he  has  either  been  evicted  or  kept 
out  of  possession  by  one  in  actual  possession  claiming  title  para- 
mount  to  his  own.  The  presumption  of  title  which  then  arises  in 
favor  of  the  party  in  possession  must  be  overcome  by  proving  title 
out  of  him,  or  both  the  aforesaid  breaches  may  be  deemed  estab- 
lished by  sufficient  proof.^ 

905.  The  eviction  naust  be  from  the  whole  or  some  part  of 
the  premises  by  title  paramount."*  The  covenantee  cannot  re- 
cover as  for  an  eviction  from  the  whole  of  certain  lands,  on  proof 
that  one  claiming  under  a  paramount  title  had  recovered  in  eject- 
ment an  undivided  half  interest  therein,  as  such  recovery  is  not  a 
constructive  recovery  of  the  other  half  interest.  The  covenant  in 
such  case  is  broken  only  as  to  such  undivided  half,  and  the  cove- 
nantee would  be  in  possession  jointly  with  another  as  tenant  in 
common  with  him."^ 

The  removal  of  a  building  from  tlie  granted  land  by  a  tenant 
under  a  prior  agreement  with  the  grantor  is.  a  breach  of  the  cove- 
nant of  warranty.^ 

906.  An  incumbrance  does  not  constitute  a  breach  of  this 
covenant  until   the   grantee's  possession  is  disturbed.     Out- 

1  Whitbeck  v.  Cook,  15  Johns.  483,  8  -  Stewart  v.  West,  14  Pa.  St.  336,  per 

Am.  Dec.  272  ;  Sedgwick  v.  Hollenback,  Gil)Son,  C.  J. 

7  Johns.  376  ;   Carter  v.   Denman,   23  N.  =*  Ileyn   i-.  Ohman,  42  Neb.   693,  60  N. 

J.  L.  260  ;  Kellot;  ,-.  I'latt,  33   N.  J.   L.  W.  Rep.  952. 

328;  Zabriskie  r.  Baudendistel  (N.  J.  Eq.),  ^  Ceccoui  v.  Uodden,  147  Mass.  164,  16 

20  Atl.  Rep.  163;  Baudendistel  v.  Zabris-  N.  E.  Rep.  749  ;  Kramer  v.   Carter,  136 

kie,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  453  ;  Real  v.  Hollister,  Mass.  504  ;  Mooney  v.  Burchard,  84  Ind. 

20  Neb.  112,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  189;  Ander-  285. 

son  V.  Buchanan,  20  Neb.  272,  29  N.  W.  ^  McGrew  v.  Harmon,  164  Pa.  St.  115, 

Rep.  935;  Morgan  r.  Henderson,  2  Wash.  30   Atl.   Rep.   265;    Dewey    i-.   Brown,  2 

T.  367,  8  Pac.  Rep.  491  ;  Moore  v.  Frank-  Pick.  387  ;  Gray  v.  Givens,  26  Mo.   291  ; 

enfield,  25  Minn.  540.  Dawson  v.  Mills,  32  Pa.  St.  302. 

6  West  V.  Stewart,  7  Pa.  St.  122. 

717 


§  007.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

standiui:;  city  and  county  taxes  at  the  time  the  deed  was  executed 
do  not  constitute  a  breach  of  the  covenant  against  quiet  enjoy- 
ment. Tlie  payment  of  such  taxes  by  the  grantee,  before  any 
move  is  made  to  collect  tlie  same,  is  a  voluntary  payment,  and 
imposes  no  liability  upon  the  grantor  under  the  covenant.^ 

A  mortgage  upon  the  property  is  not  a  breach  of  the  covenant 
for  quiet  enjoyment,  but  the  covenant  is  broken  when  the  mort- 
gage is  foreclosed  and  the  property  sold.^  "  If  one  is  content  to 
take  a  deed  with  a  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment  only,  he  can 
have  no  relief  until  his  possession  is  distui'bed  by  one  claiming 
under  a  superior  title.  He  could  have  no  relief  whatever  by  rea- 
son of  the  fact  that  thei-e  was  a  mortgage  upon  the  property  at 
the  time  the  deed  was  made,  until  the  rights  under  the  mortgage 
had  been  so  asserted  as  to  interfere  with  his  possession  ;  whereas, 
if  the  deed  had  contained  a  covenant  against  incumbrances, 
a  right  of  action  would  have  accrued  upon  the  delivery  of  the 
deed,  if  at  the  time  there  was  an  outstanding  mortgage  upon  the 
property."  ^ 

Thus,  if  there  is  a  paramount  mortgage  upon  the  land,  there 
is  no  breach  of  the  covenant  of  warranty  until  the  mortgagee 
or  the  purchaser  at  the  mortgage  sale  has  taken  possession ;  * 
though  a  voluntary  payment  of  the  mortgage  when  foreclosure 
is  threatened  is  a  breach  of  the  covenant,  the  grantee  in  such 
case  assuming  the  burden  of  showing  that  the  mortgage  was 
a  paramount  title.^  The  recording  of  a  certificate  of  entry  by 
a  mortgagee  for  the  purpose  of  foreclosure  is  a  breach  of  the 
covenant.*' 

907.  The  covenant  of  warranty  can  never  be  treated  as  a 
covenant  against  incumbrances,  for  in  that  case,  the  incum- 
brances being  in  existence  when  the  deed  was  made,  the  covenant 
would  be  broken  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance,  and  would  become 
a  mere  right  of  action  not  assignable  at  law,  and  would  not  pass 
to  the  subsequent  grantee.' 

1  Leddy  v.  Enos,  6  Wash.  247,  33  Pac.  «  Jackson  ik  McAuley  (Wash.),  43  Pac. 
Rep.  508.  Rep.  41,  per  Hoyt,  C.  J. 

2  Cornish  v.  Capron,  ISC,  X.  Y.  232,  32  •*  Hamilton  v.  Lusk,  88  Ga.  520,  15  S. 
N.  E.  Rep.  773;  St.  John  v.  Palmer,  5  E.  Rep.  10;  Kramer  v.  Carter,  136  Mass. 
Hill,  599;  Jackson  v.  McAuley  (Wash.),  504. 

43  Pac.  Rep.  41  ;  McLean  v.  Webster,  45         ^  Sprague  v.  Baker,  17  Mass.  586. 
Kans.  044,  26  Pac.  Rep.  10.  6  Furnas  v.  Durf.'iii,  119  Mass.  500. 

"  Marbury  v.  Thornton,  82  Va.  702,  1 
718 


COVENANT    FOR   WARRANTY   AND   QUIET    ENJOYMENT.       [§§  908-910. 

908.  The  existence  of  an  easement  in  the  land  conveyed  is 
not  a  breach  of  these  covenants  until  the  right  is  asserted  or 
used.  It  was  so  held  even  where  the  easement  was  a  right  of 
way  in  favor  of  a  railroad  company  for  its  road,  for  the  right  of 
way  might  by  non-user  revert  to  the  grantor.^ 

An  outstanding  equitable  title  which  may  ripen  into  a  para- 
mount title  is  within  the  general  covenants  of  warranty .^  But  if 
the  covenantee  takes  possession,  or  has  power  to  take  possession, 
under  bis  deed,  he  cannot  complain  of  the  outstanding  equitable 
title  until  it  is  successfully  asserted .-^ 

909.  The  loss  of  an  incorporeal  incident  of  the  land  con- 
veyed, by  virtue  of  a  paramount  right  in  another,  may  be  a 
breach  of  the  covenant  of  warranty  and  quiet  enjoyment.  Thus, 
where  a  mill  with  a  dam  and  pond  was  conveyed  with  such  cove- 
nants, but  without  any  express  covenant  in  regard  to  the  water- 
power,  and  the  purchaser,  while  maintaining  the  dam  at  the  same 
height  as  it  was  when  the  conveyance  was  made,  was  sued  for 
overflowing  the  land  of  another,  and  was  compelled  to  reduce  the 
height  of  the  dam,  it  was  held  that  there  was  a  breach  of  the 
covenants.  "  The  grantee,  therefore,  was  not  merely  deprived  of 
an  easement  in  another's  land  which  was  not  conveyed,  and  which 
his  deed  did  not  purport  to  convey,  but  ho  lost  b}'  force  of  the 
paramount  title  a  thing  actually  conveyed,  included  within  tlie 
metes  and  boitnds  of  his  deed,  and  just  as  much  property  granted 
by  that  conveyance  as  if  it  had  been  a  particular  acre  of  the  land. 
Considering  the  subject-matter  of  the  grant,  the  peculiar  charac- 
ter of  the  property  as  a  water-power  and  a  mill-site,  the  existence 
of  the  dam  at  a  height  essential  to  that  power  and  to  the  full 
enjoyment  of  the  property,  we  hold  that  the  deed  conveyed  the 
dam  at  its  existing  height,  and  tlie  covenant  of  warranty  was 
broken  when  the  grantee  was  compelled,  iji  whole  or  in  part,  to 
take  it  down."* 

910.  The  covenants  of  warranty  and  for  quiet  enjoyment  are 
broken  if  there  is  an  outstanding  title  to  an  easement  which 

S.  E.    Rep.  909  ;  "Washington  City  Sav.  -  Ungij;er  ».  O^rlrsby,  99  Hi.  40.'). 

Bank  v.  Tliornton,  83  Va.    157,  2  S.  E.  '■*  Wilson  v.   Irish,  .57  Iowa,  184,6  N. 

Hep.  193  ;  Sheffey  ".  Gardiner,  79  Va.  313  ;  W.  R-p.  .591 ,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  343. 

Dic]<in.son  v.  Hoome.s,  8  Gratt.  353 ;  Kra-  *  Adams   v.  Conover,   87    N.    Y.    422, 

mer  v.  Carter,  136  Mass.  504.  428,  22  Iliin,  424,  41    Am.  Rep.  381,  per 

1  Brown  v.  Young,  69  Iowa,  625,  29  N.  Fincli,  J. 

W.  Rep.  941.  See,  liowever,    Mitchell    v.  Warner,   5 

719 


§  010.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

matei'iiilly  impairs  the  value  of  the  property  conveyed,  and  inter- 
feres with  the  use  and  possession  of  some  portion  of  it,  altliough 
there  is  no  physical  ouster.^  It  is  broken  in  case  the  land' is  situ- 
ated upon  a  stream,  and  the  owner  below,  under  and  by  virtue  of 
a  paramount  right,  raises  the  height  of  a  dam  upon  his  land,  and 
thereby  floods  the  purchaser's  land ;  iov  the  flooding  of  the  land 
under  such  paramount  right  is  an  eviction.  "  Anciently,  by  the 
feudal  constitution,  it*  tlie  vassal's  title  to  the  fee  whicli  he  had 
received  at  the  hands  of  his  lord,  and  for  which  he  was  to  render 
certain  duties,  failed,  he  had  the  right  to  call  upon  his  lord  in  a 
proper  form  of  action  for  other  land  of  equal  value.  The  modern 
personal  covenants  contained  in  deeds  which  are  not  more  than 
two  hundred  years  old  are  a  substitute  for  this  ancient  right. 
Now,  instead  of  other  lands,  the  grantee  recovers  upon  his  cove- 
nants damages  for  the  land  from  which  he  was  ousted,  or  to 
which  his  title  fails.  Suppose  some  feudal  lord  had  given  to  his 
vassal  land  which  another  person  subsequently  flooded  under  a 
paramount  right,  can  it  be  doubted  that  the  lord  could  have  been 
compelled  to  give  other  land  of  equal  value  ?  And  so  now,  instead 
of  land,  the  grantor  should,  upon  his  covenant  of  warranty,  be 
compelled  to  give  damages."  ^ 

The  loss  of  an  easement  apparently  belonging  to  the  land  con- 
veyed, but  not  belonging  to  the  grantor,  or  necessarily  attached 
to  the  land,  is  not  a  breach  of  the  covenants  of  warranty  and 
quiet  enjoyment.  Thus,  where  a  dwelling-house  and  lot  with 
appurtenances  were  conveyed  with  such  covenants,  and  at  the 
time  of  the  conveyance  the  drain-pipes  from  the  house  emp- 
tied into  a  sewer  leading  from  the  premises  to  and  across  the 
adjoining  land  of  another,  who  had  given  no  continuing  right  to 
such  use  of  the  sewer,  and  who  afterwards  obtained  a  perpetual 
injunction  against  the  purchaser's  using  the  sewer,  it  was  held 
that   there  was  no  breach  of  the  covenants,  as   the  use  of   the 

Conn.  497  ;  Dobbins  v.  Brown,  12  Pa.  St.  roe,  38  Vt.  469 ;  Butt  v.  Riffe,  78  Ky.  352, 

7.5  ;  Peters  v.  Grubb,  21  Pa.  St.  455.  relating  to  a  private  passajreway. 

1  Scriver  v.  Smith,  100  N.  Y.  471,  3  N.  '-^  Scriver  v.  Smith,  100  N.  Y.  471,  478, 

E.  Rep.  675,  53  Am.  Rep.  224 ;  Adams  v.  3  N.  E.   Rep.  675,  53  Am.  Rep.  224,  30 

Conover,  87  N.  Y.  422,  41  Am.  Rep.  381  ;  Hun,  129,  per  Earl,  ,1.     And  see  Adams 

Rea  V.   Minkler,  5  Lans.    196;  Lamb  v.  v.  Conover,  87  N.  Y.  422;  Green  v.  Col- 

Danforth,  59  Me.  322,  8  Am.  Rep.  426  ;  lins,  86  N.    Y.    246 ;   Rea  v.  Minkler,  5 

Russ  V.  Steele,  40  Vt.  310  ;  Clark  v.  Con-  Lans.  196. 
720 


COVENANT    FOR   WARRANTY    AND   QUIET   ENJOYMENT.       [§§  911-013. 

sewer  was  not  a  legal  appurtenance  within  the  meaning  of  the 
deed.i 

911.  This  covenant'  is  broken  in  case  the  land  described 
by  metes  and  bounds  encroaches  upon  a  highway,  and  the 
purchaser  is  compelled  to  remove  a  bouse  and  fence  which  so 
encroached.  "The  street  was  obvious  and  observable,  of  course; 
but  the  hidden  fact  which  afterwards  transpired,  that,  acrording 
to  the  true  measurements  of  the  street,  the  house  stood  upon  a 
j)art  of  the  highway,  was  not  observable  and  in  no  wise  apparent, 
and  could  not  have  been  in  contemplation  of  the  parties  contract- 
ing together.  The  purchaser  was  disturbed  in  the  quiet  posses- 
sion he  had  contracted  for,  and  deprived  of  a  part  of  his  house 
altogether,  and  of  exclusive  possession  of  a  part  of  the  land  he 
had  purchased.  We  cannot  but  regard  this  as  a  breach  of  the 
covenants  in  his  deed  for  quiet  possession."  ^ 

The  covenants  of  warranty  and  for  quiet  enjoyment  are  not 
broken  by  reason  of  a  Hmitation  of  the  use  of  land  formerly  a 
portion  of  a  street,  where  this  limitation  is  authorized  by  a  stat- 
ute, for  a  purchaser  is  presumed  to  know  of  such  limitation  of 
his  right.'^ 

912.  A  covenant  of  general  warranty  is  not  broken  by  an 
entry  upon  the  land. by  authority  of  the  State  in  the  exercise 
of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  Such  entry  is  an  inherent  right 
in  the  State,  and  cannot  be  prevented  by  the  owner ;  his  remedy 
is  compensation  provided  by  the  State,  and  not  an  action  on  his 
vendor's  covenant  of  warranty."* 

913.  But  when  the  title  to  the  land  in  controversy  is  in  the 
United  States,  and  liable  to  entry  and  settlement  imdvr  the  pro- 
visions of  the  homestead  law,  that  of  itself  is  such  a  hostile  asser- 
tion of  the  paramount  title  as  would  authorize  tlu^  purchaser  to 
voluntarily  submit  to  it.''     The  reason  given  for  this  rule  in  some 

1  Green  v.  Collins,  86  N.  Y.  246,  40  Am,  Mass.  19  ;  Cooper  v.  Blooilt,'ooil,  ;V2  N.  J. 

Rep.  531,  20  Iliin,  474.  Ivf.  209  ;  Kulin  v.  Freeman,  1.")  Kiiiis.  423  ; 

■2  Trice  v.  Kayton,  84  Va.  217,  220,  4  Stevenson   v.   Loehr,  .'57  111.  .'J09  ;  Foils  v. 

S.  E.  Rep.  377,  per  Lacy,  J.  Huntley,  7  Wend.  210. 

3  Neeson  v.  Bray,  19  N.  Y.  Sujip.  st41,  ^  Kan.^as  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dunmeyer,  19 

46  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  914.  Kans.  .539.     As  tending  to  su])port  tliis 

■*  Alee  V.  Mason,  101    Pa.  St.  17  ;  Dyer  rule,  see  McGary  v.  IIastin>,'8,  39  Cal.  360, 

i;.  "VVi{;litman,66  Pa.  St.  425;  Patterson  v.  2  Am.    Rep.   4.56;  Abbott   v.  Rowan,  33 

Arthurs,  9  Watts,  152  ;  Bailey  i'.  Milten-  Ark.  593;  flieen  r.  Irving,  54   Misa.  450; 

berger,  31  Pa.  St.  37  ;  Dobbins  r.  Brown,  Gletin  v.  Thistle,  23  Miss.  42  ;  Brown  v. 

12  Pa.   St.  75;  Brimmer  v.  Boston,  102  Allen,  32  N.  Y.  St.  796,  10  N.   Y.  Supp. 

721 


§§  914,  915.] 


COVENANTS   FOR    TITLE. 


decisions  is  that  the  statute  of  limitations  does  not  run  against  the 
United  States,  and  that  no  length  of  adverse  holding  will  secure  a 
title  to  the  grantee  in  possession.  In  addition  to  this,  the  United 
States  should  be  considered  as  always  asserting  title  to  its  lands. ^ 
The  lands  belonging  to  the  public  domain  of  the  United  States, 
subject  to  entry  and  settlement,  may  be  considered  as  always 
being  offered  for  sale  to  those  who  possess  the  i)roj)er  qualifications. 

914.  There  may  be  a  constructive  eviction  as  well  as  an 
actual.  A  cimstructive  eviction  may  be  founded  on  the  assertion 
of  a  hostile  paramount  title.  If  such  a  title  is  claimed,  and 
exists  in  fact,  there  is  a  constructive  eviction,  though  no  judgment 
in  favor  of  the  claim  has  been  rendered.^  The  inability  of  the 
purchaser  to  enter  into  possession  of  the  land  without  committing 
a  trespass,  by  reason  of  the  paramount  title  being  in  another, 
has  the  same  effect,  as  respects  the  right  of  action  for  a  breach 
of  the  covenants  contained  in  the  deed,  as  would  an  eviction  if 
possession  had  been  acquired.^ 

915.  There  is  a  constructive  eviction  when  the  purchaser 
is  unable  to  obtain  possession  by  reason  of  a  paramount  title 
and  possession  in  another.*     The   purchaser  is   not  required   to 


714;  McLennan  v.  Prentice,  85  Wis.  427, 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  764;  Yokum  v.  Thomas, 
15  Iowa,  67  ;  Meservey  v.  Snell  (Iowa), 
62  N.  W.  Rep.  767. 

1  Dillalumty  r.  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S. 
Ry.  Co.  59  Ark.  629,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  1002, 
28  S.  W.  Rep.  657. 

2  Axtel  V.  Chase,  83  Ind.  546  ;  Knepper 
V.  Kurtz,  58  Pa.  St.  480;  Sprague  v. 
Baker,  17  ]\Iass.  585 ;  Loomis  v.  Bedel,  11 
N.  H.  74 ;  Green  v.  Irving,  54  Miss.  450, 
28  Am.  Rep.  360;  St.  John  v.  Palmer, 
5  Hill,  599  ;  Matteson  v. Vaughn,  38  Mich. 
375  ;  Funk  v.  Creswell,  5  Iowa,  89 ;  Mead 
V.  Stackpole,  40  Hun,  473 ;  Shattuck  v. 
Lamb,  65  N.  Y.  499,  505,  22  Am.  Rep. 
656;  Parkinson  v.  Sherman,  74  N.  Y.  88, 
93,  30  Am.  Rep.  268 ;  Patton  v.  McFar- 
lane,  3  Pen.  &  W.  419. 

*  Resser  v.  Carney,  52  Minn.  397,  54 
N.  W.  Rep.  89;  Fritz  v.  Pusey,  31  Minn. 
368,  18  N.  W.  Rep.  94  ;  Shattuck  v.  Lamb, 
65  N.  Y.  499,  22  Am.  Rep.  656. 

*  Blanchard  v.  Blanchard,  48  Me.  174; 
Curtis  V.  Deering,  12  Me.  499;  Hamilton 

722 


V.  Cutts,  4  Mass.  349  ;  Chandler  v.  Brown, 
59  N.  H.  370 ;  Drew  v.  Towle,  30  N.  H. 
.531  ;  Green  v.  Irving,  54  Miss.  450; 
Witty  V.  Hightower,  12  Sm.  &  M.  478; 
Mills  V.  Rice,  3  Neb.  76 ;  Playter  v.  Cun- 
ningham, 21  Cal.  229  ;  Moore  v.  Vail,  17 
111.  185;  Shattuck  v.  Lamb,  65  N.  Y. 
499,  22  Am.  Rej).  656;  Fowler  v.  Poling, 
6  Barb.  165.  In  the  last-named  case  the 
authorities  are  carefully  reviewed,  and 
the  early  case  of  Kortz  v.  Carpenter,  5 
Johns.  120,  directly  overruled.  Green- 
vault  r.  Davis,  4  Hill,  643  ;  Grist  v. 
Hodges,  3  Dev.  198;  Mackey  v.  Collins, 
2  Nott.  &M.  186;  Marbury  i'.  Thornton, 
82  Va.  702,  l  S.  E.  Rep.  909  ;  Jones  v. 
Richmond,  88  Va.  231,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  414 ; 
Clafliu  V.  Case,  53  Kans.  560,  36  Pac. 
Rep.  1062  ;  Fritz  v.  Pusey,  31  Minn.  368, 
18  N.  W.  Rep.  94;  Murphy  v.  Price,  48 
Mo.  247 ;  Blondeau  v.  Sheridan,  81  Mo. 
545;  Russ  v.  Steele,  40  Vt.  310;  Clark 
V.  Conroe,  38  Vt.  469,  475 ;  Rex  v.  Creel, 
22  W.  Va.  373. 


COVENANT    FOR    WARRANTY   AND  QUIET    ENJOYMENT.       [§§  916-918. 

commit  a  trespass  in  his  endeavor  to  make  an  actual  entry.  The 
covenant  is  broken  when  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  the  land 
is  incumbered  by  a  lease  under  which  the  lessee  holds  possession 
with  the  grantor's  agreement  to  convey  the  land  to  him  on  the 
payment  of  a  certain  sum.^ 

When  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  a  third  person  is  in  pos- 
session holding  under  a  paramount  title,  the  covenant  of  warranty 
is  at  once  broken,  and  there  is  a  constructive  eviction.^ 

916.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  vendee  should  take  actual 
possession  of  the  land  in  order  to  have  a  good  cause  of  action 
on  the  covenant  of  warranty.  He  is  not  required  to  hold  pos- 
session himself,  or  by  his  tenants  or  agents.  The  fact  that  if  a 
vendee  who  has  been  dispossessed  had  taken  possession  of  the 
land  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  to  him,  he  would  have  acquired 
title  by  adverse  possession,  does  not  relieve  his  vendor  from  lia- 
bility to  him  on  his  warranty  of  title.^ 

917.  There  may  be  a  constructive  eviction  where  the 
grantee's  possession  is  constructive  only.  In  some  early  cases 
it  seems  to  have  been  held  that  an  actual  putting  out  of  posses- 
sion was  necessary  to  constitute  a  breach  of  the  covenant."*  Under 
this  strict  rule,  there  could  be  no  eviction  unless  the  grantee  first 
obtained  possession.  It  was  accordingly  declared  that,  as  between 
the  covenantor  and  covenantee,  the  former  could  not,  to  defeat  his 
covenant,  say  that  the  latter  was  not  in  actual  possession;  and, 
being  thus  in,  the  actual  adverse  possession  of  a  third  person  put 
him  out  eo  mstanti^  and  so  constituted  an  eviction."  And  so, 
where  the  land  was  vacant  and  the  covenantee  did  not  take  pos- 
session in  fact,  it  was  held  that,  as  the  legal  title  had  ])assed  to 
him,  the  constructive  possession  vested  in  him,  and  he  was  con- 
structively evicted  when  the  legal  title  passed  to  a  third  person 
under  a  decree  for  tlie  foreclosure  and  sale  of  the  land  under  a 
prior  mortgage.^ 

918.  The  possession  of  one  holding  adversely  to  the  grantee 
is  prima  facie  evidence  of  title  in  the  adverse  holder  and  of 
eviction  of  the  grantee.      In  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  a 

1  Smith  V.    Scribner,  59  Vt.  96,  7  Atl.  *  Hamilton  r.  Cutts,  4  Mass.  349,3  Am. 
Eep.  711.  Dec.  222;  Wchh  v.  Alexander,  7  Wend. 

2  Dillahiinty  v.   Little  Rock   &  Ft.   S.  281;  Kerr  i'.  Shaw,  13  Johns.  236. 
Ry.  Co.  .59  Ark.  629,  28  S.  W.  Hep.  6.57.  ^  Gri.st  v.  Ilodgcs,  3  Dev.  N.  C.  198. 

3  Graham  y.  Dyer  (Ky.),  29  S.  W.  Rep.  «  St.    John    v.   Palmer,   5   Hill,   599; 
846.  Moore  v.  \'ail,  17  111.  185. 

70f> 


§  919.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

breach  of  covenants  of  warranty  of  title  and  for  quiet  enjoyment, 
the  plaintiff,  to  establish  prima  facie  the  breaches  alh'ged,  is  re- 
ciuiied  merely  to  prove  that  he  has  either  been  evicted  or  kept  out 
of  possession  by  one  in  actual  possession  claiming  title  paramount 
to  his  own.  The  presumption  of  title  which  then  arises  in  favor 
of  th(^  piii'ty  in  possession  must  be  overcome  by  proving  title  out 
of  him,  or  both  of  the  breaches  named  may  be  deemed  established 
by  sufficient  proof. ^  Tlie  covenantee  is  not  required  to  commit  a 
trespass  to  acquire  possession .^ 

Where  at  tlie  time  of  the  conveyance  the  real  estate  is  vacant 
and  continues  vacant,  and  the  owner  of  the  true  title  brings 
against  the  covenantee  an  action  in  the  form  of  ejectment  to  deter- 
mine the  title,  tlie  covenantee  may  waive  the  objection  that,  by 
reason  of  his  not  being  in  possession,  that  form  of  action  will  not 
lie,  and  may  try  the  title  in  the  action  thus  brought,  and,  upon 
final  judgment  against  him  on  the  question  of  title,  may  abandon 
all  further  claim  to  the  premises,  and  that  will  constitute  a  breach 
of  the  covenant.'^ 

919.  There  is  a  constructive  eviction  also  "when  the  para- 
mount title  is  so  asserted  that  the  grantee  must  yield  to  it  or 
go  out.  The  grantee  in  such  case  may  purchase  the  title  of  the 
true  owner,  and  this  will  be  considered  a  sufficient  eviction  to 
constitute  a  breach.^ 

1  Heyn  v.  Ohman,  42  Neb.  693,  60  N.  497,  522  ;  Sterling  v.  Peet,  14  Conn.  245 ; 
W.  Rep.  952.  That  possession  is  prima  McGary  v.  Hastings,  39  Cal.  367,  2  Am. 
fucJe  evidence  of  title,  see  Robinoe  v.  Doe,  Rep.  456  ;  Loomis  v.  Bedel,  11  N.  H.  74  ; 
6  Rlackf.  85  ;  Ward  r.  Mcintosh,  12  O.  St.  Dillahunty  v.  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  Ry. 
231;  Shumway  1-.  Phillips,  22  Pa.  St.  151  ;  Co.  59  Ark.  629,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  1002; 
Jones  r.  Bland,  112  Pa.  St.  176,  2  Atl.  Ogdeu  v.  Ball,  40  Minn.  94,41  N.  W. 
Rep.  541  ;  Brown  f.  Fengius,  37  Neb.  256.  Rep.  453;    Moore  v.   Vail,   17  III.   185; 

2  Caldwell  v.  Kirkpatrick,  6  Ala.  60,  41  Axtel  v.  Chase,  83  Ind.  546  ;  Kellog  r. 
Am.  Dec.  36  ;  Anderson  v.  Knox,  20  Ala.  Piatt,  33  N.  J.  L.  328  ;  Flynn  v.  White 
156;  Thomas  v.  St.  Paul's  M.  E.  Church,  Breast  Coal  M.  Co.  72  Iowa,  738,  32  N. 
86  Ala.  138, 144,  5  So.  Rep.  508  ;  Say  re  r.  W.  Rep.  471  ;  Thomas  v.  Stickle,  32  Iowa, 
Sheffield  Land  Co.  (.Ala.)  18  So.  Rep.  101.  71  ;  Stone  v.  Hooker,  9  Cow.  154  ;  Green- 

3  Allis  r.  Nininger,  25  Minn.  525.  vault  v.  Davis,  4  Hill,  643  ;  Fowler  v.  Pol- 
*  Barlow  v.  Delaney,  40  Fed.  Rep.  97  ;     ing,  6  Barb.  165;  Wood   v.  Forncrook,  3 

Duvall  V.  Craig,  2  Wheat.  45  ;  Noonan  v.  Thomp.  &  C.  303  ;  Brown  v.  Allen,  10  N. 

Lee,  2  Black,  499;  Hamilton  v.  Cutts,  4  Y.  Supp.  714;  Hodges  v.  Latham,  98  N. 

Mass.  349,  3  Am.  Dec.   222  ;  Sprague  v.  C.  239, 3  S.  E.  Rep.  495  ;  Grist  v.  Hodges, 

Baker,  17  Ma.ss.  585  ;  Smith  v.  Shepard,  3  Dev.  198;  Haffey  v.  Birchetts,  11  Leigh, 

15  Pick.  147,  25  Am.  Dec.  432  ;  Donnell  83  ;  Turner  v.  Goodrich,  26  Vt.  707  ;  Pit- 

V.  Thompson,   10   Me.   170,   177,  25  Am.  kin  w.  Leavitt,  13  Vt.  379  ;  King  y.  Merk, 

Dec.  216;  Mitchell  v.  Warner,  5  Conn.  6  Mont.  172,  9  Pac.  Rep.  827;  Real  v. 
724 


COVENANT    FOR   WARRANTY    AND   QUIET   ENJOYMENT.       [§§  920,  921. 

A  covenantee  is  not  required  to  resist  an  action  by  the  holder 
of  the  paramount  title  until  actually  dispossessed  by  legal  process, 
but  may  recover  against  his  covenantor  after  A^oluntarily  surren- 
dering to  the  holder  of  the  better  title :  he,  at  most,  assuming 
thereby  the  burden  of  establishing  the  title  which  he  has  thus 
recognized. 1 

A  grantee  who  voluntarily  surrenders  possession  of  the  whole 
land,  warranted  to  one  who  claims  onl}'  a  part  interest  in  it,  can- 
not recover  damages  from  the  warrantor,  as  for  an  eviction  from 
the  whole  tract,  on  the  theory  that  the  entry  of  the  part  owner 
was  both  for  himself  and  his  cotenants.^ 

There  is  no  eviction  where  the  grantee  voluntarily  abandons 
the  property,  and  incites  another,  who  is  not  shown  to  have  title 
thereto,  to  claim  it.-^ 

920.  There  is  a  constructive  eviction  -where  the  paramount 
title  is  offered  for  sale  at  public  auction.  Tlie  grantee  in  such 
case  is  justified  in  purchasing  such  paiamount  title,  and  he  can 
sustain  an  action  on  the  covenant  of  warranty  although  there 
was  no  actual  eviction  or  disturbance  of  possession.  There  is  no 
injustice  done  the  grantor  by  this  rule,  for  no  action  can  be  main- 
tained against  him  upon  his  covenant  in  such  a  case  except  upon 
proof  of  the  actual  existence  of  a  title  superior  to  the  one  he 
conveyed,  and  which  his  grantor  could  not  withstand  at  law.* 

921.  A  purchaser  who  voluntarily  surrenders  the  land  to 
a  third  person,  who  asserts  an  adverse  title,  must  establish  the 
validity  of  the  title  he  has  recognized,  before  he  can  recover  for 
a  breach  of  wari'anty  against  his  covenantor.'^    So,  if  he  puichases 

Hollister,  17  Neb.  661,  24  N.  \V.  Rep.  333 ;  Serg.  &  R.  364 ;  Knepper  v.  Kurtz,  ."iS  J'a. 

Westrope  v.  Chambers,  51  Ti-x.  178.  St.  480;  Ogileu  v.  Ball,  40  Miun.  94,  41 

1  Real  v.  Hollister,  20  Neb.  114,  29  N.  N.  W.  Rrp.  453;  Cheney  v.  Straube,  .(5 
W.  Hep.  189;  Cheney  i^.  Stranbe,  35  Neb.  Neb.  .521,  53  Js'.  W.  Rep.  479;  Walker 
521,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  479,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  v.  Kirshuer  (Kans.),  42  Pac.  Rep.  596; 
234.  rianiilton  v.  Cutis,  4  Mass.  349, 3  Am.  Dec. 

2  McGrew  (7.  Harmon,  164  Pa.  St.  115,  222;  George  v.  Putney,  4  Cush.  350; 
30  All.  Rip.  268.  Lambert  r.  E.stes,  99  Mo.  604,  1.3   S.  W. 

■'Hester   v.    Hunniciitt  (Ala.),   16   So.  Rep.  284  ;  Hall  y.  Bray,  51  Mo.  288  ;  Mor- 

Rep.  162.  gan  v.  Hann  &  St.  Jo.  R.  Co.  63  Mo.  129  ; 

*  Loomis  r.  Bedell,  II  N.  H.  74  ;  Tucker  Waril   v.   Ashbrobk,  78   Mo.  515;    Beyer 

V.    Cooney,    34    Hun,    227;    St.    John    r.  r.  Schiilize,  22  Joiie.s  &   S.  212;    Snyiler 

Palmer,  5  Hill,  599  ;  Whitney  r.  Din.smore,  r.  .lennin-js,  15  Neb.  372  ;  Clark  v.  Muin- 

6  Cush.  124.  ford,  62  Tex.  531  ;    Woodford   v.  Leavcn- 

5  McGiew  V.  Harmon,  164  I'a.   St.  115,  worth,  14  Ind.  311  ;  Marvin  v.  Applegate, 

30Atl.  Rep.  265  ;  Clarke  v.  McAnulty,  3  18   Ind.  425;  Cranre  c  Collenbaugh,  47 

72.-) 


§§  922,  923.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

;in  outstaiulinijj  title  without  waiting  fov  an  actual  ouster,  he  must 
show  the  validity  of  that  title  before  he  can  recover  on  his  war- 
ranty.^ 

922.  A  judgment  against  a  vendee  establishing  a  para- 
mount adverse  title  in  another  is  binding  upon  the  vendor  if 
he  was  made  a  party  to  the  action,  or  had  notice  of  its  pend- 
ency. The  vendee  in  such  case,  in  suing  on  the  covenant  of 
warrant}',  need  not  allege  that  tlie  eviction  was  by  a  title  para- 
mount to  that  derived  from  the  vendor,  but  may  allege  the  judg- 
ment against  him  in  an  action  to  which  the  vendor  was  a  party, 
or  of  the  pendency  of  which  he  had  been  notified.  If  the  vendor 
had  due  notice  of  the  pendency  of  such  suit  against  the  vendee, 
the  judgment  therein  was  conclusive  against  him,  and  no  further 
allegation  or  evidence  of  the  adverse  title  is  necessary  in  a  suit  by 
the  vendee  upon  tlie  warranty  of  title.^ 

923.  Eviction  under  title  paramount  is  not  sustained  by 
mere  proof  that  judgment  was  rendered  against  the  grantee 
in  ejectment,  and  tliat  he  surrendered  possession  in  obedience 
to  tlie  judgment,  there  being  no  evidence  that  his  warrantor  had 
any  notice  of  the  ejectment  suit,  or  any  opportunity  to  defend  it, 
and  none  as  to  the  title  under  which  the  grantee  was  ejected,  or 
the  time  when  that  title  originated.^ 

A  judgment  against  the  grantee  involving  the  title  to  the 
land  is  admissible  in  evidence  to  show  an  eviction  though  the 
grantor  was  not  notified  of  the  suit  or  made  a  party  to  it;  but 
he  may  be  required  to  prove  aliunde  that  the  title  upon  which 
such  judgment  was  obtained  was  in  fact  a  paramount  title.  ^ 

Ind.  2.56  ;  Sheetz  v.  Longlois,  69  Ind.  498  ;  Litt.  118,  124,  14  Am.  Dec.  45  ;  Thiele  v. 

Greeuvault  v.  Davis,  4  Hill,  643  ;  Thomas  Axell,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.   548,  24  S.  W. 

V.   Stickle,   .32  Iowa,    71  ;  Cassidy's  Sue-  Rep.  552. 

cession,  40  La.  Ann.  827,  5  So.  Rep.  292  ;         3  Haines  v.  Fort,  93   Ga.  24,  18   S.  E. 

Huff  v.  Cumberland  Val.  Land  Co.  (Ky.)  Rep.    994;  Clements  v.   Collins,    59    Ga. 

30   S.  W.  Rep.    660;    Kin>,'   v.   Merk,   6  124  ;  Gragf?  d.  Richardson,  25  Ga.  566,  71 

Mont.  172,  9  Pac.  Rep.  827.  Am.    Dec.  190;  Maverick  v.  Ronth  (Tex. 

1  Eversole  i;.  Early,  80  Iowa,  601,   44  Civ.   App.),    26    S.   W.    Rep.    1008;    Mc- 

N.  W.   Rep.  897;  Thomas  v.    Stickle,  32  Groffor    r.   Tabor    (Tex.  Civ.   App.),    26 

Iowa,  71  ;  Funk  v.  Creswell,  5  Iowa,  62;  S.  W.  Rep.  443. 
Turner  v.  Goodrich,  26  Vt.  707.  •»  McGregor  v.  Tabor  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

■■^  Graham  r.  Dyer  (Ky.),  29  S.  W.  Rep.  26  S.  W.  Rep.  443  ;  Johns  v.    Hardin,  81 

346  ;  Jones  v.  ,Jone.s,  87    Ky.  42,  7   S.  \Y .  Tex.  37,  16    S.  W.  Rep.  623;   Ofjburn   v. 

Rep.   886  ;  Elliott  v.  Saufley,  89   Ky.   52,  Whitlow,  80  Tex.  239,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  807  ; 

11    S.  W.  Rep.  200;  Woodward  i".  Allan,  Ruclianan    v.    Kauffman,    65    Tex.  235  ; 

3    Dana,   164;    Cummins  v.  Kennedy,  3  Clark  v.  Mumford,  62  Tex.   531;  West- 
726 


COVENANT    FOR   WARRANTY   AND    QUIET    ENJOYMENT.       [§  924. 

924.  A  covenantor  who  has  reasonable  notice  of  an  action 
of  ejectment  against  his  covenantee,  and  an  opportunit}^  to 
defend  it,  is  bound  by  the  judgment  in  such  suit,  and,  when  sued 
on  his  warranty,  cannot  be  heard  to  show  that  the  action  of  eject- 
ment might  have  been  successfully  defended.^  If  there  was  a 
good  defence  he  should  have  interposed  it,  or  ever  afterwards  kept 
silent.  In  order  to  conclude  a  warranty  by  a  judgment  of  evic- 
tion, "  the  notice  must  be  distinct  and  unequivocal,  and  expressly 
require  the  party  bound  by  the  covenant  to  appear  and  defend 
the  adverse  suit."  ^  The  notice  should  be  in  writing,^  though  a 
parol  notice  has  been  held  sufficient  in  a  few  cases.* 

Tenants  in  common,  who  were  owners  of  land  subject  to  a 
mortgage,  made  partition  of  it,  one  of  them  assuming  to  pay  the 
mortgage  and  covenanting  that  the  part  conveyed  to  the  other 
was  free  of  the  incumbrance ;  thus  not  only  making  himself  per- 
sonally liable  for  the  payment  of  the  mortgage,  but  charging  his 
part  of  the  land  primarily  for  its  payment.  This  covenant  was 
annexed  to  and  passed  with  the  land  to  a  subsequent  purchaser. 
The  mortgage  was  foreclosed,  and  all  the  land  covered  by  it  was 


rope  V.  Chambers,  51  Tex.  178;  Peck  i;. 
Hensley,  20  Tex.  673. 

1  Arkansas :  Collier  v.  Cowger,  52  Ark. 
322,  12  S.  W.  Kep.  702.  Connecticut: 
Hinds  r.  Allen,  34  Conn.  185.  Georgia: 
Wimberly  v.  Collier,  32  Ga.  13.  Illinois  : 
McConnell  v.  Downs,  48  111.  271.  Indiana : 
Bever  v.  North,  107  Ind.  544 ;  Mooney  o. 
Burchard,  84  Ind.  285.  Iowa  :  Bellows  v. 
Litchfield,  83  Iowa,  36,  48  N.  W.  Rep. 
1062.  Kentucky  :  Graham  v.  Dyer(Ky.), 
29  8.  W.  Kep.  346 ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  87 
Ky.  82,  7  S.  W.  Rep.  886 ;  Elliott  v. 
Saufley,  89  Ky.  57,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  200; 
Woodward  v.  Allan,  3  Dana,  164;  Cum- 
mins V.  Kennedy,  3  Litt.  118,  124,  14 
Am.  Dec.  45.  Maine:  Williamson  v. 
Williimison,  71  Me.  442.  Massachusetts: 
Mcrritt  V.  Morse,  108  Mas.s.  270  ;  Hoylc 
I?.  Ivlwards,  1 14  Ma.'*.'<.  373  ;  Hamilton  v. 
Cults,  4  Miis.s.  348.  Michigan  :  Mason  i: 
Kellogs,  38  Mich.  132.  Mississippi :  Cum- 
mings  V.  Harrison,  57  Miss.  275.  Mis- 
souri: St.  J^ouLs  V.  Bi.^SLll,  46  Mo.  157. 
Nevada:  Dalton  t-.  Bowker,  8  Nev.  190. 
New    Jersey :     Cha])m:in    r.  Holmes,    10 


N.  J.  L.  20.  New  York:  Jenks  v.  Quinn, 
137  N.  Y.  223,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  376  ;  Kelly 
I'.  Dutch  Church,  2  Hill,  105;  Cooper  t-. 
Watson,  10  Wend.  202;  Adams  v.  Con- 
over,  22  Hun,  424.  Ohio  :  Smith  v.  Dixon, 
27  Ohio  St.  471  ;  King  v.  Kerr,  5  Ohio, 
154,  158.  Pennsylvania:  Terry  ?•.  Dia- 
beustadt,  68  Pa.  St.  400.  Tennessee : 
Williams  v.  Burg,  9  Lea,  455  ;  Greenlaw 
V.  Williatns,  2  Lea,  533.  Vermont :  Tur- 
ner V.  Goodrich,  26  Vt.  707  ;  Pitkin  v. 
Leavitt,  13  Vt.  379,  where  the  purchaser 
brought  suit  to  recover  the  laud.  Wis- 
consin :  Eaton- I-.  Lyman,  24  Wis.  438; 
Wendel  v.  North,  24  Wis.  22.3. 

Otherwise  in  North  Carolina  :  Wilder 
V.  Ireland,  8  J(jncs  L.  85. 

-  Rawle  on  Covenants,  5lh  ed.  §  125; 
Wheelock  v.  Overshiner,  110  Mo.  100,  19 
S.  W.  Rep.  640;  Somers  v.  Schmidt,  24 
Wis.  417,  421. 

«  Mason  r.  Kellogg,  38  Mich.  132  ; 
Chamberliiin  r.  Preble,  1 1  Alien,  370,  373; 
Brown  v.  Taylor,  13  Vt.  631. 

*  Miner  v.  Clark,  15  Wend.  425,  427. 

727 


§  925.]  COVENAXIS    FUK    TIILE. 

sold  together  to  satisfy  it.  The  covenantor  had  notice  of  a  pro- 
posed sale  of  the  premises  on  foieclosiue,  and  promised  to  be 
present  and  protect  the  title,  but  did  not  appeal',  ami  the  pur- 
chaser was  evicted.  In  a  suit  on  the  covenant  it  was  held  ihat 
the  purchaser  was  not  chargeable  with  the  consequences  of  omit- 
ting to  inform  the  officer  making  the  sale,  tlutugh  present  at  the 
time,  of  the  facts  by  which  other  laud  was  prinuirily  charged 
with  the  payment  of  the  mortgage,  on  the  ground  that  the  legal 
evidence  of  such  facts  could  be  found  in  a  deed  executed  and 
recorded  twenty  years  before,  to  which  the  purchaser  was  ntjt  a 
party,  and  as  to  the  contents  of  which  he  was  in  fact  wholly 
ignorant.^ 

Where  a  grantee  is  sued  by  an  adverse  claimant,  and  notifies 
the  covenantor's  agent  to  appear  and  defend  the  suit,  and  the  agent 
practically  carries  on  and  controls  the  litigation,  the  covenantor 
is  bound  by  the  result.^ 

925,  A  judgment  obtained  against  the  grantee,  in  a  suit  of 
which  the  grantor  had  no  notice,  may  be  given  in  evidence 
to  prove  that  the  title  on  which  it  was  founded  was  a  paramount 
one,  but  it  is  not  prima  facie  evidence  of  such  a  title.  In  an 
action  against  a  warrantor,  a  judgment  recovered  against  the 
purchaser  in  an  action  involving  the  title,  to  which  the  war- 
rantor was  not  a  party,  is  admissible  to  show  an  eviction  of  the 
purchaser,  and  that  he  had  in  fact  yielded  to  such  claim,  if  in 
addition  the  purchaser  makes  proof  aliunde  that  that  title  was  in 
fact  superior  to  his.  It  is  incumbent  upc»i  him  to  establish  by 
competent  and  satisfactory  evidence  the  existence  and  validity  of 
the  outstanding  title.'^ 

An  eviction  is  not  shown  merely  by  a  judgment  for  the  re- 
covery of  the  land,  when  such  judgment  was  agreed  to  by  the 
grantee  without  the  warrantor's  consent.'^ 

1  Jenks  V.  Quinn,  137  N.  Y.    223,   33  Tex.    531  ;    Buchanan   ;;.    Kauffraan,    65 

N.  E.  Rep.  376.  Tex.  23.5  ;   Ogburn   v.  Whitlow,  80  Tex. 

-  Bellows  V.  Litchfield,  83  Iowa,  36,  48  239,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  807  ;  Johns  v.  Ilardiu, 

N.  W.  Rep.  1062  ;  Graham  v.  Dyer  (Ky.),  81  Tex.  37,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  623 ;  Wheelock 

29  S.  VV.  Rep.  346.                              •  r.    Overshiner,    110    Mo.    100,   19    S.   W. 

•■'McGregor  v.  Tabor  (Tex.  Civ.  Apj).),  Rep.  640;  Fields  v.  Hunter.  8  Mo.   128; 

26   S.  W.  Rep.  443;    Maverick  v.  Routh  Walker  v.  Dcaver,  79   Mo.  664;    Taylor 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26   S.  W.   Rep.   1008;  v.  Stewart,  54  Ga.  81  ;  Pitkin  v.  Leavitt, 

Tarpley  v.  Poage,  2  Tex.  139, 148  ;  Peck  v.  13  Vt.  379,  384. 

Hensley,20  Tex.  673;  Westrope  r.  Cham-  *  Maverick  r.  Routh  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

bers,  51  Tex.  178;  Clark  v.  Mumford,  62  26  S.  W.  Rep.  1008. 

728 


COVENANT   FOR    WARRANTY   AND   QUIET   ENJOYMENT.       [§§  926,  927. 

In  an  action  for  breach  of  covenant  of  warranty,  a  petition 
which  describes  the  land,  and  alleges  that  the  grantor  had  no 
title  to  it  when,  he  conveyed  it  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  such 
title  was  defeated  in  an  action  brought  against  the  plaintiff  by 
third  persons,  of  the  pendency  of  which  action  the  grantor  was 
notified,  and  which  be  was  vouched  in  to  defend,  states  a  good 
cause  of  action.^ 

926.  Eviction  must  be  alleged  as  an  issuable  fact,  and  it  is 
not  sufficient  to  plead  the  evidence  tending  to  show  an  eviction. 
The  evidence  may  prove,  though  it  does  not  constitute,  the  cause 
of  action,  and  the  pleader  should  set  out  the  material  or  issuable 
facts.2 

In  an  action  for  breach  of  warranty,  and  for  equitable  relief 
on  the  ground  of  mutual  mistake  because  of  a  partial  conflict  in 
old  surveys,  ouster  or  offer  to  surrender  possession  need  not  be 
shown  by  plaintiff.^ 

Where  plaintiff  relies  on  a  paramount  title  without  eviction, 
defendant  cannot  object  that  the  petition  does  not  show  the  owner 
and  his  title,  nor  offer  to  reconvey  the  full  unincumbered  title 
acquired  from  defendant,  when  the  petition  alleges  a  prior  grant 
to  a  third  person  ;  that  defendant  knew,  and  plaintiff  was  igno- 
rant, of  the  existence  of  such  prior  grant  when  the  conveyance 
was  made  to  plaintiff" ;  that  defendant  never  had  title  in  fee  to 
the  land  so  conveyed  ;  and  that  plaintiff  has  never  sold  or  incum- 
bered the  land.* 

927.  At  common  law,  in  an  action  for  a  breach  of  war- 
ranty, it  w^as  sufficient  to  allege  in  general  terms  an  eviction 
under  a  paramount  title. ^  In  modern  practice,  and  even  under 
some  of  tlie  codes  of  practice,  it  is  not  necessary  to  set  out  the 
facts  which  it  is  claimed  constitute  an  eviction.  It  is  sufficient 
to  allege  an  eviction  by  the  holder  of  a  pafamount  title  without 
pleading  the  facts.^ 

•  Thitle   V.    Axell,   5    Tex.  Civ.   App.         ^  Townsend   v.    Morris,   6    Cow.    123; 
548,  24  S.  \V.  Kcp.  552.  Kicl^ert  v.  Snyder,  9  Wend.  416;   Day  v. 

-  Dillaluinty  v.  Little  Kock  &   Ft.  S.  Cliisrn,  10  Wheat.  440;    Kdlog  v.  Piatt, 

Ry.  Co.    59    Ark.  629,  27    S.    W.    Rep.  33  N.  .1.  L.  328  ;    Elliott  v.  iSuuHcy,  89 

1002.  Ky.  52,  1 1  S.  \V.  Rep.  200. 

3  Gass  t'.  San>,'er   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  •■'  Cheney  y.   Strauhe,   35    Neb.   521,  .53 

S.  W.  Rep.  502.  N.  W.  Re]).   479;   Maxw.    Code   PI.  648; 

*  White  V.  Ilolley   (Tex.    Civ.  App.),  Boone,  Code  PI.  245. 
24  S.  W.  Rep.  831. 

729 


§  d'lS.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

Where  the  assignment  of  tlie  breach  is  special,  the  special 
breach  averred  must  be  the  breach  proven  ;  otherwise  there  will 
be  a  fatal  variance  between  the  allegations  and  the  proof.  A 
party  cannot  allege  one  thing,  and,  to  support  the  same,  prove  a 
state  of  facts  dissimilar  thereto.^ 

A  complaint  alleging  the  making  and  delivery  by  defendant 
of  a  deed  with  covenants  of  warranty  and  peaceable  enjoyment ; 
that  the  premises  wei'e  subject  to  a  tax  which  the  grantee  was 
obliged  to  pay ;  and  that,  in  an  action  to  foreclose  the  purchase- 
money  mortgage  given  back  on  the  conveyance  of  the  property, 
brought  by  the  assignee  of  the  mortgage,  it  was  decided  that  the 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  judgment  of  foreclosure  and  sale  for  the 
amount  of  the  mortgage,  less  the  tax  so  paid,  but  which  does  not 
allege  that  any  judgment  had  been  rendered  adjudicating  such  tax 
a  lien  upon  the  premises,  or  that  any  judgment  was  entered  in  the 
foreclosure  action,  —  does  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a 
cause  of  action  for  breach  of  the  covenants.^ 

VI.   Covenants  that  run  ivith  the  Land. 

928.  The  covenants  of  seisin  and  of  good  right  to  convey 
are  broken,  if  at  all,  when  the  deed  is  delivered.  They  are 
personal  covenants,  and  do   not  run  with   the   land.^     They  are 

1  Walker  f.  Kirshner  (Kans.),  42  Pac.  Davis  v.  Lyman,  6  Conn.  249;  Hartford 
Rep.  596;  Garvey  v.  Fowler,  4  Saudf.  &  S.  Ore  Co.  v.  Miller,  41  Conn.  112; 
665;  Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  y.  Diiunieyer,  19  Lockwood  v.  Sturdevant,  6  Conn.  373. 
Kans.  539;  Dagger  «.  Oglesby,  3  111.  App.  Kentucky:  Fitzliugh  v.  Croahan,  2  J.  J. 
94.  Marsh.  429,  19  Am.  Dec.  139;  Pence  v. 

2  Kidder  r.  Bork,  ".2  Misc.  519,  33  N.  Duval),  9  B.  Men.  48.  Illinois:  King  v. 
Y.  Snpp.  663.  Gilson,  32    111.    348,    83    Am.   Dec.   269  ; 

^  Alabama:    Sayre   v~    Sheffield    Land  Jones  v.  Warner,  81   111.  343;  Ciapp  v. 

Co.  (Ala.)    18    So.  Rep.   101;    Heflin   v.  Herdman,    25    111.    App.    509;  Brady  v. 

Phillips,  96  Ala.  561,  11    So.  Rep.   729,  Spurck,  27  111.  478.    Indiana  :  In  case  the 

731  ;  Moore  v.  Johnston,  87  Ala.  220,  6  grantor  has  neither  title  nor  possession. 

So.  Rep.  50  ;  Anderson  v.  Knox,  20  Ala.  Jackson  v.  Green,  112  Ind.  341,  14  N.  E. 

156.     Arkansas  :  Benton  County  v.  Ruth-  Rep.  89  ;  Craig  v.  Donovan,  63  Ind.  513. 

erford,  33  Ark.  640;  Logan  v.  Moulder,  See,    however,    §    929.     Iowa:    Zent    v. 

1    Ark.   313,  .33  Am.   Dec.  338;  Pate  v.  Picken,  54  Iowa,  .535 ;  Brandt.?'.  Foster,  5 

Mitchell,  23  Ark.  590;  Hendricks  v.  Kee-  Iowa,  287  ;  Sac  County  Bank  v.  Hoojjcr, 

see,  32  Ark.  714.     California:  So  by  stat-  77  Iowa,   435.     Maine:    Montgomery    v. 

ute.     Civ.  Code  1895,  §  14(11  ;  Salmon  v.  Reed,  69  Me.  510;  Wilson  v.  Widenham, 

Vallejo,  41   Cal.  481  ;  Lawrence  y.  Mont-  51    Me.  566  ;  Heath  y.  Whidden,  24  Me. 

gomery,  37  Cal.  183.     Connecticut:    But-  383;  Boothby  i\  Hathaway,  20  Me.  251; 

ler  u.  Biirnos,  60  Conn.  170,21   Atl.  Rep.  Allen   v.  Little,  36  Mc.   170.     Otherwise 

419;  Mitchell  v.  Warner,  5  Conn.  497;  by  statute.     See  §  929.     Massachusetts; 

730 


COVENANTS    THAT   RUN    WITH    THE   LAND. 


[§  928. 


covenants  in  prcesenti,  and  their  breach  does  not  depend  npon  an}' 
future  contingency.  If  the  grantor  is  not  well  seised,  and  has' 
not  good  right  to  convey  when  the  deed  is  delivered,  a  right  of 
action  upon  the  covenants  at  once  accrues. 

If  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  the  breach  is  only  a  technical 
one,  for  which  nominal  damages  are  recoverable,  there  may  be  a 
further  action  upon  the  covenant  of  warranty  when  there  is  an 
eviction  of  the  grantee  or  any  one  having  his  title.^  These  cove- 
nants are  to  some  extent  cumuhitive.  They  are  broken  at  differ- 
ent times,  —  the  covenant  of  seisin  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance, 
and  the  covenant  of  warranty  upon  a  subsequent  eviction  of  the 
grantee.  A  judgment  for  nominal  damages  in  an  action  upon 
the  covenant  of  seisin  is  a  bar  to  another  action  upon  that  cove- 
nant, although  there  is  afterwards  an  eviction  of  the  grantee,  for 
which  full  damages  should  be  recovered  by  the  grantee ;  but  to 
recover  such  damages  he  must  sue  upon  the  covenants  of  war- 
ranty and  for  quiet  enjoyment.  Of  course,  if  there  is  a  substantial 
breach  of  the  covenant  of  seisin  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance, 
for  which  full  damages  are  recovered,  there  can  be  no  further 
recovery  in  an  action  upon  the  covenant  of  warranty. 


Smith  V.  Richanis,  155  Mass.  79,  28  N. 
E.  Rep.  1132;  Bickford  o.  Page,  2  Mass. 
455;  Clark  y.  Swift,  3  Met.  390;  Slater 
V.  Rawson,  1  Met.  450;  Thayer  v.  Clem- 
ence,  22  Pick.  490.  Kansas :  Dale  v. 
Shively,  8  Kaus.  276  ;  Scufhu.s  v.  Grand- 
staff,  12  Kans.  467.  Minnesota :  Allen 
V.  Allen,  48  Minn.  462,  464,  51  N.  W. 
Rep.  473  ;  Ogden  v.  Ball,  40  Minn.  94,  41 
N.  W.  Rep.  453  ;  Kimhall  v.  Bryant,  25 
Minn.  496.  Missouri  :  Adkins  v.  Tomlin- 
son,  121  Mo.  lOB,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  573; 
Allen  V.  Kennedy,  91  Mo.  324,  2  S.  W. 
Rep.  142  ;  Murphy  v.  Price,  48  Mo.  247. 
Nebraska:  Real  v.  Hollister,  20 Neb.  112, 
29  N.  W.  Rep.  189  ;  Chapman  v.  Kimhall, 
7  Xch.  309  ;  D.ividson  v.  Co.x,  10  Neb. 
150.  New  Hampshire:  Dickey  v.  Wes- 
ton, 61  N.  II.  23  ;  Smith  v.  -lefts,  44  N. 
H.  482;  Moore  v.  Merrill,  17  N.  II.  75, 
43  Am.  Dec.  593 ;  Morrison  /•.  I'nder- 
wood,  20  N.  II.  369.  New  Jersey :  Gar- 
rison V.  Sandford,  12N.  .J.  L.  201  ;  Chap- 
man V.  Holmes,  10  N.  J.  L.  20 ;  Carter  v. 
Denman,  23   N.  J.   L.  200.     New  York: 


Mygatt  V.  Coe,  124  N.  Y.  212,  20  N.  E. 
Rep.  Oil,  afhrming  44  Hun,  31  ;  Hamilton 
V.  Wilson,  4  Johns.  72,  4  Am.  Dec.  253  ; 
Greenby  v.  Wilcocks,  2  Johns.  1,  3  Am. 
Dec.  379,  a  leading  case;  Abbott  v.  Allen, 
14  Johns.  248 ;  M'Carty  v.  Leggctt,  3  Hill, 
134  ;  Mott  V.  Palmer,  1  N.  Y.  564.  North 
Carolina  :  Price  v.  Deal,  90  N.  C.  290 ; 
(hist  V.  Hodges,  3  Dev.  198,  200.  North 
Dakota  :  Bowne  v.  Wolcott,  1  N.  Dak.  497, 
48  N.  W.  Rep.  426.  So  provided  by  stat- 
ute. Dak.  Comp.  Laws,  §  3444.  Penn- 
sylvania :  Wilson  v.  Cochran,  46  Pa.  St. 
229.  South  Dakota:  Dak.  Cumi..  Lmws 
1887,  §  444.  Tennessee:  Inj; ram  r.  Mor- 
gan, 4  Ilunii.)].  00,  40  Am.  Dec.  020  ;  Ken- 
ney  v.  Norton,  10  Ileisk.  384.  Vermont  : 
Clement  r.  IJank.OI  Vt  298,  17  All.  Kep. 
717;  Swa,sey  v.  Brooks,  30  Vt.  0'.)2 ; 
Garfield  v.  Williams,  2  Vt.  327.  Texas: 
Wcstrope  V.  Chiimbers,  51  Tex.  178. 

1  Ogden  V.  Ball,  40  Minn.  94,  41  N.  W. 
Rep.  453;  Donnell  r.  Thompson,  10  Mo. 
170,  25  Am.  Dec.  216. 

731 


§  0-29 


COVENANTS    FOR    TITLE. 


929.  In  a  few  States  it  is  held,  however,  that  this  cove- 
nant is  more  than  a  covenant  in  the  present  tense  ;  tlmt  it  is 
ratliev  a  covenant  of  indeinnity,  uiul  runs  with  the  huul  to  the 
extent  that  if  the  covenantei!  takes  any  estate,  or  even  the  posses- 
sion, the  covenant  runs  with  the  hind  and  inures  to  the  subsequent 
grantee,  upon  whom  the  loss  falls. ^  This  is  the  English  rule.^  The 
same  construction  is  given  to  the  covenant  Avlien  it  is  implied 
under  a  statutory  covenant. 

According  to  these  authorities,  damages  arising  from  the  breach 
of  this  covenant  may  be  assigned  so  as  to  enable  the  assignee  to 
sue  in  his  own  name.'^  "  The  covenant  is  taken  for  the  protection 
and  assurance  of  the  title  which  the  grantor  assumes  to  pass  by 
his  deed  to  the  covenantee  ;  and  where  the  covenantee  assumes 
to  pass  that  title  to  another,  it  is  fair  to  suppose  that  he  intends 
to  pass  with  it,  for  the  protection  of  his  grantee,  every  assurance 


^  Colorado :  The  covenants  of  seisin, 
peaceable  possession,  freedom  from  in- 
cumbrances, and  of  warranty,  contained 
in  any  conveyance  of  real  estate,  of  any 
interest  therein,  run  with  tlie  premises, 
and  to  inure  to  the  benefit  of  all  sub- 
sequent purchasers  and  incumbrancers. 
Annot.  Stats.  1891.  §  436.  Indiana  : 
Overhiser  v.  McCollister,  10  Ind.  41 ;  Mar- 
tin V.  Baker,  5  Rlackf.  232  ;  Coleman  (;. 
Lyn)an,  42  Ind.  289  ;  Wrifrht  v.  Nipple, 
92  Ind.  310.  Iowa:  Boon  v.  McIIenry, 
55  Iowa,  202,  7  N.  W.  Kej).  503 ;  Scho- 
field  V.  Iowa  Homestead  Co.  32  Iowa, 
317,  7  Am.  Rep.  197.  Maine:  The  as- 
signee of  a  grantee  may  maintain  an  ac- 
tion on  a  covenant  of  seisin,  or  freedom 
from  incumbrance,  contained  in  absolute 
deeds  of  the  premises  between  the  parties, 
and  recover  such  damages  as  the  first 
grantee  might  have  recovered  on  eviction, 
upon  filing,  for  the  use  of  his  grantor,  a 
release  of  the  covenants  of  his  deed  and  of 
all  causes  of  action  thereon.  The  prior 
grantee  cannot,  in  such  case,  release  the 
covenants  of  the  first  grantor  to  the  i)reju- 
dice  of  his  grantee.  R.  S.  1883,  ch.  82, 
§  18.  See  Wil.son  v.  Wideiiham,  51  Me. 
566 ;  Trnsk  v.  Wilder,  50  Me.  450 ;  Little- 
field  V.  Pinkbam,  72  Me.  369.  Missouri : 
Allen  V.  Kennedy,  91  Mo.  324, 2  S.  W.  Rep. 

732 


142 ;  Cockrell  v.  Proctor,  65  Mo.  41  ;  Ma- 
gwire  V.  Rlggiu,  44  Mo.  512;  Chambers 
V.  Smith,  23  Mo.  174;  Dickson  v.  Desire, 
23  Mo.  151;  Hall  v.  Scott  Co.  2  Mc- 
Crary,  356;  Schnelle  &  Q.  Lumber  Co. 
V.  Barlow,  34  Fed.  Rep.  853  ;  Kimball  v. 
Bryant,  25  Minn.  496.  Ohio:  If  the 
grantor  was  in  possession,  and  delivers 
possession  to  the  grantee,  there  is  a  com- 
pliance with  the  covenant,  and  no  action 
lies  till  an  eviction,  and  the  covenant 
runs  with  the  land  till  that  occurs.  But; 
if  the  grantor  was  not  in  possession, 
there  is  a  breach  of  the  covenant  as  soon 
as  made,  and  the  grantee  alone  can  si;e 
upon  it.  Lane  v.  Fury,  31  Ohio  St.  574, 
577  ;  Stambaugh  r.  Smith,  23  Ohio  St. 
584,  588  ;  Devore  v.  Sunderland,  17  Ohio 
St.  52;  Foote  v.  Burnet,  10  Ohio,  317; 
Bobinson  v.  Neil,  3  Ohio,  525  ;  Backus 
!;.  McCoy,  3  Oliio,  211;  Gest  v.  Kenncr, 
2  Handy,  86,  92.  Wisconsin  :  Mccklem 
V.  Blake,  22  Wis.  495,  99  Am.  Dec  68  ; 
Eaton  V.  Lymnn,  24  Wis.  438,  30  Wis.  41, 
49,  33  "Wis.  34. 

-  Kingdon  v.  Nottle,  4  Maule  &  S.  53, 
1  Maule  &  S.  355;  King  v.  Jones,  5 
Taunt.  418. 

3  Allen  V.  Kennedy,  91  Mo.  324,  2  S 
W.  Rep.  142;  Van  Doren  v.  Relfe,  20 
Mo.  455. 


COVENANTS    THAT    liUX    WITH    THE    LAND. 


[^  9o0. 


of  it  that  he  has,  whether  resting  in  right  of  action  or  in  unbroken 
covenant ;  so  that  if,  before  enforcing  his  remech'  for  breach  of 
the  covenant,  the  covenantee  execute  a  conveyance  of  the  land, 
unless  there  be  something  to  show  a  contrary  intention,  it  may 
be  presumed  that  he  intended  to  confer  on  his  grantee  the  benefit 
of  the  covenant  so  far  as  necessary  for  his  protection,  —  that  is, 
that  he  intends  to  pass  all  his  riglit  to  sue  for  the  breach, -so  far 
as  the  grantee  sustains  injury  by  reason  of  it."  ^ 

930.  The  covenant  against  incumbrances  is  a  personal  one 
which  does  not  run  with  tlie  land.  It  is  bi'oken  the  instant  it 
is  made,  thus  vesting  in  the  covenantee  a  chose  in  action,  which 
is  not  assignable,  and  therefore  does  not  pass  to  his  grantee  or 
devisee.2     The  grantee  can  maintain  no  action  upon  it,  and  can- 


1  Kimball  v.  Bryant,  25  Minu.  496,  499, 
per  Giltillan,  C.  J. 

-  Arkansas  :  Logan  i'.  Moulder,  I  Ark. 
313,  33  Am.  Dec.  .338;  Brooks  v.  Mooily, 
25  Ark.  452.  California  :  So  declared  by 
statute.  Civ.  Code,  §  1461.  Connecticut: 
Butler  V.  Barnes,  60  Conn.  170,  192,  21 
Atl.  Rep.  419.  Illinois:  Fuller  v.  Jil- 
lette,  9  Biss.  296  ;  Richard  v.  Bent,  59  111. 
38,  14  Am.  Rep.  1,  where  there  is  an 
entire  failure  of  title  and  the  breach  is 
complete.  See  §  931.  Massachusetts : 
Ladd  V.  Noyes,  137  Mass.  151  ;  0.sborne 
V.  Atkins,  6  Gray,  423 ;  Whitney  v.  Dins- 
more.  6  Cush.  124;  Clark  v.  Swift,  3 
Met.  390 ;  Thiiyer  v.  Clemence,  22  Pick. 
490;  Wyman  r.  Ballard,  12  Mass.  304; 
Prescott  ('.  Trueman,  4  Mass.  627,  3  Am. 
Dec.  249.  What  effect  is  of  the  statute, 
Pub.  Stats.  1882,  eh.  126,  §  18,  giving  a 
right  of  action  to  a  grantee,  his  heirs, 
executor,  a<Iministrator,  successors,  or  as- 
signs, for  removing  an  incumbrance  that 
appears  of  record,  was  left  undetermined 
by  the  court  in  Tihbetts  ;•.  Lecson,  148 
Mass.  102,  18  N.  E.  Rep.  679.  Michi- 
gan :  Post  V.  Campau,  42  Mich.  90,  3  N. 
W.  Rep.  272  ;  Davenport  r.  Davenport, 
.52  Mich.  587,  18  N.  W.  Rep.  371.  Ne- 
braska: Camj)bell  r.  McClure  (Xeb.),  63 
N.  W.  Rep.  920  ;  Chapman  v.  Kimball,  7 
Neb.  399  ;  Mills  c  Saunders,  4  Neb.  190. 
New    Hampshire:  Russ  v.  Perry,  49   N. 


H.  547  ;  Morrison  i'.  Underwood,  20  N.  H. 
369;  Andrews  !;.  Davison,  17  N.  11.413, 
43  Am.  Dec.  606.  New  Jersey :  Garrison 
V.  Saudford,  12  N.  J.  L.  261  ;  Stewart  v. 
Drake,  9  N.  J.  L.  139;  Carter  r.  Den- 
man,  23  N.  J.  L.  260,  273.  New  York  : 
Greenby  v.  Wilcocks,  2  Johns.  1,  3  Am. 
Dec.  379  ;  Hamilton  r.Wilson,4  Johns.  72, 
4  Am.  Dec.  253 ;  2  Wait,  Act.  &  Def.  380. 
By  statute  in  this  State,  choses  in  action 
are  assignable  (Code  Civil  Proc.  §  1910) ; 
and  since  this  statute  a  disposition  has 
been  shown  to  repudiate  the  ancient  rule, 
and  to  permit  the  grantee  or  devisee  of 
the  covenantee,  if  lie  suffers  from  the 
breacli  of  the  covenai:t,  to  resort  to  the 
covenant  for  protection  and  redress.  Boyd 
V.  Belmont,  58  How.  Pr.  513;  Ernst  v. 
Parsons,  54  How.  Pr.  163;  Andrews  v. 
Appel,  22  Hun,  429;  Colby  v.  Oi-good, 
29  Barl).  .339;  Coleman  v.  Brisnaham,  8 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1.58.  North  Dakota:  So  by 
statute.  R.  Codes  1895,  §  3785.  Penn 
sylvania  :  Cathcart  v.  Bowman,  5  I'li.  St. 
317;  Funk  r.  Voni-ida,  11  S.  &  1{.  109, 
14  Am.  Dee.  617  ;  Wilso-i  r.  Coeliran,  AC, 
V:\.  St.  229.  South  Dakota  :  So  by  stat- 
ute. Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  3444.  Ver- 
mont: Potter  V.  Taylor,  6  Vt.  076;  Swa- 
sey  V.  Brooks,  30  Vt.  692.  Sec,  however, 
§  931.  Virginia  :  Marbury  v.  Thornton, 
82  Va.  702,  1  S.  E.  Rep.  909. 

733 


§  931.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

not  assert  it  by  way  of  estoppel,  since  be  acquired  no  interest 
in  it. 

931.  In  several  States,  however,  the  covenant  against  in- 
cumbrances runs  with  the  land.^  Wbere  tbe  incumbrance  is 
one  that  may  be  extinguished  by  payment,  and  for  which  the 
covenantee  has  only  nominal  damages  until  he  extinguishes  it, 
tbe  covenant  runs  with  tbe  land,  and  remains  alive  in  tbe  bands 
of  a  subsequent  grantee  wlio  may  be  compelled  to  extinguish 
such  incumbrance.  Until  such  payment  of  the  incumbrance, 
there  is  no  substantial  breach  of  the  covenant  for  Avbich  dam- 
ages may  be  recovered. ^  "  Where  tbe  covenant  of  seisin  is 
broken  and  there  is  an  entire  failure  of  title,  the  breach  is  final 
and  complete,  the  covenant  is  broken  once  for  all ;  actual  dam- 
ages, and  all  tbe  damages  that  can  result  from  the  breach,  have 
accrued ;  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  purchase-money  and 
interest,  which  are  at  once  recoverable.  In  such  case  the  right  of 
action  is  substantial,  and  its  transfer  may  well  be  held  to  come 
within  the  rule  prohibiting  the  assignment  of  choses  in  action. 
But  as  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  is  one  of  indemnity, 
the  covenantee  can  recover  only  nominal  damages  for  a  breach 
thereof,  unless  he  can  show  that  be  has  sustained  actual  loss  or 
injury  thereby,  or  has  had  to  pay  money  to  remove  tbe  incum- 
brance. And  where  there  is  the  barren  right  of  recovery  of  only 
nominal  damages,  the  right  of  action  is  one  only  in  name,  and  is 
essentially  no  right  of  action."  ^  If  substantial  damages  have 
been  recovered  for  a  breach,  a  second  action  on  the  covenant 
cannot  be  had  for  a  further  breach  of  the  covenant.'* 

For  a  breach  of  the  covenant  occurring  during  the  lifetime  of 
the  covenantee  bis  administrator  must  sue.     The  covenant  cannot 

1  Colorado :     So    by    stiitute.      Annot.  Brisbane,  1   Nott   &  McCord,  104 ;  Jeter 

Stats.   1891,  §436.     Illinois:    Richards,  r.  Glenn,  9  Rich.  374.     Vermont :  Cole  ?;. 

Bent,   59    111.    38.      Indiana :    Martin   v.  Kimball,  52  Vt.  639.     Wisconsin :   Eaton 

Baker,  5  Blackf.  232;  Overhiser  v.  Mc-  v.  Lyman,  30  Wis.  41  ;  Mecklemi;.  Blake, 

Colli.ster,   10  Imi.  41.      Maine:  Assignee  22    Wis.    495;    I'illsbury  v.   Mitchell,   5 

may  sue  provided  he  releases  his  imme-  Wis.  17. 

diate  grantor.     R.    S.    1883,  ch.  82,  §    18.  ^  Buren   v.  Hubbell,  54  Mo.  App.  617; 

Missouri:   Hunt   v.  Marsh,   80   Mo.  396;  Barnhart  v.   Hughes,  46   Mo.  App.  318; 

Walker  r.  Doaver,  79   Mo.  664 ;   Dickson  Winningham  v.   Pennock,   36   Mo.   App. 

i:  Desire,  23  Mo.  151.     Ohio  :    Devore  v.  688. 

Sunderland,  17  Ohio  St.  52,  60;  Foote  v.  ^  Richard  v.  Bent,  59    HI.  38,  per  Shel- 

Bumet,  10  Ohio,  317  ;  Backus  v.  McCoy,  don,  J. 

Ohio,  211.     South  Carolina:  M'Crady  r.  *  Taylor  u.  Heitz,  87  Mo.  660. 
734 


COVENANTS  THAT  RUN  WITH  THE  LAND.       [§  932. 

run  with  the  land  after  such  breach,  or  descend  to  the  heir.^ 
After  breach  the  covenant  is  turned  into  a  mere  right  of  action, 
which  can  be  taken  advantage  of  only  by  the  covenantee  or  his 
personal  representative.  It  cannot  pass  to  an  heir,  devisee,  or 
subsequent  jJurchaser.^ 

In  Indiana  a  covenant  against  incumbrances  embraced  in  the 
statutory  form  of  deeds  of  general  warranty  is  one  that  runs 
with  the  land.  "  For  this  rule  the  statute  and  the  comprehensive 
form  of  the  warranty  used  by  virtue  thereof  supply  the  reason. 
The  term  'convey  and  warrant'  is  construed  as  containing  cove- 
nants not  only  of  title  and  seisin,  and  against  incumbrances,  but 
also  for  quiet  enjoyment ;  and,  where  the  original  grantor  either 
had  the  title  or  was  in  possession  under  claim  of  title,  such  cove- 
nant is  in  futtii'O  and  runs  with  the  land.^  .  .  .  Usually,  it  is 
true,  a  special  covenant  against  incumbrances  is  in  pro'senti^  and 
does  not  run  with  the  land,  as  such  covenant  is  broken  as  soon  as 
made,  and  vests  the  right  of  action  at  once  in  the  immediate 
covenantee,  and  in  him  alone,  or,  in  case  of  his  death,  in  his  legal 
representative ;  but  it  is  otherwise  where  the  covenant  against 
incumbrances  is  embraced  in  the  general  warranty.  In  that  case, 
any  breach  calculated  to  disturb  the  grantee  in  the  enjoyment  of 
his  property  is  covered  by  his  covenant,  embracing  as  it  does  a 
guaranty  for  future  as  well  as  present  enjoyment.  He  may  wait 
until  he  is  evicted  and  then  sue,  or  he  may  pay  off  the  incum- 
brance and  bring  his  action,  provided  he  finds  it  necessary  to 
extinguish  the  incumbrance  in  order  to  ward  off  an  eviction  if 
the  land  is  legally  bound."  ^ 

932.  The  covenants  for  warranty  and  quiet  enjoyment  run 
with   the  land.     The    authorities    are    unifoim    to    this   effect.'' 

1  Fiink  V.  Bellis,  33  lud.  135.  ^  California,  North  Dakota,  South  Da- 

2  Buren  v.  Ilubbell,  54  Mo.  App.  617;  kota:  The  only  covenants  that  run  with 
Blondeau  v.  Sheridan,  81  Mo.  545;  Kel-  the  land  are  those  of  warranty,  for  quiet 
logg  V.  Malin,  G2  Mo.  429,  50  Mo.  496 ;  enjoyment,  and  further  assurance.  Cal: 
Taylor  v.  Heitz,  87  Mo.  660.  Civ.   Code,  §   1461  ;    N.  Dak.    R.    Codes 

3  Worley  v.  Hineman,  6  Ind.  App.  240,     1895,  §  3785 ;  S.  Dak.  Comp.  Laws  1887, 
■244,33  N.  E.  Rep.  260,  per  Reinhard,  C.     §3445.     Connecticut:    Butler  v.  Barnes, 

J. ;  Dehority  v.  Wright,  101  Ind.  382.  60  Conn.  170,  21  Atl.  Rep.  419  ;  Booth  i-. 

*  Jackson   v.   Green,  112  Ind.  341,  14  Starr,  I  Conn.  244,246,  6  Am.  Dec.  233. 

N.  E.  Rep.  89  ;  Sinker  v.  Floyd,  104  Ind.  Illinois  :  Barry  v.  Guild,  126   111.  439,  18 

291,  4  N.  E.  Rep.  10;  Black  v.  Duncan,  N.  K.  Hep.  759.     Maine:  Crookcr  v.  Jcw- 

60  Ind.  522  ;  Coleman  v.  Lyman,  42  Ind.  ell,  29  Me.  527  ;  Allen  v.  Little,  36   J\Tc. 

289.  170.     Massachusetts:  White  ;>.  Wliittipv, 

73.3 


§  933.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

Tile  covenant  runs  with  the  land  as  an  incident,  although  the 
grantor  had  neither  the  legal  title  nor  possession,  provided  posses- 
sion passed  to  the  grantee.  "The  covenant  attached  to  a  grant 
does  not  pass  by  the  deed  from  the  covenantee  to  his  assignee, 
but  onl}'  by  the  land  conveyed.  It  passes,  not  by  the  form  of 
the  conveyance,  but  merely  as  an  incident  to  the  land  ;  so,  when 
the  grantee  takes  no  estate  under  the  grant,  no  assignment  of  the 
land  by  him  can  transfer  it  to  the  assignee.  As  it  is  not  capable 
of  a  direct  transfer,  so  as  to  enable  the  assignee  to  maintain  an 
action  for  its  breach  in  his  own  name,  it  cannot  pass  by  the 
operation  of  the  assignment,  for  it  cannot  run  with  the  land 
which  the  grantee  does  not  have  to  convey.  It  is  stated  that  in 
England,  when  nothing  but  bare  possession  of  the  land  passes  by 
the  conveyance,  the  covenant  does  not  pass,  either  by  the  direct 
or  indirect  operation  of  the  assignment.  But  the  tendency  of 
the  American  cases  is  to  hold  that  possession  is  a  sufficient  estate 
to  cause  the  covenant  to  attach  to  the  land,  and,  upon  an  assign- 
ment or  transfer  of  the  land  by  the  covenantee,  to  pass  to  the 
assignee.  Possession  is  an  estate  that  in  time  may  ripen  into  a 
perfect  title."  i 

A  deed  that  passes  the  legal  title  carries  the  right  of  possession, 
and  gives  constructive  possession  without  an  actual  entry  by  the 
grantee.  When  he  takes  actual  possession  of  the  premises,  hav- 
ing the  legal  title,  the  covenant  of  warranty  running  with  the 
land  inures  to  his  benefit.^ 

933.  Any  deed  that  transfers  the  title  passes  to  the  grantee 
the  benefit  of  a  covenant  that  runs  with  the  land.  Such  is 
the  effect  of  a  quitclaim  deed,  or  a  deed  of  release  without  cove- 

3  Met.  81.  Nebraska  :  Keal  v.  Hollister,  lotson  v.  Prichard,  60  Vt.  94,  U  Atl.  Rep. 
17  Xel).  061,  06.5,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  333.  302;  Wilder  v.  Davenport,  58  Vt.  642,5 
New  Hampshire:  Chandler?'.  Brown,  59  Atl.  Hep.  733;  Williams  v.  Wetherbee,  1 
N.  II.  370  ;  Moore  v.  Merrill,  17  N.  H.  75,  Aik.  233.  Virginia  :  Marbury  v.  Thorn- 
81,  43  Am.  Dec.   593  ;  Chase   v.  Weston,  ton,  82  Va.  702,  1  S.  E.  Rep.  909. 

12  N.   H.  413.     New  Jersey:    Carter  v.  i  Tillotson  v.  Prichard,  60  Vt.  94,  101, 

Denman,  23  N.  J.  L.   200.     New  York:  14    Atl.  Rep.   302,    per   Taft,   J.,   citin<? 

Rindskopf  v.  Farmers' L.   &    T.  Co.   58  Rawle   on   Covenants,  §233;    1    Smith's 

Barb.  36.    Tennessee  :  Lawrence  v.  Sentcr,  Leading  Cases,  1 83,  in  the  notes  to  Spen- 

4  Sneed,  52.    Texas  :  Alvord  v.  Waggoner  cer's  Case,  5  Coke,  16. 

(Tex.   Civ.  App.),  29  S.   W.   Rep.   797;  2  Chandler  v.  Brown,  59  N.   H.  370; 

Flaniken  v.  Neal,  67  Tex.  629,  4   S.  W.  Moore  v.  Merrill,  17  N.  H.  75,  81,  43  Am. 

Rep.  212  ;  Saunders  v.  Flaniken,  77  Tex.  Dec.  593. 
662,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  236.     Vermont :  Til- 

736 


COVENANTS  THAT  RUN  WITH  THE  LAND.   [§§  9o4-936. 


nants,^  and   of  a  deed  without  covenauts    to  a  purchaser   at  a 
judicial  sale.^ 

934.  The  covenant  of  warranty  does  not  pass  to  a  subse- 
quent purchaser  at  a  tax  sale,  for  the  title  under  such  deed  is 
not  derivative,  bat  new  and  independent.-^ 

935.  Covenants  that  run  with  the  mortgaged  land  inure  to 
the  covenantee's  mortgagee  and  his  grantees,  in  proportion  to 
their  shares  and  interests.  They  inure  to  the  benefit  of  a  pur- 
chaser at  the  foreclosure  sale.* 

936.  A  remote  grantee,  when  evicted,  may  sue  any  or  all 
of  the  grantors  in  the  line  of  the  title  who  conveyed  with  cove- 
nants of  warranty,  until  be  has  obtained  satisfaction,  and  there 
can   of  course  be   but    one    satisfaction.^      But  no    intermediate 


1  Jenks  V.  Quinn,  137  N.  Y.  223,  230, 
affirming  61  Hun,  427 ;  Hunt  v.  Amidon, 
4  Hill,  345,  40  Am.  Dec.  283  ;  Jackson  v. 
Groat,  7  Cow.  285  ;  Beddoe  i;.  Wadsworth, 
21  "Wend.  120;  Wilson  v.  Widenham,  51 
Me.  566 ;  Chandler  v.  Brown,  59  N.  H. 
370 ;  "Warren  v.  Cochran,  30  N.  H.  379 ; 
Moore  v.  Merrill,  17  N.  H.  75,  81,  43 
Am.  Dec.  593  ;  Hunt  v.  Middle.sworth,  44 
Mich.  448  ;  Thomas  v.  Bland,  91  Ky.  1,14 
S.  "W.  Kep.  955  ;  Wead  v.  Larkin,  54  111. 
489,5  Am.  Rep.  149;  Brady  v.  Spurck, 
27  Bl.  478  ;  Claycomb  v.  Munger,  51  111. 
373. 

-  "White  V.  Whitney,  3  Met.  81  ;  Thayer 
V.  Clemence,  22  Pick.  490  ;  Moore  v.  Mer- 
rill, 17  N.  H.  75,43  Am.  Dec.  .593.  Ken- 
tucky: Thomas  v.  Bland,  91  Ky.  1,  14  S. 
"W.  Rep.  955  ;  Cummins  v.  Kennedy,  3 
Litt.  118,  121,  14  Am.  Dec.  45  ;  Young  v. 
Triplett,  5  Litt.  248;  Hunt  v.  Orwig,  17 
B.  Mon.  73,  66  Am.  Dec.  144 ;  Perkins  v. 
Coleman,  90  Ky.  611,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  640; 
Richard  v.  Bent,  59  111.  38,  14  Am.  Rep. 
1  ;  Fi.'sk  I'.  Cathcart,  3  Colo.  App.  374,  33 
Pac.  Rep.  1004 ;  Saunders  v.  Franklin, 
77  Tex.  662,  14  S.  "W.  Rop.  236;  P'lani- 
ken  V.  Neal,  67  Tex.  629,  4  S.  W.  Rep. 
212;  Town  v.  Needham,  3  Paige,  .545,  24 
Am.  Dec.  246  ;  Redwine  v.  Brown,  10  Ga. 
311.  So  by  statute.  R.  Code  1882,  §  2623  ; 
Lewis  V.  Cook,  13  Ircd.  L.  193  ;  M'Ciady 
V.  Brisbane,  1  Nott.  &  M.  104,9  Am.  Dec. 
676  ;  Markland  v.  Crump,  1  Dev.  &  B.  94, 


27  Am.  Dec.  230 ;  Carter  v.  Denman,  23 
N.  J.  L.  260 ;  White  v.  Presly,  54  Miss. 
313. 

In  Georgia  it  is  provided  by  statute 
that  the  purchaser  of  land  obtains  with 
the  title,  however  conveyed  to  him,  at 
public  or  private  sale,  all  the  rights  which 
any  former  owner  of  the  land,  under  whom 
he  claims,  may  have  had  by  virtue  of  any 
covenants  of  warranty  of  title,  or  of  quiet 
enjoyment,  or  of  freedom  from  incum- 
brances, contained  in  the  conveyance  from 
any  former  grantor,  unless  the  transmis- 
sion of  such  covenants  with  the  land  is 
expressly  negatived  in  the  covenant  itself. 
Code  1S82,  §  2702. 

•^  Bellows  V.  Litchfield,  81  Iowa,  36,  48 
N.  "W.  Rep.  1062;  Crum  v.  Cotting,  22 
Iowa,  411. 

•»  White  V.  "Uniitncy,  3  Met.  81  ;  Tufts 
V.  Adams,  8  Pick.  547  ;  Mygatt  v.  Coe, 
142  N.  Y.  78,  36  N.  F>.  Rep.  870 ;  Lane  v. 
Woodruff,  1  Kans.  App.  241,  40  Pac.  Rep. 
1079  ;  Town  v.  Needliam,  3  Paige,  545,  24 
Am.  Dec.  246;  Andrews  v.  Wolcott,  16 
Barb.  21  ;  Rose  v.  Schaffner,  50  Iowa, 
483  ;  Wilder  v.  Davenport,  58  Vt.  642, 
5  Atl.  Rep.  7.53;  M'Murphy  v.  Minot,  4 
N.  H.  251  ;  Cavis  v.  McClary,  5  N.  H. 
529. 

6  Crookcr  v.  Jewell,  29  Mo.  527  ;  Withy 
V.  Mumford,  5  Cow.  137  ;  Cnsfield  v.  Storr, 
36  Md.  129;  Wilson  v.  Taylor,  9  Ohio 
St.    595;    King    v.    Kerr,   5   Ohio,    154; 

737 


§§  937-939.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

gr;mtee  can  sue  any  of  the  preceding  grantors  until  he  has  been 
evicted,  or  compelled  to  pay  damages  upon  his  own  warranty.^ 
"  Every  assignee  may,  for  a  breach  of  such  covenant,  maintain 
an  action  against  all  or  any  of  the  prior  warrantors  till  he  has 
obtained  satisfaction.  This  results  from  the  nature  of  the  cove- 
nant, for  each  covenantor  covenants  with  the  covenantee  and  his 
assigns  ;  and  as  the  lands  are  transferable  it  was  reasonable  that 
covenants  annexed  to  them  should  be  transferred.  .  .  .  The 
nature,  then,  of  the  engagement  of  the  first  covenantor  is  to 
indemnify  all  the  subsequent  covenantees  from  all  damages  aris- 
ing from  his  breach  of  the  covenant."  ^ 

937.  Damages  arising  from  broken  covenants  do  not  run 
with  the  land,  though  the  covenants  themselves  do.^  Such 
damages  do  not  inure  to  tlie  subsequent  grantees  of  the  title. 
Therefore,  after  a  covenant  of  warranty  and  for  quiet  enjoyment 
is  broken  by  an  eviction  under  a  paramount  title,  it  no  longer 
runs  with  the  land,  and  a  subsequent  grantee  has  no  right  of 
action  upon  it."^ 

938.  If  the  covenant  is  in  fact  personal,  it  does  not  run 
with  the  land  merely  because  it  is  to  the  grantee,  "  his  heirs 
and  assigns."  The  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York  has  recently 
said :  °  "  Whatever  confusion  may  exist  in  the  cases  with  reference 
to  the  use  of  these  words,  it  is  clear  that  they  cannot  dispense 
with  some  privity  of  estate  in  order  to  carry  the  covenant  with 
the  land ;  and  it  has  never  been  held  that  a  covenant  which,  in  its 
nature  or  otherwise,  is  personal,  is  made  to  run  with  the  land 
by  the  mere  employment  of  these  words." 

939.  A  suit  upon  the  covenant  must  be  maintained  by  the 

Claycomb  v.  Munger,  51    111.  373;  Cum-  *  Barry  v.  Guild,  28  111.  App.  39. 

ming.s  V.  Harrison,  57  Miss.  275.  ""  Mygatt  v.  Coe,  147  N.  Y.  456,  42  N. 

1  Burt  V.  Dewey,  40  N.  Y.  283,  100  Am.  E.  Rep.  17,  per  O'Brien,  J.,  citing  Rawle, 
Dec.  482;  Booth  v.  Starr,  1  Conn.  244,  6  Cov.  §§  2,  203  ;  Norcross  v.  James,  140 
Am.  Dec.  233.  Mass.  188,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  946  ;  Dart,  Vend. 

2  Booth  V.  Starr,  1  Conn.  244,  246,  249,  (5th  ed.)  777,  778 ;  Sugd.  Vend.  577,  578; 
6  Am.  Dec.  233,  per  Swift,  J.  Hurd  v.  Curtis,  19  Pick.  459  ;  Jacques  v. 

3  Provident  Life  &  T.  Co.  v.  Fiss,  147  Short,  20  Barb.  269;  Andrews  r.  Appel, 
Pa.  St.  232,  23  Atl.  Rep.  560;  Marl)iiry  22  Hun,  429;  Clark  v.  Devoe,  124  N. 
V.  Thornton,  82  Va.  702,  1  S.  E.  Rep.  Y.  120,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  275;  Dexter  v. 
909  ;  Demarest  v.  Willard,  8  Cow.  206;  Beard,  130  N.  Y.  549,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  983. 
Davis  V.  Lyman,  6  Conn.  249  ;  Adams  v.  And  see  Mygatt  v.  Coe,  142  N.  Y.  78,  36 
Couover,  87  N.  Y.  422,  41  Am.  Rep.  381  ;  N,  E.  Rep.  870. 

Garrison  v.  Sandford,   12  N.  J.   L.   261; 
Ladd  V.  Noyes,  137  Mass.  151. 

738 


COVENANTS   THAT   RUN   WITH  THE  LAND.  [§  940. 

person  in  whom  the  title  stands  at  the  time.  The  covenantee 
cannot  maintain  an  action  upon  it  after  he  has  parted  with  his 
title.^  If  a  grantee  iii  a  warranty  deed  has  himself  conveyed 
part  of  the  land  with  warranty,  he  cannot  recover  of  bis  grantor 
on  the  warranty,  as  to  the  part  which  he  has  conveyed,  till  he  has 
satisfied  his  grantee's  claim.^ 

The  benefit  of  the  covenant  runs  to  the  purchaser  of  any  part 
of  the  land  to  which  the  warranty  applies,  and  such  purchaser 
may  maintain  a  suit  separately  in  respect  of  the  part  he  has  pur- 
chased.3  In  California,  North  Dakota,  and  South  Dakota  it  is 
provided  by  statute  that  a  covenant  running  with  the  land  binds 
those  only  who  acquire  the  whole  estate  of  the  covenantor  in 
some  part  of  the  property.  No  one,  merely  by  reason  of  hav- 
ing acquired  an  estate  subject  to  a  covenant  running  with  the 
land,  is  liable  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  before  he  acquired 
the  estate,  or  after  he  has  parted  with  it,  or  ceased  to  enjoy  its 
benefits.  Where  several  persons,  holding  by  several  titles,  are 
subject  to  the  burden,  or  entitled  to  the  benefit,  of  a  covenant 
running  with  the  land,  it  must  be  apportioned  among  them 
according  to  the  value  of  the  property  subject  to  it  held  by  them 
respectively,  if  such  value  can  be  ascertained,  and,  if  not,  then 
according  to  their  respective  interests  in  point  of  quantity.'* 

940.  Possession  alone  has  been  held  to  be  sufficient  to 
make  the  grantor's  covenants  binding  upon  his  heirs  and 
assigns.  A  husband  and  wife  joined  in  a  deed  of  her  real 
estate  with  covenants  of  warranty.  It  appeared  that  the  husband 
was  at  the  time  in  possession  of  the  land,  and  his  wife  occupied 
the  premises  with  him  ;  that  she  had  color  of  title,  but  he  not 

1  Bickford  v.  Page,  2  Mass.  455,  460;  244,  248,  6  Am.  Dec.  233;  Withy  v. 
Booth  V.  Starr,  1  Conn.  244  ;  Jones  v.  Mumford,  5  Cow.  137  ;  Wheeler  v.  Sohier, 
Richmond.  88  Va.  231,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  414;  3  Cush.  219  ;  Baructt  v.  Barbour,  1  Litt. 
Kane  v.  Sanger,  14  Johns.  89;  Cunning-  (Ky.)  396;  Whitzman  v.  Ilinsh,  87  Tenn. 
ham   V.   Kniglit,   1    Barb.  399;    Keith   v.  513,11  S.  W.  Kcp.  421. 

Day,  15  Vt.  660;  Tillotson   v.   Prichard,  »  Lamb  y.  Dauforlh,  59  Me.  322  ;  Swett 

60  Vt.  94  ;  Crooker  ;;.  Jewell,  29  Me.  527  ;  v.  Patrick,  12  Me.  9  ;  Kane  v.  Sanger,  14 

Hunt    V.    Middleswonh,   44    Mich.   448,  Johns.  89  ;  Dickinson  v.  Iloomcs,  8  Gratt. 

7  N.  W.  Rep.  57 ;  Claycomb  v.  Munger,  406 ;  Brown  v.  Metz,  33  111.  339 ;  Whitz- 

51  111.  373;  Thompson  r.   Sanders,  5  T.  man  r.  Ilirsh,  87  Tenn.  513. 

B.  Mon.  .•557.  '  California:  Civ.  Code,  §§  1462-1467. 

2  Alvord  V.  Waggoner  (Tex.),  32  S.  North  Dakota:  H.  Codes  1895,  §§3786- 
W.  Rep.  872,  reversing  same  ca.se,  29  S.  3791.  South  Dakota :  Comp.  Laws  1887, 
W.  Rep.   797;  Booth  v.   Starr,   1   Conn.  §§344.3-3450. 

739 


§  941.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

even  that ;  that  the  two  assumed,  as  joint  grantors,  to  convey  the 
land ;  that  the  husband  delivered  the  possession  to  the  purchaser, 
which  was  the  only  estate  which  either  grantor  had,  or  which 
they  conld  convey  ;  and  that  the  husband  shared  in  the  purchase- 
money  paid  for  the  grant.  On  this  state  of  facts  it  was  held 
that  the  husband  was  not  a  stranger  to  the  title,  and  merely  an 
independent  covenantor  ;  that  his  possession  was  an  estate  in  the 
land  which  his  deed  transferred  to  the  purchaser;  and  that  to 
this  his  covenant  of  warranty  attached,  and  henceforth  ran  with  the 
land.i  Mr.  Justice  Finch,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  Court 
of  Appeals  of  New  York  to  this  effect,  said:  "  It  is  certainly  the 
law  of  this  State  that  one  in  possession  of  land  merely,  without 
other  actual  title,  has  an  estate  in  the  land  which  he  may  transfer 
to  a  grantee,  and  which  is  sufficient  to  carry  with  it  his  covenant  of 
warranty  down  the  line  of  succession.^  .  .  .  We  have  here,  then, 
a  situation  in  which  the  defendant  was  in  possession  of  land,  and 
so  had  an  estate  in  it ;  where  he  assumed  to  transfer  it  as  grantor 
by  deed ;  where  he  transferred  his  possession  to  the  grantee ; 
where  he  received  in  exchange  some  part  or  the  whole  of  the 
consideration  of  the  grant;  where  his  wife,  who  joined  in  the 
deed,  had  no  better  title  than  his,  whatever  he  may  have  thought 
about  it ;  where  he  meant  and  intended  that  his  warranty 
should  run  to  assigns,  and  expressed  that  intention  on  the  face 
of  his  covenant.  It  is  impossible,  on  such  a  state  of  facts,  to 
deem  him  a  stranger  to  the  title,  and  merely  an  independent 
covenantox'." 

941.  But,  the  same  case  coming  again  before  the  court,  it 
was  finally  held  that  the  legal  possession  which  will  carry 
the  covenants  must  be  founded  upon  a  valid  right  or  interest 
in  the  nature  of  property.  Therefore  it  was  held  that  where  a 
husband  and  wife  live  on  her  land,  and  he  does  such  acts  merely 
as  grow  out  of  the  marital  relations,  and  which  must  exist  in 
every  case  where  a  husband  lives  with  his  wife  in  her  home  on 
her  land,  he  does  not  have  such  possession  as  will  constitute  a 
covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment,  contained  in  their  deed  of  such 
land,  a  covenant   by  him  running  with  the  land  which  inures  to 

1  Mygatt  v.  Coe,  142  N.  Y.  78,  36.N.  E.  continued    the    learned    judge,   "  T  have 

■Rep.  870.  found  no  case  in  this  State  to  the  con- 

-  That  was  explicitly  held    in  Bcddoe  trary,  and  no  reason  to  doubt  the  sound- 

V.  Wadsworth,  21  Wend.  120,  124;  "  aud,"  ness  of  the  doctrine." 

740 


COVENANTS  THAT  RUN  WITH  THE  LAND.       [§  9i2. 

the  covenantee's  grantee.^  "  The  presumption  is,"  say  the  court, 
"that  the  legal  possession  follows  the  ownership  of  the  land. 
Hence  it  was  necessary  to  show  that  the  wife,  by  some  act  or 
agreement  on  her  part,  express  or  implied,  had  surrendered  to 
the  husband  some  interest  in  the  property  or  dominion  over  it 
which  necessarily  took  from  her  at  least  some  right  or  incident 
ordinarily  pertaining  to  the  absolute  ownership  of  real  estate. 
The  husband  could  acquire  no  estate  capable  of  sale  or  convey- 
ance, not  even  the  lowest  known  to  the  law,  without  abridging  to 
the  same  extent  that  of  the  wife.  Whatever  interest  he  gained 
she  must  have  lost.  ...  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  how  two  per- 
sons can  have  such  a  possession  of  the  same  thing  at  the  same 
time.  The  wife  in  this  case  certainly  acquired  such  a  possession 
upon  the  conveyance  to  her,  and  there  was  no  evidence  to  war- 
rant the  conclusion  that  she  had  in  any  way  transferred  it  to 
the  husband." 

942.  The  covenant  of  a  stranger  to  a  title  does  not  run 
with  the  land.^  A  covenant  will  not  run  with  the  land  unless 
there  is  either  mutuality  or  succession  of  interest.  Privity  of 
contract  is  sufficient  between  the  immediate  parties,  but  there 
must  be  privity  of  estate  to  carry  the  benefit  of  the  covenant  to 
subsequent  owners  of  the  property  to  which  the  covenant  relates. 
Lord  Kenyon,  in  a  leading  case,  said  :  "  It  is  not  sufficient  that  a 
covenant  is  concerning  the  land,  but  in  order  to  make  it  run  with 
the  land  there  must  be  a  privity  of  estate  between  the  covenant- 
ing parties."-^     In  a  recent  case  in  New  York,  when  it  was  for 

1  Mygatt  t).  Coe,  147  N.  Y.  456,42  N.  406;    the   dissenting   opinion  in    Mypatt 

E.   Rep.   17,  Haight  and  Finch,  JJ.,  dis-  v.  Coe,   124  N.  Y.  212,  26  N.  E.  Rep. 

seuting.  611. 

-  riatt,   Gov.  461;    Bally   v.   Wells,  .3  In  Lydiik  r.  Bait.  &  0.  R.  Co.  17  W.  Va. 

Wils.  25;  Hurd  v.  Curtis,  19  Pick.  459;  427,   the  court   refers   to  tlie   conflicting 

Slater  I'.  Rawson,  1  Mete.  4.50;  Mygattv.  views  on  the  question  as  to  whether  the 

Coe,  124   N.  Y.   212,26   N.    K.    Rep.  611,  covenant  of  a  stranger  runs  with  the  laud, 

142  N.  Y.  78,  36  N.   E.   Rep.  870,  147  N.  and    say.s  :    "It  is  not   necessary   in    this 

Y.  456,42  N.  E.   Rep.    17;  Durnhcrr  y.  case  to  determine  which  of   these  views 

Rau,  135  N.  Y.  219,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  49.  is  sound  ;  for,  in  the  case  before  us,  the 

Opposed  to  these  authorities  are  :  Paken-  requisite  privity  of  estate  exists." 
ham's  Ca.se  (Y.  B.  42  Edw.  III.  3),  com-         »  Webb  v.  Russell,  3  Term  R.  393,  af- 

monly  known  as  the  "  Prior  and  Convent  firmed  in  the  Exchequer  Chninber,  1  II. 

Case,"  and  Judge  Hare's  learned  note  to  Black.  563,  approved  in  Kep;  ell  v.  Bai- 

Spencer's  Case,  5  Coke,  16,  in  thcSthedi-  ley,  2   Mylne  &   K.  517,  543,  where  the 

tion   of  Smith's  Leading  Cases,  vol.  i.  p.  cases  were  reviewed  by  Brougham,  Lord 

192;  Dickinson  l:  Hoomes,  8  Gratt.  353,  Chancellor,  and  again  it  was  dircftly  held 

741 


§  943.] 


COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 


the  third  time  before  the  Court  of  A})peals  for  review,  O'Brien,  J., 
for  the  court  said:^  "The  distinction  between  personal  covenants 
in  deeds  and  those  which  run  with  the  bind  was  made  at  a  time 
when,  by  the  common  law,  clioses  in  action  were  not  assignable, 
and  this  circumstance,  doubtless,  was  an  element  in  the  process 
of  reasoning  through  which  the  rule  was  established.  Since 
choses  in  action  are  now  assignable,  it  may  well  be  doubted 
whether  the  reason  of  the  rule  still  exists  in  all  its  force.  When 
a  person  who  is  a  stranger  to  the  title  consents  to  become  a 
party  to  the  conveyance  for  the  benefit  of  the  land,  and  in 
order  to  enhance  the  value  of  the  estate  conveyed,  it  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  suggest  arguments,  based  upon  reason  and  justice,  for 
holding  him  to  his  stipulation  in  favor  of  a  remote  as  well 
as  an  immediate  grantee.  But  the  law  for  this  case,  at  least, 
seems  to  be  settled  otherwise,  and,  doubtless,  according  to  the 
weight  of  authority." 

VII.  Measure  of  Damages  on  Covenant  for  Seisin. 
943.  The  measure  of  damages  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant 
of  seisin,  when  no  interest  has  passed,  or  even  possession,  is 
the  consideration  paid  with  interest.^     This,  as  between  the  par- 


that  a  covenant  between  a  covenantor  and 
a  covenantee,  between  whom  there  was 
no  privity  in  estate,  does  not  run  with 
the  land.  See  I'rofessnr  Washburn's 
learned  treatise,  3  Washb.  Real  Property, 
5th  ed.  p.  501. 

1  Myjratt  V.  Coe,  147  N.  Y.  4.56,  42  N. 
E.  Rep.  17. 

'^  Alabama  :  Bibb  v.  Freeman,  59  Ala. 
612  ;  Copeland  v.  McAdory,  100  Ala.  553, 
13  So.  Rep.  545.  Arkansas  :  Logan  v. 
Moulder,  1  Ark.  313,  33  Am.  Dec.  338. 
California,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota  : 
The  detriment  caused  by  the  breach  of  a 
covenant  of  seisin,  of  right  to  convey,  of 
warranty,  or  of  quiet  enjoyment,  in  a 
grant  of  an  estate  in  real  property,  is 
deemed  to  be:  1.  The  price  paid  to  the 
grantor,  or,  if  the  breach  is  partial  only, 


derived  no  benefit  from  the  property,  not 
exceeding  five  years ;  3.  Any  expenses 
properly  incurred  by  the  covenantee  in 
defending  his  possession.  California: 
Civ.  Code,  §  3304.  North  Dakota:  R. 
Codes  1 895,  §  4981 .  South  Dakota :  Comp. 
Laws  1887,  §  4584.  Connecticut:  Hart- 
ford &  Salisbury  Ore  Co.  v.  Miller,  41 
Conn.  112;  Sterling  v.  Peet,  14  Conn. 
245.  Illinois:  Home  u.  Walton,  117  III. 
130;  King  v.  Gilson,  32  111.  348,  83  Am. 
Dec.  269  ;  Weber  v.  Anderson,  73  111.  439. 
Indiana:  Rhea  v.  Swain,  122  Ind.  272; 
Wilson  V.  Peelle,  78  Ind.  384;  Wright 
V.  Nipple,  92  Ind.  310.  Iowa:  Zent  v. 
Picken,  54  Iowa,  535  ;  Brandt  v.  Foster,  5 
Iowa,  287  ;  Norman  v.  Winch.  65  Iowa, 
263.  Kentucky  :  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v. 
South  Park  Residence  Co.  94  Kv.  271,  22 


such  proportion  of  the  price  as  the  value  S.  W.   Rep.  314;  Cosby  v.  West,  2  Bibb, 

of  the  property  affected  by  the  breach  bore  568  ;  Thompson  v.  Jones,  11  Bush,  353  ; 

at  the  time  of  the  grant  to  the  value  of  Robertson  t7.  Lemon,  2  Bush,  301.   Maine: 

the  whole  property;    2.  Interest  thereon  Baxter  r.  Brndt)ury,  20  Me.  260,  37  Am. 

for  the  time   during   which   the   grantee  Dec.  49 ;   Montgomery  v.  Reed,  69  Me. 

742 


MEASURE   OF   DAMAGES    ON   COVENANT    FOR   SEISIN.       [§  943. 

ties,  is  the  agreed  value  of  the  land,  or,  in  other  words,  the  con- 
sideration of  the  conveyance.  The  rule  is  based  upon  the  suppo- 
sition that  the  grantee  took  nothing  by  the  conveyance,  for  the 
reason  that  the  grantor  had  no  interest  to  convey.  The  rule  is, 
therefore,  limited  to  cases  where  there  has  been  a  total  breach  of 
the  covenant,  and  no  interest  has  passed  to  the  grantee  by  the 
conveyance.  It  is  limited  to  cases  where  no  semblance  of  title 
or  benefit  whatever  has  passed ;  w^here  the  grantee  has  derived 
no  advantage  whatever  from  it,  and  can  derive  none  without  a 
wrongful  entry  upon  the  estate  of  another.  When,  therefore, 
the  grantee  has  recovered  damages  for  a  complete  breach  of  the 
covenant,  and  this  fact  appears  of  record  in  the  suit,  the  grantor 
is  entitled  to  reenter,  and  the  grantee  cannot  set  up  the  convey- 
ance by  way  of  estoppel. 

Full  damages,  measured  by  the  consideration  paid  and  interest, 
cannot  be  recovered,  in  case  the  grantee  has  entered  into  and  holds 
possession,  until  there  has  been  an  eviction  by  title  paramount, 
either  actual  or  constructive. ^ 


510  ;  Stubbs  v.  Page,  2  Me.  378.  Massa- 
chusetts :  Bickford  v.  Page,  2  Mass.  4.'>5  : 
Sumner  v.  Williams,  8  Mass.  162  ;  Harris 
V.  Newell,  8  ]Mass.  262  ;  Marston  v.  Hobbs, 
2  Mass.  4.3.3,  43  Am.  Dec.  611  ;  Chapel  v. 
Bull,  17  Mass.  213;  Smith  v.  Strong-,  14 
Pick.  128  ;  Jenkins  v.  Hopkins,  8  Pick. 
346;  Whiting  v.  Dewey,  15  Pick.  428; 
Hodges  V.  Thayer,  110  Mass.  286.  Min- 
nesota :  Kimball  v.  Bryant,  2,5  Minn.  496. 
Mississippi :  Herndon  r.  Harrisson,  34 
Miss.  486,  69  Am.  Dec.  399;  Phipps  v. 
Tarpley,  31  Miss.  433.  Missouri :  Murphy 
V.  Price,  48  Mo.  247  ;  Lawless  v.  Collier, 
19  Mo.  480  ;  Martin  v.  Long,  3  Mo.  391  ; 
St.  Louis  V.  Bissell,  46  Mo.  157.  New 
HampsMre :  Morse  v.  Shattuck,  4  N.  II. 
229,  17  Am.  Dec.  419 ;  Nutting  v.  Herbert, 
35  N.  II.  120,  127  ;  Willson  v.  Willson,  25 
N.  H.  229,  57  Am.  Dec.  320;  Foster  v. 
Thompson,  41  N.  IT.  373.  New  York  : 
Staats  I".  Ten  Evck,  3  Caines,  111,2  Am. 
Dec.  254  ;  Caulkins  v.  Harris,  9  Johns. 
324;  Pitcher  v.  Livingston,  4  Johns.  1,  4 
Am.  Dec.  229.  North  Carolina  :  Price  v. 
Deal,  90  N.  C.  290  ;  Wilson  r.  Porbe-S  2 
Dev.  30 ;  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Glenn,  68  N. 


C.  35.  North  Dakota  :  Bowne  v.  Wolcott, 
1  N.  Dak.  415,  497,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  336, 
426.  Ohio:  Clark  v.  Parr,  14  Ohio,  118, 
45  Am.  Dec.  529;  Backus  v.  McCoy,  3 
Ohio,  211,  17  Am.  Dec.  585.  Oregon: 
Stark  V.  Olney,  3  Orcg.  88.  Pennsylvania : 
Cox  V.  Henry,  32  Pa.  St.  18;  Weiting 
V.  Nissley,  13  Pa.  St.  650.  Tennessee : 
Kincaid  v.  Brittain,  5  Sneed,  119;  Park 
V.  Cheek,  4  Cald.  20.  Vermont :  Blake  v. 
Burnham,  29  Vt.  437.  Wisconsin :  Mc- 
Lennan V.  Prentice,  85  Wis.  427,  55  N. 
W.  Kep.  764 ;  Daggett  v.  Keas,  79  Wis. 
60,  48  N.  W.  Kep.  127  ;  Mecklem  v. 
Blake,  22  Wis.  495,  99  Am.  Dec.  68 ; 
Messer  v.  Oestreicb,  52  Wis.  684,  10  N. 
W.  Rep.  6 ;  Conrad  v.  Trustees,  64  Wis. 
258,  25  N.  W.  Rep.  24 ;  Semple  v.  Whor- 
ton,  68  Wis.  626,  32  N.  W.  Rep.  690; 
Mclnnis  v.  Lyman,  62  Wis.  191,  22  N. 
W.  Rep.  405. 

J  McLennan  v.  Prentice,  85  Wis.  427, 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  764 ;  Mecklem  v.  Blake,  22 
Wis.  495,  99  Am.  Dec.  68 ;  Ilorton  v. 
Arnold,  18  Wis.  212;  Taft  v.  Kessel,  16 
Wis.  273  ;  Hill  v.  Butler,  6  Ohio  St.  207 ; 
Small  V.  Reeves,  14  Ind.  163. 

743 


§  •^•^^•] 


COVENANTS   FOR    TITLE. 


This  is  the  general  rule  ot  damages  for  a  breach  of  the  cove- 
nants of  warranty  and  quiet  enjoyment,  and  the  covenant  against 
incumbrances,  when  the  breach  is  such  as  to  wholly  defeat  the 
estate  conveyed,  though  there  are  exceptions,  which  will  be  noted 
in  the  divisions  of  this  chapter  in  which  the  rules  of  damages  for 
breaches  of  those  covenants  are  particularly  considered.^ 

944.  For  a  breach  of  any  covenant,  by  reason  of  a  failure 
of  the  title  to  a  part  of  the  land  conveyed,  the  measure  of 
damages,  when  determined  by  the  consideration  paid,  is  such 
fractional  part  of  the  whole  consideration  as  the  value,  at  the 
time  of  the  purchase,  of  the  part  to  which  the  title  failed  bears 
to  the  whole,  and  interest  thereon  during  the  time  the  grantee 
has  been  deprived  of  the  use  of  the  part  to  which  the  title  failed, 
but  not  exceeding  six  years.^     The  rule  is  the  same  whether  the 


1  See  divisions  VIII.  and  IX. 

2  Griffin  v.  Reynolds,  17  How.  609.   Illi- 
nois :  Major  v.   Dunnavant,   25  111.   262 ; 
Clapp  r.  Herdman,  25  111.  App.  509  ;  Tone 
V.  Wilson,  81   111.  529 ;  Weber  v.  Ander- 
son, 73  111.  439 ;   Wadhams  v.  Innes,  4  111. 
App.  642.     Indiana:   Scheible  v.  Slagle, 
89  Ind.  323  ;  Hoot  v.  Spade,  20  Ind.  326  ; 
Wright  V.  Nipple,  92  Ind.  310.      Iowa: 
Mischke  v.  Baiighn,  52  Iowa,  528 ;  Kos- 
tendader  v.  Pierce,  37  Iowa,  645,  41  Iowa, 
204;    McDunn  v.  Des  Moines,  39  Iowa, 
286.     Kentucky  :  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v. 
South  Park  Residence  Co.  94  Ky.  271,  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  314 ;  Hunt  v.  Orwig,  17  B. 
Mon.    73.     Maine :    Blanchard  v.  Hoxie, 
34  Me.  376 ;  Blanchard  v.   Blanchard,  48 
Me.    174.     Massachusetts:    If   there  has 
been  an  eviction,  the  value  of  the  land  at 
the  time  of  the  eviction  is  the  measure. 
Boyle  V.  Edwards,  114  Mass.  373  ;  Harlow 
V.  Thomas,  15  Pick.  66  ;  Lucas  ;;.  Wilcox, 
135  Mass.  77  ;  Cornell  v.  Jack.son,  3  Cush. 
506;    Byrnes   v.  Rich,  5  Gray,   518,   per 
Shaw,  C.J.     Michigan:  Long  v.  Sinclair, 
40  Mich.  569.    New  Hampshire :  Winni- 
piseogee  Paper  Co.  v.  Eaton,  65  N.  H.  13, 
18  Atl.  Rep.   171 ;  Ela  v.  Card,  2  N.  H. 
175,9  Am.  Dec.  46;  Partridge  v.  Hatch, 
18  N.  H.  494 ;  Parker  v.  Brown,  15  N.  H. 
176.     New  York:  Hymes  v.  Esty,  133  N. 
Y.  342,  347,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  105  ;  Hymes  v. 
Van  Cleef,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  341  ;  Hunt  v. 

744 


Raplee,  44  Hun,  149  ;  Staats  v.  Ten  Eyck, 
3  Caines,  111,  2  Am.  Dec.  254;  Guthrie  v. 
Pugsley,  12  Johns.  126  ;  Morris  ?;.  Phelps, 
5  Johns.  49,  4  Am.  Dec.  323 ;  Eiirniss  v. . 
Ferguson,  15  N.  Y.  437.  North  Carolina : 
Price  V.  Deal,  90  N.  C.  290.  Ohio :  Xyce 
V.  Obertz,  17  Ohio,  71.  Oregon  :  Stark  v. 
Olney,  3  Orcg.  88.  Pennsylvania :  Boaup- 
land  V.  McKeen,  28  Pa.  St.  124.  Rhode 
Island :  Porter  v.  Bradley,  7  R.  I.  538. 
South  Carolina:  Aiken  v.  McDonald  (S. 
C),  20  S.  E.  Rpp.  796;  Hunt  v.  Nolen 
(S.  C),  24  S.  E.  Rep.  310 ;  Earle  v.  Mid- 
dletou,  Che\es,  127  ;  Wallace  v.  Talbot,  1 
McCord,  466;  Ciawford  v.  Crawford,  1 
Bailey,  128;  Lewis  v.  Lewis,  5  Rich.  12; 
Jeter  v.  Glenn,  9  Rich.  374.  Tennessee: 
Whitzmau  v.  Hirsh,  87  Tenn.  513  ;  Mette 
V.  Dow,  9  Lea,  93  ;  Moses  v.  Wallace,  7 
Lea,  413.  Texas :  Kecsey  ".  Old,  82  Tex. 
22,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  928;  White  v.  Hollny, 
3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  590,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  831  ; 
Saunders  v.  Flaniken,  77  Tex.  662,  14  S. 
W.  Rep.  236  ;  Weeks  v.  Barton  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  31  S.  W.  Rep.  1071  ;  Gass  v.  San- 
ger (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W.  Rep.  502. 
Vermont :  Downer  v.  Smith,  38  Vt.  464. 
Virginia  :  Conrad  v.  Effinger,  87  Va.  59, 12 
S.  E.  Rep.  2 ;  Clarke  «.  Hardgrove,  7  Gratt. 
.399;  Click  v.  Green,  77  Va.  827,  835; 
Threlkeld  v.  Eitzhugh,  2  Leiirh,  451 .  West 
Virginia  :  Butcher  v.  Peterson,  26  W.  Va. 
447.    Wisconsin  :  McLennan  v.  Prentice, 


MEASURE    OF   DAMAGES   ON   COVENANT   FOR   SEISIN.       [§  945. 

covenant  be  for  seisin,  against  incumbrances,  or  for  warranty, 
except  in  the  States  in  which  the  rule  prevails  that  in  actions 
for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  warranty  the  measure  of  damages 
is  the  value  of  the  land  at  the  time  of  eviction. 

If  the  land  is  all  of  the  same  general  character  and  quality, 
and  there  is  failure  of  title  to  a  part,  as  where  the  land  is  situated 
in  an  open  prairie  country,  presumably,  in  the  absence  of  proof 
to  the  contrary,  the  value  of  each  acre  is  its  fro  rata  part  of  the 
entire  contract  price. ^ 

945.  If  separate  prices  were  agreed  upon  for  several  tracts 
conveyed,  on  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  seisin  as  to  one  tract 
the  rule  of  damages  is  the  sum  paid  for  that  tract.^  If  a  distinct 
parcel  of  land  was  inserted  with  others  by  mistake,  and  nothing 
was  paid  for  this  parcel,  and  it  was  not  considered  by  either 
party  as  included  in  the  purchase,  the  damages  for  a  breach  of 
the  covenant  of  seisin  as  to  this  parcel  should  be  nominal  only.^ 
Parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  show  such  mistake,  and  the 
knowledge  of  the  purchaser  that  such  parcel  belonged  to  another 
and  was  not  intended  or  understood  to  be  included  in  the  convey- 
ance, for  such  evidence  cannot  be  received  to  vary  or  contradict 
a  deed ;  but  such  evidence  is  admissible,  on  the  question  of  dam- 
ages, to  show  the  consideration  paid  for  the  parcel  for  which  a 
breach  of  the  covenant  of  seisin  is  claimed,  or  to  show  that  there 
was  no  consideration  for  such  parcel.* 

Where  there  is  a  failure  of  title  as  to  one  of  several  parcels  of 
land  of  different  values  sold  and  conveyed  by  one  deed,  the  values 
of  the  different  paicels  not  having  been  determined  by  the  parties, 
the  measure  of  damages  is  the  value  of  such  parcel,  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  relation  of  its  value  to  the  remainder  of  the  land 
at  the  time  of  sale,  assuming  the  price  agreed  upon  by  the  par- 
ties as  the  value  of  the  whole,  with  interest  for  such  time  as  the 
purchaser  has  been  deprived  of,  or  is  accountabU;  for,  the  mesne 
profits.'' 

85  Wis.  427,  55  N.  W.  Kep.  764  ;  Messer  per  Morton,  J. ;  (".rant  i-.  Hill  (Tex.  Civ. 

V.  Oestreich,  52  Wis.  684,  696,  10  N.  W.  App.),  -SO  S.  W.  Hep.  952. 

Rep.  6 ;  Scmple  v.  Whorton,  68  Wis.  626,  "  Lelaud  c.  Stone,  10  Mass.  459  ;  Barns 

32  N.  W.  Rep.  690;  Larson  v.  Cook,  85  v.  Learned,  5  N.  11.  264. 

Wis.  564,  55  N.  W.  Hep.  703.  ■»  Nntting  v.  llerijert,  .•(5  N.  II.  120. 

1  Gass  V.  Sanger  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  ^'  Grillin  v.  Reynolds,  17  IIow.  609; 
S.  W.  Kep.  502.  Grant  v.  Hill  (Tex.  Civ.  Apj).),  3ii  S.  W. 

2  Harlow  i-.   Tliomus,   15   Pick.  66,70,  Rep.   952;  Raines  v.   Cidlowiiv,   27  Tex. 

745 


§§  946.  947.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

946.  The  damages  for  a  breach  of  this  covenant  are  limited 
to  the  actual  damages  sustained,  and,  if  the  grantee  has  taken 
and  retained  some  interest  under  the  deed,  the  vakie  of  this  inter- 
est must  be  deducted  from  the  purchase-price  in  any  recovery  for 
the  breach. 1  It  does  not  matter  whether  this  interest  be  direct 
or  indirect,  or  whether  it  accrues  by  force  of  the  deed  alone,  or 
by  its  cooperation  -witli  other  instruments  or  other  circumstances, 
the  vahie  of  it  must  be  accounted  for  in  estimating-  the  dam- 
ages. 

947.  The  price  of  the  land  recoverable  for  a  breach  of  this 
covenant  is  the  price  the  grantor  received.  Therefore,  in  case 
the  person  to  whom  he  has  contracted  to  sell,  instead  of  receiving 
a  conveyance,  contracts  to  sell  to  a  third  person,  and  the  grantor  at 
the  request  of  his  vendee  conveys  directly  to  such  third  person 
by  deed  with  general  covenant  of  seisin,  the  amount  of  recovery 
against  the  grantor  for  breach  of  such  covenant  is  limited  to  the 
consideration  received  by  him,  with  interest  thereon.^ 

Where  land  is  conveyed  to  a  trustee,  who  pays  nothing  for  it, 
and  he  afterwards  in  execution  of  his  trust  conveys,  with  cove- 
nants of  warranty,  to  a  third  person,  to  whom  his  grantor  has 
sold  it,  he  thereby  executes  his  grantor's  contract,  and  the  consid- 
eration which  fixes  the  limit  of  his  liability  on  his  covenant  is 
the  price  paid  by  the  third  person  to  his  grantor.^ 

678;  Weeks  v.  Barton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  Proctor,  65  Mo.  41  ;  Smith  v.  Hughes,  50 

31  S.  W.  Eep.  1071  ;  White  v.  Holley,  3  Wis.  620,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  653  ;  Hencke  v. 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  590,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  831  ;  Johnson,  62  Iowa,  555,  17  N.  W.  Rep. 
Gass  V.  Sanger  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  766;  Huntsman  v.  Hendricks,  44  Minn. 
W.  Rep.  502;  Mann  v.  Matthews,  82  Tex.  423,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  910;  Kimball  v.  Bry- 
98,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  927;  Cornell  v.  Jack-  ant,  25  Minn.  496;  Ogden  v.  Ball,  38 
son,  3  Cush.  506 ;    Winnipiseogee  Paper  Minn.  237,  36  N.  Rep.  344. 

Co.  V.  Eaton,  65  N.  H.  13,18  Atl.  Rep.  In  general,  on  the  subject  of  damages  for 

171  ;  Partridge  v.  Hatch,  18  N.  H.  494  ;  breaches  of  the  several  covenants,  see  the 

Furniss  r.  Ferguson,  15  N.  Y.  437  ;  Mor-  excellent  treatises,  Sedgwick  on  Damages, 

ris  V.  Phelps,  5  Johns.  49;  Hymes  v.  Van  and  Sutherland  on  Damages,  as  well  as 

Cleef,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  341  ;  Beaupland  v.  Rawle  on  Covenants,  referred  to  in  other 

McKeen,   28  Pa.    St.   124,   70  Am.  Dec.  parts  of  this  chapter.     It  is  possible  here 

115.  to  state  only  the  more  general  and  impor- 

1  Hartford  &  S.  Ore  Co.  v.   Miller,  41  tant  rules  as  to  damages. 

Conn.  112;  Baxter  v.  Bradbury,  20  Me.  -  Bowne  v.  Wolcott,  1  N.  Dak.  497,  48 

260,  264,  37  Am.  Dec.  49 ;  King  v.  Gilson,  N.  W.  Rep.  426  ;  Barnett  v.  Hughey,  54 

32  111.  348;  Toner.  Wilson,  81  III.  529;  Ark.  195,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  464;  Byrnes  v. 
Wise  V.  Hyatt,  68  Miss.  714,  10  So.  Rep.  Rich,  5  Gray,  518. 

37;  Downer  i-.  Smith,  38  Vt.  464 ;  Law-  3  Barnett  v.  Hughey,  54  Ark.  195,  15 
less  v.  Collier,  19  Mo.  480;    Cochrell  v.     S.  AY.  Rep.  464. 

746 


MEASURE   OF   DAMAGES    ON    COVENANT    FOR    SEISIN.         [§  948. 


948.  For  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  damages,  the 
true  consideration  may  be  shown  by  parol  evidence  in  contra- 
diction of  the  statement  of  the  consideration  contained  in  the 
deed.i  Such  evidence  may  have  the  effect  of  increasing  the  dam- 
ages by  showing  that  the  actual  consideration  was  greater  than 
that  expressed  in  the  deed,  or  may  have  the  effect  of  diminishing 
the  damages  by  showing  that  the  actual  consideration  was  less 
than  that  expressed.  The  recital  of  the  consideration  paid  is  at 
most  only  jyrijna  facie  evidence  of  the  amount ;  it  is  open  to 
explanation  and  contradiction,  not  to  defeat  the  deed,  but  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  the  true  consideration.  As  to  third  persons, 
such  recital  is  not  even  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  consideration 
actually  paid.^ 

If  no  consideration  was  actually  paid  by  the  grantee  to  the 
grantor,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  value  of  the  land,  with 
interest  from  the  date  of  the  deed.'^ 

This  and  the  following  sections,  relating  to  evidence  as  to  the 
amount  of  the  consideration  actually  paid,  are  applicable  in  deter- 
mining the   measure  of  damages  for  breaches  of  the  covenants 


1  Patrick  v.  Leach,  1  McCrary,  250. 
Connecticut :  Belden  v.  Seymour,  8  Conn. 
304,21  Am.  Dec.  661.  Georgia:  Martin 
V.  Gordon,  24  Ga.  533  ;  Fields  v.  Willing- 
ham,  49  Ga.  344.  Illinois :  Howell  v. 
Moores,  127  111.  67,  19  N.  E.  Kep.  863. 
Indiana:  Gavin  v.  Buckles,  41  lud.  528. 
Iowa  :  Wachendorf  n.  Lancaster,  66  Iowa, 
458,  23  N.  W.  Rep.  922  ;  Williamson  v. 
Test,  24  Iowa,  138;  Ilallam  v.  Todhnnter, 
24  Iowa,  166  ;  Bloom  v.  Wolfe,  50  Iowa, 
286  ;  Blood  v.  Wilkins,  43  Iowa,  565. 
Kentucky :  Engleman  v.  Craig,  2  Bush, 
424 ;  Louisville,  St.  L.  &  T.  By.  Co.  v. 
Neafus  (Ky.),  18  S.  W.  Kep.  1030.  Maine : 
Good.speed  r.  Fuller,  46  Me.  141,  71  Am. 
Dec.  572  ;  Gushing  v.  Rice,  46  Me.  303, 
71  Am.  Dec.  579.  Massachusetts  :  Hodges 
V.  Thayer,  110  Mas';.  2R6  ;  Byrnes  r.  Rich, 
5  Grav,  518;  Harlow  ;•.  Thomas,  15  Pick. 
66  ;  Estabrook  v.  Smith,  6  Gray,  570,  578, 
66  Am.  Dec.  443 ;  Dexter  r.  Manley,  4 
Cush.  14,  26  ;  Smith  v.  Strong,  14  Pick.  128. 
Michigan:  Cook  ?•.  Curtis,  68  Mich.  611, 
36  N.  W.  Rep.  692.  Minnesota :  Devine 
V.  Lewis,  38  Minn.  24,35  N.  W.  Rep.  711. 


Mississippi :  Moore  v.  McKie,  5  Sm.  «Sb 
M.  238.  Missouri :  Lambert  v.  Estes,  99 
Mo.  604,  608,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  284;  Bobb 
V.  Bobb,  89  Mo.  411,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  511  ; 
Henderson  v.  Henderson,  13  Mo.  151  ; 
Bircher  v.  Watkius,  13  IMo.  521 ;  Guinotte 
V.  Chouteau,  34  Mo.  154.  New  Hamp- 
shire :  Nutting  v.  Herbert,  35  N.  11.  120, 
37  N.  H.  346;  Morse  v.  Shattuck,  4  N.  H. 
229,  17  Am.  Dec.  419.  New  York  :  Bing- 
ham V.  Weiderwax,  1  N.  Y.  509  ;  McCrea 
r.  Purmort,  16  Wend.  460,  30  Am.  Dec. 
1 03.  Oregon  :  Stark  i\  Olncy,  3  Oreg.  88. 
Pennsylvania :  Cox  r.  Henry,  32  Pa.  St. 
18.  South  Carolina:  Garrett  v.  Stuart,  1 
McCord,  514.  Tennessee:  Colcote  r.  El- 
kin  (Tenn.),  15  S.  W.  Rep.  85;  Perry  v. 
Central  So.  R.  Co.  5  Coldw.  138.  Wiscon- 
sin :  Semple  v.  Whorton,  68  Wis.  626,  637, 
32  N.  W.  Rep.  690. 

2  Allen  V.  Kennedy,  91  Mo.  324,  2  S. 
W.  Rep.  142. 

8  Staples  V.  Dean,  114  Mass.  125; 
Hodges  V.  Thayer,  110  Mass.  286  ;  Byrnes 
V.  Rich,  5  Gray,  518;  Smith  v.  Strong.  14 
Pick.  128. 

747 


§§  949,  950.] 


COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 


against  inciiuibrauces  and  of  warranty,  where  the  general  rule  of 
ilumages  is  the  consideration  paid. 

949.  If  the  consideration  was  not  paid  in  money,  but  in 
goods,  bonds,  or  other  things  not  money,  the  value  of  the  thing 
received  is  the  measure  of  damages.  Thus,  in  a  suit  against  a 
raihoad  company  for  a  breach  of  warranty  in  a  conveyance  of 
land,  the  company  may  show  that  the  consideration  was  paid  in 
unmatured  bonds  of  the  companj'^,  and  that  they  were  worth  less 
than  their  face  vakie.^ 

950.  The  rule  that  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  consid- 
eration paid  applies,  though  the  grantor  did  not  receive  the 
entire  consideration.  Thus,  where  the  owner  of  land  jjlaced  it 
with  an  agent  for  sale,  with  the  agreement  that  the  agent  might 
retain  as  his  commission  whatever  should  be  received  for  the  land 
over  a  certain  amount,  and  to  facilitate  the  sale  the  owner  con- 
veyed the  land  to  a  trustee  to  convey  to  such  persons  as  the  agent 
might  sell  to,  the  deed  containing  a  covenant  of  warranty,  it  was 


1  Montgomery  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
67  Fed.  Rep.  445.  Bellin-er,  J.,  said :  "  I 
am  of  opinion  that  the  fact  of  payment  in 
bonds  not  yet  due,  or  actually  worth  less 
than  par,  may  be  alleged  as  showing  the 
damage  sustained  by  reason  of  the  failure 
of  title  complained  of.  It  is  argued  that, 
since  the  obligation  of  the  company  is  to 
pay  these  bonds  at  their  face,  the  company 
will  not  be  permitted  to  say  that,  when  it 
took  them  in  payment  for  land,  it  received 
less  in  money  value  than  their  par  value. 
But  if  such  bonds  are  not  yet  due,  or  are 
subject  to  the  priority  of  bonds  of  another 
series,  or  are  only  a  part  of  the  bonds  of 
one  series,  a  recovery  by  plaintiff  of  dam- 
ages to  the  amount  of  their  par  value  has 
the  effect  to  compel  their  payment  before 
maturity,  or  in  disregard  of  tlie  rights  of 
other  lien-holders.  If  these  bonds  were  at 
the  time  actually  worth  but  ten  per  cent, 
of  their  face,  it  was  upon  the  assumption 
that  the  assets  of  the  company,  if  applied 
in  payment  of  its  obligations  in  the  order 
in  which  such  obligations  were  entitled  to 


It  follows  that  the  bondholders  of  the 
comi)any  cannot  compel  the  present  pay- 
ment in  full  of  bonds  not  yet  matured,  or 
that  are  subsequent  in  order  of  payment, 
or  that  belong  to  a  series  for  the  full  pay- 
ment of  which  the  assets  of  the  company 
are  inadequate.  The  officers  of  the  com- 
pany have  no  right  to  pay  off  a  part  of 
such  bonds  at  their  face,  to  the  injury  of 
the  rights  of  other  bondholders,  and  what 
they  cannot  do  directly  they  cannot  do  in- 
directly. And  yet  this  is  what  will  hap- 
pen if  the  plaintiff,  having  bought  lands 
with  these  bonds,  can  now  recover  as  dam- 
ages their  jjar  value,  with  interest,  upon 
the  company's  covenant  of  warranty  of 
title.  The  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  com- 
pensation. It  is  only  to  this  extent  that 
damages  are  allowed,  and  the  measure  of 
his  damages  is  the  property  wliich  he  ex- 
changed for  the  land  in  question  with  its 
increment,  or  its  value  in  money,  with 
interest."  Also  see  IIod;ics  v.  Thayer, 
110  Mass.  286;  Cook  v.  Curtis,  68  Mich. 
611,  36  N.  W.  Rep.  692;  Byrnes  v.  Rich, 


be  discharged,  would  only  pay  that  much.  5  Gray,  .518  ;  Lacey  v.  Marnan,  37  Ind. 

The  debts  of  the  company  are  the  debts  168;  Williamson  v.   Test,  24  Iowa,  138; 

of  its  assets,  beyond  which,  so  far  ns  cred-  McGuffoy  v.  Humes,  85  Teiin.  26,  1  S.  W. 

ifors  are  concerned,  there  is  no  liability.  Rep.  506. 
748 


MEASURE    OF   DAMAGES   ON   COVENANT   FOR   SEISIN.       [§§  951,  952. 

held  that  the  warranty  inured  to  the  benefit  of  a  purchaser,  and 
the  measure  of  damages  was  the  amount  paid  and  interest,  not- 
withstanding a  large  part  of  this  amount  was  retained  by  the 
agent  as  his  commission .^ 

Such  would  be  the  amount  of  damages  although  no  part  of  the 
money  reached  the  hands  of  the  warrantor.^ 

951.  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  no  consid- 
eration was  paid  for  a  part  of  the  land  conveyed,  to  which 
there  was  no  title,  it  having  been  included  in  the  description  by 
mistake.^  Such  evidence  is  admissible  onl^^  on  the  question  of 
damages.  It  could  not  be  received  to  contradict  or  vary  the  deed 
by  showing  that  such  land  was  intended  or  understood  to  be 
included  in  the  conveyance,  for  the  purpose  and  with  the  result 
of  negativing  any  breach  of  the  covenant.  Evidence  that  no 
consideration  was  paid  for  a  part  of  the  land ;  that  such  part, 
though  included  in  the  deed,  had  already  been  conveyed  to 
another;  and  that  the  parties  knew  and  understood  that  such  part 
was  not  to  pass  by  the  conveyance,  —  is  admissible  on  the  question 
of  damages,  and  on  that  question  only.* 

952.  Though  the  covenant  of  quiet  enjoyment  and  the 
other  usual  covenants  be  joined  with  the  covenant  of  seisin, 
the  extent  of  the  grantor's  liability  is  the  purchase-money,  with 
interest.^  Upon  this  point  Chief  Justice  Kent  said  :  "  When  the 
covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment  follows  a  covenant  of  seisin  in  the 
same  deed,  the  intent  of  the  instrument,  taken  together,  appears 
manifestly  to  be,  that  the  one  covenant  is  merely  auxiliary  to  the 
other,  as  the  one  covenant  relates  to  the  title,  and  the  other  refers 
to  the  future  enjoyment  of  that  title.  The  covenant  for  quiet 
enjoyment  respects  the  possession  merely,  and  it  would  seem  to 
be  unreasonable  and  very  inconsistent  for  the  plaintilT  to  recover 
under  one  covenant  the  whole  value  of  the  estate,  as  it  was 
intended  to  be  conveyed,  and,  under  another  covenant  in  the  same 

1  Rash  V.  Jenne,  26  Oreg.  If9,  37  Pac.  *  Nutting  v.  Ilorbcrt,  .35  N.  II.  120,  per 
Rep.  5.38.  Fowler,  J. ;    Spurr  i'.  Andrew,  6  Allen, 

2  Bloom  V.  Wolfe,  50  Iowa,  286.  420  ;  Bruus  v.  Sciireibcr,  4.3  Minn.  468, 45 
8  Leland  v.  Stone,  10  Mass.  459 ;  Nut-     N.  W.  Rep.  861;  Simnnovich   v.  Wood, 

ting  V.  Herbert,  .35  N.   II.  120,  .37  N.  II.     145  Mass.  180,  13  N.  E.  Rep.  391. 

346 ;  Barns  v.  Learaeil,  5  N.  H.  264  ;  Stew-         ''  Willson  v.  Willson,  25  N.  H.  229,  57 

art   V.   Hadley,   55    Mo.   235.      And   .^iee     Am.  Dec.  320. 

Weeks  v.  Barton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  31  S. 

W.  Rep.  1071. 

749 


§  953.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

deed,  distinct  and  increased  damages,  because  he  was  not  per- 
mitted to  enjoy  that  estate.  These  covenants  must  be  taken  in 
connection  to  ascertain  their  import."  ^ 

A  recovery  of  damages,  though  only  nominal,  as  in  case  the 
grantee  has  not  been  disturbed  in  his  possession,  is  a  bar  to  a  sub- 
sequent action  on  this  covenant,^  but  not  to  an  action  on  the  cove- 
nants of  warranty  and  for  quiet  enjoyment,  upon  a  subsequent 
eviction  for  breaches  of  those  covenants  subsequently  occurring.^ 

953.  For  a  breach  of  the  covenant  which  is  technical 
merely,  the  grantee  can  recover  nominal  damages  only.  Thus, 
if  the  conveyance  passed  to  the  grantee  the  full  equitable  inter- 
est, with  the  possession  of  the  land,  which  has  remained  undis- 
turbed, and  no  hostile  title  has  been  asserted,  the  grantee  having 
everything  but  the  legal  title,  it  is  manifest  that  the  grantee  can- 
not recover  the  full  purchase-money  and  at  the  same  time  retain 
the  land.  In  the  absence  of  a  tender  of  a  reconveyance  the  grantee 
is  limited  to  a  nominal  recovery.  Thus,  where  one  makes  a  valid 
entry  upon  government  land,  and,  before  he  receives  a  patent  for 
the  land,  conveys  the  land  by  a  deed  in  which  he  covenants  that 
he  is  well  seised  in  fee,  his  covenant  is  broken,  because  he  is  not 
seised  of  the  legal  title.  He  holds  the  full  equitable  and  bene- 
ficial title,  but  the  legal  title  remains  in  the  United  States  till 
the  patent  actually  issues.  Until  some  paramount  or  hostile  title 
is  in  some  manner  asserted,  or  the  grantee  is  in  some  manner  dis- 
turbed in  his  possession,  such  breach  is  a  mere  technical  breach, 
for  which  the  grantee  can  recover  nominal  damages  onl3^^ 

If  the  covenantee  has  entered  into  possession,  and  he  has  never 
been  disturbed  in  his  possession,  he  can  recover  only  nominal 
damages,  although  the  title  to  the  whole  or  some  part  of  the  land 
be  in  another.'^     The  grantee  may  buy  in  the  outstanding  title, 

1  Pitcher  i'.  Livingston,  4  Johns.  1,18,  *  Bowne  v.  Wolcott,  1  N.  Dak.  415,  48 
4  Am.  Dec.  229.  And  see  Ogden  v.  Ball,  N.  W.  Rep.  336 ;  O'Meara  v.  McDaniel, 
40  Minn.  94,  99,  41  N.  W.  Eep.  453.  49  Kans.  685,  31  Pac.  Rep.  303  ;  Lessly 

2  Donnell  v.  Thompson,  10  Me.  170,  v.  Bowie,  27  S.  C.  193,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  199; 
174,  25  Am.  Dec.  216;  Nosier  v.  Hunt,  Mecklem  v.  Blake,  22  Wis.  495,  99  Am. 
18  Iowa,  212;  Smith  v.  Hughes,  50  Wis.  Dec.  68. 

620,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  6.53  ;  Eaton  v.  Lyman,  ^  Sable  v.  Brockmeier,  45  Minn.  248,  47 

30  Wis.  41  ;  Mecklem  v.  Blake,  22  Wis.  N.  W.  Rep.  794;  Ogden  v.  Ball,  38  Minn. 

495,  99  Am.  Dec.  68;  Noonan  v.  Ilsley,  237,  36  N.  W.  Rep.  344;  Cockrell  y.  Proc- 

22  Wis.  27.  tor,  65  Mo.  41 ;  Axtel  v.   Chase,  77  Ind. 

3  Ogden  V.  Ball,  40  Minn.  94,  41  N.  W.  74 ;  Boon  v.  MeHenry,  55  Iowa,  202,  7  N. 
Rep.  453.  W.  Rep.  503  ;  Wilson   v.  Irish,  02  Iowa, 

750 


MEASURE   OF  DAMAGES   ON   COVENANT   FOR   SEISIN.       [§§  954,  955. 

and  in  that  case  he  is  entitled  to  recover  the  amount  he  has  rea- 
sonabh'  paid  for  such  title ;  but  until  he  proves  what  he  paid  for 
such  title  he  can  recover  only  nominal  damages. ^ 

A  grantee  who  has  parted  with  his  entire  interest  in  the  land  can 
recover  only  nominal  damages  for  a  technical  breach  of  the  cove- 
nants of  seisin  and  of  right  to  convey.  Stated  more  fully  and 
completely,  the  rule  is  that,  when  personal  covenants  are  connected 
with  the  sweeping  covenant  of  warranty,  and  the  covenant  of  seisin 
is  broken,  but  the  grantee  has  parted  with  the  property,  and  has 
never  been  disturbed  in  his  ownership,  nor  paid  anything  in  pur- 
chasing in  the  paramount  title,  nor  became  liable  to  pay  anything, 
he  can  at  most  recover  only  nominal  damages  from  the  grantor 
for  the  breach  of  the  covenant  of  seisin.^ 

954.  If  the  grantee  in  case  of  a  technical  breach  of  the 
covenant  of  seisin  tenders  a  reconveyance,  the  proper  rule  of 
damages  is  the  entire  purchase-jarice,  with  interest.'^  A  recovery 
of  full  damages  against  the  grantor  entitles  him  to  a  reconvey- 
ance. The  grantee  is  estopped  to  claim  the  land  as  against  the 
grantor.*  If  the  legal  seisin  is  transferred  to  the  grantee  before 
he  has  brought  his  action  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant,  he  cannot 
elect  to  reject  the  title  and  recover  the  purchase-money.  He  can 
only  recover  the  damages  he  has  actually  sustained  from  inter- 
ruption of  possession  or  otherwise.^ 

955.  The  action  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  seisin  is 
not  founded  on  any  right  to  rescind  the  contract  or  deed, 
though  rescission  results  from  a  recovery  and  satisfaction  of  judg- 

260,    17  N.    W.    Rep.    211;    Norman   v.  Garfield    v.  Williams,    2    Vt.   311,   327; 

Winch,  65  Iowa,  263,  21  N.  W.  Rep.  598;  Reese  v.  Smith,  12  Mo.  344;  Wilson  v. 

Wilson  V.  Forbes,  2  Dev.  30;  Cowan  i;.  Forbes,  2  l)ev.  30;  M'Carty  v.  Le;igett. 

Silliman,  4  Dev.  46.  3  Hill,  134  ;  Colby  v.  O^tiooA,  29  Bnrh. 

1  Snell  V.  Iowa  Homestead  Co.  50  Iowa,  339;  Boon  u.  McIIenry,  55  Iowa,  202,  7 
701,  13  N.  W.  Rep.  848  ;  Pate  v.  Mitchell,  N.  W.  Rep.  503. 

23  Ark.  590,  79  Am.  Dec.  114.  «  Frazer   v.    Supervisors,  74    III.   2S2 ; 

2  Hammerslough  v.  Ilackett,  48  Kans.  Kincaid  v.  Brittain,  5  Suecd,  119  ;  Recohs 
700,  29  Pac.  Rep.  1079,  citing  Morrison  v.  Younglove,  8  Baxt.  385;  Rowne  v. 
V.  Underwood,  20  N.  IT.  369;  Baxter  u.  Wolcott,  1  N.  Dak.  415,48  N.  W.  Rep. 
Bradbury,  20  Me.  260,  37  Am.  Dec.  49  ;  336. 

Kimball  v.  Bryant,  25  Minn.  496  ;  Burke  •»  Parker  v.  Brown,  15  N.  II.  176. 

V.  Beveridge,  15  Minn.  205;  King  v.  Gil-  '>  Baxter  v.  Bradbury,  20  Me.  260,37 

80n,  32  111.  348,  83  Am.  Dec.  269  ;  Brandt  Am.  Dec.  49  ;  Knowles  v.   Kennedy,  82 

V.  Foster,  5  Iowa,  287  ;  Prcscott  i;.  True-  Pa.  St.  445 ;  King  v.  Gilson,  32   111.  348, 

man,  4  Mass.  627,  3  Am.  Dec.  249 ;  Mid-  83  Am.  Dec.  269. 
dlebury   College   v.   Cheney,  1  Vt.   336  ; 

751 


§956.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

ment,  in  equity  if  not  at  Uiw.^  An  executed  conveyance  cannot 
be  rescinded  merely  because  of  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of 
seisin,"'  unless  the  vendor  is  insolvent,  though  it  has  bei-n  errone- 
ously stated  in  some  cases  that  if  the  grantee  desires  to  rescind 
for  want  of  title  in  the  grantor,  and  to  recover  the  consideration 
paid  with  interest,  he  may  tender  to  the  grantor  a  reconveyance 
and  the  possession,  and  then  may  maintain  his  action  on  the  cove- 
nant.^ 

So  long  as  the  purchaser  remains  in  quiet  possession,  he  can- 
not sustain  a  bill  for  a  rescission  or  abatement  of  price  on  the 
ground  of  an  outstanding  title,  unless  upon  the  score  of  fraud.^ 

An  action  to  rescind  a  sale  of  land  on  the  ground  of  fraud 
cannot  be  joined  with  an  action  on  the  covenants  of  seisin  and 
right  to  convey  contained  in  the  deed  thereof,  since  the  former  is 
a  disaffirmance,  while  the  latter  is  an  affirmance,  of  the  contract.^ 

An  action  for  rescission  may  be  maintained  when  the  vendor 
has  made  material  representatious,  as  to  his  seisin  and  right  to 
convev,  which  are  false,  and  deceived  the  vendee  and  induced 
him  to  purchase.^  It  is  in  such  case  immaterial  whether  the 
representations  were  knowingly  or  ignorantly  made. 

956.  Only  nominal  damages  can  be  recovered  against  one 
who  conveys  with  covenants  of  warranty  if  he  acquires  title 
before  suit  is  brought."     The  after-acquired  title  in   such  case 

1  Catlin  V.   Hurlburt,  3  Vt.  403;  Ben-  24   Ala.  513;  Parker  v.  Parker,  93  Ala. 

jamin  v.  Hobbs,  31  Ark.  151.  80,  9  So.  Rep.  426. 

-  McLennan  v.  Prentice,  85  Wis.  427,  "^  Sayre  v.  Sheffield  Land  Co.  (Ala.)  18 

55  N.  W.   Rep.   764;  Booth  v.   Ryan,  31  So.   Rep.    101;  Reese    v.  Smith,  12    Mo. 

Wis.  45,  58,  per  Dixon,  C.  J. ;  Smith   v.  344 ;  Morrison  v.  Underwood,  20  N.  H. 

Hughes,  50  Wis.  620,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  653  ;  369  ;  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Glenn,  68  N.  C. 

Clementson  v.  Streeter,  59  Wis.   429,   18  35;    Cornell   v.   Jackson,   3    Cash.   506; 

N.  W.  Rep.  340 ;   Parker  v.  Parker,  93  Knowles  v.    Kennedy,   82   Pa.    St.   445  ; 

Ala.  80,  9  So.  Rep.  426  ;  Strong  v.  Wad-  Resser  v.  Carney,  52  Minn.  397,  54  N.  W. 

dell,  56  Ala.  471 ;  Lett  v.  Brown,  56  Ala.  Rep.  89;  McLennan  r.  Prentice,  85  Wis. 

550.  427,    55    N.    W.    Rep.    764;    Mclnnis   v. 

3  Mecklem  v.  Blake,  22   Wis.  495,   99  Lyman,  62  Wis.  191,  22  N.  W.  Rep.  405; 

Am.  Dec.  68.  Baxter  v.  Bradbury,  20  Me.  260,  37  Am. 

*  Lessly  v.  Bowie,  27  S.  C.  193,  3  S.  E.  Dec.  49,  the  court  saying  :  "  The  plaintirf, 

Rep.  199;  Childs  v.  Alexander,  22  S.  C.  by  taking  a  general  covenant  of  warranty, 

169,185;  Whitworth  v.  Stuckey,  1  Rich,  not  only   assented    to,   but   secured   and 

Eq.  404.  made  available  to  himself,  all  the  legal 

^  McLennan  v.  Prentice,  85  Wis.  427,  consequences   resulting    from   the    cove- 

55  N.  W.  Rep.  764.  nant.     Having  therefore  under  his  deed, 

^  Lindsey  v.  Veasy,  62  Ala.  421  ;  Kelly  before  the  commencement  of  the  action, 

V.  Allen,  34  Ala.  663  ;  Walton  v.  Bonham,  acquired  the  seisin  which  it  was  the  object 

752 


DAMAGES   ON   COVENANTS  AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.       [§§  957,  958. 

inures  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantee.  It  is  considered  that,  when 
the  covenant  is  taken  and  the  covenantee  pays  his  money,  he 
intends  to  acquire  title  to  the  land,  and  not  to  make  a  loan,  and 
when  he  has  obtained  what  he  purchased  he  has  sustained  no 
injury.  Technically  there  has  been  a  breach  of  the  covenant, 
for  which  the  law  gives  a  right  of  recovery,  but  having  the  title 
for  which  he  contracted  he  can  only  recover  nominal  damages. ^ 

VIII.  Measure  of  Damages  on  Covenants  against  Incumbrances. 

957.  If  the  incumbrance  is  such  as  to  wholly  defeat  the 
estate  conveyed,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  consideration- 
money  and  interest  thereon.^  If  the  incumbrance  is  less  in  amount 
than  the  consideration  paid  for  the  land,  and  the  grantee  pays 
it  to  relieve  his  property,  he  is  entitled  to  recover  the  amount 
paid  with  interest.-^ 

Where  one  conveyed  land,  with  a  covenant  to  save  the  grantee 
harmless  against  a  mortgage  upon  that  and  other  land  given  by 
a  former  owner,  and  the  mortgage  was  afterwards  foreclosed  upon 
all  the  mortgaged  land,  and  the  land  was  bought  by  the  grantee, 
it  was  held,  in  an  action  by  him  on  the  covenant,  that  the  measure 
of  his  damages  was  the  price  paid  by  him  to  his  grantor,  and 
that  the  fact  that  the  land  other  than  that  conveyed  by  his 
grantor  was  worth  more  than  the  amount  paid  for  the  purchase 
under  the  mortgage  could  not  be  taken  into  account  to  reduce  the 
damages.* 

958.  If  the  incumbrance  is  practically  inextinguishable, 
as  in  case  of  a  permanent  easement,  the  measure  of  damages 
is  the  difference  in  the  value  of  the  land  without  and  with  the 

of  both  covenants  to  secure,  he  could  be  Jenkins  v.  Ilopkiua,  8  Pick.  346 ;   Blan- 

entitled  only  to  nominal  damages."  chard  v.  Ellis,  1  Gray,  195 ;  Dana  v.  Good- 

1  King  t'.  Gilsou,  32  III.  348,  356,  83  fellow,  51  Mi.nn.  375,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  656; 
Am.  Dec.  269,  citing  Cotton  v.  V7ard,  3  Nichol  v.  Alexander,  28  Wis.  118;  I'ear- 
T.  B.  Mon.  304;  Reese  v.  Smith,  12  Mo.  son  v.  Ford  (Kans.),  42  Pac.  Rep.  257  ; 
344;  Cornell  v.  Jackson,  3  Cush.  506;  Foote  v.  Burnet,  10  Ohio,  317,  335,  36 
Morrison  v.  Underwood,  20  N.  II.  369,  Am.  Dec.  90;  Copelaud  v.  McAdory,  100 
followed  and  adopted  in  Sayre  v.  Sheffield  Ala.  553,  560,  13  So.  Rej).  545  ;  Alexan- 
Land  Co.  (Ala.)  18  So.  Rep.  101.  der  v.  Bridgford,  59  Ark.   195,  27  S.  W. 

2  Hymes  v.  Esty,  133  N.   Y.  342,  347,  Rep.  69. 

31   N.  E.  Rep.  105;    Dimmick  r.  Lock-  «  Titclier  v.  Livingston,  4  .loiins.   1,4 

wood,  10    Wend.   142;    Kelly   v.   Dutch  Am.  Dec.  229;  Dimmick  v.  Lockwood,  10 

Church,  2  Hill,  105;  Hunt  v.  Raplee,  44  Wend.  142. 

Hun,   149;  Adams  r.  Conovcr,  22  Hun,  '  Dana  v.  Goodfellow,  51  Minu.  375,  53 

424;    Chapel    v.   Bull,    17     Mass.    213;  N.  W.  Rep.  656. 

753 


§  958.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

incumbrauce.^  A  restriction  as  to  building  lines,  or  as  to  the 
cliavacter  or  cost  of  the  building  to  be  erected  upon  the  land, 
is  for  all  practical  purposes  inextinguishable,  for  the  purchaser 
cannot  compel  a  release  of  it  in  any  form,  and  therefore  the 
measure  of  damages  is  the  injury  arising  from  the  continuance 
of  the  incumbrance. 

A  similar  rule  of  damages  aj)plies  in  case  of  a  breach  of  a 
covenant  to  allow  another  to  exercise  a  certain  easement,  as  where 
a  deed  of  a  right  of  way  to  a  railroad  company  having  provided 
for  a  private  way  on  the  grantor's  farm  under  the  railroad,  the 
company  having  violated  the  covenant,  evidence  of  what  his  land 
was  worth  without  the  crossings,  and  what  it  would  have  been 
worth  with  them,  is  admissible.^ 

If  the  incumbrance  is  of  a  kind  which  interferes  with  the  pur- 
chaser's enjoyment  of  the  property,  he  is  entitled  to  substantial 
damages,  the  measure  of  which  is  a  just  compensation  for  the 
injury  resulting  from  the  incumbrance.^ 

Interest  cannot  be  recovered  on  damages  arising  from  the  breach 
of  a  covenant  against  incumbrances  when  the  incumbrance  is 
permanent  in  its  nature ;  for  in  such  case  the  measure  of  the 
damages  is  the  difference  of  the  value  of  the  premises  with  and 
without  the  incumbrance,  and  is  necessarily  unliquidated.* 

1  Copeland  i;.  McAdory,  100  Ala.  553,  Albany,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sparks,  12  Ind.  App. 
560,  13  So.  Rep.  545  ;  Clark  v.  Ziegler,  79  410,  40  N.  E.  Rep.  546  ;  Louisville,  New 
Ala.  346,  85  Ala.  154;  Mackey  v.  Har-  Albany,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sumner,  106  Ind. 
mon,  34  Minn.   168,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  702;  55,  5  N.  E.  Rep.  404. 

Hubbard  V.  Norton,  10  Conn.  422;  Mitch-  3  Bradshaw  y.  Crosby,  151   Mass.  237, 

(11  V.  Stanley,  44  Conn.  312;   Fagan  v.  24  N.  E.  Rep.  47;  Wetherbee  v.  Bennett, 

Cadmus,  46  N.  J.  L.  441,  445 ;  Porter  v.  2  Allen,  428  ;  Bronson  v.  Coffin,  108  Mass. 

Bradley,  7  R.  I.  538;  Streeper  v.  Abeln,  175,  11  Am.  Rep.  335  ;  Harlow  w.  Thomas, 

59  Mo.  App.  485;  Kellogg  v.   Malin,  62  15  Pick.  66;  Williamson  v.  Hall,  62  Mo. 

:Mo.  429 ;  Walker  v.  Deaver,  79  Mo.  664  ;  405 ;  Kellogg  v.  Malin,  62  Mo.  429,  434  ; 

Henderson   v.   Henderson,    13  Mo.    151;  Hubbard  d.  Norton,  10  Conn.  422;  Funk 

Hymes  v.  Esty,  133  N.  Y.  342,  31  N.  E.  v.  Voneida,   11    Serg.  &  R.   110,  14  Am. 

Rep.  105;  Huyck  v.  Andrews,  113  N.  Y.  Dec.  617;  Fritz  v.  Pusey,  31   Minn.  368, 

81,  20  N.  E.    Rep.    581;    Delavergne   v.  18  N.  W.  Rep.  94;  Walker  y.  Wilson,  13 

Norris,  7  Johns.  358  ;  Richmond  v.  Ames,  Wis.  522  ;  Guthrie  v.   Pugsley,  12  Johns. 

164  Mass.  467,  41  N.  E.  Rep.  671  ;  Bron-  126  ;  Brown  v.  Allen,  73  Hun,  291,  26  N. 

son  V.  Coffin,  108  Mass.  175  ;  Wetherbee  Y.  Supp.  299. 

V.    Bennett,    2    Allen,    428 ;    Harlow    v.  See,  however.  Black  v.  Coan,  48  Ind. 

Thomas,  15  Pick.  66;  Batchelder  r.  Stur-  385;    Rosenberger   v.    Keller,   33    Gratt. 

gis,  3  Cush.  201  ;  Prescott  v.  Trueman,  4  489  ;  Fritz  v.  Pusey,  31  Minn.  368,  18  N. 

Mass.  627,  630,  3  Am.  Dec.  249.  W.  Rep.  94. 

2  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee  (Ind),  ^  Doctor  v.  Darling,  22  N.  Y.  Supp 
41    N.    E.    Rep.    1058;    Louisville,    New  594,  596,  per  Follett,  J. 

754 


DAMAGES   ON   COVENANTS   AGAINST   INCUMBKANCES.      [§  959. 

959.  The  measure  of  damages  for  the  incumbrance  of  an 
unexpired  term  of  lease  is  the  fair  rental  value  of  the  property 
to  the  expiration  of  the  term.  "The  underlying  principle  is 
that  the  damages  should  be  estimated  according  to  the  real  injury 
arising  from  the  existence  of  the  incumbrance,  which,  in  the  case 
supposed,  is  presumably  and  ordinarily  the  value  of  the  use  of 
the  premises  for  the  time  during  which  the  vendee  has  been 
deprived  of  such  use."  ^ 

The  purchaser  may,  if  he  prefers,  recognize  the  lease  to  the 
tenant  and  accept  the  unpaid  rent ;  and  in  that  case  he  could  not 
recover  damages  for  the  incumbrance.  But  he  is  not  obliged  to 
recognize  the  lease,  and  he  is  not  obliged  to  receive  the  unpaid 
rent  in  satisfaction  of  his  damages  for  the  incumbrance.  He  is 
entitled  to  the  immediate  possession  of  the  land,  and,  being 
deprived  of  such  possession  by  reason  of  the  existence  of  the  lease, 
be  is  entitled  to  all  his  damages  for  the  injury.^ 

If  the  breach  of  the  covenant  consists  in  the  possession  of  the 
land  by  a  tenant  of  the  grantor,  who  offers  to  attorn  to  the  pur- 
chaser, and,  not  being  recognized  by  the  purchaser,  pays  the  rent 
to  the  grantor,  the  purchaser  is  entitled  to  damages  to  the  full 
rental  value  for  the  time  he  is  kept  out  of  possession,  without 
deduction  of  the  rents  turned  over  to  the  grantor.^ 

If  there  is  a  crop  upon  the  leased  land  at  the  time  of  the  deliv- 
ery of  the  deed  which  the  lessee  is  authorized  to  remove,  the  meas- 
ure of  damages  may  be  increased  to  the  extent  of  the  value 
of  the  crop,  less  the  expense  of  taking  care  of  and  harvesting  the 
same.* 

Wliere  the  incumbrance  is  a  right  granted  to  a  stranger  to  cut 
timber  on  the  land  for  a  term  of  years,  tlie  measure  of  damages 
is  the  value  of  the  timber  to  the  purchaser  of  the  land  for  the  use 


1  Fritz  V.  Pusey,  31  Minn.  368,  370,  18  Pac.  Rep.  493.  "If  the  (lefcndauts  had 
N.  W.  Rep.  94,  per  Mitchell,  J.  ;  Clark  v.  given  to  the  ])laintiff  ilie  ininiediiitc  pos- 
Fisher,  .54  Kan.s.  403,  38  Pi\c.  Rep.  493  ;  session  of  the  jtremi.ses  at  the  time  of  the 
Porter  ;'.  Rradlc}',  7  R.  I.  .538,  542.  delivery  of  the  deed,  as  they  covenanted 

2  Clark  V.  Fisher,  54  Kans.  403,3s  Pac.  therein,  lie  would  have  had  the  exclusive 
Rep.  493,  per  Horton,  C.  J.  ;  Smith  v.  possession  thereof,  with  all  the  crops 
Leighton,  38  Kans.  544,  17  I'ac.  Rep.  f,'rowing  thereon."  Per  Horton,  C.  J., 
52.  citint;   Chiipman    v.  Vench,  32  Kans.  167, 

8  Edwards  r.  Clark.   83  Mich.  246,  47  4   Pac.   Rep.  100;  Rohinsou  u.  Hall,   33 

N,  "W.  Rep.  112.  Kans.  139,  5  Pac.  Rep.  703. 


*  Clark   V.    Fisher,    54    Kan.s.   403,   38 


755 


§§  9G0,  961.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

of  his  farm,  estimated  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  to  him,  and 
not  the  value  of  the  timber  to  the  purchaser  of  that.^ 

If  the  incumbrance  is  a  lease  of  the  coal  in  the  granted  land, 
but  the  coal  remains  in  its  natural  state,  and  the  covenantor 
tenders  a  release  from  the  lessee,  the  damages  are  merely  nomi- 
nal.2 

Where  the  incumbrance  consists  of  a  right,  under  a  lease 
which  does  not  expire  for  some  years,  to  procure  ice  from  the 
premises,  and  a  right  of  way  across  the  land  for  such  purpose, 
the  plaintiff  may,  upon  proper  and  sufficient  proof,  recover  sub- 
stantial damages,  although  he  has  paid  nothing  to  extinguish  the 
incumbrance,  nor  been  disturbed  in  his  possession.^ 

960.  Only  nominal  damages  can  be  recovered  in  case  the 
incumbrance  is  an  inchoate  right  of  do^wer  ;  because  of  the 
contingent  nature  of  this  incumbrance,  it  is  not  susceptible  of 
computation  until  the  right  becomes  consummate.*  If  the  dower 
right  has  become  fixed,  the  measure  of  damages  is  determined 
according  to  the  expectation  of  life  of  the  tenant  in  dower,  on  the 
basis  of  the  consideration  paid  to  the  covenantor  for  the  land.^ 

961.  The  damages  must  be  proximate  and  not  remote. 
Thus,  where  one  who  was  tlie  actual  owner  of  a  farm  and  in  posses- 
sion of  it  sold  it  with  covenants  of  warranty  subject  to  a  mortgage, 
but,  by  reason  of  the  loss  of  a  deed  in  the  grantor's  chain  of  title 
before  it  was  recorded,  the  grantee  was  unable  to  obtain  a  loan 
upon  the  farm,  and  in  consequence  the  mortgage  was  foreclosed 
and  the  grantee  evicted,  the  defect  in  the  title  not  having  been 
made  good  in  season  to  prevent  the  eviction,  though  it  was  after- 
wards remedied,  it  was  held  that  the  grantee  could  not  recover 
damages  for  the  loss  of  the  farm.^ 

Where  the  breach  consists  of  an  alleged  encroachment  of  the 
buildings  on  the  adjoining  land  of  another,  evidence  that  the 
covenantee  had  made  a  contract  to  sell  the  premises,  and  that  the 

1  Cathcart  v.  Bowman,  5  Pa.  St.  317  ;  ^  Terry  v.  Drabenstadt,  68  Pa.  St.  400; 
Clark  V.  Zeigler,  85  Ala.  154,  4  So.  Rep.  Tiorneyv.  Whitin<r,  2  Colo.  620;  Western 
669.  V.    Short,    12    B.    Mon.    153;     Wager   v. 

2  Buren  v.  Hubbell,  54  Mo.  App.  617.        Schuyler,  1  Wend.  553 ;  Gnthrie  v.  Pugs- 
8  Smith  r.  Davis,  44  Kans.  362,  24  Pac.     ley,  12  Johns.  126;  Downie  v.  Ladd,  22 

Rep.  428.  Neb.    .531,  35   N.  W.  Rep.  388;  Mills  v. 

*  Blevins  v.   Smith,    104  Mo.    583,  16  Catlin,  22  Vt.  98. 

S.  W.  Rep.  213 ;  Walker  v.  Deaver,  79  «  j^^mb  v.  Buker,  34  Neb.  485,  52  N. 

Mo.  664.  W.  Rep.  285. 
756 


DAMAGES    ON   COVENANTS   AGAINST   INCUMBRANCES.       [§  962. 

purchaser  refused  to  accept  on  account  of  such  encioacbment,  is 
not  admissible,  as  his  damages,  if  anything,  are  the  difference  in 
value  between  the  building  with  and  without  the  encroachment.^ 
962.  If  the  plaintiff  has  paid  off  the  incumbrance  at  any 
time  before  the  trial,  he  may  recover  what  he  has  fairly  and 
reasonably  paid  for  that  purpose,  not  exceeding  the  value  of  the 
estate.2  The  burden  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  the  sum 
he  has  paid  to  extinguish  an  incumbrance  was  fairly  and  neces- 
sarily paid.3     If  the  incumbrance  is  an  assessment  for  a  street 


1  Steam  v.  Hesdorfer,  9  Misc.  Rep.  134, 
29  N.  Y.  Siipp.  281. 

'  Arkansas :  Collier  v.  Cowger,  52  Ark. 
322,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  702.  CaUfornia:  Civ. 
Code,  §  3305;  McGary  v.  Hastinjrs,  39 
Cal.  360,  2  Am.  Rep.  456.  Connecticut : 
Beecher  v.  Baldwin,  55  Conn.  419,  12 
Atl.  Rep.  401 ;  Kelsey  v.  Renier,  43  Conn. 
129,  21  Am.  Rep.  638 ;  Davis  v.  Lyman, 
6  Conn.  249.  Georgia  :  Amos  v.  Cosby, 
74  Ga.  793.  Illinois :  Wadhams  v.  Swan, 
109  111.  46  ;  Cheney  v.  City  National 
Bank,  77  111.  562  ;  Richard  v.  Bent,  59 
III.  38,  14  Am.  Rep.  1  ;  Willets  v.  Bur- 
gess, 34  111.  494.  Indiana:  Worley  v. 
Hincman  (Ind.  App.),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  260; 
Burk  V.  Clements,  16  Ind.  132  ;  Snyder  v. 
Lane,  10  Ind.  424  ;  Rardin  v.  Walpole,  38 
Ind.  146.  Iowa:  Harwood  v.  Lee,  85 
Iowa,  622,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  521  ;  Guthrie 
V.  Russell,  46  Iowa,  269,  26  Am.  Rep. 
135;  Baker  v.  Corbett,  28  Iowa,  317. 
Maine :  RunncUs  j;.  Webber,  59  Me.  488  ; 
Reed  v.  J'ierce,  36  Me.  455,  58  Am.  Dec. 
761  ;  Spring  v.  Chase,  22  Me.  505,  39 
Am.  Dec.  595  ;  Stoddard  v.  Gage,  41  Me. 
287  ;  ITrrrick  v.  Moore,  19  Me.  313. 
Massachusetts:  Rradshaw  r.  Crosby,  151 
Ma.ss.  2.-57,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  47  ;  Coburn  v. 
Litfhfield,  132  Mass.  449;  Smith  v.  Car- 
ney, 127  Mass.  179,  182;  .Johnson  v.  Col- 
lins, 116  Mass.  392;  Hairiii;;ton  r.  Mur- 
phy, 109  Mass.  299;  Farnum  i>.  Peterson, 
111  Ma.ss.  148;  Norton  v.  Babcock,  2 
Met.  510;  Comings  v.  Little,  24  Pick. 
266;  ITnrlow  v.  Thomas,  15  Pick.  66; 
Leffincwcll  i:  Elliott,  10  Pick.  204  ;  Batch- 
elder  V.  Stnnris,  3  Cu.sli.  201  ;  Brooks  >•. 
Moody,  20  Pick.  474 ;  Tuft.s  v.  Adams,  8 


Pick.  547  ;  Chapel  v.  Bull,  17  Mass.  213. 
Missouri:  Edington  v.  Nix,  49  Mo.  134; 
St.  Louis  V.  Bissell,  46  Mo.  157  ;  Hender- 
son V.  Henderson,  13  Mo.  151  ;  Ward  v. 
Ashbrook,  78  Mo.  515;  Williamson  v. 
Hall,  62  Mo.  405  ;  Morgan  v.  Hannibal 
&  St.  Jo.  R.  Co.  63  Mo.  129  ;  Walker  v. 
Deaver,  79  Mo.  664 ;  Barnhait  i:  Hughes, 
46  Mo.  App.  318.  Nebraska:  Mills  «. 
Saunders,  4  Neb.  190.  New  Hampshire  : 
Smith  V.  Jefts,  44  N.  H.  482;  Willson  v. 
Willson,  25  N.  H.  229,  57  Am.  Dec.  320; 
Morrison  v.  Underwood,  20  N.  H.  369  ; 
Osgood  V.  Osgood,  39  N.  H.  209.  New 
Jersey:  Fagan  v.  Cadmus,  46  N.  J.  L. 
441  ;  Hartshorn  v.  Cleveland,  52  N.  J.  L. 
473,  19  Atl.  Rep.  974  ;  Stewart  v.  Drake, 
9  N.  J.  L.  139;  Garrison  v.  Sandford,  12 
N.  J.  L.  261.  New  York:  Braman  v. 
Bingham,  26  N.  Y.  483 ;  Grant  v.  Tall- 
man,  20  N.  Y.  191,  75  Am.  Dec.  384; 
Delavergne  v.  Norris,  7  Johns.  358,  5 
Am.  Dec.  281;  St^inard  i*.  Eldridge,  16 
Johns.  2.54  ;  Hall  c.  Dean,  13  Johus.  105  ; 
North  Carolina  :  Lane  r.  Richardson,  104 
N.  C.  642,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  189.  North 
Dakota:  K.  Codes  1895,  §  4982.  Ohio: 
Stambau^'h  v.  Smith,  23  Ohio  St.  584 ; 
Foote  V.  Burnet,  10  Ohio,  317,  36  Am. 
Dec.  90.  Oregon:  Corbett  r.  Wren n,  25 
Orog.  305,  35  Pac.  Rep.  658.  Pennsyl- 
vania: Funk  V.  Voneida,  II  S.  &  R.  IK), 
112,  14  Am.  Dec.  617.  South  Dakota: 
Comp.  Laws  1887,  §  4585.  Vermont: 
Ricliardson  r.  Dorr,  5  Vi.  9.  Wisconsin: 
Eaton  ;•.  Tallmadge,  22  Wis.  526  ;  Pills- 
bury  I'.  Mitchell,  5  Wis.  17;  Eaton  v. 
Lvman,  30  Wis.  41. 
3  Gilbert  v.  Rushmer,  49  Kans.  632,  31 

757 


§§  963,  96i.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

iinprovoiuent,  which  became  an  incumbrance  from  the  time  of  the 
completion  of  the  improvement,  and  the  purchaser  shows  that  the 
sum  paid  by  him  was  reasonably  necessary  to  discharge  the  incum- 
brance, his  recovery  of  such  sum  will  not  be  affected  by  the  fact 
that  an  assessment  for  the  improvement,  levied  after  the  making 
of  the  covenant,  and  still  existing  at  the  time  of  payment,  is 
invalid  for  non-compliance  with  the  provisions  in  regard  to  levy- 
ing such  assessment.  The  right  of  the  city  to  have  the  amount 
determined,  and  to  collect  it  from  the  property,  remained  ;  and, 
whether  the  determination  was  finally  made  by  the  existing  assess- 
ment or  by  another  to  be  substituted  for  it,  the  lien  would  con- 
tinue from  the  time  of  the  completion  of  the  improvement.  The 
avoidance  of  the  assessment  would  merely  cast  upon  the  plaintiff 
the  burden  of  showing  aliunde  that  the  sum  paid  by  him  was  rea- 
sonably necessary  to  discharge  the  property  from  its  liability  for 
a  just  and  legal  share  of  the  expense  of  the  improvement.^ 

963.  If  the  grantee  is  compelled  to  buy  off  a  claim  of  a  right 
of  way  to  which  the  land  was  subject,  and  the  price  paid  is 
reasonable,  he  may  recover  it  in  an  action  on  the  covenant  against 
incumbrances.^ 

If  an  easement,  such  as  a  right  of  way  of  a  railroad,  or  of 
a  public  highway,  when  considered  with  reference  to  the  entire 
parcel  conveyed,  enhances  rather  than  diminishes  its  value,  the 
grantee  is  entitled  only  to  nominal  damages  as  for  a  technical 
breach  of  the  covenant. ^ 

964.  To  recover  more  than  nominal  damages,  the  burden  is 
on  the  grantee  to  show  the  fair  and  reasonable  value  of  the 
incumbrance  paid  by  him.  He  is  not  entitled  to  recover  in  an 
action  upon  the  covenant  what  lie  actually  paid  to  extinguish  the 
incumbrance,  unless  he  shows  that  the  sum  so  paid  was  the  fair 
and  reasonable  value  of  the  incumbrance.^  Evidence  given  by 
the  person  who  held  the  incumbrance,  that  the  price  paid  to  him 
to  extinguish  it  was   the   least   sum  that  he  would  take  for  his 

Pac.  Rep.   123;    Anderson   v.   Kuox,  20  2  Richmond  f.  Ames,  164  Mass.  467,  41 

Ala.  156;  Pate  v.  Mitchell,  23  Ark.  590,  N.  E.  Rep.  671  ;   Harlow   v.  Thomas,  15 

79  Am.  Dec.  114;  Guthrie  v.  Russell,  46  Pick.  66,  69. 

Iowa,  269,  26  Am.  Rep.  135  ;  Lawless  v.  3  Wadhams  v.  Swan,  109  111.  46. 

Collier,  19  Mo.  480;  Walker  v.   Deaver,  *  Guthrie  v.  Russell,  46  Iowa,  269,  26 

5  Mo.  App.  139.  Am.  Rep.  135;  Pate  v.  Mitchell,  23  Ark. 

1  Hartshorn  v.  Cleveland,   52  N.  J.  L.  590,  79  Am.  Dec.  114. 
473,  19  Atl.  Rep.  974. 

758 


DAMAGES   ON   COVENANTS   AGAINST   INCUMBKANCES.       [§§  965,  966. 

interest,  is  not  sufficient  without  other  evidence  to  establish  the 
reasonableness  of  such  payment.^ 

One  who  buys  land  by  a  deed  containing  a  covenant  against 
incumbrances  may  discharge  a  mortgage  which  incumbered  the 
land  at  the  time  of  the  purchase,  and,  though  he  knew  of  the 
mortgage,  which  was  to  a  building  association,  and  agreed  to  pay 
a  certain  sum  towards  the  discharge  of  it,  he  may  recover  upon 
his  covenant  the  sum  paid  for  the  discharge  of  it  in  excess  of  the 
sum  he  agreed  to  pay  for  that  purpose.  The  grantor,  for  the 
purpose  of  mitigating  the  damages  for  breach  of  the  covenant, 
may  show  that  the  purchaser  agreed  to  ipay  a  part  of  the  incum- 
brance, but  he  cannot  negative  the  covenant  by  showing  that, 
if  the  purchaser  had  waited  till  the  maturity  of  the  mortgage, 
the  sum  he  agreed  to  pay  upon  it  would  have  been  sufficient  to 
extinguish  it,  instead  of  the  much  larger  sum  required  for  its 
extinguishment  at  the  time  the  purchaser  dischai'ged  it.^ 

965.  An  action  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  against  in- 
cumbrances cannot  be  maintained  by  a  covenantee  who  has 
taken  an  assignment  of  the  mortgage  which  constitutes  the 
incumbrance.  If  he  were  allowed  to  do  so,  an  evil-disposed 
grantee  might  buy  in  an  incumbrance  before  maturity,  hold  it 
unsatisfied,  and  recover  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  his  deed, 
and  then  dispose  of  the  mortgage  to  one  purchasing  in  good  faith 
without  notice  before  maturity,  and  for  valuable  consideration, 
and  tlius  be  twice  paid  for  the  incumbrance.^  Accordingly,  a 
purchaser,  who  buys  in  and  holds  as  assignee  a  prior  mortgage 
covering  the  land  purchased  and  other  land,  cannot  recover  there- 
for in  an  action  for  breach  of  his  vendor's  covenant  against 
incumbrances  until  he  has  exhausted  his  remedy  on  such  mortgage 
by  foreclosure  or  otherwise.* 

966.  An  incumbrance  that  is  invalid  is  not  within  the 
covenant  against  incumbrances,  though  it  is  upon  record,  as, 
for  instance,  an  invalid  tax  deed.  If  the  purchaser  expends 
money  in  removing  the  apparent  incumbrance,  he  cannot  recover 
even  nominal  damages  in  an  action  upon  such  covenant." 

1  Gilbert  v.  Ruslimcr,  49  Ivans.  632,  31  *  Ilarwood  i-.  Lee,  85  Iowa,  022,  52  N. 
Pac.  Rep.  123.  W.  Kcp.  521. 

2  Corbett  v.  Wrenn,  25  Oref,'.  305,  35  >>  TiW.ctts  v.  Leeson,  148  Mass.  102,  18 
Pac.  Rep.  658.  N.  E.  Rep.  679. 

3  Ilarwood  v.  Lee,  85  Iowa,  622,  52  N. 
W.  Rep.  521. 

769 


§  9GT.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

In  Massachusetts  it  is  now  provided  by  statute  that  when  real 
estate  is  conveyed  by  deed  or  mortgage  containing  a  covenant 
against  incumbrances,  and  an  incumbrance  appears  of  record  to 
exist  thereon,  whether  known  or  unknown  to  the  grantor,  he  is 
liable  in  an  action  to  the  grantee,  his  heirs,  executor,  administrator, 
or  assigns,  for  all  damages  sustained  in  removing  the  same.^  This 
statute  was  not  intended  to  declare  that  to  be  an  incumbrance 
which  was  not  so  according  to  legal  definition,  but,  in  view  of 
the  embarrassment  arising  from  titles  appearing  by  the  record 
yet  having  no  actual  existence  in  fact,  to  afford  a  remedy  to  the 
grantee  by  enabling  him  to  remove  the  incumbrance  and  recover 
the  damages  sustained.^ 

Where,  after  bringing  an  action  for  a  breach  of  covenant  for 
removino-  an  invalid  incumbrance,  a  new  cause  of  action  accrued 
under  this  statute,  it  was  held  that  the  action  could  not  be  sus- 
tained under  the  statute,  because  the  right  of  action  did  not 
exist  at  the  time  it  was  brought.^  If  the  invalid  incumbrance 
is  an  assessment  for  improvements  which  may  be  validated  by  a 
re-assessment,  the  purchaser  may  remove  the  incumbrance  without 
waiting  for  a  re-assessment,  and  recover  upon  his  covenant  the 
amount  reasonably  paid,  with  his  reasonable  expenses.* 

If  a  purchaser,  without  notice  to  his  grantor,  pays  a  tax,  which 
is  an  apparent  lien  on  the  land,  voluntarily  and  without  an  adju- 
dication as  to  its  validity,  and  without  having  been  disturbed  in 
his  quiet  and  peaceable  possession,  in  a  suit  against  the  grantor 
on  his  covenant  against  incumbrances,  the  grantor  may  show  that 
the  tax  was  invalid,  and  may  thus  defeat  a  recovery.^ 

967.  Only  nominal  damages  can  be  recovered  for  the  exist- 
ence of  an  incumbrance  until  it  is  paid,  if  there  has  been  no 
attempt  to  enforce  the  incumbrance.^ 

1  Pub.  Stats,  ch.  126,  §  18.  Conn.  419;   Briggs  v.    Morse,  42  Conn. 

2  Tibbetts  v.  Leeson,  148  Mass.  102,  18  258;  Davis  v.  Lyrnan,  6  Conn.  249.  Illi- 
N.  E.  Rep.  679.  A  similar  statute  in  nois :  Cheney  v.  City  Nat.  Bank,  77  111. 
Minnesota  is  given  a  like  construction.  562 ;  Richard  v.  Bent,  59  III.  38,  14  Am. 
Hawthorne  v.  City  Bank,  34  Minn.  382,  Rep.  1  ;  Willets  v.  Burgess,  34  111.  494. 
26  N.  W.  Rep.  4.  Indiana  :  Marsh   v.  Thompson,  102  Ind. 

8  Tibbetts  v.  Leeson,  148  Mass.  102,  18  272  ;  Whisler  v.  Hicks,  7  Blackf.  100, 102, 

N.  E.  Rep.  679.  33  Am.  Dec.  402  ;  Black  i'.  Coan,  48  Ind. 

*  Coburn  v.  Litchfield,  132  Mass.  449.  385.    Iowa:  Yancey  v.  Tatlock  (Iowa),  61 

5  Balfour  ;;.   Whitman,   89  Mich.   202,  N.    W.    Rep.    997  ;  Funk    v.    Creswell,    5 

50  N.  W.  IJep.  744.  Iowa,  62  ;  Brandt  v.  Foster,  5  Iowa.  287; 

*^  Connecticut:  Beecher  v.  Baldwin,  55  Royer  v.  Foster,  62  Iowa,  321,  17  N.  W. 
760 


DAMAGES  ON  COVENANTS  AGAINST  INCUMBRANCES.   [§  967. 

The  covenant  against  incumbrances  is  strictly  one  of  indem- 
nity, and  if  the  gi'antee  extinguishes  the  incumbrance  he  can 
recover  only  the  sum  he  has  paid  to  extinguish  it.^  If  the  incum- 
brance is  a  mortgage  or  lien  which  can  be  discharged  by  the 
payment  of  money,  and  which  does  not  interfere  with  the  enjoy- 
ment of  the  property  by  the  grantee,  the  law  gives  only  nominal 
damages  if  the  grantee  has  done  nothing  towards  the  removal  of 
the  incumbrance.^  The  reason  of  the  rule  is,  that  the  grantee 
may  never  be  disturbed  by  the  incumbrance.  The  debtor  wliose 
debt  the  incumbrance  is  may  pay  it.  If  the  grantee  in  the  case 
of  an  outstanding  mortgage  could  recover  the  amount  of  the 
mortgage  from  his  grantor  before  paying  it,  the  holder  of  the 


Rep.  516;  Sac  County  Bank  v.  Hooper, 
77  Iowa,  435,  42  N.  W.  Rep.  363  ;  Har- 
wood  V.  Lee,  85  Iowa,  622,  52  N.  W.  Rep. 
521.  Maine  :  Rimnells  v.  Webber,  59  Me. 
488  ;  Reed  v.  Pierce,  36  Me.  455,  58  Am. 
Dec.  761;  Clark  v.  Perry,  30  Me.  148; 
Herrick  v.  Moore,  19  Me.  313.  Massa- 
chusetts: Jobnsoii  ?;.  Collins,  116  Mass. 
392;  Rradshaw  v.  Crosby,  131  Mass. 
235,24  N.  E.  Rep.  47  ;  Harrington  v.  Mur- 
phy, 109  Mass.  299;  Harlow  v.  Thomas, 
15  Pick.  66  ;  Tufts  v.  Adams,  8  Pick.  547  ; 
Batchelder  v.  Stnr<ris,  3  Cush.  201  ;  Clark 
V.  Swift,  3  Met.  390 ;  Brooks  v.  Moody, 
20  Pick.  474;  Thayer  v.  Clemence,  22 
Pick.  490 ;  Prescott  v.  Tnieman,  4  Mass. 
627,  3  Am.  Dec.  249.  Michigan  :  Norton 
V.  Colfrrovo,  41  Mich.  544,  3  N.  W.  Rep. 
159.  Missouri:  St.  Louis  v.  Bissell,  46 
Mo.  l.''>7;  Kilinj^ton  v.  Nix,  49  Mo.  134. 
Nebraska:  Mills  v.  Saunders,  4  Neb.  190. 
New  Hampshire:  Smith  v.  .lefts,  44  N. 
II.  482  ;  Osgood  v.  Osgood,  39  N.  H.  209  ; 
Andrews  v.  Davison,  17  N.  H.  413,  43 
Am.  Dec.  606;  Morrison  v.  Underwood, 
20  N.  H.  369.  New  Jersey  :  Garrison  v. 
Sandford,  12  N.  J.  L.  261  ;  Stewart  v. 
Drake,  9  N.  J.  L.  139.  New  York  :  Dda- 
vergne  v.  Norris,  7  Joims.  358,  5  Am.  Dec. 
281  ;  Kent  v.  Welch,  7  Johns.  258,  5  Am. 
Dec.  266;  Hall  w.  Dean,  13  John.s.  105; 
De  Forest  v.  Leete,  16  .Johns.  122  ;  Stan- 
ard  V.  Eldridge,  16  Johns.  254  ;  Grant  r. 
Tallman,  20  N.  Y.  191,  75  Am.  Dec.  384  ; 
Barlow  v.  St.  Nicholas  Nat.  Bank,  63  N. 


Y.  399,  20  Am.  Rep.  547  ;  Soule  v.  Dixon, 
1  N.  Y.  Supp.  697;  McGuckin  v.  Mil- 
bank,  83  Hun,  473,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  1049  ; 
Braman  v.  Bingham,  26  N.  Y.  483  ;  Stearn 
V.  Hesdorfer,  9  Misc.  Rep.  134,  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  281.  North  Carolina-:  Lane  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 104  N.  C.  642,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  189. 
Ohio  :  Foote  v.  Burnet,  10  Ohio,  317,  36 
Am.  Dec.  90 ;  Stambaugh  v.  Smith,  23 
Ohio  St.  584.  Pennsylvania :  Funk  v. 
Voneida,  11  S.  &  R.  110,  14  Am.  Dec. 
617.  South  Carolina:  Letsly  v.  Bowie, 
27  S.  C.  193,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  199  ;  M'Crady 
r.  Brisbane,  1  Nott  &  MeC.  104.  Ver- 
mont :  Richardson  v.  Dorr,  5  Vt.  9. 
Wisconsin  :  Eaton  v.  Lyman,  30  Wis.  41  ; 
Pillsbury  v.  Mitchell,  5  Wis.  17. 

1  Mitchell  V.  Hazen,  4  Conn.  495,  10 
Am.  Dec.  169. 

2  Bradshaw  v.  Crosby,  151  IMass.  237, 
24  N.  E.  Rep.  47  ;  Batchelder  i;.  Sturgis, 
3  Cush.  201  ;  Prescott  v.  Truemnn,  4 
Mass.  627,  3  Am.  Dec.  249;  Clark  i-. 
Swift,  3  ISfetc.  390  ;  Harlow  v.  Thomas, 
15  Pick.  66;  Tufts  r.  Adams,  8  Pick.  547  ; 
Delavergne  v.  Norris,  7  Johns.  358,  5 
Am.  Dec.  281  ;  Richard  r.  Bent.  59  111.38, 
14  Am.  Rep.  1  ;  Johnson  r.  Collins,  116 
Mass.  392  ;  Reed  v.  Pierce,  36  Me.  455, 
58  Am.  Dec.  761  ;  Eaton  v.  Lyman,  30. 
Wis.  41  ;  Foote  v.  Burnet,  10  Ohio,  317, 
36  Am.  Dec.  90  ;  Lane  v.  Richardson,  104 
N.  C.  642,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  189;  Lessly  v. 
Bowie,  27  S.  C  193,3  S.  E.  Rep.  199; 
Dimniick  v.  Loekwnf-d,  10  Wend.  142. 

761 


§  9G8.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

niortua<^e  is  not  thereby  paid,  and  lie  has  no  claim  upon  the 
grantee  for  the  amount^  but  he  may  still  resort  to  the  grantor,  if 
he  is  the  mortgagor,  and  compel  him  to  pay  it  again. ^ 

IX.  Measure  of  Damages  on  Covenants  of  Warranty. 

968.  The  measure  of  damages  generally  adopted  for  a 
breach  of  the  covenants  of  quiet  enjoyment  and  warranty,  in  a 
suit  by  the  grantee  against  the  grantor,  is  the  value  of  the  land  at 
the  time  of  the  conveyance,  which  is  the  consideration  agreed  upon 
by  the  parties,  with  interest    and  costs.^     This  rule,  of  course, 

1  Mitchell   V.  Hazeu,  4  Conu.  495,  10  36  N.  W.  Rep.  692.     Minnesota :  Devine 

Am.  Dec.  169.  v.  Lewis,  .38   Minn.   24,   3.")   N.    W.  Rep. 

•-  Hopkins  v.  Lee,  6  Wheat.  109  ;   Rat-  711  ;  Moore  i;.  Fran  lien  field,  2h  Minn.  540. 

rick  V.  Leach,  1  McCrary,  250.  Alabama  :  Mississippi :  Phipps  v.  Tarpley,  31  Miss. 

Kingsbury  v.   Milner,  69  Ala.  502.     Ar-  433;  Brooks  v.  Black,  68  Miss.  161,  8  So. 

kansas  :  Barnett  v.  Hughey,  54  Ark.  195,  Rep.  332  ;  White  v.  Fresly,  54  Miss.  313. 

15  S.    W.  Rep.  464;    CarvilJe    v.  Jacks,  Missouri:   Matheny  w.  Stewart,  108  Mo. 

43  Ark.  439;  Logan  v.  Moulder,  1    Ark.  73,  17   S.  W.  Rep.  1014;  Dickson  v.  De- 

313,  33  Am.  Dec.  338.     California:  Mc-  sire,  23  Mo.  151  ;  Reese  v.  Smith,  12  Mo. 

Gary  v.  Hastings,   39    Cal.  360,   2   Am.  344;  Hutcliins  y.  Roundtree,  77  Mo.  500; 

Rep.  456.     Colorado  :  Taylor  v.  Wallace,  Drydeu  o.  Kellogg,  2  Mo.  App.  87  ;  Lam- 

20  Colo.  211,  37rac.  Rep.  963.     Georgia:  bert  v.  Estes,  99  Mo.  604,  13  S.  W.  Rep. 

Davis  V.  Smith,  5  Ga.  274,  285,  47  Am.  284.     Montana  :  Taylor  v.  Holter,  1  Mont. 

Dec.  279  ;  Martin  u.  Gordon,  24  Ga.  533.  688.      Nevada:    Hoffman    v.   Bosch,  18 

Illinois:   Harding  v.  Larkin,  41    111.  413.  Nev.    360,    4   Pac.   Rep.    703;  Dalton    v. 

Indiana:    McClure  v.  McClure,    65  Ind.  Bowker,  8  Nev.  190.     New   Hampshire: 

482  ;  Rhea  v.  Swain,  122  Ind.  272;  Reese  Winnipiseogee  Paper  Co.  v.  Eaton,  65  N. 

V.  McQuilkin,    7    Ind.    450;    Thomas   v.  H.  13,   18  Atl.  Rep.  171  ;  Morse  v.  Shat- 

Hamilton,  71  Ind.  277  ;  Wood  v.  Bibhins,  tuck,  4  N.  H.  229,  17  Am.  Dec.  419;  Will- 

58  Ind.  392;  Phillips  i\  Reichart,  17  Ind.  son  v.  Willson,    25    N.    H.   229,  57  Am. 

120  :  Burton  v.  Reeds,  20  Ind.  87.     Iowa  :  Dec.  320  ;  Drew  v.  Towle,  30  N.  H.  531, 

Bello\vs   V.   Litchfield,    83   Iowa,   36,   48  64  Am.  Dec.  309  ;  Fo-ster  v.   Thompson, 

N.   W.  Rep.    1062;    Wilhelm   v.  Fimple,  41    N.  H.  373;  Nutting  v.  Herbert,  35  N. 

31  Iowa,  137,  7  Am.  Rep.  117;  Fawcett  H.  120;   Moody  u.  Leavitt,  2  N.  H.  171; 

(>.  Woods,  5  Iowa,  400;    Williamson    v.  Bedel  v.  Loomis,  11   N.  H.  9,   19.     See 

Test,  24  Iowa,  138.     Kansas  :  Stebbins  v.  earlier  cases.      New   Jersey :     Morris    v. 

Wolf,    .33  Kans.   765,    7    Pac.   Rep.    542.  Rowan,  17  N.J.  L.  304  ;  Stewart ;;  Drake, 

Kentucky:    Graham    v.   Dyer    (Ky.),    29  9  N.  J.  L.  139 ;  Holmes  r.  Sinnickson,  15 

S.  W.  Rep.  346;  Pence  v.  Duvall,  9  B.  N.  J.  L.  313.     New  York :  Staats  v.  Ten 

Mon.  48;   Cox  v.  Strode,   2  Bibb,  273;  Eyck,   3   Caines,  111,  2    Am.  Dec.  254; 

Robertson  v.  Lemon,  2  Bush,  301.     Lou-  Pitcher  u.  Livingston,  4  Johns.  1,  4   Am. 

isiana  :  Boyer  ?•.  Amet,  41   La.  Ann.  721,  Dec.  229  ;  Bennet  y  Jenkins,  13  Johns.  50; 

6  So.  Rep.  734.    Improvements  may  be  Jenks  ;;.  Quinn,  137  N.  Y.  223.  .33  N.  W, 

included.     Coleman   v.  Ballard,    13    La.  Rep.  376,  61  Hun,  427,  41  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

Ann.   512;  Hale   v.  New  Orleans,  13  La.  22,  16  N.  Y.   Snpp.  240;  Pctrie  r.  Folz, 

Ann.  499.     Maryland:   Crisfield  v.  Storr,  22  .L  &  S.  223,   10  N.  Y.   St.  Rep.  451  ; 

36    Md.    129,    150,    11     Am.    Rep.    480.  Peters  u.   McKeon,  4   Denio,  546  ;   Kelly 

Michigan  :  Cook  v.  Curtis,  68  Mich.  611,  v.  Dutch  Church,  2  Hill,  105.  North  Car- 
762 


DAMAGES    ON    COVENANTS   OF   WARRANTY. 


[§  ^68. 


excludes  any  compensation  for  the  appreciation  of  the  value  of  the 
land  through  improvements  made  by  the  grantee.  For  this  reason, 
and  as  well  because  it  excludes  the  grantee  from  tlie  benefits 
which  he  would  seem  to  be  entitled  to  from  a  good  bargain,  or 
fx'om  a  rise  in  the  market  value  of  the  land,  the  rule  has  often 
been  spoken  of  in  the  courts  where  it  is  adopted,  as  arbitrary 
and  unjust.^  It  was  adopted  from  the  warrant}'  of  the  ancient 
English  law  which  gave  to  an  evicted  feoffee  no  personal  action, 
but  a  right  to  recover  from  his  feoffor  other  lands  equal  in 
value  to  those  from  which  he  had  been  evicted.  "  As  the  value 
of  land  was  not  measured  in  money,  so  tliere  was  no  fluctua- 
tion in  the  market,  and  purchasers  did  not  acquire  title  with  the 
intention  of  subsequently  conveying  to  a  new  purchaser  at  a 
profit.  Even  when  the  next  step  was  taken,  and  the  ordinary 
purchase  and  sale  of  lands  began  to  become  common,  the  idea  of 
fluctuation  in  value  was  not  thought  of,  and  the  consideration 
named  in  the  deed  began  to  be  regarded  as  a  pecuniary  equiva- 
lent for  the   old  agreement  to  enfeoff  of  lands   of  equal   value. 


olina :  West  v.  West,  76  N.  C.  45 ;  Wil- 
liams V.  Beeman,  2  Dev.  483  ;  Ramsey  v. 
Wallace,  100  N.  C.  75,  6  S.  E.  Rep.  638. 
Ohio :  Wade  v.  Comstock,  1 1  Ohio  St. 
71;  Llovd  V.  Qiiimby,  5  Ohio  St.  262; 
Clark  V.  Parr,  14  Ohio,  118,  45  Am.  Dec. 
529;  Foots  v.  Burnett,  10  Ohio,  317,  36 
Am.  Dec.  90;  King  v.  Kerr,  5  Ohio,  154, 
22  Am.  Dec.  777 ;  Dustin  v.  Newcomer, 
8  Ohio,  49.  Oregon :  Rash  v.  Jenne,  26 
Oreg.  169,  37  Pac.  Rep.  538;  Stark  v. 
Olney,  3  Oreg.  88.  Pennsylvania :  Cox 
V.  Henry,  32  Pa.  St.  18  ;  Hertzo}^  v.  Ilert- 
zog,  34  Pa.  St.  418;  McClure  n.  Gamble, 
27  Pa.  St.  288;  Brown  r.  Dickerson,  12 
Pa.  St.  372  ;  Cathcart  v.  Bowman,  5  Pa. 
St.  317;  King  v.  Pyle,  8  S.  &  R.  166; 
McCafferty  v.  Griswold,  99  Pa.  St.  270 ; 
Allison  r.  Montgomerj',  107  Pa.  St.  455. 
South  Carolina  :  Act  1 824.  §  4,  p.  24  ;  Low- 
rance  v.  Robertson,  10  S.  C.  8  ;  Fiirnian 
V.  Elmore,  2  Notf.  &  McC.  189;  Bond  v. 
Qnattlebaum,  1  McCord,  584 ;  Aiken  v. 
McDonald,  43  S.  C.  29,  20  S.  E.  Rep. 
796;  Earle  v.  Middlcton,  Cheves,  127; 
Henning  v.  Withers,  3  Brev.  458,  6  Am. 
Dec.  589.    Early  cases  adopted  the  oppo- 


site rule.  Tennessee  :  McGuffey  v.  Humes, 
85  Teun.  26;  Siiaw  v.  Wilkins,  8  Humph. 
647,  49  Am.  Dec.  692  ;  Mette  v.  Dow,  9 
Lea,  93  ;  Elliott  v.  Thompson,  4  Humph. 
99,  40  Am.  Dec.  630.  Texas :  Thiele  v. 
Axel),  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  548,  24  S.  W. 
Rep.  803  ;  Rogers  t".  Golson  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  31  S.  W.  Rep.  200;  Simpson  v. 
Belvin,  37  Tex.  674 ;  Glenn  v.  Mathews, 
44  Tex.  400;  Turner  v.  Miller,  42  Tex. 
418,  19  Am.  Rep.  47.  Virginia:  Sheffey 
v.  Gardiner,  79  Va.  313  ;  Click  v.  Green, 
77  Va.  827  ;  Haffey  v.  Birchetts,  1 1  Leigh, 
83;  Thrclkeld  r.  Fitzhugh,  2  Lei-h,  451, 
463.  Early- cases  !ulo[)ted  the  New  Eng- 
land rule.  West  Virginia :  Butcher  v. 
Pctcnson,  26  W.  Va.  447,  53  Am.  Rep.  89; 
Morehind  v.  Metz,  24  W.  Va.  119,  49  Am. 
Rep.  246.  Wisconsin  :  Conrad  v.  Trus- 
tees, 64  Wis.  258,  25  N.  W.  Rep.  24 ; 
Messcr  v.  Ocslreich,  52  Wis.  684,  10  N.  , 
W.  Rep.  6;  Mclnnis  i\  Lymmi,  62  Wis. 
191,  22  N.  W.  Rep.  405  ;  Lawton  v.  Howe, 
14  Wis.  241  ;  Hidl  v.  Do  Laplaine,  5  Wi.s. 
206,  68  Am.  Dec.  57. 

I   Ilymes  i-.  I':sty,  133  N.  Y.  342,347,  31 
N.  E.  Rep.  105. 

763 


§§  9i)9,  9T0.J  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

Instead  of  ij^etting  land  of  equal  value,  the  plaintiff  was  to  get 
what  both  parties  had  by  consent  substituted  for  it,  —  the  con- 
sideration. So  strongly  fixed  was  the  old  idea,  that  it  was  not 
perceived  until  at  a  comparatively  recent  date  that  to  take  the 
consideration  as  an  arbitrary  limit  violates  all  the  general  rules 
governing  the  measure  of  damages  upon  breaches  of  contract 
applicable  in  such  a  case."  ^ 

Under  this  rule  of  damages,  it  is  no  defence  that  the  land  con- 
veyed was  not  worth  the  consideration  paid  for  it.^ 

If  the  covenantee  is  a  mortgagee,  upon  a  total  breach  of  these 
covenants  the  amount  of  the  mortgage  debt  is  the  measure  of 
damages.^ 

969.  In  England,  the  New  England  States,  and  in  Michi- 
gan, however,  the  measure  of  damages  for  a  breach  of  the 
covenant  of  warranty  is  the  value  of  the  land  at  the  time  of 
eviction.^  In  the  same  States  the  damages  for  a  breach  of 
the  covenant  for  seisin  is  the  consideration  paid.  The  technical 
reason  for  this  difference  as  to  the  rule  of  damages  in  the  two 
cnses  is,  that  the  covenant  of  warranty  is  not  broken  until  evic- 
tion, while  the  covenant  for  seisin  is  broken  as  soon  as  it  is 
made. 

970.  The  grantee  cannot  recover  damages  for  improvements 
he  has  made,  nor  for  the  increased  value  of  the  land  from  adven- 
titious sources.^  In  an  early  case  Chief  Justice  Kent  said  :  "  The 
purchaser  may  have  made  the  purchase  under  the  expectation  of 

1  Sedgwick  on  Damages,  §  951.  Am.   Dec.    182;    Caswell   v.  Wendell,  4 

2  Brady  y.  Peck  (Ky.),  34  S.  W.  Rep.  Mass.  108;  Bigelow  v.  Jones,  4  Mass. 
906.  512  ;  Donahoe  v.  Emery,  9  Met.  63  ;  Nor- 

3  Wetmore  i-.  Green,  11  Pick.  462;  ton  v.  Babcock,  2  Met.  510;  White  v. 
Curtis  V.  Deering,  12  Me.  499.  Whitney,  3  Met.  81 ;  Furnas  r.  Durgin, 

*  Jenkins   v.  Jones,  9    Q.   B.  D.   128.  119  I\Iass.  500,  20  Am.  Rep.  341;  Boyle 

Connecticut :  Horsford  y.  Wright,  Kirb.  3,  v.  Edwards,    114    Mass.  373;  Cecconi  v. 

1   Am.  Dec.  8  (1786),  the  earliest  case;  Rodden,   147    Mass.    164,  16  N.  E.  Rep. 

Sterling  v.  Peet,   14  Conn.  245;   Butler  749.     Michigan:    Eaton    v.   Knowles,  61 

V.   Barnes,   60    Conn.  170,   21  Atl.   Rep.  Mich.  625,  28  N.  W.  Rep.  740.     Vermont: 

419;  Beecher  v.  Baldwin,  55  Conn.  419,  Kcelcr  v.   Wood,   30    Vt.  242;  Keith    v. 

12  Atl.   Rep.   401.     Maine:    Williamson  Day,  15Vt.  660;   Park  v.  Bates,  12  Vt. 

V.Williamson,   71    Me.  442;    Ryerson  v.  381,   387,   36   Am.  Dec.  347;    Drury  v. 

Chapman,  66  Me.  557  ;  Doherty  y.  Dolan,  ShuBiway,    D.    Chip.    110,    1    Am.    Dec. 

65  Me.  87  ;  Hardy  v.  Nelson,  27  Me.  525  ;  704. 

Swett  V.  Patrick,  12  Me.  1  ;  Elder  v.  True,         "  Copeland  r.  McAdory,  100  Ala.  553, 

32    Me.    104;  Cushman    v.   Blanthard,  2  560,  13  So.  Rep.  545;  Carvill  v.  Jacks,  43 

Me.  266, 11  Am.  Dec.  76.    Massachusetts:  Ark.  439  ;  Logan  v.  Moulder,  1  Ark.  313, 

Gore  V.   Brazier,   3   Mass.  523  (1807),  3  33  Am.  Dec.  338. 

764 


DAMAGES   ON   COVENANTS    OF   WARRANTY.  [§  970. 

a  great  rise  in  the  value  of  the  land,  of  great  improvements  to 
be  made  by  the  application  of  his  wealth,  or  his  labor.  But  such 
expectations  must  have  been  confined  to  one  party  only,  and  not 
have  entered  as  an  ingredient  into  the  bargain.  It  was  the  land 
and  its  price,  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  which  the  parties  had  in 
view,  and  to  tliat  subject  the  operation  of  the  contract  ought  to 
be  confined.  The  argument  in  favor  of  the  value  of  the  land, 
and  the  improvements  as  they  exist  at  the  time  of  eviction,  has 
generally  excepted  cases  of  extraordinary  increase  and  of  very 
expensive  improvements.  It  seems  to  have  been  admitted  that, 
without  such  a  limitation  to  the  doctrine,  it  could  not  be  endured. 
But  this  destroys  everything  like  a  fixed  rule  on  the  subject, 
and  places  the  question  of  damages  in  a  most  inconvenient  and 
dangerous  uncertainty."  ^ 

The  general  rule  of  damages  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of 
warranty  in  its  terms  excludes  the  value  of  improvements,  for 
the  measure  is  the  value  of  the  land  as  determined  by  the  parties 
at  the  time  of  the  conveyance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  measure 
of  damages  established  in  England  and  New  England,  being  the 
value  of  the  land  at  the  time  of  eviction,  necessarily  includes  the 
value  of  improvements  made  by  the  purchaser  prior  to  that  time, 
even  though  made  after  notice  of  the  paramount  claim.^ 

The  value  or  expense  of  improvements  made  by  the  evicted 
grantee  cannot  be  recovered  as  a  part  of  his  damages  in  an  action 
for  the  breach  of  a  covenant  of  seisin  or  quiet  enjoyment.'^  "  The 
cost  or  value  of  improvements  upon  the  property  not  being  lecov- 
erable  in  case  the  entire  estate  is  lost  by  the  failure  of  the  prin- 
cipal covenants,  it  is  difficult  to  see  on  what  principle  their  value 
or  cost  can  be  sustained  when  the  worth  of  the  estate  is  simply 
diminished  through  the  failure  of  a  subordinate  covenant.  In 
some  cases  the  same  measure  of  damages  may  be  recovered  upon 
a  breach  of  a  covenant  against  incumbrances  as  upon  a  brcat-h 
of  a  covenant  of  seisin  ;  for  example,  when  the  incumbrance  is 
foreclosed  and  the  grantee  is  evicted.     The  measure  of  damages 

1  Pitcher  v.  Livingston,  4  Johns.  1,  4  Y.  Supp.  594;  Pitcher  v.  Livingston,  4 
Am.  Dec.  229.  See,  also,  Staats  y.  Ten  Johns.  1,  4  Am.  Dec.  229;  Bennet  v. 
Eyck,  3  Caines,  111,  per  Kent,  C.  J.  Jenkins,  1.3  Johns.  ."iO  ;  Murray  v.  IJailou, 

2  Cccconi  V.  Podden,  147  Mass.  164,  1  Juiins.  Cli.  .500,  577  ;  Diinniick  v.  Lock- 
170,  If)  N.  E.  Rep.  749.  wood,  10  Wend.   142;   Kinney  v.  Watts, 

8  Willson  V.  Wilhson,  25  N.  II.  229,  57  14  Wend.  38 ;  Peters  v.  McKeou,  4  Deuio, 
Am.  Dec.  320 ;  Doctor  v.  Darling,  22  N.     540,  5.50. 

765 


§§  971,  972.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

caused  by  an  incumbrance  cannot  be  greater  when  the  grantee  is 
not  evicted  than  it  is  in  the  case  of  an  eviction."  ^ 

When,  in  an  action  upon  a  paramount  title,  a  recovery  is  had 
and  the  defendant  is  allowed  the  value  of  improvements  made 
by  his  warrantor,  such  defendant,  in  a  suit  upon  the  covenant 
of  warranty,  should  deduct  the  amount  so  allowed  from  the  pur- 
chase-price he  is  entitled  to  recover  as  the  measure  of  damages 
for  the  breach  of  the  covenant.^ 

971.  The  damages  a  subsequent  purchaser  can  recover  are 
limited  to  his  actual  loss  and  to  the  amount  of  the  cove- 
nantor's liability.  When  the  suit  is  between  the  original  jDarties, 
the  damages  are  measured  by  the  consideration  they  themselves 
have  set  upon  the  land  in  the  consideration  paid  for  the  convey- 
ance. But  when  the  original  grantee  has  sold  the  land  to  another, 
and  the  second  or  any  subsequent  purchaser  has  been  evicted,  and 
he  brings  his  action  against  the  original  grantor  who  sold  with 
warranty,  his  right  of  recovery  is  in  the  first  jalace  limited  to  his 
actual  loss,  and  in  the  second  place  this  cannot  exceed  the  liability 
of  the  grantor  who  is  sued  to  his  immediate  grantee.  In  other 
words,  the  damages  are  measured  by  the  amount  of  consideration 
paid  by  the  plaintiff  for  the  land,  with  interest,  not  exceeding 
the  amount  paid  the  original  grantor  for  it.^ 

972.  Some  courts  hold,  however,  that  the  measure  of  recov- 
ery is  the  value  of  the  land  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  by  the 
original  covenantor  to  the  covenantee,  and  that  that  value  is  con- 
clusively fixed  by  the  consideration  then  paid.  Under  this  rule, 
if  a  remote  grantee  should  sue  all  the  previous  covenantors,  his 
recovery  would  be  as  variable  as  the  several  amounts  received  by 
each  covenantor  ;  "  and,  in  case  the  consideration  paid  by  him  to 
his  immediate  grantee  is  less  than  the  consideration  received  by 
the  original  covenantor,  his  recovery  would  be  less  against  such 
grantee  than  it  would  be  in  an  action  against  the  original  cove- 

1  Doctor  i;.  Darling,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  594,  sire,  23  Mo.  151.  New  York:  Jenks  v. 
597,  per  FoUett,  J.  Quinii,   61    Hun,   427,   41  St.  Rep.  22,  16 

2  Ingram  v.  Walker  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  N.  Y.  Supp.  240;  Petric  v.  Folz,  22  Jones 
26  S.  W.  Eep.  477.  &  S.  223.     And  see  Greenvault  v.  Davis, 

''■  Colorado  :  Taylor  v.  Wallace,  20  Colo.  4  Hill,  643.     North  Carolina  :  Williams  ?;. 

211,37Pac.  Pep.  963.     Maryland:  Cris-  Beeman,  2  Dev.  483.     Tennessee:  Mette 

field  V.  Storr,  36  Md.  129,   11    Am.   Rep.  v.  Dow,  9  Lea,  93;  Whitzman  v.  Hirsli, 

480.     Minnesota:  Moore  v.  Frankenfield,  87  Tenn.  513,  11   S.  W.  Rep.  421.     Wis- 

25  Minn.  540.     Missouri:  Dickson  v.  De-  consin  :  Eaton  v.  Lyman,  26  Wis.  61. 

766 


DAMAGES    ON   COVENANTS   OF   WARRANTY.       [§§  973,  974. 

nantor;  while,  under  the  rule  that  the  amount  of  his  recovery  is 
the  amount  of  consideration  actually  paid  by  him  for  the  land, 
not  exceeding  the  original  purchase-price,  the  recovery  in  both 
cases  would  be  the  same.  The  rule  limiting  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages in  a  case  like  this,  where  the  remote  grantee  elects  to  sue 
the  original  covenantor,  to  the  actual  loss  sustained  by  him, 
seems  to  us  not  only  equitable,  but  is  in  principle  analogous  to 
the  doctrine  that  applies  in  an  action  by  the  original  covenantee. 
Compensation  for  his  loss  is  all  that  any  evicted  grantee  can 
reasonably  ask."  ^ 

973.  A  covenantee  who  has  conveyed  the  land  with  cove- 
nants of  warranty  may  maintain  an  action  against  an  ante- 
cedent covenantor  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  which  occurred 
after  he  had  conveyed  the  land,  if  he  has  been  obliged  to  make 
good  his  own  covenant  to  his  grantee.  By  satisfying  the  cove- 
nant, it  is  regai'ded  as  having  been  restored  to  him,  and  he  has 
his  right  of  action  against  any  antecedent  covenantor.^  If  he 
has  conveyed  by  quitclaim  deed,  so  that  he  is  not  liable  to  his 
grantee,  the  latter,  if  any  one,  has  a  remedy  against  the  antece- 
dent grantor  on  the  covenants  in  his  deed.^ 

974.  A  purchaser  who  has  himself  perfected  the  title  may 
recover  of  his  warrantor  the  amount  he  has  reasonably  paid, 
with  interest,  and  not  the  whole  purchase-price  of  the  land.*    The 

1  Taylor  v.  Wallace,  20  Colo.  211,  37  Connecticut:  Davis  v.  Lvraan,  6  Conn. 
Pac.  Rep.  963,  per  Goddard,  J.  Ken-  249.  Georgia :  Amos  v.  Cosby,  74  Ga. 
tucky:  Dougherty  u.  Duvall,  9  B.  ]Mon.  793.  Illinois:  Clapp  r.  Hcrdman,  25  111. 
57  ;  Hunt  v.  Orwi<r,  17  B.  Mon.  73.  Mis-  App.  509;  Clayconib  v.  Muii<rer,  51  111. 
sissippi:  Brooks  v.  Black,  68  Miss.  161,  6  373,377.  Iowa:  Richards  v.  Iowa  Home- 
So.  Rep.  332.  South  Carolina :  Lowrance  stead  Co.  44  Iowa,  304,  24  Am.  Rep.  745  ; 
V.  Robertson,  10  S.  C.  8.  Snell  v.  Iowa  Homestead   Co.  59   Iowa, 

2  Wheeler  r.  Sohier,  3  Cush.  219;  Bax-  701,  13  N.  W.  Rep.  848;  Fawcett  v. 
ter  V.  Ryerss,  13  Barb.  267  ;  Clement  v.  Woods,  5  Iowa,  400;  Yokuni  r.  Thomas, 
Bank,  61  Vt.  298,  17  Atl.  Rep.  717.  15  Iowa,  67  ;"  Royer   v.  Foster,   62   lown, 

"i  Hunt  y.  Middlesworth,  44  Mich.  448,  321,  17  N.  W.  Rej..  516.     Kansas:    Dal.! 

7  N.  W.  Rep.  57.  i:  Shivcly,  8  Kans.  276;   McKec  v.  Bain, 

4  Alabama:  Anderson  j'.Kddx,  20  Ala.  II    Kan.'».    569.    Maine:    Reed  r.  Picrc, 

156;  Lewis  v.   Harris,  31   Ala.  689.     Ar-  36    Me.  455,  58   Am.  Dec.  761;  Sprin- 

kansas  :  Dillahunty  o.  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  i;.  Chase,  22  Mc.  505,  39  Am.  Dec.  595  ; 

S.  Ry.  Co.  59   Ark.  629,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  Kelly  v.  Low,  IS  Mc  244;  Swett  v.  Pat- 

1002;  on  rehearing,  28  S.  W.  Rep.  657  ;  rick,   12   Me.  9.      Massachusetts:    Smith 

Collier  V.  Cowger,  52  Ark.  .322,  12  S.  W.  v.  Carney,   127  Mass.  179  ;  Batchcldcr  r. 

Rep.  702  ;  Pate  v.  Mitchell,   23  Ark.  .590,  Sturgis,  3   Cu.sh.  201  ;   Wyman   v.   Bri-- 

79  Am.  Dec.  114.     California :  McGary  y.  den,  4  Mass.  1.50;  Comings  v.  Little,  24 

Hastings,  39  Cal.  360,  2  Am.  Rep.  456.  Pick.   266 ;  Estabrook  v.  Smith,  6  Gray, 

767 


§  ^75.] 


COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 


covenantee  can  recover  only  the  amount  he  actually  and  reason- 
ably paid  for  the  outstanding  title.  If  such  title  is  a  mortgage 
■which  he  has  bought  for  less  than  its  face,  he  can  recover  only 
the  amount  he  paid  for  it.^  Moreover,  the  amount  he  can  recover 
is  limited  to  the  value  of  the  land,  which,  by  the  ride  generally 
prevailing,  is  the  value  the  parties  put  upon  it  at  the  tinie  of  the 
conveyance,^  though  in  New  England  this  is  the  vahie  at  the  time 
of  the  eviction.^ 

But,  contrary  to  the  rule  above  stated,  it  has  been  held  in  Texas 
that  where  the  warrantee,  pending  a  suit  which  resulted  in  his 
eviction,  bought  the  outstanding  superior  title  for  less  than  the 
purchase-money,  his  recovery  upon  the  warranty  was  not  affected 
by  his  purchase  of  the  title  at  a  less  sum,  but  that  he  was  entitled 
to  judgment  for  the  puichase-money  in  the  deed  of  warranty, 
with  interest.^ 

In  an  action  by  the  grantee  to  recover  the  amount  he  has  paid 
in  removing  an  incumbrance  or  in  extinguishing  a  paramount 
title,  the  burden  is  upon  him  to  show  that  the  amount  paid  was 
reasonable.^ 

975.  When  the  eviction   is  by  reason   of  a  mortgage    or 


572,  66  Am.  Dec.  445 ;  Thayer  v.  Clem- 
ence,  22  Pick.  490;  Harlow  v.  Thomas, 
15  Pick.  66.  Michigan:  Long  v.  Sinclair, 
40  Mich.  569.  Minnesota :  Kimball  v. 
Bryant,  25  Minn.  496.  Missouri :  Ward 
V.  Ashbrook,  78  Mo.  515  ;  Blondeau  v. 
Sheridan,  81  Mo.  545,  47  Mo.  App.  460  ; 
Dickson  v.  Desire,  2.3  Mo.  151  ;  St.  Louis 
V.  Bissau,  46  Mo.  157;  Nebraska:  Che- 
ney V.  Straube,  35  Neb.  521,  53  N.  W. 
Rep.  479  ;  New  Hampshire  :  Loomis  v. 
Bedel,  11  N.  H.  74;  Willson  v.  Willson, 
25  N.  H.  229,  57  Am.  Dec.  320.  New 
Jersey  :  Hartshorn  v.  Cleveland,  52  N.  J. 
L.  473,  19  Atl.  Rep.  974;  Stewart  v. 
Drake,  9  N.  J.  L.  139.  New  York  :  De- 
lavergne  v.  Norris,  7  Johns.  358,  5  Am. 
Dec.  281  ;  Andrews  v.  Appel,  22  Hun, 
429 ;  Petrie  v.  Folz,  22  Jones  &  S.  223. 
North  Carolina :  Price  v.  Deal,  90  N.  C. 
290.  Ohio  :  Lane  v.  Fury,  31  Ohio  St. 
574.  Oregon  :  Arrigoni  v.  Johnson,  6  Oreg. 
167,  Ehode  Island :  Porter  v.  Bradley,  7 
R.  I.  538.  Texas  :  McClelland  v.  Moore, 
48   Tex.  355 ;   Denson  i;.  Love,  58  Tex. 

768 


468 ;  James  v.  Lamb,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
185,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  172.  Vermont:  Cole 
V.  Kimball,  52  Yt.  639  ;  Turner  v.  Good- 
rich, 26  Vt.  707.  Wisconsin:  Eaton  v. 
Tallmadge,  22  Wis.  526 ;  Hard  v.  Hall, 
12  Wis.  112;  Bailey  v.  Scott,  13  Wis. 
618. 

1  McDowell  V.  Milroy,  69  111.  498; 
Knadler  v.  Sharp,  36  Iowa,  232. 

2  Grant  v.  Tallman,  20  N.  Y.  191 ; 
McGary  v.  Hastings,  39  Cal.  360,  369,  2 
Am.  Rep.  456  ;  Richards  v.  Iowa  Home- 
stead Co.  44  Iowa,  304,  24  Am.  Rep.  745 ; 
Cox  V.  Henry,  32  Pa.  St.  18;  Brady  v. 
Spurck,  27  111.  478. 

3  Johnson  v.  Collins,  116  Mass.  392; 
Kelsey  v.  Remer,  43  Conn.  129,  21  Am. 
Rep.  638 ;  Porter  v.  Bradley,  7  R.  I.  538. 

*  Thiele  v.  Axell,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  548, 
24  S.  W.  Rep.  552. 

5  Kelsey  v.  Remer,  43  Conn.  129,  21 
Am.  Rep.  638 ;  Guthrie  v.  Russell,  46 
Iowa,  269,  26  Am.  Rep.  135  ;  Anderson  v. 
Knox,  20  Ala.  156;  Pate  v.  Mitchell,  23 
Ark.  590,  79  Am.  Dec.  114. 


DAMAGES   ON   COVENANTS  OF  WARRANTY.      [§§  976,  977. 

other  paramount  lien,  and  there  is  time  for  redemption,  the 
measure  of  damages  is  the  amount  payable  to  effect  a  redemp- 
tion,i  if  that  is  less  than  the  full  value  of  the  land.  This  is  an 
exception  to  the  general  rule  that,  where  there  has  been  no  evic- 
tion, and  the  grantee's  possession  has  not  been  interfered  with, 
be  can  recover  only  nominal  damages.  This  exception  to  the 
rule  is  not  made  in  some  decisions.^ 

976.  It  is  held,  however,  in  some  cases,  that  the  grantee 
■who  has  been  evicted  by  a  paramount  mortgage  is  under  no 
obligation  to  redeem,  and,  therefore,  that  he  is  entitled  to  recover 
the  value  of  the  land  measured  by  the  consideration  paid  and 
interest.^  Although  it  is  a  rule  that  a  party  exposed  to  injury  or 
damage  shall  make  the  loss  as  small  as  he  reasonably  can,  a  pur- 
chaser by  warranty  deed  is  not  required  to  advance  the  money 
to  pay  a  mortgage  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  himself  or  his 
land.4 

The  purchaser  may  recover  upon  his  covenant,  although  he 
might  have  removed  the  incumbrance  or  defect  of  title.° 

When,  however,  a  mortgage  or  other  paramount  lien  has  been 
foreclosed  and  all  right  of  redemption  is  gone,  the  rule  of  dam- 
ages is  the  value  of  the  land  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance 
by  the  defendant,  not  exceeding  the  consideration  received  by 
him.6 

977.  Where  the  breach  of  the  covenant  is  the  adjudication 
of  the  existence  of  a  public  highway  over  the  land,  the  meas- 
ure of  damages  is  not  the  full  value  of  the  land  so  occupied  in 
fee,  for  the  easement  of  the  public  does  not  deprive  the  owner  of 
the  fee ;  but  the  correct  measure  of  damages  is  the  diminution, 
if  any,  in  the  value  of  the  lot  at  the  time  of  the  eviction,  caused 
by  the  assertion  of  the  right  to  use  the  strip  as  a  street,  with 

1  Furnas  v.  Durgin,  119  Mass.  500,  20  *  Wilcox  v.  Cnmpl)ell,  106  N.  Y.  325, 
Am.  Rep.  341  ;  Donahoe  v.  Emery,  9  12  N.  E.  Kep.  823,  8  N.  Y.  St.  Kep.  885. 
Met.  63;  Norton  j;.  Babcock,  2  Met.  .OlO;  ^  Elder  v.  True,  32  Me.  104;  Blan- 
White  V.  Whitney,  3  Met.  81, 89  ,  Tufts  v.  chard  v.  Ellis,  1  Gray,  Htf) ;  Miller  r.  Hal- 
Adams,  8  Pick.  547  ;  Curtis  v.  Decrinp,  12  sey,  14  N.  J.  L.  48  ;  Wilcox  v.  Campbell, 
Me.  499;  Lloyd  v.  Qiiimby,  5  Ohio  St.  106  N.  Y.  325,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  823;  Jenks 
262;   Winslowr.  McCall,  32  Barb.  241.  v.    Quinn,   61   Hun,   427,  437,  16  N.   Y, 

2  Bundy  v.  Ridcnour,  63  Ind.  400  ;  Ran-  Supp.  240. 

dell  V.  Mallett,  14  Me.  51.  «  Jenks   .•.  Quinn,   137  N.  Y.    223,   61 

8  Elder  v.  True,  32  Me.  104  ;  Stewart  Hun,  427,  41  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  22,  16  N.  Y. 

V.  Drake,  9  N.  J.  L.  139  ;  Miller  v.  Hal-  Supp.  240,33  N.  E.  Rep.  376. 
sey,  14  N.  J.  L.  48. 

769 


§§  978-980.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

interest  to  the  time  of  trial,  and  the  costs  of  the  action  which 
resulted  in  the  eviction,  with  interest  thereon  from  the  time  of 
the  recovery.^ 

978.  If  the  grantee  himself  holds  a  title  or  incumbrance  on 
the  real  estate  conveyed,  he  cannot  set  up  sucii  title  as  a  breach 
of  the  covenant  of  warranty,  for  "  covenants  of  warranty  only 
extend  to  a  title  existing  in  a  third  person  which  may  defeat  the 
estate  granted  by  the  covenantor.  They  do  not  embrace  a  title 
already  vested  in  the  covenantee."  ^ 

979.  A  purchaser  is  not  estopped  or  precluded  from  main- 
taining an  action  upon  any  of  the  covenants  in  his  deed  by  rea- 
son of  having  given  a  mortgage  to  his  grantor  for  purchase- 
money  containing  similar  covenants.^  "  It  could  not  have  been 
intended  that  the  mortgage  should  in  effect  embrace  and  hypothe- 
cate to  the  vendor  his  own  covenant  assuring  to  his  vendee  the 
title  which  he  then  assumed  to  convey.  As  between  the  parties 
to  such  a  transaction,  the  mortgage  back  to  the  vendor  is  to  be 
deemed  as  reconveying,  subject  to  the  condition  of  defeasance, 
only  such  estate  as  is  conveyed  by  the  mortgagee  to  the  mort- 
gagors. It  was  not  effectual,  as  between  these  parties,  to  dis- 
charge the  vendor  from  his  obligation  upon  the  covenant  of  seisin, 
which,  being  then  broken,  gave  to  the  mortgagors  an  immediate 
right  of  action."  * 

980.  It  is  a  defence  to  an  action  for  a  breach  of  the  cove- 


1  Hymes   v.   Esty,   133  N.   Y.  342,  31  plied  as  where  a  covenant  against  incum- 

N.  E.  Rep.  105.     The  court  say:   "It  is  brances  has  been  broken  by  the  existence 

the  manner  in  which  this  easement  affects  of  an  easement." 

the  entire  premises  purchased  which  con-  -  Carson  v.  Cabeen,  45  111.  App.  262; 

stitutes    his    loss,   if  any.     It  may  have  Smiley  v.  Fries,  104  111.  416;  Furness  v. 

proved  to  be  a  benefit  rather  than  an  in-  Williams,  11  111.  229;  Fitch  v.  Baldwin, 

jury.     It  not  infrequently  happens  that  a  17  Johns.  161  ;  Dillahunty  v.  Little  Rock 

lot-owner  will  consent  to  the  laying  out  of  &  Ft.  S.  Ry.  Co.  59  Ark.  629,  27  S.  W. 

a  street  across  his  lands,  because  of  the  Rep.  1002,  on  rehearing  28   S.  W.   Rep. 

convenience  of  access  it  will  afford,  or  the  657. 

creation  of  a  new  frontage  for  building  ^  gumner  v.  Barnard,  12   Mete.  459; 

lots,  or  some  other  compensatory  advan-  Brown  v.  Staples,  28  Me.  497 ;  Smith  v. 

tage  which    it    brings.     If    the    plaintiff's  Cannoll,  32  Me.  123;   Haynes  y.  Stevens, 

entire  lot  is  le.=s  valuable  or  marketable  1 1  N.  H.  28  ;  Connor  v.  Eddy,  25  Mo.  72  ; 

on  account  of  the  encroaching  street,  to  Rawle,  Cov.  (5th  ed.)  §  266;  Hubbard  v. 

that  extent  he  should  be  remunerated,  but  Norton,  10  Conn.  422. 

beyond  that  there  is  neither  reason  nor  *  Resser  v.  Carney,  52  Wan.  397,  54 

justice    in   a  demand   for   payment.      In  N.  W.  Rep.  89,  jjer  Dickinson,  J.     See  2 

other  words,  the  same  rule  should  be  ap-  Jones  on  Mortgages,  §§  1500-1505. 

770 


DAMAGES   ON   COVENANTS    OF   WARRANTY.       [§§  981,  982. 

nant  that  the  purchaser  has  agreed  to  remove  the  incum- 
brance. Where,  upon  the  execution  and  delivery  of  a  deed,  the 
purchaser  retains  the  entire  consideration,  or  some  part  of  it,  and 
holds  it  upon  the  trust  and  agreement  that  he  would  apply  it  to 
the  payment  of  existing  incumbrances  on  the  land,  which  the 
grantor  was  bound  to  pay,  in  an  action  for  breach  of  the  covenant 
against  incumbrances  in  a  deed,  evidence  of  such  agreement  is 
admissible  in  defence  of  the  action.  It  does  not  show,  or  tend  to 
show,  that  the  incumbrance  was  not  to  be  paid  off  by  the  grantor, 
but  that  it  was  to  be  paid  out  of  his  own  money  in  the  plaintiff's 
hands  for  that  purpose.  It  does  not  contradict,  vary,  or  change 
the  effect  of  the  deed  or  covenant.^ 

981.  The  grantee  is  entitled  to  recover  interest  on  the 
consideration  of  the  conveyance,  as  compensation  for  the  mesne 
profits  he  is  liable  to  account  for  to  the  true  owner  who  has 
evicted  him.^  But  if  the  grantee  has  been  in  the  quiet  possession 
of  the  land,  and  has  received  the  rents  and  profits  from  the  time 
of  the  execution  of  the  deed,  and  is  not  liable  to  account  therefor 
to  the  owner,  he  should  not  be  allowed  to  recover  interest  on  the 
consideration  paid  by  jiim.^ 

982.  If  the  grantee  has  purchased  an  outstanding  para- 
mount title,  and  has  been  all  the  time  in  possession,  he  can 
recover  only  the  amount  paid  for  such  title,  with  interest  from  the 
time  of  payment.*     If   he  has  yielded   p(»ssession   to  the   person 

1  Becker  v.  Knudson,  86  Wis.  14,  56  N.  389 ;  Brooks  v.  Black,  68  Miss.  161,  8  So. 
W.  Rep.  192;  Waclieiidorf  v.  Lancaster,  Rep.  332;  Clark  v.  Parr,  14  Ohio,  118,  45 
66  Iowa,  458,  23  N.  W.  Rep.  922;  Blood  Am.  Dec.  529;  Cox  «;.  Henry,  32  Pa.  St. 
V.  Wilkins,  43  Iowa,  565.  18;  Morris  v.  Rowan,   17  N.  J.  L.  304; 

2  Staats  V.  Ten  Eyck,  3  Caines,  111,  Sumner  i;.  Williams,  8  Mass.  162,  5  Am. 
115,  2  Am.  Dec.  254;  Pitcher  v.  Livinj^-  Dec.  83. 

ston,  4  Johns.   1,   13,  4   Am.   Dec.  229;  "  McGuffey  (-'.  Iliuiies,  85    Teiin.    26, 

Caulkins  v.  Harris,  9  Johns.  324 ;  Ben-  1  S.  W.  Rep.  506 ;  O'Mtara  v.  McDaniel, 

net  V.  Jenkins,  13  Johns.  .50;  Kinney  i'.  49   Kans.  685,31  Pnc.  Rep.  303;  Cox  v. 

Watts,   14  Wend.  38,  40;  Peters  v.   Mc-  Henry,  32  Pa.  St.  18;  Mann  v.  Mathews, 

Keon,  4  Denio,  546,  549 ;  Drew  v.  Towlc,  82  Tex.  98,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  •)27  ;  Brown  v. 

30  N.  H.  531,  64  Am.  Dec.  309  ;  Kennison  Ilearon,  66  Tex.  63,   17  S.  AV.  Rep.  395  ; 

V.  Taylor,   18  N.  H.  220;  Mariin  v.  Gor-  Collins?;.  Dnrward,4  Tex.  Civ.  Ap[i.  339, 

don,  24  Ga.  .533;  Groesbeck  v.  Harris,  82  23  S.  W.  Rep.  561  ;    Wade  v.  Comstock, 

Tex.  411,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  8.50;  Shorthell  v.  II  Ohio  St.   71  ;    Ilutchins  v.  Roundtree, 

Ferguson,  44  Iowa,  249;  Flint  v.  Stead-  77  Mo.  500. 

man,  36  Vt.  210;  Messer  v.  Oestreich,  52  *  Sprins;  v.  Chase,  22   Me.  502,  39  Am. 

Wis.  084,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  6  ;  Point  Street  Dec.  595  ;  Tanner  v.  Livingston,  12  Wend. 

Iron    Works    v.  Turner,    14  R.    I.     122;  83. 
Gunter  v.  Beard,  93  Ala.  227,  9  So.  Rep. 

771 


§  083.]  COVENANTS   FOR  TITLE. 

having    paramount    title,    be    is    entitled    to    interest    from    that 
time.^ 

Interest  is  not  recoverable  prior  to  eviction  asserted  by  a  judg- 
ment in  ejectment,  unless  the  plaintiff  in  the  ejectment  suit  has 
recovered  mesne  profits  from  the  grantee.^ 

The  grantor,  when  sued  on  his  covenants  of  warranty,  cannot 
set  off  rents  and  profits  received  by  the  grantee  from  the  prop- 
erty before  he  was  evicted,  though  the  true  owner  failed  to  recover 
for  these  items  in  his  action  to  evict  the  grantee ;  and  it  is  imma- 
terial that  the  reason  why  he  so  failed  to  recover  was  because  he 
occupied  another  tract  of  land  of  equal  value.^ 

If  the  grantee  has  not  used  or  occupied  the  land,  he  is  en- 
titled to  interest  on  the  price  paid  for  it  from  the  time  it  was 
paid.* 

983.  It  is  a  general  rule  that  a  covenantee  is  entitled  to 
recover  the  costs  and  expenses  he  has  sustained  in  the  ac- 
tion by  which  he  was  evicted,  or  in  the  assertion  or  defence  of 
the  title  warranted.  Such  costs  include  reasonable  counsel  fees.^ 
"  In  this  class  of  cases  the  reasons  which  have  led  the  courts  to 
include  as  part  of  the  damages  the  reasonable  cost  which  the 
plaintiff'  has  actually  been  put  to  in  the  eviction  proceedings  are 
not  far  to  seek.  The  covenantor  has  in  writing  agreed  to  defend 
the  title  to  the  land  conveyed.  When  he  knows  that  the  title  is 
attacked  in  court  it  becomes  his  duty  to  defend  it.  In  the  words 
of  Judge  Kent,^  the  covenantor  '  was  bound  to  defend  and  protect 
the  plaintiff  and  his  assigns  in  the  title  he  had  conveyed.  At 
common  law  he  might  have  been  vouched  to  come  in,  and  have 
been  substituted  as  a  real  defendant  in  the  suit.'  Under  our 
practice  the  covenantor  may  be  vouched  or  summoned  in  tlie  evic- 
tion proceedings  to  defend  the  title,  or  he  may  voluntarily  under- 
take the  defence.  If  the  covenantor  fails  or  refuses  to  defend  in 
the  eviction  proceedings,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  defendant  therein  to 
defend  the  property  as  best  he  can.    Under  such  circumstances,  it 

1  Lambert  v.  Estes,  99  Mo.  604,  13  S.         ^  Staats  v.  Ten  Eyck,  3  Caines,  111,2 
W.  Rep.  284.  Am.  Dec.  254  ;  Sterling  v.  Peet,  14  Conn. 

*  Collier  v.   Cowger,  52  Ark.  322,  12     245,254. 

S.  W.  Rep.  702.  ^  In  an   opinion  given   by  him  in  the 

3  Rhea  v.  Swain,  122  Ind.   272,  23  N.     ease  of  Staats  v.  Ten  Eyck, 3  Caines,  HI, 
E.  Rep.  776,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  1000.  2  Am.  Dec.  254. 

*  Graham   v.    Dyer   (Ky.),   29   S.    W. 
Rep.  346. 

772 


DAMAGES    ON   COVENANfS    OF   WARRANTY.  [§  984. 

is  just  and  equitable  that  the  plaintiff  in  the  action  for  a  breach 
of  the  covenant  of  warranty  should  be,  to  some  extent  at  least, 
made  good  for  the  reasonable  '  cost  which  he  has  actually  been  put 
to '  in  an  attempt  made  in  good  faith  to  defend  the  title.  It  is  in 
a  very  proper  sense  the  natural  and  necessary  consequence  of  the 
breach  of  covenant.  It  is  incurred  on  behalf  of  the  covenantor, 
and  in  the  performance  of  his  duty,  and  he,  when  properly  cited 
in,  can  at  any  time  put  an  end  to  the  suit  by  compromise  or  other- 
wise, or  can  himself  assume  the  cost  and  expense  of  defending 
the  title."  1 

But  this  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  costs  have  been  incurred 
in  a  proceeding  to  reform  the  deed  so  as  to  include  the  parcel  of 
land  from  which  the  grantee  has  been  evicted.  Thus  an  action 
was  brought  against  a  grantee  of  lands  for  trespass  on  a  small 
portion  of  land  which  both  he  and  his  grantor  erroneously  sup- 
posed was  embraced  by  the  description  in  the  deed  to  him. 
After  judgment  for  plaintiff  in  this  action,  the  grantee  brought  a 
suit  against  the  grantor  to  reform  his  deed  so  as  to  include  the 
land  and  contain  a  covenant  of  warranty,  and  to  recover  damages 
for  breach  of  warranty.  It  was  held  that  the  grantee  was  not 
entitled  to  attorneys'  fees  as  items  of  damages  paid  in  the  suit 
against  him  for  trespass,  such  damages  having  been  sustained 
before  the  reformation  of  his  deed  by  insertion  of  the  covenant 
of  warranty .2 

984.  If  a  covenantor  has  notice  of  a  suit  involving  the 
title  and  fails  to  defend  it,  and  the  purchaser  defends,  the 
expenses  incurred  by  him  in  such  defence,  with  interest  tliereon, 
may  be  added  to  the  amount  of  damages  awarded  him  in  liis  suit 
upon  the  covenant  of  title.-"^  But  the;  prevailing  rule  is  that  no- 
tice to  the  covenantor  is  not  necessary  to  make  him  responsible 

1  Butler  V.  Barnes,  01    Conn.  399,  406,  S.  W.  Rep.  197;  Ilayncs  r.   Stevens,  11 

21  At!.  Kep.  419,  per  Torrance,  J.     And  N.  II.  :>h  ;  Daiton  v.  Bowker,  8  Nev.  190; 

see    Wiiliainsou    v.    Williamson,    71    Me.  Stebbin.s   r.  Wolf,  .-i.-}    Kans.   7f).'>,  7   Pac. 

442;  Kverson   v.  Chapman,  f,6  Me.  557;  Kep.  542;  Morri.s  /;.  Howan,  17  N.  J.   L. 

Matheny  v.   Stewart,   108   iMo.   7.3,  17  S.  304;   Holmes  i..  Siunickson,   15  N,  J.  L. 

W.   Rep.   1014;    Iluteliins    v.  Roundtrcc,  313;  Robertson  d.  Lemon,  2  Bu.sh,  301. 

77  Mo.  500;   WaLsh  r.  Dunn,  34  III.  App.  -  Butler  v.   Barnes,   01    Conn.  399,   21 

146;  Leffingwell  v.  Elliott,  10  Pick.  204  ;  Atl.  Rep.  419,  24  Atl.  Rep.  328. 

Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  South  Park  Res-  •'  AVinnipiseogee   Paper   Co.  v.  Eaton, 

idence  Co.  94  Ky.  271,  22    S.   W.   Rep.  65   N.  U.  13,  18  Atl.  Rep.  171  ;  Ilutcblns 

314;  Hedrick  v.  Smith,  77  Tex.  608,  14  u.  Roundtree,  77  Mo.  500. 


§§  985,  986.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

for  the  expenses  incurred  by  the  grantee  in  defending  the  title 
warranted  to  him.' 

985.  Costs  and  expenses  incurred  by  the  purchaser  in 
defending  a  title  are  not  allowed  where  it  is  evident  that 
defence  is  useless,  and  he  has  been  notified  not  to  defend  by 
his  grantor,  who  acknowledges  liability  on  his  covenants.-  But 
other  decisions  are  to  the  effect  that  the  grantee  has  the  right  to 
defend  the  title  warranted  to  him  though  the  covenantor  refuses 
to  defend,  and  notifies  the  grantee  that  if  he  defends  he  will  do 
so  at  his  own  expense.^ 

The  purchaser  is  not  entitled  to  costs  in  defending  a  branch  of 
the  action  against  him  which  sought  to  recover  land  not  embraced 
in  the  grantor's  deed.^ 

If  the  suit  was  groundless,  and  results  in  favor  of  the  title 
warranted,  the  purchaser  is  not  entitled  to  costs  and  expenses 
incurred  in  defending  the  suit.  The  grantor  does  not  warrant 
that  no  one  sliall  make  a  claim  of  adverse  title,  but  only  that  no 
one  shall  make  a  claim  which  shall  be  adjudged  valid  and  para- 
mount to  the  title  conveyed  by  his  deed.^ 

986.  Reasonable  counsel  fees  may  usually  be  recovered  by 
a  covenantee  against  the  covenantor  in  defending  the  title  cove- 
nanted. If  it  was  the  duty  of  the  covenantor  to  defend  a  suit 
against  the  covenantee,  and  he  declined  or  neglected  to  do  so, 
and  the  covenantee  in  good  faith  defended  them,  it  would  seem 
that  reasonable  counsel  fees  should  be  allowed  him.^ 

1  Boyle  V.   Edwards,   114    Mass.    .373;  S.  E.  Rep.  68 ;   Threlkeld  v.   Fitzhugh,  2 

Ryerson  v.  Chapman,  66  Me.  557;  Ken-  Leigh,  451. 

nison  v.  Taylor,  18  N.  H.  220;   Keeler  v.         «  Richmond  v.  Ames,  164  Mass. 467, 41 

Wood,  .30  Vt.  242  ;  I'itcher  v.  Livingston,  N.  E.  Rep.  671,  citing  Westfield  v.  Mayo, 

4  Johns.   1,   4   Am.    Dec.  229;    Lane    v.  122  Mass.  100,  23  Am.  Rep.  292  ;  Leffing- 

Fury,  31    Ohio    St.    574;    Robertson    v.  well  y.  Elliott,  10  Pick.  204  ;   ^Meservey  u. 

Lemon,  2  Bnsh,  .301 ;  Harding  v.  Larkin,  Snell  (Iowa),  62  N.  W.  Rep.  767  ;  Mercan- 

41111.413.  tile   Trust  Co.  i-.  South  Park   Residence 

-  Matheny  v.  Stewart,  108  Mo.  73,  17  Co.  94  Ky.  271,  22  S.  W.  Rej).  314;  Yo- 

S.  W.  Rep.  1014  ;  Terry  v.  Drabenstadt,  kum  v.  Thomas,  15  Iowa,  67;   Rwartz  v. 

68  Pa.  St.  400.  Ballon,  47  Iowa,  188,   29  Am.  Rep.  470; 

=*  Morris  v.    Rowan,   17   N.   J.  L.  304 ;  Harding   y.  Larkin,  41    111.   413;   Lane  u. 

Crisfield  v.  Storr,  36  Md.  129,  11  Am.  Rep.  Fury,  31  Ohio  St.  574  ;  McAlpin  v.  Wood- 

480;  Point  Street  Iron  Works  y.  Turner,  ruff,  11  Ohio  St.  120;    Swett   v.   Patrick, 

14R.  I.  122.  12    Me.    9.       Otherwise   in  Mississippi : 

*  Graham  v.  Dyer  (Ky.),  29  S.  W.  Rep.  Brooks  v.  Black,  68  Mi.ss.  161,  8  So.  Rep. 

346.  332,  Cooper,  J.,  saying :  "Believing  that 

5  Smith  V.  Parsons,  33  W.  Va.  644,  11  the  rule  allowing  any  costs  shoi  Id  never 

774 


DAMAGES   ON   COVENANTS   OF   WARRANTY.  [§  987. 

If  no  opportunity  was  given  to  the  covenantor  to  defend  the 
suit,  the  law  is  more  doubtful,  says  Chief  Justice  Field  in  a 
recent  case  in  Massachusetts,  "although  the  tendency  is  to  allow 
reasonable  counsel  fees,  if  the  circumstances  were  such  as  to  ren- 
der the  employment  of  counsel  proper."  ^ 

The  grantee,  when  evicted,  cannot  recover  counsel  fees,  as  well 
as  the  value  of  the  land,  where  he  has  called  upon  the  grantor  to 
defend  the  title  and  he  has  immediately  employed  competent 
counsel  to  do  so.^ 

A  mortgagor  in  a  purchase-money  mortgage  may  set  off  his 
expenses  in  defending  the  title,  when  his  grantor,  who  has  war- 
ranted the  title,  seeks  a  judgment  in  foreclosure  of  such  mort- 
gage.3 

The  grantee  is  entitled  to  recover  for  expenses  actually  paid  for 
drafting  and  recording  a  discharge  of  a  mortgage  which  is  a 
breach  of  the  covenants  of  the  deed ;  but  not  for  lost  time,  car 
fares,  and  the  like  expenses  of  the  grantee  in  attending  to  the 
business.^ 

987.  The  statute  of  limitations  applies  to  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  a  breach  of  covenant  of  warranty  of  title.  The 
provision  applicable  to  such  an  action  is  that  which  appertains  to 
an  action  upon  a  bond  or  obligation  under  seal.  Tlic  ailion  is 
upon  the  written  covenant,  though  the  breach  of  it  is  compen- 
sated for  in  damae:es.° 

The  grantee's  cause  of  action  on  the  covenant  does  not  arise 
until  there  lias  been  a  breach  of  it  by  the  assertion  of  a  para- 
mount title  by  the  true  owner.  The  grantee  is  not  required  to 
assert  his  rights  against  his  warrantor  until  the  j^aramount  title 
was  itself  asserted  in  some  way,  whether  by  suit  or  by  occui)ancy 
thereunder.^ 

have  been  established,  we  decline  to  ex-  E.  Hep.  2;  Finton   r.  E;,'lcstou,  01  Ilnn, 

tend  it  beyond   the  limits   of   the  taxed  246,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  721. 

costs  of  the  case."     And  Texas  :  Chirk  v.  ■'•  I'otwin  r.   Bla.sher,  9  Wash.  4f)0,  ;!7 

Mumfoid,  62  Tex.  531.  I'ac.  Hep.  710. 

'  Richmond   v.  Ames,    iO-l    Mas.s.  467,  *   HraiLslmw   r.  Cnwby,  I.^l    Mass.  2.37, 

41  N.  E.  Kcp.  671,  citint,'Lin(lseyr.  Parker,  24   N.  E.  IJep.  47. 

142  Mass.  582,  8  N.  E.  Kep.  745;   Boston  <>  Thomas  r.  Hland,  91  Ky.  I,  14  S.  \V. 

&  A.  R.  Co.  V.  Charlton,  101  Mass  .32,  .30  Rep.  9.')5  ;  (Jnerin  r.  Smith,  62  Midi.  309, 

N.  E.  Rep.  688;   Bradshaw  v.  Crosby,  151  28  N.   W.  Rep.  906  ;  Davenport  r.  Davcn- 

Mass.  2.37,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  47  ;  Farnum  v.  port,  52  Mich.  587,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  .371. 

Peter.^on,  111  Ma.ss.  148.  «  Alvordw.  Wa;,';,'oner  (Tex.  Civ  App.), 

2  Conrad  v.  Effinger,  87  Va.  59,  12  S.  29  S.  W.  Rep.  797,   affirmed   (Tex.)   32 

776 


§  988.]  COVENANTS    FOR   TITLE. 

If  a  purchaser  neglects  to  enforce  possession  within  the  statu- 
tory period,  where  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  the  hind  was  in 
the  adverse  possession  of  another,  and  permits  tliat  possession  to 
ripen  by  hipse  of  time  into  a,  good  title,  he  is  without  remedy  on 
his  covenant.^  Moreover,  if  a  purchaser  neglects  to  enforce  his 
possession  where  the  land  is  vacant,  vfithin  the  statutory  period 
of  limitation,  he  must  take  the  consequences  of  his  own  neglect.^ 
If  for  that  period  he  neglects  to  take  possession  of  land  adapted 
to  occupancy  and  cultivation,  which  has  remained  vacant  and 
unoccupied,  and  is  therefore  defeated  in  an  action  brouglit  by  him 
to  obtain  possession  from  one  claiming  under  a  prior  adverse  and 
better  title  than  his  own,  and  thereupon  brings  suit  upon  the 
covenant  of  warranty  against  his  grantor,  although  an  action  on 
the  warranty  did  not  accrue  until  the  assertion  of  the  superior 
title,  the  plaintiff's  neglect  in  failing  to  take  possession  of  the 
lands  for  so  long  a  period,  and  thereby  protect  his  title,  precludes 
his  recovery  on  the  covenant.-^ 

988.  A  covenant  may  be  released  directly  or  indirectly  by 
the  person  entitled  to  enforce  it.  Thus  a  covenant  of  warranty 
ordinarily  runs  with  the  land,  and  passes  with  it  to  successive 
holders,  but  the  last  holder  may  release  and  discharge  it,  and 
thereby  terminate  all  rights  under  it  either  in  favor  of  himself  or 
of  any  subsequent  grantee  of  the  land.*  The  acceptance  of  a  con- 
veyance subject  to  a  specified  mortgage,  the  consideration  paid 
being  measured  by  the  fact  that  the  land  is  thus  held  for  the  satis- 
faction of  the  debt  charged  upon  it,  thereby  relinquishes  the  bene- 
fit of  covenants  of  warranty,  as  respects  such  incumbrance  in  prior 
deeds.  "  One  who  by  his  own  consent  acquires  and  holds  an 
estate  expressly  so  charged  cannot  consistently  claim  that  there 

S.  W.  Rep.  872 ;  Clark  t;.  Mumford,  62  -  Matteson  v.  Vaughan,  38  Mich.  373, 

Tex.  531 ;   Jones   v.  Paul,   59    Tex.  41 ;  per  Campbell,  C.  J. 

Eustis  V.  Cowherd,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  343,  3  Claflin  v.  Case,  53  Kans.  560,  36  Pac. 

23    S.  W.  Rep.    737.     Where  there  has  Rep.  1062.     See,  also,  Abbott  v.  Rowan, 

been  no  decision  against  the  paramount  33  Ark.  593 ;   Shattuck  v.  Lamb,  65  N. 

title,  and  within  the  statutory  period  after  Y.  499,  22  Am.  Rep.  656  ;  St.  John   v. 

its  extiuguLshment  by  the  covenantee  he  Palmer,  5  Hill,  599. 

brings  his  action  on  the  covenant  of  war-  *  Merritt  v.  Byers,  46  Minn.   74,  48  N. 

■  ranty,  he  is  not  barred  by  the  statute  of  W.    Rep.  417;    Middlemore  v.    Goodale, 

limitations.      Blondeau   i-.    Sheridan,    81  Cro.  Car.  503  ;  Brown  v.  Staples,  28  Me. 

Mo.  545.  497,  48  Am.  Dec.  504  ;  Field  v.   Snell,  4 

1  Rindskopf  v.  Farmer's  L.  &  T.  Co.  58  Cash.  504. 
Barb.  36. 

776 


AFTER-ACQUIRED   TITLE   OF  GRANTOR.      [§§  989,  990. 

passed  to  him  without  qualification  and  for  his  benefit,  as  an  inci- 
dent of  the  estate  so  conveyed,  the  obligations  of  former  cove- 
nantors to  the  effect  that  the  estate  should  not  be  so  charged."'  ^ 

989.  Whether  several  covenantors  are  bound  jointly  or 
severally  or  both,  and  whether  several  covenantees  are  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  covenants  jointly  or  severally  or  both,  is  a  matter 
of  intention  to  be  gathered  from  the  terms  of  the  instrument, 
or  from  its  construction  with  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  inter- 
est of  the  parties,  or  from  other  circumstances.^  Where  two  or 
more  persons  covenant  with  another  by  the  words  "  we  covenant," 
the  words  indicate  a  joint  covenant,  and  are  to  be  so  considered, 
unless,  from  the  whole  instrument,  such  appears  not  to  have  been 
the  intention  of  the  parties.^ 

If  the  deed  itself  sets  out  the  interests  of  the  several  grantors 
which  are  different,  the  covenant  of  title  will  have  reference  to 
such  interests,  and  will  not  be  construed  as  the  joint  covenant  of 
all.4 

A  covenant  by  several  with  one  or  more  of  their  number  cannot 
be  enforced  at  law.     These  are  no  pi-oper  parties  for  a  contract.^ 

X.  After-acquired  Title  of  Grrantor. 

990.  An  after-acquired  title  of  a  grantor  who  has  conveyed 
the  land  by  a  warranty  deed  passes  to  his  grantee  by  operation 
of  law  immediately  upon  his  acquiring  such  title.*^     The  after- 

1  Merritt  v.  Byers,  46  Minn.  74,  48  N,  ^  Abbott  v.  Hills,  1 58  Mass.  396,  33  N. 

W.  Rep.  417,  per  Dickinson,  J.  E.  Rep.  592  ;  Eastman  v.  Wright,  6  Pick. 

-  Beiesford  v.  Browning,  1  Ch.  D.  30;  316. 

VVilmer  v.  Currey,  2  De  G.  &  Sm.  .347.  «  Tillsbury  v.  Alexander,  40  Neb.  242, 

3  Enys  V.  Donnithorne,  2  Burr.  1190;  .58  N.  W.  Rep.  859 ;  Nioodenius  c.  Young, 
Donahoe  v.  Emery,  9  Met.  63,  67  ;  Pliila-  90  Iowa,  423,  57  N.  W.  Rep.  906 ;  Sayre 
delphia  v.  Reeves,  48  Pa.  St.  472;  Phil-  v.  Sheffield  Land  Co.  (Ala.)  18  So.  Rep. 
lips  V.  Bonsall,  2  Binn.  138.  101  ;  Prewitt  v.  Ashford,  90  Ala.  294,  7 

4  Redding  i;.  Lamb,  81  Mich.  318,  45  So.  Rep.  831  ;  Parker  v.  Marks,  82  Ala. 
N.  W.  Rep.  997.  "While  the  rule  in  .548,3  So.  Rep.  5;  Bone  v.  Lansden,  85 
construing  covenants  is  to  construe  them  Ala.  562,  6  So.  Rep.  611;  Chapman  v. 
most  strictly  against  the  covenantor,  and  Abrahams,  61  Ala.  114;  Blakeslee  v.  In- 
most favorably  to  the  covenantee,  yet  the  surancc  Co.  57  Ala.  205 ;  Carter  v.  Chau- 
rule  should  be  carefully  observed  that  dron,  21  Ala.  72,  91  ;  Stewart  c.  Anderson, 
covenants  are  to  be  construed  as  nearly  as  10  Ala.  504  ;  M'Gee  v.  Easli.s  5  Stew.  & 
possible  by  the  obvious  intention  of  the  P.  426  ;  Kennedy  r.  M'Cartney,  4  Port, 
parties,  which  must  be  gathered  from  the  141  ;  De  Chaumont  v.  Forsythe,  2  Penn. 
whole  context  of  the  instrument,  inter-  507;  Ilu/.zcy  v.  Heffernan,  143  Miiss.  232, 
preted  according  to  the  reasonable  sense  9  N.  E.  Rep.  570;  Knight  v.  Thayer,  125 
of  the  words."     Per  Long,  J.  Mass.  25;    Russ  v.  Alpaugh,   118  Mass. 

777 


§  991.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

acquired  title  inures  immediately  to  the  grantee  by  way  of  estop- 
pel. Chancellor  Kent,  in  his  Commentaries,  in  speaking  of  this 
estoppel,  goes  further  than  some  authorities  and  says :  "  The 
estoppel  works  an  interest  in  the  land.  An  ejectment  is  main- 
tainable on  a  mere  estoppel.  If  the  conveyance  be  with  general 
warranty,  not  only  the  subsequent  title  acquired  by  the  grantor 
will  inure  by  estoppel  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantee,  but  a  subse- 
quent purchaser  from  the  grantor,  under  his  after-acquired  title, 
is  equally  estopped,  and  the  estoppel  runs  with  the  land."  ^ 

The  grantor's  acquisition  of  title,  even  after  his  grantee  has 
brought  suit  upon  the  covenants,  has  the  effect  to  reduce  the  dam- 
ages the  grantee  can  recover ;  ^  and  if  such  acquisition  wholly 
remedies  the  defect  for  which  the  suit  was  brought,  the  grantee 
is  entitled  to  nominal  damages  only.^ 

The  rule  does  not  apply  when  the  title  afterwards  acquired  is 
one  expi-essly  excepted  by  the  grantor  in  his  prior  conveyance. 
In  subsequently  acquiring  and  asserting  that  excepted  title  he 
does  not  allege  anything  inconsistent  with  what  he  has  asserted 
in  his  own  deed.* 

991.  The  principle  of  estoppel  may  be  invoked  though  the 
grantor's  deed  is  without  a  covenant  of  warranty,  if  his  deed 
purports  to  convey  a  particular  estate  which  he  afterwards  ac- 
quires. In  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  it  was  said 
by  Mr.  Justice  Nelson  that  "the  principle  deducible  from  these 
authorities  seems  to  be  that,  whatever  may  be  the  form  or  nature 
of  the  conveyance  used  to  pass  real  property,  if  the  grantor  sets 
forth  on  the  face  of  the  instrument,  by  way  of  recital  or  averment, 
that  he  is  seised  or  possessed  of  a  particular  estate  in  the  premises, 
and  which  estate  the  deed  purports  to  convey,  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  if  the  seisin  or  possession  of  a  particular  estate  is  affirmed 
in  the  deed,  either  in  express  terms  or  by  necessary  implication, 
the  grantor,  and  all  persons  in  privity  with  him,  shall  be  estopped 

369,  19  Am.  Rep.  464  ;  White  v.  Patten,  King  v.  Gilson,  32  111.  348;  Boon  v.  Mc- 

24  I'ick.  324 ;  Somes  v.  Skinner,  3  Pick.  Henry,  55  Iowa,  202 ;  Overhiser  v.   Mc- 

52;  Flauiken  v.  Neal,  67  Tex.  629,  4  S.  Collister,  10  Ind.  41  ;  Baxter  v.  Ryerss,  13 

W.   Rep.  212.     The  rule  does  not  apply  Barb.  267. 

when  the  conveyance  was  invalid  as  being         ^  Sayre  t>.  Sheffield  Land,  &c.  Co.  (Ala.) 

prohibited  bylaw.     Holmes  v.  Johns,  56  18  So.  Rep.   101  ;  Cornell  v.  Jackson,  3 

Tex.  41  ;  Atkinson  v.  Bell,  18  Tex.  474.  Cush.  .506  ;  Reese  v.  Smith,  12  Mo.  344. 

1  4  Kent  Com.  98.  *  Huzzey  v.  Heffernan,  143  Mass.  23^ 

''Cornell    v.    Jackson,   3    Cush.    506;  9  N.  E.  Rep.  570. 
778 


AFTER-ACQUIRED   TITLE   OF   GRANTOR.  [§  992. 

from  ever  afterwards  denying  that  he  was  so  seised  and  possessed 
at  the  time  he  made  the  conveyance."  ^ 

This  doctrine  has  no  application  when  the  deed  does  not  on  its 
face,  either  expressly  or  by  necessary  implication,  assert  a  partic- 
ular estate  or  title  in  the  grantor  or  his  ancestor.  A  deed  recit- 
ing that  the  parties  have  by  amicable  arrangement  divided  among 
themselves  the  property  of  their  father's  estate,  and  that,  to  carry 
the  agreement  into  effect,  and  in  consideration  of  one  dollar  to 
each  in  hand  paid,  the  parties  have  granted,  sold,  and  conveyed  "  all 
their  right,  title,  and  interest "  in  the  land  mentioned,  does  not 
carry  on  its  face,  either  in  express  terms  or  by  necessary  impli- 
cation, a  statement  that  the  grantors  or  their  ancestors  were 
seised  of  a  title  in  fee  in  the  premises,  and  hence  does  not  estop 
one  of  the  grantors  from  asserting  an  after-acquired  title  in  fee 
against  one  claiming  under  the  grantee.^ 

It  is  provided  by  statute  in  several  States  that  when  a  grantor 
was  not  possessed  of  the  estate  which  he  pnrported  to  convey  by 
any  proper  deed,  any  estate  afterwards  acquired  by  him  in  the 
land  shall  inure  to  the  benefit  of  his  grantee.'^ 

992.  Aside  from  the  estoppel  arising  from  the  conveyance 
of  a  particular  estate,  only  a  warranty  deed  operates  to  trans- 
fer an  after-acquired  title  of  the  grantor.  A  quitclaim  deed,  or 
one  purporting  to  pass  onl}'^  the  right,  title,  and  interest  of  the 
grantor,  cannot  have  that  effect,  nor  can  a  deed  without  cove- 
nants.* 

1  Van  Kenssclaer  v.  Kearney,  11  How.  ch.  73,  §  51.  North  Dakota:  Tl.  Codes 
297,326;  Fairbanks  c.  Williamson,  7  Me.  1895,  §  3547.  Oklahoma:  Conip.  Stats. 
96;  Jackson  v.  I'arkhurst,  9  Wend.  209;  1893,  §  1611.  Utah:  Conip.  Laws  1888, 
Bayley  v.  McCoy,  8  Oreg.  259 ;  Taf,'gart  §  2620. 

f.  Risley,  4  Oreg.  235.  ■*  Heiine.son     v.     Aiken,    102    III.    284; 

2  Pendill  v.  Marquette  County  Agricul-  Ilolbrook  v.  Debo,  99  111.  372  ;  Hooker 
tural  Soc.  95  Mich.  491,  55  N.  W.  Hej).  ?-.  Tarwater,  138  Ind.  385,  37  N.  E. 
384.  Rep-   9"9 ;    Stephenson  v.   Boody  (Ind.), 

^  Arkansas:  Dig.  of  Stat.'*.  1894.  §  699.  38  N.   E.  Rep.  331  ;  Locke  r.  White,  89 

California:  Civ.  Code,  §1106.     Colorado:  Ind.  492;    Nicholson   r.  Caress,  45   Ind. 

Annot.  Stats.  1891,  §430.     Georgia:  Code  479;  Avery  z-.  Akins,  74   Ind.  283;  Gra- 

1882,  §  2699.     Idaho:   R.  S.  IK87,  §  2928.  ham  v.  Graham,  55  Ind.  23;  Shumakcr  i;. 

Illinois  :  R.   S.  1889,  ch.  .30,   §  7.     Iowa:  John.«on,  35  Ind.  33  ;  Bohon  v.  Holion,  78 

R.   S.   1888,  §  3102.     Kansas:    1    G.    S.  Ky.  408;  Miller  v.  Ewing,  6  Cnsh.  34; 

1889,   §    1114.     Mississippi:    Code    1892,  Allen  w.  Ilolton,  20  Pick.  458  ;  Blandi.'ird 

§  2438.      Montana:    Comp.    Stats.   1887,  i".  Brooks,  12   Pick.  47  ;  People  v.   Miller, 

p.   662,    §  267;    Codes    1895,    Civ.   Code,  79  Mich.  93,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  172  ;   Frost  v. 

§  1512.     Nebraska:    Comp.   Stats.  1893,  Mi.ssionarv   Society,  56  Mich.  62,  69,22 

779 


§§  993-995.]  COVENANTS   FOR    TITLE. 

A  statutory  covenant  of  warranty  bas  the  same  effect  as  an 
express  covenant  in  giving  the  grantee  the  benefit  of  bis  grantor's 
subsequently  acquired  title.^ 

993.  To  eflfect  an  estoppel,  the  after-acquired  title  must 
have  come  to  the  grantor  in  the  same  right  or  capacity  in 
which  he  conveyed  the  land.  Tbus,  if  be  made  the  conveyance 
in  bis  individual  cajxicity,  a  title  afterwards  acquired  by  bim  as  a 
trustee  for  others  does  not  inure  to  tbe  benefit  of  bis  grantee.^ 
On  this  same  principle,  as  stated  by  Professor  Wasbburn,'5  <.<.  jf^ 
after  having  made  a  conveyance  with  warranty  without  having 
title,  tbe  estate  comes  to  tbe  grantor  as  a  mere  conduit  in  passing 
it  from  its  owner  through  bim  to  another  person,  it  does  not  inure 
to  tbe  benefit  of  bis  original  grantee." 

Under  a  deed,  by  husband  and  wife,  of  tbe  wife's  land,  with 
covenants  of  warranty  by  both,  a  title  afterwards  acquired  by  tbe 
husband  inures  by  way  of  estoppel  to  tbe  grantee,  as  against  tbe 
grantor  and  all  persons  who  bold  under  tbe  grantor's  deed  given 
after  tbe  subsequent  title  is  acquired.* 

994.  A  wife  is  not  estopped  by  her  husband's  warranty  to 
acquire  an  outstanding  superior  title,  and  her  purchase  does 
not  inure  to  tbe  husband's  grantee.  Such  a  purchase  is,  however, 
regarded  with  suspicion,  and  slight  circumstances  may  be  suf- 
ficient to  throw  on  her  tbe  burden  of  showing  tbe  bona  fides  of 
her  title.^ 

995.  An  after-acquired  title  does  not  inure  to  the  benefit  of 
one  to  whom  the  grantor  has  made  a  fraudulent  conveyance 
with  warranty.  Tbe  grantor  cannot  do  by  circuity  and  indh-ec- 
tion  what  tbe  law  forbids  to  be  directly  done.  "  He  cannot  avoid 
tbe  claims  of  creditors  or  bona  fide  purchasers  by  conveying  with 
warranty  to  defraud  them,  and  afterwards  acquiring  tbe  title."  ^ 

The  fraud  must,  however,  be  proved;  it  will  not  be  implied. 
Where  a  husband  buys  land  from  an  administrator,  and  conveys 

N.  W.  Rep.  189;  White  v.   Biocaw,   14  118,  par.  50.     So  held  in  Phillippi  y.  Leet, 

Ohio  St.  339;  Hope  v.  Stone,   10  Miim.  19  Colo.  246,  35  Pac.  Rep.  540. 
141.  *  Powers  V.  Patten,  71  Me.  58;). 

1  Pratt  V.  Pratt,  96  III.  184  ;  Wadhaiiis         ^  Cameron  v.   Lewis,  59  Miss.  134,  dis- 

V.  Gay,  73  111.  415;  D'Wolf  r.  Haydn,  24  approving  of  Hardeman  v.  Cowan,  10  S. 

111.  525.  &  M.  486  ;  Taylor  v.  Eckford,  11  S.  &  M. 

-  Kelley  v.  Jenness,  50  Me.  455,  79  Am.  21  ;  Carter  v.  Bustamente,  59  Miss.  559. 
Dec.  623;   Sinclair    v.   Jackson,  8    Cow.         «  Stokes  v.  Jones,  21  Ala.  731,  18  Ala. 

543.  734  ;  Gillilaud  v.  Fenu,  90  Ala.  230,  8  So. 

3  3  Washburn  Real  Prop.  (4th  ed.)  p.  Rep.  15. 

780 


AFTER-ACQUIRED   TITLE    OF    GRANTOR.       [§§  996-998. 

it  with  full  warranty  to  bis  wife,  and  proper  proceedings  by  the 
administrator  to  sell  the  land  had  not  been  taken,  and  new  pro- 
ceedings are  instituted  and  another  deed  made  to  the  husband,  it 
inures  to  the  wife,  and  the  land  cannot  be  sold  for  debts  of  the 
husband  incurred  since  the  first  conveyance  to  her.^ 

996.  The  grantee  is  not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  his  grant- 
or's after-acquired  title  if  he  has  recovered  judgment  and  satis- 
faction against  his  grantor  for  a  breach  of  his  covenant.  He 
cannot  afterwards,  upon  the  grantor's  acquiring  title  to  the  land, 
recover  from  him  the  land  itself.^ 

A  superior  title  in  the  vendee,  or  a  subsequent  acquisition  of  it 
by  him,  does  not  inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  vendor,  or  give  him  a 
right  to  recover  the  purchase-price.'^ 

Where  a  grantor,  subsequently  acquiring  title  to  land  lie  has 
conveyed,  gives  a  mortgage  back  for  the  purchase-money  as  part 
of  the  same  transaction,  the  title  he  so  acquires  inures  to  his 
former  grantee,  subject  to  such  mortgage  for  purchase-money.'* 

997.  A  grantee  is  not  compelled  to  accept  the  after-acquired 
title,  but  may  proceed  upon  his  covenants.  Thus,  after  a 
grantee,  who  has  acquired  neither  title,  possession,  nor  the  right 
of  possession,  has  brought  suit  for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of 
seisin,  he  is  not  compelled  to  accept  the  after-acquired  title  in 
satisfaction  of  the  already  broken  covenant  of  seisin,  or  in  mitiga- 
tion of  damages  recoverable  for  the  breach.^ 

998.  The  equitable  right  of  a  purchaser  to  claim  the  bene- 

1  Morris  v.  Jansen,  99  Mich.  436,   58  lu  Kesser  v.  Carney,  52  Minn.  397,  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  365.  N.  W.  Kep.  89,  Dickinson,  J.,  said  :  "  The 

-  Porter  r.  Hill,  9  Mass.  34,6  Am.  Dec.  phiintiff  lias  elected  to  comnieuce  an  ac- 

22.  tiou  to  recover  the  ])urchasc-])iice  ])aid  for 

8  American  Asso.  v.  Short  (Ky.),  30  S.  a  title,  and  he  insists  upon  his  lc{,'al  ri^ht. 

W.  Rep.  978.  We  cannot  understand  how  that  perfect, 

*  Elder  v.  Derby,  98  111.  228.  ab.solute  legal  ri;,'ht  of  action,  and  cs|)e- 

6  Resser  v.  Carney,  52  Minn.  397,  54  N.  cially  after  an   action   has  been  already 

W.  Rep.  89;    Buckingham  v.  Hanna,  2  instituted,  is  defeated;  how  the  right,  at 

Ohio  St.  551  ;  Burtnersi).  Keran,  24  Gratt.  the  election  of  the  gr.intee,  to  enforce  his 

42,  67;  Chc:w  v.  Barnet,    11    Serg.   &   R.  action   for  ihe  breach  i.{  the  covenant,  is 

389,  391  ;  Blanchard  v.  Ellis,  1  Gray,  195,  taken  away  or  lost  by  any  i)roper  ai)plica- 

61    Am.    Dec.  417;    Tucker  v.  Clarke,  2  tion  of  the  principle  that  an  after-acquired 

Sandf.  Ch.   96;  Bingham   v.  Wei<lerwax,  title  inures  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantee 

1   N.  Y.  509 ;   Nichol   v.   Alexander,   28  by  force  of  his  covenants,  and  upon  priu- 

Wis.   118;    Mclnnis    v.    Lyman,  62   Wis.  cijiles  enibraccd   within   the  general   doc- 

191,  22  N.  W.  Rep.  405  ;  Burton  i;.  Reeds,  trine  of  estoppel." 
20  Ind.  87,  93. 

781 


§  999.]  COVENANTS   FOR   TITLE. 

fit  of  an  after-acquired  title  of  his  grantor  is  a  right  of  the 

purcliasei-  only.  "  This  equitable  right,"  su}^  the  Supreme  Court 
in  Alinncsota,  "is  one  in  favor  of  the  covenantee,  resting  u{)on  the 
estoppel  of  the  covenantor  to  assert,  as  against  him,  a  title  to  the 
property.  If  tlie  grantee  acquires  nothing  by  the  deed  to  him, 
and  has  and  asserts  a  legal  cause  of  action  for  covenant  broken, 
no  principle  of  estoppel  operates  against  him  to  compel  him,  per- 
haps years  afterwards,  as  in  this  case,  to  accept,  in  satisfaction 
of  that  legal  cause  of  action,  wholly  or  partially,  a  title  which  his 
covenantor  may  then  procure.  The  latter,  whose  covenant  has 
been  wholly  broken,  has  no  right  to  elect,  as  against  the  cove- 
nantee, and  to  his  prejudice,  whether  he  will  respond  in  damages 
for  the  breach  by  repaying  the  purchase-money,  or  buy  in  the 
paramount  title,  when  the  value  of  the  property  may  have  greatly 
depreciated,  and  compel  the  plaintiff  to  accept  that  title.  The 
right  of  election  is,  and  should  be,  with  the  other  party.  He  has 
the  benefit  of  the  estoppel,  but  it  is  not  to  be  imposed  upon  him 
as  a  burden,  at  the  will  of  the  party  who  alone  is  subject  to  the 
estoppel.  He  may  elect  to  pursue  the  action  at  law,  and  recover 
the  consideration  paid  for  a  title  which  was  not  conveyed  to 
him."i  An  after-acquired  title  of  the  grantor  does  not  inui-e  to 
the  grantee  by  way  of  estoppel  without  his  consent,  so  as  to  defeat 
his  right  to  maintain  an  action  on  the  covenant  against  incum- 
brances, and  recover  the  consideration  paid  by  him,  with  iu- 
terest.2 

An  after-acquired  title  descends  to  any  person  who  holds  under 
the  first  grantee,  however  remote  from  him  in  the  line  of  title, 
and  the  succession  is  not  broken  by  some  of  the  intervening  deeds 
conveying  only  "  the  right,  title,  and  interest  in  the  land  "  which 
the  grantors  had,  such  mode  of  conveyance  being  equivalent  to  a 
release  deed  at  least.'^ 

999.  The  ancestor's  deed  with  covenants  of  title  does  not 
estop  or  rebut  his  heirs,  even  to  the  extent  of  assets  received  by 
descent,  from  asserting  against  his  grantee  a  title  derived  from 
another  source.  Chief  Justice  Gray,  delivering  the  judgment  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  jMassachusetts,  said:  "At  common  law,  a 

1  Resser  v.  Carney,  52  Minn.  397,  54  N.  Clarke,  2  Sandf.  Ch.  96  ;  Nichol  v.  Alex- 
W.  Rep.  89,  per  Dickinson,  J.  ander,  28  Wis.  118,  130. 

2  Blanchard  v.  Ellis,  1  Gray,  195;  Bur-  3  Powers  v.  Patten,  71  Me.  583. 
ton    V.    Reeds,   20   Ind.   87 ;    Tucker  v. 

782 


AFTER-ACQUIRED   TITLE   OF   GRANTOR.  [§  999. 

conveyance  of  land  with  warranty  bound  the  grantor  and  his 
heirs  to  warrant  the  title  to  the  lands  granted,  and  either  upon 
voucher,  or  upon  judgment  upon  a  writ  of  warrantia  chartce,  in 
case  of  eviction  of  the  grantee,  to  yield  him  other  lands  of  equal 
value.  The  warranty  was  lineal,  when  the  title  asserted  by  the 
heir  was  derived,  or  might  by  possibility  have  been  derived,  from 
the  warranting  ancestor ;  and  collateral,  when  it  neither  was  nor 
could  have  been  derived  from  him.  In  both  lineal  and  collateral 
warranty,  the  heir  was  bound  to  yield  other  lands,  in  case  of 
eviction,  only  if  and  so  far  as  he  had  other  lands  by  descent  from 
the  warrantor.  ...  A  lineal  warranty  estopped  the  heir  to  assert 
title  to  the  lands  warranted,  although  he  took  no  other  lands  by 
descent ;  for  to  allow  him  to  recover  the  lands  warranted  would 
allow  him  to  take  those  lands  by  descent,  contrary  to  his  ances- 
tor's warranty ;  and  the  common  law  (by  a  rule  the  justice  of 
which  is  not  apparent)  held  him  equally  barred  and  estopped  in 
the  case  of  a  collateral  warranty,  upon  the  mere  presumption  that 
he  might  hereafter  take  assets  by  descent  from  or  through  the 
same  ancestor."  But  the  English  doctrine  of  "lineal  and  col- 
lateral warranties"  was  never  adopted  in  American  jurispru- 
dence.2 

1  Russ    V.   Alpaugh,    118    Maw.   369,        ^  3  Washburn's    Real    Prop.   5th    ed. 
372.  P-  514. 

783 


v.- 


